

ISSN 2782-3067 (Print)

RUSSIA & WORLD: SCIENTIFIC DIALOGUE

РОССИЯ И МИР

НАУЧНЫЙ ДИАЛОГ

ENGLISH EDITION

No. 3(13)
SEPTEMBER 2024

Science, Research,
Analytics

Consulting
Projects

Digital Technologies
and Solutions


Publishing
and Media activities

Education
and Training

Humanitarian
communications

*The art of dialogue
and confidence*

 22, p. 1, lane Korobeynikov, Moscow, 119034

 +7 (495) 252-67-88

 www.nicrus.ru

 institut@nicrus.ru



RUSSIA & WORLD: SCIENTIFIC DIALOGUE

No. 3(13)
SEPTEMBER 2024

18+



ISSN 2782-3067 (Print)
DOI: 10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)
УДК: 94; 316; 327
ББК: 60.5; 63; 66

Information about the journal

The journal «Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue»

– print media (mass media), magazine.

Published since 2021, 4 times a year.

Registration number and date of the decision on registration with the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Communications (Roskomnadzor): PI No. FS77-81013 dated May 17, 2021.

The journal is registered in the National ISSN Center of the Russian Federation ISSN 2782-3067 (Print)

Archive:

Russian State Library

National Electronic-Information Consortium

Open Access Policy

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» is an open access journal. All articles are made freely available to readers immediately upon publication. The open access is granted in accordance with the Budapest Open Access Initiative (BOAI) definition: all articles are available free of any charge on the public internet, permitting any users to read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of these articles, crawl them for indexing, pass them as data to software, or use them for any other lawful purpose, without financial, legal, or technical barriers other than those inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself. For more information please read BOAI statement.

All articles and materials published in the journal are indexed in the Russian Science Citation Index (RSCI) database on the website of the Scientific Electronic Library eLIBRARY.RU, and they are also available through the website of the scientific electronic library "CyberLeninka".

The journal is included by the Higher Attestation Commission under the Ministry of Education and Science of Russia in the List of peer-reviewed scientific publications in which the main scientific results of a dissertation for the degree of doctor and candidate of sciences should be published.

Founder, Publisher

ANO «National Communications Development Research Institution»

22, building 1, Korobeynikov Lane, Moscow, 119034

E-mail: rw.journal@nicrus.ru

Partners

Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 12

Rozhdestvenka str., Moscow, 107031, Russian Federation. Tel.: +7 (495) 621-18-84

www.orientalistica.com orientalistica@ivran.ru

Address of the Editorial Office

ANO «National Communications Development Research Institution»

Editorial Office «Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» 22, building 1,

Korobeynikov Lane, Moscow, 119034

Russian Federation

Website: <https://www.russia-world.ru/jour>

E-mail: rw.journal@nicrus.ru

Aim and Scope

The purpose of the journal is to create a scientific discussion platform for peer discussion of problems and for the development of optimal solutions in the field of international cooperation, joint research, and publication of its results. Foreign scientists and experts are invited to publish and review the materials submitted for consideration.

The scientific concept involves the publication of scientific papers, including research insights and scholarly results, discussion articles and reviews, in the field of political science, sociology, world economy, cultural studies. The substantive and thematic profile of the journal includes topics reflecting international and regional processes, political, economic, social, cultural aspects of international relations, interstate and intercultural communications, international security and sustainable development

Scientific specialties and branches of science corresponding to them

SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

HISTORICAL SCIENCES

5.6.7. History of International Relations and Foreign Policy

SOCIOLOGICAL SCIENCES

5.4.4. Social structure, social institutions and processes

5.4.5. Political Sociology (sociological)

POLITICAL SCIENCES

5.5.2. Political institutions, processes, technologies

5.5.4. International relations, global and regional studies

© «Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue», 2024

© ANO «National Communications Development Research Institution», 2024

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Vitaly V. NAUMKIN – DSc (Hist.), Full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, professor, Scientific Supervisor of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

DEPUTY CHIEF EDITORS

Valentina V. KOMLEVA – DSc (Soc.), professor, Deputy Director for Scientific Work of the National Communications Development Research Institution (Russia)

Alina V. GASUMYANOVA – CandSc (Law), Deputy Director for Media Activities of the National Communications Development Research Institution, Deputy Director of the Center for Strategic Studies in the Sphere of Energy and Digital Economy MIEP MGIMO of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (Russia)

EXECUTIVE EDITOR

Olga V. ZHULIKOVA – CandSc (Soc.), Candidate of Sociological Sciences, Associate Professor, expert of the National Communications Development Research Institution (Russia)

EDITORIAL BOARD

Nikolay M. ARSENTIEV – DSc (Hist.), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, professor, Director of the Historical and Sociological Institute of the N.P. Ogarev National Research Mordovian State University (Russia)

Kalimash K. BEGALINOVA – DSc (Philos.), professor, Professor of the Department of Religious and Cultural Studies, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Kazakhstan)

Andrey V. VINOGRADOV – DSc (Polit.), Head of the Center for Political Research and Forecasts, Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Editor-in-chief of the scientific and socio-political journal «Problems of the Far East» (Russia)

Vladislav V. VOLKOV – DSc (Soc.), Leading researcher at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, University of Latvia; Professor at the Baltic International Academy (Latvia)

Oksana V. GAMAN-GOLUTVINA – DSc (Polit.), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, professor, Head of the Department of Comparative Political Science of MGIMO of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, President of the Russian Association of Political Science, member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation (Russia)

Alexey A. GROMYKO – DSc (Polit.), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, professor of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

Denis A. DEGTEREV – DSc (Polit.), Professor, Leading Researcher, Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

Vladimir K. EGOROV – DSc (Philos.), professor, Head of the UNESCO Department of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Honorary Doctor of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

Alexey E. ZAGREBIN – DSc (Hist.), professor, professor of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Chief Researcher of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

Irina D. ZVYAGELSKAYA – DSc (Hist.), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia), Professor, Head of the laboratory «Center for Middle Eastern Studies» of the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

Arous ZOUBIR – Professor of Sociology, Director of the Laboratory of Religion and Society, University of Algiers 2, Faculty of Social Sciences (Algeria)

Fidel LEON-DARDER – PhD, professor at the University of Valencia (Spain)

Valerii A. LETIAEV – DSc (Law), CandSc (Hist.), professor, professor of the Institute of Public Administration and Civil Service, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (Russia); professor of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry (Russia)

Elena A. NAZAROVA – DSc (Soc.), professor, professor of the Department of Sociology of MGIMO of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (Russia)

Mirzokhid A. RAKHIMOV – DSc (Hist.), professor, Head of the Department of Social and Humanitarian Sciences, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan; Director of the Center for Modern History, Head of the Department of Modern History and International Relations, Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Uzbekistan)

Sergey V. RYAZANTSEV – DSc (Econ.), corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, professor, Director of the Institute of Demographic Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

Oleg F. SHABROV – DSc (Polit.), professor, professor of the Department of State Policy, Faculty of Political Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University, President of the Academy of Political Sciences (Russia)

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL

CHAIRMAN

Alexander V. FEDOROV – CandSc (Law), professor, Honoured Lawyer of the Russian Federation (Russia)

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN

Vladislav I. GASUMYANOV – DSc (Econ.), Director of the National Communications Development Research Institution, Head of the Basic Department of Corporate Security MGIMO of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (Russia)

Mikhail V. BELOUSOV – CandSc (Soc.) (Russia)

Armais A. KAMALOV – DSc (Med.), professor, Full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, (Russia)

Slava T. KHODKO – CandSc (Tech.) (Russia)

CONTENTS

Naumkin V.V.
Editor-in-chief Foreword5

INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROCESSES

International relations, global and regional studies

Sutyryn V.V.
Reassembling Post-Soviet Eurasia: Russia's Leadership Potential in Conditions of External Pressure 14

Konovalov I.A.
Transformation of Post-Soviet Russia's Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region..... 23

Sugonyaev P.M.
Pragmatism and Ideology in Russian-German Energy Relations..... 32

Matveev I.A.
Arab Countries' Interest in Integration in Eurasia: Tactics or Strategy? 43

Nessar M.O.
Features of Afghanistan Governance in the Period 2021–2024 56

Sanakoev I.B.
The Republic of South Ossetia in the Context of Regional Security Threats 65

Abalova N.Dzh., Troitsky Y.F., Pogorelskaya A.M., Kudayarov K.A.
Russia as an Object of Scientific Studies in Kyrgyzstan..... 74

CHANGING SOCIETY

Social Structure, Social Institutions and Processes. Political sociology

Yakovlev A.I.
Evolution of Value Systems in the "Era of Great Changes": General Challenges and Problems. 86

Barakhvostov P.A.
Integration Projects and Institutional Matrices 95

Zhulikov S.E., Zhulikova O.V.
Training Specialists in the Field of Artificial Intelligence at Russia and Central Asian Countries Universities: Ranking Positions and Cooperation Opportunities..... 101

HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE AND MODERNITY

History of International Relations and Foreign Policy

Petrosian A.G.
Syrian-Armenian Relations: Historical Background and Current State 118

Grishin Ia.Ia., Letiaev V.A.
Against Whom was the Polish Army Actually Mobilized on the Eve of the “September Catastrophe” of 1939? 126

Batyrbayev B.S.
The Politics of Memory in Kyrgyzstan: The Formation of National Identity in the Context of the Formation of the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region..... 138

POWER, POLITICS, STATE

Political institutions, processes and technologies

Bocharov Y.B.
The Results of the President of Russia Elections in Foreign Countries in 2024 and the Fiasco of the Non-Systemic Opposition 148

Tabak V.N.
On the Issue of Symbolic Politics in Modern Moldova (1989–2023) 165



Vitaly V. NAUMKIN,
Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
Editor-in-chief of the journal
«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue»

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF FORWORD

Dear readers!

We present to you a new issue of our journal with the research results by leading Russian and foreign scientists. The materials of the journal give an idea of the role of Russia in the processes taking place in different regions of the world.

The section "International, Global and Regional Processes" presents studies of general and specific issues of the formation of a new world order, the development of a large Eurasian space and bilateral relations between Russia and foreign countries.

The change in the world order and its geopolitical, geoeconomic and cultural-humanitarian consequences for Eurasian integration are considered in the article by V.V.Sutyurin "Reassembling Post-Soviet Eurasia: Russia's Leadership Potential in Conditions of External Pressure". The analysis of the transformations of the post-Soviet space shows the main risks and challenges for the countries of the region. Medium-term challenges for integration processes are associated with the problems of energy transition, the information and communication revolution, the policy of the United States and other Western countries to contain and slow down the technological progress of Russia, China and other non-Western countries. According to the author, on the one hand, there is a threat of consolidating post-Soviet Eurasia on the periphery of world development processes, on the other hand,

prerequisites for accelerated integration arise. The author recommends strengthening and making the main direction of Eurasian integration of countries in the field of scientific and technological interaction based on mutual benefit and trust with Russia playing a leading role.

I.A.Kononov examines Russia's interests in the Asia-Pacific Region in his article "Transformation of Post-Soviet Russia's Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region". The challenges that Russia faced after the collapse of the USSR contributed to the transformation of its interests in this region, economic diversification, development of joint infrastructure projects and strengthening of military-strategic cooperation with Asian partners and, above all, with China and the ASEAN and APEC countries. Russia's desire to strengthen economic ties with the countries of the Asia-Pacific Region is systemic and covers many areas. Examining these areas and specific cooperation projects in the Asia-Pacific Region, the author concludes that Russia's strategic reorientation to the Asia-Pacific Region is becoming an important element of its foreign policy doctrine, but Russia should "continue to seek a balance between strengthening national security and developing economic ties".

The article by P.M.Sugonyaev "Pragmatism and Ideology in Russian-German Energy Relations" analyzes historical and current aspects of bilateral relations, their features, and the results of the energy policy pursued by Germany. The author notes that the policy of economic pragmatism in recent years in Germany has been replaced by an ideological policy in relations with Russia, which leads to

the loss of sovereignty in the energy supply sphere. The article contains statistical data on energy cooperation between Russia and Germany and the dynamics of German energy. The author believes that Germany's position on the world stage is declining as a result of the reduction in economic power due to the refusal of energy supplies from Russia, and the increased vulnerability of Germany's political system to external influences.

The complex issue of the Arab countries' interests in Eurasian integration is considered in the article by I.A.Matveev, "Arab Countries' Interest in Integration in Eurasia: Tactics or Strategy?". In the context of growing resistance from the Global South to Western policy, Russia proposes that its Arab partners form relations based on a fair consideration of mutual interests. The Arab world perceives Russia as a state-civilization that is the driving force behind the integration of the Non-West. Of particular interest is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a platform for coordinating the actions of power centers – India, China, and Russia – and as an organization that Iran, a regional rival of Saudi Arabia, has joined. The author concludes that the Arab countries' interest in integration in Eurasia, including cooperation with Russia, is predominantly strategic.

Of scientific and practical interest is the article by M.O.Nessar "Features of Afghanistan Governance in the Period 2021-2024", which examines the dynamics of the development of the situation in the country after the Taliban movement came to power. The article analyzes the factors of stability in modern Afghanistan, establishes the dependence of stability in the country on the volume of foreign aid and predicts a deterioration in the situation in Afghanistan in the event of a reduction in foreign aid. The author assesses the level of risks and challenges emanating from the territory of Afghanistan and believes that after the Taliban came to power (with relative stabilization of the situation inside the country) instability began to shift towards Pakistan and Iran.

Security issues in the South Caucasus region are considered in the article by

I.B.Sanakov "The Republic of South Ossetia in the Context of Regional Security Threats". According to the author, the existing challenges, risks and threats to South Ossetia are growing both at the local (the country is in a state of latent conflict with Georgia) and at the regional level. The article provides proposals for the creation of a sustainable security system for South Ossetia in order to prevent violent methods of resolving contradictions.

For the first time, our journal publishes materials on the analysis of scientific research on Russia in the post-Soviet space. N.Dzh.Abaloova, Y.F.Troitsky, A.M.Pogorelskaya, K.A.Kudayarov in the article "Russia as an Object of Scientific Studies in Kyrgyzstan" analyze scientific works of a social and humanitarian nature in the areas of "Russian language and literature", "political science", "history", "economics" and "law". The authors identify the content, direction and intensity of research on Russia in Kyrgyzstan and come to the conclusion that Russian studies are of the greatest interest to Kyrgyz researchers. Research in other areas is insignificant, the scope of scientific research is limited to historical, political and economic relations between the two states. The study showed that, in general, the ideological positions of local experts regarding Russia are positive or neutral, although there are isolated works that have a negative assessment of Russia and Kyrgyz-Russian relations.

The section "Changing Society" examines the issues of changing values in the era of change, the role of integration projects and institutional matrices, and raises issues of training specialists in the field of artificial intelligence, which is one of the factors of the international subjectivity of countries.

The problem of the evolution of the system of traditional values in the era of fundamental changes is raised by A.I.Yakovlev in the article "Evolution of Value Systems in the 'Era of Great Changes': General Challenges and Problems". The author suggests considering value problems from the point of view of values of different levels: formational (characteristic of a specific social system and changing with it)

and civilizational (deep values, characteristic of the religious and cultural space and preserved in the system of ideals and norms of behavior of many generations). In the context of a changing world order, the search for new meanings of development, globalization, confrontation between the West and non-Western countries, conflicts of values of different levels arise in spiritual life. From this position, the author comes to the conclusion that non-Western societies adapt their value systems to changing conditions while maintaining the ideals and norms of their cultural and religious tradition, and not every civilizational challenge becomes a threat to traditional values.

The issue of the reasons for the formation of regional systems is raised in the article by P.A. Barakhvostov "Integration Projects and Institutional Matrices". From the author's point of view, regional orders are associated with a certain type of institutional matrices of integrating countries, and when integrating public systems, institutions complementary to those dominant in the institutional matrix are used to mitigate possible institutional imbalances. For countries with different types of institutional matrices, convergence is possible, but integration in this case will be limited to only certain areas. The article also examines a group of factors that block regional integration.

The article by S.E. Zhulikov and O.V. Zhulikova "Training Specialists in the Field of Artificial Intelligence at Russia and Central Asian Countries Universities: Ranking Positions and Cooperation Opportunities" raises the issue of the quality of training specialists in the field of artificial intelligence and the possibilities of cooperation between the countries of Central Asia and Russia in this area. According to the authors, despite the fact that Russia, according to international rankings, is not a world leader in training specialists in artificial intelligence, it has a serious technological research base, experience in fundamental physics and mathematics education, and strong programming schools. It is advisable for the countries of Central Asia to use this potential of Russia by building educational and scientific

cooperation with Russia, integrating into the Russian scientific and technological space.

The "Historical Retrospective and Modernity" section contains articles on the history and current state of Armenian-Syrian relations, the politics of memory in Kyrgyzstan, and an article on the mobilization of the Polish army on the eve of World War II. Despite the difference in topics, the central theme of all articles is the issue of historical objectivity and the need to turn to reliable sources in the modern interpretation of international processes.

In the article "Syrian-Armenian Relations: Historical Background and Current State" A.G. Petrosian provides a brief overview of the history of relations between Armenia and Syria, but focuses on the period after the declaration of statehood of the Republic of Armenia in 1991 and the beginning of the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Syrian Arab Republic. Highlighting a number of factors contributing to the development of Armenian-Syrian contacts, the author considers the most significant presence of the Armenian community in Syria. According to the author, the basis for deepening bilateral ties between countries is the positive experience of the history of relations between Armenia and Syria, the absence of obvious contradictions, and the role of Armenia in providing humanitarian assistance to Syria.

The article by Ia.Ia. Grishin and V.A. Letiaev "Against Whom was the Polish Army Actually Mobilized on the Eve of the 'September Catastrophe' of 1939?" is dedicated to the 85th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II and is relevant in the context of the confrontation between the West and Russia and the aggressive anti-Russian policy of modern Poland. Based on archival data and other sources, the authors analyze a number of facts related to Poland's preparation for a future war, consider the East ("Wschud") plan and the West ("Zahud") plan, the mobilization plans of the Polish army, and come to the conclusion that "the Polish army on the eve of the 'September catastrophe' of 1939 was mobilized against the USSR, that became a fatal

mistake of the Polish government, leading to a catastrophic result for it, and that also became the beginning of World War II".

The author's view on the role of legal norms in preserving historical memory, their contribution to the formation of national identity is presented in the article by B.S. Batyrbayev "The Politics of Memory in Kyrgyzstan: The Formation of National Identity in the Context of the Formation of the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region". Using a specific example, the author shows the influence of the politics of memory on legislation, cultural heritage and historical memory and reveals the role of legal norms and institutions in the formation of national identity. The author pays special attention to the impact of the new Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic and the concepts of the country's development on the formation of a common civil identity.

The section "Power, Politics, State" presents research on political institutions, processes and technologies.

The article by V.N. Tabak "On the Issue of Symbolic Politics in Modern Moldova (1989-2023)" examines the evolution of narratives of symbolic politics in Moldova and identifies three modern narratives: "Russia as a threat", "European integration as a national idea" and the linguistic narrative of "the identity of the Romanian and Moldovan languages". According to the author, the policy of constructing a Romanian identity among Moldovans, reflecting the interests of ethnic minorities ("unionist Romanians"), provokes social disunity. As a result, the country is characterized by a highly competitive political process, a decrease in trust in the foreign policy vector of the republic (European integration) and, at the same time, a nationalistic ideological trend.

The results of foreign voting in the elections of the President of Russia are analyzed by Y.B. Bocharov "The Results of the President of Russia Elections in Foreign Countries in 2024 and the Fiasco of the Non-Systemic Opposition". The article contains a lot of statistical data, the author's analysis of the actions of the opposition to discredit

and disrupt the voting in the elections of the President of the Russian Federation abroad. The conclusion is made about the absence of a real influence of the non-systemic opposition (primarily the opposition located in the EU countries) on the electoral behavior of Russians living outside the Russian Federation at the time of the elections.

Summing up the review of this issue of the journal, I express my gratitude to our authors for the originality and novelty of their research approaches and the opportunity to introduce interesting authors and the results of their research to the Russian and foreign scientific community.

Until next time on the pages of our journal.

With sincere respect
to our readers and authors,
Academician of the Russian
Academy of Sciences
Vitaly Naumkin

INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROCESSES

International relations

RUSSIA & WORLD: SCIENTIFIC DIALOGUE

**РОССИЯ
И МИР**
НАУЧНЫЙ ДИАЛОГ

... the challenges will primarily affect the member states [of the EAEU, CSTO], but there are no sufficient grounds to expect that they will seek a response to the challenges through increasing integration with Russia.

