

# The Results of the President of Russia Elections in Foreign Countries in 2024 and the Fiasco of the Non-Systemic Opposition

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**Abstract.** In the article, a personal view of an Israeli student on the results of the presidential election in Russia in 2024. The issues of organization of voting of citizens of the Russian Federation living outside its territory are considered. Analyzed the possible and taken actions of the unsystematic opposition to discredit and fail to vote in the elections of the head of the Russian state in precincts located outside the borders of the territory of Russia. During the research, the results of the elections were considered from different points of view: in the regional aspect, by specific countries and by the election commission of a separate precinct. It was concluded that the non-systemic opposition (primarily located in the EU) has no real opportunities to actively influence the electoral behavior of Russians living outside the Russian Federation at the time of the elections.

**Keywords:** electoral process, election of the President of the Russian Federation, voting, electoral behavior, non-systemic opposition

**For citation:** Bocharov Y.B. The Results of the President of Russia Elections in Foreign Countries in 2024 and the Fiasco of the Non-Systemic Opposition. *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue*. 2024; 3(13): 202-221, [doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3\(13\)-202-221](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-202-221)

## Introduction

According to Russian legislation, citizens of Russia permanently residing abroad or temporarily on business trips, on tourist trips and for other reasons outside of Russia during the period of preparation and holding of elections of both the President and deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation have the right to vote and perform other electoral actions in the same manner as citizens of the Russian

Federation residing on the territory of Russia<sup>1</sup>. At the same time, the presence of a second citizenship does not affect the right of Russian citizens to participate in elections.

At the same time, the organization of the electoral process and the possibilities of exercising their constitutional right to vote while outside the territory of the Russian Federation differ significantly in a number of respects from this process in Russia. The differences are mainly related to the organization and operation of polling stations abroad, the formation of their staff and the conduct of mobile and early voting.

In this regard, in the overwhelming majority of countries in the world where a large number of Russians live (are at the time of the elections) who have the right to vote in Russian elections, polling stations and the number of members of their commissions are formed based not on the actual number of voters, but on the capabilities of Russian diplomatic missions in these countries to open polling stations (precinct electoral commission) and staff them with responsible workers.

According to the Central Election Commission, as of January 1, 2024, 2,002,787 Russian voters live outside the Russian Federation. Based on the situation in the world and the capabilities of Russian diplomatic missions, voting in the 2024 Russian presidential elections was planned to be held only in 144 countries around the world, where 286 polling stations were organized. The total number of precinct election commissions abroad has decreased compared to the 2018 presidential elections, when 394 precinct election commissions were opened. This is due to the closure of 26 Russian foreign missions in unfriendly countries, a reduction in the number of embassy and consulate employees due to the mass expulsion of Russian diplomats, and the refusal of the authorities of some states to ensure the security of Russian diplomatic missions and Russian citizens visiting them during the elections.

In the 2024 elections, the precinct election commission was mainly located in the embassies or consulates general of the Russian Federation, but in some countries (for example, in Angola, Hungary, Zimbabwe, Iraq, India, Malaysia, Nepal, Thailand) the commissions traveled to other cities to provide Russians with the opportunity to exercise their right to vote. In a number of countries in Africa and Latin America, one precinct election commission served two countries at once. At the same time, either early or mobile voting was organized in almost a hundred precinct election commissions.

On the one hand, the geopolitical situation in the world in connection with the events in and around Ukraine has divided the world into a number of opposing blocs. Almost 50 countries are part of the bloc "at war" with Russia, if not directly, then indirectly, introducing economic and political sanctions both against the state and against some of the diplomatic missions of Russia, on whose territory voting is usually organized. In this regard,

<sup>1</sup> Federal legislation on elections and referendums in Russia. Available from: <http://www.novgorod.izbirkom.ru/zakonodatelstvo-o-vyborakh-i-referendumakh/federaln-zakon/index.php>.

the number of precinct election commissions opened outside the territory of Russia has decreased by almost a third.

On the other hand, the composition of voters voting outside the territory of Russia has changed dramatically. Usually, the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation operates data on the number of foreign voters based on the consular records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. It is assumed that most of these voters have long been living outside Russia and have a different opinion of it than before leaving it. During these elections, the number of Russians “temporarily” abroad increased several times, despite the fact that many of them left not for countries with traditional emigration geography, but according to the principle of “where it was possible to go” – and they left first of all for neighboring countries of the post-Soviet space, as well as for countries with a visa-free or simplified visa regime for Russians, and mainly for “resort” countries of the world.

Against the backdrop of all these events abroad, the non-systemic Russian opposition has become more active (not without active financial and ideological support from the West). Trying to prove its importance, promoting the thesis about the illegitimacy of power in Russia due to the alleged presence of administrative resources and pressure on voters, the opposition tried to demonstrate using the example of elections in the “free world” (free from Russian influence) that Russians living here will vote radically differently. And this “free” vote will confirm the opposition’s thesis about the lack of real support by Russians for the policy of President V.V.Putin.

