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The purpose of the journal is to create a scientific discussion platform for peer discussion of problems and for the development of optimal solutions in the field of international cooperation, joint research, and publication of its results. Foreign scientists and experts are invited to publish and review the materials submitted for consideration.

The scientific concept involves the publication of scientific papers, including research insights and scholarly results, discussion articles and reviews, in the field of political science, sociology, world economy, cultural studies. The substantive and thematic profile of the journal includes topics reflecting international and regional processes, political, economic, social, cultural aspects of international relations, interstate and intercultural communications, international security and sustainable development

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Vitaly V. NAUMKIN,
Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
Editor-in-chief of the journal
«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue»

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF FORWARD

Dear readers!

With the third issue for 2023, the journal "Russia and the World: Scientific Dialogue" opens the third year of its publication as a scientific discussion platform for discussing problems and developing optimal solutions in the field of international cooperation, conducting joint research and publishing their results.

The theme of the journal is related to the formation of a more equitable, polycentric world, in which the non-equilibrium model of world development, which for centuries provided for the outstripping economic growth of Western colonial powers by appropriating the resources of dependent territories and states in different parts of the world, should become a thing of the past.

It is important for the Editorial Board that the ideas expressed in the pages of the journal allow for a deeper understanding of the processes and emerging issues in the field of international relations and international co-operation, and for this purpose the journal provides free, open access to research results. In addition to contributing to the global exchange of knowledge, our goal is to provide a platform for understanding trends in the study of social structure, social institutions and processes, political sociology, political institutions, processes, technology, international relations, global and regional studies, history of international relations and foreign policy.

The authors of this issue of the journal are scholars from five countries: the Russian Federation, the Republic of Armenia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan. In the field of political sciences in this issue they present the results of research on the formation of a new world order, Russian peacekeeping operation in the North Caucasus, diplomacy of heads of state, alternative energy in Kazakhstan, military-technical cooperation between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation, Ibero-American cooperation, development of Turkish-Azerbaijani communications. Sociological sciences are represented by the problems of spiritual choice of a person in the context of global challenges of modernity, creation of a civilizational platform of Russia and South Ossetia, study of the dynamics of migration processes between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation. The history of international relations and foreign

policy is presented on the materials of the role of Central Asia in the military solution of the conflict in Europe in the middle of the XX century (the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945), the study of the history of foreign policy of Japan, the Soviet stage of development of the science of international relations on the material of the historical person - Vladimir M. Khvostov.

The issue opens with a series of seven articles on international, global and regional processes in international relations.

Pavel A. Barakhvostov considered the axiological aspects of F. Ratzel's "Law of Expansion" in the formation of a new world order. In the author's understanding, the instinct of self-preservation induces social systems not to territorial expansion by increasing the geographical space they occupy, but to integration on the basis of a common normative approach to the mechanisms of functioning. As a result, the author came to the conclusion that "integration unions can grow, but up to a certain limit (the limit of saturation, or expansion), determined not by the natural limits of geographical space, but by the possibility of developing a common position on the main (fundamental) issues of functioning, common norms and practices".

Ruzanna E. Gasparyan and Alexander Yu. Skakov, who recently passed away prematurely, have turned to a study of the interim results of the Russian peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh (2020-2023). The authors drew attention to one of its essential outcomes: "... more than 48,000 displaced persons and refugees returned to Nagorno-Karabakh, and... most of the prisoners who returned to Armenia were transported with the help of peacekeeping forces".

Wang Yu analysed the role of diplomacy of the two heads of state based on the Chinese media and social media reaction to Xi Jinping's visit to Russia in March 2023. The diplomatic communication between the two heads of state confirmed the prevailing Chinese concept: "China has always pursued an independent foreign policy, and promoting high-level Russia-China relations is also a strategic choice made by China in view of the overall situation of its domestic development and overall diplomatic strategy.

Aigerim Y. Ibrayeva identified the prospects for hydrogen energy in the world and in Kazakhstan and concluded that "under favourable conditions and the right

strategy, Kazakhstan can become a leader in hydrogen energy in the region and make a significant contribution to the global development of this industry. The development of hydrogen energy in Kazakhstan contributes to achieving national and international sustainable development goals, reducing greenhouse gas emissions and reducing dependence on unstable energy sources".

Zhak S. Manukyan studied the legal-contractual basis of military-technical co-operation between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation. It should be taken into account that the main part of the armaments of the Armenian armed forces is of Soviet or Russian production. Under these circumstances, deepening of co-operation between our countries in the military-technical sphere and development of the legal framework are of great importance.

Timur A. Tufetulov turned to the role of Spain in Ibero-American co-operation, examining the position of this country and the importance for it of this integration. "In recent years," states the author, "the countries of Iberia and Latin America have faced serious economic and political problems - crises, recessions and financial difficulties. But this has not affected the Ibero-American Community, which has stood the historical test."

Sophia A. Tyulyakova identified trends in the development of friendly communications between Turkey and Azerbaijan. The strong ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan are characterised by the actors themselves as "strategic" and "allied", and unofficially the politicians of the two countries claim to be one nation, "thus influencing the formation of Azerbaijan's communication regime".

The problems of changing society in the context of the study of social structure, social institutions and processes, and political sociology are presented in three articles.

Alexander Yu. Bendin, Alexei V. Isaev, Anatoly S. Filatov, Andrey D. Kharitonov-Tanevsky, Pavel A. Barakhvostov addressed the role of religious institutions as regulators of morality in geopolitics. The article presents materials of the international round table "Religious Institutions as Regulators of Moral Paradigm in Geopolitics" held within the framework of the Christmas Readings "Global Challenges of Modernity and Spiritual Choice of Man" by the National Research Institute of Communications Development (NIIRK), the Belarusian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, and the "Christian Educational Centre named after Sts. Methodius and Cyril". The article contains the opinions of Russian and Belarusian scholars on this problem. The authors come to the conclusion: "The basis of modern geopolitics is the position of confrontation between the West (civilizations of the sea dominated by market institutions) and the East ("land civilizations dominated by redistributive institutions"). The regulator smoothing this confrontation is religion".

Evgenia V. Dumina drew attention to the existence of a common civilisational platform for Russia and South Ossetia. The cultural interaction of the two peoples was considered. The study led the author to the conclusion: "The prospect of revival of the Great Country - Russia as a fully sovereign and multinational world power acutely raises the question of the official status of the future state formation, its international legal recognition in case the Russian authorities support the idea of South Ossetia's accession to the Russian Federation".

Farhod K.U. Yokubov reviewed the migration processes between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation and noted that "the Russian labour market plays an important role in the economic mobilization of Uzbek labour migrants... and the Russian destination remains popular and attractive for labour migrants. As a result, most remittances to Uzbekistan come precisely from Russia".

The history of international relations and foreign policy in the relationship between historical retrospect and modernity is examined in three articles.

Dilshod N. Aberkulov studied the role of military formations of the Central Asian Military District in the defence battles near Moscow. The author sees the relevance of the analysis in the fact that it is now "appropriate to remember those tragic and heroic days when all the peoples of the former Soviet Union rose to defend their homeland, realizing the great danger that German fascism with its hateful ideology carried with it".

Valerii A. Letiaev and Rafik R. Magdeev examined the priorities of Japan's foreign policy programme during the period when Yoshihide Suga was Prime Minister. The Japanese prime minister understood these priorities as «restoring diplomacy and security». The authors emphasised that "Yoshihide Suga was the first leader in eight years to form a cabinet of people he knew personally, expecting to follow the course set by his predecessor, Shinzo Abe". His reputation as a «hard-headed lieutenant» who managed bureaucrats and pushed policies has led observers to characterise him as a «problem solver», «Sugalin» (similar to Stalin) and «chair-warming».

Albina M. Imamutdinova turned to the study of the scientific heritage of the Soviet historian Vladimir M. Khvostov (1905-1972) in the context of the history of international relations. The author understands the importance of «studying the history of the Soviet stage of Russian historical science ... as one of the most important tasks of further development of modern scientific knowledge. This is, first of all, connected with the study of the scientific heritage of historians, with the disclosure of the essence of their worldview, views, concepts, rethinking the experience of previous generations of scientists». The author emphasises that «an independent place in these studies is occupied by the historian himself, the «life milestones» of his creative path, his ideals, socio-cultural environment - all this influences his formation».

Dear readers!

The editorial board of the journal hopes that the materials of the issue will arouse your interest and that you yourself will become one of our authors in the future

Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Vitaly Naumkin

INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROCESSES

International Relations, Global and Regional Studies

RUSSIA & WORLD: SCIENTIFIC DIALOGUE

**РОССИЯ
И МИР**
НАУЧНЫЙ ДИАЛОГ

Integration unions can increase, but up to a certain limit (the limit of saturation, or expansion), determined not by the natural limits of geographical space, but by the possibility of developing a common position on the main (fundamental) issues of functioning, common norms and practices.

P.A.Barakhvostov

Friedrich Ratzel's Law of the Spatial Growth of States in the Situation of the New World Order Formation

Based on the results of the peacekeeping forces actions the trilateral meeting was held on January 11, 2021 in Moscow with the participation of the President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia N. V. Pashinyan and the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan I. G. Aliyev. It was announced, that more than 48 thousand displaced persons and refugees returned to Nagorno-Karabakh, and that most of the prisoners returned to Armenia were transported with the help of peacekeeping forces. As of February 16, 2022, 150 people were released from captivity.

R.E.Gasparyan, A.Yu.Skakov

Russian Peacekeeping Mission in Nagorno-Karabakh (2020–2023)

China has always pursued an independent foreign policy, and promoting the development of high-level Russian-Chinese relations is also a strategic choice made by China taking into account the overall situation of its internal development and China's overall diplomatic strategy.

Wang Yu

Diplomacy of Heads of State: Chinese Media about Xi Jinping's Visit to Russia in March 2023

Given favorable conditions and the right strategy, Kazakhstan can become a leader in the field of hydrogen energy in the region and make a significant contribution to the global development of this industry. The development of hydrogen energy as an industry in Kazakhstan also contributes to achieving national and international goals in the field of sustainable development, reducing greenhouse gas emissions and reducing dependence on unstable energy sources.

A.E.Ibraeva

New Trends and Prospects for Hydrogen Energy in the World and in Kazakhstan

...Taking into account that the bulk of the weapons of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia are of Soviet or Russian production, deepening cooperation between our countries in the military-technical sphere, as well as enriching the legal framework, is of great importance.

Zh.S.Manukyan

Contractual Legal Framework for Military-Technical Cooperation between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation

In recent years, the countries of Iberia and Latin America have faced serious economic and political problems: crises, recessions and financial difficulties. But this did not affect the Ibero-American community, which withstood the historical test.

T.A.Tufetulov

The Role of Spain in Ibero-American Cooperation

Strong ties between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan are characterized as "strategic" and "allied," and unofficially, politicians of the two countries declare that the two countries are inhabited by one people, thus influencing the formation of the communication regime of Azerbaijan.

S.A.Tyulyakova

Trends in the Development of Friendly Communications between Turkey and Azerbaijan

Friedrich Ratzel's Law of the Spatial Growth of States in the Situation of the New World Order Formation

Pavel A. Barakhvostov✉

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Abstract. In this paper, on the basis of an institutional approach, it is analyzed how fair the "law of expansion" of F. Ratzel is in the current situation of the formation of a new world order. It is shown that in modern conditions the instinct of self-preservation induces social systems not to territorial expansion due to an increase in the occupied geographical space, but to integration in various forms, which is based on a single normative approach to the mechanisms of the functioning of the union. In this sense, integration is a kind of expansion of the space occupied by society. Integration unions can increase, but up to a certain limit (saturation limit), determined not by the boundaries of geographical space, but by the possibility of developing a common position on the main issues of functioning, common norms and practices. As a rule, alliances are not absolutely symmetrical and include the "core" and the periphery of integration. The former include the most economically and politically strong states. At the same time, due to the asymmetry of the unions, the "core" institutions are transplanted to the periphery and there is a bidirectional institutional diffusion, which is due to the desire for institutional convergence, and this facilitates interaction within the union. Thus, "channels" for the institutional expansion of integrable societies are formed within the unions. Transplantation and diffusion of institutions are the mechanisms for the implementation of expansion in modern conditions. It is shown that when integrating social systems in order to mitigate possible institutional imbalances, the action of institutions that are complementary to the dominant ones in the institutional matrix is included: when integrating X-matrix countries - market ones, and vice versa.

Keywords: geopolitical approach, geopolitical space, expansion, institutional approach, integration, regionalism, regionalization

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Introduction

At the turn of the XIX and XX centuries. the founder of geopolitics F. Ratzel formulated the "law of expansion". Based on the ideas of Darwinism, he argued that the state is a living organism [45], similar to natural organisms, evolving and improving in relation to the physical environment. His main instinct is self-preservation, and the indicator of life is development (internal change, movement), growth [18]. Wondering what the indicator of the life of the state is, F. Ratzel believed that this is the space occupied by it [45]. Thus, developing and gaining strength, each state strives for spatial growth, which continues to its natural borders through conquest or colonization. According to F.Ratzel, in the process of growth, the state tries, first of all, to absorb "politically valuable" places: coastlines, riverbeds, plains, resource-rich regions. At the same time, the "impulse" to territorial expansion comes from outside [38]. The growth of states contributes to the stratification of the world: the strong powers create colonial empires, the lots of the weak powers are to be attached to strong powers or involved in the orbit of their influence [6].

The "Law of Expansion" became the foundation for the infamous, tarnished ideologies of colonialism by European powers, American expansionism, Italian fascism, German Nazism, and Japanese militarism. The world has changed a lot over the past period. However, the problem of expansion research has not lost its relevance. Its forms and causes in the XX century and at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries were considered by S.Huntington, G.Morgenthau, S.Cohen, G.Kissinger, R.Stoikers, I.Lacoste, Z.Brzezinski, etc.

E.Battler, W.Gray, V.Kupchan, J.Galtung, K.Rayet, R.Collins analyzed the geopolitical changes in the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Various aspects and forms of geopolitical expansion in the post-bipolar era are described by A.Abazov, V.Kudryavtsev, D.Malysheva, M.Ilyin.

A.Utkin, K.Sorokin, E.Pozdnyakov, Yu.Tikhonravov analyzed the processes of expansion of individual states in various regions of the world. K.Gadzhiev, N.M.Rakityansky, N.V.Eliseev, N.A.Komleva studied the impact of globalization on the manifestations of geopolitical expansion.

Despite the close attention to this problem, which has been repeatedly intensified due to the change in the global balance of power, the challenge to the leadership of the collective West from Russia and China, and the formation of a new world order taking place before our eyes, as a rule, this phenomenon is analyzed within the framework of a geopolitical approach that allows us to explore only its individual aspects. In this paper, a different method of solving this problem is proposed – an institutional one, when the focus of analysis is directed to considering the state and evolution of the institutional environment of a developing open social system, which is an integrated combination of interrelated and interdependent subsystems: economic, political and socio-cultural. Based on this approach, we will try to answer how fair is F.Ratzel's "Law of expansion" in modern conditions.

Materials and methods

The research is based on an institutional approach, in which institutions are considered as stable models of interactions in society, as ways of actions and judgments that exist in society outside of a single individual (5), as “rules of the game” that structure social action [32].

In the analysis, we use the idea of society as a holistic integrated phenomenon [T.Parsons], in which interrelated and interdependent subsystems (economic, political, socio-cultural) are equivalent [I.Wallerstein]. A complex institutional structure allows regulate the functioning of the entire system, in which it is possible to identify the “backbone” – the economic, political and socio-cultural basic institutions forming an institutional matrix that set the direction of collective and individual actions.

There are two main types of basic institutions: redistributive and market-based. This position is based on the hypothesis of two types of economic systems, substantiated in the works of A.Smith, K.Marx, M.Weber, V.Oiken, K.Polanyi, D.North, as well as the idea of K.Wittfogel, T.Parsons, I.Wallerstein on the connection of economic, political and socio-cultural institutions.

The basic redistributive institutions include: in the economic sphere - public property, redistribution relations (accumulation – coordination – distribution), official labor; in the political sphere – a unitary (unitary-centralized) political structure, a hierarchical vertical of power, appointments as an order of occupation of managerial positions, complaints by instances as a feedback mechanism; in the socio-cultural sphere – a communitarian worldview (awareness of the priority of the rights and interests of “We” over “I”); egalitarianism [7]. Basic market institutions: in the economic sphere - private property, purchase and sale as an institution of exchange, profit as an institution of feedback, wage labor, competition; in the political sphere – federal political structure; electability as an order of formation of personnel of managers at all levels, self-government and subsidiarity; in the socio-cultural sphere – subsidiary ideology expressing dominance “I” over “We” [7]. In the institutional matrix, the basic institutions of two types – redistributive and market-based - coexist simultaneously on the principles of dominance and complementarity. An institutional matrix dominated by redistributive institutions is called an X-type matrix, a market-type matrix.

The analysis of empirical data shows the relationship of the type of institutional matrix with the geographical space occupied by the social system [8; 20; 21; 27; 30; 33; 34; 36; 40; 42]. In the work [24] it was revealed that the temperature, precipitation level and risk of natural disasters determine the greatest influence on the nature of institutional models emerging in states. It is shown that in territories with relatively mild climatic characteristics (optimal air temperatures and precipitation), as well as low risks of natural disasters, states with Y-type institutional matrices are usually formed. In turn, in regions where there are significant fluctuations in precipitation amplitude and air temperature, average temperatures and average precipitation levels are very high or very low and disaster risks are high, countries with X-type institutional matrices prevail.

This feature can be explained by the fact that the formation of a social system begins at a stage when sedentary agriculture occupies a dominant position in the economy, which allows society to survive and provide itself with food, regardless of environmental conditions. It is in the agrarian epochs that mechanisms for coordinating social activities arise, thanks to which it is possible to master nature and use it for public needs. At the same time, the agricultural sector is strongly influenced by climatic factors and the landscape. The transition to subsequent stages of development does not cancel out the institutional results of previous historical epochs, but absorbs them into itself due to the mechanisms of cumulative causality [T.Veblen], the effect of dependence on the path [P.A.David, S.Ya. Libovits, S.Ya.Margolis, etc.], “blocking” effects [D.North].

Institutions are stable enough, but they are not a fixed structure (35). Institutional changes can be gradual [3; 17; 25; 28; 31] and fast. They are caused by both endogenous and exogenous factors. The latter include, for example, the impact of other countries due to diffusion or targeted transplantation (the term was introduced by V.Polterovich [10] of their institutes.

The process of institutional diffusion is difficult to predict, while the transplantation of institutions can be facilitated through a number of technologies: by modifying the transplant [26], local transplantation within not the entire country, but its separate region [41], borrowing the institute from the past of the donor country at any stage of its development [44], “building sequences of intermediate institutions connecting the initial structure with the final one corresponding to the transplanted institution” [10].

The above provisions are used further to analyze the features of the manifestation of expansion in modern conditions.

Results

A social system is an integrated formation of three interconnected and interdependent subsystems (economic, political, sociocultural), each of which can be associated with the space it occupies (economic, political, sociocultural). The economic space arises and functions on the basis of the material needs of a person due to his biological nature, the political and socio-cultural space – on the basis of higher social needs associated with the fact that a person is a social being. These spaces are closely intertwined, their boundaries are blurred and do not coincide with the state ones. The number of actors in these spaces has increased dramatically (along with the state, the role of non-state actors has increased), and it is often impossible to accurately determine their affiliation to a particular social system. The problem of the homeostasis of society is now more connected not with the geographical space occupied by it, but with non-territorial spaces: economic, political, socio-cultural. How can we ensure the development of the social system with such an “overgrowth” of the spaces associated with it?

Currently, an attempt to give “geographical territoriality” to their economic, political, and socio-cultural space by joining other peoples and the territories they occupy can lead

society to destruction. The instinct of self-preservation motivates social systems not to territorial expansion by directly increasing the occupied space, but to integration in various forms. It is based on a unified normative approach to the mechanisms of functioning of the union. In this sense, integration is a form of expansion of the space occupied by society (expansion).

It should be noted that integration is understood as “the emergence of some new community, some integral formation with orderly, organic relations between its constituent elements” [2:32], “the process of formation and development of connections leading to the emergence of a state of connectedness” [4:11], the unification of social systems into a kind of “community or even a system with self-sufficient integration mechanisms” [19].

As a rule, unions are not absolutely symmetrical and include the “core” and “periphery” of integration. The former include the most economically and politically powerful States. At the same time, due to the asymmetry of unions, there is a transfer of “core” institutions to the periphery and bidirectional institutional diffusion, which is due to the desire for institutional convergence (in the optimal case, unification), which facilitates interaction within the union. Thus, “channels” of institutional expansion of integrated societies are formed within unions. Transplantation and diffusion of institutions are the mechanisms of expansion in modern conditions. An example of such an institutional expansion is the influence of the German legal tradition on the legal community of the European Union. The EU law, which is currently applied in all member states of the union, has an obvious German imprint. At the same time, the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights are based mainly on French legislation and legal practices in France.

Often, the countries of the “core” of integration resort to managing the processes of institutional transplantation and diffusion through the use of incentive conditionality mechanisms (financing the transplantation of institutions, granting economic preferences to the acceptor country) and socialization (training the elite of the target country in their practices). Negative conditionality (forcing the introduction of institutions) is rarely used. An example is the adoption of the EU in 1999 Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe.

Institutional diffusion has a spatial limit, which is determined by the following factors:

1) the difference between the types of institutional matrices of the donor and acceptor countries: the greater the difference between them, the more difficult the diffusion process is. Due to their inherent creative potential, peoples have the opportunity to creatively rethink (hybridize) diffused (transplanted) institutions, “adjusting” them to their matrix. The high degree of hybridization, in which the essential characteristics of a hybrid institution allow it to be attributed to the type of institutions dominating the matrix of the acceptor society, determines the limit of the diffusion of institutions;

2) the depletion of the donor social system, which must expend enormous efforts (invest significant funds) to maintain the process.

Integration unions can increase, but up to a certain limit (saturation limit, or expansion), determined by the possibility of developing a common position on the main issues of functioning, common practices. An example of this is the European Union, which

has experienced several expansions in different geographical directions, joining states with different levels of economic development and different cultures. The achieved limit of expansion to the East is due not only to geopolitical reasons (Russia's disagreement), but also to significant difficulties in coordinating the institutional matrices of the Western European EU countries and the post-Soviet states. R. Prodi, President of the European Commission, stated in 2002 that the EU could not expand further, since the union could only be reduced to a free trade area, having lost the “political” component of interaction¹. Thus, the limit of the union's expansion in modern conditions is determined not by natural geographical limits, but by the possibility of coordination, “docking” of the main institutions that set the principles of its functioning. The saturation limit of a stable integration union cannot exceed the spatial limit of institutional diffusion.

As a rule, an integration association is formed within the framework of a certain region with an established regional order, which is determined by the ratio in the integration processes of regionalization (integration “from below”) and regionalism (integration “from above” with the transfer of part of sovereignty to supranational structures) [43]. It is noted that regional orders in Europe and Asia differ significantly [1; 9; 12; 13; 23; 37]: if regionalism occupies a significant place in the first case (integration of countries with Y-type institutional matrices), regionalization occupies a significant place in the second (mainly integration of X-type countries). In addition, regional governance in the West and East differs significantly, understood as ways to coordinate social actions to create mandatory rules and/or public goods and services in one or more problem areas at the regional level [15; 16; 29; 39]. Regional governance includes hierarchical and non-hierarchical ways of shaping regional policy on key issues. The former, as a rule, prevail in regions uniting countries with the Y-matrix, the latter are typical for regions of countries with the X-matrix, in countries united by the struggle against colonialism and apartheid [46, chapter 12, 13]. For example, the institutions of regional governance in East Asia are not as rigid as in the EU. They are based on informal confidence-building tools, bilateral and multilateral meetings of country leaders, bilateral and multilateral free trade and security agreements, etc. This feature has been called “self-blocking multilateralism” [22:116], “permanent underinstitutionalization” [14:330].

Due to the complexity of the space occupied by the social system, integration in modern conditions is a multidimensional and multidimensional process that does not always boil down to the formation of protectionist schemes in trade. Security remains one of the main drivers of integration, as a result of which stable unions with a high level of regionalism seek to extend their institutions outside the integration association (to the nearest neighbors) to facilitate interaction with the outside world, on the one hand, on the other - in an attempt to create a zone of security and prosperity not only directly at their borders, but also at the borders neighbors due to the huge connectivity of space in the modern world. An example of such a phenomenon should be considered the European

¹ Prodi R. 2002. A wider Europe: a proximity policy as a key to stability: EU Doc. SPEECH/02/619, Brussels, 5–6 Dec. 2002. Available from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-619_en.htm.

Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), implemented in relation to the EU's closest neighbors from the East and South. Since its launch, the European Neighborhood Policy has been an "expansion without expansion." The European Neighbourhood Policy did not imply direct access to the benefits of EU membership and was aimed at spreading EU institutions beyond the integration association [11:9]. Institutional diffusion far beyond the geographical space occupied by the social system, outside the integration union, is a form of expansion in modern conditions.

Discussion

The features of the integration processes discussed above as manifestations of institutional expansion are largely determined by the type of institutional matrix of the social system. The X-matrix countries have a strong state with a hierarchical system of power, which, when integrated, do not need anyone's coordinating action: the State takes over this function itself. This leads to the fact that unification is carried out "from below" (at the level of non-state actors), and the main mechanism of integration is regionalization, which is based on the involvement of market (complementary) institutions that perform a compensatory function, preventing institutional imbalances in the matrix.

The countries of the Y-matrix type, the construction of power relations in which is carried out on the principle of decentralization (self-government and subsidiarity), when united, need some kind of coordinating, guiding force. This leads to the predominance of the mechanism of regionalism in the integration, which is based on the use of redistributive (complementary) institutions, which, as in the previous case, perform a compensatory function in order to mitigate institutional imbalances.

For countries with different types of institutional matrix, convergence is possible (for example, cooperation in the field of security, or participation in a Free Trade Zone), but integration in this case will be limited only to certain areas of exceptional importance for public systems, with the prevalence of regionalization processes (integration "from below" without creating any significant and effective supranational bodies).

Because of this, a number of researchers argue that the modern world order is a regional world order (23), emphasizing the regional architecture of world politics [46].

Conclusion

Thus, as in the time of F. Ratzel, any society is driven by the instinct of self-preservation, which in modern conditions encourages not direct expansion in the form of annexation of new territories, but integration in various forms, based on a unified normative approach to the mechanisms of functioning of the union. In this sense, integration is a kind of form of expansion of the space occupied by society (expansion). Integration unions can increase, but up to a certain limit (saturation limit, or expansion), determined not by the natural

limits of geographical space, but by the possibility of developing a common position on the main (fundamental) issues of functioning, common norms and practices.

As a rule, unions are not absolutely symmetrical and include the "core" and "periphery" of integration. The first include the most economically and politically powerful States. At the same time, due to the asymmetry of unions, there is a transplantation of "core" institutions to the periphery and bidirectional institutional diffusion, which is due to the desire for institutional convergence (in the future, unification), which facilitates interaction within the union. Thus, "channels" of institutional expansion of integrated societies are formed within unions. Transplantation and diffusion of institutions are the main mechanisms of expansion in modern conditions.

It is shown that when integrating social systems in order to mitigate possible institutional imbalances, institutions complementary to the dominant ones in the institutional matrix are involved: when integrating X (Y)-matrix countries, market (redistributive) ones are used.

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Contribution of the author

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Russian Peacekeeping Operation in Nagorno-Karabakh (2020–2023)

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Abstract. The article presents the results of a study of the peacekeeping mission conducted by the Russian peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020–2023 and assesses its effectiveness. According to the trilateral agreement signed on November 10, 2020 by the Presidents of the Russian Federation, the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, Russian peacekeepers were introduced into Nagorno-Karabakh. After the signed trilateral agreement, two more agreements followed, which fixed effective activities and strengthened the need for the presence of peacekeepers in the region. In December 2022, Azerbaijani so-called “eco-activists” blocked the only road (the Lachin Corridor) connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, blocking the free movement of people and goods, hindering the activities of peacekeepers and creating a humanitarian crisis for the population of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Keywords: peacekeepers, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transcaucasia, politics

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Introduction

In 2020, Russian peacekeepers were introduced into the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh to maintain stability in the region and promote peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This was part of a tripartite agreement signed on the night of November 9–10, 2020 by the two countries and Russia. Russian peacekeeping forces use military

equipment such as helicopters and armored vehicles (90 armored personnel carriers) to monitor the ceasefire and ensure the safety of civilians in the region. Peacekeepers control a corridor allowing the free movement of people and goods across the region's borders. Russian peacekeepers are mediators in negotiations between the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides.

The purpose of the article is to present the results of a study of the operation of Russian peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh and assess its effectiveness.

The relevance of the topic is related to the need to study regional problems.

The operation of the Russian Federation in Nagorno-Karabakh is not the only peacekeeping operation in the post-Soviet space¹. The international community, led by the UN, during the Cold War was unable to respond to major conflicts due to hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union. At that time, military intervention in the affairs of other states was considered a violation of the norm of non-intervention. During the Cold War, there were three significant cases of intervention by individual states: the Indian intervention in East Pakistan (1971), the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda (1978), the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia (1979)². After the collapse of the USSR, Russia took on a peacekeeping mission in a number of CIS countries³. Thus, the Russian operational group of troops of the 14th Army, stationed in Transnistria (Moldova) [2:209–210], is carrying out a peacekeeping mission [1]. Russia actively participated in resolving conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Tajikistan [1]. In addition to peacekeeping missions in Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan, Russian military personnel participated in UN peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia⁴. Russian military personnel were stationed in Angola as part of the UN Control Commission⁵. 73 Russian military observers were part of UN missions in the Middle East, on the Iraq-Kuwait border, Western Sahara, Yugoslavia, Angola and Georgia. 1,600 Russian airborne troops became part of the NATO Special Forces in the former Yugoslavia (Kosovo).

Russia has its military bases on the territory of the CIS, which is a guarantor of the security of both the state borders of Russia itself and the borders of its allies. There are

¹ Laktionova I.V. Russia's peacekeeping activities in the CIS (1992–1999). Abstract of the theses of the CandSc (Polit.). Moscow, 2004.

² Wheeler N.J., Morris J. Humanitarian Intervention and State Practice at the End of the Cold War. In: Fawn R., and Larkins J. International Society after the Cold War. Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1996.

³ Zagorsky A.V. Russia in the European security system. Moscow: IMEMO RAS, 2017:139.

⁴ Nikitin A.I. International conflicts: intervention, peacekeeping, resolution. Moscow: Aspect Press, 2017:384.

⁵ Consideration by the Security Council of issues in accordance with its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The situation in Angola. Compendium of the Practice of the Security Council - Supplement for the years 1993–1995. Chapter VIII. Responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international law and security. The situation in Angola. Available from: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/ru/sc/repertoire/93-95/93_95_08.pdf

several Russian military facilities in Belarus⁶. Until 2014, the Crimean naval base operated in Ukraine⁷. In Armenia, in the city of Gyumri, the 102nd military base of Russia has been permanently located since 1995⁸. The Gabala radar station is located in Azerbaijan, which was leased to Russia from 1994 to 2012⁹. Until 2009, Russian military bases were permanently located in Georgia¹⁰. Military installations of the Russian Federation are located on the territory of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan¹¹.

Materials and Methods

The authors' research materials included published documents, statements by politicians, interviews and media publications.

The variety of sources promotes the use of different methods. The main research methods were content analysis, event analysis, historical retrospective method, and comparative analysis.

Results

Events in the region and the activities of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh from November 10, 2020 to January 31, 2023

The war started by the Republic of Azerbaijan against the Defense Army of Nagorno-Karabakh (Republic of Artsakh) on September 27, 2020, ended on November 10, 2020 with a tripartite agreement signed by the Presidents of the Russian Federation V.V.Putin, the Republic of Azerbaijan I.G.Aliyev and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia N.V.Pashinyan. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Declaration provided for the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh along the line of contact and the Lachin (Berdzor) corridor for a period of five years, with an automatic extension for the next 5 years, unless one of the parties declares its intention to terminate the application of the

⁶ Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia on Russian military bases on the territory of the Republic of Georgia dated September 15, 1995. In: Legislation of the CIS countries. Available from: https://base.spininform.ru/show_doc.fwx?rgn=25425

⁷ Crimean naval base of the Black Sea Fleet. In: Nevsky Bastion. Available from: <https://tass.ru/spec/black-sea-fleet>

⁸ 102nd Russian military base. Available from: https://gyumri.mid.ru/ru/sootchestvenniki/102_aya_rossiyskaya_voennoy_baza/

⁹ Russia and Azerbaijan agreed to lease the Gabala radar station for three years. Available from: <https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2012/09/28/rossiya-i-azerbajdzhan-dogovorilis-ob-arende-gabalinskoy-rls-na-tri-goda>

¹⁰ Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia on Russian military bases on the territory of the Republic of Georgia dated September 15, 1995. Available from: https://base.spininform.ru/show_doc.fwx?rgn=25425

¹¹ Lukin M. All Russian bases. Kommersant. 21.05.2007. Available from: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/766827/>; Nersisyan L. There is nowhere else to retreat: Russian military bases, 2015. Regnum. 24.03.2015. Available from: <https://regnum.ru/news/polit/1908336.html>.

agreement in 6 months before the end of the term^{12*}. At that time, the participation of other countries in the peacekeeping mission was not discussed.

The Humanitarian Response Center of the Russian peacekeeping contingent is actively working in Stepanakert (the capital of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic)¹³. Within the framework of the Center, humanitarian aid is delivered to the population, demining of territories is organized, and assistance is provided in the search for missing persons. The center provides necessary humanitarian assistance¹⁴, promotes employment and solving other social problems¹⁵.

At a trilateral meeting held on January 11, 2021 in Moscow with the participation of the President of the Russian Federation V.V.Putin, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia N.V.Pashinyan and the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan I.G.Aliyev, it was announced that more than 48 thousand displaced persons and refugees have returned to Nagorno-Karabakh¹⁶, and that most of the prisoners who returned to Armenia were transported with the help of peacekeeping forces. As of February 16, 2022, 150 people were released from captivity¹⁷.

In total, 22 groups of prisoners were returned after the war, 18 of them through the mediation of the Russian Federation and 4 through the mediation of other countries - the USA, EU, France, Hungary and Georgia. Through the mediation of the Russian Federation, 111 Armenian prisoners of war were released from captivity (we note the return of 15 Armenian prisoners of war in exchange for a map of 97,000 anti-personnel and anti-tank

¹² Statement by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the President of the Russian Federation. Available from: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384> * Ознакомиться с картами дислокации миротворческих войск можно на сайте Минобороны РФ: Архив карт обстановок в районе проведения миротворческой операции. Available from: https://mil.ru/russian_peacekeeping_forces/infograf/.htm

¹³ Russian peacekeepers received more than 3.5 thousand requests for help at the Citizens Reception Point, and also began targeted distribution of humanitarian aid in Stepanakert. Available from: https://z.mil.ru/spec_mil_oper/brief/briefings/more.htm?id=12351938@egNews; Около 2,5 тыс. человек обратились за помощью в пункт приема граждан российского миротворческого контингента в Нагорном Карабахе. URL: <https://stat.mil.ru/et/news/more.htm?id=12347339@egNews>

¹⁴ Russian peacekeepers donated about 40 liters of blood for patients in Nagorno-Karabakh. Available from: https://contract.mil.ru/sel_contract/news/more.htm?id=12376920@egNews. Find the fallen, help the living. Available from: <https://zvezdaweekly.ru/news/2021451353-lnG65.html>

¹⁵ Russian peacekeepers carried out a humanitarian action in a kindergarten in the village of Ashan in Nagorno-Karabakh. Available from: https://mil.ru/russian_peacekeeping_forces/news/more.htm?id=12410426@egNews

¹⁶ Russian Ambassador: Russian peacekeepers played an important role in the return of prisoners from Azerbaijan. Available from: <https://tass.ru/politika/11713111>

¹⁷ *ՀՀ Ազգային անվտանգության ծառայությունից հայտնել են, որ 44-օրյա պատերազմից մինչև 2022 թվականի փետրվարի 16-ը գերությանից ազատվել է 150 հոգի: Նրանցից մեկը՝ լիբանանահայ Մարալ Նաջարյանը, 2021-ի մարտին ուղարկվել է Լիբանան, ևս մեկը 2021-ի փետրվարին իր ցանկությամբ ուղարկվել է ՌԴ. ըստ այդմ՝ հայրենադարձված ռազմագերիների թիվը կազմում է 148: Ըստ ԱԲԾ տվյալների՝ առաջին գերուն Ադրբեյջանը վերադարձրել է դեռևս պատերազմի օրերին՝ 2020 թվականի հոկտեմբերի 28-ին. [The National Security Service of the Republic of Armenia reported that during the 44-day war until February 16, 2022, 150 people were released from captivity. One of them, Maral Najarian, an Armenian of Lebanese origin, was sent to Lebanon in March 2021, and the other was sent to the Russian Federation at her own request in February 2021: accordingly, the number of repatriated prisoners of war is 148 people. According to the National Security Service, Azerbaijan returned its first prisoner during the war, on October 28, 2020] (in Armenian). Available from: <https://www.aravot.am/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/geriner.jpg>

mines installed in the Agdam region¹⁸), 39 Armenian prisoners were released through the mediation of the mentioned countries and organizations. Later, in September 2022, 5 more prisoners were returned to Armenia¹⁹.

The clashes that occurred in the zones of the Armenian-Azerbaijani and Azerbaijani-Karabakh (Artsakh) conflicts after the trilateral statement on November 10, 2020 show that the situation in the region is far from a peaceful settlement. Already on December 11, 2020, the ceasefire was violated in the area of the settlements of Khitsaberd and Khin Tager, Hadrut region. As a result of the actions of Russian peacekeeping forces, the violation was stopped²⁰.

Azerbaijani aggression is aimed not only at Nagorno-Karabakh, but also at the sovereign territory of Armenia. On May 12, 2021, the Azerbaijani military advanced deep into the Syunik region of Armenia and tried to gain a foothold in the Black Lake area (Sevlich)²¹.

In 2022, the Azerbaijani armed forces violated agreements and carried out military operations in areas under the control of Russian peacekeeping forces²².

On March 24-25, 2022, Azerbaijani troops captured the village of Parukh (Farukh), this threatened to escalate into a new military conflict, Azerbaijan used a Turkish-made drone “Bayraktar-TB2”, striking the positions of the armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh²³.

After these events, military clashes began between Azerbaijan and Armenia on September 13, 2022. During the September escalation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, a week of fighting, according to official data, killed 207 Armenians and 77 Azerbaijanis²⁴.

The humanitarian situation around Nagorno-Karabakh escalated on December 12, 2022, when Azerbaijani so-called “eco-activists” blocked the Stepanakert-Goris road, the only highway that connects Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. The command of the Russian peacekeeping contingent negotiated with representatives of Azerbaijan on opening

18 Baku and Yerevan exchanged prisoners and maps of minefields. Available from: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/12/06/2021/60c4e88b9a79472eef8c0095>

19 Azerbaijan returned five prisoners of war to Armenia: Available from: <https://ru.armeniasputnik.am/amp/20220908/azerbaydzhan-vernul-armenii-pyatelykh-voennoplennyykh-oni-uzhe-na-rodine-47934222.html>

20 The Ministry of Defense denied reports that peacekeepers were surrounded in Karabakh: Available from: https://ria.ru/20201216/karabakh-1589572684.html?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop; Yerevan stated that the Russian Federation helped the Armenian military escape from encirclement: Available from: <https://www.interfax.ru/world/741639>

21 The actions of the Azerbaijani side in the Black Lake area are unacceptable, this is an encroachment on the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia: Nikol Pashinyan at a meeting of the Security Council. Available from: <https://www.primeminister.am/ru/press-release/item/2021/05/12/Nikol-Pashinyan-Security-Council-meeting/>; Baku explained the situation on the border with Armenia by the relocation of the military. Available from: <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/363886/>

22 Yesterday, the Azerbaijani armed forces opened fire in the direction of Nerkin Hand. According to the head of the community, one person was injured. Available from: <https://rus.azatutyun.am/a/32044574.html>; MO: Units of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces opened fire from small arms in the direction of Armenian positions near the village of Nerkin Hand. Available from: panorama.am/ru/news/2022/12/09/МО-Подразделения-ВС-Азербайджана-Неркин-Ханд/2766693

23 The toponymic war has escalated in Karabakh. Available from: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5281162>

24 The United States wants to become the main moderator of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Will the new mediators help Yerevan and Baku reach an agreement? More details on RBC: Available from: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/29/09/2022/63356c749a7947718f34cca8>

the road for civilian transport. Many countries, including France, India and the United States, called on the Azerbaijani side to unblock the Lachin corridor (Berdzor). However, Nagorno-Karabakh, with a population of 120,000 people, is still under blockade and faces a humanitarian catastrophe²⁵.

Summing up the operation of the peacekeepers of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in the region, we note that since November 23, 2020, 2,433 hectares of territory, 689.5 km of roads, 1,939 buildings have been cleared of unexploded mines and shells, 26,540 explosive objects were detected and neutralized²⁶.