V.V.Sutyurin

Reassembling Post-Soviet Eurasia: Russia's Leadership Potential in Conditions of External Pressure

The Russian Federation is entering an active phase of its geopolitical turn to the Pacific Ocean.

I.A.Kononov

Transformation of Post-Soviet Russia's Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region

In fact, the German political elite, through its own efforts, destroyed the profitable energy partnership with Russia, opposed common sense and economic pragmatism, undermining the economy that directly ensures Germany's weight and opportunities on the world stage.

P.M.Sugonyaev

Pragmatism and Ideology in Russian-German Energy Relations

A clear understanding is required of whether the interest of Arab partners in Eurasia and Russia is caused by strategic or tactical, temporary considerations

I.A.Matveev

Arab Countries' Interest in Integration in Eurasia: Tactics or Strategy?

In conditions where there is no confidence in the successful completion of the Taliban's plans to reform Afghan society, the attention of external actors, especially the countries of the region, is turned to current processes: the security situation, the humanitarian situation, economic projects, etc.

M.O.Nessar

Features of Afghanistan Governance in the Period 2021–2024

Regional algebra, not regional arithmetic, will work in the South Caucasus

I.B.Sanakoev

The Republic of South Ossetia in the Context of Regional Security Threats

Given the demand for Russian studies in scientific works and the special significance of the social and humanitarian sciences, there was an attempt to fill the existing gap in such areas as Russian language and literature, history and political science, economics and law

N.Dzh.Abalova, Y.F.Troitsky, A.M.Pogorelskaya, K.A.Kudayarov

Russia as an Object of Scientific Studies in Kyrgyzstan

Reassembling Post-Soviet Eurasia: Russia's Leadership Potential in Conditions of External Pressure

Vyacheslav V. Sutyurin✉

Center for Science Diplomacy and Advanced Academic Initiatives of MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia

v.sutyurin@inno.mgimo.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3884-536X>

Abstract. The article examines the change in the world order and its geopolitical, geoeconomic, cultural and humanitarian consequences for Eurasian integration. The stages of transformation of the post-Soviet space after the collapse of the USSR are identified. The main risks for the countries of the region are characterized. It is concluded that medium-term challenges for integration processes include three areas: energy transition, information and communication revolution, including the expansion of digital platforms and the development of large language models, as well as the policy of the United States and other Western countries to contain and slow down the technological progress of Russia, China and other non-Western countries. These challenges pose a threat of consolidating post-Soviet Eurasia on the periphery of world development, but at the same time form the prerequisites for accelerating integration. Recommendations are given on the need to strengthen the scientific and technological direction of integration interaction with the leading role of Russia up to its approval as the main one within the EAEU. This process should be built on the basis of mutual benefit and strengthening trust, strengthening humanitarian cooperation between Russia and its partners in Eurasian integration.

Keywords: Post-Soviet space, Eurasia, Russia foreign policy, Eurasian integration, Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), CIS, science and technical cooperation

For citation: Sutyurin V.V. Reassembling Post-Soviet Eurasia: Russia's Leadership Potential in Conditions of External Pressure. *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue*. 2024; 3(13): 22-33, [doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3\(13\)-22-33](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-22-33)

Introduction

The implementation of integration projects in the post-Soviet space is one of the priorities of Russia's foreign policy¹. Effective achievement of the set tasks is determined by the compliance of Russian practical steps with the situation in the region and the international situation as a whole.

The purpose of the article is to analyze the key trends influencing the political course of the states of the region, as well as global challenges affecting the regional situation. Achieving the goal includes an analysis of the processes, as a result of which it is expected to determine the main risks and priorities for the further implementation of Russia's leadership potential in the region.

The concept of "leadership potential" means Russia's ability to progressively implement its integration project, which is defined as a comprehensive international project covering several states, designed to promote increased economic connectivity and coordination of their actions in the sphere of economy, security and foreign policy with Russia playing a leading role. Integration is implemented on the basis of trade and economic ties, interests in the sphere of security and civilizational community, primarily the Russian language and common historical memory. The Eurasian Economic Union is considered the key "supporting" element of Russia's integration project as the most advanced multilateral association in the region, within which a high level of integration has been achieved, including the creation of a customs union, common technical standards and permanent supranational bodies.²

Materials and Methods

The study material consists of official documents and statements by officials, allowing us to draw conclusions about the priorities for the development of the Russian integration project in Eurasia, the vector of actions of a number of major extra-regional actors. In preparing the article, we used materials from the media and official Internet resources, as well as expert publications necessary for reconstructing events, highlighting the stages of regional development, the main modern processes, and identifying the challenges underlying regional interaction. We also used data from official trade, economic and social statistics, allowing us to assess the intensity of integration interaction within the Eurasian Economic Union.

The chronological framework of the study covers the period from the dissolution

¹ Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (approved by the President of the Russian Federation V.V.Putin on March 31, 2023). Available from: <https://www.mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/1860586/>.

² Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union of May 29, 2014. Available from: https://www.economy.gov.ru/material/file/2bbbf9ae33443d533d855bf2225707e/Dogovor_ees.pdf.



of the USSR to the present, with an emphasis on the latest trends after 2020. Historical and institutional approaches, as well as methods of analysis and synthesis, comparative analysis were used.

Results

The post-Soviet space remains “post-Soviet” as it is “linked” together by an infrastructural transport framework, the Russian language and culture are still widely used here, helping to preserve a common communicative space across state borders. At the same time, the post-Soviet space continues to fragment, centrifugal tendencies are accelerating in a number of countries, there are political and armed conflicts within the region, including between CIS members. These tendencies are superimposed on the global processes of economic integration and regionalization that have been actively unfolding in recent decades [1]. At the same time, the sustainability of these processes in the long term is not obvious, modern crises raise the question of slowing down globalization or deglobalization. Within the post-Soviet space, competition between extra-regional players is growing, which intensified long before the pandemic and the CIS [4]. Leading global actors are promoting their civilizational projects. The US is a military-ideological project of the struggle of democracies against autocracies, camouflaging a dual task - inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia in Ukraine and slowing down and preserving the economic and technological progress of the PRC. China is promoting its version of globalization, formalizing it not only in terms of infrastructure and economics (the Belt and Road), but also culturally and humanitarially within the framework of the Global Development Initiative through the UN and the Global Civilization Initiative through inter-party dialogue³. Trade and technological interaction is used as the main tool for expansion, including package solutions such as “smart and safe city” imported by Central Asian countries.

The post-Soviet space occupies a significant place in these projects. China is strengthening its interaction with Belarus and the Central Asian countries. The collective West, led by the United States, is waging a proxy war against Russia in Ukraine, increasing pressure on the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus. A striking example is Armenia, in which France and Great Britain are showing increased interest, but not in the economic sphere, but in the sphere of information and political influence. Turkey is showing ambitions on the southern perimeter of the post-Soviet space, especially in connection with the results of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the military alliance with Azerbaijan, and the build-up of its military-technical and cultural-humanitarian presence in the countries of Central Asia.

The European Union, which remains one of the leading trade and economic partners of the post-Soviet countries, is making active attempts to convert its economic role into geopolitical influence on the countries of the region, including through numerous programs in the sphere of humanitarian influence and assistance to international development [2,

³ Global Civilization Initiative continues contributing Chinese wisdom to all humanity. 2024. 15 March. Available from: <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202403/1308882.shtml>.

7]. Russia's launch of the SVO in response to NATO expansion, the threat to the security of Donbass, and the US's refusal to enter into meaningful agreements in the area of security guarantees has led to an increase in the struggle of external players for the post-Soviet space [6].

The significance of these processes for Russia's foreign policy and national security includes three important changes.

1. Geopolitical. Today, the confrontation in this area is most clearly manifested in Ukraine, but the status quo is changing in other regions, for example, in Transcaucasia and Africa. In the long term, two scenarios are possible. It is possible that the existing world order will be adjusted with a stronger role for Russia, China and a number of countries of the World Majority due to the democratization of international institutions without a direct “hot” war between the great powers. This will stabilize the situation for several more decades, while preserving the institutions of the Yalta-Potsdam order, including the UN. An alternative scenario is a full-scale collapse of the world order through a series of major wars, including possible clashes between the great powers. This will lead to the victors forming a fundamentally new configuration of institutions.

2. Geoeconomic. The changing balance of power in terms of accumulation of global wealth and material and technical development with the center of gravity shifting from West to East. In 1990, the share of the G7 countries in world GDP at purchasing power parity was more than 50%, and as of the beginning of 2024 - about 30.3%, while the BRICS countries (before expansion) accounted for 35.6%.⁴ These processes are also changing the political balance of power. The US still has an “excess privilege” in the form of the dollar as the world's reserve currency and global military potential, which could lead to attempts to overturn the board of the “world game” by force. A prototype of this can be found in the early 2000s in the implementation of the neoconservative project “For a New American Century,” which included US military interventions in Asia and the Middle East.

3. Cultural and humanitarian. The era of “soft power” as a euphemism for the cultural and economic hegemony of the West is coming to an end. The key change is that the culture, values and way of life of the West are no longer considered to be the only alternatives. Firstly, in the West there is a mutation of the cultural code and way of life, when the erosion of the middle class and the tension caused by it are obscured by gender, racial and climate doctrines of an irrational nature in the spirit of transhumanism. Secondly, in the non-Western world, primarily Russia and China, alternatives are being formulated – traditional values and civilizational diversity.⁵

The transformations and challenges noted set the coordinate system for analyzing the situation in the post-Soviet space. For a complete picture, it is necessary to reconstruct

⁴ Russia says rising economic bloc BRICS surpasses G7 in purchasing power parity. Available from: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/russia-says-rising-economic-bloc-brics-surpasses-g7-in-purchasing-power-parity/3155753>.

⁵ On approval of the Fundamentals of State Policy for the Preservation and Strengthening of Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values: Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated 09.11.2022 No. 809. Available from: <https://www.publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202211090019>.

the region's recent history. The following stages of geoeconomic development of the post-Soviet space can be identified (see Table).

Table. Stages of transformation of the post-Soviet space

Period	Brief description
1988–1998	Structural restructuring of the economies of the countries of the region – from laws on cooperatives and market reforms to the default of 1998, weakening and breaking of cooperative chains in the region
1998–2008	Active integration of the region into the world market, increasing exports, relative stabilization of the economic situation, but in the logic of asymmetric relations with developed Western countries (export of products with low added value). Increased confrontation in relations with US interference in the affairs of states in the post-Soviet space and NATO expansion (Bucharest summit) led to Georgia's invasion of South Ossetia and the Russian military operation to force Georgia to peace.
2009–2013	Regional integration received an impetus (the CIS FTA, the Customs Union, the entry into the draft Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union) against the backdrop of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009, which revealed the vulnerability of the region's economies in integrating into the global economy. A certain role was also played by the attempt to «reset» relations between the US and Russia, which contributed to a temporary reduction in Western opposition to the ties of post-Soviet countries with Russia.
2014–2019	The Ukrainian crisis and Western sanctions contributed to the sovereignty of the Russian economy through import substitution, development of agriculture, etc. After the creation of the EAEU, against the backdrop of the crisis in relations between Russia and the United States, the processes of Eurasian integration slowed down, but proved their worth as beneficial for the participating states.
2020 – present time	The pandemic has accelerated the growth of interstate rivalry, the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis and the beginning of the NWO have led to a radical reorientation of the Russian economy to the global South and East, a reconfiguration of logistics, which has given significant economic gains to Russia's partners in the EAEU, but has caused increased pressure on them from Western countries

Source: compiled by the author

Based on the analyzed regional historical and contemporary global processes, it is possible to identify a number of key challenges that will determine the intra-regional dynamics of relations in the post-Soviet space in the medium term of the next 5-7 years.

a) growing threats to political stability – from information manipulation to “color” revolutions and various forms of extremism. Mass unrest in Belarus in 2020 and Kazakhstan in 2022 clearly highlighted the increased political risks;

b) the growing influence of extra-regional players and the risks of their rivalry in the region against the backdrop of geopolitical tensions, the risks of resource shortages in individual sub-regions, including basic resources (fresh water, arable land) that determine

food security;

c) the growing risks of ending up on the periphery of the scientific and technological transformation, which will determine the new distribution of resources and influence in the world, due to the tightening of the US and Western countries' course towards protectionism and the slowdown in the technological development of non-Western countries.

Based on the analysis of key global processes and their impact on the region, historical stages of development of the post-Soviet space and medium-term challenges for the countries of the region, it is advisable to formulate a number of recommendations from the standpoint of Russian interests.

First of all, the most important field of activity is the sphere of humanitarian cooperation between Russia and its closest neighbors and partners in the CSTO and the EAEU. The Russian side began to formulate priorities several years ago [5]. Taking into account the difficulties of achieving a common position on humanitarian issues even within the EAEU, it is important to set the goal of creating a common, scientifically based understanding of the modern world system from the point of view of strategic challenges. This raises the question of the need to strengthen the interaction of scientific institutions and expert circles - at least within the EAEU and, possibly, the CSTO. It is necessary to form a common understanding of the main directions of development of the modern world, the risks and opportunities that they create for the countries of the region. The most important areas for coordinating common efforts in understanding international processes are the following.

First, the so-called energy transition to renewable energy sources and potential coercive measures from the West (carbon tax, etc.) pose a serious challenge to all EAEU countries. As does the West's securitization of technological chains and its struggle to slow down the development of the global South.

Technological progress influences the balance of power, creates divisions and rivalries in the world. This is primarily about the redistribution of markets. The transition of the global energy sector to “green” rules, for the writing of which the EU and the USA are currently competing, will give the West the opportunity to dictate conditions to non-Western countries. However, there are still many unknowns in the energy transition equation, including the resource security of this process, side effects in the area of the growing gap between rich and poor countries, where “dirty” projects for the extraction of rare earth materials will be located, etc. Today, there is already a tough struggle for the redistribution of markets in the area of “green” energy equipment. Along with this, there are also international legal issues, especially in the area of “soft” law. For example, the formula for calculating the carbon “footprint”, the redistribution of natural rent and the export of emissions to developing countries. The countries of post-Soviet Eurasia, which have a developed fuel and energy complex, are vulnerable to these challenges.

Secondly, the poorly controlled global expansion of digital platforms creates the risk of a new form of feudalism, given the degree of their control over ordinary participants

of such platforms – individuals, small and medium businesses, and government bodies. The development of artificial intelligence, like the expansion of platforms, raises the question not so much about IT standards and infrastructure, but about a worldview, when the echo chamber effect, isolating the user due to the content recommendation system in the news feed of his social networks, is replaced by large language models that formulate answers to the user's search queries. Obviously, these answers can be formed from different value and ideological positions, and the lack of subjectivity in this area leads not so much to technological as to mental colonialism.

Thirdly, the US ban on exports of advanced semiconductors and other modern technologies to China, Russia and other countries reflects new post-global trends. The rules of globalization no longer suit the West, so it has opted for actively restraining the progress of developing countries. Therefore, the countries of post-Soviet Eurasia have little choice: either to form collective technological sovereignty based on Russia's leadership, or to slide into the category of "third world" countries in social and technological terms. The issue of technological progress today is not only a question of the possibilities of forming and revealing human potential, but also a question of the availability of enormous resources: from fresh water, arable land, energy and metals to rare earth minerals. At the same time, post-Soviet Eurasia has the strategic resources necessary to ensure a worthy place for itself in the updated system of the future world order. The EAEU has proven itself as a useful tool – this is evidenced not only by its effective use under sanctions in 2022–2024, which resulted in the growth of mutual trade and cash flows. This is also evidenced by the results since the establishment of this association in 2015: the growth of mutual trade in value terms (the share of mutual trade in foreign trade has remained virtually unchanged), the growth of labor migration, the growth of cargo turnover, etc.⁶

The EAEU member states have significant mineral reserves. The global significance of Northern Eurasia is manifested in energy, logistics (transcontinental corridors, including North-South, West-East and the Northern Sea Route), agriculture, the presence of arable soil, forests, fresh water, etc. However, in order to successfully use these resources for the stable development and integration of post-Soviet countries, mainly within the EAEU, integration needs meaningful content and strategic goal-setting. Such a strategic goal could be to ensure security for stable development and scientific and technological progress while preserving the human in man (traditional values). Thus, in the context of growing global demand for electricity, its deficit is expected, including due to the huge consumption of electricity during digitalization. The construction of a nuclear power plant will allow Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to prepare for this moment. Cooperation with Russia will help create entire industries in these countries that will increase the level of competence, as is happening today in Belarus through the education and involvement of local specialists and contractors in the processes of construction and provision of nuclear power plants.

⁶ Information report "Eurasian economic integration". Government of the Russian Federation. Available from: <http://government.ru/news/49224/>.

Discussion

The analysis shows that an important issue is the symmetry of benefits and costs in the process of creating an association and creating its material platform. In recent years, there have been many obstacles along this path - from weak cooperation chains in industrial production [3] to growing differences in the humanitarian sphere against the backdrop of a reduction in the use of the Russian language in a number of neighboring states and distancing from a common history and culture. These problems are known to specialists and cannot be quickly and completely eliminated. Nevertheless, this does not negate the need for work that Russia would conduct as a pole of attraction for the entire region, taking into account the interests of its partners, but at the same time Russia would encourage them to play by common, transparent rules, reciprocating concessions and "bonuses" from the Russian side. Russian support is possible in the context of mutually beneficial cooperation, export of Russian industrial products and standards to countries and regions, providing it with valuable resources mined in neighboring countries, which will help strengthen Russia's economic security and its position in foreign markets.

Conclusions

Eurasian integration with Russia as the leader is a project that is economically beneficial for all participants, although the benefits are not always distributed equally. But the project has proven its viability and usefulness even in the face of unprecedented sanctions pressure.

In the coming years, the Eurasian Economic Union and other regional associations that are a priority for Russian foreign policy will face serious challenges. They will affect the participating countries, but there is no reason to expect that the countries will seek an answer to the challenges in strengthening integration with Russia. Contradictory trends of recent decades show that, although all participants in the EAEU and CSTO are seriously dependent on the Russian economy and security guarantees, this does not prevent them from striving to develop relations with third countries.

Therefore, the continued progressive development of Russia's Eurasian integration project, which is a success of Russian diplomacy, depends on targeted project and programmatic actions. They consist of designing future development scenarios and priorities. In this process, the critical variable on which success depends is not only economic connectivity, but first and foremost the ability of countries to develop common ideas about the future, combining pragmatic interests and values, strengthening the civilizational community over national, ethnic and religious diversity. Educational cooperation and scientific diplomacy will help solve this problem. The formation of a regional techno-scientific union and the development of the EAEU in this direction may prove expedient provided that the parties agree on and launch real, economically mutually beneficial

technologically complex projects, as well as strengthening trust based on humanitarian cooperation and developing common assessments of strategic risks and opportunities.

References

1. Baykov A.A. Economic Regionalism as a Planetary Phenomenon. Theory and Methodology of Comparison [Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law]. 2017; 4:38–53 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2017-10-4-38-53>.
2. Gromyko A.I.A. Europe between crisis and stagnation. Europe in the global reconfiguration. Gromyko A.I.A. (eds.). Moscow: Ves' Mir, 2023:8–12 [In Russian].
3. Rebeda S.V. Industrial Profile of the EAEU Member-States: the Effects of the First Decade. Rossiya i novye gosudarstva Evrazii [Russian and the New States of Eurasia]. 2024; 1: 25–41 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.20542/2073-4786-2024-1-25-41>.
4. Smirnov V.S. Battle of integrations" in post-soviet space: humanitarian dimension. Sovremennaya Evropa [Sovremennaya Evropa]. 2018; 6:51–61 [In Russian]. <http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/soveurope620185161>.
5. Sutyryn V.V. 2025 Strategy of the Eurasian Union: a Humanitarian Turn. Evraziya.Ekspert [Eurasia.Expert]. 2021; 1. Available from: <https://journal.eurasia.expert/S271332140014427-6-1> [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.18254/S271332140014427-6>.
6. Sutyryn V.V. Special Military Operation in Ukraine: Consequences for the EAEU and Eurasian Integration. Russia in Global Affairs. 2022; 2:158–163 [In English]. <https://doi.org/10.31278/1810-6374-2022-20-2-158-163>.
7. Sutyryn V.V. The Official Development Assistance Policy of the European Union in the Post-Soviet Space: Geopolitical Factors September. Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 2022; 6:543–550 [In English]. <https://doi.org/10.1134/S1019331622120097>.

About the author

Vyacheslav V. SUTYRIN. CandSc. (Polit.). Associate Professor Department of International Relations and Foreign Policy of Russia. Director Center for Science Diplomacy and Advanced Academic Initiatives of MGIMO University. <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3884-536X>. Address: 76, Prospect Vernadskogo, Moscow, 119454, Russian Federation. v.sutyryn@inno.mgimo.ru

Contribution of the author

The author declares no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Received: June 15, 2024. Approved after review: July 10, 2024. Accepted for publication: August 31, 2024. Published: September 23, 2024.

