

Arab Countries' Interest in Integration in Eurasia: Tactics or Strategy?

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Abstract. In the situation of transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world, the tasks of developing a dialogue with the Arab world are set out in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation for 2023. In contrast to the “senior-junior” concept developed by the West, in which the allegedly “natural” leading role is unfairly assigned to Western powers and which causes growing resistance from the states of the Global South, Russia proposes that its Arab partners form relations based on a fair consideration of each other’s interests. The Arab ruling circles, experts, and the “Arab street” increasingly perceive Russia as a state-civilization that is not only located in Eurasia, but is also a driving force for the integration of the Non-West. Of particular interest is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a platform for generating ideas and coordinating between the emerging centers of power represented by India, China, and Russia, especially after Iran, a regional rival of Saudi Arabia, became a member of the SCO in 2023. Is the Arab interest in the Eurasian Non-West strategic or tactical, being in the second case aimed solely at exerting pressure on the West to obtain maximum concessions? This is a difficult, but key question that requires an answer from experts, which explains the relevance of this article. In his study, the author uses situational analysis tools, including content analysis methods, force field analysis and data visualization. The author concludes that the interest of Arab countries in integration in Eurasia, including cooperation with Russia, is predominantly strategic.

Keywords: Eurasia, Russia, Arab world, Non-West, Global South, Arc of Instability, regional conflict

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Introduction

The object of our study is the Eurasian geopolitical space, the western European borders of which, unlike the southern, eastern and northern borders delineated by the Indian, Pacific and Arctic Oceans, do not coincide with the geographical boundaries of

the Eurasian continent. One cannot but agree with S.Y.Kozmenko, who, referring to the construction of a geopolitical and economic atlas of the world based on the conjugation of space in the system “continent vs. ocean”, concludes that Europe is not a single geopolitical construction, since the line of contact between maritime and continental civilizations passes here [12:123].

Given the practical orientation of the article, the subject of which is not the ideological foundations of Eurasianism, whether it is the concept of “continent-ocean” formulated by P.N.Savitsky [16:104], or the ideologeme “Russia – Eurasia”, asserting the theoretical status of Eurasian civilization¹, it makes sense to focus on the analysis of the “eastern vector” of Eurasianism. Its theorist is the same P.N.Savitsky, who spoke about the important role of the East in the history of Russia [17:1–12], another Russian founder of Eurasianism G.V.Vernadsky noted the spread of the Russian state to the east with the colonization of Siberia, which became for Russia like America for Spain and India for England [3:62–63].

The purpose of the study is to prove the hypothesis about the strategic nature of the Arabs' interest in Eurasia, and its tasks are to form the basis of arguments. The novelty of the study consists in studying the motives of Arab countries in developing relations with Eurasia as a geopolitical rather than geographical space, i.e. with the Eurasian Non-West, in line with the modern trend in the theory of international relations, when the dominance of the West in the field of theory is challenged by internationalists from China, India and other Asian countries [1:217].

Materials and Methods


The author, resorting to content analysis, relied on a wide range of Russian and foreign sources, including documents and statements of officials. Among them are the version of the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation dated March 31, 2023, V.V.Putin's program article “On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, S.V.Lavrov's comments for the media.

Theoretically useful were S.Huntington's treatise “The Clash of Civilizations and the Transformation of World Order” and the monograph “Eurasian Arc of Instability and the Problems of Regional Security from East Asia to North Africa: the Results of 2016” [9], article by L.A.Zhuravleva, E.V.Zarubina, A.V.Ruchkin, N.N.Simachkova, I.P.Chupina “State-civilization: concept, essence, structure” describing the transition from the traditional (linear) to a new civilizational methodological paradigm of social and human sciences [10:85].

Materials of international organizations, in particular, the UN Conference on Trade and Development and the Independent Commission on International Development (Brandt

¹ In particular, the works of the modern Russian researcher I.F.Kefeli are devoted to the ideology of “Russia – Eurasia”, where this problem is analyzed using a synthesis of historical and geographical knowledge, with reference to the products of the creative searches of G.V.Vernadsky and P.N.Savitsky. [11:12].