Thus, the scientific novelty of the study is predetermined by the formulation of the problem: to assess the real influence of the non-systemic opposition on members of the Russian foreign community and the presence of support among such citizens.

## Materials and Methods

The methodological basis of the research was modern methods of scientific cognition of social and legal reality, concrete historical, statistical, and systemic analysis. General scientific methods include the general dialectical method, analysis and synthesis, deduction and induction, etc.

The empirical basis of the study was made up of: data from the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation for a foreign constituency for March 2024 (in general and in the context of individual countries, states, precinct election commission), information from news agencies and other media, data from statistics and analytical centers, the author’s experience of working in a precinct election commission during the 2024 Russian presidential elections.

The author’s theoretical position was formed under the influence of such scientists as S.A.Avakyan, M.V.Baglai, G.V.Barabashev, I.B.Gasanov, N.V.Grishin, A.V.Zemlyanov, Yu.N.Lebedeva, A.V.Makarov, T.Yu.Nesterova, O.S.Morozova, G.N.Chebotarev, V.E.Chirkin, K.F.Sheremet, B.S.Ebzeev, G.O.Yarygin and others [1–4, 6–9, 11, 16].

## Results

An analysis of the results of the Russian Presidential elections abroad shows that the restrictions imposed on Russia led to a decrease in voter turnout, while protest votes and provocations organized by the opposition led to the fact that the final result for the incumbent President was the lowest for the entire period of presidential elections outside the territory of the Russian Federation, but still exceeded 72% (see Table 1). That is, in the end, Russian President Vladimir Putin clearly won abroad. It should be taken into account that the limited capabilities of the Central Election Commission and the Russian Foreign Ministry to organize elections outside the territory of the Russian Federation due to the situation in the world also affected the decrease in the number of open precinct election commissions, which led to a decrease in the share of voters compared to the previous elections.

**Table 1.** Voting results for the presidential elections of the Russian Federation abroad

Year	Number of countries	Number of election commissions	Number of voters	Number of voters for the winning presidential candidate	%
2004	140	353	273 131	232 502	85,13
2008	142	363	330 183	283 298	85,80
2012	147	384	441 931	323 686	73,24
2018	145	393	474 366	403 306	85,2
2024	144	286	380 961	275 249	72,25

*Source: compiled by the author on the materials of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation.*

According to the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, 380,961 voters voted abroad in 144 countries around the world, which is only 4.35% of the total number of voters who took part in the elections in Russia in 2024, and approximately 19% of those eligible to vote and living outside the territory of the Russian Federation.<sup>2</sup>

At the same time, the percentage of those who used their right to vote early abroad was almost ten times higher than in Russia (see Table 2).

However, it is precisely because of the specifics of organizing voting abroad that ten times fewer people were able to use the opportunity to vote outside the polling station or at home than in Russia. At the same time, in Russia, voters took three times more ballots with them “as a souvenir” than abroad. This is most likely due to the fact that voting abroad was organized mainly at diplomatic mission facilities, where a limited number of voters

<sup>2</sup> Data from the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation for the foreign district for March 2024. Available from: [https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1jwP7\\_GrNAFyr1okSUYgoos7NmKcKoDEKx\\_OrKdqIwE/edit?gid=0#gid=0](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1jwP7_GrNAFyr1okSUYgoos7NmKcKoDEKx_OrKdqIwE/edit?gid=0#gid=0).

were allowed in, which allowed members of the precinct election commission to monitor their actions in order to avoid provocations, which were talked about so much before the elections. These “losses” are the difference between the ballots issued and those found in the ballot boxes (see Table 2).

At the same time, candidates L.E.Slutsky and N.M.Kharitonov received twice as few votes (in percentage) outside the territory of the Russian Federation as they did inside Russia. This is mainly due to the absence of any advertising of these candidates abroad and the lack of information about their real activities outside the Russian Federation. But V.A.Davankov, for whom the non-systemic opposition called to vote as an alternative to V.V.Putin, received four times (in percentage) more votes abroad than inside Russia. Nevertheless, his modest result of 16.5% indicates the absence of real opposition among Russian citizens living abroad. It is because of this “protest” voting that the result of the winner of the elections, V.V.Putin, who received an absolutely victorious result not only in the world outside Russia as a whole, but also in individual regions, is slightly understated.