Official view of the activities of peacekeepers

The official assessment of the Republic of Armenia of the presence of Russian peacekeepers is positive. Despite the provocative disinformation being spread, Armenia wants to see the presence of peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. The closure of the Lachin corridor leads to an increase in anti-Russian sentiment and discontent²⁷. The Republic of Armenia invites Russia to apply to the UN Security Council to obtain a mandate for the Russian peacekeeping mission²⁸. In his speech at the congress of the “Civil Contract” party, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia stated that an important point of the agreements of the trilateral meeting held on January 11, 2021 is that the Russian Federation is the guarantor of the security of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Republic of Armenia:

...this is very important, and we agreed on this scenario and plan <...> yes, also about Russian peacekeepers, do we want Russian peacekeepers to continue their activities in Nagorno-Karabakh, of course we do <...>. I officially declare that I am ready to sign a document in Sochi that the Russian peacekeeping presence in Nagorno-Karabakh will be unconditionally extended for 10 years, 15 years, 20 years...²⁹

Studying the official position of Azerbaijan, which was reflected in the statements of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan regarding peacekeepers at different times, one

25 The humanitarian consequences of blocking the only road connecting artsakh with armenia and the world: December 26, 2022. Available from: <https://ombuds.am/images/files/c01555c03620fb8494eaeef308fe9ca15.pdf?fbclid=IwAR3yAEBlapS7WlgrCgFZ8zZ6SeKRvFh8b9H2rONXKQ3geyZ4hVR2H89n1eM>

26 Information bulletin of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on the activities of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone (as of February 5, 2023). Available from: <http://surl.li/esvmd>

27 Pashinyan said that Armenia does not criticize Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh. Available from: <https://ria.ru/20230110/mirotvortsy-1843887159.html>; <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/16766059>

28 Pashinyan named difficulties with Armenia's appeal to the UN Security Council. Available from: <https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreeneews/63bd66f49a7947317f012cc2>

29 Պատրաստ եմ ստորագրել փաստաթուղթ, որ ռուս խաղաղապահների ներկայությունը ԼՂ-ում երկարացվի 20 տարով. և Փաշինյան [I am ready to sign an extension of the Russian peacekeepers' mission in Artsakh for 20 years. N. Pashinyan] (in Armenian). Available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qn6JHDlmc78>

can understand that Baku considers the activities of peacekeepers a problem.³⁰ Azerbaijan would like to withdraw peacekeepers from the region. Recently, these statements have become more clear and harsh³¹, and after the closure of the Lachin (Berdzor) corridor, the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) is “offered” to accept Azerbaijani citizenship or leave Nagorno-Karabakh³².

The population of Nagorno-Karabakh highly appreciates Russian peacekeepers, this is expressed in statements by the President of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) Arayik Harutyunyan and the Minister of State of Nagorno-Karabakh Ruben Vardanyan³³. “The Russian Federation continues to ensure the security of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, although it is fragile and relatively stable,” said the President of Nagorno-Karabakh³⁴. In his video message, he stated:

Because Russia is busy, the guarantees of Russian peacekeepers are not implemented, which Azerbaijan takes advantage of. On the other hand, all foreign hostile forces carry out military and information provocations with the aim of undermining the role of Russian peacekeepers and creating distrust of Russia among the people of Artsakh. I am confident that the people of Artsakh will not succumb to provocations; a striking example is the special attitude towards Russian peacekeepers in Artsakh. Despite the geopolitical restructuring and challenges in the world and the region, the Russian Federation continues to provide fragile, but still relatively stable security for the people of Artsakh. We hope that it will be possible to increase the effectiveness of Russia’s peacekeeping mission and ensure the indefinite presence of peacekeepers in Artsakh as the most important guarantee of the security of our people³⁵.

One girl (Astghik), who remained in Armenia before the closure of the Lachin corridor, told how Russian peacekeepers helped them return to Artsakh:

30 Ilham Aliyev voiced claims against Russian peacekeepers and mediators Available from: <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/368522/>; Aliyev spoke about Azerbaijan’s claims to Russian peacekeepers Available from: https://lenta.ru/news/2021/09/27/aliev_karb/

31 President Ilham Aliyev: Karabakh is our land. Russian peacekeepers are stationed there temporarily. Available from: <https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3666784.html>; Ilham Aliyev: Russian peacekeepers are there temporarily, and if the Armenians are counting on someone, they will again face tragedy. Available from: <https://1news.az/news/20221108034424760-Ilkham-Aliyev-Rossiiskie-mirotvortsy-nakhodyatsya-tam-vremenno-i-esli-armyane-na-kogo-to-rasschityvayut-oni-snova-stolknutsya-s-tragediei>

32 Ilham Aliyev to the Armenians of Karabakh: accept Azerbaijani citizenship or leave. Available from: <https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-64241011>

33 Vardanyan called the situation in Karabakh too difficult for the emergence of new peacekeepers. Available from: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/16824091>; Ruben Vardanyan demands to stop criticizing Russian peacekeepers. URL: <https://rus.azatutyun.am/a/32220729.html>.

34 Ռուսական խաղաղապահների երաշխիքները ճեղքման են ենթարկվել, ինչից օգտվում է Ադրբեյջանը. Արայիկ Հարությունյան [The guarantees of Russian peacekeepers were violated, which Azerbaijan takes advantage of. Arayik Harutyunyan] (in Armenian). Available from: <https://www.pastinfo.am/hy/news/2022/09/19/axjqv26y1/1463140>.

35 We hope to ensure the indefinite presence of Russian peacekeepers in Artsakh. Arayik Harutyunyan (in Armenian). Available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GÜz275oafg0>

...when the Russian peacekeepers wanted to enter the car, they knocked on the door, we opened it, but suddenly, without knocking, the Azerbaijanis opened the door, tried to enter the car and take a video, the Russian peacekeepers did not let in, and during this commotion, one of our girls it got worse. And when we passed this section of the road, we started calling our parents to meet us...³⁶

This is one of many facts that reflect the behavior and attitude of Azerbaijanis towards Armenians, even minors.

The Russian side, despite enormous efforts aimed at a peaceful resolution of the problem and stability in the region (tripartite statements of November 9, 2020, January 11 and November 26, 2021, October 31, 2022³⁷) and calls³⁸ to the opening of the Lachin corridor, Azerbaijan continues to ignore tripartite agreements and continues to blockade Nagorno-Karabakh (depriving the population of gas supply for several days in winter). This calls into question the effectiveness of peacekeepers.

Conclusion

It is clear that depriving for months the 120,000 residents of Nagorno-Karabakh of freedom of movement, daily food supplies and other essentials is a serious violation of human rights from a legal point of view³⁹, and it can be assumed that the Azerbaijani side, judging by the warning of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to the Armenian side of other statements⁴⁰, is preparing the basis for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces from the region. But the Armenian side positively assesses the presence of Russian peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Russian peacekeepers provide in the region:

- public safety,
- stability,
- solving emerging humanitarian problems,

36 Ադրբեյջանցիները հանկարծակի դուռը բացեցին, փորձեցին մտնել մեքենան, ռուսները չթողեցին. պատմում է Արցախի վերադարձած աղջիկը. «Ռուս խաղաղապահները, երբ ուզում էին մտնել մեքենա, ծեծում էին դուռը, մենք բացում էինք, բայց հանկարծակի, առանց ծեծելու. ադրբեյջանցիները դուռը բացեցին, փորձեցին մտնել մեքենան ու տեսանկարահանել, ռուս խաղաղապահները չթողեցին, հենց այդ իրադարձման ժամանակ էլ մեր աղջիկներից մեկի ինքնազգացողությունը վատացավ: Իսկ երբ այդ ճանապարհահատվածն անցանք, սկսեցինք զանգել ծնողներին, որ մեզ դիմավորեն» [The Azerbaijanis suddenly opened the door and tried to enter the car, but the Russians did not let them in] (in Armenian). Available from: <https://politik.am/am/adrbejancinery-hankartsakidury-bacacin-pordzecin-mtnel-megenan-rusnery-chtocexin-patmum-e-arcakh-veradardzats>

37 Statement by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the President of the Russian Federation. Available from: <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5860>

38 Lavrov called for the nearest unblocking of the Lachin corridor. Available from: <https://ria.ru/20230117/koridor-1845578693.html>; Pashinyan and Putin discussed the closure of the Lachin corridor and the activities of Russian peacekeepers. Available from: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/16928667>

39 European Convention on Human Rights. Available from: <https://www.coe.int/en/web/compass/european-convention-on-human-rights>; <https://www.coe.int/en/web/human-rights-convention/reference-texts>

40 Armenia’s position is flawed! President Ilham Aliyev accused Armenia of trying to disrupt peace talks. Available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W1NJOQcWkPk>.

The deployment of Russian peacekeepers is seen as an important step towards resolving the protracted conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The presence of peacekeepers will help prevent further escalation of the conflict and create an atmosphere of cooperation between the two countries; Russia's actions in the region are seen as an important step towards regional stability and peace. The presence of Russian peacekeepers will help end decades of violence and allow both sides to focus on development and reconstruction of the region.

It can be stated:

- for the population of Nagorno-Karabakh, the presence of peacekeepers is a guarantee of survival;
- this is a guarantee of security for Nagorno-Karabakh and regional stability for the Republic of Armenia.
- Russian peacekeepers will not allow Azerbaijan to completely oust ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh.

The presence of a peacekeeping contingent in Transcaucasia is currently the only guarantee of peace and stability.

*The organization has been recognized a terrorist organization by the Russian Supreme Court. Unified federal list of organizations, including foreign and international organizations, recognized as terrorist in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation (as of June 25, 2023). URL: [http:// www.fsb.ru/fsb/npd/terror.htm](http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/npd/terror.htm); 18+

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“Diplomacy of Heads of State”: Chinese Media about Xi Jinping’s Visit to Russia in March 2023

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Abstract. The visit of the President of the People’s Republic of China to the Russian Federation attracted a lot of attention from the Chinese media, which was manifested in a large number of publications on this topic in the media and social networks. The purpose of the study was to analyze news reports and messages on the Weibo social network about the state visit of the President of the People’s Republic of China to the Russian Federation and determine its role in strengthening bilateral relations between China and Russia. For the first time, the main principles of China’s foreign diplomacy, implemented in a particular state visit, were considered by the example of how they were perceived by public opinion. A content analysis of news reports from mainstream Chinese media showed that this diplomatic move is highly appreciated. The authors of the publications noted the high significance and effectiveness of this visit. A statistical analysis of publications on the Weibo social network showed that public opinion also generally assesses Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia positively, paying attention to the content side of Russian-Chinese relations. In general, strengthening and deepening the comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Russia in the new era is a strategic choice made by countries based on the domestic political and domestic economic situation, which is in line with the fundamental interests of the peoples of the two countries and the development trend of international relations. The results of the study showed that China has always pursued an independent foreign policy, and promoting the development of Russian-Chinese relations at a high level is a strategic choice made by China, taking into account its internal development and overall diplomatic strategy.

Keywords: PRC media, new media, Russian-Chinese relations, community of common destiny, relations between heads of state

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Introduction

The President of China Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Russia from 20th to 22nd March 2023. This was Xi Jinping’s first foreign visit since taking office as President of China for his third term and his ninth since 2013. It is obvious that the visit to Russia, being the first state visit to a foreign country after re-election, reflects the importance of this diplomatic direction for Xi Jinping. Let us note that in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, Western sanctions against Russia and foreign political pressure on China, Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia took place in accordance with normal diplomatic practice, which reflects a high degree of trust between the two countries and a high level of bilateral relations.

The Chinese media paid much attention to the coverage of Xi Jinping’s state visit to Russia and praised its results. This state visit received even more attention by the Chinese media than Xi Jinping’s previous foreign trips in any other period.

Officially, the Chinese Foreign Ministry described Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia as a journey of friendship, cooperation and peace. Chinese state media noted that the main purpose of this visit to Russia is to raise the Russian-Chinese “comprehensive strategic partnership of the new era” to a new level, to continue to expand the Russian-Chinese economic and trade cooperation and thus show the outside world that China is an independent state, and Russian-Chinese relations have not suffered either from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, or from diplomatic and economic pressure from Western countries like the United States.¹

The visit of the Chinese President to Russia in 2023 reflects the established practice of mutual visits and bilateral summits between China and Russia for more than 20 years. The Chinese media note that Xi Jinping’s visit took place, “despite the fact that the global international situation is complex and volatile, and regional conflicts are increasing”.² It is especially noteworthy that in a complex international situation, when the whole world pays great attention to the huge risk of escalation of the Ukrainian crisis, the state visit of President Xi Jinping to Russia carries «the Chinese people’s ardent expectation of good-neighborly friendship and deepening of cooperation, as well as common expectations of the international community in an effort to avoid escalation of risks of war and intensification of the crisis, demands of peace and stability».³ In that connection, the relevance of the proposed topic is beyond doubt.

The article aims to analyze news reports and messages in the «Weibo» social network about the state visit of the Chinese President to the Russian Federation; to determine its role

1 联合早报. 于泽远: 习近平访问俄罗斯的观点. (Lianhe zaobao (Singapore newspaper). Yu zeyuan: Highlights of Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia). Available from: <https://www.kzaobao.com/shiju/20230320/135477.html>

2 Xi Jinping held a video meeting with German Chancellor O. Scholz. Russian.news.cn Available from: <https://russian.news.cn/20220510/bc72a58036de4625b0ad023f0b07e6be/c.html>

3 解放日报. 深度 | 习主席为何访俄? 学者: 遵循惯例, 因应需要, 让世界看到大国交往的样子. Jiefang zhibao (Shanghai newspaper). Depth | Why did President Xi Jinping visit Russia? Scientist: Follow the usual practice, respond to needs and let the world see what exchanges between great powers look like). Available from: <https://www.shobserver.com/news/detail?id=594145>

in strengthening bilateral relations between China and Russia in the context of the Chinese foreign policy concept «community of common destiny».

The theoretical basis of the study, along with the works related to the analysis of Chinese-Russian relations, were also the works of Chinese scientists: Lu Nanquan [7], Sun Zhuangzhi [8], Da Wei [4], Dong Qin [3], Zhong Feiteng [9] which describe the building of a new type of relationship between big powers China and Russia, Yu Xiaodi [10], Wang Mengjie [1] and Wang Linkong [2] were used in describing the strategy of global governance. The article by Dietham A. Schoyfele and David Tewkesbury «Framing, agenda setting and priming: evolution of the three media effects models», published in the *Journal of Communication*, in 2007 [11], was also used.

Materials and Methods

The reports of the official mass media of the People's Republic of China were used: *Zhenmin zhibao* (en. People's Daily), *Guangming zhibao* (en. Guangming Daily), Xinhua news agency, Sina Weibo (representative of new media).

Zhenmin zhibao was founded in 1948 and is the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China; it actively promotes the policies and regulations of the CPC and the Chinese government, records the changes and development of Chinese society. The newspaper *Guangming zhibao* is a mass media which is directly subordinated to the CPC Central Committee. This newspaper covers important events in China and abroad, as well as provides information on the state of Chinese society, culture and other important areas of life. The news agency Xinhua is one of the largest news portals in Chinese, known as "the most influential website of China".⁴

Launched in 2009, Sina Weibo is an interactive platform for microblogging, and is one of the most common social networks in China. As of the end of 2019, the number of monthly active users reached 516 million (11). Combining and comparing information from these different sources revealed features of the representation of Xi Jinping's visit in the state media of China and in the blogosphere, which gives a more diverse view of the reaction of Chinese society to Xi Jinping's visit to Moscow.

Social surveys and statistics were used.

The main method of the research was the content analysis, which allowed showing the representation of the course and results of Xi Jinping's visit to Russia in terms of the subject, topic, form, relationship and sources of information. The results of the content analysis reveal the general political significance of President Xi Jinping's visit to Russia and the strategic direction of bilateral relations between China and Russia.

The method of quantitative analysis was also used to study the headlines of the media describing Xi Jinping's visits to Russia from 2012 to 2023.

⁴ Xinhua news agency - the official news agency of the Chinese government.

Results

As we know, "the XX Congress of the CPC defined the structure and basic principles of the new Chinese diplomacy at the highest level, it also outlined its key objectives on strategic deployment of the new system of international relations" [5]. It should be noted that the principles that China adheres to in its diplomacy have always been «firmly pursuing an independent and peaceful foreign policy, firmly adhering to a mutually beneficial and mutually advantageous strategy of openness», which allows "China to make a significant contribution to the building of world peace, global development and the protection of the international order".⁵ These principles are an updated official understanding of the role of China in the development of China's international relations. This approach also explains the role of China as a major country in the international community, which is the basis for the understanding by the Chinese leadership of the important role of stable development of the Russian-Chinese relations in maintaining global strategic balance and stability, even in increasingly complex international relations.

The representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China noted that the basis of the diplomatic course of China is the "diplomacy of heads of state", which predetermines the importance of bilateral meetings at the level of heads of state. Thus, *Zhenmin Zhibao* said that after Xi Jinping met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2023 Russian-Chinese relations could become a priority for China's foreign relations. In particular, the newspaper stressed that "as Russia is the largest neighboring country and partner for comprehensive strategic cooperation, Russian-Chinese relations occupy a priority position in the foreign policy of both countries".⁶ Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang also noted the role of Russian-Chinese diplomacy at the level of heads of states: The Russian-Chinese diplomacy of the heads of states is an opportunity for the major powers to agree on strategic mutual trust and good-neighborliness, laying a model for a new type of international relations.⁷ The diplomacy of the heads of states is the highest form of foreign policy relations, which forms the general picture of the world of the country's diplomacy, providing ideological leadership and strategic choice for solving the current international and regional problems.⁸ "Foreign policy" adheres to a similar assessment: President Vladimir Putin also attaches great importance to personal diplomacy and tends to rely on personal friendly contacts with other leaders in strengthening inter-ethnic relations. Putin is also undoubtedly the

⁵ Qin Gang: China to Strengthen Partnership with Central Asian Countries. Available from: <https://tass.ru/press-relizy/17224575?ysclid=lm5c2h66q704613104>

⁶ 人民日报. 以宽广视野、长远眼光看待和把握中俄关系. *People's Daily* (the official print edition of the CPC Central Committee). Treat and understand Sino-Russian relations in a broad and long-term perspective). Available from: http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2023-03/24/nw.D110000renmrb_20230324_2-02.htm

⁷ 外交部网站. 秦刚: 世界越是动荡不安, 中俄关系越应稳步向前. Chinese Foreign Ministry website. Qin Gang: The more restless the world that is the more stable Sino-Russian relations should develop). Available from: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202303/t20230307_11036845.shtml

⁸ 中新网. 李治: 以元首外交为引领, 中国外交迈向新征程. China News. Qin Gang: The more restless the world that is the more stable Sino-Russian relations should develop). Available from: <https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2022/12-19/9917465.shtml>

foreign leader who gets along best with Xi Jinping.⁹ "Diplomacy of heads of states" clearly manifests itself in the distinctive features of birthday celebrations of both leaders.

Russian President Vladimir Putin published an article called "Russia and China: a future-bound partnership" in People's Daily newspaper noting his confidence

that our friendship and partnership, based on the strategic choice of the peoples of the two countries, will continue to grow and strengthen in the name of the well-being and prosperity of Russia and China. This will undoubtedly be facilitated by the current visit to Russia of the Chinese President <...> Russian-Chinese relations have reached the highest level in their history and continue to grow, in terms of quality they surpass the military-political alliances of the Cold War.¹⁰

Over the past decade, China and Russia have insisted on strengthening and developing bilateral relations based on the principles of non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-direction against third parties. According to Tianmu News – this is a model of relations, where each side respects the other one, coexists peacefully and cooperates with the partner on the model of mutually beneficial relations. Over the past years the relations between the two countries have changed from "mutually regarded as friendly countries" to constructive partnership relations, from the status of "partners in strategic cooperation" to "partners in comprehensive strategic cooperation".¹¹

Member of the State Council and Foreign Minister Qin Gang noted in China Newsweek that after the XX Congress of the CPC Xi Jinping made a state visit to Russia, thus opening a new page of diplomacy of the heads of states, which is consistently carried out by China. Special time was chosen for the visit, the international context of this bilateral meeting is very complex, which gives it rich subtext and will give fruitful results. This is an important decision, made by the Central Committee of the CPC led by Xi Jinping; it is focused on China's internal development and the general situation in the world. This decision reflects China's independent and peaceful foreign policy and its desire to promote world peace.¹²

Li Zigo, the director of the Eurasian Institute of the Chinese Institute of International Studies, gave his analysis to the visit of the Chinese leader to Russia in China Newsweek:

This is the first visit by a Chinese head of state since the election of a new collective leadership in China, and also the ninth visit by Xi Jinping to Russia since he led the country. Another visit

⁹ Alexander Gabuev. China's Pivot to Putin's Friends. Available from: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/25/chinas-pivot-to-putin-friends-xi-russia-gazprom-timchenko-sinopec/>

¹⁰ Vladimir Putin's article for People's Daily newspaper, Russia and China: A future-bound partnership. President of Russia (Kremlin.ru). Available from: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/70743> (accessed 02.06.2023).

¹¹ 潮新闻. 十年九次出访俄罗斯, 向世界传递什么信号? Tianmu News. Nine visits to Russia in ten years - what kind of signal does this send to the world?. Available from: <https://tianmunews.com/news.html?id=2425490>

¹² 中国新闻周刊. 郑立颖. 习近平访问俄罗斯, 为何是 "重大决策"? The periodical China Newsweek. Zheng Liying. Why is Xi Jinping's visit to Russia an "important decision?". Available from: <http://news.inewsweek.cn/world/2023-03-24/17976.shtml>

proves that China and Russia consider bilateral relations as the most important diplomatic direction. President Xi Jinping's visit also shows that Russian-Chinese relations are not aimed at third parties and will never be influenced by third parties. China firmly pursues an independent foreign policy, will continue to develop in accordance with the established direction, reflecting the stability and durability of Russian-Chinese relations.¹³

According to Zhong Feiteng's assessment made in his article on a new type of relationship between great powers and the innovation of Chinese diplomatic theory, in accordance with the strategy of «great powers diplomacy» promoted by Xi Jinping, China adheres to the common idea of diplomatic organization of relations between powers, aimed at creating the basis for relations between great powers with «common stability and balanced development», paying special attention to Sino-American relations, Russian-Chinese relations and Sino-European relations [9:128].

The concept of a new type of relations between powers was first introduced at the time of Jiang Zemin's leadership of the CPC and the People's Republic of China. The so-called "new type" of relations differs from the model of relations in which the powers belonged to two camps during the Cold War marked by struggle of ideologies and "friends and enemies" distinction. After Xi Jinping came to power, the discussion of this concept focused on how to avoid falling into the Thucydides' trap¹⁴ between the powers. The goal was to create a stable system of foreign policy relations that would promote China's economic and political growth under the leadership of the Communist Party. The establishment of a new type of relationship was originally aimed at diplomacy with the United States as well. Da Wei, Director of the Center for Strategic and Security Studies at Tsinghua University, said that during the visit of the then Vice President of China Xi Jinping to the United States in February 2012 he officially invited China and the United States to build a "new type" of relationship between the two powers. Chinese leaders positioned themselves as ideologists of diplomatic relations, while the United States reacted by not caring about the concept itself, but focusing on its practical implementation. Thus far, as Da Wei notes, no form of partnership has been established between China and the United States, as the United States still view China as a competitor, and Sino-American relations are mired in the turmoil of the trade war [6:7].

As a result, Xi Jinping's diplomatic strategy, according to Radio Free Asia, was addressed to Russia, with which China sought to establish relations of a new type.¹⁵ As the strategic rivalry between China and the US grows stronger, China and Russia become

¹³ 新华社. 综述: 共建 "一带一路" 为中哈合作注入新的生机与活力. (Xinhua News Agency. Review: Joint construction of the Belt and Road will give new vitality to Chinese-Kazakh cooperation). Available from: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-09/14/content_5709676.htm

¹⁴ The "Thucydides trap" in political science is a situation in which the fears of a stronger power about the rapid growth of a new rival country themselves escalate the confrontation between them and can become the root cause of a serious conflict)

¹⁵ 自由亚洲电台. 专栏 | 军事无禁区: 建立新型大国关系—习近平访俄战略意图. (Radio Free Asia (RSA). special section. The military does not have a forbidden zone: The establishment of a new type of relations between the great powers is Xi Jinping's strategic intention to visit Russia). Available from: <https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/zhuanlan/junshiwujinqu/mil-03302023135942.html>

closer, according to this information resource, but the People's Republic of China does not seek military-political alliances, since it is in the interests of China to maintain a balanced development of relations among the major countries.¹⁶

The Chinese Government has repeatedly pointed out that the Russian-Chinese relations adhered to the principles of "non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-opposition to third parties". During the visit to Russia, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin issued a joint statement on deepening comprehensive strategic cooperation and partnership in the new era and confirmed this principle by saying that Russian-Chinese relations are not like military-political alliance of the cold war period. But the West still questions the veracity of these claims and worries that China and Russia are headed for a military alliance. This concern stems from the statement of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2021 that China and Russia "are not allies, but more than allies":

The Chinese side highly appreciates the positive statements of Russian President Vladimir Putin on Russian-Chinese relations. This year marks the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Russian-Chinese "Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation" and, over the past 20 years, the two countries have always adhered to the view that it is necessary to develop long-term good-neighborly relations of mutually beneficial cooperation on the basis of non-alignment to blocs and the absence of confrontation, and as well as on the relations between the two countries not being directed against third countries. China and Russia are not allies, but more than allies.¹⁷

If to interpret lexical meanings of this statement, the word «more» seems to mean «to be superior, to be better». This inevitably causes anxiety and scepticism among some Western leaders who have survived the Cold War. According to Lianhe Zaobao, some of them are concerned that the meeting of the heads of China and Russia will lead to the provision of various types of military assistance by China to Russia, that close cooperation between China and Russia could threaten the existing international order. The question of whether Xi Jinping would provide Russia with additional military assistance, including lethal weapons and ammunition, with a tacit misunderstanding of what "more than allies" means, has become a major topic of discussion in the Western media. However, the Chinese media have always denied these assumptions, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry has strongly denied it. In addition, according to the analysis of Chinese experts, from the point of view of Xi Jinping's diplomatic strategy to create a basis for "overall stable and balanced development" of relations between the powers, the probability of providing military assistance to Russia is small. Otherwise, it would disrupt balanced development between the powers and have serious consequences for China itself.¹⁸ After Xi Jinping's visit to Russia, Vladimir Putin said in an interview with Russian media that "we are not creating any military alliance with

16 Ibid.

17 Beijing commented on Putin's words about relations with China - RIA Novosti, 22.10.2021 (ria.ru). Available from: <https://ria.ru/20211022/kitay-1755763431.html?ysclid=lhm7okshuk981185202>

18 联合早报. 拜登相信中国未提供武器给俄罗斯. (Lianhe Zaobao. Biden believes that China did not supply weapons to Russia). Available from: <https://www.kzaobao.com/world/20230326/135856.html>

China. Yes, we have military-technical cooperation, we do not hide, but it's transparent, there is nothing secret"¹⁹.

It should be noted that China has always adhered to the strategy of peaceful development, and Russian-Chinese relations have always been independent and free from interference and provocation by third parties. China's involvement in the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is Xi Jinping's most significant initiative to establish relations of a new type between powers. Mediation in the settlement of the conflict will strengthen Russian-Chinese relations; will make it possible to oppose Western Europe, to oppose the United States and to promote the People's Republic of China's strategy to create a new model of relations between great powers, which should ultimately change the international order.

In continuation of this logic, Qiu Wenhan, the reporter of Jiefang zhibao, refers to the assessment of the current stage of development of Russian-Chinese relations made by Feng Shaolei, Director of the Russian Research Center and the Peripheral Research Center of the East China Normal University:

The current situation is different from the Sino-US-Soviet triangle in the Cold War. First, with regard to China and Russia, they are completely unwilling to return to a state of <...> high military confrontation and high ideological confrontation. Secondly, the international environment has changed. Now all parties are under a network system linked by the market. You have me and I have you. It is difficult to separate one from another. Once a confrontation occurs, it will be a disaster for everyone.²⁰

Thus, Russian-Chinese relations are becoming an important part of China's system of international relations, which has long attached great importance to the development of a healthy, stable and close Russian-Chinese strategic partnership. President Xi Jinping's visit to Russia is a standard regular diplomatic activity between the heads of China and Russia, who for a long time have maintained close cooperation, reflecting close cooperation between the countries themselves. The current international situation has undergone profound changes and the world has entered a new period of upheaval and change. China and Russia are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and major countries with economic and political significance. Russian-Chinese relations not only relate to bilateral cooperation and practical cooperation in various fields between the two countries, their influence and role in the international arena go far beyond bilateral relations. The reason why President Xi's visit attracted wide international attention is also due to the fact that since Russia launched a special military operation in Ukraine, the Ukrainian crisis has become stronger, and there are no signs that disagreements between Russia and Ukraine can be resolved through peaceful consultations. Some Western countries, especially NATO countries led by the United States, continue to participate indirectly in this conflict, which

19 Putin refuted claims that cooperation between Russia and China is a threat to the West (tass.ru). Available from: <https://tass.ru/politika/17370957?ysclid=lhm8jf113e932086115>

20 解放日报. 袁雯涵. 大三角将如何摆动. (Jiefang zhibao (Shanghai newspaper). Qiu Wenhan. How the triangle will swing). Available from: <https://www.jfdaily.com/staticsg/res/html/journal/detail.html?date=2021-05-25&id=3144648&page=04>

further complicates the Ukrainian crisis. The international community hopes that peace will come to the region as soon as possible and that the conflict will soon be over. In this context, international public opinion will no doubt associate President Xi Jinping's visit with diplomatic mediation in resolving the Ukrainian crisis.

Lu Nanquan, in the journal of Xinjiang Normal University back in 2015, assessing the prospects of Chinese-Russian relations noted that for China, relations between powers, border relations, relations with developing countries and multilateral relations constitute the overall picture of the international diplomatic strategy system. Russia is not only a large country, but also the largest country with which China borders. The development of relations with Russia is an important measure for China's diplomatic strategy and is of great strategic importance [7:20–28].

Russia and China have similar views on major international political issues and on cooperation in international affairs; the status of relations with China is constantly improving. In Xi Jinping's article "Forge ahead to new prospects of friendship, cooperation and joint development of China and Russia", published in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, the President noted that "China and Russia are the largest neighbors, strategic partners of comprehensive cooperation, and China considers the relations between China and Russia as one of the main priorities in diplomacy".²¹ The leaders of both countries stressed that the development of Russian-Chinese relations has driving forces within the countries themselves. So Russian President Vladimir Putin noted that the Russian-Chinese partnership:

surpasses Cold War-time military-political alliances in its quality, with no one to constantly order and no one to constantly obey, without limitations or taboos. We have reached an unprecedented level of trust in our political dialogue, our strategic cooperation has become truly comprehensive in nature and is standing on the brink of a new era. <... > In fact, today, the Russia-China relations serve as the cornerstone of regional and global stability, driving the economic growth and securing the positive agenda in international affairs. They provide an example of harmonious and constructive cooperation between major powers.²²

"Xinhua's review of the President's visit was symbolically entitled «Advancing the past and Opening up the future, steady and long-term progress to comprehend the historical significance of President Xi Jinping's visit to Russia in four dimensions ». It noted: «the plans to create a new vision and new measures for the development of the Russian-Chinese comprehensive strategic partnership are an important part of President Xi Jinping's visit to Russia».²³ During the visit, the heads of the two states signed "Joint Statement by the President of Russia and the President of China on the Plan to Promote

²¹ Vladimir Putin's article for People's Daily newspaper, Russia and China: A future-bound partnership// President of Russia (Kremlin.ru). Available from: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/70743>

²² Ibid.

²³ Xinhua: the visit of the President of China to Russia will be a trip of friendship, cooperation and peace (tass.ru). Available from: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/17306981?ysclid=lm9pbep31245874958>

Table 1. List of Xi Jinping's foreign policy visits to Russia from 2013 to 2023

Date	Place	Information
March 2013	Moscow	Both sides signed the «Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on mutually beneficial cooperation and deepening of the comprehensive strategic partnership».
September 2013	Saint-Petersburg	To participate in the G20 Summit.
February 2014	Sochi	To participate in the opening ceremony of the 22nd Winter Olympics.
May 2015	Moscow	The «Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Interconnection and Cooperation in the Construction of the Economic Belt of the Silk Road and the Eurasian Economic Union» was issued.
July 2015	Ufa	Attended the 7th BRICS Leaders Summit and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Leaders' Summit.
July 2017	Moscow	Statement by China and Russia on the Korean Peninsula Issue and Statement on Further Deepening of Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation and Partnership Issued.
September 2018	Vladivostok	To participate in the 4th Eastern Economic Forum.
June 2019	Moscow/Saint-Petersburg	To pay a state visit to Russia and take part in the 23rd St.Petersburg International Economic Forum, hold talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin and lead Sino-Russian relations to a new era of Sino-Russian comprehensive strategic partnership.
March 2023	Moscow	China and Russia signed joint statement "On deepening of comprehensive strategic partnership in the new era" and "Statement on the plan to promote the key directions of Russian-Chinese economic cooperation until 2030".

Source: website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China²⁴

the Key Elements of Russian-Chinese Economic Cooperation until 2030", which provides for the promotion of the qualitative development of Russian-Chinese trade and economic cooperation, maintaining the momentum for the rapid development of trade in goods and services between the two countries, and commitments to significantly increase trade between the two countries by 2030. The document clarifies that both sides will engage in bilateral economic cooperation in eight key areas, including expansion and optimization of trade structure, development of interconnected logistics systems and increasing the level of financial cooperation. Bilateral trade between China and Russia increased by 116 per cent over a 10-year period, effectively strengthening the material basis of relations between the

²⁴ Available from: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/wjdt_674879/wsrc_674883/

two countries and providing an important impetus for their further economic and social development.²⁵

Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang noted: "The interaction of heads of states is a compass and a benchmark in Russian-Chinese relations".²⁶ For many years, no matter how the international situation changed, the heads of China and Russia always maintained close communication and exchanged regular visits. Since 2013, the leaders of China and Russia have been at the helm of steady, healthy and stable development of bilateral relations. Over the years, relations between the two countries have gone from «mutual respect» and the status of "friendly countries" to comprehensive strategic cooperation. "Under the guidance of the two heads of states strategies, comprehensive strategic cooperation and partnership between China and Russia in the new era will continue to move forward at a higher level".²⁷

Since Xi Jinping became China's national leader in 2012, heads of China and Russia have met more than 40 times. Even during the coronavirus epidemic, Putin and Xi Jinping maintained contact through video meetings and telephone communication.

The newspaper Hangzhou zhibao (Hangzhou Province) noted:

Over the past decade, the top leaders of China and Russia have met 41 times at bilateral and international events. Such frequent and high-quality political exchanges between the two heads of state are quite rare in the world diplomatic arena, and form a model of relations between the big powers through the diplomacy of the heads of state.²⁸

From past reports on state visits we see that the interaction between the heads of China and Russia has many peculiarities. For example, in the process of communication between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, the words "old friend", "mutual benefit", "joint use" and "win-win outcome" are often used. From constructive partnership to strategic partnership, from developing a comprehensive strategic partnership to a comprehensive strategic partnership in a new era, these transformations in status show that relations between the two countries have gradually entered a new phase. China and Russia have different historical and cultural traditions, and their bilateral relations were bad during the Cold War. However, over the past 30 years, the two countries have reached a turning point and development in their relations with each other, as their relations serve the fundamental interests of the peoples of the two countries. According to researcher Sun Zhuangzhi, this was influenced by both the political decisions of the leaders and the active participation of various government departments [8].


²⁵ 新华社. 述评: 继往开来 行稳致远——从四个维度领悟习近平主席访俄的里程碑意义. (Xinhua News Agency. Overview: Advancing the past and Opening up the future, steady and long-term progress - to comprehend the historical significance of President Xi Jinping's visit to Russia in four dimensions). Available from: http://www.news.cn/world/2023-03/24/c_1129462327.htm

²⁶ 中央广电总台央视新闻客户端. 秦刚谈中俄关系: 不结盟、不对抗、不针对第三方. (China Media Group. Qin Gang talks about Sino-Russian relations: non-aligned, non-confrontational, not directed against third parties). " <https://news.cri.cn/xiaozhi/6f71beee-9d71-ae9c-104b-4c0627828f41.html>

²⁷ Russia and China Create Foundations for Multipolar World - Russia's Regions (gosrf.ru). Available from: <https://www.gosrf.ru/rossiya-i-kitaj-sozdayut-osnovy-mnogopolynarnogo-mira/?ysclid=lmhainkztx416090753>

²⁸ Ibid.

Table 2. Publication activity of news portals covering Xi Jinping's visits to Russia from 2013 to 2023



Source: Baidu Statistics Media Index²⁹

The study analyzed the statistics of publications of the Chinese media devoted to the meetings of the heads of Russia and China, and joint visits of the leaders of the two countries over the past 10 years, that is, during Xi Jinping's term as President of China.

According to Baidu's figure above, there are two peaks in the publication activity of news portals: the first was when Xi Jinping first became President of China and first visited Russia in 2013, which was Xi Jinping's first state visit in office; the second is a visit to Russia in 2023, that is, after the end of the pandemic and the beginning of his third term.

Let's consider the assessment of Xi Jinping's visit in the Chinese press during and immediately after the visit:

1. Zhenmin zhibao: The visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Russia opens a new era of comprehensive strategic cooperation and partnership between China and Russia. The newspaper Zhenmin zhibao noted in its report that the visit took the Russian-Chinese relations to a new stage. President Xi Jinping and President V. V. Putin have reached a number of important agreements, giving new impetus to Russian-Chinese relations and the development of cooperation between the two countries.

2. The newspaper Guangming zhibao: the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping takes place in an extremely difficult international situation and is of great importance for Russian-Chinese relations, regional stability and world peace, and the development of bilateral relations between China and Russia is necessary to ensure stability and peace in the entire Eurasian region.

²⁹ URL: <https://index.baidu.com/v2/index.html#/>

3. China News Agency (ChinaNews): Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin met to build mutual trust and move to a new level of comprehensive strategic cooperation and partnership between China and Russia. The meeting between the Chinese President and the Russian President further strengthened mutual trust between the leaders of the two countries and demonstrated the spirit of pragmatic cooperation in the Russian-Chinese relations, and the leaders of the two countries have reached a number of agreements and fully contributed to the in-depth development of Russian-Chinese relations.

4. Xinhua Agency: Chinese President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin held talks in the Kremlin. The Heads of States signed the "Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on deepening comprehensive strategic cooperation and partnership in the new era" and "Joint statement by the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the People's Republic of China on the development plan of key directions of Russian-Chinese economic cooperation until 2030". The news agency Xinhua noted that the talks between the leaders of the two countries were characterized by a deep exchange of views, rich and comprehensive content, which gave new impetus to the development of comprehensive strategic cooperation and partnership between Russia and China in the new era.

5. Information Network Qiushi (public-political magazine, official print organ of the CPC Central Committee): This is the first visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Russia since he was re-elected in 2022. The development of a comprehensive strategic partnership based on cooperation between China and Russia in the new era has given new impetus, has brought more stability to a complicated international situation and has had an important and far-reaching impact on the promotion of a multipolar world and the democratization of international relations.

6. China Central Television: The strategic leadership of the heads of China and Russia will give a powerful boost to bilateral relations, improve the well-being of the peoples of the two countries and make a great contribution to the development and progress of the world.³⁰

Thus, the Chinese media generally consider Xi Jinping's visit to Russia an important stage in the development of Russian-Chinese relations. Numerous personal agreements and signed documents mean that cooperation between the two countries is getting even closer. China and Russia have shown a propensity to deepen cooperation in many areas, which has received wide attention and positive assessment from the Chinese media.

During the research the data of users of the Chinese social network Sina Weibo were collected and analyzed in the form of their comments on the state visit of Xi Jinping to Russia. According to user discussions, most of them expressed support for the visit of the Chinese President to Russia, believing that China and Russia play an important role in world affairs. Here is what some users write:

30 央视网. 国际热评: 经贸务实合作为中俄关系发展注入强劲动力 (China Central Television. International hot Review: Pragmatic economic and trade cooperation has given a powerful impetus to the development of Sino-Russian relations). Available from: <https://news.cctv.com/2023/03/22/ARTIfSFBc5qYvVqLDkMuH2wv230322.shtml>

1. 中俄两国是好朋友, 互相支持, 这次访问有望加强两国的合作. ("China and Russia are good friends who support each other. This visit is expected to strengthen cooperation between the two countries").

2. 希望习主席的访问可以加强中俄关系, 为两国人民带来更多利益. ("I hope that the visit of President Xi Jinping can strengthen Russian-Chinese relations and bring more benefits to the peoples of the two countries").

3. 中俄两国在经济和安全领域需要更多的合作, 习主席的访问肯定会有所帮助. ("China and Russia need to deepen economic and security cooperation and President Xi's visit will definitely help it").