Figure 1. Assessment of Strategic and Tactical Guidelines of Arab Countries in Terms of Integration in Eurasia




Source: compiled by the author using the basic method of Kurt Lewin [20]

Report), data from the electronic resources of integration associations and organizations involving Eurasian and Arab countries, including the SCO, were used.

The research was based on the principle of the unity of theory and practice, assuming the correlation of theoretical provisions concerning multipolarity, civilizations, North-South dichotomy and integration in the Eurasian space with the facts obtained by the author empirically – during business trips to Arab countries, in conversations with officials, businessmen and diplomats.

To summarize this information, infographics (maps, drawings) were used with the help of data visualization. The author supplemented the geographical maps available in the public domain on the Internet, including those of the Maghreb and Mashreq, indicating the borders of the West / Non-West and Eurasian Non-West in the Middle East and North Africa macro-region, updated the map of the Eurasian arc of instability prepared by St. Petersburg University in 2016, and mapped conflicts, challenges and threats.

It is worth mentioning force-field analysis, the founder of which is considered to be Kurt Lewin. This method, which is used in the social sciences to identify forces in favor of or against changes in the status quo in a highly competitive environment, was adapted by the author to a comparative assessment of tactical and strategic imperatives that determine the interest of Arab countries in integration in Eurasia (Figure 1):

Figure 2. Territorial Structure of the Arab World and Its borders with the West and Non-West


Results

Currently, the mutual attraction between the Eurasian geopolitical space and the Arab world is determined by a complex of factors. Note the following:

1. Geographical factor.

“The Arab World” (Arabic. al-Watan al-Arabiyy) is a concept that was popularized after the Second World War by ideologists of Arab nationalism (Michel Aflak and others), designating in documents of that time, for example, in the Program of the Syrian Arab Renaissance Party in 1947, “the territory located between the Taurus and Bolshoy Zab mountain ranges, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, The Ethiopian Highlands and Greater Sahara, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea” [cit. according to: 15:73]. For the purpose and objectives of this article, the “Arab world” refers to the totality of the 22 member countries of the League of Arab States (LAS), covering mainly the macroregion known as the Middle East and North Africa². 110 States are located in Africa and the remaining 12 in Asia (Figure 2).

² The term Middle East and North Africa, MENA is used in the scientific and expert community, as well as in documents of the UN, the World Bank and other international organizations: MENA / United Nations Global Compact. N/d. Available from: <https://unglobalcompact.org/engage-locally/mena> (accessed 17.05.2024); Middle East and North Africa: Overview. The World Bank – official website. 15 Dec 2021. Available from: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/overview>.

Figure 3. Eurasian Arc of Instability

Source: the author updated the map prepared in 2016 at St. Petersburg State University to the state of 2024 [9]

Thus, part of the Mashreq – the east of the Arab world, which includes the Asian countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, or Levant (Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Palestinian territories), Mesopotamia (Iraq) and the Persian Gulf subregion (Bahrain, Yemen, Qatar, Kuwait, Kuwait, UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia), is located on the Eurasian continent. The other part of the Mashreq, combining Egypt and East African states (Djibouti, Comoros, Somalia, Sudan), is adjacent to Eurasia. Arab West – Maghreb³, which includes the countries of North-West Africa (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia), despite its greater remoteness from the Asian part of Eurasia (with proximity to Europe) than Mashreq, is still connected with Eurasia by the commonality of geopolitical and geo-economic challenges.

2. Geopolitical factor.

Analyzing the Eurasian Neo-West – while the Arab countries' relations with the European West are subject to a different logic – it becomes clear that in the process of creating a multipolar world, which Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov rightly called “unstoppable”⁴, The imperatives of the countries of Eurasia and the

³ Maghreb / Nikonov V.A. Concise toponymic dictionary. Moscow: Mysl, 1966. P. 247.

