

Religious Institutions as Regulators of the Moral Principles in Geopolitics

Alexander Yu. Bendin^{1a}, Alexey V. Isaev^{2b},
Anatoly S. Filatov^{3c}, Andrey D. Kharitonov-Tanevsky^{4d},
Pavel A. Barakhvostov^{5e}

¹ Belarusian State University, Minsk, Belarus

² Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (Russia), Orel, Russia

³ Crimean Federal University named after V. Vernadsky, Simferopol, Russia

⁴ Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (Russia), Moscow, Russia

⁵ Belarusian State University of Economics, Minsk, Belarus

^a bendin26256@yandex.ru, <https://orcid.org/0009-0003-9773-0260>

^b IsaevLesha@yandex.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9551-8678>

^c asfilatov58@gmail.com, <https://orcid.org/0009-0006-5674-4756>

^d andrey_h-t@rambler.ru, <https://orcid.org/0009-0006-0659-4219>

^e barakhvostov@yandex.by, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8943-5980>

Abstract. The materials of the international round table “Religious institutions as regulators of moral principles in geopolitics”, held as part of the Christmas Readings “Global challenges of modernity and the spiritual choice of man” by the National Research Institute for the Communications Development (NIIRK), the Belarusian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, the International Public Association “Christian Educational Center named after Saints Methodius and Cyril”. The article reflects the views of Russian and Belarusian scientists on the influence of geopolitics on the activities of religious institutions, their communication with the state and society, the influence of religion on geopolitical and political decisions. The idea is expressed about the moral leadership of the church in modern society and politics, the youth education. The problem of developing the communication skills of clergy, new forms of information in the context of digitalization and the development of the information society is

considered. The compensatory function of religious institutions in the socio-cultural sphere, aimed at smoothing emerging institutional imbalances and balanced development of society, is substantiated.

Keywords: institutional environment, institutional matrix, sect, religion, denomination, geopolitics, regulator, morality, religious tolerance, integration, state-confessional institution, Muscovy, Russian Empire, Holy Governing Synod, heterodox and heterodox confessions, Russian “schism”

For citation: Bendin A.Yu., Isaev A.V., Filatov A.S., Kharitonov-Tanevsky A.D., Barakhvostov P.A. Religious Institutions as Regulators of the Moral Principles in Geopolitics. *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue*. 2023;3(9):124-151, [https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2023-3-3\(9\)-124-151](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2023-3-3(9)-124-151)

Introduction

The geopolitical and geo-economic transformations of recent decades that have radically changed the modern world have actualized the research of the East-West dichotomy.

In classical geopolitics, this problem is considered in the context of the dualism of land and sea [5]. From this point of view, the social system is what the Russian Eurasian at the first stage of the development of this science, Peter Savitsky, succinctly called local development that is a set of constant and variable principles. The variable principle, that is, the creative potential of the population to transform the surrounding reality, enters into dynamic equilibrium with the constant principle, with space. The two fundamental forms of space are land and sea, the opposition of which constitutes the fundamental law of geopolitics. However, the idea of the irreconcilability of social institutions characteristic of the peoples of the land and the peoples of the sea was questioned by the French scientist Paul Vidal de la Blache, who put forward the idea, important for the subsequent development of political science, that land and sea not only struggle, but also successfully interpenetrate each other [26].

This idea of the presence of the dialectic of opposite social institutions in one social system is complemented by the subsequent neo-institutionalism and its component part - the theory of institutional matrices [6]. According to these theories, society consists of three interconnected subsystems: economic, political and socio-cultural. Each subsystem, in turn, is reduced to basic institutions, which come in two types – redistributive and market [25]. Reconciling neo-institutionalist terminology with geopolitical terminology, we can conditionally say that redistributive institutions correspond to land institutions, and market institutions correspond to sea institutions. Some institutions are unthinkable without others, and in each of the three social subsystems, one type of institution plays the role of dominant, and the other – complementary, performing a compensatory function. Thus, the geopolitical and institutional approaches turn out to be closely related, and many geopolitical problems can be considered using the methodology of institutionalism.

Religious institutions occupy a special place in the sociocultural subsystem of society. For centuries, religion has been the main form of human exploration of reality, which is why

it is obvious: the analysis of the evolution of religious consciousness gives us very eloquent pictures of what processes are taking place with society.

However, a careful look at the place of religion reveals to us a less noticeable fact: in relation to the rest of the socio-cultural subsystem, religious institutions most often function on the principle of compensatory. This means that religion balances possible institutional imbalances.

The hypothesis of the immanent compensatory nature of religious institutions in the socio-cultural system can be proved by the example of the religious life of the Russian Empire, to which our work is devoted. The relevance of the research is due to the need to identify the principles of the functioning of religion in the social system in modern conditions.

For modern politics, the most important task is to preserve the integrity of the geopolitical space of the Russian Federation. This goal is achieved by maintaining a balance between the interests of the Center and the regions, between political, economic, military and ideological means of preserving social stability and law and order in Russian society. The history of domestic politics in Russia has several stages, among which the imperial stage is the most important. Currently, the experience of imperial geopolitics is becoming an object of scientific interest. The creation of the Eurasian empire necessitated the organization and functioning of state-confessional institutions of law and management, which regulated state-religious and interreligious relations between Orthodox and non-Orthodox subjects. The policy of religious tolerance, combined with the policy of protecting the interests of the Orthodox Church, allowed the empire to establish control over new territories and ensure law and order and interreligious peace between representatives of different faiths and religious communities.

The ideological crisis, expressed, as a rule, in a religious form due to the fideistic perception of ideas by the masses, was the cause not only of the destruction of social and state foundations in a single state education, but also of the civilizational crisis and the accompanying geopolitical transformations. On the other hand, the strengthening and creation of powerful states acting in the status of geopolitical dominators was the result of a religious and ideological upsurge. The events in Russia are a striking example of the impact of the religious and confessional crisis on the stability of the functioning of the state and the social structure. When, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the crisis of religious ideology, the institutionalized expression of which was the Holy Governing Synod, eventually led to the October political coup of the Bolsheviks, the first thing the new government began to do was to spread and implement (usually forcibly) its ideological postulates. Moreover, initially the ideological postulates of Bolshevism as a political trend were formulated in the form of communist ideology, which is essentially a kind of religion. At the same time, communism, as a religious form, became a means and a way of geopolitical positioning of the USSR.