**Table 2.** Comparative analysis of voting in the territory of the Russian Federation and abroad

Data from the PEC protocols	Abroad	% of the total number of those who voted abroad	In the Russian Federation	% of the total number of those who voted in the Russian Federation
Total votes	380 961		87 576 075	
Early voters	73 199	19,21	2 100 202	2,40
Voting at the PEC on election day	301 971	79,27	73 447 089	83,87
Mobile voting on election day	5 791	1,52	12 028 784	13,74
Number of invalid ballots	26 147	6,87	1 193 278	1,37
Number of valid ballots	354 577	93,13	86 204 291	98,63
Number of ballots «stolen» by voters	237	0,06	17 806	0,20
Votes for each registered candidate (% of the number of voters)				
Davankov V.A.	63 388	16,65	3 362 484	3,85
Putin V.V.	275 249	72,25	76 277 708	87,28
Slutsky L.E.	7 495	1,97	2 795 629	3,20
Kharitonov N.M.	8 445	2,22	3 768 470	4,31

Source: compiled by the author on the materials of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation

## Protest movement and attempts to disrupt the vote

In the run-up to the elections, there were many publications that the non-systemic opposition was preparing for provocations during the elections of the President of the Russian Federation. Anti-Russian propaganda was supposed to act through negative posts on social networks. According to preliminary information, the bet was on local protest actions of activists, attempts to “stir up” the topic of those mobilized for the SVO and “anti-war” sentiments, delegitimization of the political leader V.V.Putin using tools known within the framework of the phenomenon of “hybris syndrome” [10].

No one expected to completely disrupt the elections, but they tried to discredit them.

As the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs M.Zakharova stated in a special commentary to TASS, “Western opponents of Moscow have been actively trying to disrupt the presidential elections in Russia for the past year. Our enemies have been stirring not in a week, not even in a month, but, it seems to me, they have been doing everything in the past year to either disrupt the elections, prevent them from being held, or distort the idea of the elections in various ways”<sup>3</sup>. She explained that paid opposition was also used, which turned out to be “agents of influence and simply mercenaries.” It should be noted that the change in the tasks of the non-systemic opposition in the context of the increasing confrontation between the West and Russia is also noted in scientific studies [5, 12, 14, 15].

The attempts at destabilization were so serious that the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation took special measures to counteract all possible negative impacts. As stated by the head of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation E.Pamfilova, “The West intends to disrupt them, and certain work is already underway in this direction. We understand that they are already working to simply disrupt the Russian presidential elections. Enormous funds have been allocated by Western countries, primarily the United States. All centers are working, starting with the Baltics, Poland, which are preparing, all the Khodorkovskys, Kasparovs and all the other “runners” who, like rats, fled the country, are gathering. They are all now thinking about how to demolish Russia”<sup>4</sup>. According to her, more than 100 countries are watching to see if Russia will withstand this pressure or not. But Pamfilova assured that Russia is ready for the upcoming elections.

According to the assessment of the Duma commission investigating interference by foreign states in Russia’s internal affairs, Mikhail Khodorkovsky has joined the work on “delegitimization”<sup>5</sup>, who quietly resumed the work of the Open Russia structure<sup>6</sup>.

Several well-known opposition groups were particularly active in the information space, calling on everyone to unite and act as a united front of “resistance”, but later,

<sup>3</sup> Russian Foreign Ministry: Western enemies have been doing everything they can to disrupt the Russian presidential elections for the past year. TASS. 16.03.2024. Available from: <https://tass.ru/politika/20250185>.

<sup>4</sup> Pamfilova announced the West’s intention to disrupt the Russian presidential elections in 2024. TASS. 24.04.2024. Available from: <https://tass.ru/politika/17589659?ysclid=lxedzjqwbc379531607>.

<sup>5</sup> «Baba Yaga Against.» How the Fugitive Opposition Prepares for the Russian Presidential Elections. REGNUM. 17.04.2024. Available from: <https://regnum.ru/article/3852317>.

<sup>6</sup> \*This organization is recognized as undesirable in the Russian Federation.

having quarreled among themselves for leadership, each went their own way. The question of a single leadership has always been raised in the non-systemic opposition, largely due to mercantile interests. All Western state and public structures that finance various types of Non-Governmental Organizations / Non-Commercial Organizations and conduct one or another activity against Russia, first of all want to give money to really operating opposition structures or, so to speak, “effective” leaders of public opinion. It was for this “bread and butter” that there was a confrontation between the so-called leaders of “protest” public opinion, and it was for this activity that protest groups were formed abroad, mainly in European countries, from among Russians who had recently left the country due to the events around the SVO.

Approximately a year and a half after the start of the SVO, the head of VTsIOM V.Fedorov stated on the air of the radio station “Moscow Speaks” that the number of citizens who have left Russia since the start of the SVO, according to various estimates, is from 500 to 800 thousand people<sup>7</sup>. According to Fedorov, the exact number of those who left cannot be named, because the data of sociologists, customs and border services do not reflect the real picture of such migration. At the same time, initially the overwhelming majority left for countries with a visa-free regime for Russians. According to various studies, the largest number of such Russians were accepted by Kazakhstan and Serbia (150 thousand people each), the top three countries are closed by Armenia (110 thousand people)<sup>8</sup>.