⁴ Lavrov considered futile attempts to stop the development of multipolarity centers / RBC, January 27, 2023. Available from: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/27/01/2023/63d316379a79476461e6e74b>.

Arab world are converging or coinciding. This means their desire to ensure their national sovereignty, a decent place in the global economy and sustainable access to the achievements of scientific and technological progress. It is not for nothing that S.V.Lavrov included Egypt and the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf among the promising centers of multipolarity, along with the leading Eurasian powers represented by India and China⁵. It is worth agreeing with N.Y.Surkov, who speaks about “the rapprochement of Arab countries with Asia within the framework of the turn to the East” and “diversification of the foreign policy of Arab countries in line with the desire to ensure their strategic autonomy through participation in Non-Western integration associations” [18:95].

As for the geopolitical challenge of regional conflicts (internal, between states, states and non-state actors) common to the Eurasian Non-West and the Arab world, they all form the Eurasian arc of instability (Figure 3), which, as S.N.Kolotov reasonably notes, “for the first time in history extends from the Pacific to the Atlantic Ocean [i.e., covering both Eurasia proper and the neighboring territories of Africa. – Author’s note] and has numerous offshoots, which, like tentacles, entangle the countries and regions caught in its sphere of influence, plunging them into the abyss of long-term controlled destabilization” [13:28].

As the Israeli-Palestinian escalation that began on October 7, 2023 shows, the risks of destabilization turning into a partially or even completely uncontrollable clash (“big war”) are increasing due to the growing interdependence of conflicts. We are talking about a “mini-arc of instability” in the Middle East, which took shape as a result of military clashes between the West and the Yemeni Houthis in the Red Sea, the war in Gaza, the military confrontation between Israel and Iran and its Iranian allies – “Iran” in Lebanon and Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq.

3. The civilizational factor.

There are difficulties in defining the boundaries of the West and Non-West in Eurasia: Thus, in the mid-1990s, Samuel Huntington referred the countries of Northern, Western, and partly Southern Europe to the West, with the exception of the Balkans, Eastern and Central Europe without the states of the former eastern camp [19:26-27]. Another American scientist, Stephen Kotkin, whose approach seems more logical, guided not by geography, but by a value-institutional principle, argued that European Russia is not the West, while Asian Japan, sharing Western values, is part of the West⁶.

Life proves the isolation of the West in historical, value and religious terms from Non-Western Eurasian civilizations, which, according to S.Huntington [19], includes the Islamic civilization (Islamic world), uniting the Arab Maghreb and Mashreq with Eurasia. In this case, the Eurasian Non-West covers 27 out of 57 countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, if we include Albania (a member of the

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Remnick D. The Weakness of the Despot: An Expert on Stalin Discusses Putin, Russia, and the West. *The New Yorker*. 11 Mar 2022. Available from: <https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/stephen-kotkin-putin-russia-ukraine-stalin>.

Organization of Islamic Cooperation) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (an observer in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) to the West. Thus, according to S.Huntington, the Orthodox civilization with its bastion – Russia, which is in inseparable historical and spiritual connection with the socio-cultural phenomenon of the ‘Russian world’, which, by analogy with the Islamic world, as V.V.Ksenofontov correctly notes, is based on a religious – Orthodox foundation [14:207], and now – on the Islamic one as well.

A.G.Dugin, the founder of Neo-Eurasianism. Dugin distinguishes among the civilizations located ‘on the other side of the West’ (in Eurasia or on the lands adjacent to it) Indo-European civilizations (Indian and Iranian) [5], non-Indo-European civilizations (Chinese, Japanese, African, Pacific) [7], the civilization of the African Nord [8] and the civilizations of the frontiers: Russian (Eurasian), Semitic, including Arabian-Islamic, Turkish [6]. Which, in our opinion, corresponds more clearly than S. Huntington’s and S. Kotkin’s notion of the Eurasian Non-West discussed in this article.