The aim of the article is to present to readers the positions of Russian and Belarusian scientists on complex problems of mutual influence of religion and geopolitics.

Materials and methods

The participants of the discussion used a wide range of non-contradictory methods, including systemic, institutional, constructivist, historical, socio-philosophical, scenario forecasting, comparative analysis methods. P.A. Barakhvostov proposed to test the hypothesis of the immanent compensatory nature of religious institutions in the socio-cultural system on the example of the religious life of the Russian Empire. The methodological basis of his research was a neo-institutional approach supplemented by the theory of institutional matrices.

The research materials include published normative legal acts, documents, and statements by politicians, media publications reflecting practices in the field of religion to ensure geopolitical stability and stability, and the results of sociological research.

The variety of sources used has led to the use of different methods of working with them: content analysis, event analysis, historical retrospective method, comparative analysis, observations, secondary analysis, and questionnaires.

Results

The Experience of the Russian Empire State-confessional Institutions in the Implementation of Internal Geopolitics (A.Yu. Bendin)

Since the second half of the XVI century, the Orthodox Muscovite Kingdom began to acquire the features of a growing proto-Imperial state formation, which gradually included new territories, ethnic groups and non-Orthodox faiths in the west and in the east (Little Russia, the Volga region, the Urals, Western and Eastern Siberia). Since that time, permanent trade and diplomatic relations with Western Europe, both Catholic and Protestant, have been established. The establishment of control and centralized management of new territories inhabited by non-Orthodox subjects were carried out with the help of religious tolerance, which began to be used as an instrument of internal geopolitics.

The tsar and the patriarch together carried out state and spiritual management of Russian subjects, the attitude towards the "Gentiles" being joined was tolerant. They were not forced to convert to Orthodoxy and did not interfere in their internal religious life, while strictly prohibiting the preaching of their faith among the Orthodox. These were the features of Moscow's religious tolerance during the period of the dual power of the tsar and the patriarch. Proto-imperial religious tolerance towards non-Orthodox and non-Orthodox subjects, as well as to persons accepted into the Moscow service and foreign trade "guests", was traditional in nature and had no institutional and legal formalization.

The traditions of proto-imperial religious tolerance, which became a distinctive feature of the internal geopolitics of the Moscow Kingdom, were used by Peter the Great

(1682–1725) when creating the Russian Empire. Peter modernized Moscow's traditions by laying the legal and administrative foundations of three state-confessional institutions of law and management, which became instruments of internal geopolitics. With the help of these institutions, the construction and management of an ever-growing empire began to be carried out.

For the ruling Russian Church, the Holy Synod, which replaced the patriarch and was subordinate to the emperor, became a special institution of law and administration. In 1702 Peter I began the formation of the state confessional Institute of religious tolerance, which was responsible for non-Orthodox confessions. By Peter I's decrees, the construction of the institute for the management of the Russian "schism", based on the principles of religious discrimination, began. The supreme power, with the help of the established state-confessional institutions of law and management, asserted state sovereignty over new territories, controlled the Orthodox and non-Orthodox population and carried out internal confessional geopolitics in the center and on the outskirts of the Russian Empire.

As the empire grew geographically, especially during the reign of Catherine the Great (1762–1796), the institution of religious tolerance as an instrument of internal geopolitics was widely used in the incorporation of annexed territories in the west and south (Western Russian and Lithuanian lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Black Sea region, Crimea, etc.). Non-Orthodox subjects who lived in these territories received the protection of Russian laws on "freedom of faith", which was considered as one of the conditions for achieving the loyalty of the non-Orthodox to the Orthodox sovereign. Catherine the Great significantly reduced the degree of religious discrimination of the Russian "schism" by introducing, among other things, the term "Old Believer". The state, with the help of the Old Believers, began colonizing empty lands in the Volga region and Western Siberia.

The final administrative and legal formalization of the three confessional-state institutions was received during the reign of Emperor Nicholas I (1825–1855). The state tasks of the institutions, both in the pre-reform and post-reform period, were to maintain the traditional religiosity of Orthodox and non-Orthodox subjects, preserve religious and moral values, ensure interfaith peace and social stability of a polyreligious and multiethnic society, achieve law-abiding and political loyalty to the Russian monarch.

In 1905–1906, the Institute of religious tolerance was reformed by Emperor Nicholas II (1894–1917). The non-Orthodox subjects of the empire received new religious rights, and some of the exclusive privileges of the dominant Russian Church were abolished. The institution of discrimination of the "split" was also abolished. The communities of Old Believers and sectarians were legalized and became part of the modernized institute of religious tolerance. Under the conditions of political and religious freedoms that defined the period of the Duma monarchy, the Holy Governing Synod and the modernized institute of religious tolerance were still used by the state as an instrument of internal geopolitics to achieve political loyalty, interreligious peace, law-abiding and public order.

Religious Institutions in the Perception of the Population: Spiritual and Moral Imperative vs Socio-Political Participation (A.V.Isaev)

The search for a development direction in the context of changes in the world order, the transformation of moral values of society (including in an environment of inconsistency between institutions-values and institutions-means) [15:47–63] actualizes the discussion of the issue in a global context.

Considering religion as a mediator in solving security or identity crises [10:133], one of the strategic resources of "soft power" (and in some cases, "hard power"), state institutions actively use it in their internal and geopolitical interests (7:40–44; 12:13–22; 9–11). This is clearly evident in the modern world, regardless of region or religion. However, as M.M.Mchedlova rightly notes, "religious involvement in the sphere of international relations leads to competition and conflicts when religious connotations become a field of discursive competition in the political and ideological space" (8a).

Religious figures offer their own options for socio-political affiliation, trying to avoid open political participation, but actively involved in solving social problems of citizens. The spiritual and moral imperative of religion, in turn, encourages society to appeal to the practices of religious institutions. Thus, at the beginning of the 20th century, public discourse indicated that the cause of crimes and other social destructions should be sought not only in anatomical and physiological anomalies, but more in the moral education of a person¹, the main role in which was assigned to Orthodoxy and religious figures.

Today, the Church also remains an important social institution, whose activities are manifested in many areas of modern society. Religion forms a system of values, actively participates in the spiritual and moral education of the younger generation, and contributes to increasing the level of social cohesion.

"The sociological assessment of the role of religion and the presence of churches in society has a direct impact on the perception (in the mass media and among politicians) of the importance of religious leaders and religious institutions themselves" [10:13].