Some users also drew attention to the specific content of Xi's visit, namely trade and energy cooperation. Below are some users' opinions:

1. 希望习主席能够促进中俄贸易往来, 减少相互依赖. ("I hope that President Xi Jinping can promote Russian-Chinese trade cooperation").

2. 能源是中俄关系的重要领域, 希望习主席能够推动能源合作. ("Energy is an important area of Russian-Chinese relations, and I hope President Xi Jinping will be able to promote energy cooperation").

3. 中俄两国可以在基础设施建设和技术合作方面加强合作, 我期待习主席能够提出更具体的计划. ("China and Russia can strengthen cooperation in infrastructure construction and technical cooperation. I look forward to more concrete results from Xi Jinping's visit").

Fig. 1. Quantitative distribution of reactions to the news about Xi Jinping's visit to Russia



Source: Sina Weibo³¹

31 Exclusive. Xi Jinping's speech at the XX National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party 16.10. 2022: deda14 —(livejournal.com). Available from: <https://deda14.livejournal.com/959148.html?ysclid=lhmbcvitoh166755164>

In general, users of the Chinese site Sina Weibo gave a positive assessment of Xi Jinping visit to Russia, highly appreciated the prospects of cooperation and development between the two countries, and drew attention to specific issues and the results of the visit.

According to the statistics of emotions in the social network on the news about the visit of the Chinese President, it is possible to distinguish six different reactions: positive, neutral, anger, surprise, sadness and fear. The statistical distribution of these reactions is shown in the figure (Fig. 1):

From the diagram you can see that attitude to Xi Jinping's visit to Russia according to Weibo data is mostly positive, which is confirmed by 70% of positive reactions. Users are optimistic about bilateral relations and cooperation between China and Russia and hope that this visit will help strengthen cooperation and boost development between the two countries. At the same time, users pay attention to the specific content of this state visit, hoping to strengthen cooperation in the field of trade, energy, infrastructure construction, etc. Some users expressed a restrained position, negative reactions have also been noted, but for the most part positive attitudes can be seen.

Xi Jinping's visit to Russia is, on the one hand, a reflection of head-of-state diplomacy and the creation of a new type of relationship between major powers, and on the other hand, China's desire to become more involved in global governance, to which separate attention should be given.

China's active participation in reforming and restructuring global governance is an important strategic step taken at the XX Congress of the Communist Party of China. The report at the XX Congress noted that:

China will take an active part in the reforming and development of global governance, implementing its own concept of global governance based on the principles of mutual consultation and joint building of the future of mankind; firmly adhere to genuine multiculturalism, promote the democratization of international relations, promote the development of global governance in a more just and rational direction.³²

China's participation in global governance in 2023 is presented in Table 3.

The concept of global governance is the theory of governance put forward by Secretary-General Xi Jinping in a report to the XIX CPC Congress on 18th of October 2017. He stressed that "joint discussion, joint construction and joint use" is the content of China's global governance concept.³³ China is an important country involved in global governance, and in this regard Xi Jinping noted that "strengthening global governance and advancing global governance reform is the overall direction of Chinese diplomacy". The President of the People's Republic of China also notes: "We put forward the initiative "One Belt – One Way", establish a new type of relations based on mutually beneficial cooperation, and adhere to the concept of "community with a shared future for mankind in accordance

³² Ibid.

³³ 人民网. 全球治理观. (the Internet version of "People's Daily". overview global governance). Available from: <http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0823/c413700-30246392.html>

Table 3. China's participation in the global governance system for 2023

Date	Actions
February, 21	Chinese Foreign Ministry Published "The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper"
February, 24	On the occasion of the first anniversary of the Ukrainian crisis, the paper "China's position on the political settlement of the Ukrainian crisis" was published.
March, 6-10	Saudi Arabia and Iran reach historic reconciliation after 5 days of bilateral dialogue in Beijing.
March, 15	During a high-level dialogue between the Communist Party of China and the world's political parties, Xi Jinping first proposed the Global Civilization Initiative.
March, 20-22	Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Russia, during which the heads of China and Russia signed a joint statement emphasizing the importance of resolving the Ukrainian crisis through peaceful negotiations.

Source: China Internet Information Center (Website)³⁴

with the trends of the time".³⁵ This concept is based on the construction of a new type of international relations and the formation of the common destiny of mankind, which has already become the general principle of China's participation in the management of global affairs and relations with other countries. Guided by this principle in global governance, China adheres to the concept of joint problem-solving and common development, expands the points of convergence of interests of countries around the world, promotes the initiative "One Belt – One Way", promotes cooperation and exchange among major countries and adheres to the principle of sincerity, which contributes to the common development of mankind" [1: 17-20].

China's expert Dong Qin noted that participation in global governance reflects China's need for more Chinese experts to express their views on how to build a new model of global governance, which implies the need to strengthen China's role in global governance, to be more proactive and to broaden its voice. The aim of China's participation in this process is to achieve compliance with the principle of «joint consultation, joint construction and joint use» [3: 87].

In a report at the XX Congress of the CPC Xi Jinping noted that the concept of «joint consultation, joint construction and joint use of the concept of global governance» and the initiative "One Belt – One Way" are important components of the concept of "community of human destiny" and represent an effective way and practical platform for building the «community of common destiny for mankind» through "joint consultations, joint

³⁴ Available from: http://news.china.com.cn/txt/2023-03/22/content_85184720.htm

³⁵ 中国政府网. 习近平在中共中央政治局第二十七次集体学习时强调推动全球治理体制更加合理公正, 为我国发展和世界和平创造有利条件. (The State Council of the People's Republic of China network. During the 27th collective study of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping stressed the importance of promoting a more reasonable and fair system of global governance and creating favorable conditions for the development of our country and world peace. October 13, 2015). Available from: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-10/13/content_2946293.htm

construction and joint use" which, taken together, is the scientific underpinning of China's basic strategy for participation in global governance and is aimed at promoting a more just and reasonable international political and economic order.³⁶ Yu Xiaodi, devoted his article in the journal of Wuhan University of Science and Technology to the realistic background, main concepts and practical direction of the important speech of Xi Jinping on global governance. He noted that adhering to the principle of "joint consultation, joint construction and joint use", Xi Jinping took active actions to maintain multilateral cooperation, to form a new type of relations between the big powers, harnessing the power of the new industrial revolution to advance scientific and technological innovation and advance global healthcare governance and economic recovery from the epidemic, which was a practical demonstration of China's main methods in promoting global governance [10: 44].

The military conflict between Russia and Ukraine emphasized the urgency of the formation of new principles of global security governance. Xi Jinping first proposed a global security initiative on April 21, 2022, when he delivered a speech at the opening ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia, noting that "humanity is an indivisible community united by a common destiny", and formulated "Six principles" in the field of security, namely:

1. Stay committed to the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security;
2. Stay committed to respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries;
3. Stay committed to abiding by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter;
4. Stay committed to taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously;
5. Stay committed to peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation;
6. Stay committed to maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional domains.³⁷

Proceeding from respect for the legitimate security interests of all countries, restoration of confidence, strengthening unity, achieving mutual and global security and building an inclusive cooperative security mechanism, managing global security in China's understanding has become a sound choice to help build a global governance system [2:22-31].

Conclusion

Thus, the Chinese press noted that diplomacy at the level of heads of states facilitates close cooperation among great powers. The establishment of close and trustful relations

³⁶ Xi Jinping. Holding high the great banner of socialism with Chinese specificity, to struggle for comprehensive construction of a modernized socialist state. Report at the XX National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 16, 2022. Further references to the report are made on this source. Available from: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/rus/zxxx/202210/t20221026_10792071.html

³⁷ Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the opening of the Boao Forum for Asia2022 - golosarmenii.am Available from: <https://www.golosarmenii.am/article/149008/si-czinpin-vystupil-s-rechyu-na-otkrytii-boaoskogo-aziatskogo-foruma-2022?ysclid=lhylupr4649826093>

between countries is of practical importance for regional security and stability and the building of national relations. It also strengthens global security and allows building mutually beneficial relations among countries.

Russian-Chinese relations have their own history and logic of development. Russia, as the largest neighboring country and a partner in comprehensive strategic cooperation, is a priority in the overall diplomatic and foreign policy of the People's Republic of China. China has always pursued an independent foreign policy, and promoting high-level Russian-Chinese relations is also a strategic choice, given China's overall domestic development situation and China's overall diplomatic strategy.

The historic visit of the Chinese President to Russia, which received the detailed coverage in the Chinese media, marked the "summit" of relations between the leaders of the two states. Strengthening and deepening of the comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Russia in the new era is a strategic choice made by the countries based on the domestic political and economic situation, which correspond to the fundamental interests of the peoples of the two countries, as well as trends in the development of international relations. A high degree of mutual trust between the heads of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation ensures the strategic leadership of the two countries in the international arena and provides a solid political guarantee of comprehensive strategic cooperation and partnership between China and Russia in the future.

All the diplomatic aspirations of the People's Republic of China, as set out in China's major party and state documents, and as the vast majority of Chinese society perceives it, are aimed at building a new type of international relations consistent with the "community of the common destiny" concept to realize the mission of joint global management and formation of a sense of responsibility of great powers. Therefore, China took part in the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, trying to assume the role of peacemaker and put forward its constructive plan for the settlement of the conflict. This is also the focus of China's diplomatic efforts in mediating the resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

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New Trends and Prospects of Hydrogen Energy in the World and in Kazakhstan

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Abstract. The article explores the trends in the development of hydrogen energy both in the world in general and in Kazakhstan in particular. The author considers the growing interest in hydrogen energy in the context of the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and search for alternative energy sources. The article analyzes key international and national initiatives in the field of hydrogen energy, including the development of technologies for the production, storage and use of hydrogen. Particular attention is paid to the role of Kazakhstan in the development of hydrogen energy and its cooperation with other countries, especially with the EU and Japan, which has significant experience in this area. The author draws conclusions about the prospects for hydrogen energy.

Keywords: energy transformation, hydrogen energy, economic efficiency, international actors, hydrogen economy

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Introduction

In recent years, hydrogen energy has become one of the key areas in the field of alternative energy sources. Hydrogen is a clean and sustainable source of energy, producing no greenhouse gas emissions. This makes it particularly attractive to countries seeking to reduce their dependence on fossil fuels and reduce their negative impact on the environment.

Interest in hydrogen energy is growing around the world. Many developed countries are actively investing in research and development in this area, developing national

strategies and legislation to promote the development of the hydrogen economy. Hydrogen production from renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power is growing. Electrolysis technologies, which produce hydrogen from water using electricity, are becoming increasingly efficient and cost-effective. Demand for hydrogen is growing in a variety of industries, including transportation, chemicals, glass, food processing, oil refining, metallurgy and energy [6:38]. Hydrogen fuel cells are becoming increasingly popular in the automotive industry, used in manufacturing processes and as a source of energy for power grids.

In recent years, the world community has increasingly paid attention to hydrogen energy due to the gradual depletion of traditional fossil fuels and the desire to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. According to the forecast of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)¹, Hydrogen can be a key element of the future energy system and reduce dependence on fossil resources. The forecast proposes a compelling path to decarbonization across all energy use areas, with electrification and energy efficiency driven by renewables, green hydrogen and sustainable modern bioenergy². It is possible that by 2050 hydrogen energy will account for about 12% of global energy consumption [10:35].

Many countries have already begun to invest in hydrogen energy and develop corresponding national strategies. Japan, Germany, the United States and Australia are actively developing hydrogen technologies and creating infrastructure for the use of hydrogen in vehicles. One of the main reasons for switching to hydrogen is to prevent global warming caused by fossil fuel use [2:217].

In connection with the Russian view on hydrogen energy, its role in the global energy balance and importance for the Russian Federation, let us pay attention to the works of M.G.Borisova [1], G.N.Dolenko [2], A.Konoplyanika [3], Yu.N.Linnik and E.D.Falyakhova [4], E.B.Malykh and V.A.Plotnikova [5], D.K.Chugunova and R.A.Kasyanov [9] and other authors. Among the foreign authors, we note: A.Alsalman [11], P.Atanassov [12], A.Boretti [13], M.Genovese [16], J.Nowotny [17] and others.

This topic is still new for Kazakh researchers. In this regard, the purpose of this article is to consider the main trends in hydrogen energy. The objectives of the study are: 1) to study the world experience in introducing hydrogen energy; 2) describe the achievements, obstacles and general course of development of Kazakhstan in this direction.

Materials and Methods

To achieve the goal – to describe the achievements and course of Kazakhstan in the field of hydrogen energy development – historical, analytical methods and the method of discourse

¹ International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) – an intergovernmental international organization founded in 2009 to support the use of all forms of renewable energy sources. IRENA makes it easy to access all the information you need about renewable energy sources, including technical data.

² Forecast for the transformation of the global energy system. Available from: https://www.irena.org//media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2021/Jun/IRENA_World_Energy_Transitions_Outlook_Summary_2021_RU.pdf?rev=bbc217fbc6ea48b69a318b6475cc96e4

analysis of articles in the media, scientific articles in peer-reviewed Russian, Kazakh and foreign publications, forecast reports, regulations and programs were used development.

Results

Key players in the global hydrogen market. The companies are major players in the global hydrogen market and play an important role in the development and commercialization of hydrogen technologies. Many companies in different countries are actively investing resources and conducting research in the field of hydrogen production, storage, transportation and use. Among the key companies in the global hydrogen market are the following:

Large oil and gas companies such as Shell, Total Energies, BP, and Exxon Mobil are developing hydrogen technologies and investing in infrastructure for the production and use of hydrogen. They are also working on developing hydrogen production projects using renewable energy sources³.

Electrolyser Manufacturers: companies such as Nel Hydrogen, ITM Power, Siemens Energy, Ballard Power Systems are leading manufacturers of electrolyzers, devices that break water into hydrogen and oxygen. They are developing electrolyzers of various capacities and technologies⁴.

Fuel Cell Manufacturers: companies such as Ballard Power Systems, Plug Power, Hydrogenics, Toyota, Hyundai, develop and manufacture fuel cells that use hydrogen to produce electricity. They specialize in various types of fuel cells, including polymer electrolyte membrane fuel cells (PEMFC), oxide ceramic fuel cells (OCFC), and others.

Automobile Manufacturers: Major automobile companies such as Toyota, Hyundai, BMW, Daimler, Audi are developing and producing hydrogen fuel vehicles (hydrogen fuel cells or combustible cells). They are investing in the development of hydrogen infrastructure and working to create affordable and efficient hydrogen cars.

Manufacturers and suppliers of hydrogen infrastructure: Air Liquide, Linde, Air Products companies provide solutions for storing, transporting and distributing hydrogen. They specialize in the design and construction of fueling stations for hydrogen cars, as well as the development of pipelines and hydrogen storage facilities⁵.

³ Hydrogen. Available from: <https://www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/new-energies/hydrogen.html> Hydrogen & renewable hydrogen. Available from: <https://gasmobility.totalenergies.com/gas-fuel-products/hydrogen-renewable-hydrogen> Energy Outlook. Available from: <https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/energy-outlook/hydrogen.html> Advancing climate solutions. Available from: <https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/what-we-do/delivering-industrial-solutions/advancing-climate-solutions>

⁴ Nel Hydrogen. Available from: <https://nelhydrogen.com/> TM Power. Available from: <https://www.itm-power.com/> Siemens Energy. Available from: <https://www.siemens-energy.com/global/en/innovation/hydrogen.html> Ballard Power Systems. Available from: <https://www.ballard.com/>

⁵ Air Liquide. Available from: <https://www.airliquide.com/hydrogen> Linde. Available from: <https://www.linde.com/en/what-we-do/hydrogen-energy> Air Products. Available from: <https://www.airproducts.com/industries/energy/hydrogen-energy>

Renewable Hydrogen Companies: with increasing interest in clean sources of hydrogen, companies such as Orsted, Iberdrola, NextEra Energy, Engie are developing and implementing hydrogen production projects using renewable energy sources, including wind and solar power⁶.

Transport Companies and Logistics Operators: Transport and logistics companies such as DHL, UPS, Amazon are developing plans and implementing projects to use hydrogen technology in their operations. This could include the use of hydrogen trucks, drones or other means of transport to deliver goods.⁷

Hydrogen fuel production and storage companies for stationary applications: companies such as Bloom Energy, FuelCell Energy, Mitsubishi Power develop and offer hydrogen-based electricity generation systems for stationary applications such as power plants, energy storage and home power systems⁸.

The growth of the hydrogen economy requires significant investment, and finance and investment companies play an important role in raising capital and financing projects. Venture capitals, banks and investment funds are actively investing in startups and companies related to hydrogen technologies.

Hydrogen power plants of a car (cylinder with compressed hydrogen+fuel cell+electric motor) at first glance look attractive both in price and in terms of performance characteristics. However, the main incentive for their development is the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere. The lack of hydrogen infrastructure is one of the main obstacles to the development of hydrogen transport. A solution to the problem may be the use of hydrogen as fuel for an internal combustion engine, or mixtures of fuel with hydrogen.

Creating a wide hydrogen gas station infrastructure at the current level of technology is an extremely expensive task (about \$5 billion to cover 10% of US vehicles) and an unresolved technical, economic and safety task [19]. The danger of explosions of an “explosive mixture” in the event of a leak of hydrogen with atmospheric oxygen during the massive use of compressed hydrogen is very high. Safe methods of storing hydrogen are either too expensive or low-tech. However, intensive developments are underway in this direction.

Use of hydrogen fuel cells in air transport

ZeroAvia is working on developing electric aircraft using hydrogen fuel cells [13:6]. They aim to replace traditional aircraft engines so that planes can fly entirely on hydrogen without emitting carbon dioxide or other harmful emissions⁹.

⁶ Orsted. Available from: <https://orsted.com/> Iberdrola. Available from: <https://www.iberdrola.com/> NextEra Energy. URL: <https://www.nexteraenergy.com/> Engie. Available from: <https://www.engie.com/>

⁷ DHL. Available from: <https://www.dhl.com/global-en/home/our-divisions/ecommerce/innovation/hydrogen-fuel-cell-vehicles.html>, UPS. Available from: <https://www.ups.com/us/en/services/technology-integration/fuel-cell-technology.page>, Amazon. Available from: <https://www.aboutamazon.com/sustainability/sustainable-operations/transportation/alternative-fuels>

⁸ Bloom Energy. Available from: <https://www.bloomenergy.com/>. Fuel Cell Energy. Available from: <https://www.fuelcellenergy.com/> Mitsubishi Power. Available from: <https://power.mhi.com/>

⁹ ZeroAvia. Available from: <https://www.zeroavia.com/>

HES Energy Systems is developing hydrogen power systems for unmanned aerial vehicles. They are creating powerful, compact systems that allow them to fly long distances using hydrogen fuel cells¹⁰.

Major aviation company Airbus is conducting research on the use of hydrogen fuel cells in air transport. They are exploring the possibilities of creating hydrogen aircraft¹¹.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) are also conducting research into the use of hydrogen fuel cells in air transport. They are exploring the use of hydrogen in drones and developing prototypes to test their functionality and effectiveness¹².

Atomic and hydrogen energy

Nuclear-hydrogen energy has prospects for reducing greenhouse gas emissions¹³, sustainable development and diversification of energy sources. Here are some of the prospects for this energy concept.

Low-carbon energy: Using nuclear energy in combination with hydrogen production reduces emissions of greenhouse gases and other pollutants into the atmosphere. Nuclear energy is a low-carbon energy source because its production does not emit significant amounts of carbon dioxide.

Energy independence: the development of nuclear-hydrogen energy can reduce dependence on imported oil and gas. Hydrogen can be produced from water, making it affordable and potentially independent of foreign energy suppliers [8:174].

Renewable source of hydrogen: Hydrogen can be produced from renewable energy sources such as solar and wind energy. This allows the use of nuclear-hydrogen energy as a form of storage and use of renewable energy.

Efficient and high energy density: Hydrogen has a high energy density, meaning it can provide a large amount of energy at a relatively low weight, allowing it to be used in a variety of industries, including transportation and power generation.

Infrastructure development: the development of nuclear-hydrogen energy will require the creation of appropriate infrastructure, including a network of nuclear reactors, water electrolysis systems, hydrogen storage and distribution. This can promote the development of technology and innovation in related industries and create new jobs.

Several important challenges associated with nuclear-hydrogen energy should be noted:

Safety: nuclear power requires strict safety measures to prevent possible accidents and leaks of radioactive materials. Robust control, regulation and safety systems are needed to protect the environment and society.

¹⁰ HES Energy Systems. Available from: <https://hes.sg/>

¹¹ Airbus. URL: <https://www.airbus.com/newsroom/press-releases/en/2020/09/airbus-reveals-zeroemission-concept-aircraft-powered-by-hydrogen.html>

¹² Space Applications of Hydrogen and Fuel Cells. Available from: <https://www.nasa.gov/content/space-applications-of-hydrogen-and-fuel-cells>

¹³ Clean Energy Nuclear Power, 30.09.2020. Available from: <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/20-02283r.pdf>

Waste management: the production of electricity and hydrogen from nuclear energy produces radioactive waste. These wastes require special treatment to minimize their impact on the environment and human health.

Public opinion: nuclear-hydrogen energy evokes different attitudes in society. Awareness campaigns and discussions need to be conducted to achieve consensus and understanding about the benefits and risks of the technology.

Financing and economic efficiency: the introduction of nuclear-hydrogen energy requires significant investments in the construction and maintenance of nuclear reactors, electrolysis systems and infrastructure. This relates to issues of economic efficiency and competitiveness with other energy sources.

Regulation and international cooperation: the development of nuclear and hydrogen energy requires the establishment of appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks at the national and international level. Coordination and cooperation between countries in the field of nuclear safety and hydrogen use are important aspects for the successful implementation of this concept.

All these aspects are important for the development and implementation of nuclear-hydrogen energy. With joint efforts, scientific and technological advances, and support from governments and society, nuclear-hydrogen energy can become a significant factor in solving the energy and environmental challenges of the future.

Hydrogen energy development programs in the world

In the United States, there are several programs aimed at developing hydrogen energy. Some of them are listed below.

H2@Scale Program: This program, launched by the US Department of Energy (DOE), aims to develop and commercialize hydrogen energy technologies [18:46]. It includes research and development, demonstration projects and industry partnerships to integrate hydrogen systems into a variety of sectors, including power generation, transportation and industrial applications.¹⁴

National Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Laboratory: This laboratory complex, located in New York City, provides unique capabilities for the research, development and testing of hydrogen technologies. It conducts research into water electrolysis, hydrogen storage, fuel cells and other related technologies.

The H2USA initiative is a partnership between government, industry, and other stakeholders to develop hydrogen energy infrastructure in the United States [11]. Members of this partnership are working together to create the conditions for the deployment of hydrogen energy technologies, including the development of standards, certification and information exchange¹⁵.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of Energy. (n.d.). H2@Scale. Available from: <https://www.energy.gov/eere/fuelcells/h2scale>

¹⁵ United States Department of Energy, July 2016. Available from: https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2016/07/f33/fcto_h2usa_factsheet.pdf

Fuel Cell Technologies Office Program: This DOE program focuses on the research, development, and demonstration of fuel cell technologies, including hydrogen fuel cells. It supports projects in transportation, stationary applications and energy efficiency systems to improve the performance and reduce the cost of fuel cell technologies.

The Hydrogen and Fuel Cells Program works in collaboration with industrial partners, academic institutions and research organizations to develop and implement new technologies. The goal of the program is to create economically competitive and sustainable hydrogen energy solutions that can be used in various sectors such as energy, transport and industry.

Programs and initiatives in the United States are aimed at stimulating the development and implementation of hydrogen technologies, creating the necessary infrastructure and improving technological solutions in this area. Thanks to this approach, the United States is actively promoting the development of hydrogen energy and playing an important role in shaping the global market for hydrogen technologies [18].

In Japan, there are several programs aimed at developing hydrogen energy. Japan actively supports the industrial, research and infrastructure development of hydrogen technologies. Listed below are some of them.

Hydrogen Infrastructure Development for the Sustainable Energy System: this program, led by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) of Japan, specifically develops hydrogen infrastructure to support the deployment of hydrogen technologies. As part of the program, hydrogen filling stations are being built, hydrogen storage and delivery systems are being developed, and research is being conducted to optimize infrastructure¹⁶.

Hydrogen Fuel Cells and Hydrogen Storage Technologies Program: this program, run by the National Institute of Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), focuses on research and development in hydrogen fuel cells and hydrogen storage technologies. The goal of the program is to increase the efficiency of fuel cells, improve durability, develop new materials and hydrogen storage technologies¹⁷.

Hydrogen Society Strategy Program: Japan has developed a hydrogen society strategy to accelerate the adoption of hydrogen technologies in various sectors, including energy, transport and industry. The strategy includes financial support and subsidies for research, development and demonstration projects in hydrogen and fuel cells [17]¹⁸.

Hydrogen Energy Islands Program: plans to be regions fully equipped with hydrogen infrastructure, including hydrogen production, storage, transportation and use. They will use hydrogen in various fields such as electricity, transport, industry and domestic purposes. The Hydrogen Energy Islands program is part of Japan's hydrogen energy

¹⁶ Analyzing the necessity of hydrogen imports for net-zero emission scenarios in Japan. Available from: <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306261921006814>

¹⁷ Japan Science and Technology Agency - "Hydrogen and Fuel Cells - Toward a Sustainable Hydrogen Society". Available from: <https://www.jst.go.jp/kisoken/presto/hydrogen/en/index.html>

¹⁸ Japan's Ministry of the Environment - "Hydrogen Society". Available from: <https://www.env.go.jp/en/focus/attach/060403-5.pdf>

development strategy and aims to create model regions where hydrogen technologies will be widely used and demonstrated (20)¹⁹.

In the European Union (EU), there are several programs and initiatives aimed at developing hydrogen energy to reduce dependence on hydrocarbons [9:151]. The EU actively supports research, development and demonstration projects related to hydrogen technologies. Some of them are listed below.

EU Recovery and Resilience Plan (Next Generation EU): As part of this plan, the EU is committing significant investments to the development of hydrogen energy. The goal is to create a sustainable, competitive and innovative hydrogen economy that can reduce greenhouse gas emissions and accelerate the clean energy transition [16].

EU Hydrogen Strategy: this strategy, introduced in 2020, identifies hydrogen as a key element in achieving the EU's climate and energy goals. The strategy sets goals for developing the hydrogen economy, including increasing hydrogen production, deploying hydrogen infrastructure and supporting hydrogen technologies across industries.

Fuel Cells and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking also funds and supports research, development and demonstration projects in the field of hydrogen storage systems. It promotes the development of fuel cell technologies and hydrogen storage systems, as well as their commercialization.

European Clean Hydrogen Alliance: In 2020, the European Commission launched this initiative to mobilize investment and promote the development of hydrogen energy in Europe [12:57]. The Alliance brings together various stakeholders, including businesses, research organizations, government institutions and public organizations, to create concrete projects and solutions in the field of hydrogen energy.

Clean Energy for All Europeans: This program, led by the European Commission, includes measures to stimulate the development of clean energy sources, including hydrogen energy [14]. It aims to achieve energy efficiency, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and create a sustainable and competitive energy system in Europe²⁰.

These programs in the European Union show great plans and strategic attention to the development of hydrogen energy. The focus is on producing clean green hydrogen without carbon emissions [3]. They aim to create an enabling environment for innovation, deploying hydrogen infrastructure, developing new technologies and attracting investment in this promising area.

In Russia, rich in natural resources and energy, the need to develop hydrogen energy is also important, since the future of the country as a global energy power directly depends on it. Russian scientists note that energy directly affects geopolitics. Thus, the basis of geopolitics of the 19th and 20th centuries. lies steam and coal power. During the transition to the fourth industrial revolution, the features of which have not yet been precisely defined, it is important to study what will develop it, including hydrogen energy [1:49]. In the event

¹⁹ Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) – “Hydrogen Energy Island Concept”. Available from: https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2021/0108_002.html

²⁰ European Commission – “A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe”. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/hydrogen-strategy_en

of a world transition to hydrogen and an increase in the share of electricity generation from it, Russia can also maintain its leading position in the energy market and become a global exporter of hydrogen [5:216] in combination with natural gas, which, even with a decrease in the share of oil in energy consumption, will remain demand.

Programs and strategies for hydrogen energy in Kazakhstan

There are several programs in Kazakhstan aimed at developing hydrogen energy. Kazakhstan is actively researching and implementing hydrogen technologies in its energy system. Some of them are listed below.

Strategy Kazakhstan Energy 2050: this is a long-term plan for the development of the energy sector of Kazakhstan, includes the development of hydrogen energy as one of the key areas. The goal of the strategy is to increase energy efficiency and use clean energy sources, including hydrogen.

In 2013, specific goals for the development of the renewable energy sector were formulated and, as a result, the volume of the renewable energy market and the potential for reducing greenhouse gases from renewable energy sources were determined. The Concept of Kazakhstan's transition to a green economy and the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy have goals to increase the share of alternative and renewable energies in the country's energy balance to 3% in 2020, to 15% in 2030, and to 50% in 2050²¹.

National Hydrogen Energy Development and Introduction Program: this program was launched with the goal of developing and introducing hydrogen energy in Kazakhstan. It includes research, development and projects in the field of hydrogen technologies, including the production, storage, transportation and use of hydrogen.

Kazakhstan plans to create a hydrogen cluster - an innovation center that brings together enterprises, research organizations and government institutions for cooperation and development of hydrogen technologies. The cluster will facilitate the exchange of knowledge, the development of new technologies and the creation of favorable conditions for the deployment of hydrogen infrastructure.

Kazakhstan is also actively developing international cooperation in the field of hydrogen energy. As part of this cooperation, the country conducts joint research, exchanges experience and best practices with other countries and international organizations.

For example, Kazakhstan cooperates with Japan, which has extensive expertise in the field of hydrogen energy. In 2019, Kazakhstan and Japan signed an agreement on cooperation in the field of hydrogen energy, which provides for the exchange of technical knowledge, experience and technologies, as well as the joint implementation of projects²².

Kazakhstan is also actively involved in the work of the International Hydrogen Energy Agency (IPHE), which is an international platform for cooperation in the field of hydrogen

²¹ Development of renewable energy sources. Available from: <https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/energo/activities/4910?lang=ru>

²² On the signing of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of Japan on cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy and the Agreed Protocol thereto. Available from: https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P100000093_

energy. Within the framework of IPHE, Kazakhstan exchanges information and experience with other participating countries, participates in joint research projects and program initiatives. The German-Swedish company SVEVIND Energy Group intends to invest \$50 billion in the production of green hydrogen in Kazakhstan. This will allow the production of up to 3 million tons of hydrogen²³.

All of these programs, strategies and international cooperation in the field of hydrogen energy reflect Kazakhstan's commitment to developing clean energy sources and creating a sustainable energy system [7]. Kazakhstan recognizes the potential of hydrogen energy and is actively working to implement it in its national energy strategy.

Conclusion

This article examined the world experience of countries that developed hydrogen energy more than others and explored the experience of Kazakhstan, achievements and problems. There is a growing interest in hydrogen energy around the world. Many developed countries are actively investing in research and development in this area, developing national strategies and legislation to promote the development of the hydrogen economy. Countries such as Germany, Japan, South Korea and Australia are already implementing projects related to the production, storage and use of hydrogen [4:36].

One important trend is the increasing scale of hydrogen production from renewable energy sources such as solar and wind energy. Electrolysis technologies, which produce hydrogen from water using electricity, are becoming increasingly efficient and cost-effective.

Demand for hydrogen is growing in various sectors, including transport, industry and energy. Hydrogen fuel cells are becoming increasingly popular in the automotive industry, used in manufacturing and as a source of electrical energy.

Kazakhstan, possessing vast reserves of natural resources and significant potential for the development of renewable energy sources, has all the prerequisites for the development of hydrogen energy. The country is already implementing projects to produce hydrogen based on renewable energy sources such as solar and wind energy. These projects improve energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Kazakhstan is actively developing a legislative framework and national strategies in the field of hydrogen energy. The country's authorities provide financial support and tax incentives for investors who are interested in developing this sector. This creates a favorable environment for investment and stimulates the development of hydrogen infrastructure.

Kazakhstan has significant research potential in the field of hydrogen energy. There are scientific institutes in the country that are engaged in research and development of new technologies in this area. This promotes innovative solutions and ways to optimize hydrogen production processes.

²³ \$50 billion project: Kazakhstan begins to produce green hydrogen. Available from: https://el.kz/ru/proekt-na-50-mlrd-dollarov-kazahstan-nachinaet-proizvodit-zelenyy-vodorod_79364/

However, the development of hydrogen energy in Kazakhstan faces obstacles:

- for the successful implementation of hydrogen projects, it is necessary to develop the appropriate infrastructure, including production facilities, networks for transportation, storage and refueling of hydrogen. Building such an infrastructure requires significant investment and strategic planning.
- the cost of hydrogen production and related technologies remains high. There is a need to reduce production costs, improve process efficiency and develop business models that are economically viable.
- the development of hydrogen energy requires the presence of qualified specialists who will be familiar with modern technologies, methods and safety in this area. Educational programs and trainings must be developed to prepare the necessary specialists.
- cooperation with international partners can play an important role in the development of hydrogen energy. Exchange of experience, technologies and best practices with other countries active in this area can contribute to faster development in Kazakhstan.

All this requires an integrated and coordinated approach on the part of government, business, scientific and educational institutions.

Given favorable conditions and the right strategy, Kazakhstan can become a leader in the field of hydrogen energy in the region and make a significant contribution to the global development of this industry. The development of hydrogen energy in Kazakhstan contributes to the achievement of national and international goals in the field of sustainable development, reducing greenhouse gas emissions and reducing dependence on unstable energy sources.

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Contractual Legal Framework for Military-Technical Cooperation between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation

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Abstract: The article deals with the contractual legal foundations of military-technical cooperation between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation. The features of the development of military-technical cooperation, events affecting the formation of its contractual legal framework within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the significance of cooperation are shown.

Keywords: Armenia, Russia, military-technical cooperation, legal framework, allied states, security

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Introduction

Allied relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation are built on the basis of bilateral and multilateral legal norms. Allied relations have developed between the two states, and cooperation in the military-technical sphere occupies a special place. Developing for about three decades, it contributes to strengthening the defense sector of both countries.

The Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation have been carrying out military-technical cooperation both in a bilateral and multilateral format in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and since 2002, in parallel and at a deeper level, within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). It is important to note

that military-technical cooperation between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation is not only the import or export of weapons, but mutual allied obligations.

The problems of military-technical cooperation between the two states both in the CIS and the CSTO were considered by both Armenian and foreign researchers [1; 2; 4; 3; 6].

The purpose of the study is to analyze the legal framework of military-technical cooperation between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation and the opportunities it provides.

Materials and Methods

The source base for the study is a number of legal documents signed between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation at the bilateral and multilateral level.

The study was conducted using the method of content analysis of documents.

The comparative analytical method was used to make the results of the study more holistic and comprehensive.

Results

Military-technical Cooperation between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation Within the CIS and CSTO

In the first years of the creation of the CIS, the participating states sought to carry out military-technical cooperation in a multilateral format. For this purpose, on February 14, 1992, by decision of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS, the Council of Defense Ministers (CDM) of the CIS member states was created, which is the body of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS on issues of military policy and military development of the CIS member states¹. In order to deepen cooperation in the military-technical sphere between the CIS member states, on April 19, 1995, the Military-Technical Committee under the CDM CIS was created, the tasks of which are to develop, coordinate and submit to the CDM proposals on the main directions of the military-technical policy of the states-members of the CIS, convergence of legal acts of the CIS member states in the military-technical sphere, and so on². Naturally, both the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation, being active participants in integration processes in the CIS, have established cooperation in the military-technical sphere since the formation of this organization. The Military Technical Committee under the CDM CIS dealt with military-technical cooperation, as well as issues of modernization and repair of weapons and military equipment of the national armed forces

1 Regulations on the Council of Defense Ministers of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Available from: <https://mil.ru/smosng/about/documents/more.htm?id=12087397@egNPA>

2 Military-technical committee at the CIS Defense Ministry. Available from: <https://mil.ru/smosng/units/coordinationcommittees/vtk>

of the CIS member states³. The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia actively participates in the work of expert commissions of the CDM CIS and other bodies⁴. The regular meeting of the Military Technical Committee at the CDM of the CIS member states, held in Moscow on November 11, 2021, was attended by delegations headed by deputy heads of defense departments of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Following the meeting, the Chairman of the Military Technical Committee at the CDM CIS, Army General D.Bulgakov, stated that “the meeting was held in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and will undoubtedly contribute to further convergence of views on the development strategy and organization of logistics support for troops.”⁵

The Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation also closely cooperate in the military-technical sphere in the Council of Commanders of the Border Troops, created by the decision of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS on July 6, 1992⁶. According to the CIS Charter, “The Council of Commanders of the Border Troops is the body of the Council of Heads of State on issues of protecting the external borders of member states and ensuring a stable situation on them”⁷. One of the tasks of the Council of Commanders of the Border Troops is the development and strengthening of the border troops of the CIS member states through the convergence of national legislation on border issues and their protection, mutual exchange of information, cooperation in the field of military-technical policy and personnel training⁸.

The Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation also carry out military-technical cooperation with other CIS member states within the framework of the joint air defense system (USA) of the CIS member states (the Agreement on the creation of a joint air defense system of the CIS member states was signed by the heads of the CIS member states 10 February 1995 in Almaty) [4:22]. Cooperation involves joint planning of military-technical policy, modernization of resources and air defense systems, rearmament, etc.⁹.

One of the priority areas in the first half of the 1990s was military integration within the CIS. Important was the signing of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) (May 15, 1992) (4:16), followed by the signing of the “Agreement on the approval of the Regulations on the Collective Security Council” (July 6, 1992), according to which the Collective Security Council Along with other powers, he also had the authority to make recommendations on the main directions of military-technical policy and equipping the Armed Forces of the

3 A collection of analytical, informational and scientific materials on the activities of the Commonwealth of Independent States, under the general editorship of V.G.Garkun. Minsk, 2013. P.135. Available from: <https://e-cis.info/upload/iblock/157/157c092a191e68f09e19062d855aeea2.pdf>

4 Military-political cooperation. Available from: <https://www.mil.am/ru/pages/39>

5 A meeting of the Military Technical Committee under the Council of Defense Ministers of the CIS member states was held in Moscow. Available from: <https://mil.ru/smosng/news/more.htm?id=12394396@egNews>

6 Decision on the creation of the Council of Commanders of the Border Troops. Available from: <https://cis.minsk.by/reestr2/doc/131#text>

7 The Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Available from: <http://cis.minsk.by/reestr2/doc/187#text>

8 Agreement on the Regulations on the Council of Commanders of the Border Troops. Available from: <https://cis.minsk.by/reestr2/doc/258#text>

9 On the unified air defense system of the CIS countries. Available from: <https://cis.minsk.by/news/12024/ob-obedinennoj-sisteme-protivovozdusnoj-oborony-stran-sng>

participating states with weapons and military equipment¹⁰. An important step was the "Decision on priority measures for the implementation of the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992" signed on December 24, 1993¹¹. From the point of view of military-technical cooperation between the two countries at the multilateral level, the Concept of Collective Security of the state's parties to the Collective Security Treaty, approved on February 10, 1995 [2:17], was important. The document noted that the participating states are united by military-political and economic interests, military-technical base and infrastructure, and the desire to pursue a coordinated policy to ensure collective security. As is known, the member states of the Collective Security Treaty planned to implement the collective security system in stages, and the first stage included the development of a program of military and military-technical cooperation between the member states and the beginning of its implementation¹².

In the late 1990s, it was obvious that not all CIS countries wanted to participate in deep integration in the military-political sphere (in April 1999, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty) [4:21], and it was precisely for this reason. For this reason, integration in the military-political sphere began to gradually deepen within the framework of the member states of the Collective Security Treaty, this also applied to cooperation in the military-technical sphere.

An important legal basis here is the "Agreement on the basic principles of military-technical cooperation between the states parties to the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992", signed on June 20, 2000 by the states parties to the Collective Security Treaty, which regulates the export and import, supply or procurement of military products, development and production of military products¹³. Article 6 of this agreement states

The supplying Party has the right to exercise control over the intended use of military products supplied under this Agreement. The control mechanism is determined by a separate Protocol, which will become an integral part of this Agreement¹⁴.