The key component of the civilizational factor is the self-perception by the emerging centers of power in Eurasia of their identity in line with the new paradigm of civilizational states. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2023 defines ‘Russia’s special position as a distinctive state-civilization, a vast Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power, which united the Russian people and other nations that make up the cultural and civilizational community of the Russian world’. O.H.Bardakchian rightly calls China a textbook example of a state-civilization, referring to the longevity and clear cultural continuity of Chinese dynasties and political regimes [2:11], A.G.Volodin also includes India and Iran among Eurasian states-civilizations [4:106].


Despite the failure of attempts to unite the Arab countries in the second half of the 20th century (the creation of the United Arab Republic in Egypt and Syria, etc.), as a result of which the modern Arab world has not become a single state by analogy with the Arab early medieval caliphates, the imperative of integration has not completely faded here. This fact stimulates the growing interest of Arab elites in dialogues with established states-civilizations of Eurasia, such as Russia or China.

4. Geo-economic factor.

Within the framework of the UN Conference on Trade and Development’s classification of the world’s countries by level of economic development, the absolute majority of Asian countries in Eurasia and all Arab countries are classified as developing economies or least developed countries. Only Israel, Cyprus, the Republic of Korea, Russia and Japan are recognised as developed economies (Figure 4).

This gradation correlates with Willy Brandt’s line presented back in 1980, which divided the world into a developed (‘rich’) North and a developing (‘poor’) South (Figure 5), now known as the Global North and Global South.

⁷ Decree on Approval of the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Official electronic resource of the President of Russia, 31 March 2023. Available from: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70811>.

Figure 4. UNCTAD Classification of countries by the level of economic development⁸


The tasks set out in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2023 to transform Eurasia into a common space of peace, stability, mutual trust, development and prosperity through the formation of a broad integration circuit – the Greater Eurasian Partnership – make it necessary to identify the true mood of the Arab partners. A clear understanding of whether their interest in Eurasia and Russia is driven by strategic or tactical, temporary considerations is required, which explains the relevance of this article.

Discussion

The analysis in the article, firstly, allows us to identify the vectors of foreign policy and foreign economic activities of the Arab countries in relation to the Eurasian Non-West:

- the Chinese bilateral vector implies cooperation in trade, technology, investment, and in the foreseeable future, political dialogue and military-technical cooperation;
- the Russian bilateral vector involves political dialogue and cooperation in trade and investment, including Russia's participation in ensuring food and technological security of Arab countries, as well as military-technical cooperation;
- the Indian bilateral vector is based on trade, technology and investment cooperation, assuming intensification of political dialogue and military-technical cooperation in the future;
- Central Asian – a largely one-way vector from the Arab countries towards Central Asia – includes trade, economic and investment tracks. The Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani's visit to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan in June 2023 is an illustration.

⁸ UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2023: Classification of Economies. World by Development Status. Available from: <https://hbs.unctad.org/classifications/#disclaimer>.

Figure 5. The Brandt Line⁹

Secondly, the challenges for the Eurasian Non-West and the Arab world were considered:

- Regional conflicts with a high degree of internationalization, their negative impact on the world economy and global logistics networks. These include the threat of interruption of maritime communications in the event of a military clash between China and Taiwan, the closure of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait due to the open conflict between Israel/USA and Iran, the war in Gaza, which has put on pause the laying of the transport corridor 'India – Middle East – Europe', problems with navigation in the Red Sea due to the confrontation between the Houthies and the West, and the Ukrainian crisis, which has disrupted logistics in the Black Sea;
- threats of terrorism and extremism, separatism and trans-border organised crime;
- the Eurasian arc of instability encompassing the neighbouring regions of Africa;
- US claims to global hegemony in the discourse of Leadership Mandate¹⁰ and America First Approach¹¹;
- The West's imposition of a senior/junior co-operation paradigm; pressure on Arab countries to reconsider relations with China and Russia. An example is the statement by Amit Mithi, CEO of the promising Saudi IT company Alat, on May 8, 2024, that he was ready to abandon dialogue with China at Washington's request¹². Despite the war in Gaza, the Biden

⁹ Grotlüschen A., Buddeberg K. PIAAC and the South – Is Southering the New Othering? Global Expansion of Dominant Discourses on Adult Literacy // *European Journal for Research on the Education and Learning of Adults*. 12. May 2020. P. 4. Uploaded by Buddeberg K. from the Royal Geographical Society. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341127462_PIAAC_and_the_South_-_Is_Southering_the_new_Othering_Global_Expansion_of_dominant_Discourses_on_Adult_Literacy.