Among the main destinations chosen by Russian citizens were also Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, the United Arab Emirates, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Spain, Israel, Mongolia, Latin American countries, the Baltic States, Canada and the United States. Subsequently, a number of EU countries, including Latvia and the Czech Republic, suspended issuing visas to Russian citizens; Finland, Poland and the Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) stated that they would not provide asylum to Russians fleeing mobilization. On the contrary, Germany offered asylum to Russian oppositionists and conscripts who did not want to fight with Ukraine.

Naturally, this group of refugees became the main platform for the work of all structures of the non-systemic opposition. The ideological meaning of Western support for relocates is analyzed in great detail in the article by L.L.Khoperskaya [13].

Research previously conducted by us on the example of Israel<sup>9</sup>, show that among those voting in Israel in Russian elections (both Duma and presidential) a certain tendency can be traced: the longer a Russian lives in a “foreign” country, the more “pro-Russian” his views become, the more often he votes for the ruling party and for President V.V.Putin. However, this time, literally within a year before the elections, both refugees from Ukraine

<sup>7</sup> The head of VTsIOM named the number of citizens who left Russia since the beginning of the SVO. #GOVORITMOSKVA.18.07.2023. Available from: <https://govoritmoskva.ru/news/372241/>.

<sup>8</sup> Russians have emigrated in huge numbers since the war in Ukraine. 23.08.2023. Available from: <https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2023/08/23/russians-have-emigrated-in-huge-numbers-since-the-war-in-ukraine>.

<sup>9</sup> Bocharov Yu. On the reasons for the lack of real opposition among Russian voters abroad (using the situation in Israel as an example). Citizen. Elections. Power. 2022; 1(23). Available from: <https://www.rcoit.ru/upload/iblock/cc0/cv44e1vjz7c6xfgu9q5c8rk0cjkslk5y/>.

**Table 3. Voting results by regions of the world**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Total
Regions	post-Soviet space	Europe	Middle East	other countries of Asia, Oceania and Australia	Africa	North America	South America	
Number of countries	14	32	17	19	39	2	21	144
Polling stations	90	51	34	41	43	6	21	286
Voted (people)	173 777	118 366	40 957	30 384	5 584	5 661	6 232	380 961
Valid ballots	167 492	105 625	37 672	27 994	5 441	4 712	5 641	354 577
Invalid ballots	6 252	12 621	3 234	2 368	140	944	588	26 147
“Stolen” ballots	33	120	51	22	3	5	3	237
Candidates								
Davankov V.A.	14 034	27 024	8 701	9 428	604	1 803	1 794	63 388
%	8%	23%	21%	31%	11%	32%	29%	17%
Putin V.V.	150 002	71 004	26 907	16 573	4 555	2 688	3 520	275 249
%	86%	60%	66%	55%	82%	48%	57%	72%
Slutsky L.E.	1 347	3 786	1 058	950	135	84	135	7 495
%	0,8%	3%	3%	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%
Kharitonov N.M.	2 109	3 811	1 006	1 043	147	137	192	8 445
%	1%	3%	3%	3%	3%	2%	3%	2%

*Source: compiled by the author on the materials of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation.*

and Russia went to Israel en masse. And this mass of frightened or offended people created a certain mood in society, while “dissatisfaction” was massively poured out in a negative light for Russia in local and Russian-language media.

In this regard, assuming a model of action of the main opposition groups based in Europe, and the geography of the main flows of refugees both in the CIS countries and in Europe and the world, the author tried to analyze how strong the “protest movement” is in these countries and could influence the course of the elections.

### Overall results of voting outside the territory of the Russian Federation

As noted above, more than 380 thousand people took part in the voting in 144 countries of the world, the overwhelming majority of whom (72.3%) voted for the President of the Russian Federation V.V.Putin. At this point, the question of what the non-systemic opposition managed to do can be considered closed – “nothing”. But let’s look specifically at



the regions and countries. There, a slightly different picture opens up, deserving attention for its study and analysis in order to develop and adopt appropriate measures. Initially, the author divided the entire territory outside the Russian Federation, where there was a precinct election commission, into regions by geographic features: the post-Soviet space, Europe, the Middle East, the remaining countries of Asia, Oceania and Australia, Africa and America, which we will divide into North and South together with Central America. The Baltics were considered separately. Also, Transnistria was considered separately from the voting in Chisinau (Moldova), and all their indicators were summarized in the section of the post-Soviet countries.