Mechanisms for control of supplier side military products are an important part of both multilateral and bilateral documents. In the military-technical sphere, cooperation between the CSTO member states deepened when the Collective Security Treaty was transformed into the CSTO and the CSTO Collective Security System gradually began to take shape. Both in the case of the CIS and within the CSTO, military-technical cooperation

¹⁰ Agreement on approval of the Regulations on the Collective Security Council. Available from: <https://cis.minsk.by/reestr2/doc/126#text>

¹¹ Decision on priority measures to implement the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992. Available from: <https://cis.minsk.by/reestr2/doc/292#text>

¹² The concept of collective security of the states parties to the Collective Security Treaty. Available from: https://odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/kontseptsiya_kollektivnoy_bezopasnosti_gosudarstv_uchastnikov_dogovora_o_kollektivnoy_bezopasnosti/#loaded

¹³ "Agreement on the basic principles of military-technical cooperation between the states parties to the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992." Available from: https://odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/soglashenie_ob_osnovnykh_printsipakh_voenno_tekhnicheskogo_sotrudnichestva_mezhdu_gosudarstvami_ucha/#loaded

¹⁴ Ibid.

has acquired great importance, which was enshrined in the CSTO Charter¹⁵. Important regulatory legal documents on deepening cooperation in the military-technical sphere were adopted by the CSTO member states at the session of the CSTO Collective Security Council, held on October 6, 2007 in Dushanbe¹⁶. The CSTO collective security system itself presupposes that the CSTO member states must cooperate in the military-technical sphere to develop this system. The security of the CSTO collective security system in the Caucasus region is based on the existing strategic cooperation between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation. It becomes clear that military-technical cooperation between the two countries is not limited to only the bilateral level, but is part of an integral system.

In parallel with the development of the Collective Security System, the CSTO is making changes to a number of basic documents, for example, as a result of changes in the 2010 CSTO Charter, Article 7 was edited:

Member states also interact in the areas of military-technical (military-economic) cooperation, providing the armed forces, law enforcement agencies and special services with the necessary weapons, military, special equipment and special means, training military personnel and specialists for the national armed forces, special services and law enforcement¹⁷.

And in the "Agreement on the basic principles of military-technical cooperation between the member states of the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992" in 2003-2017, amendments were introduced four times by the corresponding protocols (changes and additions to the Agreement signed on September 19, 2003, 6 October 2007, December 10, 2010, November 30, 2017)¹⁸. From the point of view of cooperation of the CSTO member states in the military-technical sphere, the "Agreement on cooperation of member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in the field of development, production, operation, repair, modernization, extension of service life and disposal", signed on December 10, 2010, was also important. military products¹⁹. In general, preferential terms for military-technical supplies have been established thanks to the existing contractual framework within the CSTO.

¹⁵ Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Available from: <https://szrf.ru/list.html#editions=e1028&divid=1000008&volume=10220040030008&page=1&sort=position&limit=50&valid=10220040030008&docid=14>

¹⁶ Regulatory legal documents signed within the framework of the CSTO. Available from: https://odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/normativnye_pravovye_dokumenty_podpisannye_v_ramkakh_odkb/#loaded

¹⁷ Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Available from: https://odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/ustav_organizatsii_dogovora_o_kollektivnoy_bezopasnosti/#loaded

¹⁸ Agreement on the basic principles of military-technical cooperation between the states parties to the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992. Available from: https://odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/soglashenie_ob_osnovnykh_printsipakh_voenno_tekhnicheskogo_sotrudnichestva_mezhdu_gosudarstvami_ucha/#loaded. Look also: Fourth Protocol on Amendments to the Agreement on the Basic Principles of Military-Technical Cooperation between the States Parties to the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992. Available from: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202003300001?index=1>

¹⁹ Agreement on cooperation between member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in the field of development, production, operation, repair, modernization, extension of service life and disposal of military products. Available from: https://mkves.odkb-csto.org/news/regulations/soglashenie_o_sotrudnichestve_gosudarstv-chlenov_5/#loaded

Bilateral Military-Technical Cooperation between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation

Since the mid-1990s the slowdown of integration processes within the CIS [5: 28–29] “forced” the CIS member states to cooperate at the bilateral level, which also extended to cooperation in the military-technical sphere. This was expressed in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, signed on August 29, 1997 between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia [3:77]. Article 4 of this agreement stipulates that the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation will cooperate in the field of military-technical policy, military production, taking into account the standardization of weapons, including the financing of agreed military programs²⁰.

The “Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Armenia on military-technical cooperation” signed on January 17, 2003 assumes that the Parties, if necessary, will create a joint working body on military-technical cooperation²¹. Developing this agreement, on June 25, 2013, the “Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia on the development of military-technical cooperation” was signed. Article 9 of the Agreement provides that “The Party that supplied military products under this Agreement has the right to exercise control over its availability and intended use, the procedure for which the Parties will determine in an additional agreement”²². On October 13, 2016, the “Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia on the procedure for monitoring the availability and intended use of military products supplied under the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia on the development of military-technical cooperation of June 25, 2013” was signed. Article 8 of this agreement states that

The party into whose territory military products are supplied is obliged to present the military products specified in the control request, as well as the necessary documentation confirming their intended use²³.

It is noteworthy that during the ratification of this agreement in the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia, representatives of the opposition launched a heated

²⁰ Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia. Available from: <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/8306454?marker>

²¹ Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government Republic of Armenia on military-technical cooperation. Available from: <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/901947466?marker=64U0IK>

²² Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia on the development of military-technical cooperation. Available from: <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/499042956?marker§ion=text>

²³ Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia on the procedure for monitoring the availability and intended use of military products supplied under the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia on the development of military-technical cooperation of June 25, 2013. Available from: <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/456039035?section=text>

debate on Article 8²⁴. Representatives of the opposition saw this clause as a limitation of the sovereignty of Armenia, although similar provisions were reflected in the “Agreement on the Basic Principles of Military-Technical Cooperation between the States Parties to the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992” signed by the participating states of the CST.

It is obvious that after the 44-day war in Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) in 2020, the Republic of Armenia needs to update and replenish its weapons to increase its defense capability, and in this regard, deepening military-technical cooperation with the Russian Federation is vital. A similar goal was pursued by the visit of the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Armenia to Moscow on August 11, 2021, during which the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation S.Shoigu noted that Russia is ready to assist in reforming the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia²⁵. Earlier, according to TASS news agency, on April 7, 2021, the press secretary of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation of the Russian Federation V.Reshetnikova announced that the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia are implementing the military-technical cooperation program in full²⁶. After the Russian Federation launched a special military operation in Ukraine in 2022, problems arose, forcing the leadership of the Republic of Armenia to look for additional ways and suppliers to acquire weapons. However, the Russian Federation continues to play a primary role, as evidenced by the regular 16th meeting of the Armenian-Russian Intergovernmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation held in Yerevan in March 2023, during which the Armenian side emphasized the importance of strengthening and developing bilateral military-technical relations²⁷.

On April 7, 2023, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Armenia S.Kopyrkin gave clarifications in an interview with Armenia Today on military-technical cooperation between both allied states, emphasizing its importance. The ambassador noted that the sphere of military-technical cooperation is not public, but noted “it has traditionally been and is an important part of our bilateral relations. There are appropriate mechanisms in place that ensure interaction in this area”²⁸.

At the same time, Ambassador S.Kopyrkin recalled that a Russian military base is stationed in the Republic of Armenia and a joint group of troops operates, and also added that

when we talk about military-technical cooperation, joint exercises, we consider this as a factor in ensuring the security of the Republic of Armenia and as an integral part of our common efforts

²⁴ They say: we will use the Aerospace Forces of the Russian Federation, well, we'll see. Nikol Pashinyan. [in Armenian]. Available from: <https://www.tert.am/am/news/2017/10/05/Pashinyan/2502421>

²⁵ The Russian Defense Minister held talks with his Armenian counterpart in Moscow. Available from: https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12376659@egNews (дата обращения 22.05.2023).

²⁶ The Russian Federation believes that military-technical cooperation with Armenia is fully implemented. Available from: <https://tass.ru/ekonomika/11089461>

²⁷ Meeting of the intergovernmental commission in the administrative complex of the Ministry of Defense. Available from: <https://www.mil.am/ru/news/11389>

²⁸ Kopyrkin: Russia does not abandon its obligations to Armenia. Available from: <https://armeniatoday.news/exclusive-ru/601107/>

to maintain and strengthen security in the region, create conditions for the political settlement of those problems and contradictions that exist²⁹.

Thus, the Ambassador of the Russian Federation again emphasized the existence of a wide range of strategic and allied relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation in the field of security, placing special emphasis on military-technical cooperation.

Conclusion

The Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation, in the process of military-political integration within the CIS, are actively involved in military-technical cooperation at many levels. Taking into account that a huge legacy remains from the military-industrial complex of the USSR, there are great opportunities for developing cooperation in the military-technical sphere in both bilateral and multilateral formats. However, despite the existence of a legal framework, a number of CIS member states, for various reasons, did not show interest in military, including military-technical cooperation. However, Armenia and the Russian Federation continued to develop integration processes within the CIS. Both countries effectively cooperate within the CIS in matters of protecting external borders and developing a joint air defense system, which also contributes to the development of the legal framework for military-technical cooperation. The CSTO is an important legal basis for the establishment of multilateral allied relations between Armenia and the Russian Federation, on the basis of which the CSTO member states, deepening integration, continued to develop military-technical cooperation as allies. The formation of the CSTO Collective Security System, in turn, also stimulated the further development of military-technical cooperation within the CSTO. Based on some features of integration within the CIS and CSTO, a large-scale legal framework for military-technical cooperation has been formed between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation at the bilateral level, which is complemented by military-technical cooperation within the CIS and especially the CSTO.

Thus, in the military-technical sphere, the legal framework formed by the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation at the multilateral and bilateral levels allows the allied states to develop effective cooperation, which helps to increase the defense capability of both states. Since the bulk of the weapons of the Republic of Armenia are of Soviet or Russian origin, deepening cooperation between our countries in the military-technical sphere and enriching the legal framework is very important.

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The Role of Spain in Ibero-American Cooperation

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Abstract. This article examines one of the most actual issues of Spanish foreign policy: the role of Spain in Ibero-American cooperation. The historical background and claims of Spain and Morocco to these disputed territories, which are used by it to substantiate its claims, are presented. The problem is far from being resolved: the migrant crisis in Ceuta in May 2021 and Morocco's claims to the cities of Ceuta and Melilla confirm the difficult situation in the Strait region for Spanish foreign policy. The article deals with territorial issues in the Strait, in which Spain has jurisdiction, powers and special responsibility, using cooperation with the EU as a short- and long-term strategy.

Keywords: Ibero-America, Spain, international cooperation, foreign policy, economy

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Introduction

Ibero-America has always been a priority of Spanish foreign policy. Humanitarian, historical, social, cultural, political, economic and linguistic ties have made Ibero-America an object of constant interest for the Spanish government.

Ibero-America and the Caribbean have changed greatly in recent years, requiring a new look at Spain's relationship with the region. Ibero-American economies modernized, the middle class grew, and projects of integration and cooperation expanded. Against this background, Spain strives to maintain bilateral relations in accordance with the characteristics of each country and to engage in dialogue with all countries. Its goal is to strengthen mechanisms for political dialogue, coordinate action in international organizations and explore economic opportunities for mutual benefit.

Spain is one of the main investors in the Ibero-American economy and plays a large role in key sectors of social development and modernization, such as banking,

energy, telecommunications, infrastructure construction and management, tourism and the provision of public services. International development cooperation is one of the main instruments of Spain's Ibero-American foreign policy, since it is necessary not only to strengthen dialogue and develop cooperation in order to contribute to the strengthening of the institutions of the Ibero-American countries, but also to support effective economic reform processes that promote growth and promote redistribution of wealth and justice¹.

The relevance of studying the role of Spain in Ibero-American cooperation lies in the growing role of international summits in discussing global issues in the modern world. The first Ibero-American summit was held during World War II. The summits made a special contribution to the development of international contacts as an important new form of international cooperation.

The issue of the development of integration processes between Latin American countries and the European Community has been considered in the works of Russian and foreign researchers, but a number of aspects of the activities of Spain and Portugal within the Ibero-American Community remain insufficiently studied.

The article uses the results of research by the chief researcher at the Center for Iberian Studies of the Institute of Latin America of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor P.P.Yakovlev [16, 17, 18], the work of A.Andreev [1], N.E.Anikeeva [2], D.V.Bobrik (3), N.M.Bogolyubova and Yu.V.Nikolaeva [4], A.Yu.Borzova, O.V.Volosyuk, N.D.Nikolashvili [5], I.A.Gritsenko [7], V.M.Davydov [6], V.Yu.Dereshuk [8], D.N.Konovalova, Yu.A.Pavlova [12], M.S.Ryzhov [13], V.P.Totsky [14], M.A.Shepelev [15] and others, which examined a regional view of Latin American integration in its global aspect. The collection of articles edited by A.V.Shestopal "Ibero-American Studies: Ibero-American Relations with Eurasia, Including Russia, and the Process of Modernization in Latin America" examines the relations between Ibero-America and the Eurasian continent, including Russia. Among the works of foreign authors on this topic, we note the monograph by Celestino del Arenal "Ibero-American Summits (1991-2005)" [20], which defines the priorities of Spain in its interaction with Latin America, the article by W.B.Bristol [19], who back in 1943 considered community as an ideological concept, M. de Lema [21], who studied the history of the formation of the concept of the Ibero-American community, E.M.Quintero Niño [22], who wrote about the prerequisites for the formation of the Ibero-American community.

The article, based on conclusions already made by other researchers, reveals the role of Spain in Latin American integration thanks to the Ibero-American summit.

¹ Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EU and Cooperation of the Kingdom of Spain. Available from: <https://www.exteriores.gob.es/es/PoliticaExterior/Paginas/EspanaIberoamerica.aspx>

Materials and Methods

Spain's role in South-South cooperation is of paramount importance. Its main organization is the Ibero-American Secretariat. Its activities include annual presidential summits, meetings between national focal points and the preparation of annual reports. The article analyzes the materials of the Ibero-American summits², Internet resources directly related to the work of the Ibero-American Community, materials relevant for studying the work of the Ibero-American Secretariat and the activities of the Spanish government. We used materials posted on Internet resources in English, Spanish and Portuguese, publications: El Pais³, El Mundo⁴, El Mercurio⁵

Results

Ibero-American cooperation played an important role in the process of creating the Ibero-American Community. To intensify it, the Ibero-American Summit was created. Its first meeting took place in 1991 in Guadalajara and in 1992 in Madrid, in accordance with the political desire of the 21 participating countries (22 with the addition of Andorra) to formalize the historical ties between Ibero-America and the Iberian Peninsula through dialogue, cooperation and solidarity.

The main principles enshrined in the "Declaration of Guadalajara" were: democracy; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; respect for sovereignty; non-interference; the right of every people to self-determination "in conditions of peace, stability and justice."⁶

Over the years, the organization of Ibero-American cooperation has established itself as one of the most authoritative in the region with specific proposals for citizens. A comprehensive "Global Presence Index" was created: in 2011, 54 countries were taken into account, in 2022 - 150 countries. According to the formula, 36% of a country's global influence comes from soft power, 43% from economics, and 21% from military power⁷.

² Official website of the General Ibero-American Secretariat Available from: <https://www.segib.org/>

³ España se consolida como el gran inversor de América Latina. El Pais. Available from: <https://elpais.com/america/cumbre-iberoamericana/2023-03-24/espana-se-consolida-como-el-gran-inversor-de-america-latina.html>

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⁵ Los futuros líderes iberoamericanos que están cambiando el presente. El Mercurio. Available from: <https://elmercurio.com.ec/2020/10/12/los-futuros-lideres-iberoamericanos-que-estan-cambiando-el-presente/>

⁶ Declaración de Guadalajara. SEGIB. Guadalajara, 19 de julio de 1991. Available from: <https://segib.org/wp-content/uploads/Primera-Cumbre-Iberoamericana-de-Jefes-de-Estado-y-de-Gobierno.pdf>

⁷ Que es el Índice ElCano de Presencia Global. Estructura. Real Instituto Elcano. 2022. Available from: <https://www.globalpresence.realinstitutoelcano.org/es/estructura>

The XXVI Ibero-American Summit, held in La Antigua, Guatemala, in 2018, adopted the II Four-Year Plan of Action for the Development of Ibero-American Cooperation (PACCI) for 2019-2022. It was held under the motto "A prosperous, inclusive and sustainable Iberoamerica" [17].

PACCI II⁸ was aimed at renewing the Ibero-American cooperation launched at the 22nd Summit in Cadiz in 2012, towards a coordinated development, towards the promotion of the Ibero-American Knowledge Space (KS), the Ibero-American Cultural Space (ECI) and the Ibero-American Space Social Cohesion (EICS), defining three priority areas for action.

PACCHI II articulated this process in the 2030 Agenda, taking advantage of horizontal linkages.

For this purpose, II Pact has identified seven strategic directions ⁹:

- Strategic direction 1: Strengthening Ibero-American cooperation
- Strategic direction 2: Promoting social inclusion, eradicating poverty and reducing inequality
- Strategic direction 3. Development of knowledge, higher education, science and technology in Ibero-America
- Strategic direction 4: Promoting gender equality in Latin America.
- Strategic Direction 5: Promoting sustainable development based on the diversity and richness of Ibero-American cultures.
- Strategic direction 6. Promoting support for the environmental aspect in the region.
- Strategic direction 7: Strengthening innovation, entrepreneurship and digital transformation in Ibero-America. Spanish cooperation supports Ibero-American organizations, as stated in the Fifth Spanish Cooperation Master Plan 2018-2021:

Ibero-American Secretariat (SEGIB), Ibero-American Council of Ministers of Justice (COMJIB) and Ibero-American Youth International Association (IOJ), Ibero-American Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (OEI), Ibero-American Social Security Organization (OISS), Ibero-American Programs and Projects (PIPA).

Programs and initiatives are intergovernmental cooperation activities in which national governments express their willingness to cooperate in a certain area, agree on its composition, and are responsible for its implementation. This cooperation, which does not interfere with the sovereignty of each country in choosing a development model, management system and economic orientation, is easily integrated into the national strategies and plans of each country and reinforces these national plans and related public policies with joint regional activities¹⁰

Alliance projects are activities carried out by regional and/or local public authorities, private or public-private organizations that contribute to the development of Ibero-

⁸ Plan de acción cuatrienal de la Cooperación Iberoamericana 2015-2018 (PACCI). Available from: <https://www.segib.org/?document=plan-de-accion-cuatrienal-de-la-cooperacion-iberoamericana-2015-2018>

⁹ II Plano de Ação Quadrienal da Cooperação Ibero-Americana. Available from: <https://www.segib.org/wp-content/uploads/II-PACCI-ESP-PORT-Baja-OK.pdf>

¹⁰ España en la cooperación iberoamericana. Available from: <https://www.somosiberoamerica.org/onda-pais/espana/espana-en-la-cooperacion-iberoamericana/>

American countries. Alliance projects bring into cooperation non-state actors such as local and regional authorities, non-governmental organizations, associations, universities, trade unions, companies and foundations. The Ibero-American Center for Strategic Urban Management, created at the V Ibero-American Summit, is currently in the draft stage. The project's goal is to innovate governance structures and lead the reorganization of city functions "in the strategic planning of urban economic and social development for the main areas of urban activity."

Currently, a number of Latin American programs are being developed jointly with Spain, Portugal and Andorra. These include programs to support theatres, archives, public libraries and museums, as well as cooperation in education and training. Ibero-America is not just a geographical landmark. It is a structure in which member states and their societies dialogue and cooperate with each other. As a pluralistic space of countries with common values, cultures, affinities and interests, the Ibero-American Community enjoys priority in Spain's democratic foreign policy. The concept of Ibero-America, in contrast to the Latinism, paternalism and imperialism that guided Latin American politics during the Franco era, corresponds to the understanding of the continent as a continent of equality and progress [2]. Ibero-American cooperation has been a strategic constant in foreign affairs as a state policy, along with the European direction and the desire for multilateralism. The annual summit of heads of state and government of Latin America, Spain and Portugal is an important element of exchange between the participating countries. The purpose of the summits is to discuss the most pressing issues in the development of Latin American countries and develop common positions on these issues. Each meeting is organized to discuss an issue that affects the interests of all or most participants: "Globalization and regional political issues" (VII summit), "Trade and integration as elements of the development of Latin America" (IV summit) and "Problems of managing globalization" (IX summit). The institutionalization of the Ibero-American Summit, established in 1991, strengthened the principles of political dialogue and cooperation through debate and political consensus, the implementation of specific initiatives. New impetus for cooperation was given in the 1980s. It consisted of supporting democracies that could not be integrated without taking into account their social and economic characteristics. Then, based on support for the peace process in Central America, as noted by N.M. Bogolyubova Yu.V. Nikolaeva, a policy of coordinating interests and values through initiatives for institutional strengthening and technical cooperation began to take shape [4].

Over the next decade, they became the basis of relations, and the region became a priority area of cooperation. More recently, the accession of a number of countries in the region to the group of upper-middle-income countries has provided an opportunity to adapt strategies and tools to South-South and triangular cooperation to exchange experiences and create dialogue on public policy issues. Thanks to these changes, Ibero-American cooperation has become especially relevant.

Ibero-American cooperation¹¹ acquired a special status in the international system and anticipated modern models of cooperation. In 2015, a transitional development program until 2030 was adopted, which called for overcoming the binary model between North and South and, moreover, changing the structure of production and consumption in developed countries, choosing a broader system of cooperation. Transitional development involves all countries equally in addressing the enormous social, energy and environmental challenges facing the planet. The relevance of this approach has been heightened by the impact of COVID-19, in particular structural inequalities in the region and the ethical, political and socio-economic implications of events in Ukraine.

This evolution is reflected in Spain's participation in programs, initiatives and projects related to Ibero-American cooperation, in particular (PIPA) SEGIB. These are programs ranging from basic areas (culture, knowledge, social cohesion) to innovations in education, rights of the disabled, the elderly, and other interests).

Since 1992, the Spanish Cooperation has been one of the main participants in PIPA, contributing to the renewal of Ibero-American cooperation by improving quality, inclusiveness, uniformity of procedures, results orientation and mechanisms for monitoring and transparency.

Thus, despite the decline in imports of Latin American goods and services into Spain, the Latin America region remains a priority for Spain. The Kingdom of Spain and Latin America are linked by active economic cooperation, both at the bilateral level and within the EU, to solve common multidimensional problems.

Discussion

Second half of 2023¹², when Spain takes over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, it offers a special opportunity to contribute to the repoliticization of Euro-Latin American relations through projects that will revive the ideas of the Social Pact of cooperation aimed at an equitable model of development. The Spanish EU Presidency at the end of 2023 is an opportunity to revive Euro-Latin American relations and new agreements within the framework of the concept of progressive cooperation.

Currently, Latin America and the European Union face the common challenge of overcoming a socio-economic and geopolitical crisis, a serious health crisis, but this situation is also an opportunity to carry out reforms and solve problems such as inequality, tax problems or lack of trust between institutions and citizens. Spanish-European and Ibero-American cooperation has the experience, tools, resources and shared values to address these challenges

¹¹ Cooperación Iberoamericana. Available from: <https://www.aecid.es/dónde-cooperamos/américa-latina-y-caribe/cooperación-iberoamericana>

¹² Presidencia española del Consejo de la UE. Available from: <https://www.hablamosdeeuropa.es/es/Paginas/Presidencia-española-del-Consejo-de-la-UE.aspx>

Conclusion

Ibero-American summits have become a forum for discussing many international issues at the global and regional level. At each summit, heads of state and government commit to pursuing democracy and economic exchange and upholding human rights. This experience can be used in other international forums. Currently, Latin America is one of the most dynamically developing regions of the world. Brazil is beginning to play a greater role in international relations and is one of the BRICS countries whose growth guarantees the growth of the world economy. Ibero-America is gaining serious weight in the international arena.

In recent years, the countries of Iberia and Latin America have faced serious economic and political problems – crises, recessions and financial difficulties. But the Ibero-American Community has stood the test of history. It can be concluded that the Ibero-American Summit has become the most important and effective factor in the development of Latin American integration, especially for Spain and Portugal, and its role in relations between Iberian and Latin American countries will increase.

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Trends in the Friendly Communications Development between Turkey and Azerbaijan

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Abstract. This article provides an analysis of the trends in the development of friendly Azerbaijani-Turkish communications. The increasing integration of the two states determines not only the bilateral, but also the foreign policy communications of the countries. Azerbaijan pursues a multi-vector and sovereign foreign policy, but many of the decisions directly meet the interests of the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance and contribute to further integration. Turkization and strengthening of cooperation with NATO are the main accents of the current Azerbaijani agenda on the world stage.

Keywords: Azerbaijan, Turkey, foreign policy communication, communication regime, strategic partnership, Turkish-Azerbaijani relations

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Introduction

In the friendliness rating “Communication regimes of neighboring countries - 2022” [3], published by the National Research Institute for the Development of Communications, the Republic of Azerbaijan is in 7th place. Compared to the previous year, the country decreased by two positions. First of all, the authors of the report attribute this to the weakening of foreign policy strategic communication with Russia against the backdrop of deepening integration with an important regional player - the Republic of Turkey, as well as the introduction of the concept of the “Turkic world”. Despite the signing of the Declaration on Allied Cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan, analysts note the formation of a civilizational rift and a weakening sense of the common historical past of the two countries.

Türkiye is officially declared a priority partner of Azerbaijan, and bilateral relations are characterized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan¹ as “friendly and fraternal”. In this regard, a common policy of the two states is being formed on a number of issues, including international relations.

The author used the works of researchers on similar topics, Russian, Turkish, Azerbaijani and other foreign researchers: V.A.Avatkov [1, 5]; A.G.Ibragimov [2]; V.V.Komleva [3]; E.F.Parubochaya [4]; R.Ibrahimov [6], A.Valiyev, N.Gafarova [7]; E.Mikail, Y.Atun, A.Atun [8], who have studied individual stages and problems in the topic under study over the past thirty years.

The purpose of the study is to identify the causes, conditions and trends in the formation of friendly foreign policy communications between Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Materials and Methods

When writing the article, materials from Russian, Azerbaijani and Turkish official sources were studied (reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, speeches of top officials of states, publications of government bodies and international organizations, integration associations. The research is based on the comparative method and the method of system analysis.

Results

Multi-vectorism and pragmatism are the fundamental principles of the foreign policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Like any independent state, the country directs its foreign policy to achieve national interests [1]. Article 10 of the Constitution² it states that Azerbaijan builds its relations with other countries and the outside world on the basis of international law and the interests of the country, the country wants dominance in the South Caucasus by using its interaction with Turkey, as well as friendly relations with Moscow.

Azerbaijan, like any other state, forms its foreign policy taking into account a number of factors. Among them, it is necessary to highlight the geographical location: Azerbaijan is located at the crossroads of major transport routes, which makes it an important player in regional and international affairs. Most of its borders with neighboring countries lie across seas and rivers, allowing it to control transport routes and influence the regional economy.

¹ On the results of 2022: press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan. The official website. Available from: <https://mfa.gov.az/files/PR%20End-of%20Year%2028.12.2022.pdf>

² Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic. Official website of the President of Azerbaijan. Available from: <https://ru.president.az/azerbaijan/constitution>

Our foreign policy is a peace-loving policy; we do not intend to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of any state. But at the same time, we will try to ensure the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of our republic through foreign policy at any cost,” said Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev [2].

The de facto model of relations with elements of the “union state” of Turkey and Azerbaijan has a significant impact on key decisions of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The foreign policy agenda was no exception. Despite the proclaimed multi-vector nature, the narrative of “Turkization” and alignment of interests with Turkey is the leitmotif of the country’s foreign relations [8].

Türkiye occupies a special place in the foreign policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan. It was the first country to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan. The connection between the countries has a long history based on common culture, history and traditions. Even at a time when Azerbaijan was part of the Soviet Union, official relations existed between the two republics. Visits to Baku of the Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic Süleyman Demirel in 1967 and the President of the Turkish Republic Cevdet Sunay in 1969³ played a big role in the development of these ties.

The parties are interested in developing bilateral relations. For Azerbaijan, Turkey is an ally and support in the international arena, and the growing influence of Azerbaijan contributes to strengthening the role and power of Turkey in world politics. Turkey’s position in the Caucasus is ensured mainly by Azerbaijan, so Turkey feels the need for ever closer relations. The republic is the main “conductor” of the spread of pan-Turkic ideas in the modern world.

“We are one nation, two states”⁴, – this phrase accurately characterizes the history, reality and prospects of relations between the two countries (5). Both countries support each other in international organizations such as the UN and OSCE and cooperate on regional and global issues.

The direction for the development of regional cooperation is set by the widespread idea of Turkization. Until 1991, Turkey was the only independent Turkic state in the world, therefore, after the collapse of the USSR, on the initiative of the President of the Republic of Turkey Turgut Özal, the first Summit of Turkic-speaking states was held in Ankara in 1992, where the participants announced the establishment of political and economic unity. Two decades later, in the Azerbaijani city of Nakhichevan, the creation of the Turkic Council (from 2021 - the Organization of Turkic States), which today unites 5 states, will be officially announced. Nakhchivan Agreement⁵ includes many areas of cooperation, including the development of common positions on foreign policy issues.

³ Azerbaijani-Turkish relations. Heydar Aliyev Heritage International Online Library. Available from: <https://lib.aliyevheritage.org/ru/4610295.html>

⁴ The Presidents of Azerbaijan and Turkey made joint statements to the press. Oxu.Az. Available from: <https://ru.oxu.az/politics/503712?ysclid=lftcchroca252281486>

⁵ Nakhichevan Agreement on the establishment of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States (Nakhichevan, October 3, 2009). Available from: https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=30486433&pos=1;-15#pos=1;-15

The organization is active within the framework of the adopted strategic documents: the Concept of the Turkic World until 2040 and the Development Strategy of the Organization of Turkic States in 2022-2026. It is important to develop the transport interconnection of the Turkic states, including the Trans-Caspian International Corridor “East-West”, and the development of the Southern Energy Corridor. In addition to practical issues, Turkey, within the framework of the Organization of Turkic States, is trying to resolve a number of ideological issues, for example, giving the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus observer status of the organization. This would mean recognition of this state by all members of the organization. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan declared compliance with international law, the UN Charter and support for the territorial integrity of states, that is, they did not allow Turkey’s plans to be realized⁶. 2023 has been declared the Year of the Heyday of Turkic Civilization.

Relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan are based not only on Turkic, but also Islamic principles and are determined, for example, by trilateral contacts between Turkey-Azerbaijan-Pakistan. The dialogue between the three countries, according to the Chairman of the Grand National Assembly (Parliament) of Turkey Mustafa Şentop, is at a level that only a few peoples and countries can achieve, because it is based “on the bonds of brotherhood, common history, culture and religion.” Şentop called Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan “the three leading democracies of the Islamic world”⁷.

Another trilateral alliance plays a significant role in regional cooperation: Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey, which jointly implemented cost-effective energy and transport projects that became a strong foundation for the existing geopolitical axis Ankara-Baku-Tbilisi. Since the inception of Azerbaijan’s energy industry, Turkey has provided significant support to the development of the oil industry in order to strengthen its own energy security. The South Caucasus Pipeline, as an important component of the Southern Gas Corridor, allows Azerbaijani gas and oil from other countries to enter European markets: the Balkan countries and Italy. Opportunities are being sought to increase the throughput capacity of the project; over time, Azerbaijan expects to become a guarantor of Europe’s energy security, contributing to the diversification of sources and routes of gas and oil⁸. At the opening ceremony, President İlham Aliyev thanked partners from the USA and Great Britain for their assistance in implementing the project.

A regional economic zone is being formed between the three states [6]. Ties with Georgia will expand as a natural component of relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey, because it is this country that is the geographical link between the Turkic states, which will

⁶ Islamov D. Summit of the Organization of Turkic States in Samarkand: between illusion and reality // INF. 23.11.2022. Available from: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/columns/postsoviet/sammit-organizatsii-tyurkskikh-gosudarstv-v-samarkande-mezhdu-illyuziey-i-realnostyu/>

⁷ Mustafa Şentop: Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan are the three leading democracies of the Islamic world. Media.az. 21.07.2022. Available from: <https://media.az/politics/1067869268/mustafa-shentop-turciya-azerbaydzhan-i-pakistan-tri-veduschie-demokratii-islamskogo-mira/>

⁸ İlham Aliyev took part in the official opening ceremony of the Southern Gas Corridor. May 29, 2018. Official website of the President of Azerbaijan. Available from: <https://president.az/az/articles/view/28797>

also stimulate its development as regional projects are implemented. For example, the built Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway is an important transport and logistics corridor for the region, although its capabilities are far from being fully used. In 2022, 432,284 tons of cargo were transported along the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line, in total for 2017–2022 the total volume of cargo transportation on this line amounted to 1,347,585 tons⁹.

The initiative of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to build the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway made it possible to close the “One Belt – One Road” through the ports of Aktau and Baku and ensure connectivity with the transport infrastructure of the Republic of Turkey. This gave impetus to the development of relations with China. The European Union approved the opening of the railway and called it the main element of transport arteries connecting the European Union with Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Central Asia. In an official statement¹⁰ it is indicated that this railway will create new business conditions and increase the quality of trade. It should be noted that Azerbaijan has been a participant in the EU Eastern Partnership program for many years.

It was Azerbaijan that, in the first years after gaining independence in 1991, built relations with the Western world through the intermediary support of Turkey. This applies not only to the implementation of energy and logistics projects, but also to Azerbaijan's relations with NATO. Over three decades, these relationships have strengthened. In November 2022, Azerbaijan hosted “NATO Days” – a series of events in which representatives of the General Staff of the alliance's allied forces in Europe took part. This year, Azerbaijan's partnership with NATO has retained its strategic importance. High-level dialogue and practical cooperation between the parties continued. This is stated in the year-end report of the foreign ministry of the Transcaucasian republic released on December 29, 2022¹¹.

Both countries regularly conduct joint military exercises and training, and coordinate their actions in the field of security and counter-terrorism (4). Large groups of personnel of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, as well as many representatives of the commanding staff, are trained and undergo additional training courses in Turkish military educational institutions. In 2021, the Shusha Declaration on strategic cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan was signed¹², one of the provisions of which states that now military actions against one of the countries automatically mean a declaration of war on the second. The prospect of creating a Turkish military base in Azerbaijan has been discussed for a long time.

The Karabakh issue is one of the most important in relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Turkey supported Azerbaijan in the conflict with Armenia, providing its army with support, helping to transport weapons and ammunition. Turkey's influence has

⁹ Cargo transportation on the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line exceeded 1 million tons. Report.az. 16.01.2023. Available from: <https://report.az/ru/infrastruktura/gruzoperevozki-po-zheleznodorozhnoj-linii-baku-tbilisi-kars-prevysili-1-mln-tonn/>

¹⁰ EU Statement on opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. October 30, 2017. An official website of the European Union. Available from: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/34825_en

¹¹ On the results of 2022: press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan. Available from: <https://mfa.gov.az/files/PR%20End-of%20Year%2028.12.2022.pdf>

¹² The Shusha Declaration on Allied Relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Turkey. Available from: <https://president.az/ru/articles/view/52122>

grown significantly in the region and it has attempted to seize the mediation initiative, weakening Russian influence in the region. Officially, Turkey says it hopes for the signing of a peace agreement and the establishment of good neighborly relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and supports initiatives aimed at improving infrastructure, increasing prosperity, revitalizing energy and trade routes and strengthening regional connectivity in Karabakh¹³.

Russia's important role in resolving this conflict cannot be denied. Baku strives to maintain its own position in international relations, especially with Moscow. Official Baku is developing relations with the Russian Federation, highly appreciating its participation in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, and is building deep economic and humanitarian ties with Russia. In 2022, these connections were transferred to the level of allies¹⁴. Another example of following one's own interests is the partnership with Israel, where on March 29, 2023, the official opening of the diplomatic mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan took place. Relations between the two countries are traditionally characterized by respect and mutually beneficial military, economic, and humanitarian partnership¹⁵, as well as joining forces against Iran.

Azerbaijani researchers express hope that the South Caucasus region in general and Azerbaijan in particular will become a place where the interests of Russia and Turkey do not collide, but coincide [7]. Baku will continue to be an important energy supplier to Europe and will continue to expand its network of gas pipelines to Turkmenistan, taking into account Russian interests. The resolution of the Karabakh conflict will bring both Russian and Turkish companies to the region for restoration and will open up new business opportunities for everyone. Finally, Russian political and diplomatic efforts related to resolving the Karabakh problem will be crowned with success, and Karabakh will become an example of the effectiveness of Russia's new foreign policy doctrine.

Conclusion

The strong ties between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan are “strategic” and “allied”; unofficially, politicians of the two countries declare a single people, thus influencing the formation of the communication regime of Azerbaijan. Turkization in various manifestations stimulates integration processes among member countries of the Organization of Turkic States, but the absolute leaders of integration are Turkey and Azerbaijan. The strengthening of this trend creates a civilizational (including

¹³ Relations between Türkiye and Azerbaijan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan. The official website. Available from: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-azerbaycan-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>

¹⁴ Declaration on Allied Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan. The official website of the President of the Russian Federation. 22.02.2022. Available from: <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5777>

¹⁵ Grigoriev A. Azerbaijan – Israel: the “iceberg” of cooperation acquires new facets (I). Military-political analytics. Online Magazine. 7.04.2023. Available from: <https://vpoanalytics.com/2023/04/07/azerbajdzhan-izrail-ajsberg-sotrudnichestva-obretaet-novye-grani-i/>

cultural-historical) rift between Azerbaijan and a number of partner states, for example, Russia.

Azerbaijan demonstrates the importance of maintaining and increasing dialogue with the Russian Federation, which confirms the change in the status of bilateral relations to the rank of “allied” in 2022. However, at the same time, Azerbaijan demonstrates the emergence of foreign policy interests in the person of states unfriendly to the Russian Federation. The rapprochement with the “priority partner” – Turkey – determines the tendency to strengthen communication with NATO countries.

The joint foreign policy of Turkey and Azerbaijan, implemented in many areas in relations with the European Union, China, Georgia, Pakistan and others, demonstrates its mutual benefit for both countries.

Azerbaijan pursues a multi-vector and sovereign foreign policy; however, many of the decisions directly meet the interests of the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance and contribute to further integration. Continuing a consolidated policy is a risk for maintaining an independent foreign policy, however, at the moment, Azerbaijan, due to the presence of a large amount of energy resources and geopolitical conflict, retains significant resources to ensure national interests and maintain sovereign positions in the region.

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CHANGING SOCIETY

Social Structure
Social Institutions and Processes.
Political Sociology

The modern geopolitical paradigm is based on the position of confrontation between the West (civilizations of the sea with the dominance of market institutions) and the East (civilizations of the land with the dominance of redistributive institutions). <...> The regulator that smoothes out this confrontation is religion.

A.Yu.Bendin, A.V.Isaev, A.S.Filatov, A.D.Kharitonov-Tanevsky, P.A.Barakhvostov
Religious Institutions as Regulators of the Moral Principles in Geopolitics

The prospect of the revival of a great country - Russia through the creation of a solidary, fully sovereign and multinational world power acutely raises the question of the official status of the future state entity, its international legal recognition in the event that the Russian authorities support the idea of South Ossetia about its entry into the Russian Federation.

E.V.Dumina
Russia and South Ossetia United Civilizational Platform:
Socio-Political and Cross-Cultural Interaction

The Russian labor market plays an important role in the economic mobilization of Uzbek labor migrants. Although in recent years Uzbekistan has reached agreements with many countries in the field of labor migration, the Russian route remains popular and attractive for labor migrants. As a result, the majority of remittances to Uzbekistan come from Russia.

F.K.Yokubov
Development of Migration Processes between the Republic of Uzbekistan
and the Russian Federation

RUSSIA & WORLD: SCIENTIFIC DIALOGUE

**РОССИЯ
И МИР**
НАУЧНЫЙ ДИАЛОГ



Religious Institutions as Regulators of the Moral Principles in Geopolitics

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Abstract. The materials of the international round table “Religious institutions as regulators of moral principles in geopolitics”, held as part of the Christmas Readings “Global challenges of modernity and the spiritual choice of man” by the National Research Institute for the Communications Development (NIIRK), the Belarusian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, the International Public Association “Christian Educational Center named after Saints Methodius and Cyril”. The article reflects the views of Russian and Belarusian scientists on the influence of geopolitics on the activities of religious institutions, their communication with the state and society, the influence of religion on geopolitical and political decisions. The idea is expressed about the moral leadership of the church in modern society and politics, the youth education. The problem of developing the communication skills of clergy, new forms of information in the context of digitalization and the development of the information society is

considered. The compensatory function of religious institutions in the socio-cultural sphere, aimed at smoothing emerging institutional imbalances and balanced development of society, is substantiated.

Keywords: institutional environment, institutional matrix, sect, religion, denomination, geopolitics, regulator, morality, religious tolerance, integration, state-confessional institution, Muscovy, Russian Empire, Holy Governing Synod, heterodox and heterodox confessions, Russian “schism”

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Introduction

The geopolitical and geo-economic transformations of recent decades that have radically changed the modern world have actualized the research of the East-West dichotomy.

In classical geopolitics, this problem is considered in the context of the dualism of land and sea [5]. From this point of view, the social system is what the Russian Eurasian at the first stage of the development of this science, Peter Savitsky, succinctly called local development that is a set of constant and variable principles. The variable principle, that is, the creative potential of the population to transform the surrounding reality, enters into dynamic equilibrium with the constant principle, with space. The two fundamental forms of space are land and sea, the opposition of which constitutes the fundamental law of geopolitics. However, the idea of the irreconcilability of social institutions characteristic of the peoples of the land and the peoples of the sea was questioned by the French scientist Paul Vidal de la Blache, who put forward the idea, important for the subsequent development of political science, that land and sea not only struggle, but also successfully interpenetrate each other [26].