¹⁰ Project 2025. Wash. DC: The Heritage Foundation, 31 Jan 2023. Available from: <https://www.heritage.org/conservatism/commentary/project-2025>.

¹¹ An America First Approach to US National Security. VA, USA: The America First Policy Institute, 9 May 2024. Available from: <https://americafirstpolicy.com/events/an-america-first-approach-to-u-s-national-security>.

¹² Halftermeyer M., Hawkins M. Saudi Arabia's \$100 Billion AI Fund Will Divest China If US Asks. Bloomberg, 8 May 2024. Available from: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-07/saudi-ai-fund-would-divest-from-china-tech-if-us-asked-ceo-says>.

administration continues to try to persuade Saudi Arabia to normalise relations with Israel, in return promising technological dividends and Saudi involvement in security in Gaza¹³. In 2021, Washington managed to bring India and the UAE along with the US and Israel into the Economic Cooperation Forum, which the world has dubbed the QUAD 2 alliance, similar to QUAD, the quadrilateral security dialogue between Australia, India, the US and Japan against China¹⁴;

- Western neo-colonialism, interference in the internal affairs of Eurasia and the Arab world: the war in Afghanistan (2001-2021), 'colour revolutions' in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004 and 2013-2014), Kyrgyzstan and Lebanon (2005), Myanmar (2007), Armenia (2018); military interventions in Iraq (2003), Libya (2011), Syria (2014), actions against the Houthis (since 2023), conducting the Arab Spring protests of 2011-2012;

- imposing Western mass culture on the peoples of Eurasia and Arabs to the detriment of traditional values. An example, as V.V. Putin rightly pointed out, is the 'anti-Russia' project¹⁵;

- tightening of Western sanctions against Russia, including secondary sanctions imposed by the United States. Back in 2017, the targets of sanctions in the Eurasian Non-Western space were Belarus, China, Iran, Iraq, DPRK, Moldova, Lebanon, Myanmar, Russia, Syria, and Yemen¹⁶; the situation hasn't changed qualitatively since then;

- Western efforts to maintain unequal relations with Eurasia and the Arab world. Use of unfair competition methods in rivalry with China: On 24 April 2024, J. Biden signed a law requiring the Chinese company 'ByteDance' to sell the popular social network 'TikTok'^{*17} to avoid a ban on the territory of the USA¹⁸;

- threat to the food security of Eurasia and the Arab world due to the growing volatility of world markets caused by damage to logistics and falling volumes of Ukrainian agricultural exports; risks of 'famine hotspots' that are increasing against the backdrop of global warming and desertification;

- the strong technological dependence of most Eurasian Non-Western states (to a lesser extent, China, India and Russia) on the West.

Thirdly, in terms of factual evidence of the hypothesis of this study, it is advisable to refer to the fact that 6 out of 14 SCO partner countries are members of the LAS (Bahrain,

¹³ The State Department has allowed Saudi Arabia and the UAE to participate in security in the Gaza Strip. TASS, 22 May 2024. Available from: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/20867893>.

¹⁴ Quad-2: Anti-China bloc in a new package. The Star (weekly), 20 January 2022. Available from: <https://zvezdaweb.ru/news/20221181639-an4jx.html>.

¹⁵ Vladimir Putin's article 'On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians'. Official electronic resource of the President of Russia, 12 July 2021. Available from: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/articles/66181>.

¹⁶ Makhmutov T. (author of the idea), Morozov V. (author of the text). Sanctions: everything you need to know about sanctions, their subjects, objects and subjects. Moscow: Russian Council on Foreign Affairs, 2017. Available from: <https://russiancouncil.ru/sanctions>.