As can be seen from Table 3, President V.V.Putin did not lose the elections in any of the regions. If we assume that the opposition chose V.A.Davankov as an alternative candidate to the current President of the Russian Federation, then the maximum total success (in percent) for him, and therefore for the opposition, was recorded in South and Central America, Asia, Oceania and Australia. And although V.V.Putin did not lose in these regions, he had the lowest overall rating there. The highest rating for L.E.Slutsky and N.M.Kharitonov was recorded in Europe and the countries of Asia, Oceania and Australia, the lowest – in the CIS.

### Voting results by region

In the region of the Post-Soviet space, we will consider the situation in all the former republics, including Moldova and the Baltic countries (although the latter are already members of the EU, a large percentage of both Russian-speaking citizens and those with Russian citizenship live there). There were no polling stations in Georgia and Ukraine. In Abkhazia, 30 precinct election commissions were opened, in South Ossetia – 12 precinct election commissions and in Transnistria – 6 precinct election commissions, and early voting was also organized everywhere.

In total, almost 45.6% of all those who took part in the elections voted in this region. At the same time, in the region itself, almost 50% of those who voted were in Abkhazia and Transnistria, and in them, V.V.Putin received more than 95% of the votes. Residents of these regions clearly associate their future and well-being with Russia, which is why such a high percentage of votes for the current President. In Kazakhstan, with 9,670 voters, V.V.Putin received 4,073 votes, or 48.74%, and V.A.Davankov – 4,001 votes (47.88%), but taking into account the invalid (spoiled) 1,301 ballots (13.45%), it can be considered that the opposition won. But according to the data presented above, more than 150 thousand “refugees” entered this country. Thus, the opposition managed to activate only slightly more than 2.5% of the electoral opportunities available there – potential voters – for a show fight with Russia.

The opposition gained slightly more than a third of the votes in Armenia and Uzbekistan, but this is still about 3% of the number of “refugees” who entered these countries.

In Abkhazia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Belarus, there was practically no confrontation – the figures were about 5%.

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*Source: compiled by the author on the materials of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation*

In Azerbaijan and Moldova, the opposition also had minimal results – approximately 15%.

In the three Baltic countries, 527 ballots were spoiled, or 12.74% of those issued. Almost half of them were in Estonia (224 ballots, or 9.19%) and Lithuania (203 ballots, or 26.3%). In Lithuania, with 770 voters, V.A.Davankov received 302 votes (39.22%), and V.V.Putin – 229 votes (29.74%), but taking into account the spoiled ballots, the opposition can be considered a success. At the same time, Putin clearly won in Estonia (75.22%) and Latvia (70.61%). That is, the anti-Russian position of these countries is yielding results, and the Russians are forced to mimic in order to survive. Despite the almost million-strong influx of “refugees” from Russia to the post-Soviet countries, especially to Central Asia, none of them showed any particular desire to demonstrate their attitude to the Motherland and practically did not react to the calls of the opposition. Most likely, these people became temporary “refugees” and, perhaps, are ready to return to Russia after the end of the Central Asian War, therefore they do not want to position themselves as participants of the non-systemic opposition.

In the 32 European countries under consideration (excluding the Baltics and Moldova), there was a wide range in the number of those wishing to vote.

Thus, in 11 countries, from 100 to 1,000 people voted, in 10 countries – from 1,000 to 3,000, and in 11 countries – from 3,000 to 6,000.

In Germany, 8,359 people voted, and in Cyprus – 52,269 people (44.69% of all voters in the region). Of these, 36,870 (69.21%) voted early, and Putin received 88.27% of the votes here. Perhaps Cyprus is used as a “country dacha” by many Russians who are closely connected to Russia for work (business), and they are satisfied with the current state of affairs, and, as a result, such a high percentage of votes for the incumbent President. In total, just over 118 thousand people (31.1% of the total number of voters in the world) participated in the elections of the President of the Russian Federation in 32 European countries. 12,621 ballots (10.67% of the total number issued) were declared invalid (spoiled). V.A.Davankov (and the opposition along with him) clearly won in 16 of the countries under consideration. Thus, in Montenegro Davankov gained 68.89%, in Serbia – 67.42%, in the Czech Republic – 59.89%, in the Netherlands – 56.88%, in Poland – 53.50%, in Great Britain – 53.07%, in Portugal – 51.65%, in Slovakia – 51.08%. In another group of countries V.A.Davankov gained less than 50%, but more than V.V.Putin. For example, the opponent of the current President of the Russian Federation in Denmark gained 48.24%, in Croatia 48.17%, in Austria – 47.05%, in Spain – 45.57%, in Finland – 45.30%, in Slovenia – 44.71%, in Ireland – 43.72%, in Hungary – 43.14%.