The author has read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewers for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROCESSES

International Relations, Global and Regional Studies

Original article

Political Sciences

[https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3\(13\)-34-46](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-34-46)

Transformation of Post-Soviet Russia's Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region

Ilya A. Konovalov ✉

Moscow State Linguistic University, Moscow, Russia
79163235030@ya.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2278-8081>

Abstract. The relevance of this study is due to the significant transformation of the system of international relations caused by the geopolitical transit from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. In the context of modern global changes and dynamic processes in the international arena, the study of the transformation of Russia's interests in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) is becoming especially important. It provides an opportunity to predict future trends in international relations and develop specific recommendations for the development of Russia's foreign policy strategy. In the context of worsening relations with the West and Russia's turn to the East, this study allows us to better understand key trends in the region and develop strategic solutions to strengthen Russia's geopolitical status in the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, it is important to take into account the economic, political and military aspects of Russia's presence in this dynamically developing region. Thus, this study plays a key role in shaping Russia's long-term foreign policy strategy and its adaptation to new geopolitical realities, not only in order to strengthen its position in the Asia-Pacific region, but also to respond more effectively to the challenges and opportunities arising from the transformation of the global system of international relations.

Keywords: Asia-Pacific Region, geopolitical status, geopolitical priorities, geopolitical shift, Russia, China, infrastructure projects, network alliances

For citation: Konovalov I.A. Transformation of Post-Soviet Russia's Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region. *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue*. 2024; 3(13): 34-46, [doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3\(13\)-34-46](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-34-46)

Introduction

Modern Russia is actively rethinking its foreign policy strategy, especially its relations with the Asia-Pacific region. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country has faced new challenges and opportunities, which requires a reassessment of priorities and strategic goals.

The study of this transformation has changed over two periods: Belovezhskaya (1991–2014) and Crimean (2014 to the present). The division into these periods is justified by changes in Russia's domestic and foreign policy, in the geopolitical situation.

These are key stages in the evolution of the foreign policy interests of post-Soviet Russia, reflecting changes in its geopolitical status. During the Belovezhskaya period, Russia sought to integrate into the international community and search for new economic ties; during the Crimean period, the emphasis shifted to strengthening national security and searching for strategic partners in Asia. The division presented in the article allows us to study the influence of a combination of internal and external factors, regional conflicts and economic transformations on Russia's geopolitical strategy, the transformation of its interests in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the dynamics of its foreign policy evolution.

The geopolitical transformation of post-Soviet Russia is a complex and multifaceted process. Immediately after the signing of the Belovezh Accords in 1991, Russia faced the need to rethink its foreign policy due to a sharp change in its geopolitical status. In the 1990s, the priority of Russia's foreign policy strategy was the desire to integrate into international institutions and establish economic cooperation primarily with Western countries, which was due to the need to resolve internal contradictions that arose after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the need to reduce tensions with the once ideological enemy.

The turn to the East has become a strategically important step for Russia, especially after the events of 2014. In the face of sanctions pressure and political isolation from Western countries, Russia began to more actively develop relations with the states of the Asia-Pacific region. The region has become a key area of foreign economic and foreign policy activities of Russia, which is due to its growing geopolitical status. The scientific novelty of this study lies in the comprehensive analysis of the transformation of Russia's interests in the Asia-Pacific region in the context of changing geopolitical conditions. Additionally, the evolution of Russia's interaction with key countries of the Asia-Pacific region in the Belovezh and Crimean periods is analyzed, and prospects for cooperation in the context of global changes are considered.

Materials and Methods

The study is based on the analysis of Russian foreign policy strategic documents of different periods, the use of analytical and statistical reports, official reports of specialized departments, media materials in Russian, English, Korean and other languages, which allows us to identify the evolution of priorities and directions of Russia's foreign policy strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. The author of the article used methods of comparative and content analysis, synthesis, generalization, as well as retrospective and diachronic methods. The combination of these methods ensured the formation of a holistic view of changes in the geopolitical status of post-Soviet Russia, taking into account modern geopolitical realities and changes in international politics.

Results

Belovezh period

The Belovezhskaya period (1991–2014) of international relations, characterized by the collapse of the USSR, the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the strengthening of US influence and the formation of a unipolar system, as well as the definition of its own geopolitical status and the vector of the direction of the main geopolitical priorities, set an important task for Russia: in the transformation and unpredictability of the crisis caused by the formation of a new statehood, it is necessary to preserve identity, ensuring the socio-political stability of Russia. Not without difficulties, the renewed Russian state laid a solid foundation for the implementation of both domestic and foreign political tasks. Vector strategic values were defined, reflected in the "Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation" of 1997 and the subsequent version of the document from 2000.¹ Soon the "concept" was replaced by a "strategy", which defined the goal of the policy at this stage, namely: preserving territorial integrity and sovereignty, returning the status of a world power and implementing sustainable development of the country [5].

The Russian Federation of the Belovezhskaya Pushcha period was little interested in the problems of integration into the Asia-Pacific region, the country was present here rather nominally, without clear strategic goals. However, this does not mean that work in the Asia-Pacific direction was not carried out at all. Thus, Russia was actively solving the problems of territorial claims with the PRC, work was carried out to stabilize relations with key Pacific actors (the USA and Japan), and the issue of restoring friendly relations with India was being resolved. The ideological basis for this activity was the concept of the legal continuity of the USSR. It should be noted that, despite the problem of disputed territories, the invariably cold and pragmatic approach on the part of China, Russia at the beginning of the Belovezhskaya Pushcha stage recognized the importance of the PRC in geopolitical and economic terms, increasing cooperation with the country. By the end of the 1990s, bilateral interstate relations were transformed from normalization to good neighborliness. This event was marked by a new doctrinal directive: the achievement of a multipolar world, which was enshrined in the corresponding declaration of April 23, 1997², which served as a good foundation for the transformation of Russian-Chinese relations into a strategic partnership [2].

¹ On approval of the Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation: Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 17, 1997 No. 1300 (no longer in force). Available from: <http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/11782>; The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation, approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 17, 1997 No. 1300 (as amended on January 10, 2000 No. 24). Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation, 1997. No. 52. Article 5909; 2000. No. 2. Article 170.

² Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Formation of a New International Order. Diplomatic Bulletin. P. 19–21.

Until 2013, all strategic thinking regarding the Asia-Pacific region was based on an overly optimistic assessment of trends, rather than on clearly defined realities. By the end of the Belovezhskaya era, statements about the crisis-resistance of the existing system of international interaction were replaced by more objective assessments, the unresolved structural problems were recognized, and most importantly, a change in the approach of the Russian Federation to the formulation of doctrinal guidelines was noticed, which, along with the changing international political and economic situation, prompted the state leadership to reassess values and, as a result, put forward new initiatives and interests [4]. The Belovezhskaya paradigm for Russia became a period of formation of the main doctrinal guidelines in the Asia-Pacific region: national security; strengthening sovereignty; strengthening democracy; pragmatism; multi-vector and multipolarity; consistent promotion of national interests by creating favorable external conditions, avoiding confrontation; restoration of the status of a world power.

Crimean period

By 2014, a critical mass of contradictions in the then existing system of international relations had accumulated. The growing hegemony of the United States, expressed in NATO expansion to the east, intervention in conflicts in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, as well as in the promotion of democratic values and a market economy through the mechanism of sanctions pressure, required geopolitical players to take action to balance the situation. Some scholars began to call the new paradigm of international relations the Crimean [1] paradigm; in their opinion, it was the Ukrainian crisis and the fact of the reunification of the Crimean Peninsula with Russia that became the most important bifurcation points, which changed the system of international law in a precedent-setting manner, as well as the entire system of international interaction, dealing a serious political blow to the positions of the United States and the West [1]. The attempts of the United States to maintain its dominance, along with Russia's desire to restore its global geopolitical status and the political and economic energy of China led to the formation of a limited-polar system of international interaction. Once a hegemon that directed the policies of other countries through sanctions pressure, it faced counter-sanctions. Chinese sanctions covered the activities of key American companies operating in the high-tech and industrial sectors, which led to significant economic losses. This measure also affected the export of strategically important resources and technologies to the United States. The activities of existing institutions supporting the global influence of the United States were disrupted. At the same time, the system of interaction that had formed was transitional, the basis of which was "political probing" [7]. The introduction of sanctions by China became a symbol of the growing confrontation. The United States remained a hegemon in key areas, however, in the person of the PRC and the Russian Federation, a pole of power began to form, the boundaries of whose influence, although blurred, could no longer be ignored.

Russia was ready for a new unstable world order, this conclusion can be made based on the analysis of the "Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation" 2013³, where the task of establishing flexible network alliances in order to maintain global financial and economic stability and international security was put forward. However, the transition to the Crimean paradigm also brought new serious problems for Russia, new challenges and threats that required an adequate and well-thought-out response. The country faced sanctions that drew attention to the contradictions of socio-economic development and the production sector.

Along with the confrontation of the collective West that had reached its apogee, the degradation of Russian-American cooperation, a new threat to Russia arose - the confrontation between the United States and China. The Russian economy is closely tied to the economies of these two countries, so the trade "battles" that unfolded during the Crimean period caused and continue to cause a lot of inconvenience and became an obstacle to achieving one of the main national interests - socio-economic development [2]. The Russian economy, and, consequently, all spheres of society's life began to feel a shortage of both finances and opportunities. Therefore, in 2015, a new national security strategy was formulated and adopted⁴, which emphasized that even in the Asia-Pacific region (in confrontation with Western countries) the situation is not at all favorable for the realization of national interests. The conceptual principles of the strategy did not differ much from the 2009 version⁵. However, there is a transition from a nomenclature unit to an ideological manifesto. This is evidenced by the emergence of the task of protecting and defending the population from ideological expansion and from information and psychological influence in general, as well as the task of preserving and developing Russian identity. The task of maintaining and developing spiritual and moral values has received primary importance in the sphere of culture. Russia began to need a sense of security and historical perspective more than ever and formulated this in its doctrinal documents. However, the cornerstone of this doctrine was the statement of the superiority of the spiritual over the material, which signals the acceptance of the primacy of Asian civilizational dogmas over Western ones. This clearly showed in which direction Russia is heading and who is civilizationally close to it. It was during this period that the Russian Federation made a geopolitical turn to the Pacific Ocean.

Russia is intensifying interactions within the region, especially with such organizations as the SCO, APEC, ASEAN, as a result of which many joint productive projects and enterprises with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region are emerging [3]. The basis for interaction has become the key advantages of Russia as a counterparty for Asian countries:

³ The concept of foreign policy of the Russian Federation, approved by the President of the Russian Federation on 12.02.2013. Available from: http://www.mid.m/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICk6BZ29/content/id/122186.

⁴ National security strategies of the Russian Federation: Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 31, 2015 No. 683. Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation. 2016. Vol. 4.

⁵ On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020: Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of May 12, 2009 No. 537. Code of Laws of the Russian Federation. 2009. Vol. 1.

resources, transport potential, the attractiveness of the idea of forming a multipolar world. Activities at Pacific forums with the main platform in the form of ASEAN (based on its centrality in the Asia-Pacific region) have proven to be extremely productive.

Despite various problems caused by the so-called "Asian paradox", the essence of which lies in the growth of tensions while maintaining and growing economic capacity, the Russian Federation and ASEAN have become strategically interconnected [8]. ASEAN will suffer if Russia loses the struggle for multipolarity, and Russia will lose if ASEAN loses its position as the central axis of regional interaction in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Prospect of Transformation

Crises and problems in the world forced post-Soviet Russia to reconsider its values. The value of democracy, which had long been a formal pass to world politics, began to appear less in official documents; undemocratic nature or the absence of the word "democracy" in official documents or the name of the country could become a pretext for the invasion of American forces. Russia gained self-confidence, as well as an external and internal enemy in the form of the United States, Russian populists, pro-Westerners and foreign agents. Did this help to cope with the emerging challenges? Of course, ideological issues and issues of cohesion were resolved. The state began to take the path of self-sufficiency, competent goal-setting, a value-based Russian identity is beginning to take shape, but the economy, and therefore other spheres of life, continue to face difficulties. Oddly enough, this has a beneficial effect on relations with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. Most countries benefit from Russia's economic downturn. The interest of Pacific actors, who can acquire resources, use territory or lobby their interests economically at a low price, is growing.

Today, we can confidently talk about strengthening economic cooperation and regional security, developing transport and logistics infrastructure as primary national interests and strategic goals that contribute to increasing Russia's geopolitical status in the Asia-Pacific region.

Russia seeks to develop trade and economic ties with other countries in the region, including China, Japan and South Korea.

Today, Russian-Japanese relations remain complicated due to the ongoing territorial dispute between the countries. The situation is complicated by the confrontation between the collective West and Russia, in particular, Russia's implementation of a sovereign policy to ensure security on the country's western borders.

Japan, remaining in vassal relations with America, is forced to take measures that coincide with the American course. The Russian side treats this with understanding and expresses hope for a quick normalization of relations, as evidenced by public statements by the Russian establishment. One of the key areas of cooperation between Russia and Japan is energy. Japan is interested in importing Russian gas and oil [6], Russia, in turn, can receive investments from Japan to develop its energy projects in the Far East, systematically linking it with the center of the country.

Relations between Russia and the Republic of Korea have also changed due to the events of recent years. They can be characterized as dynamic and promising, which is consistent with the laconic description of the country formulated by G.V.Zinoviev: "[South Korea] is one of the friendliest among unfriendly countries"⁶. Both countries have extensive potential for cooperation in various fields, including economics, science and technology, culture and sports. Despite international sanctions and their periodic expansion, Russia and South Korea continue to trade. South Korean companies are finding ways to maintain economic ties with Russia through intermediary countries and alternative supply routes. Russia remains an important supplier of energy resources for South Korea, including oil and gas. Projects to build new pipelines and supply liquefied natural gas continue to be discussed at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, the Eastern Economic Forum, and various bilateral dialogue platforms.

Russia actively participates in diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts in the region, in particular in resolving the Korean issue. Russia advocates dialogue and negotiations between North and South Korea, as well as between the DPRK and the United States, to create a multipolar system of regional interaction to ensure security in the region and prevent economic or other dominance of some countries over others. Active work is underway within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, aimed at developing economic and cultural cooperation between member countries, strengthening security in the region.

In particular, Russia supports the creation of a free trade zone within the SCO and is working to expand economic ties between the countries. Russian special services cooperate with colleagues from other SCO member countries in the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking and other regional security threats. The country seeks to improve the transport infrastructure in the region, including through the development of seaports and railways.

Work is underway to develop and modernize the Trans-Siberian Railway in order to improve cargo flow and reduce the time of delivery of goods to Asian countries, promoting the China-Russia-Europe project, which contributes to the development of transit transport communications in the region. A number of projects are being implemented on sea routes aimed at expanding and modernizing sea ports, such as the ports of Vladivostok, Nakhodka and St. Petersburg, with special attention being paid to the development of the Northern Sea Route. An important role is played by the construction and modernization of intermodal terminals, which ensure the transportation of goods between different modes of transport (rail, sea, road, etc.).

Discussion

Russia's desire to strengthen economic ties with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region is systemic and covers many areas. The intensive development of trade relations with China, the largest economic partner, includes large-scale investments in the energy sector, joint

⁶ Russian Ambassador called direct arms supplies to Ukraine a red line in relations with Seoul. TASS. Available from: <https://tass.ru/politika/19766145>.

construction of infrastructure facilities and technological cooperation. China is interested in stable supplies of Russian energy resources, and Russia gains access to Chinese technology and investment, which contributes to the modernization of its own industrial base.

No less significant are Russia's relations with ASEAN, which cover many areas, from military cooperation to joint scientific research. Joint energy projects, including nuclear energy, are among the key areas of cooperation. ASEAN is also interested in transport corridors linking Russia and Southeast Asia, which creates additional opportunities for trade and mutually beneficial investment projects.

An important element of Russia's strategic partnership with the Asia-Pacific region is participation in multilateral regional organizations such as the SCO and APEC. Within the SCO, Russia actively promotes initiatives to ensure regional security, combat terrorism, drug trafficking and other threats. Joint exercises and exchange of information between intelligence agencies help to strengthen trust and increase the level of security in the region.

In general, the strategic reorientation of modern Russia to the Asia-Pacific region is becoming an important element of its foreign policy doctrine. The transformation meets both internal needs for modernization and economic development, and external challenges associated with a change in the global balance of power. The Russian Federation continues to strengthen its position in the region, striving for harmonious and mutually beneficial cooperation with key Asian partners. Russia's current foreign policy strategy in the Asia-Pacific region is multifaceted and comprehensive, aimed at creating a sustainable and reliable foundation for future development.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that Russia's interests in the Asia-Pacific region have undergone a significant transformation. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia faced economic and political challenges, which contributed to a revision of its foreign policy priorities. The transformation of Russia's interests in the Asia-Pacific region is associated with the search for new opportunities for development and cooperation in the context of a changing global political situation.

Such geopolitical priorities as economic diversification, development of joint infrastructure projects and strengthening of military-strategic cooperation with Asian partners have significant potential and reflect Russia's desire to strengthen its geopolitical status both in the region and in the world as a whole.

The projects listed in the article not only open up new prospects for transit transportation between Europe and Asia, help reduce the time of delivery of goods, reduce transportation costs and increase the competitiveness of Russian routes in the world market, but also expand existing economic ties with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, providing new markets and opportunities for investment cooperation.

At the same time, challenges related to changes in the global economy and the emergence of new geopolitical risks require constant attention and adaptation of the

existing strategy. Russia continues to seek a balance between strengthening national security and developing economic ties, which contributes to stability and sustainable development in the long term.

References

1. Bunevich D.S. The Crimean Crisis of 2014 and the Creation of a New Architecture of International Relations. *Konfliktologiya [Conflictology]* / Nota Bene. 2015; 2:133–139 [In Russian].
2. Gordienko D.V. Trade and Economic Cooperation between China and Russia. Opportunities for Realizing the Import Substitution Potential in the Economy of the Russian Federation. *Ekonomika i upravlenie: problemy, resheniya. [Economy and Management: Problems, Solutions]*. 2024; Vol. 1, 2(143):33–53 [In Russian].
3. Kiselev S.G. Main Trends in the Geopolitical Picture of the World. *Rossiia i regiony mira: reglobalizaciya [Russia and Regions of the World: Re-Globalization]*: Collection of Materials of the International Scientific and Practical Conference, Moscow, May 24–26, 2023. Moscow: Moscow State Linguistic University, 2023: 129–136 [In Russian].
4. New challenges and threats to the security of the Russian Federation in the context of global and local transformations: monograph / col. of authors; under the general ed. of S.V. Ustinkin, A.V. Nikitin. Moscow: RUSAINS, 2023:388 [In Russian].
5. Soynikov A.A., Galchenko S.I. Belovezh Accords: background and consequences. *Uchenye zapiski. Elektronnyj nauchnyj zhurnal Kurskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. [Scientific notes. Electronic scientific journal of Kursk State University]*. 2021; 2(58):25–32 [In Russian].
6. Koizumi Yu. 4 Japan-Russia Relations and Security: The Japanese Perspective. *Handbook of Japan-Russia Relations*, ed. by Dmitry Streltsov and Kazuhiko Togo, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2024:56–72 [In English].
7. Lobo S.J. Russia in the Indo-Pacific through Multipolarity, Eurasian Integration, and the RFE. *The New World Politics of the Indo-Pacific*. Routledge India, 2024:89–102 [In English].
8. Song W. Between autonomy and alliance: the evolution of South Korea's alliance management strategy. *China International Strategy Review*. 2024, 6:139–155 [In English].

About the authors

Ilya A. KONOVALOV. Postgraduate student of the Department of Political Science of the Moscow State Linguistic University. <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2278-8081>. Address: 38, building 1, Ostozhenka str., Moscow, 119034, Russian Federation. 79163235030@ya.ru

Contribution of the author

The author declares no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Received: June 8, 2024. Approved after review: July 21, 2024. Accepted for publication: August 31, 2024. Published: September 23, 2024.

The author has read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewers for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

Pragmatism and Ideology in Russian-German Energy Relations

Pavel M. Sugonyaev✉

Moscow State Linguistic University, Moscow, Russia

sugonyaevpavel@gmail.com, <https://orcid.org/0009-0007-3127-5911>

Abstract. For a long time, cooperation between Russia and Germany in the energy sector was based on bilateral interests and economic pragmatism, but recently in its relations with Russia the Federal Republic of Germany has been demonstrating ideologisation and loss of sovereignty in the important sphere of energy supply. This article investigated the history of bilateral energy relations, their characteristics, the political consequences of their disruption, and the results of the German energy policy. The results of the study include quantitative data on the volume of energy co-operation between the two states in the energy sector, as well as the status and dynamics of the German energy sector over the last 30 years. The main conclusions of the study are: 1) the thesis of Germany's declining opportunities on the world stage because of its shrinking economic power has been proved. 2) The assumption of the importance of low-cost energy supplies from Russia for Germany has been confirmed. 3) The vulnerability of the German political system to external influence through destructive political forces has been revealed. The final conclusion was that ideology has taken priority over pragmatism in German energy and foreign policy towards Russia in recent years.