According to a survey by the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (October 19, 2022), assessing the situation of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), respondents (51%) noted its influence on the spiritual and moral state of society (in 2012, this figure was 63%), recognizing its role in solving domestic political issues (50%) and the impact on their own lives (35%). At the same time, the lowest weight of the ROC in international politics is indicated (34%, 2012 – 43%)². In addition, according to analysts, ideas about the position of the ROC in modern Russian society are differentiated by age – representatives of the older generation usually declare a significant impact on personal and spiritual and moral social development. Dualism is traditional in views on the degree of church interference in public

¹ Where is the cause of the moral malaise of our society? Missionary Review. 1904. Pp. 213–218.

² Church and Politics. Available from: <https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/cerkov-i-obshchestvo-monitoring>

and political life – from denial of such influence (33%) to its admission (58%) with a variation of the impact only on the spiritual sphere (45%).

Russians' opinions on the actual relationship between the secular and the religious are divided. If in 2012 the position of "the ROC builds its relations with society and the state in the right way" was dominant (43%), then 10 years later the share of its supporters decreased to 30%. Today, a third of respondents are inclined to believe that the church is too active in the life of society and state affairs, it should pay more attention to spiritual issues (31%). During the analyzed period, the indicator increased by 12 points (2012 – 19%). This point of view is twice as common among those who oppose the public and political interference of the church (64%). One in eight considers the influence of the ROC on the life of society and the state to be insufficient (12% – 11 points by 2012); among supporters of the active participation of the church in political and public life, this is 2.5 times more likely (31%). Thus, over the years, more and more citizens declare the active participation of the church in public and political affairs, but the share of those who recognize its influence on various spheres of life, on the contrary, decreases³.

According to 26% of participants in the all-Russian questionnaire (Public Opinion Foundation, April 19, 2022), the ROC does not affect public life. 45% of respondents noted its positive influence, 6% of respondents noted its negative influence. 35% of Russians do not notice the influence of the ROC on politics; 37% observe the influence on this sphere of life of the country: 14% is strong, 23% is weak. 40% of Russians more often agree with the statements of the ROC on various socio-political topics, 17% more often disagree⁴.

It is well known that the younger generation acts as a main source of social changes, the development of moral and moral foundations of the whole society largely depends on the prevailing values, the transmission of public relations, state integrity and security. In this regard, in May 2020, a survey of the student youth of the Orel region was conducted (the sample is quota-based, gender and age structure and the number of young people at the place of study was representative. 395 people were interviewed). The study showed that students tend to treat religion positively (44.1%) or neutrally (46.6%). It is noteworthy that for new generations of young people, religion is a part of world culture and history (24.6%), as well as the imperative of following moral and ethical norms (22%). It instills moral values (32.3%), preserves cultural traditions (24.8%), supports and strengthens the effect of social norms of behavior accepted in society (17.5%), supports social memory, the history of the people (13.8%). In their opinion, to be a religious person, it is necessary to adhere to the laws of morality (47.8%)

In conditions of non-transparency of world politics, it is important to follow the strategic documents of the Russian Federation (strategies, concepts, national projects). The preservation and strengthening of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values will be facilitated by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation № 809 dated 11.19.2022, however, in our opinion, the effectiveness of policy implementation in this area should be

³ Ibid.

⁴ The attitude towards the ROC and the Patriarch. Assessment of the ROC's influence on the public and political life of the country. Available from: <https://fom.ru/TSennosti/14717>

assessed more than once every six years, and at least once every three years. The issue of the media content, Internet platforms, social networks, the implementation of educational and professional standards remains an urgent issue.

Religious Factor of Civilizational Modeling and Geopolitical Structure (A.S.Filatov)

The first Christian philosopher to write a treatise on the principles of state building and the functioning of society was Augustine Aurelius (354-430). Augustine became the first thinker to write about the functions of religion in public morality as the basis of social construction thanks to Christian ideology and doctrine. The title of the treatise should be understood as a description of an ideal (God's) society or state, because the "city" of Augustine is a state or society. The mediator between the "city of God" with its ideal norms of social order and the earthly, secular state is the Church as an organizational structure guided in its activities by divine commandments.

Augustine in his religious and philosophical constructions was largely based on the ideas of Plato, since in the second half of the 4th century in the Roman Empire, Plato's philosophy was widespread and had a great influence on Roman society. The philosopher Plotinus (205–270), a Greek from Egypt who lived in Rome, founded the religious and philosophical school of Neoplatonism. In accordance with the teachings of this school, which acquired religious features in the second half of the 4th century, the universe is the result of the emanation (outflow) of the absolutely ideal First One Principle or Absolute Idea, although not personified in the image of God, but having divine attributes. According to Plotinus, the stages of emanation of the Absolute are as follows: first, the Origin self-realizes as the World Mind, then as the Soul of the World, then as individual (individual) souls, finally, as individual bodies, up to matter and nature. On the basis of these principles, the goal of human life is formulated, which consists of overcoming material and natural-physical limitations and ascending to the Origin. Neoplatonism as a religious and philosophical doctrine is directly related to both the problem of civilizational construction and geopolitics because in the second half of the 4th century it was declared the state religion of the Roman Empire, displacing Christianity from this position, the official status of which was established in 324 by the emperor Constantine the Great.

Taking into account the influence of Neoplatonism in Roman society in the second half of the 4th century, Augustine created the concept of social order. He identified two types of society: ideal and real. The ideal is the world of spiritual essences as the fundamental principles of natural-material substances and bodies. The real is earthly society as refraction through matter and the bodily nature of man of the ideal First Principle. Indeed, the collapse of societies and the destruction of states and families are based on a crisis of the ideology on which they relied and based on the principles of which they built their activities. And Augustine could see this in the example of the Roman Empire. He lived in the era of the deepest socio-political crisis that gripped the Roman state in the second half of the 4th century. This state was collapsing before his eyes. As an

educated man, he knew about numerous attempts by the Roman authorities, starting with the first emperor Augustus, to create a common ideology for the state based on religion. All these attempts were unsuccessful. The Roman Empire, whose vast territory was inhabited by representatives of various ethnic groups, did not receive an ideological core, and, tormented by ideological (primarily religious) contradictions, fell apart, despite the high level of economic development (Europe, for example, was able to reach this level only in the era of the developed Middle Ages – to the XI–XII centuries), socio-political and military organization. Is it not the lack of spiritual strength, ideological principles and ideological motives that explains the paradoxical, at first glance, defeats of the Roman legions, well trained in the tactics and strategy of military operations, in the fight against scattered and military-unqualified barbarian tribes?