¹⁷ *RKN: the foreign owner of the resource violates the law of the Russian Federation.

¹⁸ The US says it is not seeking to ban TikTok in the country. TASS, 24 April 2024. Available from: <https://tass.ru/ekonomika/20642581>.

Egypt, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Saudi Arabia)¹⁹. Egypt and the UAE became BRICS members on 1 January 2024 (Saudi Arabia has not yet joined); Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait and Palestine have applied for membership²⁰. Bahrain, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Syria have joined China's Belt and Road global logistics project²¹. Arab leaders take an active part in the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan was the guest of honour at the XXVI SPIEF, 14-17 June 2023) and other events with broad Eurasian participation.

The issues touched upon in this article have been discussed in general terms on several occasions at discussion platforms with the participation of domestic and foreign experts. These include:

- V International Conference 'World Majority in the New Realities: Regional Dimension' (Higher School of Economics, 30 November 2023), where the author of the article spoke on 'Assessing the Evolution of the Place and Role of Arab Countries in the New Emerging World Order';

- All-Russian conference with international participation 'The Concept of Russian Civilization' (Lomonosov Moscow State University, 22 January 2024). The author presented a paper 'On the factors of the growing interest of Arab countries in the Eurasian geopolitical space';

- opening of the training and educational course 'Russia – Arab World: Search for New Opportunities' (MGIMO of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 21 March 2024). The author prepared a presentation 'Russia and the Modern Arab World: Common Challenges and Priorities';

- I International Scientific and Practical Conference 'Traditional and Modern East: Development Trends' (Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, 2 April 2024). The author made a presentation on the topic: 'Russia and Arab countries: a new paradigm of co-operation';

- VIII International Scientific and Practical Conference 'Russia and the World: Dialogues – 2024. Forces of Attraction' (National Research Institute for Development of Communications and the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 23 May 2024). In his presentation, the author summarised the provisions of this article.

It is characteristic that during the discussions, Russian and Arab researchers and diplomats in a similar vein outlined the prospect of dialogues between the Arab world and centers of power in Eurasia (India, China, Russia), which, unlike the algorithms of unequal cooperation between the West and the Global South, would be based on equality and consideration of mutual interests. The participation of Arab specialists in scientific events

¹⁹ About the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Official electronic resource of the SCO, 8 December 2015. Available from: <https://rus.sectsc.org/20151208/16789.html>.

²⁰ Bahrain sees huge potential benefits from co-operation with BRICS. TASS, 24 August 2024. Available from: <https://tass.ru/ekonomika/18583387>.

²¹ Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Shanghai, China: Fanhai International School of Finance – Green Finance & Development Center, December 2023. Available from: <https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/>.

in Russia, despite Western pressure, is further evidence of the long-term interest of Arabs in Eurasia.

Conclusion

The study has shown that the Arab countries' interest in integration in Eurasia, and more specifically in the Eurasian Non-West, is not tactical but long-term strategic in nature. The reason is that in the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world, such integration is consistent with the process of sovereignisation of foreign policy and foreign economic activity of the countries of the Global South and Russia, the imperatives of sustainable development and the struggle for national sovereignty.

Multilevel collective efforts, albeit often in the form of generating ideas, are already enabling the states of the Eurasian Non-West to form a very attractive agenda for Arabs in order to confront the challenges of globalization and modern manifestations of neo-colonialism.

The tactic of changing alliances is actively used by monarchies in the conditions of rivalry between new centers of power, such as India and China, which may provide for pragmatic preservation of alliance relations by the Arabs and even creation of new partnerships with the West. However, when the global world order changes, such tactics do not replace the mainstream process of sovereignty, being used by the Non-West as a tool of pressure on the West to ensure the most favourable conditions for the implementation of promising joint projects – mainly in the spheres of high technology and finance, where the US dominance temporarily remains. Therefore, despite the current successes, the West will hardly be able to stop the course of history.

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