Keywords: energy policy, energy supply foreign policy, Germany, ideology, pragmatism, Russia

For citation: Sugonyaev P.M. Pragmatism and Ideology in Russian-German Energy Relations. *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue*. 2024; 3(13): 47-60, [doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3\(13\)-47-60](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-47-60)

Introduction

The mutually beneficial German-Russian energy partnership, which had been built over the past fifty years, was suspended with the start of a special military operation by Russia. Later, during the still undisclosed destruction of one of the branches of the Nord Stream project in September 2022, cooperation was seriously complicated due to damage to the gas pipeline infrastructure. At the same time, the possibility of supplying energy resources from Russia to Germany still remains. Our country demonstrates its interest in energy partnership. At the same time, Germany, one of the main beneficiaries of cooperation, voluntarily refuses Russian energy resources, which causes considerable economic damage to it. In Berlin, there is still a surprising political unanimity on this issue, while Germany is actively developing the concept of energy transition in parallel with the rejection of nuclear and coal energy. In this regard, the question arises: how pragmatic or still ideological was the step of the German authorities to curtail bilateral energy cooperation.

Materials and Methods

The materials of the study were official statistical data on the export and import of energy resources of Russia and Germany, respectively, research materials of experts and “think tanks” on this topic, data of foreign and Russian mass media.

During the preparation of the article, dissertation studies [5, 7, etc.], materials of publications in scientific journals [1-2, 4, 6, 9], scientific materials in foreign languages [10-12] and scientific literature [3, 8] were analyzed.

The scientific methods used in the article were the method of statistical analysis, the method of document analysis, the method of synthesis and classification in the course of preparing information tables on the topic. The comparison method was used in the course of comparing data on the energy sector of Germany in 1990 and 2022, the deduction method was applied to identify the vulnerabilities of the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Results

Successful bilateral energy cooperation between Russia and Germany was curtailed by the German side under pressure from external forces and contrary to its own national interests. This step had a direct impact on Germany's opportunities in the world, since its political weight on the world stage is determined by the economy.



The beginning of a successful cooperation

Energy cooperation between states means trade in electricity or the main types of fossil fuels, such as hard or brown coal, oil, natural gas or nuclear fuel, between an energy-rich exporting state and an energy-poor importing state. The history of economic relations between Russia and Germany goes back centuries. At the same time, the starting point in the history of the energy partnership between the parties can be easily found: at the height of the Cold War, after a change in the ruling coalition, and also due to economic necessity, Germany began to establish relations with the states of the socialist camp in the form of the “New Eastern Policy” proclaimed by the Social Democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969-1974). The “gas-pipelines” deal and the Moscow Treaty of 1970¹ provided a solid foundation for mutual partnership. In the 1970s, new deals were being concluded, and the volume of pipes and natural gas in exchange for them was increasing, despite active US attempts to prevent this [6:18-19]. Under Brandt, the share of Soviet gas rose to 5% of Germany’s total natural gas imports [8:125–127].

During the reign of the next Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt (1974–1982), the share of Soviet gas was already close to 40%. Helmut Kohl (1982–1998) increased the share to half in the late 1980s, and under him the percentage of Soviet gas did not fall below 40%. Under the government of Gerhard Schröder (1998–2005), approximately the same dynamics were maintained – from 40 to 45% of gas imports. Under Angela Merkel (2005–2021), gas supplies from Russia to Germany reached their maximum level and exceeded the 55% mark [2:206–423]. According to Gazprom, the dynamics of gas supplies to Europe over 40 years (from 1973 to 2013) demonstrated an increase from 1.1 billion m³ to 40.2 billion m³², which shows an increase of 3646%. With the growing problems caused by increasing dependence on transit countries, Russia and Germany carried out a large-scale project to build Nord Stream 1 in 2005–2012 [7:20], which directly connected them and caused a flurry of criticism against Germany from its European partners. The matter was not limited to the flows alone – both at the interstate and private company levels, joint work in the gas sector continued actively [12:13–14]. In 2007, Germany was second after the entire CIS among buyers of Russian natural gas, and in 2021, it was already in first place [3:243–261]. Accordingly, the importance of mutual cooperation has increased significantly over this period of time.

In 2019, the share of gas from Russia amounted to 50.7% of all gas imports³. In 2020, the share remained high, the following year it was at 55% and falls in 2022 to 20% against the backdrop of the Ukrainian conflict⁴. Other data show that the increase in Russia’s “blue

1 On the Moscow Treaty between the USSR and the FRG. Historical and Documentary Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available from:

2 40 years on the German market. Gazprom. 2013. Available from: <https://www.gazprom.ru/about/history/events/germany40/>.

3 Afanasyeva M. History and prospects of energy deals between Russia and Germany against the background of US sanctions and green energy policy. Available from: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/columns/europeanpolicy/istoriya-i-perspektivy-energeticheskikh-sdelok-mezhdu-rossiei-i-germaniei-na-fone-sanktsiy-ssha-i-ze/?sphrase_id=96231381.

4 Germany cuts Russian share in gas use by more than half in 2022. Bloomberg. 2022. Available from: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-12-20/germany-cuts-russian-share-in-gas-use-by-more-than-half-in-2022>.

fuel” exports increased slightly from 1992 to 2021 (by 13 billion m³). In 2022, supplies fell by almost 60 billion m³. Further developments in 2023 and 2024 show a gradual decrease in Russian gas imports to zero from September 2022⁵ (as shown in Table 1). The data provided show the actual absence of physical supplies of natural gas from Russia or transit countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic or Austria, and at the same time the replacement of volumes with gas from Norway and the Netherlands in 2023 and 2024.⁶

Table 1. The share of Russian gas in German imports under different governments

Federal Government	Share of Russian gas in German imports
W.Brandt (1969–1974)	5%
G.Schmidt (1974–1982)	40%
G.Kohl (1982–1998)	50%
G.Schröder (1998–2005)	45%
A.Merkel (2005–2021)	55%
O.Scholz (since 2021)	0%

It turns out that the Social Democrat Olaf Scholz (Chancellor of Germany since 2021) and the government of the “traffic light” coalition, in which the Green Party and the Free Party of Germany play an important role, have drastically reduced the import of Russian gas into the country, citing this primarily as an escalation in the Ukrainian conflict. German media happily wrote about the replacement of Russian gas supplies with Norwegian gas⁷. German experts began to criticize gas cooperation with Russia. The reason for the criticism was the ignoring of geopolitical risks (too high dependence on supplies from Russia), as well as the emergence of problems with European structures, and at the same time as the energy transition, the rejection of nuclear energy, attempts are being made to justify the shortcomings of cooperation with Russia by high gas prices for German industry [11:373–393]. Other experts predicted the consequences of a possible halt in energy imports from Russia (a risk for the German economy as a consequence of Germany’s high dependence on Russian supplies), while the main problems would arise with gas supplies. The German economy was advised to prepare in this case for savings and a gradual replacement of fossil fuels with renewable energy sources. In order to reduce dependence on energy imports, Germany needs to maintain high prices for fossil fuels for as long as possible in order to create more incentives for their replacement with renewable energy sources [10:14].

In the oil sector, cooperation between Russia and Germany has also been actively

5 Import volume of natural gas from Russia in Germany from June 2021 to June 2023. Statista. 2023. Available from: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1332783/german-gas-imports-from-russia/>.

6 Erdgasdaten aktuell. BDEW Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft. 2023. Available from: <https://www.bdew.de/energie/aktuelle-entwicklungen-zu-erdgasdaten/>.

7 Deutschland kompensiert russische Gaslücke. Zeit Online. 2023. Available from: <https://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2023-03/deutschland-erdgas-versorgung-russland-kompensiert-netzagentur>.

developing. In general, from 1992 to 2021, exports of oil and oil products from Russia have grown almost threefold. In 2000, Germany was in fourth place among importers of Russian oil, and from 2016 to 2021, it was consistently in third place after China and the Netherlands [3:354–355]. Just as in the situation with gas, the partnership between the two countries has been growing, and the network of oil pipelines has been actively developing. Thus, since the 1960s, the Druzhba oil pipeline was built through the territory of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the GDR, as well as the Baltic Pipeline System (BPS-1 in 2001 and BPS-2 in 2006), which bypassed transit countries from among the post-Soviet countries and former allies in the socialist camp.⁸

Although from 1950 to 1985 the main suppliers of oil to the German market remained the states of the Middle East and Africa, Russia managed to overtake them in terms of supply volumes due to the unstable political situation in the region⁹. As a result, Russia has managed to become the largest supplier of “black gold” to Germany since 2008, twice surpassing the UK, which is in second place among the main suppliers of oil to Germany. Since 2019, Germany has begun to hide data on oil supplies¹⁰, they were published again in connection with Germany’s policy of refusing all energy resources from Russia, primarily gas and oil (shown in Table 2). At the beginning of 2022, the main buyers of Russian oil were the United States and European countries (including Germany), which used an extensive system of oil pipelines and contacts developed over the years. However, by the beginning of 2023, there were noticeably fewer European buyers of Russian oil than Asian and African ones. Of particular interest is the fact that Europe began to purchase huge quantities of oil products from countries such as Brazil and India, which, in turn, seriously increased their oil imports from Russia¹¹.

German statistics show that various federal states imported oil from Russia until October 2022 and coal until February 2024.¹² According to German data, the extremely high share of Russian oil products remains (34% in 2021 and 25% in 2022) and Russia’s share in oil imports will decrease to zero in 2023. The Russian share in imports was shared primarily by Norway, the US and the UK, the share of imported diesel also decreased to 5% in 2023 (a

8 Pechishcheva L. Russian-German ‘gas’ and ‘oil’ relations. Available from: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/columns/europeanpolicy/rossiysko-germanskies-gazovye-i-neftyanye-otnosheniya/>.

9 Energy resources in Germany. Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources. Available from: https://www.bgr.bund.de/EN/Themen/Energie/Downloads/Energierohstoffe_2009_Teil3_en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.

10 Afanasyeva M. History and prospects of energy deals between Russia and Germany against the background of US sanctions and green energy policy. Available from: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/columns/europeanpolicy/istoriya-i-perspektivy-energeticheskikh-sdelok-mezhdu-rossiyei-i-germaniei-na-fone-sanktsiy-ssha-i-ze/?sphrase_id=96231381.

11 Export of petroleum products from Russia. TADVISER. 2023. Available from: https://www.tadviser.ru/index.php/%D0%A1%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8F:%D0%AD%D0%BA%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%82_%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%84%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B4%D1%83%D0%BA%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%B2_%D0%B8%D0%B7_%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B8.

12 Exports and imports (foreign trade): Länder, months, countries, classifications of trading goods. DeStatis. 2024. Available from: <https://www.genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online?operation=abrufabelleBearbeiten&levelindex=1&levelid=1714814795721&auswahloperation=abrufabelleAuspruegungAuswaehlen&auswahlverzeichnis=ordnungsstruktur&auswahlziel=werteabruf&code=51000-0037&auswahltext=&wertauswahl=253&wertauswahl=257&wertauswahl=254&nummer=10&variable=10&name=GP19B2#astructure>.

reduction of 85%)¹³. In addition, Western countries have jointly set a price ceiling on Russian oil, which has led to a decrease in Russian oil exports to Europe and an increase in oil prices on the continent. However, the lack of a sensible control mechanism and the nature of market relations will leave no chance for a price ceiling in the long term [9:540-541].

Table 2. Oil imports from Germany, the main supply region

Decade	Main region of German oil imports
1950s	Middle East
1960s	Middle East
1970s	Africa
1980s	USSR
1990s	Western Europe
2000s	Russia
2010s	Russia
2020–2024	Western Europe and the USA

There was practically no cooperation between the two countries in the nuclear field, because Russia and Germany use different types of reactors designed for different types of fuel (Germany promptly closed all Soviet-type nuclear power plants on its territory), respectively, Germany until recently cooperated with other actors in this field.

Energy cooperation in the coal sector between Russia and Germany began in the post-Soviet period of Russian history. Coal exports in the country have grown significantly since 1992, almost 6 times, brown coal - almost 30 times with maximum deliveries in 2022 and 2021, Germany was also a buyer of Russian raw materials. The share of Germany in total Russian exports has increased significantly since 2009, the country was in eighth place among buyers of Russian coal in 2021 [3:259–261]. However, due to the beginning of the NWO, Germany decided to cut ties with Russia in this area as well. The share of hard coal from the Russian Federation in 2021 remained consistently high and significantly exceeded the total supplies from other countries due to the geographical factor and the established cooperation scheme. Until July 2022, the Russian share was more than 50%, and in September 2023 it was already almost zero¹⁴. However, thanks to the momentum gained and the need for time to find new suppliers and reorient towards them, Russia remained the largest supplier of coal to the domestic market of Germany in 2022.¹⁵

13 Mineralöldaten 2023. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Energiebilanzen. 2023. Available from: <https://ag-energiebilanzen.de/daten-und-fakten/zusatzinformationen/>.

14 PEV-Schätzung Steinkohle im 1. bis 4. Quartal 2023. Schätzung der EEFA-Forschungsinstituts. Steinkohlendaten 2023. Available from: <https://ag-energiebilanzen.de/daten-und-fakten/zusatzinformationen/>.

15 Russia was the largest supplier of coal to Germany in 2022, the media reports. RIA Novosti. 25.02.2023. Available from: <https://ria.ru/20230225/ugol-1854265467.html>.

Thus, the events of 2022, according to some German officials about the formal end of the era of Russian-German cooperation, became a decisive blow to bilateral relations. The beginning was laid by the sanctions regime of 2014, although there is an opposite opinion about the finality of the break, G. Schroeder, who is confident in the resumption of future energy cooperation [2:182]. The same picture is observed in all three areas: Germany, due to ideology and solidarity, completely breaks off the special energy relations with Russia that have lasted for decades, based on an already existing infrastructure. In return, the Germans overpay for the supply of all fossil resources and are forced to build new supply chains in a crisis situation. Obviously, such a step is contrary to Germany's interests in further economic development, which has traditionally been built on profitable supplies of resources and energy carriers.

Political consequences of the end of energy cooperation with Russia

The consequences of the breakdown in energy relations between Russia and Germany have hit both sides hard. First, even despite the predictions of German experts, cooperation with Russia meant an era of cheap energy for Germany. After the end of dependence on energy resources from Russia, Germany became dependent on other energy exporters, primarily the United States, which is not only a seller of expensive liquefied natural gas, subject to serious seasonal price fluctuations, but also a direct competitor of Germany¹⁶.

Moreover, Germany, having sacrificed pragmatism and good established relations with Russia, found itself in a new geopolitical reality, where it participates with limited sovereignty in the confrontation between Washington and its competitors in the form of Russia at present and China in the future. At the same time, Germany itself declared Russia to be the greatest threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area in its National Security Strategy and accused Russia of undermining Germany's security through energy cooperation [1:74]. In addition, the energy crisis also affected domestic policy, since the ideology of abandoning fossil fuels was ultimately revised in an attempt to curb rising energy prices, which caused conflicts within the Green Party, the main lobbyist for the green course and energy transition. Disagreements arose within the party between realists and supporters of traditional environmental values. The further growth of government spending (energy crisis and economic downturn) and the state's attempts to reduce support measures for the population have led to an increase in protest activity and the mobilization of supporters of non-systemic parties, such as the Alternative for Germany. All this indicates a further complication of the socio-economic situation in the country, a gradual loss of sovereignty, and a departure from national interests [6:305-310]. This situation will have domestic and foreign policy consequences.

¹⁶ Deutsche Unternehmen mit Rekordinvestitionen in den USA – „Wir fallen derzeit zurück“. Merkur. 2024. Available from: <https://www.merkur.de/wirtschaft/deutsche-unternehmen-mit-rekordinvestitionen-in-den-usa-inflation-reduction-act-zr-92849203.html>.

The results of German energy policy (shown in Table 1)

To assess the importance of Germany's cooperation with Russia in the energy sector, as well as to assess the political consequences of abandoning the partnership with Russia, it is necessary to compare the state of the German energy sector in 1990 and 2022.¹⁷ Below, the data is collected and grouped in a table compiled by the author.

Table 3. German energy dynamics, from 1990 to 2022

Indicator	1990	2022	Dynamics
Total energy consumption, Mt oil equivalent	352	270	-23,3%
Own energy production, Mt oil equivalent	187	96	-48,7%
Energy intensity, t of conventional fuel/unit of GDP	0,130	0,065	-50,0%
Electricity production, TWh	550	578	+5,0%
Coal production, million t	434	131	-69,8%
Coal consumption, million t	449	168	-62,6%
Oil production, million t	5	3	-40,0%
Oil product production, million t	106	98	-7,5%
Oil product consumption, million t	119	92	-22,7%
Natural gas production, billion m3	19	5	-73,7%
Natural gas consumption, billion m3	70	83	+18,6%
Share of renewable energy sources in the energy balance, %	3,9	44,4	+40,5
Share of solar and wind power plants in the energy balance, %	0	32,5	+32,5
Carbon emissions, million tons	964	636	-34,0%
Electricity production at nuclear power plants, TWh	144,6	6,8	-95,3%

Total energy consumption from 1990 to 2022 fell by almost a quarter, and domestic production fell by almost half. To compensate for this decline, the energy intensity of the economy fell significantly - almost by half, with electricity production growing by only 5% over 20 years. Following the reduction in energy consumption, coal production and consumption fell significantly (by 70 and 60%, respectively), oil production, and the production and consumption of petroleum products (Germany's own meager oil production fell slightly, as did the production of petroleum products; petroleum product consumption fell by 20%). Domestic gas production fell by almost three-quarters, although also insignificant in volume. Gas consumption, in turn, grew by almost 20%.

¹⁷ Enerdata. World Energy and Climate Data. 2023. Available from: <https://energystats.enerdata.net/>.

AG Energiebilanzen. 2023. Available from: https://ag-energiebilanzen.de/daten-und-fakten/bilanzen-1990-bis-2030/?wpv-jahresbereich-bilanz=1990-2000&wpv_aux_current_post_id=45&wpv_aux_parent_post_id=45&wpv_view_count=2753-CATRe4257049c177cf191052746afc46d0a3.

Nuclear power generation experienced a real collapse due to the closure of the last nuclear power plant in April 2023.¹⁸, 20 times (in 2024, no nuclear energy will be produced in Germany at all). At the same time, one cannot fail to note the significant growth of renewable energy to 40%, and wind and solar generation to 32.5% in the country's energy balance and a reduction in carbon emissions by almost a third (which, however, is also associated with the closure of many industries and power plants in the territory of the former GDR).

Discussion

Thus, even despite the reduction in consumption of coal, oil and nuclear energy, energy efficiency and the share of generation from renewable energy sources have increased, and carbon emissions have decreased. Against this background, the indicator of consumption of natural gas stands out, of which Russia has long been a proven exporter. In general, the state and dynamics of the German energy sector over the past thirty years allow us to conclude that the economy has developed insignificantly, which reflects Germany's political weight on the world stage. Germany's attempts to increase its energy security by relying on renewable energy sources, on the one hand, help to become less dependent on supplies from abroad, but on the other hand, they pose a number of new and still unresolved problems for the energy system [4:98-106]; in addition, the state is becoming dependent on suppliers of equipment for solar and wind generation. Dependence reaches a new level, and the energy system becomes even more fragile, which threatens economic development and, accordingly, the positioning of Germany on the world stage. At the same time, the need for energy resources does not disappear, and the search for new partners along with the establishment of new supply routes leads to an additional increase in the cost of energy resources and electricity in the country. In addition, greater dependence on Euro-Atlantic partners will lead to an even greater renunciation of sovereignty and its own interests, which will make Germany only an instrument of the policies of other actors.

Conclusions

In the recent past, the volume of bilateral energy cooperation between Russia and Germany was impressive, which met the interests of both parties: Germany needed cheap energy resources and a large market, Russia needed technology and high-tech industrial goods. However, since 2014, the German authorities have chosen the path of open competition with Russia through sanctions. The German political system once again proclaimed its loyalty to the Euro-Atlantic path and its lack of alternatives; politicians who

¹⁸ Die letzten Atommeiler sind abgeschaltet. Tagesschau. 2023. Available from: <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/atomkraftwerke-stilllegung-105.html>.

were skeptical about energy cooperation with Russia and promoted expensive ideas of "green" energy were able to come to power.