By the way, the ideological crisis, expressed, as a rule, in a religious form due to the fideistic perception of ideas by the masses, became the reason for the destruction of social and state foundations not only in the Roman Empire. Almost all state formations and even social organisms disintegrated as a result of a deep religious and ideological crisis. Just as the strengthening and creation of powerful states was the result of a religious and ideological upsurge.

The religious crisis lay at the heart of the collapse of ancient Egyptian civilization, when the image of the pharaoh as a divine being and representative of the gods on earth faded. The devaluation of religious institutions in France in the second half of the 18th century and in Russia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries largely provoked social revolutions, political conspiracies and violent seizures of power.

A striking example of the influence of a religious and confessional crisis on the stability of the state and its social structure are the events in Russia. When, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the crisis of religious ideology, the institutional embodiment of which was the Holy Governing Synod, led to the October political revolution of the Bolsheviks, the first thing the new government began to do was to disseminate and implement (usually by force) its ideological postulates. Initially, the ideas of Bolshevism as a political movement were formulated in the form of communist ideology, which is a type of religion.

However, communist ideology can hardly be fully attributed to religion. And not only because of her atheism, although the functions of the gods were actually assigned to the communist leaders. First of all, because communist ideology is ambivalent and inconsistent. On the one hand, a call to believe in a bright future, on the other, a total denial of everything that is not verified by feelings, experience and practice. This duality and religious incompleteness make it possible to classify communism as quasi-religious cults, along with archaic forms of religious beliefs (astrology, magic, fetishism, witchcraft) and marginal cults (Satanism, infernal cults, fascism, Nazism or ethnocentrism). Quasi-religious cults are almost or ostensibly religious actions that lead to the formation of certain structures, sometimes having the functions of political institutions that manipulate the religious consciousness of people.

It has long been said that a religious system necessarily has its social expression in the person of believers, bearers of certain religious ideas. The problem is different: what is

the scope of religion in society, who is involved in this sphere, and what are the functions of the religious system in society in general and in certain social segments in particular?

In archaic societies with totalitarian principles of social organization, religion was the main core cementing social foundations. In this case, the entire society was the exponent and bearer of a certain religious form. It was impossible to allow the existence of parallel existing religious forms, especially anti-religious ones. Throughout this historical period, states were built on the basis of specific religious forms. Subsequently, starting from the Renaissance and especially in modern times, religion in society differentiates, various religious forms, social segments with their characteristic religious denominations arise and coexist with each other. Although in earlier historical periods we see the differentiation of religious forms, primarily in the multi-ethnic empires of antiquity, such as the Roman or Byzantine.

Along with the differentiation of religion, in modern society (especially intensively since the second half of the 19th century), there is a “dispersion” of religion in the social environment due to the spread of individual ways of comprehending God and the Absolute. Belonging to a particular form of religion is determined by ethnicity, and participation in organizational activities (cult practices, confessional ceremonies, etc.) conducted by religious institutions (the Church) is not a “sign of participation.” “Diffuse” religions arise (as defined by J.Yinger), when religious affiliation is determined by belonging to a given society [2].


The importance of individual bearers of religious consciousness is increasing, religion is being individualized. The process of the movement of religion is conveyed by the famous dialectical scheme: from the general (totalitarian religious forms in archaic societies with the dominance of collective ideas) through the specific (separation of social segments with their characteristic religious forms - differentiation of religion in multi-ethnic empires) to the specific (individualization of religion in modern Christian society).

Speaking about the functions of religion in society, one cannot ignore the sociological research that was carried out by the famous scientist, classic of world sociology M.Weber. In his research, he showed the active role of religion in social life, its leading role in the economic development of societies of different historical eras [3].

In his work “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism” [3:600–624], M.Weber proves that the Protestant worldview was formed under the influence of the social activities of the Renaissance, based on the principles of individualism. In turn, the spirit of individualism and the ethical principles of Protestantism had a decisive influence on the formation of the capitalist system of social relations and social activities. But I would like to draw attention to one aspect of Weber’s concept. Renaissance individualism struggles and liberates itself not from “religious shackles,” as is often extolled, but from the institutional restrictions of social life on the part of the Catholic Church. It is clear that the institutional structures of Catholicism are not the same thing as Christianity as an ideology, culture and civilization. In this case, the spirit of individualism, already according to M.Weber, finds its adequate embodiment in the Protestant ideology of Christianity - the embodiment of its creative aspirations.

An analysis of the religious teachings of Protestantism by M.Weber showed that the development of the social functions of Christianity allowed European society to make a breakthrough not only in economic and socio-cultural terms, but also in civilizational terms. Including in the sphere of social organization, the functioning of various social institutions, among which the institutions of civil society have become one of the most noticeable. And these aspects are directly related not only to everyday social life, but also to its civilizational standards.

Noting the importance of religious consciousness, which gives rise to a religious vision of the world and creates religious structures of the universe, we must note another important function of religious consciousness - ensuring the spiritual and practical development and understanding of the world around us by believers. Religious institutions perform this function, being themselves a consequence of institutional thinking that takes shape thanks to religious consciousness. A sequence of connections arises that can be expressed by such a diagram:



Religious institutions perform an important mission in the religious system. They deal with organizational issues - organizing interaction between various structural elements of a religious confession, connecting religious ideology, containing the main and auxiliary ideological concepts of a particular religion, and the mass of believers. It is religious institutions that ensure the dissemination of religious ideas in society and their implementation in religious practice.

Throughout human history, religious institutions have influenced social life and have sometimes been central to the management of the social system. For this reason, often all religion in the unity of its main components – religious ideology, institutional thinking and religious psychology - was reduced only to religious institutions. And then religion was assessed through the prism of the activities of one or another religious institution.

To some extent, there are grounds for this reduction, and they are related to the mission of “conductor of ideas” performed by religious institutions. However, there are religious institutions that do not allow them to be clearly presented as a “showcase” of any religion.

Firstly, the institutional nature (of any social institution – political, economic or religious) is such that it requires the participation of a structure or structural unit in the implementation of social interests. Religious institutions are included in the system of social relations, experience their influence and even undergo changes as a result.

Secondly, religious institutions are formed taking into account historical time and geographical space, therefore their “shell” is permeated with the specifics of the era of existence.