This idea of the presence of the dialectic of opposite social institutions in one social system is complemented by the subsequent neo-institutionalism and its component part - the theory of institutional matrices [6]. According to these theories, society consists of three interconnected subsystems: economic, political and socio-cultural. Each subsystem, in turn, is reduced to basic institutions, which come in two types – redistributive and market [25]. Reconciling neo-institutionalist terminology with geopolitical terminology, we can conditionally say that redistributive institutions correspond to land institutions, and market institutions correspond to sea institutions. Some institutions are unthinkable without others, and in each of the three social subsystems, one type of institution plays the role of dominant, and the other – complementary, performing a compensatory function. Thus, the geopolitical and institutional approaches turn out to be closely related, and many geopolitical problems can be considered using the methodology of institutionalism.

Religious institutions occupy a special place in the sociocultural subsystem of society. For centuries, religion has been the main form of human exploration of reality, which is why

it is obvious: the analysis of the evolution of religious consciousness gives us very eloquent pictures of what processes are taking place with society.

However, a careful look at the place of religion reveals to us a less noticeable fact: in relation to the rest of the socio-cultural subsystem, religious institutions most often function on the principle of compensatory. This means that religion balances possible institutional imbalances.

The hypothesis of the immanent compensatory nature of religious institutions in the socio-cultural system can be proved by the example of the religious life of the Russian Empire, to which our work is devoted. The relevance of the research is due to the need to identify the principles of the functioning of religion in the social system in modern conditions.

For modern politics, the most important task is to preserve the integrity of the geopolitical space of the Russian Federation. This goal is achieved by maintaining a balance between the interests of the Center and the regions, between political, economic, military and ideological means of preserving social stability and law and order in Russian society. The history of domestic politics in Russia has several stages, among which the imperial stage is the most important. Currently, the experience of imperial geopolitics is becoming an object of scientific interest. The creation of the Eurasian empire necessitated the organization and functioning of state-confessional institutions of law and management, which regulated state-religious and interreligious relations between Orthodox and non-Orthodox subjects. The policy of religious tolerance, combined with the policy of protecting the interests of the Orthodox Church, allowed the empire to establish control over new territories and ensure law and order and interreligious peace between representatives of different faiths and religious communities.

The ideological crisis, expressed, as a rule, in a religious form due to the fideistic perception of ideas by the masses, was the cause not only of the destruction of social and state foundations in a single state education, but also of the civilizational crisis and the accompanying geopolitical transformations. On the other hand, the strengthening and creation of powerful states acting in the status of geopolitical dominators was the result of a religious and ideological upsurge. The events in Russia are a striking example of the impact of the religious and confessional crisis on the stability of the functioning of the state and the social structure. When, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the crisis of religious ideology, the institutionalized expression of which was the Holy Governing Synod, eventually led to the October political coup of the Bolsheviks, the first thing the new government began to do was to spread and implement (usually forcibly) its ideological postulates. Moreover, initially the ideological postulates of Bolshevism as a political trend were formulated in the form of communist ideology, which is essentially a kind of religion. At the same time, communism, as a religious form, became a means and a way of geopolitical positioning of the USSR.

The aim of the article is to present to readers the positions of Russian and Belarusian scientists on complex problems of mutual influence of religion and geopolitics.

Materials and methods

The participants of the discussion used a wide range of non-contradictory methods, including systemic, institutional, constructivist, historical, socio-philosophical, scenario forecasting, comparative analysis methods. P.A. Barakhvostov proposed to test the hypothesis of the immanent compensatory nature of religious institutions in the socio-cultural system on the example of the religious life of the Russian Empire. The methodological basis of his research was a neo-institutional approach supplemented by the theory of institutional matrices.

The research materials include published normative legal acts, documents, and statements by politicians, media publications reflecting practices in the field of religion to ensure geopolitical stability and stability, and the results of sociological research.

The variety of sources used has led to the use of different methods of working with them: content analysis, event analysis, historical retrospective method, comparative analysis, observations, secondary analysis, and questionnaires.

Results

The Experience of the Russian Empire State-confessional Institutions in the Implementation of Internal Geopolitics (A.Yu. Bendin)

Since the second half of the XVI century, the Orthodox Muscovite Kingdom began to acquire the features of a growing proto-Imperial state formation, which gradually included new territories, ethnic groups and non-Orthodox faiths in the west and in the east (Little Russia, the Volga region, the Urals, Western and Eastern Siberia). Since that time, permanent trade and diplomatic relations with Western Europe, both Catholic and Protestant, have been established. The establishment of control and centralized management of new territories inhabited by non-Orthodox subjects were carried out with the help of religious tolerance, which began to be used as an instrument of internal geopolitics.

The tsar and the patriarch together carried out state and spiritual management of Russian subjects, the attitude towards the "Gentiles" being joined was tolerant. They were not forced to convert to Orthodoxy and did not interfere in their internal religious life, while strictly prohibiting the preaching of their faith among the Orthodox. These were the features of Moscow's religious tolerance during the period of the dual power of the tsar and the patriarch. Proto-imperial religious tolerance towards non-Orthodox and non-Orthodox subjects, as well as to persons accepted into the Moscow service and foreign trade "guests", was traditional in nature and had no institutional and legal formalization.

The traditions of proto-imperial religious tolerance, which became a distinctive feature of the internal geopolitics of the Moscow Kingdom, were used by Peter the Great

(1682–1725) when creating the Russian Empire. Peter modernized Moscow's traditions by laying the legal and administrative foundations of three state-confessional institutions of law and management, which became instruments of internal geopolitics. With the help of these institutions, the construction and management of an ever-growing empire began to be carried out.

For the ruling Russian Church, the Holy Synod, which replaced the patriarch and was subordinate to the emperor, became a special institution of law and administration. In 1702 Peter I began the formation of the state confessional Institute of religious tolerance, which was responsible for non-Orthodox confessions. By Peter I's decrees, the construction of the institute for the management of the Russian "schism", based on the principles of religious discrimination, began. The supreme power, with the help of the established state-confessional institutions of law and management, asserted state sovereignty over new territories, controlled the Orthodox and non-Orthodox population and carried out internal confessional geopolitics in the center and on the outskirts of the Russian Empire.

As the empire grew geographically, especially during the reign of Catherine the Great (1762–1796), the institution of religious tolerance as an instrument of internal geopolitics was widely used in the incorporation of annexed territories in the west and south (Western Russian and Lithuanian lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Black Sea region, Crimea, etc.). Non-Orthodox subjects who lived in these territories received the protection of Russian laws on "freedom of faith", which was considered as one of the conditions for achieving the loyalty of the non-Orthodox to the Orthodox sovereign. Catherine the Great significantly reduced the degree of religious discrimination of the Russian "schism" by introducing, among other things, the term "Old Believer". The state, with the help of the Old Believers, began colonizing empty lands in the Volga region and Western Siberia.

The final administrative and legal formalization of the three confessional-state institutions was received during the reign of Emperor Nicholas I (1825–1855). The state tasks of the institutions, both in the pre-reform and post-reform period, were to maintain the traditional religiosity of Orthodox and non-Orthodox subjects, preserve religious and moral values, ensure interfaith peace and social stability of a polyreligious and multiethnic society, achieve law-abiding and political loyalty to the Russian monarch.

In 1905–1906, the Institute of religious tolerance was reformed by Emperor Nicholas II (1894–1917). The non-Orthodox subjects of the empire received new religious rights, and some of the exclusive privileges of the dominant Russian Church were abolished. The institution of discrimination of the "split" was also abolished. The communities of Old Believers and sectarians were legalized and became part of the modernized institute of religious tolerance. Under the conditions of political and religious freedoms that defined the period of the Duma monarchy, the Holy Governing Synod and the modernized institute of religious tolerance were still used by the state as an instrument of internal geopolitics to achieve political loyalty, interreligious peace, law-abiding and public order.

Religious Institutions in the Perception of the Population: Spiritual and Moral Imperative vs Socio-Political Participation (A.V.Isaev)

The search for a development direction in the context of changes in the world order, the transformation of moral values of society (including in an environment of inconsistency between institutions-values and institutions-means) [15:47–63] actualizes the discussion of the issue in a global context.

Considering religion as a mediator in solving security or identity crises [10:133], one of the strategic resources of "soft power" (and in some cases, "hard power"), state institutions actively use it in their internal and geopolitical interests (7:40–44; 12:13–22; 9–11). This is clearly evident in the modern world, regardless of region or religion. However, as M.M.Mchedlova rightly notes, "religious involvement in the sphere of international relations leads to competition and conflicts when religious connotations become a field of discursive competition in the political and ideological space" (8a).

Religious figures offer their own options for socio-political affiliation, trying to avoid open political participation, but actively involved in solving social problems of citizens. The spiritual and moral imperative of religion, in turn, encourages society to appeal to the practices of religious institutions. Thus, at the beginning of the 20th century, public discourse indicated that the cause of crimes and other social destructions should be sought not only in anatomical and physiological anomalies, but more in the moral education of a person¹, the main role in which was assigned to Orthodoxy and religious figures.

Today, the Church also remains an important social institution, whose activities are manifested in many areas of modern society. Religion forms a system of values, actively participates in the spiritual and moral education of the younger generation, and contributes to increasing the level of social cohesion.

"The sociological assessment of the role of religion and the presence of churches in society has a direct impact on the perception (in the mass media and among politicians) of the importance of religious leaders and religious institutions themselves" [10:13].

According to a survey by the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (October 19, 2022), assessing the situation of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), respondents (51%) noted its influence on the spiritual and moral state of society (in 2012, this figure was 63%), recognizing its role in solving domestic political issues (50%) and the impact on their own lives (35%). At the same time, the lowest weight of the ROC in international politics is indicated (34%, 2012 – 43%)². In addition, according to analysts, ideas about the position of the ROC in modern Russian society are differentiated by age – representatives of the older generation usually declare a significant impact on personal and spiritual and moral social development. Dualism is traditional in views on the degree of church interference in public

¹ Where is the cause of the moral malaise of our society? Missionary Review. 1904. Pp. 213–218.

² Church and Politics. Available from: <https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/cerkov-i-obshchestvo-monitoring>

and political life – from denial of such influence (33%) to its admission (58%) with a variation of the impact only on the spiritual sphere (45%).

Russians' opinions on the actual relationship between the secular and the religious are divided. If in 2012 the position of "the ROC builds its relations with society and the state in the right way" was dominant (43%), then 10 years later the share of its supporters decreased to 30%. Today, a third of respondents are inclined to believe that the church is too active in the life of society and state affairs, it should pay more attention to spiritual issues (31%). During the analyzed period, the indicator increased by 12 points (2012 – 19%). This point of view is twice as common among those who oppose the public and political interference of the church (64%). One in eight considers the influence of the ROC on the life of society and the state to be insufficient (12% – 11 points by 2012); among supporters of the active participation of the church in political and public life, this is 2.5 times more likely (31%). Thus, over the years, more and more citizens declare the active participation of the church in public and political affairs, but the share of those who recognize its influence on various spheres of life, on the contrary, decreases³.

According to 26% of participants in the all-Russian questionnaire (Public Opinion Foundation, April 19, 2022), the ROC does not affect public life. 45% of respondents noted its positive influence, 6% of respondents noted its negative influence. 35% of Russians do not notice the influence of the ROC on politics; 37% observe the influence on this sphere of life of the country: 14% is strong, 23% is weak. 40% of Russians more often agree with the statements of the ROC on various socio-political topics, 17% more often disagree⁴.

It is well known that the younger generation acts as a main source of social changes, the development of moral and moral foundations of the whole society largely depends on the prevailing values, the transmission of public relations, state integrity and security. In this regard, in May 2020, a survey of the student youth of the Orel region was conducted (the sample is quota-based, gender and age structure and the number of young people at the place of study was representative. 395 people were interviewed). The study showed that students tend to treat religion positively (44.1%) or neutrally (46.6%). It is noteworthy that for new generations of young people, religion is a part of world culture and history (24.6%), as well as the imperative of following moral and ethical norms (22%). It instills moral values (32.3%), preserves cultural traditions (24.8%), supports and strengthens the effect of social norms of behavior accepted in society (17.5%), supports social memory, the history of the people (13.8%). In their opinion, to be a religious person, it is necessary to adhere to the laws of morality (47.8%)

In conditions of non-transparency of world politics, it is important to follow the strategic documents of the Russian Federation (strategies, concepts, national projects). The preservation and strengthening of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values will be facilitated by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation № 809 dated 11.19.2022, however, in our opinion, the effectiveness of policy implementation in this area should be

³ Ibid.

⁴ The attitude towards the ROC and the Patriarch. Assessment of the ROC's influence on the public and political life of the country. Available from: <https://fom.ru/TSennosti/14717>

assessed more than once every six years, and at least once every three years. The issue of the media content, Internet platforms, social networks, the implementation of educational and professional standards remains an urgent issue.

Religious Factor of Civilizational Modeling and Geopolitical Structure (A.S.Filatov)

The first Christian philosopher to write a treatise on the principles of state building and the functioning of society was Augustine Aurelius (354-430). Augustine became the first thinker to write about the functions of religion in public morality as the basis of social construction thanks to Christian ideology and doctrine. The title of the treatise should be understood as a description of an ideal (God's) society or state, because the "city" of Augustine is a state or society. The mediator between the "city of God" with its ideal norms of social order and the earthly, secular state is the Church as an organizational structure guided in its activities by divine commandments.

Augustine in his religious and philosophical constructions was largely based on the ideas of Plato, since in the second half of the 4th century in the Roman Empire, Plato's philosophy was widespread and had a great influence on Roman society. The philosopher Plotinus (205–270), a Greek from Egypt who lived in Rome, founded the religious and philosophical school of Neoplatonism. In accordance with the teachings of this school, which acquired religious features in the second half of the 4th century, the universe is the result of the emanation (outflow) of the absolutely ideal First One Principle or Absolute Idea, although not personified in the image of God, but having divine attributes. According to Plotinus, the stages of emanation of the Absolute are as follows: first, the Origin self-realizes as the World Mind, then as the Soul of the World, then as individual (individual) souls, finally, as individual bodies, up to matter and nature. On the basis of these principles, the goal of human life is formulated, which consists of overcoming material and natural-physical limitations and ascending to the Origin. Neoplatonism as a religious and philosophical doctrine is directly related to both the problem of civilizational construction and geopolitics because in the second half of the 4th century it was declared the state religion of the Roman Empire, displacing Christianity from this position, the official status of which was established in 324 by the emperor Constantine the Great.

Taking into account the influence of Neoplatonism in Roman society in the second half of the 4th century, Augustine created the concept of social order. He identified two types of society: ideal and real. The ideal is the world of spiritual essences as the fundamental principles of natural-material substances and bodies. The real is earthly society as refraction through matter and the bodily nature of man of the ideal First Principle. Indeed, the collapse of societies and the destruction of states and families are based on a crisis of the ideology on which they relied and based on the principles of which they built their activities. And Augustine could see this in the example of the Roman Empire. He lived in the era of the deepest socio-political crisis that gripped the Roman state in the second half of the 4th century. This state was collapsing before his eyes. As an

educated man, he knew about numerous attempts by the Roman authorities, starting with the first emperor Augustus, to create a common ideology for the state based on religion. All these attempts were unsuccessful. The Roman Empire, whose vast territory was inhabited by representatives of various ethnic groups, did not receive an ideological core, and, tormented by ideological (primarily religious) contradictions, fell apart, despite the high level of economic development (Europe, for example, was able to reach this level only in the era of the developed Middle Ages – to the XI–XII centuries), socio-political and military organization. Is it not the lack of spiritual strength, ideological principles and ideological motives that explains the paradoxical, at first glance, defeats of the Roman legions, well trained in the tactics and strategy of military operations, in the fight against scattered and military-unqualified barbarian tribes?

By the way, the ideological crisis, expressed, as a rule, in a religious form due to the fideistic perception of ideas by the masses, became the reason for the destruction of social and state foundations not only in the Roman Empire. Almost all state formations and even social organisms disintegrated as a result of a deep religious and ideological crisis. Just as the strengthening and creation of powerful states was the result of a religious and ideological upsurge.

The religious crisis lay at the heart of the collapse of ancient Egyptian civilization, when the image of the pharaoh as a divine being and representative of the gods on earth faded. The devaluation of religious institutions in France in the second half of the 18th century and in Russia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries largely provoked social revolutions, political conspiracies and violent seizures of power.

A striking example of the influence of a religious and confessional crisis on the stability of the state and its social structure are the events in Russia. When, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the crisis of religious ideology, the institutional embodiment of which was the Holy Governing Synod, led to the October political revolution of the Bolsheviks, the first thing the new government began to do was to disseminate and implement (usually by force) its ideological postulates. Initially, the ideas of Bolshevism as a political movement were formulated in the form of communist ideology, which is a type of religion.

However, communist ideology can hardly be fully attributed to religion. And not only because of her atheism, although the functions of the gods were actually assigned to the communist leaders. First of all, because communist ideology is ambivalent and inconsistent. On the one hand, a call to believe in a bright future, on the other, a total denial of everything that is not verified by feelings, experience and practice. This duality and religious incompleteness make it possible to classify communism as quasi-religious cults, along with archaic forms of religious beliefs (astrology, magic, fetishism, witchcraft) and marginal cults (Satanism, infernal cults, fascism, Nazism or ethnocentrism). Quasi-religious cults are almost or ostensibly religious actions that lead to the formation of certain structures, sometimes having the functions of political institutions that manipulate the religious consciousness of people.

It has long been said that a religious system necessarily has its social expression in the person of believers, bearers of certain religious ideas. The problem is different: what is

the scope of religion in society, who is involved in this sphere, and what are the functions of the religious system in society in general and in certain social segments in particular?

In archaic societies with totalitarian principles of social organization, religion was the main core cementing social foundations. In this case, the entire society was the exponent and bearer of a certain religious form. It was impossible to allow the existence of parallel existing religious forms, especially anti-religious ones. Throughout this historical period, states were built on the basis of specific religious forms. Subsequently, starting from the Renaissance and especially in modern times, religion in society differentiates, various religious forms, social segments with their characteristic religious denominations arise and coexist with each other. Although in earlier historical periods we see the differentiation of religious forms, primarily in the multi-ethnic empires of antiquity, such as the Roman or Byzantine.

Along with the differentiation of religion, in modern society (especially intensively since the second half of the 19th century), there is a “dispersion” of religion in the social environment due to the spread of individual ways of comprehending God and the Absolute. Belonging to a particular form of religion is determined by ethnicity, and participation in organizational activities (cult practices, confessional ceremonies, etc.) conducted by religious institutions (the Church) is not a “sign of participation.” “Diffuse” religions arise (as defined by J.Yinger), when religious affiliation is determined by belonging to a given society [2].


The importance of individual bearers of religious consciousness is increasing, religion is being individualized. The process of the movement of religion is conveyed by the famous dialectical scheme: from the general (totalitarian religious forms in archaic societies with the dominance of collective ideas) through the specific (separation of social segments with their characteristic religious forms - differentiation of religion in multi-ethnic empires) to the specific (individualization of religion in modern Christian society).

Speaking about the functions of religion in society, one cannot ignore the sociological research that was carried out by the famous scientist, classic of world sociology M.Weber. In his research, he showed the active role of religion in social life, its leading role in the economic development of societies of different historical eras [3].

In his work “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism” [3:600–624], M.Weber proves that the Protestant worldview was formed under the influence of the social activities of the Renaissance, based on the principles of individualism. In turn, the spirit of individualism and the ethical principles of Protestantism had a decisive influence on the formation of the capitalist system of social relations and social activities. But I would like to draw attention to one aspect of Weber’s concept. Renaissance individualism struggles and liberates itself not from “religious shackles,” as is often extolled, but from the institutional restrictions of social life on the part of the Catholic Church. It is clear that the institutional structures of Catholicism are not the same thing as Christianity as an ideology, culture and civilization. In this case, the spirit of individualism, already according to M.Weber, finds its adequate embodiment in the Protestant ideology of Christianity - the embodiment of its creative aspirations.

An analysis of the religious teachings of Protestantism by M.Weber showed that the development of the social functions of Christianity allowed European society to make a breakthrough not only in economic and socio-cultural terms, but also in civilizational terms. Including in the sphere of social organization, the functioning of various social institutions, among which the institutions of civil society have become one of the most noticeable. And these aspects are directly related not only to everyday social life, but also to its civilizational standards.

Noting the importance of religious consciousness, which gives rise to a religious vision of the world and creates religious structures of the universe, we must note another important function of religious consciousness - ensuring the spiritual and practical development and understanding of the world around us by believers. Religious institutions perform this function, being themselves a consequence of institutional thinking that takes shape thanks to religious consciousness. A sequence of connections arises that can be expressed by such a diagram:



Religious institutions perform an important mission in the religious system. They deal with organizational issues - organizing interaction between various structural elements of a religious confession, connecting religious ideology, containing the main and auxiliary ideological concepts of a particular religion, and the mass of believers. It is religious institutions that ensure the dissemination of religious ideas in society and their implementation in religious practice.

Throughout human history, religious institutions have influenced social life and have sometimes been central to the management of the social system. For this reason, often all religion in the unity of its main components – religious ideology, institutional thinking and religious psychology - was reduced only to religious institutions. And then religion was assessed through the prism of the activities of one or another religious institution.

To some extent, there are grounds for this reduction, and they are related to the mission of “conductor of ideas” performed by religious institutions. However, there are religious institutions that do not allow them to be clearly presented as a “showcase” of any religion.

Firstly, the institutional nature (of any social institution – political, economic or religious) is such that it requires the participation of a structure or structural unit in the implementation of social interests. Religious institutions are included in the system of social relations, experience their influence and even undergo changes as a result.

Secondly, religious institutions are formed taking into account historical time and geographical space, therefore their “shell” is permeated with the specifics of the era of existence.

But these features of religious institutions do not mean that they are a product of social relations; they only experience the influence of the social environment (sometimes very strong), but at the same time remain a product of religious consciousness. Due to misconceptions regarding the nature of religious institutions and their association with religion in general, a model of religion is being built as a product of social relations. This model sees religion as a consequence of a certain social condition and tries to present religion as the result of human errors.

Because of this specificity of the genesis and functioning of religious institutions, their condition must be considered taking into account two components: the components of the religious system, which has a natural basis in religious consciousness, and the attribute of the system of social interaction, included in the sphere of production, distribution and satisfaction of social interests. Everything that is part of the system of social interaction – social relations, communities and institutions – builds its relationship with religion through the establishment of communication channels with religious institutions. Therefore, relations between the state and religion are built through the coexistence of two social institutions – the state as a political institution, and the religious institution as a sociocultural institution.

The relations between different confessions and different religious institutions lie on the same institutional plane. In such situations, we are witnessing not the relationship between two or more religious forms (Christianity, Islam, Judaism, etc.) and, especially, not the corresponding religious ideologies, but namely religious institutions. When talking about any possible forms of cooperation and dialogue between different faiths, it is necessary to take into account these features, institutional ones first of all. Each level of the religious system contains the basis for various forms of dialogue, although the most problematic of the levels of the religious system remains the institutional component. Although the most problematic level of the religious system remains the institutional component. It is at this level that problems associated with the implementation of social interests arise; here religion enters the political field of social life. Therefore, it is necessary to build a religious dialogue on an ideologically sound basis, not through practical institutional interests, but with the help of common ideas and meanings.

An analysis of the state of the religious system as a whole, as well as its various types (Buddhism, Christianity, Islam and others), allows us to conclude that there are opportunities for the widest interfaith communication.

At the level of religious ideology, dialogue has a greater chance of starting due to the ontological and epistemological similarity of all developed religious and philosophical concepts. The subjects of this form of religious dialogue will be representatives of a certain religious ideology - philosophers, religious thinkers, theologians. The development of religious-ideological dialogue can be carried out thanks to the kinship of religious systems and the proximity of the worldviews of world religions.

The founders of world religions exemplify a high degree of religious tolerance and openness. Nowhere in the sermons of Buddha, Christ and Muhammad, and other founders of great religions, will we find condemnation of other faiths, except perhaps the condemnation of archaic forms of cult practice (incest, sacrificial cults, idolatry, etc.). A role model can be

considered Muhammad, who not only considered Christ his immediate predecessor, but also recognized his right to the Second Coming. As a result, Islam recognizes the divine essence of Jesus and fixes the human essence of Muhammad.

At the level of religious psychology, interfaith dialogue is possible under two conditions. The first is if the attitude towards it comes from the bearers of the institutional thinking of the corresponding religious systems. The second condition is related to the psychology of believers, which has many common ethnic, cultural, and human components. And this commonality in the psychology of believers acts as a bringing together religious-psychological factor. After all, the psychology of believers can never be reduced only to religious psychology. Religious psychology is a form of individual and social psychology.

In general, the problem of religious dialogue can be solved not only and not so much within the framework of the formation of universal human values, which, as a rule, are formed by the dominant cultural and civilizational model, but thanks to a complex worldview picture that is formed in the sociocultural space and the civilizational structure inherent in it, always multi-confessional and multiethnic. And fundamental will still be the search for universally significant, epistemologically valuable elements in developed religious systems, a search that should ensure interaction and development of contacts between religious and philosophical-religious schools and concepts. In this case, religious dialogue will become a condition for achieving interethnic harmony. And this is significant for the modern world.

The statements of the American political scientist S. Huntington about the inevitable clash of Christian and Muslim civilizations [20] have become an axiom for many scientists and current politicians. They are based on the fact that Christianity and Islam represent fundamentally different cultural and civilizational types and their contradictions are contradictions between the West and the East. Is it really?

In fact, Christianity and Islam are faiths belonging to the same Western cultural tradition. And the contradictions between them are no deeper than between Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Protestantism. Of course, various elements of Western culture not only fall within the sphere of complementary relations, but also demonstrate rejection of each other. In Western civilization, acute conflicts often arise that turn into open armed clashes. Does this mean that we can draw conclusions about the clash between Muslim and Christian civilizations? Is it acceptable to see the sources of these clashes in differences in ideological attitudes, cultural traditions, mentality, social structure and state-forming principles? Obviously, all this applies to the relationship between Christianity and Islam as well as to the relationship between other elements of the Western cultural and civilizational space – Catholicism and Protestantism, Eastern and Western Christianity, the Mediterranean and Baltic regions, Western and Eastern Europe, Europe and Asia, Europe and America, etc.

In Russian civilization (Russian World), the Orthodox and Muslim religious and confessional systems dominate and for centuries have demonstrated not just effective coexistence, but productive interaction, excluding any forms of conflict. This nature of relations excluded religious wars in historical Russia, in contrast to Europe, where there were several of them, and one - the Thirty Years War (1618–1648) – became pan-European.

Taking into account the above, we can determine the methodological basis for an in-depth study of the problem of interaction between Christianity and Islam, provide practical recommendations for the structure and development of the Christian-Muslim community in Europe, Asia, Africa and America, it is possible to conduct an in-depth study of the relationship between Christianity and Islam, and search for points contact and cooperation between them.

The functions of religion, including as a moral regulator in geopolitical processes, are determined by its role in the civilizational structure, which forms the global sociocultural space, acts as the basis and condition for the geopolitical positioning of states or their unions, expressing significant civilizational models [18:181–252]. The so-called political religions also manifest themselves [4, 16. Taking into account the fact that religious systems play a significant role in geopolitical processes in the modern world, these features of developed religions have a direct impact on the geopolitical structure of the world.

The dialogue of religious and confessional systems at the level of their ideologies, with their inherent moral values, is carried out not only in intercivilizational interaction, but also intracivilizationally. The format of intercivilizational interaction aimed at preserving the moral values of Russian (Russian) and Euro-Atlantic (Western) civilizations involves a dialogue of ideologies between their dominant religious and confessional systems – Christianity as Orthodoxy, on the one hand, and Christianity as Catholicism and Protestantism, on the other hand. Of course, intra-civilizational interaction can be ensured with a dialogue between Orthodoxy and Islam, the ideological similarity of which was noted above. Also, of course, with the involvement of other faiths - Buddhism, Eastern Rite Christianity, Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism, ethnic beliefs, etc.

Interaction (in accordance with the sociological definition, which implies the achievement of a common goal) of religious institutions representing different civilizational structures is essentially impossible. The interaction of religious institutions within a dispersed civilization is very difficult, just as the relations between Catholic and Protestant churches are not easy in the structure of the Euro-Atlantic civilization [17]. It is in such cases that we should talk about dialogue at the level of religious ideologies with their bearers.

But within the framework of an integrative type of civilization, which presupposes strong centripetal tendencies, the interaction of religious institutions is ensured by the common goals of civilization construction. The experience of Russian civilization, which had clearly expressed integrative features in the previous stage of its formation, demonstrates the effective interaction of religious systems of different ideologies and beliefs, including their institutions. Of course, not everything went smoothly in the relations between government agencies and religious institutions, but the history of such relations, primarily in the Russian Empire, provides examples of interaction rather than confrontation.

Any attempts to create ecumenical associations from religious institutions belonging to different civilizational structures are unlikely to be successful.

Religion as a Factor in the Consolidation of Russian Society (A.D.Kharitonov-Tanevsky)

Modern events actualize the need to consolidate Russian society. In conditions of constant foreign policy pressure, expressed in information confrontation, in economic, military-political and other confrontations, cohesion becomes what will allow preserving not only sociocultural identity, but the physical existence of Russian citizens. Sustainable consolidation of a society based on a materialistic foundation, political preferences, etc., which are factors of disintegration rather than the formation of unity, is impossible.

Historically, collectivism in its various manifestations is traditional for Russia. So, for example, before the revolution of 1917, society was dominated by conciliarity, which was the unity of faith and values (love of neighbor, mercy, sacrifice, etc.) [19]. A striking manifestation of this was active patriotism, readiness for heroism, and defense of the Motherland. Soviet collectivism was also based on non-material foundations - a state ideology covering all spheres of public life. After the collapse of the USSR, in the fundamentally new conditions for Russia of pluralism of opinions, the absence of a fixed national idea or religion, although the principles of conciliarity were preserved in public consciousness, they require improvement and development, which is especially necessary in modern realities.

Let us turn to generally accepted traditional values, the main transmitters of which are religious organizations, as the most significant and effective factor in the consolidation of society. Within the framework of this report, we consider it necessary to place emphasis on the Russian Orthodox Church due to the fact that the majority of citizens (68%)⁵ identify themselves specifically with this creed. The Russian Orthodox Church, despite negative trends (over the past 10 years, the share of those who recognize its influence on society has decreased), maintains a leading position in the formation of a moral paradigm and resolving internal political issues (as noted by 51% and 50% of respondents, respectively)⁶. Identifying oneself as Orthodox is determined not so much by religious views as by the manifestation of sociocultural self-identification, however, the level of trust in the Church is significant (51% noted that the Russian Orthodox Church is completely trustworthy and 21% – not completely trustworthy, while 13% found it difficult to answer and only 15% spoke against trusting the Church)⁷. The Russian Orthodox Church maintains its position as a moral leader in modern society. Religious norms preached by traditional religions, incl. Orthodoxy are reflected both in the legal framework and in the value paradigm of modern society. We emphasize that regardless of the attitude towards the Russian Orthodox Church in society, its historical contribution to the formation and development of culture, identity, statehood, etc. undeniable and this is evident even now.

⁵ Great Lent – 2022. VTsIOM. News. Available from: <https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/velikii-post-2022>

⁶ Church and society: monitoring. VTsIOM. News. Available from: https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/cerkov-i-obshchestvo-monitoring#_ftn1

⁷ Trust in Public Institutions. Levada Center. Available from: <https://www.levada.ru/2022/09/20/doverie-obshchestvennym-institutam-2/>

Russia has a spiritual and moral potential that, if used correctly, can create a modern analogue of pre-revolutionary conciliarity, unite society, regardless of the pluralism of political views, material benefits, etc. The main thing is to maintain a balance in the interaction between the state and the Church (otherwise, the so-called “nationalization” of it will negatively affect its authority in the eyes of society and the ability to implement a consolidating function). Moreover, reliance on constructive historical experience and the creative activity of religious organizations in modern times is necessary to fill the single value sphere of our state [10c].

Compensatory Function of Religious Institutions in the Institutional Matrix of Society (P.A.Barakhvostov)

Based on the history of Russian Orthodoxy during the imperial period, it is shown that religious institutions in the sociocultural subsystem of society always perform a compensatory function, because religion, in principle, expresses not so much what is in reality as the desire for how one would like it to be. When market institutions dominate in the matrix, religion will tend to be formed according to a redistributive type (as in the case of Catholicism), and when redistributive institutions dominate, it will tend to be formed according to a market type (as in the case of Orthodoxy). The significance of this finding is extremely important. Since political ideology is, in its ontological essence, a phenomenon similar to religion, in any liberal democratic system (market type) sooner or later significant forces will be formed that take up slogans against liberal democracy (redistributive type), and vice versa. This is the dialectic of the sociocultural sphere that states need to take into account.

For centuries, religion has been the main form of human mastery of reality, therefore an analysis of the evolution of religious consciousness allows us to understand what processes are taking place in society.

In relation to the rest of the sociocultural subsystem, religious institutions most often function on the principle of compensatory behavior. This means that religion, as it were, balances reality in the form of checks and balances.

As a starting point for our analysis, it should be noted that due to the geographical features of Rus', redistributive institutions turned out to be the dominant institutions in all its social subsystems.

The climate with a short warm period and soils were not particularly favorable for the development of Russian agriculture. The reconquest of land from nature, the implementation of agricultural work in the “pulse mobilization” mode, the low surplus product and the high risks of farming have determined the need for collective work under a single leadership, which, in addition, performs the functions of collection-accumulation-redistribution of the final product to reduce the catastrophic consequences of possible crop failures. In addition, the geopolitical location of Russian lands became the reason for the “alarming” neighborhood from both the East and the West and necessitated the creation of a powerful “system” for ensuring security. The consequence of this was the cementation of

the most important institutions of a redistributive type: a centralized power structure and a communitarian (communal) worldview.

An obstacle to the development of market-type institutions was the Mongol-Tatar yoke, which consolidated the management style (basic political institution) of the “label” type, combining Eastern worship of the central government and relative independence and even weak accountability in all matters, except taxes, at the local level.

The indicated features of the formation of the Russian institutional environment determined its specificity: a hydraulic society took shape on these lands (the term was introduced by K.Wittfogel [27]), but its density was significantly lower than in the East due to a less developed bureaucratic system due to the impulsive nature of collective work and not constant hard, but “impulse” control in the form of raids by the Horde.

Thus, without access to the sea and the advantages of maritime trade, Rus’ emerged as an almost textbook land power and entered the imperial period as a low-density hydraulic state with an institutional matrix characterized by the pronounced dominance of redistributive institutions.

The only market (in the neo-institutionalist sense of the word) institution was Orthodox Church.

If in the medieval West, in the conditions of post-imperial chaos of civil administration, it was the church that took on the function of an organizing principle, which led to the transformation of Catholicism into an extremely rigid vertical of unquestioning subordination, then in the presence of strong secular power, Orthodoxy no longer needed such a path of development. On the contrary, against the backdrop of relations of strict domination and subordination in the state as a whole, it sought to maintain a certain democracy within itself. Orthodoxy has a high degree of decentralization, the power of the Supreme Hierarchy has never been comparable to the power of the Pope in terms of the scope of powers (Patriarch Nikon, who sought to turn into a Russian pope, was quickly overthrown), and, moreover, such a rejection of verticals is reflected even in the Orthodox doctrine itself: Orthodox Christians, unlike Catholics, deny the dogma of Purgatory and the three-level ordered vertical structure of the afterlife.

Orthodoxy opposes irrationality and mysticism to this clear orderliness of the Western faith, where the greatest Catholic saint Thomas Aquinas proved the existence of God with the help of logical syllogisms.

Thus, in relation to other redistributive sociocultural institutions, Orthodoxy performed a compensatory function, as if balancing them.

The non-accidentality of this is proven by subsequent events in the imperial period of Russian history.

Inspired by the Western experience of government, Peter the Great carried out one of his most controversial reforms – church reforms. Instead of the patriarchate, the Holy Governing Synod was established, over which the chief prosecutor was assigned. The head of state also became the head of spiritual power, following the example of the reform of Henry VIII in England. The Church was deprived of even the semblance of democracy, and its functioning was placed exclusively at the service of state interests; a striking

example is the decree of the Holy Governing Synod of 1722 on the disclosure of the secret of confession.

However, the real spiritual life of the Russian people has not come to terms with this institutional unification according to the redistributive type. The fight against Peter’s reform resulted in the emergence of the longest existing Russian sect – the Khlysty sect.

Russian Orthodoxy before Peter the Great as a whole practically did not encounter sectarianism, having experience of struggle only with “Judaizers” at the end of the 15th century and schismatics in the 17th century, caused by other reasons. Consequently, Khlystyism, the first criminal cases of which occurred in the 1710s, must be directly associated with the activities of Peter the Great.

Khlysty is a unique phenomenon. Unlike other sectarians, the Khlysty did not formally break with Orthodoxy: they continued to attend church, but at the same time participated in special meetings – the zeal. The central element of the zeal was the so-called “spinning”: members of the community spun until exhaustion, shouting out their prophecies, and also, like the scourged Christ, whipped themselves, and this is how the name of the sect appeared. The Khlysty cultivated ecstasy, which they understood as their own deification, bringing freedom of action. The main doctrines of Khlysty were two unexpected commandments: 1) sin is suppressed through sin (i.e. you need to sin until you begin to feel disgust for sin), 2) every Khlyst through spiritual practices can become Christ and the Mother of God.

The last idea had a democratic, anti-autocratic overtones, which was later noted by many researchers, in particular Vladimir Bonch-Bruевич, who even saw the Khlysts as assistants to Bolsheviks.

Khlystyism, numerous for the sect and spreading by 1917 to all layers of the Russian population, was a consequence of Peter I’s transplantation of Western redistributive sociocultural institutions in the religious sphere into the Russian institutional matrix, in which religion was traditionally based on market institutions on the principle of compensatory behavior. The Khlysts contrasted the rationality of Peter’s Orthodoxy and the almost military hierarchy of its church vertical with a free, horizontal network of “ship” communities and an irrational, mystical belief that, having experienced an ascetic rebirth, any person still on earth can find bliss and become akin to God.

The phenomenon of Khlysty proves that complete unification of either any subsystem of society or the entire society as a whole according to one type (redistributive or market) of social institutions is impossible. The population will respond to attempts at such unification with spontaneously emerging institutions that balance the institutions imposed by the authorities and operate on the principle of compensatory behavior. This dynamics proves Paul Vidal de la Blache’s thesis about the interpenetration of land and sea.

Conclusion

The imperial stage of Russia’s internal geopolitics is the creation and functioning of three state-confessional institutions of law and governance, which became instruments for

building and managing an empire. The Holy Governing Synod, the institution of religious tolerance and the institution of discrimination “schism” simultaneously served as an instrument of Russia’s internal geopolitics. With their help, the imperial center established control over new territories included in the state, influenced the processes of colonization and integration of regions with a non-Orthodox population into Russia and ensured political loyalty to the Orthodox monarchy. Imperial religious legislation, on the basis of which these institutions operated, established a balance of interests between the “dominant” Russian Church and non-Orthodox confessions, and religious policy supported the stability of the existing state-religious and interreligious relations both in the Center and on the outskirts. The abolition of the institution of discrimination “schism” in 1905 and the granting of new religious rights to non-Orthodox and non-Orthodox subjects of the empire strengthened the integrative potential of the instruments of internal geopolitics of the Russian Empire. The expansion of the space of religious freedom has created new legal opportunities for the formation of political loyalty of the Russian Duma monarchy both to tolerant confessions and to communities of Old Believers and sectarians.

Religious systems in the modern world, as before, play a significant role in geopolitical processes and developed religions are able to directly influence the geopolitical structure of the world. Religious institutions perform an important mission in the structure of the religious system, being a system-forming factor. They deal with organizational issues – the interaction between various structural elements of a religious denomination; they connect religious ideology, which contains the main and auxiliary ideological concepts of a particular religion, and the mass of believers. It is religious institutions that ensure the promotion of religious ideas in society and their implementation in religious practice. However, the most problematic level of the religious system remains the institutional component. It is at this level that problems associated with the implementation of social interests arise; here religion enters the political field of social life. Therefore, it is necessary to build a religious dialogue on an ideologically sound basis, not through practical institutional interests, but with the help of common ideas and meanings. Thus, religious ideas and meanings can become both means of “soft power” and methods of informational influence on geopolitical opponents.

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Contribution of the authors

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Russia and South Ossetia United Civilizational Platform: Socio-Political and Cross-Cultural Interaction

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Abstract. The article is devoted to the topical after the collapse of the USSR problem of regional integration of sovereign countries for the joint solution of geopolitical, socio-economic, general cultural and other tasks. The article analyzes the situation associated with the ambiguity of international legal criteria for the recognition of newly formed states and the inconsistency in the interpretation of the right of peoples to equality and self-determination. The historical justification is given and the legal basis for the entry of the Republic of South Ossetia into the Russian Federation as a new subject is described. It is shown that the reunification of two Ossetias, North and South, which created a new historical reality in the life of the Ossetian ethnic group, became the basis for the decision of the leadership of South Ossetia to join Russia by holding a referendum. The circumstances of the postponement of the referendum for an indefinite period are substantiated. The author concluded that the integration of Russia and South Ossetia will lead mainly to positive consequences for both states.