If we take into account our assumption that invalid (spoiled) ballots and votes cast for V.A.Davankov can be interpreted as a “success” of the opposition, then Luxembourg, Sweden, Switzerland and France can be added to the above list. As a result, despite all the negative press, publications on the Internet and calls to “prove” something to Russia, all that the non-systemic opposition was capable of was 27 thousand (22.85%) for Davankov and 12 thousand (10.67%) spoiled ballots. And all this is presented as a success?

In 17 countries of the Middle East, more than 41 thousand people voted at 34 precinct election commissions, and the spread in the number of voters is large. On average, 500 people voted at the precinct election commissions of Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In the Emirates and Israel, just over four thousand. The maximum number of voters was in Turkey, where 15,352 people voted at 4 precinct election commissions (36.5% of all voters in the region). At the same time, 7,695 people voted in early voting in Ankara, and the minimum percentage of spoiled ballots and the maximum percentage for V.V.Putin (67.63%) in Turkey were recorded here. But at the precinct election commission in Trabzon (Turkey), only 350 people voted, with 64.47% voting for Davankov and 24.36% for Putin.

As noted above, in this region, the opposition “won” by a small margin in Israel, where Davankov gained 53.49% and Putin – 42.69%, with 18.52% of the ballots being spoiled.

In the UAE, Putin gained 53.45% and Davankov – 42.47%. And even taking into account the spoiled ballots (8.73%), the result is clear and not in favor of the opposition.

Perhaps all Russians who were at that moment on vacation, on a business trip, or “on the run” in the countries of the Middle East, in one way or another connect their fate with today’s Russia, because in the other 15 countries V.V.Putin received from 70% to 95% of the votes.

In the region of Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania, voting was held in 19 countries at 41 precinct election commissions. The opposition achieved small successes only at 4 precinct election commissions: at two in Vietnam and at one in India and Thailand. As a result, V.A.Davankov won in Vietnam and Brunei (in the latter, the minimum number of voters was recorded – only 32 people). And taking into account the spoiled ballots, Malaysia and Japan can be added to the opposition’s victory. However, in all other countries, V.V.Putin’s victory was clear – in half of these countries, the current President of Russia received from 51 to 85%, while Davankov’s result did not exceed 45%.

Perhaps the Russians in these “resorts” had no time for the elections, although in Thailand at the precinct election commission located in Phuket, 4,570 people voted, of which 48.24% voted for Putin, and 38.93% voted for Davankov.

The elections were held in 39 African countries at 43 precinct election commissions, although in practice representatives from 49 countries took part in the voting, since many precincts served two countries at the same time. In this region, V.V.Putin clearly won at all commissions with a final result of 81.62%, despite the fact that at almost half of the precincts his result was under 90%. V.A.Davankov gained 10.82%, and his best result was in Morocco – 33.81%. Of the 5,584 voters in the region, only three ballots were taken (“stolen”) “as a keepsake”. So there is definitely no point in discussing the actions of the opposition in this region.

The elections in South and Central America were held in 21 countries, where 21 precinct election commissions were opened. In this region, as in Africa, some precinct election commissions served two countries at the same time, so that in fact, citizens of the Russian Federation who were present at the time of the elections in the territory of 25 countries of the region took part in the voting. In a third of the precinct election commissions, the number of voters was from 20 to 100, in a third – from 100 to 300, the largest number of voters was in Argentina – 1,616 people. In the region as a whole, V.V.Putin received 56.51%, and V.A.Davankov – 28.8%, but he was first in Argentina (54.89%) and in Paraguay (52.94%), where only 68 people voted. In Uruguay, Putin and Davankov received the same number of votes (78 each), which gave each of them 43.09%, but taking into account the 9.39% of invalid (spoiled) ballots, we can recognize the opposition’s “victory”. The highest percentage of invalid (spoiled) ballots in the region was recorded in Argentina – 19.86%. It is hard to imagine that candidate V.A.Davankov was so well known in Argentina; most likely, either Russian citizens permanently residing here are dissatisfied with Russia’s policy, or Russian “refugees” have reached South America, although clearly not in such numbers as in the post-Soviet countries and the EU.

In North America, three precinct election commissions were opened in the United States and Canada. In both countries, Putin clearly won, gaining 42.23% in the United States and 55.84% in Canada. Davankov, respectively, had 34.56% and 27.67%. But if we return to counting all invalid (spoiled) ballots as the opposition’s “success”, then in Canada, with 13.17% of such ballots, Putin still won, but in the United States, with 18.92% of invalid ballots, we can talk about a symbolic victory for the opposition. By the way, two thirds of the spoiled ballots ended up at a precinct in New York, a city of emigrants, which most likely indicates that the wave of “refugees” from Russia has reached the United States. However, these are clearly not the figures that the non-systemic opposition has been talking about so much.