But these features of religious institutions do not mean that they are a product of social relations; they only experience the influence of the social environment (sometimes very strong), but at the same time remain a product of religious consciousness. Due to misconceptions regarding the nature of religious institutions and their association with religion in general, a model of religion is being built as a product of social relations. This model sees religion as a consequence of a certain social condition and tries to present religion as the result of human errors.

Because of this specificity of the genesis and functioning of religious institutions, their condition must be considered taking into account two components: the components of the religious system, which has a natural basis in religious consciousness, and the attribute of the system of social interaction, included in the sphere of production, distribution and satisfaction of social interests. Everything that is part of the system of social interaction – social relations, communities and institutions – builds its relationship with religion through the establishment of communication channels with religious institutions. Therefore, relations between the state and religion are built through the coexistence of two social institutions – the state as a political institution, and the religious institution as a sociocultural institution.

The relations between different confessions and different religious institutions lie on the same institutional plane. In such situations, we are witnessing not the relationship between two or more religious forms (Christianity, Islam, Judaism, etc.) and, especially, not the corresponding religious ideologies, but namely religious institutions. When talking about any possible forms of cooperation and dialogue between different faiths, it is necessary to take into account these features, institutional ones first of all. Each level of the religious system contains the basis for various forms of dialogue, although the most problematic of the levels of the religious system remains the institutional component. Although the most problematic level of the religious system remains the institutional component. It is at this level that problems associated with the implementation of social interests arise; here religion enters the political field of social life. Therefore, it is necessary to build a religious dialogue on an ideologically sound basis, not through practical institutional interests, but with the help of common ideas and meanings.

An analysis of the state of the religious system as a whole, as well as its various types (Buddhism, Christianity, Islam and others), allows us to conclude that there are opportunities for the widest interfaith communication.

At the level of religious ideology, dialogue has a greater chance of starting due to the ontological and epistemological similarity of all developed religious and philosophical concepts. The subjects of this form of religious dialogue will be representatives of a certain religious ideology - philosophers, religious thinkers, theologians. The development of religious-ideological dialogue can be carried out thanks to the kinship of religious systems and the proximity of the worldviews of world religions.

The founders of world religions exemplify a high degree of religious tolerance and openness. Nowhere in the sermons of Buddha, Christ and Muhammad, and other founders of great religions, will we find condemnation of other faiths, except perhaps the condemnation of archaic forms of cult practice (incest, sacrificial cults, idolatry, etc.). A role model can be

considered Muhammad, who not only considered Christ his immediate predecessor, but also recognized his right to the Second Coming. As a result, Islam recognizes the divine essence of Jesus and fixes the human essence of Muhammad.

At the level of religious psychology, interfaith dialogue is possible under two conditions. The first is if the attitude towards it comes from the bearers of the institutional thinking of the corresponding religious systems. The second condition is related to the psychology of believers, which has many common ethnic, cultural, and human components. And this commonality in the psychology of believers acts as a bringing together religious-psychological factor. After all, the psychology of believers can never be reduced only to religious psychology. Religious psychology is a form of individual and social psychology.

In general, the problem of religious dialogue can be solved not only and not so much within the framework of the formation of universal human values, which, as a rule, are formed by the dominant cultural and civilizational model, but thanks to a complex worldview picture that is formed in the sociocultural space and the civilizational structure inherent in it, always multi-confessional and multiethnic. And fundamental will still be the search for universally significant, epistemologically valuable elements in developed religious systems, a search that should ensure interaction and development of contacts between religious and philosophical-religious schools and concepts. In this case, religious dialogue will become a condition for achieving interethnic harmony. And this is significant for the modern world.

The statements of the American political scientist S. Huntington about the inevitable clash of Christian and Muslim civilizations [20] have become an axiom for many scientists and current politicians. They are based on the fact that Christianity and Islam represent fundamentally different cultural and civilizational types and their contradictions are contradictions between the West and the East. Is it really?

In fact, Christianity and Islam are faiths belonging to the same Western cultural tradition. And the contradictions between them are no deeper than between Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Protestantism. Of course, various elements of Western culture not only fall within the sphere of complementary relations, but also demonstrate rejection of each other. In Western civilization, acute conflicts often arise that turn into open armed clashes. Does this mean that we can draw conclusions about the clash between Muslim and Christian civilizations? Is it acceptable to see the sources of these clashes in differences in ideological attitudes, cultural traditions, mentality, social structure and state-forming principles? Obviously, all this applies to the relationship between Christianity and Islam as well as to the relationship between other elements of the Western cultural and civilizational space – Catholicism and Protestantism, Eastern and Western Christianity, the Mediterranean and Baltic regions, Western and Eastern Europe, Europe and Asia, Europe and America, etc.

In Russian civilization (Russian World), the Orthodox and Muslim religious and confessional systems dominate and for centuries have demonstrated not just effective coexistence, but productive interaction, excluding any forms of conflict. This nature of relations excluded religious wars in historical Russia, in contrast to Europe, where there were several of them, and one - the Thirty Years War (1618–1648) – became pan-European.

Taking into account the above, we can determine the methodological basis for an in-depth study of the problem of interaction between Christianity and Islam, provide practical recommendations for the structure and development of the Christian-Muslim community in Europe, Asia, Africa and America, it is possible to conduct an in-depth study of the relationship between Christianity and Islam, and search for points contact and cooperation between them.

The functions of religion, including as a moral regulator in geopolitical processes, are determined by its role in the civilizational structure, which forms the global sociocultural space, acts as the basis and condition for the geopolitical positioning of states or their unions, expressing significant civilizational models [18:181–252]. The so-called political religions also manifest themselves [4, 16. Taking into account the fact that religious systems play a significant role in geopolitical processes in the modern world, these features of developed religions have a direct impact on the geopolitical structure of the world.

The dialogue of religious and confessional systems at the level of their ideologies, with their inherent moral values, is carried out not only in intercivilizational interaction, but also intracivilizationally. The format of intercivilizational interaction aimed at preserving the moral values of Russian (Russian) and Euro-Atlantic (Western) civilizations involves a dialogue of ideologies between their dominant religious and confessional systems – Christianity as Orthodoxy, on the one hand, and Christianity as Catholicism and Protestantism, on the other hand. Of course, intra-civilizational interaction can be ensured with a dialogue between Orthodoxy and Islam, the ideological similarity of which was noted above. Also, of course, with the involvement of other faiths - Buddhism, Eastern Rite Christianity, Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism, ethnic beliefs, etc.