Keywords: state national policy, integration, Russia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia-Alania, interethnic relations, self-determination

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Introduction

The prospect of the revival of the Great Country - Russia through the creation of a solidary, fully sovereign and multinational world power acutely raises the question of the official status of the future state entity, its international legal recognition if the Russian authorities support the idea of South Ossetia about its entry into the Russian Federation.

According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russia has “a unique geographical location, a huge resource base, and intellectual potential. All this gives us a real chance to become a strong, influential and prosperous state.”¹ Considering the special geopolitical position of Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ethnopolitical situation in the country and neighboring countries, the construction of such a state-civilization as “one of the sovereign centers of world development,” the formation of a single civil nation is impossible without making informed management decisions aimed at resolving pressing problems of the state and national politics.

According to the provisions of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, updated in 2023, Russia, as the largest player on the world stage, assumes responsibility for maintaining global stability, strengthening peace and international security in the emerging multipolar world. At the same time, it will build its foreign policy on the basis of the principles of political pragmatism and national interests, where, due to historical, geographical, geopolitical, military, ethnic, demographic, economic, cultural, etc. factors require constant attention in the sphere of interethnic and interreligious relations in the post-Soviet space.² The shift of interests from integration into the Western community to strategic national priorities in foreign policy and internal political problems related to strengthening statehood, ensuring the territorial integrity of the country, overcoming the historical disunity of fraternal peoples and establishing interethnic peace and interreligious harmony on Russian soil are turning the annexation of the Caucasian territories into Russia into historical necessity. At the same time, integration with Russia is of great interest to the independent, partially internationally recognized states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In the course of centuries of social, political and intercultural interaction between Russia and the Caucasus, a rich cultural and historical experience and potential connections have developed. Political scientist Dmitry Drobnitsky believes that the issue of South Ossetia’s annexation to Russia should not be considered solely from the angle of economic gain, since the political leadership, relying on the will and desire of the people, can be guided by other, deeper motives, for example, based on the priority of human needs: “There is a certain civilizational attraction of peoples and territories to Moscow, which became apparent almost immediately after the collapse of the USSR.”³

The relevance of the study is due to the intensification of integration processes in the post-Soviet space in the last decade, determined by the absence of a language barrier, common historical memory and culture, and in the case of South Ossetia, also a common Christian faith. The study will help to better understand the importance of the allied and strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and the Republic of South Ossetia, to understand the essence and patterns of integration processes in general.

The author used the results of A.S.Bukhanov’s research on the conflict of principles of self-determination of peoples, the territorial integrity of states and possible ways to

¹ Lavrov: The Russian Federation has everything to become a strong and prosperous state. Available from: <https://ria.ru/20050512/39971579.html>

² Ibid.

³ What will the annexation of South Ossetia give Russia: the opinion of a political scientist. Available from: https://news.rambler.ru/science/48404326/?utm_content=news_media&utm_medium=read_more&utm_source=copylink

resolve it [1]; V.D.Dzidzoeva about supporters and opponents of Ossetian integration [2]; A.A.Zhurtova and A.N.Maksimchik on the historiography of Russian-Caucasian relations in the 16th–19th centuries [3]; R.M.Timosheva on the right of nations to self-determination in the context of modern interethnic conflicts [4]; L.A.Chibirova on the issues of unity and national identity of Ossetians [5]; Yu.A.Chugaenko about the historical root causes of the confrontation between Georgia and South Ossetia [6].

The purpose of the study is to comprehensively consider the issue of the readiness of South Ossetia to join the Russian Federation as a full-fledged entity. For this purpose, the state of interstate Russian-South Ossetian cooperation in various fields was determined, the main reasons slowing down integration processes were identified, and the prospects for the development of bilateral relations on mutually beneficial terms were assessed.

Materials and Methods

Research materials: published official documents and regulations (decrees and orders of the President of the Russian Federation, the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation and the President of the Republic of South Ossetia); documents on Russian-Ossetian relations in the 18th century, collected by M.M.Bliev⁴; statements and interviews of Russian and Ossetian politicians; publications in online publications on the development of Russian-Ossetian relations.

The variety of sources used led to the use of different methods: content analysis, text analysis method, methods of systemic analysis of events, historical retrospective method.

Results

The article summarizes material on Russian-South Ossetian relations. Addressing the topic of implementing the right of nations to self-determination, as prescribed in international law, allows us to reveal the problems that become an obstacle to the annexation of South Ossetia to Russia. A conclusion is made about the need for additional government measures to integrate the historically Russian lands of the Caucasus into the administrative, financial, economic, legal, social and educational systems of the Russian Federation. Let us add that for South Ossetia, Russia remains the main strategic partner, a significant and reliable ally, a guarantor of peace and security in the region, because “when the long-suffering people of Ossetia found themselves in a critical situation, Russia was always nearby, at the right time in the right place” [5:6].

⁴ Bliev M. M. Russian-Ossetian relations in the XVIII century: a collection of documents. In 2 vols. Ordzhonikidze: Ir. V. 2:1764–1784. 1984:39.

Self-determination of South Ossetia within the Context of International Law

After a referendum in January 1992 among the residents of South Ossetia, in which more than 99% of those who took part spoke in favor of the country's sovereignty and annexation to Russia, on May 29, 1992, the Supreme Council of the Republic adopted the Act of Declaration of Independence in South Ossetia⁵. Having chosen the path of historical rapprochement with Russia, the leadership of the Republic of South Ossetia outlined its foreign policy priorities and demonstrated its readiness and desire to defend its national interests.

South Ossetia approached the thirty-year mark with unresolved political and territorial problems: although the republic, not without the help and support of Russia, managed to maintain its territorial integrity, its borders remain diplomatically unrecognized by UN member states and the world community. Due to the persisting territorial contradictions between South Ossetia and Georgia and differences in the positions of the parties on the ethno-political status of South Ossetia, it is still not a full subject of international law [6]. Today, in addition to Russia, which recognized the independence of South Ossetia by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of August 26, 2008 №1261 "On recognition of the Republic of South Ossetia"⁶, the existence of the republic as an independent and sovereign state was recognized by the Republic of Nicaragua (2008), the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2009), the Republic of Nauru (2009), Tuvalu (2011, but withdrew in 2014) and the Syrian Arab Republic (2018), these countries established diplomatic relations with South Ossetia at the embassy level.

Enshrined as a peremptory norm in Article 1, Article 55, Article 73 and Article 75 of the UN Charter⁷ and other international legal documents, for example, in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of December 14, 1960⁸, the principles make it possible to realize the right of nations to equality and self-determination. However, in the context of the West's hostile attitude towards Russia, South Ossetia must realize that it has no chance of a quick procedure for joining Russia as a new full-fledged entity. The lack of a clear definition of the term "state recognition", uniformity of interpretation and official definition of criteria complicate the process of recognition of new state entities by the world community. Thus, depending on the political interests and ambitious aspirations of the leading players in the world political arena, "the priority is either the principle of territorial integrity or the right of nations to self-determination [1:3]. It is with regret that we have to admit that these are the rules of modern geopolitical games. In relation to Russia, we are already accustomed to the manifestation of a policy of "double

⁵ The act of proclamation of independence of South Ossetia. Available from: <https://ria.ru/20170529/1495085320.html>

⁶ Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated August 26, 2008 No. 1261 "On recognition of the Republic of South Ossetia." Available from: <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/27958>.

⁷ The Charter of the United Nations. Available from: <https://www.un.org/ru/about-us/un-charter/full-text>

⁸ The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was adopted by General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960. Available from: https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/declarations/colonial.shtml

standards", so in the near future we can hardly count on recognition of the legitimacy of the referendum on the issue of South Ossetia joining the Russian Federation, even if it is held. It seems unlikely that the world community will express support for the South Ossetian people and not deny them their legitimate right to self-determination. Within the framework of international law, the approval of the world community could be manifested in the legal consolidation of the results of the referendum in South Ossetia and the recognition of the new borders of the Russian Federation, but there are no illusions about the intentions of the United States and Europe towards Russia. It is clear that the reaction to the annexation of South Ossetia to Russia will be extremely negative. It can be predicted that the results of the referendum will have no force for the world community and the collective West will demand that Russia refrain from further steps towards "occupation" and "annexation" of the territory of a sovereign state, ignoring the legitimate will of the South Ossetian people.

Small and young states such as South Ossetia, due to the constant colossal pressure emanating from the United States and other Western states to act in accordance with the policies of the leading world powers, always find it difficult to defend their independence, freedom and right to self-determination. In this case, the right of peoples to self-determination, declared as the ability of each people to democratically, independently, that is, without outside interference, decide on the form of their state existence (as part of another state or as a separate state), determine their political status in the international arena, and also to build its own trajectory of economic, social and cultural development cannot be fully realized [4].

The Origins of Russian-Ossetian Interaction

We associate the dynamic development of relations in all spheres of life between the two states, firstly, with the very fact of the Russian Federation's acceptance of the emergence of a new independent state on the international stage – South Ossetia. Secondly, Tskhinvali could not help but appreciate the efforts that the Russian side is making so that the state sovereignty of the self-proclaimed South Ossetia after its secession from Georgia is recognized by authoritative organizations and countries influential in international politics. Thirdly, the establishment of regular contacts was facilitated by close diplomatic and cultural-historical ties between Russians and Ossetians, which were established in the middle of the 18th century. The Ossetian embassy in St.Petersburg (1749-1752), which included outstanding public and political figures of Ossetia of the 18th century (Elisey Khetagov, Zurab Elikhanov and others), brilliantly coped with the solution of the historical task - the annexation of Ossetia to the Russian Empire.

After the completion of the victorious Russian-Turkish war (1768-1774) and the conclusion by Russia of the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi peace treaty⁹ with the Ottoman Turkish Empire, in 1774, by decree of the Russian Empress Catherine II, Ossetia of its own free will

⁹ The results of the Russian-Turkish War (1768-1774). Kyuchuk is the Kaynardjian world. The history of Russia. Available from: <https://all-russia-history.ru/treaty-of-kuchuk-kainarji>

became part of the Russian Empire and thus, the previous Russian-Ossetian agreements on the annexation of Ossetia received international legal formalization.

This accession, based on the voluntary expression of the will of Ossetian societies, is an important historical event that led to rapprochement and strong friendship between Russians and Ossetians. The transition to citizenship of the Russian Empire, conversion to the Orthodox faith, and the acquisition of Russian patronage in the person of its sovereign determined the future fate of Ossetia. The collection of documents collected by the outstanding scientist and public figure of North Ossetia-Alania M.M.Bliev states that the Ossetians, as subjects of Russia, were paid a salary, guaranteed external security, protection from attacks by the Kabardian princes, and an end to internecine wars. They were allowed to move to the more fertile Russian-controlled foothill plains and build their fortresses and settlements there. They also received the right to “free passage” through Russian territory and to freedom of border trade. In turn, Ossetia put its mountains at Russia’s disposal, that is, it allowed the start of industrial ore mining and the export of valuable metal.¹⁰

Wanting to prove their loyalty to the government, the Ossetians, well-armed and physically trained, served in the ranks of the Russian Imperial Army and took part in its military campaigns, including foreign ones. For his numerous exploits in the Patriotic War (1812), the Russian-Turkish War (1828), the Hungarian campaign (1848), the Crimean Company (1853–1856), the Russian-Turkish War (1877–1878), the Russian-Japanese War (1904–1905), the First World War (1914–1919), Ossetian military formations were repeatedly given award banners. In addition, the Georgian Military Road, known since ancient times, passed through Ossetia, extremely important from a strategic point of view during periods of armed conflicts.

From historically reliable sources it has been established that, having taken the oath of allegiance to Russia, Ossetia emerged from a protracted crisis, and its population got rid of the centuries-old stagnant state of the economy. Archival documents indicate that the annexation of Ossetia to the Russian Empire contributed to more intensive development in many areas of socio-economic life and had a great influence on the material and spiritual culture of the Ossetian people. Thus, the annexation of Ossetia was perceived by both Russians and Ossetians exclusively as a beneficial event.

Referendum on South Ossetia Joining Russia: Disagreements and Strategic Path of Development

In 2022, after many years of the existence of the Republic of South Ossetia de facto as an independent state, the desire of Tskhinval (the administrative center of South Ossetia) for rapprochement with its sister North Ossetia-Alania within the borders of the Russian Federation intensified even more. Despite the unfavorable geopolitical situation, the main issue became the alliance and integration of the Republic of South Ossetia and the Russian

¹⁰ Bliev M. M. Russian-Ossetian relations in the XVIII century: a collection of documents. In 2 vols. Ordzhonikidze: Ir.1984.

Federation. The course towards the reunification of two branches of one ancient people – the descendants of the Great Alan ethnos, who have lived together for centuries, having a single national culture, a single literary language, similar values and traditions, was taken a long time ago. However, in a situation of a difficult military-political situation due to the special military operation carried out by the Russian army in Ukraine and the unprecedented sanctions war against Russia unleashed by the collective West, the favorable moment has not yet arrived for South Ossetia to join the Russian Federation. This is evidenced by the decree of the head of the republic A.E.Gagloev dated May 30, 2022 “On ways of further integration of the Republic of South Ossetia and the Russian Federation”¹¹, he suspended the decree of his predecessor A.I.Bibilov, dated May 13, 2022, that was shortly before the new presidential elections. By his decree “On calling a referendum of the Republic of South Ossetia”¹² A.I.Bibilov, who was then president of the republic, set a specific date for the referendum - July 17, 2022. In accordance with the decree of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia, the referendum was postponed indefinitely due to the insufficient resolution of some legal aspects of strategic importance significance for both states.

Speaking about the “uncertainty of the legal consequences of the issue,” it should be noted that the wording of the question being submitted for discussion requires clarification: “Do you support *the unification of the Republic of South Ossetia and Russia?*” (italics – E.D.). Many politicians and high-level experts agree that a question formulated in this way can generate an ambiguous answer, which leads to different interpretations of the results. Ambiguity, vagueness and contradictory interpretations are unacceptable in international politics. Criticisms were expressed about the need for a strict legal distinction between concepts such as “association”, “annexation” and “entry”.

In order to exclude a legal incident due to an incorrect formulation of the issue, Tskhinvali agreed that there was no need to rush and proposed holding additional consultations with the Russian side in order to resolve all Russian-Ossetian contradictions and find a compromise before making a final decision on accession. As the head of the South Ossetian Presidential Administration Alan Dzhioev noted, the referendum was planned “without preliminary study and coordination of this issue with the Russian side, which contradicts the agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of South Ossetia on allied integration”¹³. Thus, the leadership of South Ossetia recognizes “the inadmissibility of a unilateral decision of a referendum on issues affecting the legitimate rights and interests of the Russian Federation” and calls on its people to treat its temporary postponement with greater understanding¹⁴.

¹¹ Decree of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia “On ways of further integration of the Republic of South Ossetia and the Russian Federation” dated 30.05.2022. Official website of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia. Available from: <https://presidentruo.org/ukaz-o-putyax-dalnejshej-integracii-respubliki-yuzhnaya-osetiya-i-rossijskoj-federacii/>

¹² Decree of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia “On the appointment of a referendum of the Republic of South Osseti” dated 05.13.2022. Official website of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia. Available from: <https://presidentruo.org/ukaz-o-naznachanii-referenduma-respubliki-yuzhnaya-osetiya-2/>

¹³ Kulikov A. “A completely new entity”: Russia did not want to unite with South Ossetia. Available from: <https://www.pravda.ru/politics/1720604-referendum/>

¹⁴ The official website of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia. Available from: <https://presidentruo.org/ukaz-o-putyax-dalnejshej-integracii-respubliki-yuzhnaya-osetiya-i-rossijskoj-federacii/>

Considering the uncertainty of the legal consequences of the issue put to the referendum, President Gagloev's decision is perceived by everyone as wise. We share the point of view of the first deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee on Affairs of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Eurasian integration and relations with compatriots Konstantin Zatulin about the untimeliness of the referendum and the high risks of possible negative consequences of its holding. The aggravation of relations with Georgia in the event of a referendum is clearly not part of Russia's plans. He emphasized that the current Georgian government is not pro-Russian, it has given shelter to those who left Russia. But Georgia "is important to us in the context of what is happening in the Caucasus between Armenia and Azerbaijan. All this taken together must be assessed," Zatulin noted¹⁵. Guided by Russian-Ossetian national interests, A.E.Gagloev made a "Solomon decision", because now neither Russia nor South Ossetia are ready to put an end to this national issue.

The Unification of the Two Ossetias under the Auspices of Russia as a Priority Goal

The famous Caucasus scholar V.D.Dzidzoev pays great attention to the development of Russian-Caucasian relations and Ossetian integration. He considers the continuing division of the Ossetian people into northern and southern Ossetians a historical injustice that cannot be tolerated under any circumstances. On the contrary, it needs to be corrected as soon as possible. Well versed in the problems of interethnic relations in the Caucasus, understanding the nature of ethno-political and interstate conflicts, V.D.Dzidzoev always supported the course of unifying the Ossetian people:

Analyzing the issue of uniting Ossetia into a single whole, of course, with the Russian Federation, it is necessary to emphasize that many Ossetians, especially in South Ossetia, who experienced the horrors of genocide, oppression and abuse by sovereign Georgia, for the most part dream of the reunification of the two Ossetias. Archival documents and other competent sources indicate that in South Ossetia the absolute majority of Ossetians have always strived for unity with North Ossetia [2:29].

In his Telegram channel, former President of South Ossetia Anatoly Bibilov defined the entry of the state into Russia, which Ossetians call their historical homeland, as a strategic goal for South Ossetia. He firmly stated his intention to unite South Ossetia with the neighboring Caucasian republic of North Ossetia-Alania into a single entity. He explains his position by the fact that for the reunification of the two fraternal Orthodox peoples of the Caucasus within Russia, the preserved common ethno-confessional core and a single cultural-genetic code are of great importance. According to A.Bibilov, in the event of the

¹⁵ The State Duma explained the untimeliness of the referendum on South Ossetia's entry into the Russian Federation. Available from: <https://i-sng.ru/publikacii/v-gd-poyasnili-nesvoevremennost-refe/>

unification of two Ossetias within the Russian Federation, such a single entity may receive the name Ossetia-Alania in order to especially emphasize the connections with its ancestors and traditions¹⁶.

Before the outbreak of the military conflict in Ukraine, the Russian Federation quite actively supported the idea of South Ossetia joining Russia, taking into account the desire of the historically and geographically divided Ossetian people to unite.

Another reason for the Russian side's interest in annexing South Ossetia, according to A.A.Zhurtova and A.N.Maksimchik, is the geopolitical and socio-economic consequences of the collapse of the USSR. After the collapse of a single state, the establishment of new territorial borders, the loss of large-scale Soviet identity,

Russia is rapidly trying to find its civilizational identity. This happens by rethinking and studying the imperial experience of the past. Turning to it is associated with solving practical problems of strengthening the federal foundations of the state structure, allows us to enrich the variability of the mechanisms of governance of a multinational state, and contributes to a better understanding of current events [3:236].

Taking into account the real historical experience of Russian-Ossetian interaction, thanks to painstaking joint work to bring the two countries closer together, Russia has managed to achieve significant success. As a result of Russian-Ossetian interstate consultations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of South Ossetia, a number of strategically important regulatory documents were signed, including:

- 1) Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Republic of South Ossetia dated September 17, 2008¹⁷;
- 2) Agreement on assistance to the Republic of South Ossetia in socio-economic development dated August 26, 2009¹⁸;
- 3) Treaty on Alliance and Integration of March 18, 2015 (ratified by Federal Law of June 29, 2015 № 164-FZ, entered into force on July 30, 2015)¹⁹;
- 4) Agreement on promoting the implementation of the State Program for Socio-Economic Development of the Republic of South Ossetia for 2022-2025 (Order of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1558-r dated June 15, 2022)²⁰;

¹⁶ Shustrova M. The goal of the divided people: South Ossetia wants to unite with the North as part of Russia. Available from: <https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2022/03/31/14685469.shtml>

¹⁷ The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Republic of South Ossetia (Moscow, September 17, 2008). Available from: <https://base.garant.ru/2567313/>.

¹⁸ Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia on Assistance to the Republic of South Ossetia in socio-economic Development (Moscow, August 26, 2009) (as amended). Available from: <https://base.garant.ru/2568474/>

¹⁹ Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of South Ossetia on Alliance and Integration (Moscow, March 18, 2015). Website of the Government of the Russian Federation. Available from: <https://base.garant.ru/70900874/>

²⁰ Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1558-r dated 06/15/2022. Website of the Government of the Russian Federation. Available from: <http://government.ru/docs/all/141572/>

It is also important to note that in September 2021, in Tskhinvali, Russian President V.V. Putin signed a federal law ratifying an agreement with South Ossetia on dual citizenship²¹.

According to this law, citizens have the right not to renounce their first citizenship (Russian or South Ossetian) and can count on receiving Russian citizenship under a simplified scheme.

To summarize, we can say: all the above documents are designed to ensure:

transition to a new level of interstate relations, alliance and strategic partnership, considering that strengthening allied relations based on deep historical and spiritual ties meets the national interests of both states²².

This is one of the key provisions of the above-mentioned Treaty of Alliance and Integration.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we note that both the annexation of the Caucasian lands to the Russian Empire, which began in the 16th century and ended in the second half of the 19th century, and today's entry of the Republic of South Ossetia into the Russian Federation is a long, complex and contradictory procedure. We believe that this process should not be artificially accelerated, because rash decisions on the Ossetian issue could negatively affect the results of the negotiation processes. So that in the future the "centuries-old dream" of the South Ossetian people will come true – to unite with North Ossetia and become part of the Russian Federation²³, – it takes time, additional financial resources and enormous multilateral efforts of the political leadership, diplomats, and the expert community (lawyers, historians, political scientists, military, economists) to stabilize the entire Caucasian region, settle legal formalities and overcome existing contradictions. To resolve this issue peacefully, it is advisable for Russia and South Ossetia to enlist the support of the international community. This is the most difficult task to accomplish, since neither the United States nor European countries will ever be interested in a strong Russian state. But there is no doubt that sooner or later it will be possible to eliminate all legal ambiguities, a referendum will be held and,

²¹ Federal Law № 138-FZ dated 05/28/2022 "On Ratification of the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of South Ossetia on the Settlement of Issues of dual Citizenship". Website of the President of the Russian Federation. Available from: <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/47875>

²² Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of South Ossetia on Alliance and Integration (Moscow, March 18, 2015). Website of the President of the Russian Federation. Available from: <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/4819>

²³ The Message of the President of South Ossetia Anatoly Bibilov: The Republic of South Ossetia will be part of its historical homeland – Russia. Available from: <https://er.ru/activity/news/obrashenie-prezidenta-yuzhnoj-osetii-anatoliya-bibilova-respublika-yuzhnaya-osetiya-budet-v-sostave-svoej-istoricheskoy-rodiny-rossii> (accessed 01.06.1023).

taking into account the will of the South Ossetian people, South Ossetia will become part of the great multinational Russia.

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Contribution of the author

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Development of Migration Processes between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation

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Abstract. The article discusses the emergence and development of migration between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation. The reasons for the increase in migration from Uzbekistan to Russia over the years of independence are analyzed. The main problems faced by Uzbek labor migrants in Russia are identified. The information on the volume of money transfers from Russia to Uzbekistan year by year is presented, the factors influencing its increase or decrease are analyzed.

Keywords: migration, labor migration, patent system, migration problems, illegal migration, money transfers

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Introduction

In the context of modern globalization, migration has affected all countries of the world. Instability in countries, the economic crisis, and disagreements of various forms have led to the rapid development of migration. According to demographers, by 2050 the total number of migrants in the world will reach 230 million people, which is 2.6% of the

total population of the Earth¹. However, according to the UN, in 2020 there were 281 million migrants in countries around the world. This figure was 3.6% of the total world population².

Citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan occupy a special place among them. After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Uzbekistan, like all former USSR states, underwent large-scale reforms. The procedure for citizens traveling abroad has been simplified. As a result, many Uzbek citizens began to move to developed and developing countries of the world for work, study, advanced training and other purposes.

The purpose of this study is to study migration processes between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation during the years of independence.

Materials and Methods

Conducting the study, the author used data from the Agency for Statistics under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Central Bank and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.

Using the interview method, the main problems faced by migrants in Russia were identified. By comparing statistical data, methods of selective monitoring and periodization, the processes of increasing and decreasing the migration flow from Uzbekistan to Russia and the factors influencing it were identified.

Results


From the first day of independence of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the present day, the Russian Federation has been one of the partners in the field of migration.

Representatives of many nationalities living in Uzbekistan began to move to other countries. In particular, Russians made up 45-48%, Tatars 16-17%, Ukrainians 5-6%, Jews 5-9%, Germans 2-3%, Uzbeks 7-8% of the population who left the republic during these years [2:14]. During 1990-1998, 500,000 people moved from the Republic of Uzbekistan to the Russian Federation. Most of them were Russians who immigrated at different times [4:43], evacuees during World War II, and arrived after the Tashkent earthquake in 1966.

Since 1989, Russians began to leave Uzbekistan en masse; advertisements appeared in many Russian cities: "I will exchange my house in Tashkent for a house in any city in Russia" [9:101]. As a result, the Russian diaspora among the country's population has decreased significantly. In particular, in 1989 the number of Russians in the country was 1.7 million people, and by 1997 – 900 thousand [1]. The reason is that after the collapse of the USSR, the

¹ World migration report 2020. International organization for migration (IOM). Available from: <http://www.iom.int..>

² McAuliffe, M. and A.Triandafyllidou (eds.), 2021. World Migration Report 2022. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Geneva.

Figure 1. The number of labor migrants who arrived from the Republic of Uzbekistan to the Russian Federation for the purpose of earning a living

Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of information from the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Statistics

influence of the Uzbek language in Uzbekistan increased, teaching in this language began in schools, and a requirement arose to maintain legal documents in the Uzbek language. This and the lifting of restrictions on traveling abroad caused the emigration of representatives of the ethnically non-Uzbek population [11:41].

In the 1990s, there were no major changes in the wage and social security system in Uzbekistan. As a result of the development of private property in the country, most of the population was employed in small businesses and private entrepreneurship on farms in rural areas; many left as low-skilled labor to the countries of Western Europe, the USA, and Japan. But lack of demand and strict visa barriers led to the fact that the migration of the indigenous population of Uzbekistan developed slowly.

But since the late 1990s, the flow of labor migrants from Uzbekistan to Russia began to increase [6:86–87]. As a result of Russia's 10% GDP growth since 2000³ and its stable growth in subsequent years, this country has become one of the popular destinations for many Uzbek labor migrants. Since 2000, the total population of Russia has decreased by 0.4% per year⁴, construction, industry and other sectors have been developing, which has led to an increase in demand for foreign labor migrants. Since that time, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Armenians and representatives of other nationalities from many republics of the former USSR began to move to Russia [8:119]. The 2002 Russian population census found that the country's permanent population increased by 6.8 million people due to migrants from the former Soviet republics [10:24].

³ TheWorldBank. Available from: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=RU>.

⁴ The World Bank. Available from: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=RU>.

In 2006, demographic processes in Russia were unstable; the country's working-age population decreased by 1 million people per year [12:76]. This, in turn, led to an even greater import of labor from foreign countries, including Uzbekistan. According to the State Statistics Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the flow of labor migration from the Republic of Uzbekistan to Russia in 2008 amounted to 579,276 people, and in 2009 this figure decreased to 47,520 people. The main reason for this was the negative impact of the global financial crisis on the economy of the Russian Federation, if in 2008 the Gross domestic product of this country was \$1.6 trillion, then by 2009 this figure dropped to \$1.2 trillion⁵, the unemployment rate among the population in the Russian Federation from 6.21% in 2008 rose to 8.3% the following year⁶, and the price of petroleum products, which are Russia's main export product, fell by 70% on the world market by the end of 2008 [13:285].

In 2010, the flow of Uzbek citizens to the Russian Federation amounted to 546,673 people. By 2011, this figure increased by 61.8% and reached 860,652 people. The highest rate of labor migration flow from the Republic of Uzbekistan to the Russian Federation was in 2012 - 1,224,821 people. The rapid growth was due to a number of reasons. Firstly, due to the growth of the Russian economy after the global financial crisis, and secondly, construction for the 2014 Winter Olympics created new jobs.

In 2013, the flow of labor migration remained high. However, by the end of 2014, political instability in the Russian Federation and the associated sharp devaluation of the national currency, the ruble, had an impact on Uzbek labor migrants.

On January 1, 2015, a unified patent license was introduced for migrants wishing to work in Russia. In accordance with changes in legislation, patent prices began to differ depending on the region of the country, that is, a patent license obtained in one region could not be used for work in another region. The cost of a patent began to include the preparation and execution of documents, a medical insurance policy, a general exam on the level of knowledge of the Russian language, history and legislation of Russia, banking services, translation and notary services [6:18]. As a result, the flow of migrants from Uzbekistan decreased by 18.9%, the flow of Ukrainian migrants by 14.2%, the flow of Tajik migrants by 15.6%, and migrants of different nationalities left en masse⁷. In particular, in 2014 the number of labor migrants from Uzbekistan was 1,041,462 people, and by 2015 this figure decreased by 18%. Uzbeks preferred to work in the Republic of Turkey or the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The Russian economy has grown slowly: Russia's annual GDP growth rate increased by 0.2% in 2016, 1.8% in 2017, 2.5% in 2018 and 1.3% in 2019⁸. However, these countries also experienced economic difficulties. And in 2018, an increase in the number of construction

⁵ GDP (current US\$) – Russian Federation. World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. Available from: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=RU>.

⁶ Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate). International Labour Organization. "ILO Modelled Estimates and Projections database (ILOEST)" ILOSTAT. Accessed December 6, 2022. Available from: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=RU&view=chart>.

⁷ Alina Musina. Russia: migrant outflow threatens economic development. Available from: <https://russian.eurasianet.org/russia-outflow-of-migrants-threatens-economic-development>.

⁸ International monetary fund. Available from: <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/RUS>

works in different regions of the Russian Federation for the World Cup created new jobs for migrants [14:258–259]. This, in turn, contributed to an increase in the flow of Uzbek labor migrants to Russia in subsequent years (Diagram 1).

In recent years, Uzbek labor migrants have been obtaining citizenship of the Russian Federation in order to work with full social and legal protection, without paying the costs of obtaining a patent. For example, according to information provided by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, in 2017–2021, 118,787 citizens of Uzbekistan received citizenship of the Russian Federation⁹. This process leads in Uzbekistan to a negative result in the form of the loss of part of the working-age population, and in Russia to the regulation of the demographic instability observed in the country and the satisfaction of demand for labor.

Many unofficial private firms have been created on Russian territory, whose main task is to search for and accommodate labor migrants from abroad. This service is used by 10–15% of migrant workers¹⁰. Private enterprises and firms operating in Russia hire more foreign labor migrants than representatives of the local population. The main reason for this is that employers hire migrants informally. As a result, they save on monthly wage costs for migrants, insurance costs and tax payments to the government¹¹. For example, Dilya from Uzbekistan is one of those who have been working in Russia for several years without a written employment contract with an employer:

Dilya, 43 years old, hotel worker:

I have been working in Moscow since June 2006. I work mainly in the service sector. In all these years, I have not entered into any written agreements with employers. The reason is that employers do not want to enter into a written contract to avoid paying additional income tax, vacation pay and other expenses for employees coming from other countries¹².

Uzbek labor migrants in Russia try to appear in public places as little as possible due to “preventive” measures carried out by Russian law enforcement agencies. Similar events are held in the centers of large Russian cities, at the entrances to metro stations. In this case, migrants are stopped and checked; even if migrants have documents, there are cases of extortion of bribes within the framework of the country’s legislation [15:57]. In particular, Shakir from Uzbekistan, working in Russia, stated that he does not know the Russian language and therefore avoids meetings with law enforcement officers:

Shakir is 30 years old and an agricultural worker:

I work on a farm in the Moscow region. My monthly salary is 50 thousand rubles. I don’t speak Russian very well, so I don’t go outside the farm. Also, if you go to other places, the police will


⁹ Selected indicators of the migration situation in the Russian Federation for January – December 2021, distributed by country and region. Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. Available from: <https://мвд.рф/dejatelnost/statistics/migracionnaya/item/28104344/>

¹⁰ Tyuryukanova E. Labor migration to Russia. Available from: <https://polit.ru/article/2008/01/21/demoscope315/>

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Interview with Dili, a hotel worker from Uzbekistan. Conducted by the author of the article.

Figure 2. Money transfers from the Russian Federation to the Republic of Uzbekistan in 2011–2021 (thousands of U.S. dollar)



stop you and check your documents. Although my documents are in order, I cannot answer the questions they asked. That’s why I prefer to stay on the farm even in my free time¹³.

In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic, which swept the whole world, caused an increase in unemployment in Russia. As a result, many migrants returned home. In 2020, the number of labor migrants from abroad in different regions of Russia decreased from 20% to 50%, respectively, their share in the service sector decreased to 33.5%, in the consumer services sector – 28.6%, in the water supply and other utilities sector – by 25.8%, and in the construction sector decreased by 22.2%¹⁴.

Among the CIS countries, the Republic of Uzbekistan ranks high in terms of the number of labor migrants in the Russian Federation and remittances made by migrants to their homeland. The volume of remittances sent from Russia to Uzbekistan differed in different periods. In the period from 2011 to 2013, the volume of remittances from Uzbek citizens to the economy of Uzbekistan increased from year to year and in 2013 amounted to \$6.6 billion.

Economic instability in Russia in 2014, various forms of economic sanctions from Western countries, a sharp drop in oil prices on the world market, and a two-fold devaluation of the ruble against foreign currencies led to a decrease in the number of Uzbek migrants in the country in subsequent years and a decrease in remittances.

By 2016, the volume of money transfers from Russia to Uzbekistan decreased by 3.5 times compared to 2013 and amounted to \$1.8 billion. Over the next three years, the volume of remittances grew steadily, increasing by 41% in 2017 compared to the previous year, by 53.3% in 2018 and reaching \$3 billion in 2019. In 2020, the global spread of the COVID-19 pandemic

¹³ An interview an agricultural worker from Uzbekistan - Shakir (conducted by the author of the article)

¹⁴ Kulakova V., Yasakova E. Personnel epidemic: due to the shortage of migrants, the deadlines for housing commissioning are disrupted. Available from: <https://iz.ru/1103166/veronika-kulakova-ekaterina-iasakova/kadrovaia-epidemiia-iz-za-nekhvatki-migrantov-sryvaiutsia-sroki-vvoda-zhilia>

had a negative impact on the global economy. Mamta Murthy, Vice President for Human Resources Development at the World Bank and Head of the Migration Coordination Group, says that “as we have seen the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on migration, we have seen its negative impact on migrants and their families who depend on remittances»¹⁵.

According to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, remittances from Russia to Uzbekistan in 2020 decreased by 19.5% compared to 2019 and amounted to \$2.4 billion. In 2021, this figure grew steadily to \$3.2 billion.

The volume of foreign currency transfers from labor migration is higher than the figures given in official sources. This is due to the fact that migrants use remittance systems of national and foreign banks and transfer funds through informal channels [3:92]. An estimated 88% of migrant workers working in Russia use the remittance system. The main reason for this is the reliability of official remittance systems and the ability to receive funds from all regions of Uzbekistan, which may have increased the attractiveness of this channel among migrant workers.

Despite the widespread development and existence of the money transfer system, a tenth of all labor migrants send their savings through acquaintances returning to their homeland¹⁶. In our opinion, Uzbeks who use unofficial channels choose the unofficial route in order to avoid paying interest on the services of banks or money transfer organizations, spending time communicating with them, processing documents and formalities. As a result, it is difficult to calculate the exact amount of remittances.

Conclusion

Migration relations between Uzbekistan and Russia have deep roots. From the first years of independence to the present, migration processes from Uzbekistan can be divided into two periods. In the first period, from 1991 to 2000, the predominantly Russian population moved from Uzbekistan to Russia. The second period – from 2000 to the present – migration consists of ethnic Uzbeks. During this period, the number of labor migrants to the Russian Federation depended on the reforms carried out in its economic, political and legal spheres.

In recent years, such negative factors as the rise in price of a patent allowing legal work in Russia, the presence of corruption, and the creation of an oral rather than written employment contract between employer and employee have caused difficulties in the activities of Uzbek migrants.

The Russian labor market plays an important role for Uzbek labor migrants. Although in recent years Uzbekistan has reached agreements with many countries in the field of labor migration, the Russian direction remains attractive for labor migrants. As a result, the majority of remittances to Uzbekistan come from Russia.

¹⁵ COVID-19: Remittance flows to shrink 14% by 2021. Available from: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/10/29/covid-19-remittance-flows-to-shrink-14-by-2021>

¹⁶ Ryazanchev S. The role of labor migration in the development of the economy of the Russian Federation. Migration management in North and Central Asia. Working paper №1. P. 89. Available from: <https://yptoolbox.unescapsdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/The-Role-of-Labour-Migration-in-the-Development-of-the-Economy-of-the-Russian-Federation-Russian.pdf>

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HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE AND MODERNITY

History of International Relations
and Foreign Policy

RUSSIA & WORLD: SCIENTIFIC DIALOGUE

**РОССИЯ
И МИР**
НАУЧНЫЙ ДИАЛОГ



In these days, it is appropriate to recall the tragic and heroic days when all the peoples of the former USSR rose to defend their Motherland, realizing the enormous danger that German fascism with its misanthropic ideology brought with it.

D.N.Aberkulov

Military Formations of the Central Asian Military District
in Defensive Battles for Moscow

Yoshihide Suga became the country's first leader in eight years to form a cabinet of people he personally knew, hoping to follow the course set by his predecessor Shinzo Abe. His reputation as a "hard-nosed lieutenant" who managed bureaucrats led him to be described as a "problem solver", a "sugalin" and a "seat warmer".

V.A.Letiaev, R.R.Magdeev

Japan's Foreign Policy Priorities during the Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga Period: "Restoring
Diplomacy and Security"

Studying the history of the Soviet stage of Russian historical science is one of the most important tasks for the further development of modern scientific knowledge. This is primarily associated with the study of the scientific heritage of historians, with the revelation of the essence of their worldview, views, concepts, and rethinking the experience of previous generations of scientists. An independent place in these studies is occupied by the historian himself, the "life milestones" of his creative path, his ideals, the sociocultural environment - all this influences his formation.

A.M.Imamutdinova

The History of International Relations in the Legacy of the Soviet Historian
Vladimir Mikhailovich Khvostov (1905–1972)

Military Formations of the Central Asian Military District in Defensive Battles for Moscow

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Abstract. The article examines the role and significance of the military formations of the Central Asian Military District that participated in the battles near Moscow during the Great Patriotic War. The novelty of the article lies in the fact that the author for the first time analyzed previously classified and therefore inaccessible archival documents and newly published materials about the heroism of the soldiers of the Central Asian Military District, who took their rightful place in the ranks of the defenders of Moscow. At the end of 1941, 21 cavalry and 16 rifle divisions, 25 rifle brigades were formed in the Central Asian Military District. The entry of the Soviet Union into World War II dramatically increased the potential of progressive forces opposing fascism, as a country with great military and economic potential, with peoples having heroic traditions, entered the war.

Keywords: World War II, military formations, defense of Moscow, courage, Soviet People, Uzbek people

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Introduction

The Second World War of 1939–1945 was the largest conflict in the history of mankind, involving more than 62 countries of the world. Military operations were deployed in Europe, Asia, Africa and all oceans. Of the 110 million people were drafted into the armed forces, the total loss was 70 million. Of these, over 27 million died in battle [11:153].

The great Victory in the Second World War was, of course, achieved by the joint efforts of the peoples of the anti-Hitler coalition. Fighters from Central Asia also made their worthy contribution to the victory over fascism. Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghizs, Tajiks and Turkmens, like residents of other parts of the country, fought bravely against fascism.

Over 4 million people were drafted into military units from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan during the war years. About one and a half million fighters died of them, more than 780 thousand people were awarded orders and medals, including more than 1,000 people became Heroes of the Soviet Union, about 250 people became full cavaliers of the Order of Glory [11:5].

Victory was achieved through the efforts of all peoples, their unity, regardless of language and culture. And today, Victory Day in our countries remains a symbol of heroism and unity of fraternal peoples. I am sure that our peoples, protecting the memory of the great military and labor feat of their fathers and grandfathers, will jointly direct all their efforts to preserve the greatest value – a peaceful and prosperous life.