In fact, the German political class, through its own efforts, destroyed the profitable energy partnership with Russia, opposed common sense and economic pragmatism, undermining the economy, which directly ensures Germany's weight and opportunities on the world stage. The German political system was unable to ensure sustainable adherence to national interests and resist the destructive influence of supranational structures and foreign players. The justification for this policy was the fictitious threat from Russia in the form of cutting off energy supplies to Germany and using gas as a weapon. Despite all these fantasies, weapons were actually used against Germany, damaging its strategic gas infrastructure, which, however, was attributed to Russia's actions.

References

1. Belozyorov V.K. Germany is constructing a strategic culture. Thoughts after the release of the German National Security Strategy. *Rossiya v globalnoy politike* [Russia in global politics]. 2023; 21(123):166–177 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.31278/1810-6439-2023-21-5-166-177>.
2. Gladkov I.S. Germany's foreign trade relations: trends of the past decade. *Vlast'* [Power]. 2022; 3: 177–184 [In Russian].
3. Kalabekov I.G. Russian Reforms in Figures and Facts, 2008-2023. Moscow: RUSAKI, 2010:498 [In Russian].
4. Kotre S. Energy policy of the German Federal Government: a shift away from a market economy. *Gosudarstvennaya sluzhba* [State service]. 2019;6(122):96–106 [In Russian].
5. Parusova K.A. Development of mutual relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Russian Federation in the sphere of energy: Historical and International Aspects of the Problem]: Abstract of Theses. ... CandSc (Hist.): 07.00.15. Nizhniy Novgorod, 2005:25 [In Russian].
6. Rukavitsin P.M. Russian-German energy co-operation: paradigm shift and its economic and political implications for Germany. *Izvestiya Saratovskogo Universiteta. Novaya Seriya. Seriya: Sotsiologiya. Politologiya* [Proceedings of Saratov University. New series. Series: Sociology. Political science]. 2023; 23(3):303–312 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.18500/1818-9601-2023-23-3-303-312>.
7. Smirnov S.V. Development of cooperation between the USSR and Germany, Russia and Germany in the energy sector in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries: Abstract of Theses ... CandSc (Polit.): 07.00.03. Moscow, 2013:24 [In Russian].
8. Sumin A.M. Energy Policy of Modern Germany: Trends, Problems, Prospects. Moscow: Gazoil press, 2017:216 [In Russian].
9. Hassan S.L. Comparison of European oil market factors before and after the Russian crude oil price cap was imposed. *Economicheskije nauki* [Economics]. 2023; 5(222):537–541 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.14451/1.222.537>.
10. Bachmann R., Baqaee D., Bayer Ch., Kuhn M., Löschel A., Moll B., Peichl A., Pittel K., Schularick M. What if...? The economic impact of a ban on Russian energy supplies to Germany. *ECONtribute Policy Brief Series*. 2022; 29:21 [In German].
11. Umbach F. Strategic errors, mistakes and misjudgements in German energy policy since 2002]. *SIRIUS*. 2022; 6(4):373–393 [In German].
12. Westphal K. German-Russian gas relations in face of the energy transition. *Russian Journal of Economics*. 2020; 6:406–423 [In English].

About the authors

Pavel M. SUGONYAEV. Postgraduate student of the Department of Political Science of the Moscow State Linguistic University. <https://orcid.org/0009-0007-3127-5911>. Address: 11, Tverskaya, Moscow, 125993, Russian Federation. sugonyaevpavel@gmail.com

Contribution of the author

The author declares no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Received: May 23, 2024. Approved after review: July 17, 2024. Accepted for publication: August 31, 2024. Published: September 23, 2024.

The author has read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewers for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROCESSES

International Relations, Global and Regional Studies

Original article

Political Sciences

[https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3\(13\)-61-77](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-61-77)

Arab Countries' Interest in Integration in Eurasia: Tactics or Strategy?

Igor A. Matveev✉

Financial University Under the Government of the Russian Federation,
Moscow, Russia

iamatveev@mail.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4611-5669>

Abstract. In the situation of transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world, the tasks of developing a dialogue with the Arab world are set out in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation for 2023. In contrast to the “senior-junior” concept developed by the West, in which the allegedly “natural” leading role is unfairly assigned to Western powers and which causes growing resistance from the states of the Global South, Russia proposes that its Arab partners form relations based on a fair consideration of each other’s interests. The Arab ruling circles, experts, and the “Arab street” increasingly perceive Russia as a state-civilization that is not only located in Eurasia, but is also a driving force for the integration of the Non-West. Of particular interest is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a platform for generating ideas and coordinating between the emerging centers of power represented by India, China, and Russia, especially after Iran, a regional rival of Saudi Arabia, became a member of the SCO in 2023. Is the Arab interest in the Eurasian Non-West strategic or tactical, being in the second case aimed solely at exerting pressure on the West to obtain maximum concessions? This is a difficult, but key question that requires an answer from experts, which explains the relevance of this article. In his study, the author uses situational analysis tools, including content analysis methods, force field analysis and data visualization. The author concludes that the interest of Arab countries in integration in Eurasia, including cooperation with Russia, is predominantly strategic.

Keywords: Eurasia, Russia, Arab world, Non-West, Global South, Arc of Instability, regional conflict

For citation: Matveev I.A. Arab Countries' Interest in Integration in Eurasia: Tactics or Strategy? *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue*. 2024; 3(13): 61-77, [doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3\(13\)-61-77](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-61-77)

Introduction

The object of our study is the Eurasian geopolitical space, the western European borders of which, unlike the southern, eastern and northern borders delineated by the Indian, Pacific and Arctic Oceans, do not coincide with the geographical boundaries of

the Eurasian continent. One cannot but agree with S.Y.Kozmenko, who, referring to the construction of a geopolitical and economic atlas of the world based on the conjugation of space in the system “continent vs. ocean”, concludes that Europe is not a single geopolitical construction, since the line of contact between maritime and continental civilizations passes here [12:123].

Given the practical orientation of the article, the subject of which is not the ideological foundations of Eurasianism, whether it is the concept of “continent-ocean” formulated by P.N.Savitsky [16:104], or the ideologeme “Russia – Eurasia”, asserting the theoretical status of Eurasian civilization¹, it makes sense to focus on the analysis of the “eastern vector” of Eurasianism. Its theorist is the same P.N.Savitsky, who spoke about the important role of the East in the history of Russia [17:1–12], another Russian founder of Eurasianism G.V.Vernadsky noted the spread of the Russian state to the east with the colonization of Siberia, which became for Russia like America for Spain and India for England [3:62–63].

The purpose of the study is to prove the hypothesis about the strategic nature of the Arabs' interest in Eurasia, and its tasks are to form the basis of arguments. The novelty of the study consists in studying the motives of Arab countries in developing relations with Eurasia as a geopolitical rather than geographical space, i.e. with the Eurasian Non-West, in line with the modern trend in the theory of international relations, when the dominance of the West in the field of theory is challenged by internationalists from China, India and other Asian countries [1:217].

Materials and Methods


The author, resorting to content analysis, relied on a wide range of Russian and foreign sources, including documents and statements of officials. Among them are the version of the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation dated March 31, 2023, V.V.Putin's program article “On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, S.V.Lavrov's comments for the media.

Theoretically useful were S.Huntington's treatise “The Clash of Civilizations and the Transformation of World Order” and the monograph “Eurasian Arc of Instability and the Problems of Regional Security from East Asia to North Africa: the Results of 2016” [9], article by L.A.Zhuravleva, E.V.Zarubina, A.V.Ruchkin, N.N.Simachkova, I.P.Chupina “State-civilization: concept, essence, structure” describing the transition from the traditional (linear) to a new civilizational methodological paradigm of social and human sciences [10:85].

Materials of international organizations, in particular, the UN Conference on Trade and Development and the Independent Commission on International Development (Brandt

¹ In particular, the works of the modern Russian researcher I.F.Kefeli are devoted to the ideology of “Russia – Eurasia”, where this problem is analyzed using a synthesis of historical and geographical knowledge, with reference to the products of the creative searches of G.V.Vernadsky and P.N.Savitsky. [11:12].

Figure 1. Assessment of Strategic and Tactical Guidelines of Arab Countries in Terms of Integration in Eurasia




Source: compiled by the author using the basic method of Kurt Lewin [20]

Report), data from the electronic resources of integration associations and organizations involving Eurasian and Arab countries, including the SCO, were used.

The research was based on the principle of the unity of theory and practice, assuming the correlation of theoretical provisions concerning multipolarity, civilizations, North-South dichotomy and integration in the Eurasian space with the facts obtained by the author empirically – during business trips to Arab countries, in conversations with officials, businessmen and diplomats.

To summarize this information, infographics (maps, drawings) were used with the help of data visualization. The author supplemented the geographical maps available in the public domain on the Internet, including those of the Maghreb and Mashreq, indicating the borders of the West / Non-West and Eurasian Non-West in the Middle East and North Africa macro-region, updated the map of the Eurasian arc of instability prepared by St. Petersburg University in 2016, and mapped conflicts, challenges and threats.

It is worth mentioning force-field analysis, the founder of which is considered to be Kurt Lewin. This method, which is used in the social sciences to identify forces in favor of or against changes in the status quo in a highly competitive environment, was adapted by the author to a comparative assessment of tactical and strategic imperatives that determine the interest of Arab countries in integration in Eurasia (Figure 1):

Figure 2. Territorial Structure of the Arab World and Its borders with the West and Non-West


Results

Currently, the mutual attraction between the Eurasian geopolitical space and the Arab world is determined by a complex of factors. Note the following:

1. Geographical factor.

"The Arab World" (Arabic. al-Watan al-Arabiyy) is a concept that was popularized after the Second World War by ideologists of Arab nationalism (Michel Aflak and others), designating in documents of that time, for example, in the Program of the Syrian Arab Renaissance Party in 1947, "the territory located between the Taurus and Bolshoy Zab mountain ranges, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, The Ethiopian Highlands and Greater Sahara, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea" [cit. according to: 15:73]. For the purpose and objectives of this article, the "Arab world" refers to the totality of the 22 member countries of the League of Arab States (LAS), covering mainly the macroregion known as the Middle East and North Africa². 110 States are located in Africa and the remaining 12 in Asia (Figure 2).

² The term Middle East and North Africa, MENA is used in the scientific and expert community, as well as in documents of the UN, the World Bank and other international organizations: MENA / United Nations Global Compact. N/d. Available from: <https://unglobalcompact.org/engage-locally/mena> (accessed 17.05.2024); Middle East and North Africa: Overview. The World Bank – official website. 15 Dec 2021. Available from: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/overview>.

Figure 3. Eurasian Arc of Instability

Source: the author updated the map prepared in 2016 at St. Petersburg State University to the state of 2024 [9]

Thus, part of the Mashreq – the east of the Arab world, which includes the Asian countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, or Levant (Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Palestinian territories), Mesopotamia (Iraq) and the Persian Gulf subregion (Bahrain, Yemen, Qatar, Kuwait, Kuwait, UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia), is located on the Eurasian continent. The other part of the Mashreq, combining Egypt and East African states (Djibouti, Comoros, Somalia, Sudan), is adjacent to Eurasia. Arab West – Maghreb³, which includes the countries of North-West Africa (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia), despite its greater remoteness from the Asian part of Eurasia (with proximity to Europe) than Mashreq, is still connected with Eurasia by the commonality of geopolitical and geo-economic challenges.

2. Geopolitical factor.

Analyzing the Eurasian Neo-West – while the Arab countries' relations with the European West are subject to a different logic – it becomes clear that in the process of creating a multipolar world, which Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov rightly called "unstoppable"⁴, The imperatives of the countries of Eurasia and the

³ Maghreb / Nikonov V.A. Concise toponymic dictionary. Moscow: Mysl, 1966. P. 247.

⁴ Lavrov considered futile attempts to stop the development of multipolarity centers / RBC, January 27, 2023. Available from: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/27/01/2023/63d316379a79476461e6e74b>.

Arab world are converging or coinciding. This means their desire to ensure their national sovereignty, a decent place in the global economy and sustainable access to the achievements of scientific and technological progress. It is not for nothing that S.V.Lavrov included Egypt and the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf among the promising centers of multipolarity, along with the leading Eurasian powers represented by India and China⁵. It is worth agreeing with N.Y.Surkov, who speaks about “the rapprochement of Arab countries with Asia within the framework of the turn to the East” and “diversification of the foreign policy of Arab countries in line with the desire to ensure their strategic autonomy through participation in Non-Western integration associations” [18:95].

As for the geopolitical challenge of regional conflicts (internal, between states, states and non-state actors) common to the Eurasian Non-West and the Arab world, they all form the Eurasian arc of instability (Figure 3), which, as S.N.Kolotov reasonably notes, “for the first time in history extends from the Pacific to the Atlantic Ocean [i.e., covering both Eurasia proper and the neighboring territories of Africa. – Author’s note] and has numerous offshoots, which, like tentacles, entangle the countries and regions caught in its sphere of influence, plunging them into the abyss of long-term controlled destabilization” [13:28].

As the Israeli-Palestinian escalation that began on October 7, 2023 shows, the risks of destabilization turning into a partially or even completely uncontrollable clash (“big war”) are increasing due to the growing interdependence of conflicts. We are talking about a “mini-arc of instability” in the Middle East, which took shape as a result of military clashes between the West and the Yemeni Houthis in the Red Sea, the war in Gaza, the military confrontation between Israel and Iran and its Iranian allies – “Iran” in Lebanon and Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq.

3. The civilizational factor.

There are difficulties in defining the boundaries of the West and Non-West in Eurasia: Thus, in the mid-1990s, Samuel Huntington referred the countries of Northern, Western, and partly Southern Europe to the West, with the exception of the Balkans, Eastern and Central Europe without the states of the former eastern camp [19:26-27]. Another American scientist, Stephen Kotkin, whose approach seems more logical, guided not by geography, but by a value-institutional principle, argued that European Russia is not the West, while Asian Japan, sharing Western values, is part of the West⁶.

Life proves the isolation of the West in historical, value and religious terms from Non-Western Eurasian civilizations, which, according to S.Huntington [19], includes the Islamic civilization (Islamic world), uniting the Arab Maghreb and Mashreq with Eurasia. In this case, the Eurasian Non-West covers 27 out of 57 countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, if we include Albania (a member of the

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Remnick D. The Weakness of the Despot: An Expert on Stalin Discusses Putin, Russia, and the West. *The New Yorker*. 11 Mar 2022. Available from: <https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/stephen-kotkin-putin-russia-ukraine-stalin>.

Organization of Islamic Cooperation) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (an observer in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) to the West. Thus, according to S.Huntington, the Orthodox civilization with its bastion – Russia, which is in inseparable historical and spiritual connection with the socio-cultural phenomenon of the ‘Russian world’, which, by analogy with the Islamic world, as V.V.Ksenofontov correctly notes, is based on a religious – Orthodox foundation [14:207], and now – on the Islamic one as well.

A.G.Dugin, the founder of Neo-Eurasianism. Dugin distinguishes among the civilizations located ‘on the other side of the West’ (in Eurasia or on the lands adjacent to it) Indo-European civilizations (Indian and Iranian) [5], non-Indo-European civilizations (Chinese, Japanese, African, Pacific) [7], the civilization of the African Nord [8] and the civilizations of the frontiers: Russian (Eurasian), Semitic, including Arabian-Islamic, Turkish [6]. Which, in our opinion, corresponds more clearly than S. Huntington’s and S. Kotkin’s notion of the Eurasian Non-West discussed in this article.

The key component of the civilizational factor is the self-perception by the emerging centers of power in Eurasia of their identity in line with the new paradigm of civilizational states. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2023 defines ‘Russia’s special position as a distinctive state-civilization, a vast Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power, which united the Russian people and other nations that make up the cultural and civilizational community of the Russian world’. O.H.Bardakchian rightly calls China a textbook example of a state-civilization, referring to the longevity and clear cultural continuity of Chinese dynasties and political regimes [2:11], A.G.Volodin also includes India and Iran among Eurasian states-civilizations [4:106].


Despite the failure of attempts to unite the Arab countries in the second half of the 20th century (the creation of the United Arab Republic in Egypt and Syria, etc.), as a result of which the modern Arab world has not become a single state by analogy with the Arab early medieval caliphates, the imperative of integration has not completely faded here. This fact stimulates the growing interest of Arab elites in dialogues with established states-civilizations of Eurasia, such as Russia or China.

4. Geo-economic factor.

Within the framework of the UN Conference on Trade and Development’s classification of the world’s countries by level of economic development, the absolute majority of Asian countries in Eurasia and all Arab countries are classified as developing economies or least developed countries. Only Israel, Cyprus, the Republic of Korea, Russia and Japan are recognised as developed economies (Figure 4).

This gradation correlates with Willy Brandt’s line presented back in 1980, which divided the world into a developed (‘rich’) North and a developing (‘poor’) South (Figure 5), now known as the Global North and Global South.

⁷ Decree on Approval of the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Official electronic resource of the President of Russia, 31 March 2023. Available from: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70811>.

Figure 4. UNCTAD Classification of countries by the level of economic development⁸


The tasks set out in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2023 to transform Eurasia into a common space of peace, stability, mutual trust, development and prosperity through the formation of a broad integration circuit – the Greater Eurasian Partnership – make it necessary to identify the true mood of the Arab partners. A clear understanding of whether their interest in Eurasia and Russia is driven by strategic or tactical, temporary considerations is required, which explains the relevance of this article.

Discussion

The analysis in the article, firstly, allows us to identify the vectors of foreign policy and foreign economic activities of the Arab countries in relation to the Eurasian Non-West:

- the Chinese bilateral vector implies cooperation in trade, technology, investment, and in the foreseeable future, political dialogue and military-technical cooperation;
- the Russian bilateral vector involves political dialogue and cooperation in trade and investment, including Russia's participation in ensuring food and technological security of Arab countries, as well as military-technical cooperation;
- the Indian bilateral vector is based on trade, technology and investment cooperation, assuming intensification of political dialogue and military-technical cooperation in the future;
- Central Asian – a largely one-way vector from the Arab countries towards Central Asia – includes trade, economic and investment tracks. The Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani's visit to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan in June 2023 is an illustration.

⁸ UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2023: Classification of Economies. World by Development Status. Available from: <https://hbs.unctad.org/classifications/#disclaimer>.

Figure 5. The Brandt Line⁹

Secondly, the challenges for the Eurasian Non-West and the Arab world were considered:

- Regional conflicts with a high degree of internationalization, their negative impact on the world economy and global logistics networks. These include the threat of interruption of maritime communications in the event of a military clash between China and Taiwan, the closure of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait due to the open conflict between Israel/USA and Iran, the war in Gaza, which has put on pause the laying of the transport corridor 'India – Middle East – Europe', problems with navigation in the Red Sea due to the confrontation between the Houthies and the West, and the Ukrainian crisis, which has disrupted logistics in the Black Sea;
- threats of terrorism and extremism, separatism and trans-border organised crime;
- the Eurasian arc of instability encompassing the neighbouring regions of Africa;
- US claims to global hegemony in the discourse of Leadership Mandate¹⁰ and America First Approach¹¹;
- The West's imposition of a senior/junior co-operation paradigm; pressure on Arab countries to reconsider relations with China and Russia. An example is the statement by Amit Mithi, CEO of the promising Saudi IT company Alat, on May 8, 2024, that he was ready to abandon dialogue with China at Washington's request¹². Despite the war in Gaza, the Biden

⁹ Grotlüschen A., Buddeberg K. PIAAC and the South – Is Southering the New Othering? Global Expansion of Dominant Discourses on Adult Literacy // *European Journal for Research on the Education and Learning of Adults*. 12. May 2020. P. 4. Uploaded by Buddeberg K. from the Royal Geographical Society. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341127462_PIAAC_and_the_South_-_Is_Southering_the_new_Othering_Global_Expansion_of_dominant_Discourses_on_Adult_Literacy.

¹⁰ Project 2025. Wash. DC: The Heritage Foundation, 31 Jan 2023. Available from: <https://www.heritage.org/conservatism/commentary/project-2025>.

¹¹ An America First Approach to US National Security. VA, USA: The America First Policy Institute, 9 May 2024. Available from: <https://americafirstpolicy.com/events/an-america-first-approach-to-u-s-national-security>.