Interaction (in accordance with the sociological definition, which implies the achievement of a common goal) of religious institutions representing different civilizational structures is essentially impossible. The interaction of religious institutions within a dispersed civilization is very difficult, just as the relations between Catholic and Protestant churches are not easy in the structure of the Euro-Atlantic civilization [17]. It is in such cases that we should talk about dialogue at the level of religious ideologies with their bearers.

But within the framework of an integrative type of civilization, which presupposes strong centripetal tendencies, the interaction of religious institutions is ensured by the common goals of civilization construction. The experience of Russian civilization, which had clearly expressed integrative features in the previous stage of its formation, demonstrates the effective interaction of religious systems of different ideologies and beliefs, including their institutions. Of course, not everything went smoothly in the relations between government agencies and religious institutions, but the history of such relations, primarily in the Russian Empire, provides examples of interaction rather than confrontation.

Any attempts to create ecumenical associations from religious institutions belonging to different civilizational structures are unlikely to be successful.

Religion as a Factor in the Consolidation of Russian Society (A.D.Kharitonov-Tanevsky)

Modern events actualize the need to consolidate Russian society. In conditions of constant foreign policy pressure, expressed in information confrontation, in economic, military-political and other confrontations, cohesion becomes what will allow preserving not only sociocultural identity, but the physical existence of Russian citizens. Sustainable consolidation of a society based on a materialistic foundation, political preferences, etc., which are factors of disintegration rather than the formation of unity, is impossible.

Historically, collectivism in its various manifestations is traditional for Russia. So, for example, before the revolution of 1917, society was dominated by conciliarity, which was the unity of faith and values (love of neighbor, mercy, sacrifice, etc.) [19]. A striking manifestation of this was active patriotism, readiness for heroism, and defense of the Motherland. Soviet collectivism was also based on non-material foundations - a state ideology covering all spheres of public life. After the collapse of the USSR, in the fundamentally new conditions for Russia of pluralism of opinions, the absence of a fixed national idea or religion, although the principles of conciliarity were preserved in public consciousness, they require improvement and development, which is especially necessary in modern realities.

Let us turn to generally accepted traditional values, the main transmitters of which are religious organizations, as the most significant and effective factor in the consolidation of society. Within the framework of this report, we consider it necessary to place emphasis on the Russian Orthodox Church due to the fact that the majority of citizens (68%)⁵ identify themselves specifically with this creed. The Russian Orthodox Church, despite negative trends (over the past 10 years, the share of those who recognize its influence on society has decreased), maintains a leading position in the formation of a moral paradigm and resolving internal political issues (as noted by 51% and 50% of respondents, respectively)⁶. Identifying oneself as Orthodox is determined not so much by religious views as by the manifestation of sociocultural self-identification, however, the level of trust in the Church is significant (51% noted that the Russian Orthodox Church is completely trustworthy and 21% – not completely trustworthy, while 13% found it difficult to answer and only 15% spoke against trusting the Church)⁷. The Russian Orthodox Church maintains its position as a moral leader in modern society. Religious norms preached by traditional religions, incl. Orthodoxy are reflected both in the legal framework and in the value paradigm of modern society. We emphasize that regardless of the attitude towards the Russian Orthodox Church in society, its historical contribution to the formation and development of culture, identity, statehood, etc. undeniable and this is evident even now.

⁵ Great Lent – 2022. VTsIOM. News. Available from: <https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/velikii-post-2022>

⁶ Church and society: monitoring. VTsIOM. News. Available from: https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/cerkov-i-obshchestvo-monitoring#_ftn1

⁷ Trust in Public Institutions. Levada Center. Available from: <https://www.levada.ru/2022/09/20/doverie-obshchestvennym-institutam-2/>

Russia has a spiritual and moral potential that, if used correctly, can create a modern analogue of pre-revolutionary conciliarity, unite society, regardless of the pluralism of political views, material benefits, etc. The main thing is to maintain a balance in the interaction between the state and the Church (otherwise, the so-called “nationalization” of it will negatively affect its authority in the eyes of society and the ability to implement a consolidating function). Moreover, reliance on constructive historical experience and the creative activity of religious organizations in modern times is necessary to fill the single value sphere of our state [10c].

Compensatory Function of Religious Institutions in the Institutional Matrix of Society (P.A.Barakhvostov)

Based on the history of Russian Orthodoxy during the imperial period, it is shown that religious institutions in the sociocultural subsystem of society always perform a compensatory function, because religion, in principle, expresses not so much what is in reality as the desire for how one would like it to be. When market institutions dominate in the matrix, religion will tend to be formed according to a redistributive type (as in the case of Catholicism), and when redistributive institutions dominate, it will tend to be formed according to a market type (as in the case of Orthodoxy). The significance of this finding is extremely important. Since political ideology is, in its ontological essence, a phenomenon similar to religion, in any liberal democratic system (market type) sooner or later significant forces will be formed that take up slogans against liberal democracy (redistributive type), and vice versa. This is the dialectic of the sociocultural sphere that states need to take into account.

For centuries, religion has been the main form of human mastery of reality, therefore an analysis of the evolution of religious consciousness allows us to understand what processes are taking place in society.

In relation to the rest of the sociocultural subsystem, religious institutions most often function on the principle of compensatory behavior. This means that religion, as it were, balances reality in the form of checks and balances.

As a starting point for our analysis, it should be noted that due to the geographical features of Rus', redistributive institutions turned out to be the dominant institutions in all its social subsystems.

The climate with a short warm period and soils were not particularly favorable for the development of Russian agriculture. The reconquest of land from nature, the implementation of agricultural work in the “pulse mobilization” mode, the low surplus product and the high risks of farming have determined the need for collective work under a single leadership, which, in addition, performs the functions of collection-accumulation-redistribution of the final product to reduce the catastrophic consequences of possible crop failures. In addition, the geopolitical location of Russian lands became the reason for the “alarming” neighborhood from both the East and the West and necessitated the creation of a powerful “system” for ensuring security. The consequence of this was the cementation of

the most important institutions of a redistributive type: a centralized power structure and a communitarian (communal) worldview.

An obstacle to the development of market-type institutions was the Mongol-Tatar yoke, which consolidated the management style (basic political institution) of the “label” type, combining Eastern worship of the central government and relative independence and even weak accountability in all matters, except taxes, at the local level.