## Election results in Israel

The author of the article took part in these elections as an observer from the Public Chamber of Russia at polling station № 8096 on the territory of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Haifa (Israel).

The time voters spent in the voting booths allowed us to judge whether they were really voting or spoiling the ballot paper by writing on it. When the votes were counted, it turned out that almost every fifth ballot paper was spoiled (mostly with some notes and appeals). Judging by what was happening near the polling station, we could guess what exactly the representatives of the non-systemic opposition in Israel were trying to achieve. The general leadership and a large group of young people (judging by the conversations, those who had recently arrived in the country) were trying to delay the voting by creating a line. As a result, the line stretched along the street for almost a kilometer, and many who wanted to vote needed from three to five hours to get to the polling station. The opposition was trying to achieve this by making voters get tired of standing and leave the line, thereby reducing the number of actual voters.

A group of observers was on duty near the polling station almost the entire day, trying to conduct a survey of voters about their preferences for candidates, the reasons that made them come to the elections, and the length of their stay in the country. At the same time, it was clear that almost every hour they reported on the results of their work to some headquarters.

A total of 4,597 people voted at three polling stations in Israel, where Davankov received 43.5%, Putin – 34.8%, Slutsky – 1.48%, Kharitonov – 1.63%. The hours-long queue did not greatly affect the desire of those who came to vote. Thus, 1,683 people voted at the polling station in Haifa, which is approximately the same as the number of participants in the last parliamentary elections in 2022. In the presidential elections in 2018, the turnout was slightly higher at 1,963 people, but 507 of them voted early. It is worth considering that previously in Israel, up to 12 precinct election commissions were opened and early and mobile voting was practiced for elderly voters living in nursing homes. This time, such a practice was practically not there, and the number of precinct election commissions was four times smaller, so the turnout in the country as a whole was significantly lower than in the elections in 2018, when 12,164 people voted. Although at those precinct election commissions where voting took place in 2024, the turnout was almost identical to 2018. The problems that arose in the work of the precinct election commission are related to the technical capabilities of the commissions, which limit the service of a large mass of voters.

At the same time, activists of the non-systemic opposition in Haifa (almost a hundred representatives) after the end of voting time tried to force their way into the precinct in order to allegedly continue voting. But everyone understood that in this case the law was being violated, and the entire vote at the precinct could be declared invalid, which is what the opposition was essentially seeking. As a result, the local police had to restore order, and they quickly dealt with it. If we assume that all invalid, or rather spoiled, ballots and votes cast for V.A. Davankova, – this is the result of the paid work of the opposition, then all that they collected in Israel was

2,850 votes. And this is taking into account the fact that with the beginning of the SVO, almost 70 thousand people arrived in Israel from Russia, in addition to the 150 thousand who were previously listed in the Russian consulate in Israel; given that many of those who arrived were not temporary refugees, but had the right to repatriation to Israel.

So we can safely assume that at the time of the elections there were about 220 thousand Russians in the country. And of this entire mass of people, as if “escaping” from the war and mobilization, and therefore, in the opinion of the non-systemic opposition, clearly critical of the Russian government, only 1.17% of those who had the right and opportunity to do so wanted to express their public “protest” against Russia. And this is all the work of the opposition?

Although, of course, it can be stated that, given all other conditions, the opposition in Israel won the elections.

## Final opposition figures by region

Based on the author’s postulate that invalid (spoiled) ballots and votes for V.A. Davankov are the work of the foreign opposition, let us consider these indicators in a regional context. Table 4 presents the author’s calculations of percentages from the final figures of Table 3.

Thus, in the territory of the post-Soviet countries, voting was organized in 14 countries (excluding Georgia and Ukraine, but taking into account Abkhazia and South Ossetia), which amounted to 9.7% of the total number of countries where voting was held (144). In the post-Soviet countries, 90 precinct election commissions were organized – 31.5% of the total number of precinct election commissions created in the world (286), where 45.6% of voters voted from the total number of voters who took part in the voting abroad in general (380,961). There were 6,252 invalid ballots in the region, which amounted to 3.6% of the total number of such ballots abroad in general (26,147). As a result, we can assume that the opposition gained 11.6% of the votes in this region from the total number of voters (invalid (spoiled) ballots (3.6%) plus votes for V.A. Davankov (see Table 3 – 8%)).

In the EU countries, the non-systemic opposition gained 33.5% of the votes. But the opposition gained the maximum number of votes both in the countries of South and Central America (48.5%), and in the countries of Asia and its south-eastern part (38.2%). These countries had the smallest number of voters, so even several hundred “dissatisfied” tourists and refugees were able to “demonstrate” the strength of the opposition. At the same time, as can be seen from Tables 3 and 4, there were very few Russian refugees who took part in the voting in Africa, so the opposition had the worst results here.