Celebrating the next anniversary of the Great Victory, we remember again and again the heroism of our people; analyze the lessons of that terrible war. Based on the study of the data sources, it can be argued that the contribution of the people of Uzbekistan to the Great Victory has not yet been fully studied. A lot of work has been done in recent years. First of all, previously classified and inaccessible archival documents and materials were opened to researchers. Cooperation with archival institutions, museums and foundations, scientists, historians, specialists, the public of the republics of the former Soviet Union and other foreign countries has intensified. During the Second World War, the Uzbeks fought on, risked their lives every minute and overcame difficulties. Today we have every reason to talk about the beginning of a new stage in the study of the history of the Second World War period. Thanks to the conducted scientific research, new important data on the participation of Uzbeks in the Second World War have been obtained today. The results of this work are widely covered in the media, in new books and albums. So, until now it was believed that out of 6 million 551 thousand people living in the republic at that time, about 1 million 500 thousand participated in the war. But, as the latest data shows,

...about 1 million 951 thousand people were mobilized from Uzbekistan to the front. This means that every third Uzbek has joined the fight against fascism with weapons in his hands. The fact that for so many years the names and destinies of about 451 thousand of

our compatriots who participated in fierce battles remained out of our attention, of course, cannot be considered fair¹.

At the same time, problems in the study of the history of the Second World War should be noted. Until now, for a number of objective and subjective reasons, many archival documents, personal files of generals, Heroes of the Soviet Union, and the role of military formations of the SAMD (Central Asian Military District) in the fighting near Moscow have not been studied. The study of the history of the Second World War will make it possible to shed more light on the past, provide a basis for studying modern social transformations, and analyze the patterns of development of the history of those years.

Many books have been published about the contribution of Uzbeks to victory: written by A.Y.Bezugolny, I.V.Bystrova, T.D.Juraev, G.K.Zhukov, Z.R.Ishankhodzhaeva, D.Z.Muriev, V.S.Murmantseva, M.A.Rakhimov, M.Ya.Sukhar, B.Shaposhnikov, and we note the materials of the international scientific conference "World War II in the history and memory of the peoples of Central Asia: events, participants, symbols" [1–14].

The topic of the feat of the Uzbeks, who served in the military formations of the Central Asian Military District and participated in defensive battles near Moscow, did not attract attention in scientific terms. This article attempts to highlight the participation of Uzbeks who contributed to the defense of Moscow.

To achieve the purpose of the study, the following tasks were set: to identify the role and significance of the military formations of the Central Asian Military District that participated in World War II, including in the hardest battles near Moscow; to analyze previously classified and inaccessible archival documents and newly published materials about the heroism of the soldiers of the Central Asian Military District, to restore the names of soldiers and officers of the Central Asian Military District, who participated in the Second World War.

Materials and methods

The author sought to identify a special aspect of the problem of the Second World War: the role and significance of the creation of military formations of the Central Asian Military District, which participated in defensive battles near Moscow.

The research materials are archival sources, published documents, eyewitness memoirs, statistical collections characterizing the role of the Central Asian Military District in the hardest defensive battles near Moscow.

The source base of the study was, first of all, the archival funds of the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, the Central State Administration of Uzbekistan, where

¹ Speech by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev at a solemn ceremony dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the Great Victory and the Day of Remembrance and Honors. Uzbekistan during the Second World War (Album): A book album. Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 2021:10.

the author for the first time analyzed previously classified and inaccessible archival documents and unpublished materials on the activities of the military formation of the Central Asian military district, which participated in defensive battles near Moscow in 1941–1942.

The variety of sources used determines the use of various methods of working with them, therefore, the author used the basic methodological principles and methods of historical science: the use of general scientific analysis and synthesis, the systematic method, the method of historical retrospect, chronological, comparative method, comparative analysis.

Results

The Battle for Moscow was the largest in the history of the Second World War. The Germans planned to take the capital in 10–12 weeks, even before the beginning of winter, the population was going to be destroyed or hijacked to Germany. Life in Moscow was supposed to stop, and the city itself was planned to be destroyed. To prevent these plans from being realized, the Soviet people had to make tremendous efforts. This battle became one of the largest in the Second World War, with more than 7 million people participating on both sides.

For comparison: 4.7 million participated in the border battles during the attack on the USSR, 4.3 million participated in the Battle for Leningrad, 3.6 million participated in the Battle for Stalingrad, 4 million participated in the Battle for Kursk, 3.5 million participated in the Berlin Operation, and 7.035 million were involved in the Battle for Moscow, which was 100 thousand more than the number of the entire allied group troops and the Wehrmacht on the Western Front by April 1, 1945². Moscow was defended for less than 7 months, 203 days and nights, from September 30, 1941 to April 20, 1942. Neither before nor after the Battle for Moscow, nor in any battle did such a number of troops participate. The operation to capture Moscow began on September 30, 1941 and was called "Typhoon". It was near Moscow that Hitler suffered his first serious defeat [12].

Hitler and his generals attached high priority to the capture of Moscow. "The capture of this city," the Barbarossa plan emphasized, "means decisive success from both the political and economic sides." Based on this, they concentrated the strongest grouping of troops in the Moscow direction – Army Group Center, which included more than 40% of all infantry formations and up to 75% of tank and motorized Divisions thrown at the Soviet Union [9:3].

Unconditionally confident of their imminent victory, the Nazis hoped that all this huge armored mass of troops, covered by powerful aircraft, like a hurricane of great destructive power – a Typhoon – would sweep away everything in its path and break into

² The Red Army is in the biggest battle in history. Guide. Moscow: Military Publishing House, 2007:3.

the capital, Moscow. It was hoped that Operation Typhoon would be a decisive operation on the Soviet-German front. However, as we know, the operation with the frightening name "Typhoon" failed. The German fascist troops in the fields of the Moscow region were defeated, which was an important historical event of the first year of the war and the first major defeat of the Nazis in World War II, forever debunking the legend of the invincibility of the German army created by fascist propaganda and finally burying enemy plans for a "lightning" war.

The Battle for Moscow changed the course of the war. Hitler faced the prospect of waging a long war, for which Germany was not ready. The outstanding commander of the Great Patriotic War, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, considering the course of the war, appreciated this battle in this way: "In the battle for Moscow, a solid foundation was laid for the subsequent defeat of Nazi Germany" [6:269–270].

Since 1941, units and subunits from Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the Caucasus, Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, formed on a national basis, began to join the active army. At the end of 1941, 21 Cavalry and 16 rifle Divisions, 25 rifle brigades were formed on the territory of only one Central Asian Military District (13:214). According to A.Y. Bezugolny, a total of 24 rifle Divisions, 47 rifle brigades, 35 Cavalry Divisions were formed in SAMD during 1941–1942, and in 1943 only 1 rifle and 2 mortar brigades [1:307].

The 389th, 12th, 162nd and 69th rifle Divisions, 21st and 44th Cavalry Divisions, 128th Guards Turkestan Mountain Rifle Division and other military formations were formed in Uzbekistan [7:27]. During the war, almost all of them were awarded military orders and began to bear the name of cities liberated from the fascists.

On November 13, 1941, Resolution № 894–SS "On the formation of national military formations", published by the State Defense Committee, it was instructed to form:

- in Uzbekistan 5 Cavalry Divisions and 9 special rifle brigades;
- in the Turkmen SSR 2 Cavalry Divisions and 2 special rifle brigades;
- in the Tajik SSR, 1 Cavalry Division and 2 special rifle brigades;
- Kazakh SSR 2 Cavalry Divisions and 2 special rifle brigades in the;
- in the Kyrgyz SSR 3 Cavalry Divisions.

The composition of the Divisions should be staffed by persons of local nationality, healthy, strong, fit for military service and not older than 40 years. The resolution also defined the composition of the units being formed, if possible from persons of local nationality [3]. The military formations of the Central Asian Military District, which were part of the Red Army, supported by all the people, despite the extremely unfavorable conditions, in defensive battles and battles drained the shock group of enemy troops and, going on a counteroffensive, dealt them a crushing blow.

The number of fighters and commanders of the Red Army who participated in the Moscow Battle as part of Divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, squadrons, Divisions, companies, batteries impressively characterizes the scale and scope of this greatest battle. Dispassionate figures cannot enliven the drama of the bloody battles of these formations and units on the ground and in the air, in single combat with enemy tanks and aircraft, but they help to understand how great the price of victory near Moscow is.

Thus, from November 1941 to March 1942, in addition to the existing military formations, 14 national military formations were additionally formed in Uzbekistan, fighters who showed genuine heroism at the front.

In Uzbekistan, were formed 89th, 90th, 91st, 92, 93rd, 94th, 95th, 96th, 97th special rifle brigades, as well as the 99th, 101st, 102nd, 103rd Cavalry Divisions (4). Responsibility for their organization was distributed among the regions of the republic. For example, the city of Tashkent and the Tashkent region were responsible for the formation of the 89th Infantry Brigade and the 99th Cavalry Division, the Bukhara region for the formation of the 91st Brigade and the 101st Cavalry Division. Ferghana region – 94th Brigade, Samarkand region – 90th Infantry Brigade and 100th Cavalry Division, Namangan region – 102nd Cavalry Division, Andijan region – 92nd Brigade and 103rd Cavalry Division, Karakalpakstan – for the formation of the 97th Brigade [3].

The costs of forming national military units were covered from local budgets and from the savings of the population. Fighters of the 90th and 94th Uzbek special rifle brigades took an active part in the historic battle of the Red Army near Stalingrad. Each of these brigades consisted of 4 rifle battalions, a communications battalion, a mortar and antitank Division, a reconnaissance company, a sapper company, a company of machine gunners and a sanitary company, as well as a trucking company.

The 94th Uzbek Special Rifle Brigade was formed in the city of Ferghana in 1941–1942. At first, the brigade participated in the defense of Moscow, then, in October 1942, in the Battle of Stalingrad. In November 1942, she broke through the enemy front near the city of Serafimovich on the Don River and took an active part in the encirclement, liquidation and capture of the German fascist group of Field Marshal Pauls' army near Stalingrad. Since January 1942, Captain Sabir Sabirovich Akhunjanov served in this brigade – first as a company commander, then as a staff officer.

Uzbek Divisions, like other national military formations in the Red Army, with the beginning of a cardinal turn of events in World War II, since 1943, gradually began to join other units of the Armed Forces. Many combat military units formed in the republic have passed a long and difficult heroic path from Moscow to Berlin.

By the autumn of 1941, the situation at the front was still developing in favor of the Germans. At that time, the enemy was trying to get closer to Moscow and was sure that he would take the city.

During the Battle for Moscow, troops from all over the country, including Uzbekistan, were deployed to help the defenders of the capital. Echelons with men and weapons were moving in a continuous stream towards the capital for its defense.

On December 5, 1941, a radical turning point occurred in the battles near Moscow – the Soviet troops went on the offensive. In January 1942, the German Fascist troops were defeated and driven back. Thus, the immediate threat to Moscow was eliminated.

Our compatriots from Uzbekistan also took a worthy place in the ranks of the defenders of Moscow. For example, the soldiers of the 316th infantry Division formed in the Central Asian Military District demonstrated incredible courage and heroism. About 180 cadets of Tashkent military and military-political schools formed the core of the Division's

command and political center. The Division was commanded by Major General I.V. Panfilov.

Panfilov members Abdulla Togaev and Mamadali Madaminov killed 35 fascists on the Volokolamsk highway during fierce battles. The soldiers of the 5th company of the Division under the command of Ikrom Jalilov firmly held the defensive positions of the platoon during the heaviest battles. 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 39th, 40th special brigades staffed by cadets from Central Asian military schools participated in the defense of Moscow. The 258th Infantry, 44th and 21st (later 14th Guards) Cavalry Divisions formed in Uzbekistan also took an active part in fierce battles. Among those awarded the medal "For the Defense of Moscow" are 1,753 fighters from Uzbekistan [3].

The group of selected enemy troops rushing to Moscow surpassed our forces defending the capital. Reaching the outskirts of Moscow and the proximity of the desired goal gave the enemy troops new strength to achieve this goal. But the powerful onslaught of the enemy hordes crashed against the fortitude and courage of the defenders of Moscow. The enemy was not only broken in the most stubborn fierce battles, but was driven back from the capital. The ferocity of these battles, the steadfastness and courage of the fighters and commanders of the Red Army, and mass heroism are evidenced by the transformation of dozens of formations and units that distinguished themselves during this confrontation into guard's formations and units³.

Table 1. Formations of the SAMD (Central Asian Military District) sent from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to strengthen the troops which participated in the Moscow Battle (October 1941–April 1942)

Nº	Military unit number	Place of formation (military districts, fronts)	When were formed	Date of arrival at the front	In which military unit did they operate
Arrived in October 1941.					
1	312nd Infantry Division	SAMD, Aktobe	July 1941	6 October	43rd Army
2	312th Infantry Division	SAMD, Alma-Ata	July 1941	14 October	16th Army
3	238th Infantry Division	SAMD, Termez, Kerky	Май 1941	16 October	49th Army
Arrived in November 1941.					
4	57th Cavalry Division	SAMD, Ferghana	Сентябрь 1941	5 December	1st Guards Cavalry Corps
5	83rd Cavalry Division	SAMD, Samarkand	July 1941	9 December	61st Army
Arrived in January 1942.					
6	391st Infantry Division	SAMD, Alma-Ata	September-October 1941	22 January	3rd Shock Army
Arrived in February 1942.					
7	385th Infantry Division	SAMD, Frunze (Bishkek)	September-October 1941	1 February	50th Army

Source: The Red Army in the biggest battle of the History. The Guide⁴.

³ The Red Army is in the biggest battle in history. Guide. Moscow: Military Publishing House, 2007. P. 6.

⁴ Ibid

The Moscow operation unfolded over a vast area, the boundaries of which can be considered:

- in the north – the Volga River, from Kalyazin to Rzhev;
- in the west is the road railway line Rzhev – Vyazma – Bryansk (to Dyatkovo);
- in the south there is a conditional line Ryazhsk, Gorbachevo station, Dyatkovo;
- in the east – Kalinin, Ryazan, Ryazhsk.

The distance in a straight line: from Kalinin to Moscow – 160 km; from Moscow to Tula – 170 km; from Vyazma to Ryazan – 350 km. The surface of the territory where the military operations took place is a vast plain covered with a number of small flat hills and ridges of small hills. There are lowlands that usually stretch along rivers. Forests cover about 25% of the entire surface and are located mainly in the northeastern and central parts.

The average temperature for Moscow is November -3°, December -8°, January -11°. However, the winter of 1941/1942 was very severe, with a large snow cover. The average temperature this winter was as follows: in November -5°, in December -12°, in January -19°. In some periods, frosts in January reached -35-40°. The thickness of the snow cover reached 50-65 cm [14:9].

The communication routes were quite well developed. The most dense network of railways, highways and dirt roads, as well as a large number of waterways, is located in the middle part of the territory. The central hub of the railway network not only for the Western Front, but also for the entire European part of the Union is Moscow, which is approached from different sides by 11 railway lines with a total capacity (peacetime) of over 500 trains per day. The highway network has mainly a radial outline (just like the railway network) centered in the city of Moscow. From here, the most important railways diverge in the directions to Leningrad, Warsaw, Kharkov, Voronezh, Gorky, etc. The Moscow–Smolensk highway is a powerful highway.

Thus, Moscow is the most important hub of railways, highways, dirt roads, waterways and air routes of the former Soviet Union. Such an important political and military importance of Moscow largely determined the nature of the operations of the Western Front.

It is appropriate now to recall those tragic and heroic days when all the peoples of the former USSR rose up to defend their homeland, realizing the enormous danger that German fascism with its misanthropic ideology carried with it. The entry of the Soviet Union into World War II dramatically increased the potential of progressive forces opposing fascism, as a country with a huge territory and great military and economic potential, with peoples having a great history and heroic traditions, entered the war.

It is necessary to pay attention to the direct participants in the hostilities, soldiers and officers drafted from the Central Asian Military District. The future Hero of the Soviet Union, Tashkent Salih Umarov, received his baptism of fire in the battles near Moscow. After graduating from officer school with the rank of second lieutenant, he was appointed a platoon commander in one of the units of the Red Army defending the capital [5:427–428]. The soldiers of S. Umarov's platoon showed courage and heroism in the battles near the village of Bobrovo and the city of Yelnya. The 35th infantry brigade at the front was also

called the “Uzbek brigade”, because most of its fighters consisted of Uzbeks. This brigade took part in the military parade on Red Square in Moscow on November 7, 1941 and directly from the parade entered the battle at Lugovaya station. S. Umarov was awarded 2 Orders of Lenin, the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree, 2 Orders of the Patriotic War of the 2nd degree, the medal “For Bravery”. The title of Hero was awarded on May 31, 1945 for skillful leadership of the battle and personal courage⁵.

In the battles on the outskirts of the capital, Kayum Karimov, the former chief artist of the Namangan Theater, proved himself to be a skilled officer. Working as the chief of communications of the rifle regiment, Karimov provided excellent radiotelephone communication in the regiment. During a fierce battle near Moscow in October 1941, when the commander of one of the battalions was killed, Karimov assumed command and led the struggle of the battalion’s personnel. The onslaught of the enemy in the battalion’s area of operations was successfully repelled. In the battles near Moscow, the communist journalist Nemat Abdullayev died a brave death. He took the first fight in November 1941 as part of the 54th Cavalry Regiment. In several battles, he destroyed many Nazis. But the fighting continued with increasing ferocity. A group of soldiers, which included Abdullayev, defended the village of Barantsevo, an important node of resistance in the Moscow direction. The fascists tried their best to take over this village. The Soviet soldiers stood to the death: “We will die, but we will not miss the enemy,” was their decision. A bloody battle broke out, but the enemy could not advance a single step. Both sides suffered heavy losses. Abdullayev was seriously wounded, he was sent to the hospital, but the wound turned out to be fatal. For bravery and bravery shown in the battles near Moscow, Nemat Abdullayev was awarded the second Order of the Red Star. Nemat’s military friends buried him with military honors in the very village of Barantsevo, for which the glorious warrior from Uzbekistan fought to the end⁶.

In the ranks of the fighters, commanders and political workers of the 258th, which became the 12th Guards Division, there were 150 people awarded orders and medals of the USSR. Among them are Miromanov, Dzhumabekov, Odinaev, B.Urazov, G.Talipov, M.Bektemirov, V.Kashapov and many other warriors⁷.

There were girls among the defenders of Moscow. We can proudly call Zebo Ganieva. She is Uzbek on her mother’s side and Azerbaijani on her father’s side. In 1940 she enrolled in the acting department of GITIS. In the first days of the war, Ganieva, like hundreds of thousands of Moscow students, appealed to the military enlistment office with a request to send her to the front. The girl’s request was granted, and a few days later she was sent to short-term shooting courses. Here Zebo mastered a machine gun, learned how to shoot a sniper rifle, and got acquainted with the art of reconnaissance. In October 1941 she became a rifleman of the 3rd Moscow Communist Division. Here the girl perfected her sniper skills. In the spring of 1942, the Division arrived at the

⁵ Award documents. Available from: https://pamyatnaroda.ru/heroes/podvigchelovek_nagrazhdenie150033478/

⁶ The Book of Memory of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Tashkent: Encyclopedia, 1995. P. 534.

⁷ Ibid. P. 112–113.

Northwestern Front and joined active hostilities [10:83]. She was a radio operator and went behind the front line 16 times as part of the group, then defended Moscow as a submachine gunner on a tank, and then became a sniper. The whole country learned about her exploits – her photos and a message that she had destroyed 20 enemies with a sniper rifle were published in all central and local newspapers. Although in one of the conversations she said: “Tahir, I killed 129 fascists”⁸. At the same time, she always remained just a woman. For example, she said: “... when I found out that my nose was injured, I fainted. I was afraid that the shard had disfigured my face”⁹. In general, in the battles on the threshold of Moscow, Uzbek snipers destroyed: Iskhakov – 354 Nazi soldiers, Abubekov – 229 officers, Yusupov – 132 and Madaminov – 123 fascist soldiers and officers. For bravery in the battles on the threshold of Moscow, 1,753 Uzbek fighters were awarded the Moscow Defense Medal.

Among the formations defending Moscow was the 4th Cavalry Division formed in Tashkent. Representatives of Tashkent, Samarkand, Ferghana and other regions of Uzbekistan fought in it. Said Niyazov, a teacher from Shakhrisabz, a future knight of the Order of Glory of all three degrees, also participated in the defense of Moscow. During the bloody battles for Moscow, the names of representatives of the Uzbek people Kurban Atayev and Aminjon Rakhmanov also became known. Kurban was a machine gunner of the 1st squadron of the 52nd Cavalry Regiment of the 14th Cavalry Division. For his excellent command of weapons, skillful use of a machine gun, for courage and fearlessness in battle, he was awarded the Order of Glory of the III degree. A.Rakhmanov was an experienced telephone operator in the same 52nd Cavalry regiment. His telephone was constantly in good condition, continuous communication with the units was reliably ensured. Rakhmanov was awarded the Order of the Red Star. The Komsomol gunner from Namangan, Abdusattar Rakhimov, became famous in the battles for Moscow. When he joined the Red Army, he swore an oath to his father: “Father, I am going to war to defend our home, our city, our republic, our country. It is an honorable thing to defend the honor of the Motherland. And you can be sure that your son Abdusattar will not let you down.” He fulfilled his promise to his parents and returned home from the front as a Hero of the Soviet Union. Arifjan Mirzayev bravely defended the capital from the enemy. He was appointed head of the chemical service of the 520th Division. As an officer who knows his job well, Mirzaev has repeatedly inspired fighters to feats by personal example. He later participated in many battles and liberated Smolensk, Vitebsk, Minsk, Bobruisk, Bialystok, Warsaw¹⁰.

⁸ From the memoirs of the famous Azerbaijani artist Tahir Salakhov. Available from: www.1news.az

⁹ Ganieva Z. Evening Moscow, newspaper. 1943. May 6, №105.

¹⁰ Ibid.

Conclusion

Many of the above data indicate that fighters of different nationalities from the Central Asian Military District took an active part in the defense of Moscow and made a huge contribution to the Victory. However, this topic requires extensive study. Coverage of the activities of soldiers and officers of the Central Asian Military District who participated in the defense of Moscow is becoming increasingly important. In recent years, the study of archival documents related to the Second World War has intensified; new research and materials of oral history have been published. For historians, an important task is to determine the name of each hero, to consolidate courage and feat in historical memory. It is necessary to study the documents of the fighters who participated in the defense of Moscow, personal archival funds, that is, information stored by the descendants and relatives of the fighters, and interview them.

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Japan's Foreign Policy Priorities during the Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga Period: "Restoring Diplomacy and Security"

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Abstract. The article analyzes Japan's foreign policy during the period of Yoshihide Suga's activity as Prime Minister (2020-2021): the specifics of diplomacy and security activities, the common interests of Japan with other countries, the specifics of rapprochement and forms of interaction with different countries. The results of Japan's foreign policy in Northeast Asia in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, Japan's military cooperation within the quadrilateral alliance "Quad" are presented.

Keywords: foreign policy, diplomacy, Russian-Japanese relations, Suga Yoshihide, Japan, Vietnam, China, USA, Russia

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Introduction

Yoshihide Suga came to power after the resignation of S. Abe, who headed Japan from December 2012 to September 2020, and he continued the course of his predecessor's foreign policy, presenting himself as a follower of Shinzo Abe¹. He stated his priorities concerning foreign policy at the press-conference right after taking office:

In the field of diplomacy and security, given the significant complication of Japan's international standing, it is necessary to develop a policy based on the functioning of the alliance between Japan and the United States. In order to protect national interests and build sustainable relations with neighbouring countries, including China and Russia, we will contribute to the implementation of the strategy of free and open Indo-Pacific region. Striving for a full settlement of post-war diplomatic disputes, we will do everything in our power to resolve the problem of abductions (of Japanese citizens by the DPRK special services)².

Yoshihide Suga became the first leader of the country in almost eight years to form the cabinet of people he was personally acquainted with, hoping to follow the course set by his predecessor Shinzo Abe. His reputation as a "die-hard lieutenant" who managed bureaucrats and promoted politics prompted observers to describe him as a "problem solver", "Sugalin" and "warming the perch"³. Professor of the Keio University (Policy Management Faculty) Ichiro Shimizu noted that it was during the 2020 elections in Japan that Yoshihide Suga's image as a "commoner" spread widely. Yoshihide Suga was a clerk who supported the Prime Minister Abe's administration for a long time, while his opponents, Fumio Kishida and Shigeru Ishiba, unlike him, were hereditary legislators [17:87].

During his premiership, Yoshihide Suga faced both traditional problems such as a low birth rate in the country, and unusual ones, such as the restoration of the economy affected by COVID-19, hosting the Olympic Games in the pandemic time, as well as solving problems related to geopolitical tensions and rivalry between the United States and China. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong expressed his concern that the countries in Southeast Asia, including Singapore, being at the intersection of the interests of major powers, may find themselves caught in the middle and be forced to make difficult choices [7:157].

¹ Rich M. Japan's Next Prime Minister Emerges from Behind the Curtain. *The New York Times*. 09.04.2023. Available from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/14/world/asia/japan-prime-minister-yoshihide-suga-bio.html?searchResultPosition=1>

² Taisuke Abiru. Yoshihide Suga's Foreign Policy Track: Between the US and China. Available from: <https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/vneshnepoliticheskii-trek-yesikhide-sugi/>

³ Japan PM Suga gets a new nickname mocking his Stalin-like authoritarian manner. Daisuke Nohara, Political News Department, January 8, 2021 (Mainichi, Japan) 04.04.2023. Available from: <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20210108/p2a/00m/0na/021000c#:~:text=This%20image%20obtained%20in%20October,dictator%20of%20the%20Soviet%20Union>

The article presents the analysis of the materials on the stated issue published in Russian, Japanese, and English, which identified the research discourse available on the scientific problem. The investigation made valuable additions to the scientific research which has already been carried out on the issue adding to them the elements of its scientific novelty and also helped to identify the format of Japan's interaction with other countries, the features and areas of Yoshihide Suga's foreign policy activities as the Prime Minister of Japan.

For this purpose, the authors of this research turned to works on similar issues, and rely on the conclusions drawn in those works. Thus, the article by D.A.Rozevich "Challenges and Opportunities: Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and Japan which he will have to manage" [9] presents the reasons for Shinzo Abe's departure from the post of Prime Minister, examines the activities of Yoshihide Suga before the assumption of the post of Prime Minister, and also describes the problems that he is certain to face with as the new Prime Minister within the framework of his new position. The article considers the perceived expectations from the work of Yoshihide Suga, but due to the fact that the results of new Prime Minister's work were not known at that time yet, it is quite problematic to evaluate Yoshihide Suga's work in full at the moment. The article by A.A.Kireeva "Strategic Partnership between Japan and Vietnam: interests and constraints" [6] examines the relations between Japan and Vietnam, describes key trends in relations between the countries, identifies areas of convergence of interests and limitations in the processes of rapprochement between Japan and Vietnam. The article by A.S.Berdova "A strong hawk hides its claws: substantiating the vectors of Japan's foreign policy course development" examines the change in the understanding of Japan's geopolitics during the premiership of Yoshihide Suga and whether this understanding was going to be implemented in practice. Much attention is given to the relationship between Japan and the United States, comparing the foreign policy course under Shinzo Abe and the expected results of the foreign policy he conducted. We should also note D.V.Streltsov's article "Russian-Japanese relations after Abe: a new stress test?" [10], devoted to the analysis of qualitative changes in Russian-Japanese relations after Shinzo Abe in connection with the transformation of the international political environment and domestic political developments of both countries. With Yoshihide Suga's determination and his statements about the need to solve the problem who the northern territories belong to, unwillingness to pass the problem along to the next generation, we must admit that certain expectations were formed with his coming to power.

The conducted research, based on the conclusions already made by political analysts and other researchers, allowed us to obtain scientific results in accordance with the stated goal: to answer the question: "Does the determination of the new Prime Minister really correlate with the results of his work, is it possible to achieve the stated goals in relation to Russia?" Considerable attention is paid to the responses of Yoshihide Suga's government to the challenges he had to face. The authors have also raised the question: did Japan succeed, under the leadership of Yoshihide Suga, in changing qualitatively its approach to the implementation of foreign policy and is there a possibility that the country will move to a completely new understanding of its geopolitics?

Materials and methods

The texts of Yoshihide Suga's speeches and reports as the Prime Minister published on the website of the Office of the Prime Minister of Japan, including the political speech of Prime Minister Suga during the 203rd session of the Parliament, were used as the main information and historical sources for the research. Stylistic and linguistic analysis of the speech made it possible to assess priorities and state interests, which we came to by analyzing the content and modality of the text. The usage of common scientific methods of analysis and synthesis made it possible to study the basic documents published by the Office of the Prime Minister of Japan to identify changes in Japan's foreign policy.

Japanese media materials were also involved: articles published in the oldest English-language Japanese newspaper, The Japan Times, and other electronic publications.

To assess the level of public support, the data from a survey conducted by the largest Japanese news agencies Kyodo Tsushin, Yomiuri Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun were used.

The method of systematization was used to understand the consistency and effectiveness of Yoshihide Suga's activities as the Prime Minister of Japan.

The SWOT analysis method was also used to assess internal and external factors that could and did influence the development of Japan during his premiership. This allowed us to consider the strengths and weaknesses of its policy, opportunities and threats.

Results

In the course of the study, we conducted a SWOT analysis of the content of Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga's speech at the 203rd session of Parliament, published on the website of the Prime Minister's Office⁴

Let's note the strengths of Yoshihide Suga's speech to the parliament:

the Prime Minister's desire to contribute to solving global problems (the use of renewable energy sources and the promotion of nuclear policy, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to zero by 2050);

willingness to set ambitious goals for the country (Japan's entry into the era of 100-year life expectancy);

Yoshihide Suga publicly fixed his position on reforming the policy of promoting regions (including through the development of the tourism industry, "create a dynamic region", the "Furusato Nozei" system);

understanding the importance of improving laws to support the restoration of livelihoods for the victims of natural disasters;

⁴ 第二百三回国会における菅内閣総理大臣所信表明演説 [Political speech of Prime Minister Suga at the 203rd session of Parliament]. 16.04.2023. Available from: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/99_suga/statement/2020/1026shoshinhyomei.html

- understanding that the infectious disease highlighted various problems, such as delays in digitization of public services and the private sector, as well as an imbalance in supply chains;

- understanding the importance of the well-being of the rural population, the need to create a new flow of people from cities to rural areas;

- Yoshihide Suga insisted on the need for decisive measures to counteract the decline in the birth rate;

Weak aspects of Yoshihide Suga's speech to parliament (as we see them):

the Prime Minister positively assessed the activities of the tourism industry and investments in this area, at the same time, the spread of the new coronavirus contributed to the risk of the increase of infection in society;

- the Prime Minister understood the need to participate in the exchange between people and the influx of people from abroad, but there arose the question of compliance with quarantine measures;

- Yoshihide Suga was determined to further develop relations of trust and cooperation with the United States and other countries, as well as to develop active diplomacy, including solving the problem of the northern territories ownership and signing a peace treaty with Russia, but at the same time the format of meetings with other countries should be of a significantly limited nature.

We need to note the opportunities for the development of Japan that the Prime Minister saw during his tenure:

- further effective implementation of "Abenomics" created new drivers for the economy, respectively, the promotion of further reforms in this direction was expected;

- a proposal to take the necessary measures and continue to closely monitor economic trends in Japan and abroad, including the impact of the new coronavirus pandemic on the economy, in order to minimize the consequences in the future;

- readiness to ensure national security, consideration of the Japanese-American alliance as the basis of peace, prosperity and freedom in the Indo-Pacific region and in the international community;

- continuation of Japan's social policy pursued earlier by Shinzo Abe (promotion of efforts to increase healthy life expectancy through prevention and health promotion, provision of nursing staff and increased productivity in care facilities).

We will also note some threats and dangers for Japan that followed from the Prime Minister's speech:

- the Head of the State understood the inevitability to continue to take some measures in manual control mode;

- it was not clear whether the Prime Minister understood the media's concern about the Olympic and Paralympic Games in Tokyo.

In general, the Prime Minister's speech to Parliament can be called a success. It inspired hope for the Japanese for their security, stability and focus on the solution of emerging problems; the Prime Minister demonstrated clear understanding of the challenges facing the society. At the same time, some aspects of Japan's development were

only outlined, and methods for achieving the goals were not identified. The Prime Minister's speech demonstrated his understanding of the multi-vector nature of the Government's activities, the problems he marked were quite relevant for Japan, and the reform-oriented course was of great importance.

At the same time, some of the threats identified by the authors during the SWOT-analysis are confirmed by the surveys conducted by the media. So Suga's statements about the Olympic Games contradicted public opinion: an NHK poll from December 2020 showed that the majority of Japanese would prefer the Olympic Games to be postponed (31%) or even cancelled (32%)⁵. A later Kyodo poll showed that these figures rose to 44.8% and 35.3%, respectively, which means that 80% of its participants did not want the Olympic Games in Tokyo to take place, as expected, in the summer of 2021⁶. Let's add to this the budget of the Olympic Games, which was further increased due to the delay of the Games, which made them the most expensive Summer Olympic Games in history [4:67]. This contrasts with the fact that most of the funding for the Olympics was state money (officially about \$8.7 billion, but in fact probably much more). As Shimada Toshio claimed, according to the analysis of NHK opinion polls over the past almost two years there were observed "fluctuations in attitudes towards politics", in particular Suga Yoshihide led the fight against coronavirus, the measures he took demonstrated political and administrative readiness, but on the other hand, these measures were not always considered reasonable, and the author emphasizes that this reality is an important lesson for the future (13:26). Also, as a threat, the Head of State took the inevitability to continue to take some measures in the manual control mode. What was revealed as part of the SWOT analysis is indirectly confirmed by Kenichi Ogura, the director of Itomos Research Institute: Japanese vaccination was initially postponed, so trying to compensate for the delay, Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga surprised others by announcing that he would increase the number of vaccinations per day to 1 million, which was about five times more than at that time (19:28).

The first challenge Yoshihide Suga faced during his tenure as Prime Minister was the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the conclusion of T.E.Gorchakova and O.I.Kazakov, 2020 laid the foundation to the "post-coronavirus era", which is only beginning to form in different countries and manifest itself in various forms of "distance" life and non-contact interaction [3:61]. This circumstance was the reason for Yoshihide Suga's first official visit to Vietnam in October 2020. Traditionally in Japan, Prime Ministers chose to visit countries such as the United States and China right after taking office, but due to restrictions in the availability of these traditional countries for a visit, the tradition was interrupted. But Du Ying, in the article "The analysis on the trend of Japan's economic diplomatic policy after Yoshihide Suga came to power" noted that Yoshihide Suga chose Southeast Asia for his first visit instead of the United States, not only because of the restrictions associated with the

⁵ How TV Coverage on COVID-19 Was Affected by the 2020 Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games. 12.04.2023. Available from: https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/english/reports/pdf/report_20220301_6_01.pdf.

⁶ An Assessment of Japan's Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga: Which Path is he taking? 13.04.2023. Available from: <https://eias.org/publications/op-ed/an-assessment-of-japans-prime-minister-yoshihide-suga-which-path-is-he-taking/>

pandemic, but mostly as the opportunity to declare the “economically oriented” nature of Japan’s foreign economic activity. Yoshihide Suga would insist on creating a strong bilateral alliance with the United States, while avoiding “disconnection” with China [15:549].

The visit to Vietnam was a symbolic event. As A.A.Kireeva noted in her works, Japan attaches great importance to the development of joint cooperation to jointly overcome the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, to the expansion of economic relations (against the background of Japan’s diversification of its production networks), to the ability to export the patrol aircraft, radars and other types of weapons and military technologies to Vietnam, which became topics for negotiations between the leaders of the two countries [6:10].

His predecessor as Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, made about 80 diplomatic visits, actively built his personal relations with the heads of other countries, and did a lot for Japan to be positively perceived by the world community. According to Ming Shan Wu, Yoshihide Suga chose as his main strategy the continuation of the course laid down by Shinzo Abe [16:33]. Tokyo continued close relations with Washington even after Shinzo Abe left the post of Prime Minister. The focus on achieving positive cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and preserving the alliance between the two countries is proclaimed as the foundation of peace in the Asia-Pacific region. As Yoshihide Suga declared himself, maintaining stability in the country’s foreign policy, as well as the course started by his predecessor, is his main goal⁷.

According to the conclusion of M.A.Butrimova, the COVID-19 pandemic had a huge impact on the international community, many meetings and events had to be postponed or cancelled, but this did not prevent the Japanese Prime Minister from holding a meeting with the US. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on October 6, 2020. The goal pursued at the meeting was to get acquainted with the new leaders of the country. Both sides confirmed the continuation of the previous course to strengthen both bilateral and regional relations, against the background of China’s increasing influence [2:108]. In addition, one of the most important events during Yoshihide Suga’s premiership was his participation in the meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”), which includes the United States, Japan, India and Australia. The quadrilateral “Quad” format plays an important role in maintaining regional security, both from the point of solving the counter-terrorism tasks and from the standpoint of containing the growing might of the PRC [14:7]. This issue was considered in detail in the context of Japan’s national security in D. V. Streltsov’s article “Will Japan become a “normal” country? The temptations and risks of the military power status”: as the author concludes, this event only confirms that the Japanese security strategy is increasingly oriented not towards a bilateral paradigm, but a multilateral paradigm and one cannot disagree with this [12:183]. In addition, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga stated several times that he intended to adhere to Shinzo Abe’s policy on armaments, namely, to slowly but surely increase the military power of the state, gradually expanding the powers of the Self-Defense Forces, increasing both quantitative

⁷ 第二百三回国会における菅内閣総理大臣所信表明演説 [Political speech of the Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga at the 203rd session of Parliament]. 16.04.2023. Available from: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/99_suga/statement/2020/1026shoshinhyomei.html

and qualitative indicators of weapons⁸. This correlates with the results of the study carried out by A.N.Panov and V.V.Nelidov: reacting to the military-political situation in Northeast Asia which is undergoing significant changes, characterized, among other things, by the collapse of the system of unipolar dominance of the United States, and seeking to ensure its own security, official Tokyo is taking a wide range of steps in military-political sphere. Of course, the Japanese-American alliance still remains as the basis of Tokyo’s course in this area and, most likely, will remain so for the foreseeable future [8:88].

Japan has very difficult relations with neighbouring countries, namely, China, South Korea, North Korea and Russia. Lee Hsien Loong confirmed in the article “The Asian Century is in danger” that the relations with Russia were especially important for Abe, he made unprecedented efforts, but the willingness to radically change the position on the territorial issue (moving away from the demands to return four islands at once) did not meet any enthusiasm from the Russian side, and this caused rejection by the Americans [7:183]. Also, Aoi Yoshi, considering the positions publicly expressed by Japan and Russia, admitted that it is difficult to foresee the course of negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and Russia, including the issue of the northern territories [18:11]. A similar view is taken by D.V.Streltsov. In his opinion, the territorial dispute and the absence of the basic agreement on bilateral relations are likely to serve as an obstacle to cooperation for a long time. Nevertheless, Russia and Japan have an extensive sphere of common interests in the international political sphere, which can become the ground for further dialogue. Both countries fully understand the insufficiency and fragility of the mechanisms for ensuring international security that have developed in East Asia. Moscow and Tokyo are both interested in solving the nuclear problem of the Korean peninsula and in strengthening the non-proliferation regime there, in easing international tensions over territorial conflicts in the South China and East China Seas, in jointly combating terrorism, crime and maritime piracy, and coordinating efforts to counter unconventional threats [11:79].

Relations between Japan and Russia have undergone certain changes since Shinzo Abe. It seems that the Japanese leadership after S. Abe did not consider relations with Russia as an important priority. Yoshihide Suga never met with the Russian leader, limiting himself to telephone conversations. On September 29, 2020, a telephone conversation took place between V.Putin and Y.Suga. Commenting on this event, the Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan Kato Katsunobu noted that

“...the course aimed at solving the territorial problem without passing it on to the next generations and concluding a peace treaty remains unchanged. The “Northern Territories” are islands to which the sovereignty of Japan extends, and the issue of the ownership of the four islands is the subject of negotiations for a peace treaty”⁹

⁸ The Self-Defense Forces continue to strengthen their potential. [Electronic resource] // Red Star / Available from: <http://redstar.ru/sily-samooborony-prodolzhayut-ukreplyat-svoj-potentsial>

⁹ Walker J. & Azuma H. (2020). Shinzo Abe’s Unfinished Deal with Russia. War on the Rocks, 11 September. 04.04.2023. Available from: <https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/shinzo-abetes-unfinished-deal-with-russia/>

On October 26, 2020, Mr. Suga Yoshihide said:

"I will strive to develop the entire complex of Japanese-Russian relations, including the conclusion of a peace treaty with Russia, through a sincere exchange of views between the leaders"¹⁰.