The indicated features of the formation of the Russian institutional environment determined its specificity: a hydraulic society took shape on these lands (the term was introduced by K.Wittfogel [27]), but its density was significantly lower than in the East due to a less developed bureaucratic system due to the impulsive nature of collective work and not constant hard, but “impulse” control in the form of raids by the Horde.

Thus, without access to the sea and the advantages of maritime trade, Rus’ emerged as an almost textbook land power and entered the imperial period as a low-density hydraulic state with an institutional matrix characterized by the pronounced dominance of redistributive institutions.

The only market (in the neo-institutionalist sense of the word) institution was Orthodox Church.

If in the medieval West, in the conditions of post-imperial chaos of civil administration, it was the church that took on the function of an organizing principle, which led to the transformation of Catholicism into an extremely rigid vertical of unquestioning subordination, then in the presence of strong secular power, Orthodoxy no longer needed such a path of development. On the contrary, against the backdrop of relations of strict domination and subordination in the state as a whole, it sought to maintain a certain democracy within itself. Orthodoxy has a high degree of decentralization, the power of the Supreme Hierarchy has never been comparable to the power of the Pope in terms of the scope of powers (Patriarch Nikon, who sought to turn into a Russian pope, was quickly overthrown), and, moreover, such a rejection of verticals is reflected even in the Orthodox doctrine itself: Orthodox Christians, unlike Catholics, deny the dogma of Purgatory and the three-level ordered vertical structure of the afterlife.

Orthodoxy opposes irrationality and mysticism to this clear orderliness of the Western faith, where the greatest Catholic saint Thomas Aquinas proved the existence of God with the help of logical syllogisms.

Thus, in relation to other redistributive sociocultural institutions, Orthodoxy performed a compensatory function, as if balancing them.

The non-accidentality of this is proven by subsequent events in the imperial period of Russian history.

Inspired by the Western experience of government, Peter the Great carried out one of his most controversial reforms – church reforms. Instead of the patriarchate, the Holy Governing Synod was established, over which the chief prosecutor was assigned. The head of state also became the head of spiritual power, following the example of the reform of Henry VIII in England. The Church was deprived of even the semblance of democracy, and its functioning was placed exclusively at the service of state interests; a striking

example is the decree of the Holy Governing Synod of 1722 on the disclosure of the secret of confession.

However, the real spiritual life of the Russian people has not come to terms with this institutional unification according to the redistributive type. The fight against Peter’s reform resulted in the emergence of the longest existing Russian sect – the Khlysty sect.

Russian Orthodoxy before Peter the Great as a whole practically did not encounter sectarianism, having experience of struggle only with “Judaizers” at the end of the 15th century and schismatics in the 17th century, caused by other reasons. Consequently, Khlystyism, the first criminal cases of which occurred in the 1710s, must be directly associated with the activities of Peter the Great.

Khlysty is a unique phenomenon. Unlike other sectarians, the Khlysty did not formally break with Orthodoxy: they continued to attend church, but at the same time participated in special meetings – the zeal. The central element of the zeal was the so-called “spinning”: members of the community spun until exhaustion, shouting out their prophecies, and also, like the scourged Christ, whipped themselves, and this is how the name of the sect appeared. The Khlysty cultivated ecstasy, which they understood as their own deification, bringing freedom of action. The main doctrines of Khlysty were two unexpected commandments: 1) sin is suppressed through sin (i.e. you need to sin until you begin to feel disgust for sin), 2) every Khlyst through spiritual practices can become Christ and the Mother of God.

The last idea had a democratic, anti-autocratic overtones, which was later noted by many researchers, in particular Vladimir Bonch-Bruевич, who even saw the Khlysts as assistants to Bolsheviks.

Khlystyism, numerous for the sect and spreading by 1917 to all layers of the Russian population, was a consequence of Peter I’s transplantation of Western redistributive sociocultural institutions in the religious sphere into the Russian institutional matrix, in which religion was traditionally based on market institutions on the principle of compensatory behavior. The Khlysts contrasted the rationality of Peter’s Orthodoxy and the almost military hierarchy of its church vertical with a free, horizontal network of “ship” communities and an irrational, mystical belief that, having experienced an ascetic rebirth, any person still on earth can find bliss and become akin to God.

The phenomenon of Khlysty proves that complete unification of either any subsystem of society or the entire society as a whole according to one type (redistributive or market) of social institutions is impossible. The population will respond to attempts at such unification with spontaneously emerging institutions that balance the institutions imposed by the authorities and operate on the principle of compensatory behavior. This dynamics proves Paul Vidal de la Blache’s thesis about the interpenetration of land and sea.

Conclusion

The imperial stage of Russia’s internal geopolitics is the creation and functioning of three state-confessional institutions of law and governance, which became instruments for

building and managing an empire. The Holy Governing Synod, the institution of religious tolerance and the institution of discrimination “schism” simultaneously served as an instrument of Russia’s internal geopolitics. With their help, the imperial center established control over new territories included in the state, influenced the processes of colonization and integration of regions with a non-Orthodox population into Russia and ensured political loyalty to the Orthodox monarchy. Imperial religious legislation, on the basis of which these institutions operated, established a balance of interests between the “dominant” Russian Church and non-Orthodox confessions, and religious policy supported the stability of the existing state-religious and interreligious relations both in the Center and on the outskirts. The abolition of the institution of discrimination “schism” in 1905 and the granting of new religious rights to non-Orthodox and non-Orthodox subjects of the empire strengthened the integrative potential of the instruments of internal geopolitics of the Russian Empire. The expansion of the space of religious freedom has created new legal opportunities for the formation of political loyalty of the Russian Duma monarchy both to tolerant confessions and to communities of Old Believers and sectarians.

Religious systems in the modern world, as before, play a significant role in geopolitical processes and developed religions are able to directly influence the geopolitical structure of the world. Religious institutions perform an important mission in the structure of the religious system, being a system-forming factor. They deal with organizational issues – the interaction between various structural elements of a religious denomination; they connect religious ideology, which contains the main and auxiliary ideological concepts of a particular religion, and the mass of believers. It is religious institutions that ensure the promotion of religious ideas in society and their implementation in religious practice. However, the most problematic level of the religious system remains the institutional component. It is at this level that problems associated with the implementation of social interests arise; here religion enters the political field of social life. Therefore, it is necessary to build a religious dialogue on an ideologically sound basis, not through practical institutional interests, but with the help of common ideas and meanings. Thus, religious ideas and meanings can become both means of “soft power” and methods of informational influence on geopolitical opponents.