¹² Halftermeyer M., Hawkins M. Saudi Arabia's \$100 Billion AI Fund Will Divest China If US Asks. Bloomberg, 8 May 2024. Available from: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-07/saudi-ai-fund-would-divest-from-china-tech-if-us-asked-ceo-says>.

administration continues to try to persuade Saudi Arabia to normalise relations with Israel, in return promising technological dividends and Saudi involvement in security in Gaza¹³. In 2021, Washington managed to bring India and the UAE along with the US and Israel into the Economic Cooperation Forum, which the world has dubbed the QUAD 2 alliance, similar to QUAD, the quadrilateral security dialogue between Australia, India, the US and Japan against China¹⁴;

- Western neo-colonialism, interference in the internal affairs of Eurasia and the Arab world: the war in Afghanistan (2001-2021), 'colour revolutions' in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004 and 2013-2014), Kyrgyzstan and Lebanon (2005), Myanmar (2007), Armenia (2018); military interventions in Iraq (2003), Libya (2011), Syria (2014), actions against the Houthis (since 2023), conducting the Arab Spring protests of 2011-2012;

- imposing Western mass culture on the peoples of Eurasia and Arabs to the detriment of traditional values. An example, as V.V. Putin rightly pointed out, is the 'anti-Russia' project¹⁵;

- tightening of Western sanctions against Russia, including secondary sanctions imposed by the United States. Back in 2017, the targets of sanctions in the Eurasian Non-Western space were Belarus, China, Iran, Iraq, DPRK, Moldova, Lebanon, Myanmar, Russia, Syria, and Yemen¹⁶; the situation hasn't changed qualitatively since then;

- Western efforts to maintain unequal relations with Eurasia and the Arab world. Use of unfair competition methods in rivalry with China: On 24 April 2024, J. Biden signed a law requiring the Chinese company 'ByteDance' to sell the popular social network 'TikTok'¹⁷ to avoid a ban on the territory of the USA¹⁸;

- threat to the food security of Eurasia and the Arab world due to the growing volatility of world markets caused by damage to logistics and falling volumes of Ukrainian agricultural exports; risks of 'famine hotspots' that are increasing against the backdrop of global warming and desertification;

- the strong technological dependence of most Eurasian Non-Western states (to a lesser extent, China, India and Russia) on the West.

Thirdly, in terms of factual evidence of the hypothesis of this study, it is advisable to refer to the fact that 6 out of 14 SCO partner countries are members of the LAS (Bahrain,

¹³ The State Department has allowed Saudi Arabia and the UAE to participate in security in the Gaza Strip. TASS, 22 May 2024. Available from: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/20867893>.

¹⁴ Quad-2: Anti-China bloc in a new package. The Star (weekly), 20 January 2022. Available from: <https://zvezdaweb.ru/news/20221181639-an4jx.html>.

¹⁵ Vladimir Putin's article 'On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians'. Official electronic resource of the President of Russia, 12 July 2021. Available from: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/articles/66181>.

¹⁶ Makhmutov T. (author of the idea), Morozov V. (author of the text). Sanctions: everything you need to know about sanctions, their subjects, objects and subjects. Moscow: Russian Council on Foreign Affairs, 2017. Available from: <https://russiancouncil.ru/sanctions>.

¹⁷ *RKN: the foreign owner of the resource violates the law of the Russian Federation.

¹⁸ The US says it is not seeking to ban TikTok in the country. TASS, 24 April 2024. Available from: <https://tass.ru/ekonomika/20642581>.

Egypt, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Saudi Arabia)¹⁹. Egypt and the UAE became BRICS members on 1 January 2024 (Saudi Arabia has not yet joined); Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait and Palestine have applied for membership²⁰. Bahrain, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Syria have joined China's Belt and Road global logistics project²¹. Arab leaders take an active part in the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan was the guest of honour at the XXVI SPIEF, 14-17 June 2023) and other events with broad Eurasian participation.

The issues touched upon in this article have been discussed in general terms on several occasions at discussion platforms with the participation of domestic and foreign experts. These include:

- V International Conference 'World Majority in the New Realities: Regional Dimension' (Higher School of Economics, 30 November 2023), where the author of the article spoke on 'Assessing the Evolution of the Place and Role of Arab Countries in the New Emerging World Order';

- All-Russian conference with international participation 'The Concept of Russian Civilization' (Lomonosov Moscow State University, 22 January 2024). The author presented a paper 'On the factors of the growing interest of Arab countries in the Eurasian geopolitical space';

- opening of the training and educational course 'Russia – Arab World: Search for New Opportunities' (MGIMO of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 21 March 2024). The author prepared a presentation 'Russia and the Modern Arab World: Common Challenges and Priorities';

- I International Scientific and Practical Conference 'Traditional and Modern East: Development Trends' (Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, 2 April 2024). The author made a presentation on the topic: 'Russia and Arab countries: a new paradigm of co-operation';

- VIII International Scientific and Practical Conference 'Russia and the World: Dialogues – 2024. Forces of Attraction' (National Research Institute for Development of Communications and the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 23 May 2024). In his presentation, the author summarised the provisions of this article.

It is characteristic that during the discussions, Russian and Arab researchers and diplomats in a similar vein outlined the prospect of dialogues between the Arab world and centers of power in Eurasia (India, China, Russia), which, unlike the algorithms of unequal cooperation between the West and the Global South, would be based on equality and consideration of mutual interests. The participation of Arab specialists in scientific events

¹⁹ About the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Official electronic resource of the SCO, 8 December 2015. Available from: <https://rus.sectsc.org/20151208/16789.html>.

²⁰ Bahrain sees huge potential benefits from co-operation with BRICS. TASS, 24 August 2024. Available from: <https://tass.ru/ekonomika/18583387>.

²¹ Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Shanghai, China: Fanhai International School of Finance – Green Finance & Development Center, December 2023. Available from: <https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/>.

in Russia, despite Western pressure, is further evidence of the long-term interest of Arabs in Eurasia.

Conclusion

The study has shown that the Arab countries' interest in integration in Eurasia, and more specifically in the Eurasian Non-West, is not tactical but long-term strategic in nature. The reason is that in the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world, such integration is consistent with the process of sovereignisation of foreign policy and foreign economic activity of the countries of the Global South and Russia, the imperatives of sustainable development and the struggle for national sovereignty.

Multilevel collective efforts, albeit often in the form of generating ideas, are already enabling the states of the Eurasian Non-West to form a very attractive agenda for Arabs in order to confront the challenges of globalization and modern manifestations of neo-colonialism.

The tactic of changing alliances is actively used by monarchies in the conditions of rivalry between new centers of power, such as India and China, which may provide for pragmatic preservation of alliance relations by the Arabs and even creation of new partnerships with the West. However, when the global world order changes, such tactics do not replace the mainstream process of sovereignty, being used by the Non-West as a tool of pressure on the West to ensure the most favourable conditions for the implementation of promising joint projects – mainly in the spheres of high technology and finance, where the US dominance temporarily remains. Therefore, despite the current successes, the West will hardly be able to stop the course of history.

References

1. Alekseeva T.A. "The West and "Non-West" in the Space of International Relations Theory. Vestnik RUDN. Seriya: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya. [RUDN Bulletin. Series: International Relation]. 2017; 2:217–232 [In Russian].
2. Bardakchyan H.Kh. China as a textbook example of a state-civilization. Region i mir. [Region and World.] 2021; 6:6–11 [In Russian].
3. Vernadsky G.V. Against the Sun: The Spread of the Russian State to the East. Russkaya mysl'. [Russian Thought]. 1914, Book 1:56–79 [In Russian].
4. Volodin A.G. India as a Civilizational State. Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost'. [Social Sciences and Modernity]. 2022; 6:106–124 [In Russian].
5. Dugin A.G. Noomakhia: Wars of the Mind. On the Other Side of the West. Indo-European Civilizations: Iran, India. Moscow: Akademicheskij proekt, 2014 [In Russian].
6. Dugin A.G. Noomakhia: Wars of the Mind. Civilizations of the Borders: Russia, American Civilization, Semites and Their Civilization, Arabic Logos, and the Logos of Turan. Moscow: Akademicheskij proekt, 2014 [In Russian].
7. Dugin A.G. Noomakhia: Wars of the Mind. On the Other Side of the West: China, Japan, Africa, and Oceania. Moscow: Akademicheskij proekt, 2015 [In Russian].
8. Dugin A.G. Noomakhia: Wars of the Mind. The Hamites: The Civilization of the African North. Moscow: Akademicheskij proekt, 2018 [In Russian].
9. The Eurasian Arc of Instability and Regional Security Problems From East Asia to North Africa: Results of 2016 / Ed. by Kolotov V.N. Saint Petersburg: IPK NP-Print, 2017 [In Russian].

10. Zhuravleva L.A., Zarubina E.V., Ruchkiun A.V., Simachkova N.N., Chupina I.P. State-Civilization: Concept, Essence, Structure. Obrazovanie i pravo. [Education and Law]. 2023; 9:80–88 [In Russian].
11. Kefeli I.F. Eurasian Civilization: From an Idea to a Modern Discourse. Evrazijskaya integraciya: ekonomika, pravo, politika. [Eurasian Integration: Economics, Law, Politics]. 2021; 14(2):12–25 [In Russian].
12. Kozmenko S.Yu. The Modern Gambit in the Eurasian Version of the "Great Game". Evrazijskaya integraciya: ekonomika, pravo, politika. [Eurasian Integration: Economics, Law, Politics]. 2022; 4(42):121–129 [In Russian].
13. Kolotov V.N. The Current State of the Eurasian Arc of Instability: The Spheres of Influence and the Shift of Instability From the Western to the Eastern Flank. Sravnitel'naya politika. [Comparative Politics]. 2014; 2(15):28–42 [In Russian].
14. Ksenofontov V.V. Russian World and the Orthodox Base Social'no-politicheskie nauki. [Social and political sciences]. 2018; 3:207–210 [In Russian].
15. Matveev I.A. Syria in the Conflict / Ed. by Kuznetsov V.A.; Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Moscow: IVRAN, 2020 [In Russian].
16. Savitsky P.N. Continent – Ocean (Russia and the World Market). In: Exodus to the East: Premonitions and Fulfillments – The Affirmation of the Eurasians. Collection of articles by P.N. Savitsky, P.P. Suvchinsky, N.S. Trubetskoy, and G.V. Florovsky. Sofia: Rossijsko-bolgarskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1921:104–125 [In Russian].
17. Sokolov S.M. Eastern Vector of Eurasianism of P.N. Savitsky. Vestnik Buryatskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. [Bulletin of the Buryat State University]. 2014; 14–2:11–15 [In Russian].
18. Surkov N.Yu. Détente in the Gulf and Focus on Eurasia. The Middle East is Turning into One of the World's New Poles. Svobodnaya mysl'. [Free Thought]. 2024; 1:85–96 [In Russian].
19. Huntington S.P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York City: Simon & Schuster, 1996. Map 1.3.: The World of Civilizations: Post-1990:26–27 [In English].
20. Lewin K. Field Theory in Social Science: Selected Theoretical Papers. New York City: Harper & Brothers, 1951 [In English].

About the authors

Igor A. MATVEEV. CandSc (Hist.). Associate Professor, Department of International Business at the Faculty of International Economic Relations of the Financial University Under the Government of the Russian Federation. <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4611-5669>. Address: 49/2, Leningradsky Ave., Moscow, 125167, Russian Federation. iamatveev@mail.ru

Contribution of the author

The author declares no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Received: June 10, 2024. Approved after review: July 15, 2024. Accepted for publication: August 31, 2024. Published: September 23, 2024.

The author has read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewers for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

Features of Afghanistan Governance in the Period 2021–2024

Mohammad Omar Nessar✉

Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
nessar@yandex.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4236-0886>

Abstract. Stability in Afghanistan depends on many factors, including external ones. The article analyzes the development of the situation in the country after the Taliban¹ came to power. Considering the development of the security situation, in the humanitarian field, and the social policy of the current authorities, the author assesses the internal situation in the country and identifies the main factors that determine the level of risks and challenges emanating from the territory of Afghanistan. According to the estimates given in the article, after the Taliban came to power, with the relative stabilization of the situation within the country, instability arises in the direction of Pakistan and Iran. The author has established the dependence of social sustainability in the country on the volume of external assistance. The author predicts a worsening of the situation in Afghanistan in the event of a reduction in foreign aid.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Taliban², security, humanitarian situation, social sustainability
For citation: Nessar M.O. Features of Afghanistan Governance in the Period 2021–2024. Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue. 2024; 3(13): 78–89, doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-78-89

Introduction

Three years have passed since the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan. Despite the fact that the Afghan problem has found itself on the periphery of “big world politics” against the backdrop of current international processes, the situation in this country is in the field of view of the international community, including being analyzed in Russia. Despite the existence of problems in the humanitarian and security spheres, the Taliban continue to

control the country, concentrating real power in their hands. Therefore, external actors are forced to interact with the authorities in Kabul.

Materials and Methods

The methodological basis for understanding the military-political and socio-economic situation in Afghanistan was laid in the works of both leading domestic Afghanists, including V.G.Korgun [1], R.R.Sikoev [7], V.S.Kristoforov [8], U.V.Okimbekov [5] and others, and foreign researchers, including V.A.Mozhda [2], A.Rashid [6], R.Bannet [9], etc. Some aspects of the modern problems of Afghanistan were covered in the works of the author [3, 4]. Since the subject of the study is the analysis of the current situation, materials from domestic and foreign periodicals were also used in preparing the article.

The purpose of this article is to identify the features of the Taliban’s governance of the country from August 2021 to 2024. During the study, reports of international organizations, official documents of the authorities of the Russian Federation and statements by officials of foreign states were analyzed. The author used well-known scientific methods such as systems analysis, synthesis, comparative analysis and data comparison.

Results

Crisis of legitimacy

During the Taliban rule (August 2021 – February 2024), contacts between the Taliban government and the world community have developed. According to the Taliban government, there are diplomatic missions of at least 10 neighboring states in the Afghan capital: Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan. There is also a group of diplomats from India in Kabul. But the Taliban government has not been able to achieve official recognition from any state. Legalization is difficult for a number of reasons.

Firstly, in a number of countries the Taliban movement ³is recognized as terrorist (including in the Russian Federation).

Secondly, a number of the Taliban’s actions contradict the principles of the UN, legal norms and morality. For example, the decision to ban school education for girls, which is condemned, among other things, in Muslim countries.

Thirdly, the level of trust in the Taliban government on the part of foreign countries and international institutions is low. In practice, the Taliban government has proven inconsistent in implementing a number of conditions for recognition, including respect

1 Признана террористической организацией в России.
2 Признана террористической организацией в России.

3 In Russia it is recognized as a terrorist organization.

for the rights and freedoms of all groups of citizens and the formation of an inclusive government.

Moscow’s position on the issue of recognizing the Taliban was outlined in January of this year by the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Sergei Lavrov: “There are Uzbeks, Tajiks, Pashtuns, Hazaras in the Taliban government, but they are all politically Taliban. We are talking about ensuring not only ethno-confessional inclusivity, but also political inclusivity”⁴.

The main directions of the Taliban’s social policy

The social policy of the Taliban allows us to understand possible options for the development of the situation in the medium and long term. During the two and a half years of the Taliban’s rule, one of the priority tasks of their government has been to strengthen rural religious institutions: including the legalization of rural madrassas and religious centers: objects previously under the control of the movement are receiving legal status. The transformation of educational centers into madrassas and “jihadist centers” continues. The rural population of the country makes up almost three quarters of its number. Mosques and prayer rooms are opening in state institutions. It is necessary to note the growing role of the Ministry of Prevention of Sin and Encouragement of Good; suffice it to say that it has an instrument of coercion in the form of paramilitary formations. In parallel, the clergy is penetrating the structure of the state and the Sharia judicial bodies.

The greatest resonance is caused by the Taliban’s steps aimed at limiting the rights of women, especially the ban on their education and subsequent employment. Gender-discriminatory initiatives put the Taliban elite in a difficult position, they do not find understanding even among individual leaders of the movement. Most members of the cabinet in Kabul are against the introduction of such restrictions. In addition, this policy has been condemned even by a number of Muslim countries.

In 2022, the international community drew attention to the Taliban’s Pashtun-centric policies towards national minorities⁵. In the context of this trend, one can also consider the Taliban leadership’s attempts to displace the Persian language, which should affect relations with neighboring Iran.

Measures aimed at traditionalizing society include opposition to elements of secularism, for example, dress code requirements that apply not only to women but also to men, as well as the negative attitude of certain Taliban leaders to secular university education as such.

However, in conditions where there is no confidence in the successful completion of the Taliban’s plans to reform Afghan society, the attention of external actors, especially

4 Speech and answers to media questions by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S.V.Lavrov. MFA of the Russian Federation, 24.01.2024. Available from: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1927568/.

5 The Taliban’s governance systems in Afghanistan are unstable, Patrushev said. RIA Novosti. 30.09.2022. Available from: <https://ria.ru/20220930/afghanistan-1820508414.html>.

countries in the region, is focused on current processes: the security situation, the humanitarian situation, economic projects, etc.

Security

Ensuring security is considered by international experts as a multifaceted process. The analysis below relates more to the security of the territory and society. In general, after August 15, 2021, there has been a decrease in the intensity of hostilities and clashes on the territory of Afghanistan, which is logical, since before that, a significant proportion of attacks that caused harm to the civilian population were carried out by the Taliban themselves. Thus, in the first six months of the Taliban’s rule (from August 15, 2021 to February 15, 2022), the UN mission in Afghanistan recorded a total of 1,153 clashes, in which 397 people were killed and 756 wounded among the civilian population alone, not militants⁶. The figures show a decrease in civilian casualties in Afghanistan compared to the same period last year. Since 2022, the UN Office in Afghanistan has stopped publishing annual reports on Afghan civilian casualties due to armed conflict, but quarterly reports to the UN Secretary-General confirm that the number of incidents involving weapons is decreasing (Table 1).

Table 1. Number of incidents involving the use of weapons in the period 16.05.2021 – 22.10.2023, quarterly

	16.05.2021 – 18.07.2021	19.08.2021 – 31.12.2021	01.01.2022 – 21.05.2022	22.05.2022 – 16.08.2022	17.08.2022 – 13.11.2022	14.01.2022 – 31.01.2023	01.02.2023 – 20.05.2023	21.05.2023 – 31.07.2023	01.08.2023 – 22.10.2023
Security related incidents	6302	985	2105	1642	1587	1201	1650	1259	1414
ISIS-X attacks ⁷	88	152	82	48	30	16	11	5	8
Geography of ISIS-X operations ¹⁵ (number of provinces)	–	16	11	11	6	4	5	3	3

Source: The table was compiled by the author based on the analysis of quarterly reports of the UN Security Council monitoring group

The level of threats and security risks emanating from the territory of Afghanistan are determined by a complex of factors.

6 Interactive dialogue on the High Commissioner’s report on Afghanistan. UN, 7.03.2022. Available from: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2022/03/interactive-dialogue-high-commissioners-report-afghanistan?LangID=E&NewsID=28218>.

7 The organization is banned in Russia.

Firstly, the continuing activity of non-Afghan groups present in the country and pursuing their own interests is of particular concern. Close attention is paid to the activities of ISIS-Kh⁸, which, during 2023, managed to carry out a number of high-profile terrorist attacks, which killed high-ranking Taliban officials and foreign citizens, including diplomats. One of the major recent terrorist attacks carried out by this group was the attack on October 13, 2023, in the city of Pul-i-Khumri near a Shiite mosque, which took the lives of about 20 people. In January 2024, as a result of a terrorist attack, for which the ISIS-Kh group claimed responsibility⁹, about a dozen people were killed in the Shiite district of Kabul (Dasht-i-Barchi).

Secondly, the Taliban's unconditional victory has inspired jihadist movements operating in other countries. After the Taliban came to power in Kabul, Western intelligence agencies and regional experts warned that this had emboldened terrorists around the world. A real change in the situation can be seen in neighboring Pakistan. The change of power in Kabul prompted the Pakistani Taliban, represented by Tahreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, to withdraw from the ceasefire agreement with official Islamabad in November 2022. In the year since the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan, a record increase in terrorist attacks has been recorded on the territory of Pakistan itself [9].

The Taliban's challenge to the countries of the region was their refusal to sever ties with foreign groups considered terrorist. A report was presented to the UN Security Council, which spoke about the Taliban's close ties with the Al-Qaeda group¹⁰. According to the document, the notorious terrorist group has managed to establish eight new training camps and weapons storage bases across Afghanistan, including in the provinces of Ghazni, Laghman, Parwan, Uruzgan and Panjshir. The Taliban has denied any links to al-Qaeda¹¹, the accusations against them appear justified after the alleged liquidation of the leader of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan¹² Ayman al-Zawahiri, carried out with the help of a US drone in August 2022¹³.