Thus, unlike Shinzo Abe, Yoshihide Suga treated Japanese-Russian relations with great scepticism, did not consider this area an important priority. Therefore, we should agree with the D.V.Streltsov's conclusion, who characterized Russian-Japanese relations after Shinzo Abe, that with his resignation in September 2020, the achievements of "personal diplomacy" based on close relations between the two leaders ceased to work. The appearance of new prime ministers in Japan meant that relations with them had to start almost from scratch, despite the experience of interaction during the Shinzo Abe era (Suga Yoshihide held the post of General Secretary of the Cabinet of Ministers under him, and Kishida Fumio held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2012-2017) [10:124]. This is confirmed by A.S.Berdova: from 2007 to 2020, with a short break, Shinzo Abe rigidly and single-handedly pursued his own political course, but now Japan is once again entering the era of "revolving doors", when factions within the ruling party will agree on a regular change of leader, thereby ensuring the changeability of power within the elites, while maintaining the leading the positions of the Liberal Democratic Party. Accordingly, one should not expect such a leader as Suga to conduct a bright and independent foreign policy and qualitative changes in the course. Even the ruling party of Japan itself will not allow this [1:93].

Conclusion

Based on the analysis of the content of Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga's speech at the 203rd session of Parliament, we came to the conclusion that, in general, the Prime Minister's speech to Parliament can be called successful. It gave the Japanese people hope for their security, stability and focus on solving emerging problems; the Prime Minister demonstrated understanding of the challenges facing the society. At the same time, some aspects of Japan's development were only outlined, but the methods to achieve these goals were not disclosed. Yoshihide Suga's speech reveals his understanding of the multi-vector nature of the Government's activities, the problems he identified were quite relevant for Japan at those times, and the course reforms were of great importance. However, understanding the actual tasks, with the absence of specific tools for solving the latter, did not lead his government to the expected results. The hosting of the Olympic Games in the coronavirus pandemic was accompanied by a number of difficulties, including disapproval from the local population, who advocated the cancellation of such a major event. This

¹⁰ Prime Minister Kishida's keynote speech at the 205th session of Parliament. 04.04.2023. Available from: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/100_kishida/statement/2021/1008shoshinhyomei.html

contrasted to the fact that most of the Olympics funding was state money (officially about \$8.7 billion, but in fact, probably much more)¹¹.

Answering the question: "Did the determination of the new Prime Minister really correlate with the results of his work, were his methods to achieve the stated goals in relation to Russia working out?" we can conclude: of course, Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga was determined to solve the problem. This is confirmed by his words from his speech in Parliament: "With Russia, through a sincere exchange of views between the leaders, I will strive to develop the entire complex of Japanese-Russian relations, including the conclusion of a peace treaty"¹². The relations with Russia were also particularly important for Abe: he made unprecedented efforts in this regard. And Yoshihide Suga did not want to lose what he had previously achieved. At the same time, relations between Japan and Russia have undergone certain changes since Shinzo Abe. Yoshihide Suga never met with the Russian leader, limiting himself to telephone conversations. The analysis of works on similar issues confirms that with the resignation of Shinzo Abe, Russian-Japanese relations are undergoing particular changes, and the coming of new Prime Ministers in Japan meant that relations with them should be started almost from scratch, despite the experience of interaction between the leaders in the Abe era. While Shinzo Abe almost single-handedly pursued his own hard-line political course, nowadays, with the fractions within the ruling party agreeing on a regular change of a leader, thereby ensuring the changeability of power within the elites, one should not expect a leader like Suga to conduct a brilliant and independent foreign policy or qualitative changes of the course. Thus, it can be concluded that despite all the determination to continue the line the former Prime Minister started in relation to Russia, it was not possible for Yoshihide Suga to achieve the stated goals.

The authors could also answer the question: "Was Japan, under the leadership of Yoshihide Suga, able to qualitatively change its approach to the implementation of foreign policy and is there a possibility that Japan will move to a completely new understanding of its geopolitics?" As part of the foreign policy course, the COVID-19 pandemic made a huge impact on the international community, many meetings and events had to be postponed or cancelled, but despite this, Yoshihide Suga sought to maintain relations with foreign partners. He set himself to continue the course started by Shinzo Abe, which became his main strategy. According to the Prime Minister, to maintain stability in the foreign policy of the country and develop the political line which his predecessor started was his main goal¹³. The Prime Minister held several meetings during the official visit to Vietnam in October 2020, following which the issues of developing joint cooperation to overcome the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, expanding economic ties (with Japan diversifying

¹¹ Senior IOC member says he's not sure Tokyo Games will happen. 13.04.2023. Available from: <https://apnews.com/article/yoshihide-suga-tokyo-coronavirus-pandemic-2020-tokyo-olympics-japan-cc0ff909fc55074063a736d042dac9a8>

¹² Prime Minister Kishida's keynote speech at the 205th session of Parliament. 04.04.2023. Available from: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/100_kishida/statement/2021/1008shoshinhyomei.html

¹³ 第二百三回国会における菅内閣総理大臣所信表明演説 [Political speech of Prime Minister Suga at the 203rd session of Parliament]. 16.04.2023. Available from: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/99_suga/statement/2020/1026shoshinhyomei.html

its production networks) and the possibility of arms exports were discussed. In October 2020, the Prime Minister had a meeting with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, where the parties confirmed their wish to continue the previous course to strengthen both bilateral and regional relations, against the backdrop of China's increasingly growing influence. In addition, one of the most important events during Yoshihide Suga's premiership was his participation in the meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue ("Quad"), which includes the United States, India and Australia besides Japan. At the same time, Japan maintained quite strained relations with neighbouring countries, namely, China, South Korea, North Korea and Russia. The opinion of some experts that Yoshihida Suga qualitatively changed his approach to the implementation of foreign policy was not confirmed. We stated that his choice was to continue the political course laid down by Shinzo Abe, but at the same time Yoshihida Suga was limited by certain circumstances, with the COVID-19 pandemic as one of the main obstacles.

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The History of International Relations in the Legacy of the Soviet Historian Vladimir M. Khvostov (1905–1972)

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Abstract. In the article, based on a large number of archival documents, some of which were first put into scientific circulation, the research activities and problems of scientific research by V.M.Khvostov are considered. The author analyzed two main directions in the work of the scientist: the history of diplomacy and international relations; problems of general and national history (mainly the events of world wars). The contribution of V.M.Khvostov to the study of this issue is determined, his creative biography is considered as one of the models of the life and career of a scientist in the Soviet political and historiographic space.

Keywords: historiography, foreign policy, history of diplomacy, international relations, general history, national history

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Introduction

The study of the history of the Soviet stage of Russian historical science is one of the most important tasks of the further development of modern scientific knowledge. This is primarily due to the study of the scientific heritage of historians, with the disclosure of the essence of their worldview, views, concepts, and rethinking the experience of previous generations of scientists. An independent place in these studies is occupied by the historian himself, the «life milestones» of his creative path, his ideals, the socio-cultural environment – all this influences his formation.

Among the outstanding representatives of the Russian historiography of the twentieth century, the historian Vladimir Mikhailovich Khvostov (1905–1972) stands out vividly. Interest in his personality, scientific and professional activity is still relevant today. Vladimir Mikhailovich Khvostov was a specialist in the history of Modern times and international relations, became a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences in the Department of Historical Sciences, became the first president of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the USSR, participated in the creation and activities of the International Committee of Historical Sciences of the USSR (Photos 1, 2, 3).

In the 1930s, he published a number of articles on the history of international relations in the Middle East at the end of the XIX century, based on archival materials. Later he studied the history of German foreign policy. The result was the work “Foreign Policy of the German Empire in the last years of Bismarck’s Chancellorship”, which in 1938 was defended by him as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Historical Sciences.

Nevertheless, the personality of the scientist and his creative contribution to the study of the problems of the history of international relations and foreign policy of Russia have not yet become the object of special consideration. The purpose of the study is to reconstruct the creative biography and determine the scientific contribution of V.M.Khvostov to the study of the history of international relations and foreign policy of Russia, to consider his life history and creative biography as one of the models of the scientist’s life and creative path in the Soviet political and historiographical space – on the basis of archival materials introduced into scientific circulation for the first time.

Materials and methods

The materials involved during the study can be divided into several groups.

The first group contains unpublished materials: archival documents from the personal fund of Khvostov (fund 1667), as well as funds of his contemporaries and close friends with whom he corresponded for a long time (funds 693, 1604, 1702, 1713), which are presented in the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ARAS, Moscow).

The materials of the funds help to recreate the biography and professional activity of the scientist. The personal fund of Khvostov preserved in the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences is of particular value for the study. It amounts to 544 cases for the years 1901–1975¹. The personal fund of Khvostov has not yet been described, although it is provided for use by visitors to the archive. Most of the materials available in the fund are related to his activities in the Commission of Historians of the USSR and the GDR. A significant place in the materials of the foundation is occupied by Khvostov’s reviews of the works and scientific activities of other historians, reviews of doctoral and candidate dissertations, as

1 ARAS, fund 1667.

well as reviews of books by contemporaries, a list of his own works should also be included here². Of particular interest are the documents on the participation of Khvostov in the work of international congresses, conferences and scientific organizations. The fund contains documents characterizing the personality of Khvostov (29 cases for 1926-1974). These are reviews by N.M.Druzhinin, M.V.Nechkina, I.I.Mints, A.L.Sidorov, M.N.Pokrovsky, S.D.Skazkin, E.V.Tarle, newspaper and magazine clippings about his speeches at sessions, conferences³, congresses⁴. An important role for the study of facts about the life and work of Khvostov is played by his correspondence. Among the addressees and correspondents, the largest part is occupied by: L.Boltz, A.A.Gromyko, N.M.Druzhinin^{5,6}, A.S.Yerkalimsky, I.M.Maysky^{7,8}, A.Z.Manfred, I.I.Mints, V.P.Potemkin, S.D.Skazkin, V.V.Struve, M.N.Tikhomirov^{9,10}, V.Ulbricht, L.Stern. In the Central State Archive of Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan (CSA of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Tatarstan), information was found about Khvostov attendance of meetings and meetings of the Eastern Pedagogical Institute¹¹. With the help of the found office materials of Kazan University (f. 1487) in the department of manuscripts and rare books of the N. Lobachevsky Scientific Library the personal file of Khvostov, which was formed by the staff of the Eastern Pedagogical Institute in 1921, was studied¹². The collection of archival materials related to the biography of the scientist is very extensive and contains a significant amount of diverse information that helps to fully illuminate different aspects of the life and work of Khvostov.

The second group of sources is represented by the works of Khvostov himself. Among the historiographical sources we have studied such works as: "40 years of struggle for peace"[12], "Diplomatic struggle during the First World War"[14], "Instructive lessons of history"[23], "The Franco-Russian Union and its historical significance"[31], "The principle of peaceful coexistence"[25], "Some results of the discussion on the issue of periodization of the history of foreign policy"[21], "The world between the two World Wars"[12], "The international political significance of the victory of the Soviet Union over German fascism"[19], "Methodological Guide to Modern History (1870-1918)"¹³, «History of International Relations»[15], "On the question of history and Modernity in the school course of social Studies»[16], «How the German imperialists once "conquered" before their own death"[17], "The Crisis of Bismarck's Foreign Policy" [18], "Documents of the USSR Foreign

2 ARAS, fund 411, Inventory 3, File 314, pp. 20-33.

3 ARAS, fund 1667, Inventory 1, File 73, pp. 1-23.

4 ARAS, fund 1667, Inventory 1, File 73, pp. 1-73.

5 ARAS, fund 1604, Inventory 4, File 226, p. 1.

6 ARAS, fund 1604, Inventory 4, File 826, pp. 1-39.

7 ARAS, fund 1702, Inventory 4, File 273, pp. 1-5.

8 ARAS, fund 1702, Inventory 4, File 771, pp. 1-13.

9 ARAS, fund 693, Inventory 4, File 57, pp. 1-2.

10 ARAS, fund 693, Inventory 4, File 646, pp. 1-19.

11 CSA HPD of the RT, fund 7415, Inventory 1, part 23, p. 2.

12 Archive of Kazan (Volga region) Federal University, fund 1487, Inventory 1, File 3608. p. 4, fund 1713, Inventory 3, File 268, p. 3.

13 Methodical manual on modern history (1870-1918), ed. V.M.Khvostov Moscow, State Educational and Pedagogical Publishing House of the Ministry of Education of the RSFSR, 1953. P. 244.

Policy"^{14,15} and others. Some of them are presented in the argumentation of this article, others are used in the context of the ongoing research to correct the conclusions presented in the published work of the author. In addition to the scientific works of Khvostov himself, we note the works in collaboration with other historians, such as "History of Diplomacy" (volume 2, 1945, authors – Khvostov and Mints) [5], "History of Diplomacy" (2nd edition, volume 2, 1963) [4], "New History, Part II, Textbook for universities"¹⁶, "How the Second World War arose" [7]. V.M.Khvostov, in collaboration with L.G.Beskrovny and S.L.Tikhvinsky, considered a wide range of issues related to the formation of the Russian-Chinese border in the XVIII-XX centuries in the manuscript "Folding of the Russian-Chinese border", stored in the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences¹⁷. Articles belonging to Khvostov were used in the study: Marxist Historian[13,27], Red Archive [29,24], Class Struggle [22] and Historical Journal [26].

A special role in the study of V.M.Khvostov is played by N.P.Poletiki's memoirs "Seen and experienced (from memories)" [10], in which he tells about the formation of V.M.Khvostov as a historian and scientist. The following works are also important for studying the creative portrait of V.M.Khvostov: B.F.Bulov "Memories. Translated from German. Edited and with a preface by V.M.Khvostov" [1]; Y.A.Polyakov "Luminaries of Russian Historical Science: Memoirs" [11].

The theoretical and methodological approaches of the author are based on the principles of scientific objectivity and historicism, thanks to which were provided the study of the views and activities of V.M.Khvostov as a phenomenon generated and conditioned by the objective-historical conditions of the development of Russian society and the state of historical science, the analysis of scientific ideas and the scientist's worldview as a process and objective influence of a scientist's activity on the state of scientific life. The principle of historicism allowed us to consider the process of creating theoretical and methodological views of a scientist, his political views and scientific concepts, from the very moment of their formation.

The following scientific methods were used in the study: historical-genetic, historical-comparative, historical-chronological, historical-biographical, historiographical and source analysis. With the help of the historical method, the life path of V.M.Khvostov is presented against the general background of the political situation in Russia in the middle of the twentieth century. The use of the historical-genetic method allowed us to consider the life of the scientist and his activities in the context of historical problems in the chronological framework from 1929 to 1972. The historical-comparative method made it possible to compare the views of Vladimir Khvostov in the general historiographical context of the epoch. The historical-chronological method made it possible to reconstruct the history of

14 Documents of the foreign policy of the USSR. Vol. 1 / Ed. by I.N.Zemsky, S.M.Mayorov, I.V.Sadchikov, V.M.Khvostov. Moscow, State publishing house polit. literatures, 1957. P. 772.

15 Documents of the foreign policy of the USSR. Vol. 2 / Ed. by G.K.Deev, E.M.Zhukov, M.A.Sivolobov, V.M.Khvostov. Moscow, State publishing house polit. literatures, 1958. P. 804.

16 New History. Part II. Textbook for universities / Ed. by E.V.Tarle, A.V.Efimov, F.I.Notovich, V.M.Khvostov. Moscow, 1939. P. 298.

17 ARAS, fund 1604, Inventory 1, File 133, p. 40.

his life. The historical and biographical method made it possible to recreate the portrait of the scientist both as a person and as an organizer of science.

Results

V.M.Khvostov was focused on studies of the period of Modern History, mainly interested in the history of diplomacy and international relations. From 1933 to 1938, he worked on his doctoral dissertation «Essays on the Foreign Policy of the German Empire» [2], in which he examined the main aspects and trends of German foreign policy in the last years of Bismarck's chancellorship. In the preface to the memoirs of B.Bulov, he criticized the thesis of the former Reich Chancellor that Germany allegedly passed the so-called "danger zone" in relations with England under him and, consequently, the First World War was not necessarily an objective phenomenon. V.M.Khvostov reasoned that the nature of relations between the two countries in the maritime sphere in the first decade of the XX century testified that a military conflict between them was inevitable. This thesis was a red thread in the researcher's reasoning, presented in his large-scale works published in the period from 1945 to 1963. V.M.Khvostov linked the German-English naval antagonism in 1906–1914 with the negative reaction of Great Britain to the German Naval Law of 1900 and its amendments in 1906, 1908 and 1912 [6].

Among the priority scientific topics for V.M.Khvostov was the history of international relations and foreign policy. He often visited the reading room of the Archive of Russian Foreign Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, where he got acquainted with the documents of the Foreign policy department of tsarist Russia, diplomatic correspondence, reports and diaries of Russian diplomats. Before the Great Patriotic War, V.M.Khvostov published a number of scientific articles on international relations in Europe and the Middle East (1895–1897), preparations for the capture of the Bosphorus in the 1890s, Bismarck's foreign policy and about the policy of the European powers. In addition to these works, V.M.Khvostov published articles on the history of Italian colonial expansion and the Italo-Abyssinian War (1895–1896) and reviews of the works of foreign historians devoted to Russian foreign policy [2].

He paid special attention to the publication of documents on the history of international relations, identified by him in various archives. Based on the involvement of a variety of documentary material, he drew new conclusions about Franco-German relations after the Frankfurt Peace [9], in particular, about Bismarck's continuous provocation of war against France, his desire to cause a new military conflict in any way, to prove the inevitability of a new Franco-German war. The historian linked this issue with another central problem of European politics of the same period – Russian-German relations, publishing a book on this topic, The Bismarck Foreign Policy Crisis, in which he concluded that the Austro-German Alliance was becoming the «core of the foreign policy» of the German Empire. That is why Germany sought to preserve the inviolability of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. According to V.M.Khvostov, Bismarck, on the one hand, sought to keep Russia from an

alliance with France by any means, and on the other, pushed it in every possible way on the slippery path of adventures in the Eastern question. The second way led to an inevitable clash between Russia and England. This led to his important conclusion: "Only in the light of Bismarck's "English" policy reveals the true meaning of his policy towards Russia and Austria" [3]. N.M.Lukin, assessing V.M.Khvostov's contribution to the study of this problem, noted:


Of the greatest interest is the author's successful attempt to prove the correctness of Engels's position on the basis of the latest materials ("Bismarck uses every effort to cause a war with Russia") and destroy the legend created by one of the trends in modern historiography – the legend of Bismarck's «pacifism», his bet on preserving peace in Europe. At the same time, another legend is being destroyed – about the "misunderstood" Bismarck, who allegedly sought a direct alliance with England even during the conclusion of the reinsurance agreement and the creation of the "Eastern Entente". Khvostov managed ... to prove that Bismarck wanted war with France in every possible way for its final defeat, that for this purpose he tried to draw Russia into a southeastern adventure, the success of which was to prevent England. Only the collapse of Bismarck's British policy, which failed to force England to play the role of a «working ox» in the war with Russia, forced him to be «peace-loving» towards Russia and France [9].

V.M.Khvostov also investigated a complex tangle of current contradictions in the Middle East. Russian Russian diplomacy's active actions in the Balkans, he saw this as one of the reasons for Anglo-Russian antagonism.

The work on archival documents concerning issues of European politics relevant to the second half of the XIX century led the scientist to study the policies of European powers and the United States at the beginning of the XX century, as well as to subjects related to the history of Asian, African and Latin American countries in modern and modern times. The result of many years of work by the scientist was a chapter in the second volume of the "History of Diplomacy" devoted to the diplomatic history of the period 1870–1914. For this work, he, like a number of other authors of the book, was awarded the USSR State Prize.

V.M.Khvostov paid much attention to the initial period of the First World War and international relations during the war, especially German foreign policy. Despite the heavy lecturing and propaganda load, he continues to work on the second edition of the "History of Diplomacy", the second volume of which is "Diplomacy in Modern Times. 1801–1914" was entirely written by him. He significantly revised and expanded his chapter published in

Photo 1. Vladimir Mikhailovich Khvostov



Source: URL: <http://www.arran.ru/> (accessed: 20.01.2022).

the first edition, attracting a huge array of additional documentary materials and sources. In the 2nd edition of «History of Diplomacy» (Vol. II) V.M.Khvostov highlighted the nature of Russia's foreign policy. Two chapters were devoted to the First World War: the twelfth and the thirteenth [4]. When preparing this edition, new research and publications of sources were taken into account, some inaccuracies were corrected, some sections were supplemented. At the same time, the task was to overcome, if possible, the well-known one-sidedness of the first edition, which mainly paid attention to the countries of Europe. He included additional materials on the history of diplomacy in Asia, especially China and India. The presentation of the history of the diplomacy of the United States of America has been significantly expanded.

The twelfth chapter opened with the conclusion that the Balkan wars had led to an aggravation of international conflicts: "The Balkans have turned into a powder magazine of Europe".

Behind the Balkan monarchies were the great imperialist powers that disputed each other's influence in the Middle East. Russia and England sought to wrest Turkey from German influence. In Sofia, Bucharest and Athens, there was a fierce struggle between the Entente and the Austro-German bloc for the political orientation of the Balkan governments, for their military forces necessary in view of the impending world war. Austria was waiting for an opportunity to deal with Serbia; Serbia sought to liberate the Yugoslavs of Austria-Hungary; Russia patronized the Serbs [15].

Considering the situation in the Far East, he characterized it through the growth of Japanese-American antagonism, while the Anglo-Japanese and Russian-Japanese contradictions were blunted by the fact that Russia and England were busy preparing for the fight against Germany. With the outbreak of the First World War, the dependence of these powers on Japan in the Far East increased even more. Now Japan could make full use of those special facilities to "rob" China.

V.M.Khvostov believed that Anglo-German antagonism was the main factor in the imperialist struggle that led to the war of 1914. He called the perpetrators of the war «imperialists of all countries», since both groups of powers that were at war with each other, both the Entente and the Triple Alliance, conducted an imperialist policy and prepared an aggressive war. But Germany directly started the war in the summer of 1914. It was the most aggressive power, armed itself most hastily and managed to prepare for war better and faster than anyone. V.M.Khvostov concluded about the prerequisites of the First World War. The last years before it began were a period of sharp aggravation of imperialist contradictions. The international situation has become so acute that a fire of war could easily arise at any moment and for the slightest reason. In fact, that's what happened. The flame that broke out in the Balkans for a relatively small reason soon spread to the entire European continent and engulfed the whole world. Thus, the contradictions between the main capitalist countries, which reached a catastrophic acuteness, led to the First World War.

In the thirteenth chapter of the History of Diplomacy, V.M.Khvostov analyzed diplomacy during the First World War. He continued to consider the issues of diplomatic struggle in other works, for example, in the monograph "Diplomatic struggle during the First World War" [9]. V.M.Khvostov came to the conclusion that during the war, the main efforts of the secret diplomacy of both warring camps were aimed at recruiting allies and taking care of inter-allied relations: on methods of joint warfare, on the coordination of military actions between the allies, on the financing of the war, on the supply of weapons and military materials, and finally, on drawing the contours of the future a peace treaty, on the division of the expected production. This led him to the final conclusion: the European and world war has a clearly defined character of a bourgeois, imperialist, dynastic war. This conceptual position was argued by him throughout his work. And only "after the overthrow of the Imperialist Provisional Government by the rebellious people, Russia embarked on the path out of the imperialist war", V.M.Khvostov summed up [14].

The V.M.Khvostov Foundation has preserved materials of a conversation at the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences with the Deputy director of the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Gyorgy Ranky, during which issues of cooperation between Hungarian and Soviet historians were discussed, during which Ranky said that before leaving he received an answer to his letter on the development of scientific cooperation between institutes of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences¹⁸. According to him, he would like to further clarify some issues, said that the conference proposed in his letter on the study of the history of the emergence and development of the people's democratic system was supposed to coincide with the 20th anniversary of the liberation of Hungary, by the beginning of 1965, confirmed the invitation to Soviet historians to take part in this conference. V.M.Khvostov, in turn, thanked for the invitation and replied that Soviet historians would obviously try to take part in the conference, promised to discuss his proposal with his colleagues and notify him. When asked by Ranky, V.M.Khvostov promised to inform him of the date of the symposium on the agrarian history of Eastern Europe.

After that, Ranky moved on to the question posed by him in his letter about the participation of Soviet historians in a conference in Budapest on the study of the history of Austria-Hungary, scheduled for March-April 1964. He said that he had received a message from A.A.Huber that Y.A.Pisarev would arrive at the conference. Ranky said that the Hungarian Academy is asking for a second representative. According to Ranky, it could be Islamov. V.M.Khvostov replied that he would talk to Islamov and give an answer. Ranky moved on to paragraph four of his letter concerning the coordination of efforts in the fight against bourgeois ideology in historiography. He explained that Hungarian historians would like to work out the main provisions on which the joint struggle against bourgeois ideology in historical science should be based, as well as to distribute the areas of work, establishing in which area of historical knowledge each of the socialist countries has the best forces, and will be able to more productively carry out work on exposing bourgeois ideology.

18 ARAS, fund 1667, Inventory 1, File 456, p. 10.

V.M.Khvostov invited him to concretize his proposal. Ranky replied that they expect that the Soviet Institute of History will develop the main provisions that could determine the direction of the struggle against alien ideology. V.M.Khvostov said that they have released a number of collections against bourgeois historiography, and that their installations partially answer his question, noting that, however, he will consult with their employees about what remains to be done in this sense. On the question of the three options proposed by Hungarian historians for possible cooperation in writing a two-volume history of Hungary, the historian said that they accept the first of the three options proposed in Ranky's letter and would be very grateful for the review and discussion by Hungarian historians of the book when it is ready. Ranky agreed, but made it clear that he would like direct and broader participation of Hungarian historians in the «History of Hungary» prepared at the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences. V.M.Khvostov noted that the preparation of the book is still a matter of the future that so far they have agreed to jointly discuss the work and review it by Hungarian historians. He agreed to return to this issue.

After that, Ranky moved on to the issue (also raised in his letter) of publishing in Hungarian a collection of articles on the history of Hungary prepared by the staff of the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences. V.M.Khvostov invited Ranky to familiarize himself with the collection "Revolutionary Movement and Socialist Construction in Hungary" already available to them, and almost ready for printing. Ranky asked to show him the contents of the collection, to which V.M.Khvostov agreed.

Moving on to the next paragraph of the text of the letter, Ranky said that he would write to V.M.Khvostov about the contents of their planned collection dedicated to the twentieth anniversary of the liberation of Hungary and about the topics of those articles that he would like to receive for this collection from Soviet historians. V.M.Khvostov thanked Ranky for the offer to send their graduate student to Hungary for training and he said that he would inform the candidate's name and the time of his arrival by a reply letter. He also noted that they are ready to consider hosting a Hungarian graduate student.

In connection with the issue of information exchange raised by Ranky in his letter, V.M.Khvostov informed him that some information had already been sent to them by mail. He also asked him what other questions are of interest to Hungarian historians in the sense of information about the work of Soviet historians.

Ranky pointed out two main issues:

- 1) What is the Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences doing;
- 2) Which issues in his work are debatable.

He mentioned, as an example, the question of the agrarian system in Russia on the eve of the October Revolution.

V.M.Khvostov replied that he would inform all visiting historians about the work of the Institute on April 28. And that, in his opinion, the best channel for exchanging information are journals. They agreed to send information for publication in journals, if possible, quarterly. The conversation was held in very friendly tones. Ranky sought to expand cooperation with Soviet historians as much as possible, and is clearly interested in this.

However, during a personal meeting, entering the office of V.M.Khvostov, Ranky immediately began a conversation in German, although, as V.M.Khvostov later became convinced, he speaks Russian with dignity.

In 1963, the second edition of the second volume of the "History of Diplomacy" [4] was published, significantly revised and expanded. It summed up the results of the great work done by Soviet historians, and first of all, by V.M.Khvostov himself. This volume was essentially a new job. In it, a study based on primary sources, the study of diplomatic actions and an in-depth analysis of the most important international phenomena and Russia's foreign policy were combined with broad generalizations.

The volume presented the results of research on the following topical issues: the role of Russia in deterring German aggression in the 1870–1880s in Europe, Russia's policy and the rivalry of the great powers in the Eastern question and in the Balkans. The pages with the results of research on the policy of the ruling circles of Russia in the Balkans were meaningful. Russian Russian policy and the Russian-English contradictions in the Middle East, V.M.Khvostov concluded that two streams of expansion collided in Central Asia – from England and from Russia. The connection between the issues of the Middle East and Central Asia in the foreign policy systems of Russia and England was clearly revealed. V.M.Khvostov considered strategic considerations and trade interests as motives of policy in Central Asia, both in Russia and England, also pointing out that the annexation of Central Asia also met the interests of the Russian bourgeoisie, since it opened up sales markets and sources of raw materials to it [4:543].



In the 1950s and early 1970s, V.M.Khvostov made a great contribution to the preparation of a number of fundamental works. As one of the authors and members of the editorial boards, he participated in the preparation of the History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, the multi-volume "History of the USSR from Ancient Times to the Present Day", the "Soviet Historical Encyclopedia", and the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" [8].

In 1970, the work "The World between two World Wars" was published [20], the publication of which was preceded by a heated discussion at the XIII International Congress of Historical Sciences in Moscow. This topic was presented by four reports:

1. "The social movement in Europe after 1914" by Prof. Valyana;
2. "The problem of collective security between the two world wars" by Prof. Oprea and Campus;
3. "Fascism – varieties of fascism in Central and Eastern Europe" by Prof. Lasko;
4. "Social Christianity" by Prof. Ober [2].

Each of the reports was of considerable interest to V.M.Khvostov, regardless of the presence in some of them of such provisions with which it is impossible to agree. However, the topic of «Peace between two World Wars» was not fully disclosed. That is why he prepared a work of the same name, which describes the main features of the historical period that began after the First World War and ended with the beginning of the Second: the development of a new social system, the beginning of which was laid by the October Revolution in Russia. After the First World War, two social systems coexisted and fought,

Photo 2. Autobiography of Vladimir Mikhailovich Khvostov



Source: ARAN, f. 1667, op. 1, storage unit 307. Ll. 1-1 turnover.

not counting the many social structures that remained as remnants of a more distant past.

The V.M.Khvostov Foundation also preserves the comments of academicians M.V.Nechkina and I. I. Mints on the report of the XXIV Congress of the CPSU and the tasks of historical science at the All-Union Coordination Meeting of Historians, in which they emphasize that one of the most important tasks of our institutes is to strengthen ties with the institutes of republican academies¹⁹. In their remarks, they refer to the words of L.I.Brezhnev about significant achievements of Soviet science and about the activities of scientific institutions in which there are also significant shortcomings. It is no secret that there were also such scientists who were busy with matters that were largely disconnected from both the immediate practical needs of the country and the real interests of the development of fundamental branches of science. The key to success is to concentrate on the most promising areas of science and to raise the scientific and theoretical level of historical research in every possible way. Also in the article in the Yearbook of German History for 1969 I.I.Mints noted that the Meeting would help Soviet historians in the great task of solving the problems put forward to the social sciences by the 24th Congress of the CPSU [3].

The XIII International Congress of Historical Sciences, held in August 1971 in Moscow, confirmed the relevance of the problems of science studies, scientific policy, and the entire complex of disciplines, which were then united under one name «History of Science». During the Congress, and in constant practical work, it was revealed that contacts and joint activities of historians of the humanities and natural sciences turned out to be very weak. The tasks of developing the science of science, studying the system of folding and development of scientific institutions, centers, scientific societies, scientific periodicals, the system of training scientific personnel – could not be developed in isolation within individual scientific disciplines. Even in the field of humanities alone, there were no necessary contacts and agreed plans. Historians of historical science have advanced further in this direction than other humanities. On this basis, it was proposed to develop a research plan on the history of the humanities in the USSR. It was only on this basis that it was possible to advance in the development of science about science.

The period between the two wars attracted the special attention of historians and V.M.Khvostov too. In Soviet historiography, the emergence of a socialist social system was understood as a fundamental difference between the period between the two wars and the period preceding the October Revolution and the First World War. Another feature that distinguished the period between the two wars was the general crisis that engulfed the old social system, capitalism. This general crisis was expressed not only in very deep economic shocks as a result of the two economic crises of 1920 and 1929. The general crisis of the old world was also expressed in the extreme aggravation of all its contradictions – in the rise of the working-class movement in the developed capitalist countries, the growing discontent of the peasantry and petty-bourgeois strata, and finally, in the huge and rapid increase in the national liberation struggle of the peoples of the colonies and semi-colonies. The end of the

19 ARAS, fund 1667, Inventory 1, File 144, p. 3.

First World War not only did not eliminate international contradictions, but on the contrary, strengthened them. In particular, the contradictions between the victors and the defeated Germany, in the end, was one of the main reasons for the emergence of the Second World War.

The international labor movement 1918–1939 is a much broader concept than the socialist movement in Europe, which received widespread, but also controversial coverage in the works of Khvostov's contemporaries. His inclusion in the discussion on this issue is confirmed by the monograph «Problems of the history of the USSR foreign Policy and international Relations. Selected works» [28]. The book examines the formation and development of the Soviet historiography of modern Western countries during the first quarter of a century of the existence of the Soviet state. The monograph was based on numerous literature and archival documents extracted from the funds of fifteen archives of the country. The author paid special attention to the analysis of V.I.Lenin's works on the subject under study, the works of Soviet scientists on the Modern History of Western countries, discussions on these problems that took place in the second half of the 20s–early 30s, the development of Soviet historical institutions.

In his work «Russia and German Aggression in the days of the European crisis of 1887» (1946), V.M.Khvostov contributed to the development of the problem of counterbalancing German aggression in Europe. It was he who, in the post-war years, was the first to begin its in-depth study, having made a large article about the military alarm of 1887. He highlighted the role of Russia during the European crises provoked by Bismarck in 1875, 1877 and especially in 1887, coming to the conclusion that Bismarck could not draw Russia into the fairway of his aggressive policy in Europe. V.M.Khvostov made an important conclusion about the influence of the unsuccessful outcome of the 1887 war alarm for Bismarck on the acceleration of the rapprochement of Russia and France, the formation of an alliance between them [5].

We should also note the «Yearbook of German History» of the 1969 edition, in the editorial board of which V.M.Khvostov was also present. One of the most important tasks of the new edition was to expose various falsifications of history in the West German editorial historiography, contrasting them with a truly scientific concept. According to the authors, the «Yearbook of German History» helped to further expand the fruitful scientific cooperation of Soviet historians with historians of the GDR, the joint struggle against distortions of the historical past, often serving the policy of reaction, revenge and war. On the pages of this publication, a worthy place was occupied by works on historical transformations in the German Democratic Republic, which successfully created a developed society in difficult conditions. The work consisted of several sections, among which the largest number of articles stand out: «The Middle Ages and Modern Times», «To the 150th anniversary of the birth of K.Marx», «Modern History» [14].

In the second half of the 1940s, V.M.Khvostov's lecture courses on the history of international relations were published, which he prepared for reading the course «History of International Relations» at the Higher Diplomatic School of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The course of lectures covered the period from 1870 to 1893. In 1947, V.M.Khvostov's work of the same name was published for the Higher All-Army military-political courses of

Photo 3. Portrait of Vladimir Mikhailovich Khvostov

Source: ARAN, f. 1667, op. 1, storage unit 446. L. 46.

the Main Political Directorate of the Armed Forces of the USSR. The course was prepared for the period 1871–1917, consisted of 7 chapters: “The Franco-Prussian war and its consequences”, “The Eastern crisis of 1875–1878”, “The emergence of two military-political blocs on the continent of Europe”, “The end of the struggle for the redistribution of the world and the first wars for this redistribution”, “Russian-Japanese the War and the Entente”, “The Struggle of the Entente and the German-Austrian bloc (1908–1911)” and “The Beginning of the First World Imperialist War”.

The V.M.Khvostov Foundation has preserved letters from the Gramsci Institute in Rome inviting him to take part in the II Conference on the Study of Gramsci Heritage on March 19–21, 1960²⁰. On the initiative of the Gramsci Institute, a conference on the study of Gramsci heritage on the topic “Problems of Unification of Italy” was held. The conference focused on some issues that aroused particular interest in connection with recent historiographical studies. On the one hand, the conditions in which the Italian unified state was created and the methods of its formation, the political

and social situation of Italy after the revolution of 1848, the nature of the governing class that operated in the decisive years 1859–1861, its social base, the formation of its ideology and division into parties, its dependence on the social and political development of Europe. On the other hand, the characteristics of society and the state after unification, the formation of a peculiar capitalist structure in Italy and, in connection with this, the formation of a specific form of a single state, which was established for a long time in the subsequent history of Italy.

The II Gramsci Heritage Conference developed its work around the following reports: “The Emergence of a United State” by Prof. Giorgio Candeloro, “National market and Capitalist accumulation in united Italy” by Senator Emilio, “Politics and Governance in the United State” by Prof. Ernesto Rajonieri. The official invitation was received from the Secretary General of the Gramsci Institute, Dr. Frank Ferry, President of Ranuccio Bianca Bandinelli [20].

The history of the First World War attracted the attention of many researchers in various countries of the world. Statesmen and public figures, civil and military historians, writers and publicists, economists and sociologists dedicated their works to her.

An extensive literature has been created in which such issues as the origin, results and lessons of the war of 1914–1918, its impact on the economy and socio-political life of

20 ARAS, fund 1667, Inventory 1, File 357, p. 8.

the warring powers, the role of each participant in it, the nature of military operations and military art are analyzed. The study of the First World War has not lost its relevance today, because it is directly related to the solution of one of the most pressing problems of our time – the problem of war and peace. A generation of people living in the age of nuclear weapons is turning to the past to better understand the present. And it is important to know how in the second decade of the XX century the imperialists managed to plunge the peoples into one of the greatest tragedies of human history. V.M.Khvostov also tried to give his answer to these questions, devoting his doctoral dissertation, numerous sections of the History of Diplomacy and special articles to this problem.

In the personal fund of V.M.Khvostov, R.P.Konyusha's review of V.M.Khvostov's unpublished manuscript “The Socio-political Views of M. Hess” has been preserved, in which Konyushaya indicates that the unpublished work of the late academician V.M.Khvostov is a report on what he did (apparently, in the late 20s–early 30s) research work devoted to the critical analysis of the system of socio-political views of Moses Hess²¹. In this regard, the reviewer drew attention to the special speeches of Marx and Engels against «true socialism» and its ideologists – in the “German Ideology” and “Manifesto of the Communist Party” – represented an essential moment in the struggle of the founders of scientific communism, the leaders of the international proletariat for the theoretical foundations and program of the proletarian Communist Party. Attaching great fundamental importance to this struggle of Marx and Engels, Lenin considered it necessary to study and illuminate it, showed that the direction of “true socialism”, as one of the forms of petty-bourgeois socialism, did not sink into oblivion, but from time to time revived in a certain historical environment. “True socialists”, as he wrote in 1906, “are something like peaceful Laurists, semi-culturalists, non-revolutionaries, heroes of sophisticated reasoning and abstract preaching”. In the light of the assessments of Marx, Engels and Lenin, as the reviewer wrote, the author convincingly reveals the supra-class nature of M.Hess's social protest, his exaltation of the supra-class humanistic consciousness, the extra-social «ethical authority» opposed to the crude materialism of the individual. Socialism in Hess and other true socialists' perspective was confined within the framework of the opposition «love – egoism». Showing the inconsistency of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois historiography of true socialism, V.M.Khvostov makes an independent class analysis of the socio-political, partly philosophical, views of Hess, as they developed before the revolution of 1848. According to Konyusha, the analysis was carried out by V.M.Khvostov with great care. His methodology is still of considerable interest to researchers. The concrete historical environment in which Hess's views were formed is being recreated. The typically petty-bourgeois nature of his ideology, ideas about the future society, as well as about those forces that are the first carriers and conductors of a new, harmoniously organized society are thoroughly revealed. Then follows a description of the methods of transition to this new society. The work was of quite definite interest for the coverage of the early period of the formation of Marxism, the biography of the

21 Khvostov V.M. History of international relations and the struggle for the division of the world 1870–1900 (textbook). M.: Military-political. Academy named after Lenin, 1940. 84 p.

young Marx. As for the very system of ideas of «true socialism» critically examined in the manuscript, even now some of them and even whole complexes of ideas, according to Konyusha, continue to exist in the complex ideological struggle of the modern world, especially in the consciousness in some parts of Asia and Africa. Communist leaders and the parties they lead in developing countries have to speak out against various forms of non-proletarian socialism, which, for example, under the guise of criticizing capitalism, idealize pre-capitalist relations or propagandize so-called «democratic socialism», speculating with a considerable number of «ideas» of the old «true socialism» of the last century.

Conclusion

The Russian historiography of the Soviet period had an ideological component, the monopoly of the Marxist-Leninist methodology in the approach to the study of the problem. However, this does not detract from the significance of scientific discoveries made in 1920–1991.

At the initial stage of the development of Soviet historiography, much attention was paid to the publication of documents on international relations of the early XX century and memoir literature, the translation of works by foreign authors. This stimulated historians to conduct research.

Dealing primarily with the problems of the history of diplomacy, V.M.Khvostov was a broad-profile historian and a major organizer of science. He, as one of the authors and members of the editorial board of the fourth volume, took an active part in the preparation of the multi-volume “History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union” and a short work on its history-edited by academician B.N.Ponomarev, in the preparation of the “History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union”, the multi-volume history of the USSR from ancient times to of our days, “Soviet Historical Encyclopedia”, was a member of the editorial boards of various historical journals and collections.

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
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
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