References

1. Bendin A.Yu. State-religious institutions of the Russian Empire in the 18th – early 20th centuries: the evolution of relations “ours – others – others”. *Bulletin of the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia. Series: History of Russia.* 2021. Vol. 20, No 1, February: 8–31. [In Russian].
2. Vasilyeva E.N. John Milton Yinger’s contribution to the sociology of religion. In: *Religion in the history of the peoples of Russia and Central Asia: materials of the 2nd international scientific conf.* Ed. P. C. Dashkovsky. Barnaul: Alt. un-ty, 2014:19–21. [In Russian].
3. Weber M. Selected works. *The image of the Society.* Moscow: Jurist, 1994:702. [In Russian].
4. Gentile E. Political religions. Between democracy and totalitarianism. St. Petersburg: Vladimir Dal’, 2021:400. [In Russian].
5. Dugin A.G. Postmodern geopolitics. *Times of new empires. Essays on geopolitics of the XXI century.* St. Petersburg: Amphora, 2007. [In Russian].
6. Kirdina S.G. Institutional matrices and development of Russia: introduction in X–Y theory. St. Petersburg: Nestor-History. 2014. [In Russian].

7. Komleva V.V. Religious institutions as regulators of the moral paradigm in geopolitics. *Ethnosociety and International Culture.* 2017; (110):40–44. [In Russian].
8. Krasnozhen M.E. Infidels in Rus’. Vol. 1: The situation of non-Orthodox Christians in Russia. Yuriev, 1900. [In Russian].
9. Kuznetsov N.D. Management of affairs of foreign confessions in Russia in its historical development. Yaroslavl’, 1898. [In Russian].
10. Lunkin R.N. Churches in politics and politics in churches. How modern Christianity is changing European society. Moscow: Institute of Natural Science RAS, Nestor-History, 2020. [In Russian].
11. Mchedlova M.M. The cultural basis of national security and religion: from value space to the prevention of extremism. *Bulletin of the Russian nation.* 2020. No 6(76):93–104. [In Russian].
12. Mchedlova M.M. Religion, Society, Politics: Changing Institutional Boundaries. In: *Religion in Modern Russia: Pandemic Events and Discourses.* Moscow: Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN), 2021. [In Russian].
13. Mchedlova M.M. Social consolidation of Russian society: the role of the religious factor. *Bulletin of the Russian nation.* 2015; 3(41):65–80. [In Russian].
14. Pavlov A.S. The course of church law. St. Petersburg, 2002. [In Russian].
15. Sadkov V.G., Chubarets O.V., Aronov D.V. Global values of a planetary civilization and ensuring the leading role of Russia in the modernization of the UN. *National interests: priorities and security.* 2015. Vol. 11. No 40(325):47–63. [In Russian].
16. Voegelin E. The New Science of Politics. Introduction. St. Petersburg: Vladimir Dal’, 202:372. [In Russian].
17. Filatov A.S. Euro-Atlantic civilizational aggression in the context of geopolitical confrontation with Russia. *Svobodnaja Mysl’.* 2022; 1(1691):159–169. [In Russian].
18. Filatov A. S. Russia and the world. Geopolitics in the civilization dimension: monograph. Moscow: Prospekt, 2015:352. [In Russian].
19. Frank S.L. Spiritual foundations of society. Moscow, 1992:488–489. [In Russian].
20. Huntington S. Clash of Civilizations. Moscow: LLC AST Publishing House, 2003:603. [In Russian].
21. Tsvetaev D.V. From the history of foreign confessions in Russia in the 16th and 17th centuries. Moscow, 1886. [In Russian].
22. Agnew J. Deus Vult: The Geopolitics of the Catholic Church. *Geopolitics,* 2010; 15:39–61. [In English].
23. Habashi J. Geopolitics of Religion and Its Role in Youth Agency. In: *Political Socialization of Youth.* Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-47523-7_5 [In English].
24. Megoran N. Evangelical Geopolitics: Practices of Worship, Justice and Peacemaking. In: Brunn S. (eds) *The Changing World Religion Map.* Springer, Dordrecht. 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9376-6_162 [In English].
25. Polanyi K. *The Livelihood of Man (Studies in Social Discontinuity).* NY: Academic Press, Inc. 1977. [In English].
26. Vidal de la Blache P. *Principios de Geografia Humana.* Lisbon: Cosmos. 1954 [1921]. [In English].
27. Wittfogel K.A. *Oriental Despotism. Comparative study of total power.* New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1963. [In English].

About the authors

Alexander Yu. BENDIN. DSc (Hist.), Professor, Professor Department of Theology, Institute of Theology, Belarusian State University (Minsk, Belarus), <https://orcid.org/0009-0003-9773-0260>. Address: 24 Independence Avenue, Minsk, Belarus, 220030, e-mail: bendin26256@yandex.ru

Alexey V. ISAEV. CandSc (Polit.). Associate Professor of the Department of Sociology and Social Technologies of the Central Russian Institute of Management - a branch of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation (Oryol, Russia), <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9551-8678> Address: 12 st. Oktyabrskaya, , Orel, Russia, 302028, e-mail: IsaevLasha@yandex.ru

Anatoly S. FILATOV. CandSc (Philos.). Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Philosophy, Crimean Federal University, <https://orcid.org/0009-0006-5674-4756>. Address: 4, Vernadsky Avenue, Simferopol, Republic of Crimea, 295007, e-mail: asfilatov58@gmail.com, tel.: +7-978-761-79-12

Andrey D. KHARITONOV-TANEVSKY. Lecturer at the Faculty of State and Municipal Administration of the Institute of Public Administration and Administration of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation, <https://orcid.org/0009-0006-0659-4219>. Address: 84, Vernadsky Avenue, Moscow, Russian Federation, 119606, e-mail: andrey_h-t@rambler.ru

Pavel A. BARAKHVOSTOV. Ph.D. in Political Science, Associate Professor. Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Belarusian State University of Economics, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8943-5980>, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8943-5980>. Address: 26, Partizansky pr., Minsk, Republic of Belarus, 220070, e-mail: barakhvostov@yandex.by

Contribution of the authors

The authors contributed equally to this article.

The authors declare no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Submitted: 10 May 2023. Approved after peer reviewing: May 25, 2023. Accepted for publication: June 10, 2023. Published: September 15, 2023.

The authors have read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work.