Geopolitical conditions and the above factors play an important role in shaping the policies of the countries of the region towards Afghanistan, considering the Taliban government as a source of threats and risks. In particular, Russia, Tajikistan and Pakistan have repeatedly drawn attention to the alarming situation in the country during the Taliban's rule. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu focused on the presence of ISIS¹⁴ in Afghanistan, calling the group's goal the spread of radical ideology and subversive activities in the region¹⁵.

8 ISIS-Khorasan – Afghan branch of the structure. The organization is banned in Russia.
9 The organization is banned in Russia.
10 The organization is banned in Russia.
11 The organization is banned in Russia.
12 The organization is banned in Russia.
13 The Taliban* vowed to cut ties with al Qaeda, but the terror group appears to be growing in Afghanistan. CBS News, 01.02.2024. Available from: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/afghanistan-taliban-al-qaeda-growing/>.

*In Russia it is recognized as a terrorist organization.
14 The organization is banned in Russia.
15 A meeting of the Russian Defense Ministry Board was held in Moscow. Official website of the Russian Defense Ministry, 27.02.2024. Available from: https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12502300@egNews.

New challenges

While the number of security incidents has decreased since August 2021, new challenges have been identified that could cause long-term destabilization of the region. First, these are regular armed border clashes between the Taliban and the military of Pakistan and Iran, and shelling of the border zone of several Central Asian countries. From August 2021 to October 2023, the UN recorded at least 80 armed clashes, including 59 incidents on the Afghan-Pakistani border, 16 on the Afghan-Iranian border, 3 on the Afghan-Tajik border, and at least 1 incident on the Afghan-Uzbek border (Table 2). Border clashes are caused by various reasons, including attempts to illegally cross the border by refugees, smugglers, and armed groups, as well as mistaken and deliberate attempts by the Taliban to move the border line.

Table 2. Border armed clashes in the period 16.05.2021 – 22.10.2023

	16.05.2021 – 18.07.2021	19.08.2021 – 31.12.2021	01.01.2022 – 21.05.2022	22.05.2022 – 16.08.2022	17.08.2022 – 13.11.2022	14.01.2022 – 31.01.2023	01.02.2023 – 20.05.2023	21.05.2023 – 31.07.2023	01.08.2023 – 22.10.2023
Border clashes	Pakistan	1	2	2	14	19	14	5	3
	Iran	2	2	3	1	1	6	1	
	Tajikistan	1	1					1	
	Uzbekistan		1						
	Turkmenistan								

Source: The table was compiled by the author based on the analysis of quarterly reports of the UN Security Council monitoring group

Secondly, this is the aggravation of the migration crisis in the region, which is putting a strain on the socio-economic systems of neighboring countries. Data on the outflow of refugees from the country after the Taliban came to power varies, but an analysis of reports from the International Organization for Migration suggests a significant increase in the outflow of population to Iran and Pakistan. The number of Afghan refugees who arrived in the Islamic Republic of Iran during the two years of Taliban rule reached 1.5 million people per year. At the same time, the total number of Afghan refugees in this country, including illegal refugees, is estimated by Iranian authorities at 6 million people, which is about 7

percent of the country's population¹⁶. The total number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan in October 2023 was estimated by local authorities at 4.4 million people¹⁷.

Thirdly, this is the growth of tensions in relations with neighboring countries due to the joint use of water resources. After the Taliban came to power, tensions increased between the Taliban and the Islamic Republic of Iran due to the transboundary Helmand River, the use of whose waters became the subject of heated disputes in 2022–2023. If the new Afghan authorities treat transboundary rivers in the same way, then we can predict an increase in tensions with other neighbors, given that Afghanistan, in terms of the formation of water resources, is a "Upstream" country in relation to most of its neighbors. The construction of the Kush-Tepa canal on the Amu Darya River, which began almost immediately after the Taliban came to power, has already become a source of concern for Afghanistan's northern neighbors.

Humanitarian sphere

After August 2021, the attention of the international community turned to the humanitarian situation. Not a single international meeting on Afghan issues is complete without discussing the situation in the humanitarian sphere. During the Taliban's second rule, the human rights situation, especially the situation of Afghan women, remains tense. After the ban on women's work was introduced, the unemployment rate in the country increased significantly. An additional blow to the socio-economic situation was the collapse of the banking system that followed the change of power in Kabul and the introduction of US sanctions against the Taliban government. If we illustrate the dynamics of the development of the socio-economic situation after the Taliban came to power based on reports coming from the country, it looks like this: in the period from August 2021 to February 2022, a negative trend emerged, but by the beginning of 2022, the situation leveled off, the main economic indicators became stable. Experts largely attributed this to the expansion of foreign aid, the volumes and parameters of which had been established, in particular, the flow of cash dollars had been improved. From February 2022 to the end of 2023, the country received between \$40 and 80 million weekly. In total, after the change of power in Kabul, more than \$2.9 billion in cash were delivered to Afghanistan through the UN. Humanitarian aid consists of contributions from Western countries, where the main share comes from the United States (for example: out of \$2.9 billion, \$2.6 comes from the United States). However, humanitarian aid includes more than just the supply of cash dollars in order to maintain humanitarian stability. A significant portion of the financial aid goes through the funding of non-governmental organizations and UN programs operating in Afghanistan and beyond. In April 2023, US Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) John Sopko said that Washington had spent a total of \$8 billion

¹⁶ Afghan refugees pose a major challenge in Iran, ex-lawmaker says. Iran International, 18.08.2023. Available from:

¹⁷ Pakistan Orders Illegal Immigrants, Including 1.73 Million Afghans, to Leave. USnews, 3.10.2023. Available from: <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-10-03/pakistan-orders-all-illegal-immigrants-to-leave-after-suicide-bombings>.

on aid to Afghanistan since the withdrawal of troops (over 20 months), including funds allocated to help Afghan refugees outside the country¹⁸. In September 2023, Bloomberg journalists collected data proving that the national currency of Afghanistan (Afghani), largely due to the influx of American cash dollars, retained its stability, becoming one of the world's stable currencies in the third quarter of 2023. As shown above, the socio-economic stability in the country largely depends on the volume of foreign aid. US spending on the war in Ukraine and the results of the presidential elections could cut the volume of aid to Afghanistan, which would worsen the humanitarian situation, among other things.

Conclusions

An analysis of governance in Afghanistan from August 2021 to February 2024 shows that the most pessimistic forecasts regarding the development of the situation in this country have not come true. So far, there has been no explosion in the security and humanitarian situation. However, the most optimistic forecasts have not come true either. There are no tangible results in the implementation of regional economic projects related to the realization of Afghanistan's transit potential aimed at supplying energy resources from Central Asia to South Asia. This is hampered by the lack of legal status for the Taliban government and, as a result, trust in it.

An analysis of the social policy of the Taliban after their return to power allows us to conclude that the main goals and objectives of the Taliban have remained virtually unchanged for 20 years; they are still striving to establish the same order that they promoted in the past. But the lack of internal consensus, the influence of external factors and the profound changes that have occurred in Afghan society itself over 20 years are forcing the current authorities to be cautious. Against the background of relative progress in the security sphere within the country, the level of threats and risks emanating from the territory of Afghanistan remains high overall.

We can talk about the movement of instability to neighboring countries. Thus, in Pakistan, after the establishment of Taliban power, a sharp deterioration in the security situation was recorded, which is associated with the activation of the Taliban-allied group "Tahriki Taliban-e-Pakistan". The influx of a large number of Afghan refugees into the countries of the region, primarily Iran, creates a serious burden on the socio-economic system of neighboring countries.

The sharp increase in the number of Afghan migrants causes discontent among the local population, threatening to destabilize the domestic political situation. Afghanistan under the Taliban remains dependent on external financial aid, which serves as a stabilizer of the situation inside the country and social stability. Based on this, one can predict

¹⁸ Haley O., Sami Y. U.S. taxpayers helping fund Afghanistan's Taliban? Aid workers say they're forced "to serve the Taliban first". CBS News, 21.04.2023. Available from: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/afghanistan-taliban-tax-dollars-after-withdrawal/>.

a deterioration in the situation in the event of a reduction in the volume of external aid, primarily from Washington.

References

1. Korgun V.G. History of Afghanistan. XX century. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2004:529 [In Russian].
2. Mozhdza V.A. Afghanistan and five years of the Taliban rule. Tehran, 2003:240 [In the Dari language].
3. Nessar O.M. Genesis and evolution of the Taliban movemen. Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue. 2023; 2:20–31 [In Russian].
4. Nessar M.O., Topychkanov P.V. Kabul and Islamabad: myths and reality. Rossiya v global'noj politike [Russia in global politics]. 2023; Vol. 21. 5:219–233 [In Russian].
5. Okimbekov U.V. Women's issue in Afghanistan under the Taliban. Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue. 2023; 2:158–170 [In Russian].
6. Rashid A. Taliban. Islam, Oil, and the New Great Game in Central Asia / trans. from English by M. Povalyaeva. Moscow: Biblion – Russian Book, 2003:282 [In Russian].
7. Sikoev R.R. Taliban: Religioso-Political Portrait. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2004:204 [In Russian].
8. Khristoforov V.S. American Troops in Afghanistan (2001–2021): Can Neither be Left nor Taken Out. Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue. 2023; 2:55–65 [In Russian].
9. Rubin B. Afghanistan What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford University Press, 2020:392 [In English].

About the author

Mohammad Omar NESSAR. CandSc (Hist.). Senior Researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4236-0886>. Address: 12, Rozhdestvenka str/, Moscow, 107031, Russian Federation. nessar@yandex.ru

Contribution of the author

The author declares no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Received: June 26, 2024. Approved after review: July 28, 2024. Accepted for publication: August 31, 2024. Published: September 23, 2024.

The author has read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewers for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROCESSES

International Relations, Global and Regional Studies

Original article

Political Sciences

[https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3\(13\)-90-101](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-90-101)

The Republic of South Ossetia in the Context of Regional Security Threats

Inal B. Sanakoev✉

South Ossetian State University after A.A.Tibilov, Tskhinval, Republic of South Ossetia

inal59@mail.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4390-1012>

Abstract. The article analyzes the security problems in the South Caucasus. The emphasis is placed on the key security threats to the Republic of South Ossetia, which is actually in a state of latent conflict with Georgia. The article uses the method of situational analysis (sitanalysis), which involves considering the problem at the applied level, identifying all the factors that influence the formation of the situation. The author considers that the most important part of the situational analysis is the development of practical recommendations in order to implement a favorable forecast and, if possible, avoid an unfavorable course of events.

According to the author's main conclusions, the Republic of South Ossetia is currently facing a number of serious external threats to its national security in the South Caucasus. The existing threats, challenges and risks for South Ossetia in the South Caucasus region tend to increase, both in local and regional variants. According to the author, efforts should continue to create a sustainable security architecture in the South Caucasus in order to prevent any violent scenarios for resolving existing contradictions and achieving sustainable peace and stability in the region.

Keywords: South Ossetia, security threats, regional security system, growth of military spendings, cooperation with NATO, Georgia, political struggle

For citation: Sanakoev I.B. The Republic of South Ossetia in the Context of Regional Security Threats. Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue. 2024; 3(13): 90-101, [doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3\(13\)-90-101](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-90-101)

Introduction

Newly formed states face internal and external threats. Among external threats, the most significant are threats to national security, emanating from the immediate surroundings of these states or the region as a whole. External threats create obstacles

not only for regional stability, but also for internal nation-state building, since they divert internal resources of new states to ensuring security. Security threats are one of the most significant problems in the South Caucasus region, which has many contradictions of different levels and natures.

Materials and Methods

South Caucasus regional threats have long been the subject of close attention and analysis in the domestic and foreign expert community. At various times, these problems were written about by R.Arzumanyan, G.P.Grigoryan, V.V.Denisov, A.K.Dudayti, S.M.Ivanov, D.B.Malyшева, S.A.Markov, G.Novikova, S.A.Ragozina, G.V.Lukyanov, A.Rondeli, Thomas de Waal and others. By general recognition of experts, the security situation in the South Caucasus is not simple. According to G.Novikova, "it should be noted that the situation in the South Caucasus is more than dangerous. The aggravation of insecurity in the zone of any of the conflicts will entail a chain reaction in the entire region"¹.

The abovementioned problems are also typical for the Republic of South Ossetia, which has been facing external threats to its national security since its formation. In this regard, the question of what threats does the Republic of South Ossetia face in the context of modern political processes in the South Caucasus is of scientific and applied interest.

The article uses the method of situational analysis, which involves identifying all the factors that influence the formation of a specific situation. Situational analysis, as a rule, is aimed at predicting the development of the situation in the near, medium and long term. The author believes that the most important part of situational analysis is the development of practical recommendations in order to implement a favorable forecast and, if possible, avoid an unfavorable course of events.

Results

Lack of a regional security system in the South Caucasus

One of the most serious threats to South Ossetia is the lack of a regional security system in the South Caucasus. The creation of such a system is especially relevant after the events in Nagorno-Karabakh, which led to the actual liquidation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was resolved through violence. And this happened when the entire world community is leaning towards peaceful and non-violent schemes for resolving interethnic conflicts. The use of violence, successful for the party that used it, calls

¹ Novikova G. On the brink of war. Or the growth of the security deficit in the South Caucasus. Available from: <https://spectrum.am/ru/article/on-the-verge-of-war-or-increasing-security-deficit-in-the-south-caucasus/>.

into question the need and legitimacy of using a whole range of peacekeeping and conflict management practices that have already been developed, aimed at finding compromises, developing models for managing ethnic conflicts, and are actively used in various regions of the world. Any violent scenarios for resolving interethnic contradictions are accompanied by a huge number of human casualties on both sides, which is not justified in any way.

On the other hand, the liquidation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic by military means creates an unfavorable and dangerous precedent for all unrecognized and partially recognized states, when for the first time in the post-Soviet space the conflict between the right to self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity of the state was resolved in favor of the latter.

After the Karabakh events in the former Soviet republics, in particular in Georgia, opinions began to be openly expressed that if the issue could be resolved in this way in Karabakh, then why can't it be done in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. If such opinions are already openly expressed in the sphere of public policy, then it is logical to assume that they can be actively discussed in the political corridors, where political decisions are made. Therefore, there is a potential danger of duplicating the Karabakh scenario in these republics.

The urgency of creating a regional security system in the South Caucasus is also due to another important factor. The South Caucasus is a complex region in geopolitical, religious, and ethno-political terms, with a large number of contradictions, both modern and past.

On the one hand, there are many political and ethnic entities here. Each of them adheres to its own security concepts, formulated at the expense of the security of others, and builds its own model of relationships with neighbors. On the other hand, there are external actors at the regional and global level in the region, actively participating in regional political processes, playing their own game.

In addition, the South Caucasus is a region of open conflicts, a whole "bouquet" of latent conflicts, which, under certain circumstances, threaten to move into an open phase and create serious threats both at the local and regional levels. The region can quickly approach a critical point, when an ill-considered political step can lead to avalanche-like processes that can get out of control. No one can calculate the consequences of their steps. According to D.B. Malyшева, "the volatile situation in the region, the uncertainty and unpredictability of the internal political development of the Caucasian republics, the presence of unresolved conflicts and, finally, the prospect of extracting energy resources from the Caspian oil fields are turning the Caucasus into an arena of geopolitical rivalry, which means that stability is still very far away" [15].

It cannot be said that there have been no practical proposals for the creation of a regional security system in the South Caucasus for many years. There were quite a few in the 1990s and 2000s. All of them were built according to a certain arithmetic scheme. Thus, following the five-day war in South Ossetia, the so-called five-digit Turkish initiative "Russian-Turkish Platform 2008 (3+2)" was formulated and proposed – three South Caucasus states plus Turkey and Russia. The "Seven-digit Iranian Initiative (3+3+1)" was put on the

agenda – three South Caucasus states plus neighboring countries (Iran, Turkey and Russia) and the EU. Expert proposals were made in the format of 12 participants (3+3+3+2+1) – three recognized states of the South Caucasus, three new states of the South Caucasus (South Ossetia, Abkhazia and the People's Karabakh Republic), three neighboring states (Russia, Iran and Turkey), 2 – the EU and the USA, 1 – China. In the context of China's growing geopolitical power, the expansion of its role in global and regional politics, this country is beginning to play an increasingly active role in the South Caucasus.

However, none of the proposed initiatives were implemented in practice.

Militarization of Georgia

Another major threat to South Ossetia is the ongoing militarization of Georgia. South Ossetia is concerned about the lack of a peace and non-aggression treaty with Georgia. The talks held in Geneva since 2008 (more than 50 rounds) between Russia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the United States and mediated by special representatives of the UN, EU and OSCE have not yielded results. Work is traditionally conducted in two working groups – on security and on humanitarian issues. The Geneva discussions remain the only platform for dialogue between Sukhumi, Tskhinvali and Tbilisi. Until now, the Georgian side has refused to sign a peace treaty with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, continuing to consider them “territories occupied by Russia”. This effectively means that both South Ossetia and Abkhazia continue to be in a state of war with Georgia, at least de jure.

Military spending in Georgia is growing rapidly. It began to grow back in 2001 under E. Shevardnadze. At first, the growth rates were relatively modest: 27% in 2001, 14.3% in 2002, 11.7% in 2003, 14% in 2004. The record year was 2005 – 165.5% growth! After that, the rates slowed: 69% in 2006 and 63% in 2007. In 2021, Georgia's military budget was \$290 million. In 2022 – \$322 million. In 2022, defense spending in Georgia increased by \$32 million, or 9% compared to the previous year. In 2023, Georgia's defense budget was \$450 million, which is \$128 million more than in 2022. According to the 2024 budget, funding for the country's Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry, and State Security Service will increase by 254 million lari (more than \$94 million). The parliamentary vote on the budget was 83 for and 0 against. The budget of the Ministry of Defense of Georgia in 2024 will be 1.38 billion lari (\$511 million), which is 110 million lari (\$40 million) more than in 2023. For the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2024, the authorities decided to allocate funds in the amount of 1.26 billion lari (\$466 million), which is 114 million lari (\$42 million) more than in 2023. The budget of the State Security Service of Georgia in 2024 will be 210 million lari (\$78 million). This is 30 million lari (\$11 million) more than in 2023.²

The Georgian political elite remains dissatisfied with the growth of the country's military spending. According to the commentary of Finance Minister L.Khutsishvili, Georgia's defense budget does not meet the challenges the country faces. Chairman of

² The Georgian Parliament has adopted a budget with an increase in spending on security forces by \$94 million in 2024. Available from: <https://tass.ru/ekonomika/19546639?ysclid=lvobqs3a5e136988112>.

the Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security I.Beraya said during the committee hearings of the draft state budget of Georgia: “In order to effectively defend and contain existing threats, Georgia needs combat-ready, mobile and NATO-compatible defense forces, for which it is important to increase the defense budget”³. Deputy Chairman of the Georgian Parliamentary Committee on Defense and National Security V.Chachibaia called these expenses insufficient so that “no one would even think of hatching aggressive plans against Georgia”⁴. According to him, at least another \$97 million is needed for defense. The argument is based on NATO standards. According to the draft budget for 2023, the defense budget will be 1.58% of Georgia's GDP, while according to NATO standards, the defense budget should be at least 2% of the country's GDP. The NATO standard also stipulates that at least 20% of the defense budget should be spent on developing defense capabilities, while in Georgia's draft budget for 2023, only 13.84% of the defense budget is allocated for this area.

Expanding Georgia's cooperation with NATO

The third threat to South Ossetia remains Georgia's cooperation with NATO and the United States. Georgia maintains its foreign policy orientation toward Europe and the United States. The United States, in turn, continues to consider Georgia its foreign policy priority in the region. According to the Atlantic Council's 2022–2023 Global Strategy, Georgia has been subjected to “Russian aggression” and needs practical assistance. It is emphasized that “Moscow's expansion” has not received a proper response from Georgia and it is time to change this. According to this document, “to further strengthen Georgia's security, Washington should deploy American infrastructure (logistics, equipment, airfield) for use by the US. Air Force. This is clearly not enough to create an American base, but it will ensure the presence of the US. Air Force in Georgia”⁵. NATO Secretary General's Special Representative for the South Caucasus and Central Asia says NATO continues close political dialogue with Georgia: “Thanks to this cooperation, which has been further strengthened over many years, Georgia's defence forces are more capable and interoperable with NATO than ever before”⁶.

Georgia is an active participant in all NATO programs aimed at gradually involving new countries in the alliance. There is talk about liberalizing NATO accession procedures, creating simplified mechanisms, as in the case of Montenegro, which joined NATO through a parliamentary decision, and not a national referendum. There are high-level contacts with NATO and joint exercises.

³ Tbilisi has announced the need to increase the military budget. Available from: <https://easaily.com/ru/news/2021/10/15/v-tbilisi-zayavili-o-neobhodimosti-velicheniya-voennogo-byudzheta>.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ NATO continues close political dialogue with Georgia as its closest and long-standing partner – Secretary General's Special Representative. Available from: <https://www.trend.az/scaucasus/georgia/3551618.html>.