## Conclusions

This study analyzed not only the results of elections outside the territory of the Russian Federation, but also the ability of the non-systemic opposition to influence the mood of Russian citizens abroad. We relied on the following information: firstly, two

**Table 4.** Regional voting results and opposition figures

Regions	1 Post-Soviet space	2 Europe	3 Middle East	4 Asia, Oceania, Australia	5 Africa	6 South Americaa	7 North America
Number of countries (in % of the total number of countries – 144)	9,7%	22,2%	11,8%	13,2%	27,1%	1,4%	14,6%
Precinct Electoral Commission (in % of the total number of precinct electoral commissions – 286)	31,5%	17,8%	11,9%	14,3%	15,0%	2,1%	7,3%
Voted (in % of the total number of voters – 380,961)	45,6%	31,1%	10,8%	8,0%	1,5%	1,5%	1,6%
Invalid ballots in the region (in % of the total number of invalid ballots – 26,147)	3,6%	10,7%	7,9%	7,8%	2,5%	16,7%	9,4%
“Opposition” in the region (total: % of invalid ballots (line above) + % of votes for V.A.Davankov (according to data from Table 3)	11,6%	33,5%	29,1%	38,8%	13,3%	48,5%	38,2%
% of votes received by a candidate in the region from the total number of votes received abroad (according to Table 3)							
Davankov V.A.	22,14%	42,63%	13,73%	14,87%	0,95%	2,84%	2,83%
Putin V.V.	54,50%	25,80%	9,78%	6,02%	1,65%	0,98%	1,28%
Slutsky L.E.	17,97%	50,51%	14,12%	12,68%	1,80%	1,12%	1,80%
Kharitonov N.M.	24,97%	45,13%	11,91%	12,35%	1,74%	1,62%	2,27%

Source: the author's calculations based on the Table 3 data.

million citizens of the Russian Federation (declared by the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation), who, according to the consular service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, were listed in countries around the world, and, secondly, unverified data from the opposition press, which stated that the number of “refugees” from Russia during the period of the SVO also amounted to two million people.

Based on the experience and position of the author, in the issue of the confrontation between candidate V.V.Putin and the non-systemic opposition in the elections of the President of the Russian Federation abroad, the “forces” were actually equal. As noted earlier, the longer a Russian lives abroad, the more he begins to support Russia's policy in the world. It can be hypothetically assumed that the majority of Russians who permanently and for a long time live abroad would hardly succumb to the agitation of the non-systemic opposition.

At the same time, the “refugees” from Russia are those whom the non-systemic opposition could count on, especially since substantial sums of money were allocated for its work.

As a result, it can be assumed that initially those who were neutral or supported Russia, compared to those dissatisfied with its policies, were in a ratio of two to three. That is, the non-systemic opposition had an electoral base of almost 2.5 million people. And what is the result?

The non-systemic opposition elected candidate V.A.Davankov as its representative, it also called for spoiling ballots, but this candidate, having gained 25% of the votes, won only 41 precinct election commissions (14.33%), and taking into account the invalid (spoiled) ballots counted by the author of the article as his victory, another 15 precinct election commissions (5.24%) out of the 286 organized precinct election commissions. In total, based on these two indicators, the opposition can be recognized as having won in 26 countries of the world (18.05%) out of 144.

In almost 20 countries of the world where the opposition's victory was recorded, the leadership of these countries is actually in a state of war with Russia, and it is natural that local mass media are working against Russia and V.V.Putin. Nevertheless, the opposition won in these countries with a minimal advantage, which shows that representatives of the Russian diaspora, not afraid of threats and pressure from both the government of the country of residence and the non-systemic opposition, came and supported the policy of the current President of Russia V.V.Putin. Many leaders of the non-systemic opposition living in Europe came to these sad conclusions almost immediately after the elections. After all, during the voting process, according to exit polls, they made emotional reports, articles, notes about Russia's defeat in many European capitals, but after a couple of days all this topic faded away.

At the same time, the overwhelming majority of “leaders” of the non-systemic opposition are corrupt and acted according to the principle: the main thing is to shout louder before the elections so that they continue to finance the “struggle”, but the promised result was not achieved with the “mastered” funds. If the allocated millions, which were written about, were in fact effectively spent and as a result brought less than 90 thousand votes (both votes for the candidate and spoiled ballots) from the two million foreign electorate, then we can conclude about the extremely low influence of the opposition “leaders” and technologies. The share of oppositionists in the general population of the foreign electorate can be considered in the overwhelming majority of countries almost as a statistical error.

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## Contribution of the author

The author declares no conflicts of interests.

## Article info

Received: June 10, 2024. Approved after peer review: June 30, 2024. Accepted for publication: August 31, 2024. Published: September 23, 2024.

The author has read and approved the final manuscript.

## Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewers for their contribution to the peer review of this work.