⁶ Ibid.

In March 2022, the Georgia-NATO command and staff exercises were held near Tbilisi for the third time. The Georgian side took full control of the exercises. The military personnel worked out the planning of the alliance's military operations using simulators. NATO members and partners took part in the maneuvers. In total, more than 20 NATO countries and partners were involved in the exercises.

In August-September 2023, large-scale military exercises "Agile Spirit" were held on the territory of Georgia. They involved 3.6 thousand military personnel from 22 NATO member states and partners of the North Atlantic bloc. Agile Spirit is being held in the country for the eleventh time, but these exercises were unique in their scale and territorial scope. They were held for the first time in both Eastern and Western Georgia. In addition, some tasks were practiced in the waters of the Georgian port of Poti together with the Georgian Coast Guard. The exercises began with the landing of servicemen from the 173rd Brigade of the US Armed Forces in Europe on the former Russian military airfield Vaziani (in the suburbs of Tbilisi), where the NATO-Georgia Joint Training Center is now located. The scenario of the exercises was a simulated invasion of a simulated enemy, field exercises with live fire, joint operations of special forces and military doctors were held. According to the Ministry of Defense of Georgia, the exercises "Agile Spirit 2023" were aimed at increasing the operational interoperability between the Georgian Defense Forces, the Joint Forces of the United States, allies and partner forces at the tactical level, improving and strengthening operational capabilities in planning and conducting operations in a multinational environment.

In March 2024, Georgia hosted a two-week military exercise, Trojan Trail 2024, which brought together servicemen from Georgia, the United States, and NATO member states. The exercises included land and sea exercises in the eastern and western parts of Georgia. The goal of the exercises was to exchange experiences between the countries and improve combat training. Trojan Trail 2024 was aimed at enhancing interoperability between the participating countries. This was the third time that the Georgian Defense Forces participated in the multinational exercise. Trojan Trail was led by the United States Special Operations Command Europe. This year, Georgia and the United States will reportedly hold another joint exercise, Noble Partner, which will be held in the country for the seventh time. According to the International Republican Institute, 79% of Georgians surveyed support the country's accession to NATO.

Internal political struggle in Georgia

The growing internal political struggle in Georgia should be recognized as a threat factor for South Ossetia. A characteristic feature is the promotion of the ethno-national card. The Georgian political opposition actively uses slogans taken from the 1990s about the return of the "lost" territories in the political struggle. And these slogans ("Su-khu-mi, Tskhin-va-li", "Abkhazia is Georgia", "Samamchablo is Georgia") find support in various strata of the population who retain faith in the need for the violent return of these territories. A new wave of ethno-nationalism from the time of Gamsakhurdia is growing in

Georgia. Fortunately, the political ratings of nationalists lag behind the ratings of the ruling "Georgian Dream" in a ratio of 1:2, but the use of "color" technologies once again cannot be ruled out. If the United National Movement manages to come to power in Georgia, this could lead to another outbreak of violence in the region.

Conclusions

According to the general opinion of experts, it is not "regional arithmetic" that will work in the South Caucasus, but "regional algebra". According to R.Arzumanyan, "at best, projects reflect not only arithmetic, but also multidirectional vectors in the domestic and foreign policies of actors, when it becomes appropriate to talk about "regional algebra", which also does not stand the test of reality, forcing us to speak and reason not in terms of static structures and architecture, but a dynamic picture and processes in a complex nonlinear system"⁷. As R.Arzumanyan writes, "it is necessary to come to terms with the fact that there are no simple solutions in the South Caucasus and the thesis of strategists is correct that any complex problem has a simple, clear and wrong solution."⁸ According to experts, in this situation, applied policy should be based on the principle of basic common sense ("do no harm"), and, first of all, avoid decisions that could contribute to instability and chaos in the region.

In this regard, representatives of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Russia participating in the Geneva discussions on April 4-5, 2024, expressed concern about the growing NATO presence on the territory of Georgia and the build-up of military training activities and the intensification of measures to integrate Georgia into the North Atlantic military alliance. At the same time, the South Ossetian delegation emphasized the need to continue marking the line of the South Ossetian-Georgian border and installing engineering structures on this line and once again called on the Georgian side to work together on the delimitation and demarcation of the state border between South Ossetia and Georgia. The participants in the discussions noted the contradictory approaches of the parties to the development of a document on the non-use of force, but the South Ossetian participants called for continued work in this area, which is key to the goals of the Geneva format.

To summarize the above, we note the main points:

1. The Republic of South Ossetia faces a number of serious external threats to its national security in the South Caucasus.
2. The existing local and regional threats, challenges and risks for South Ossetia in the South Caucasus region are growing.

⁷ Arzumanyan R. The regional security system of the South Caucasus and problems of sovereignty. Available from: <https://theanalyticon.com/ru/новости/система-региональной-безопасности-ю/>.

⁸ Arzumanyan R. Armenian-Turkish relations through the prism of the regional security system of the South Caucasus. Available from: http://www.noravank.am/rus/issues/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=4604.

3. Efforts should be continued to create sustainable security in the South Caucasus in order to prevent any violent options for resolving contradictions and achieving sustainable peace and stability in the region.

References

1. Arzumanyan R., Baghdasaryan A. Theory of war in the 21st century. 21-j vek [21st century]. 2011; 3(19) [In Russian]. URL: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/teoriya-voyny-v-xxi-veke>.
2. Arzumanyan R.V. Centers of power in the 21st century. The relationship between the political and the religious at the present stage. Moscow: ANO TsSOiP, 2015:136 [In Russian].
3. Baum V.V., Degterev D.A., Zhabkina E.I. Ten years without diplomatic recognition: an applied analysis of Russian-Georgian relations (2008-2018). Problemy nacional'noj strategii [Problems of national strategy]. 2019; 4(55):70–86 [In Russian].
4. Borzova A.Yu., Savicheva E.M., Kulumbegova L.T. Security Issues in the South Caucasus in Research by Foreign Analytical Centers. Postsovetskie issledovaniya [Post-Soviet Studies.] 2022; 5(02):138–146 [In Russian].
5. Butorov A.S., Degterev D.A., Savicheva E.M. Regional Security in the South Caucasus: New RUDN Database on International Relations. Post-Soviet Studies [Post-Soviet Studies]. 2023; 4(6):388–400 [In Russian].
6. Galoyan N.G. Foreign Policy Strategies in the Sphere of Security of the EU, USA, and NATO in Relation to the States of the South Caucasus. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya [International Relations]. 2017; 3:80–91 [In Russian].
7. Grigoryan G.P. Political Context of Eurasian Integration. Evrazijskaya integraciya: problemy i perspektivy realizacii [Eurasian Integration: Problems and Prospects of Implementation]: A Collection of Articles Based on the Materials of the II All-Russian Scientific and Practical Conference. Barnaul, 2014:15–22 [In Russian].
8. Grigoryan G.P. Problems of Eurasian Integration. Prospects for Integration Processes in Eurasia in the 21st Century: A Collection of Materials of the International Scientific and Practical Conference. Ufa: BashSU RIC, 2013:191–198 [In Russian].
9. Grigoryan G.P. Russia and the World: Mutual Knowledge. Dnevnik Altajskoj shkoly politicheskikh issledovanij, [Diary of the Altai School of Political Studies]. 2009; 25:95–97 [In Russian].
10. de Waal T. Security Threats in the South Caucasus. Postsovetskie issledovaniya [Herald of Europe]. 2002; 7 [In Russian]. Available from: <https://magazines.gorky.media/vestnik/2002/7/ugrozy-bezopasnosti-na-yuzhnom-kavkaze.html>.
11. Dudayti A.K. Problems of Energy Security in the South Caucasus after the August War of 2008. Vestnik Severo-Osetinskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta im. K.L.Hetagurova. [Bulletin of the K.L.Hetagurov North Ossetian State University]. 2022; 4:44–51 [In Russian].
12. SIPRI Yearbook 2021: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security: Translation from English / SIPRI, IMEMO RAS; editorial board: A.A.Dynkin, A.G.Arbatov, V.G.Baranovsky, et al. Moscow: IMEMO RAS, 2022:964 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.20542/978-5-9535-0611-3>.
13. Zhiltsov S.S., Savicheva E.M. Regional security in the South Caucasus: the energy component. Problemy postsovetskogo prostranstva. [Problems of the post-Soviet space]. 2021; 8(3):331–340 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.24975/2313-8920-2021-8-3-331-340>.
14. Kurylev K.P., Galoyan N.G., Stanis D.V., Bredikhin A.V. Maintaining the balance of power in the South Caucasus. Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya. [World economy and international relations]. 2018; Vol. 62. 3:108–118 [In Russian].
15. Malysheva D.B. Security issues in the Caucasus. Central'naya Aziya i Kavkaz. [Central Asia and the Caucasus]. 2001; 1(13):41–56 [In Russian].
16. Rondeli A. The South Caucasus and Russia. Vestnik Evropy. [Herald of Europe]. 2002; 7:7–8 [In Russian].
17. Skvortsova N., Abazov D. Conflict of Interest in the South Caucasus. Postsovetskie issledovaniya [Post-Soviet Studies]. 2020; Vol. 3. 2:181–188 [In Russian].
18. Strategic Review 2023 / A.G.Arbatov (ed.), A.V.Zagorsky, S.M.Ivanov, P.A.Karasev, A.I.Nikitin, S.K.Oznobishchev (IMEMO RAS); MGIMO MFA of Russia. Moscow: MGIMO-University, 2024:300 [In Russian].
19. Novikova G. Russia's Belt of (In)Security. European Security and Defence. 2021; 11–12:19–21 [In English].

20. Novikova G. Significant Shifts in the Geopolitics of the South Caucasus. European Security and Defence. 2021; 9:47–49 [In English].
21. Novikova G. The South Caucasus and the European Security Architecture. Panorama of Global Security Environment. Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs. Bratislava, 2010:351-365 [In English]
22. Novikova G. The South Caucasus in the Shadow of the War in Ukraine. European Security and Defence. 2023; 5:72–74 [In English]

About the author

Inal B. SANAKOEV. CandSc. (Polit.). Head of the Department of Political Science and Sociology. South Ossetian State University after A.A.Tibilov. <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4390-1012>. Address: 8, V.V.Putin str, Tskhinval, 500200, Republic of South Ossetia. inal59@mail.ru

Contribution of the author

The author declares no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Received: June 25, 2024. Approved after review: July 22, 2024. Accepted for publication: August 31, 2024. Published: September 23, 2024.

The author has read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewers for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

Russia as an Object of Scientific Studies in Kyrgyzstan

Nazgul Dzh. Abalova^{1a}✉, Yevgeny F. Troitsky^{2b}✉,
Anastasia M. Pogorelskaya^{3c}✉, Kanybek A. Kudayarov^{4d}✉

¹Institute of World Languages and International Relations named after Sh.Kadyrova of the I.Arabaev Kyrgyz State University, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
2,3 Tomsk State University, Tomsk, Russia

⁴The Center for Russian Studies of J.Balasagyn KNU, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan

^anazdil72@mail.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9607-536X>

^beft@rambler.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6489-7193>

^cpogorelskaya@mail.tsu.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3003-4757>

^dkana8306@mail.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8970-8694>

Abstract. The object of the study is scientific social and humanitarian publications devoted to Russia of Kyrgyzstan scientists. These are works in five disciplines: “Russian language and literature”, “political science”, “history”, “economics” and “law”. The purpose of the work is to identify the degree of study and the specificity of research on Russia in Kyrgyzstan in studies on Russian philology, history and political science, and analysis of expert-analytical and scientific-educational materials on economic and legal aspects of research.

Of greatest interest to Kyrgyz researchers is Russian language, which is explained by the status and role of the Russian language in the Kyrgyz Republic and its dominant position in the capital, Bishkek, where all major universities of the republic dealing with Russian topics are located. In the sphere of the other four disciplines, the interests of researchers are limited to historical, political and economic relationships between the two states. The study showed that, in general, the ideological positions of local experts are manifested in a positive or neutral attitude towards Russia, despite individual (single) works that contain a negative interpretation of Kyrgyz-Russian relations.

Keywords: Russia, Kyrgyzstan, science, Russian studies, social and humanitarian sciences, universities, analytical centers

For citation: Abalova N.Dzh., Troitsky Y.F., Pogorelskaya A.M., Kudayarov K.A. Russia as an Object of Scientific Studies in Kyrgyzstan. *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue*. 2024; 3(13): 102-117, doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-102-117

Introduction

The development of Kyrgyz-Russian relations – both bilaterally and within the framework of international integration formats (EAEU, CSTO, SCO, etc.) – in recent years has led to an increase in scientific and educational contacts between the two states. Since 2019, forums of rectors of universities of Kyrgyzstan and Russia have been held, and since 2022, the Association of Universities of Russia and Kyrgyzstan has been functioning. Kyrgyz-Russian scientific and educational partnership is successfully developing within the framework of network universities of the SCO and the CIS, created to implement joint scientific and scientific-technical projects. Almost any Russian university has experience of cooperation with universities in Kyrgyzstan, many universities in Kyrgyzstan have dozens of agreements with universities in the Russian Federation. The scientific and expert community of Kyrgyzstan is actively studying Kyrgyz-Russian cooperation, as evidenced by numerous publications of scientists and experts from Kyrgyzstan. But there are no publications that would reflect the development of such a direction as Russian studies in Kyrgyzstan, which would allow us to determine the degree of interest of Kyrgyz researchers in the science of Russia. Given the demand for Russian studies in scientific works, an attempt was made to fill the existing gap in such areas as Russian language and literature, history and political science, economics and law.

Materials and Methods

The study is based on the analysis of scientific, educational and expert-analytical literature: articles, monographs, textbooks, dissertations. Much attention is paid to scientific, educational and analytical centers of Kyrgyzstan dealing with the issues under study: the features of the research they conduct and the topics that are of priority for them. The resources of the scientific electronic library “Elibrary”, the database of scientific works of the National Electronic Library of Kyrgyzstan (“neb.kg”), the dissertation library of the information agency “AKIpress” (“Bilim AKIpress”), and materials of the network of academic libraries “Kirlibnet” were used. Articles were downloaded from “Elibrary” based on a thematic selection according to five selected areas of research by Kyrgyz scientists about Russia. Within the first area (Russian philology), 1,545 units were selected. Historical and political science areas – 694 and 372 units. Economics and law – 3,331 and 1,382 articles, respectively. The chronological framework of the study is 2020–2024.

Results

Russian language and literature

The Russian language has official status in Kyrgyzstan and is widely used as a second language. Its role is high in the higher education system of Kyrgyzstan: 54 out of 68 universities in Kyrgyzstan (including branches of Russian universities) have Russian as the only or one of the languages of instruction¹.

Higher education institutions in Kyrgyzstan play a key role in preserving and promoting the Russian language. There are four capital universities in Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz National University named after J.Balasagyn, Bishkek State University named after K.Karasayev, Kyrgyz State University named after I.Arabayev, Osh State University) with Russian philology departments, and four more regional universities with philology departments that train specialists in Russian language and literature and translators along with specialists in other foreign languages.

A special role is also played by the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University named after B.N.Yeltsin, whose humanities faculty offers master's programs in "Russian as a Foreign Language"² and "Russian Literature". Since 2020, the Institute of the Russian Language has been operating within it as a platform for the implementation of scientific, methodological, informational, analytical, cultural and educational activities aimed at preserving and strengthening the position of the Russian language in Kyrgyzstan. For example, in April 2024, the Institute's staff conducted field sociolinguistic research in the regions of Kyrgyzstan in order to study the language situation and monitor the status of the Russian language. The data obtained is currently being processed, which will be included in the content of a monograph being developed under the supervision of Doctor of Philological Sciences M.Dzh.Tagayev.

Research and dissertations on the Russian language, literature and methods of teaching the Russian language³ contribute to the preservation and support of the Russian language as an important part of Russia's cultural heritage, the development of academic interest in Russian philology, the improvement of specialists' qualifications and the deepening of intercultural interaction. An analysis of the dissertations topics shows that scientific research on Russian philology in Kyrgyzstan is more concerned with comparative linguistics in the Kyrgyz and Russian languages. An important part are dissertations on the theory and methodology of teaching, but topics directly related to Russian literature and language are not so popular.

Political science

The Kyrgyz political science expert community is represented both within the framework of analytical centers specializing in international relations and foreign policy (the National Institute

¹ National Erasmus+. Office in Kyrgyzstan: official website. Bishkek. Available from: <https://erasmusplus.kg/wp-content/uploads/%D0%A1%D0%BF%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%BA-%D0%92%D1%83%D0%B7%D0%BE%D0%B2.pdf>

² Кыргызско-Российский Славянский университет: официальный сайт. Бишкек. Available from: <https://krsu.edu.kg/sveden/education/programs/russkiy-yazyk-kak-inostrannyi-45.04.01.html>

³ Over the past five years, 9 dissertations have been written in these specialties.

for Strategic Studies of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Institute for Political Studies at the T.Usulbaev Foundation, the Polis Asia Center), and within the framework of specialized divisions, faculties and departments of universities (the Center for Eurasian Studies and the Institute for Strategic Analysis and Forecasting at the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University, the International University of Kyrgyzstan, the Osh Humanitarian and Pedagogical University, the Ala-Too International University, etc.).

Political science research by Kyrgyz experts on Russia is scientific, educational and expert-analytical work on the topics of:

- bilateral Kyrgyz-Russian relations;
- the place and role of Russia in the geopolitical space of Central Asia (in the past and present);
- Russian foreign policy concepts and strategies implemented in relation to the region, and Kyrgyzstan in particular, in which an important place is given to the position of Russian compatriots, their role in the implementation of Russia's "soft power" in the Central Asian republics.

Much attention is paid to integration within the framework of interaction between Russia and Kyrgyzstan (as well as other former Soviet republics) in the CIS, EAEU and CSTO. The topic of geopolitical confrontation between the countries of the collective West and Russia is important, against the background of which there was an intensification of Russian economic, scientific and educational policy in Kyrgyzstan and in the post-Soviet space as a whole.

Political analysis reveals Kyrgyzstan's commitment to the ideas of Eurasian integration. The only exception is the analytical center "Center Polis Asia", whose projects focus on negative moments in the common history of Kyrgyzstan and Russia (victims of Stalin's repressions, dispossession, victims of concentration camps, etc.), promoting the concept of decolonization of the consciousness of the citizens of Kyrgyzstan.

History

In the historical science of Kyrgyzstan, much attention is paid to the coverage of Kyrgyz-Russian relations, which is confirmed by the number of scientific publications (based on the RSCI) published in 2020-2024. The peculiarity of the reviewed works is that they mainly present not history, but historical periods that were directly related to Kyrgyz history, had a direct impact on the development of the Kyrgyz people and Kyrgyz statehood, and contributed to its comprehensive development.

Most of these works are articles in periodicals at higher educational institutions of Kyrgyzstan and Russia, in collections of articles and conference materials held in the two states.

The authors of the studied works represent at least 16 scientific and scientific-educational centers of Kyrgyzstan. The overwhelming majority of the authors are employees of the relevant (specialized) university departments⁴. The largest number of works are presented by authors from the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University, the Kyrgyz State University named after I.Arabaev, and the Kyrgyz National University named after J.Balasagyn.

⁴ The universities established on the basis of intergovernmental agreements include: Kyrgyz-Turkish University "Manas" and Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University named after B.N.Yeltsin.

The main subject areas of research include:

1) in the pre-Soviet period: cultural and historical ties of the Kyrgyz with the peoples of Russia [14, 20] (for example, with the population of Altai and Buryatia); ties of the Kyrgyz of the Tien Shan and Yenisei; the policy of the Russian Empire in Central Asia (including the Stolypin reform in the region); coverage of various aspects of the 1916 uprising;

2) in the Soviet period: the fight against Basmachi; the formation of Kyrgyz statehood in the Soviet period; the history of the creation and development of specialized government bodies (various ministries and departments in the Kyrgyz SSR); the history of the formation of various cities of Kyrgyzstan; the role of the Russian language in Kyrgyzstan; development of science, education and culture in the KSSR⁵; the role of various historical figures in the formation of Kyrgyz statehood; the emergence and development of the Kyrgyz intelligentsia; Stalin's repressions, political repressions in the Kyrgyz SSR in 1937–1938; the contribution of Russian scientists to the development of Kyrgyz studies; the Great Patriotic War and Kyrgyzstan's contribution to the common victory; the economy and socio-economic development of the Kyrgyz SSR during the Great Patriotic War; educational work in the Kyrgyz SSR during the Great Patriotic War; the government of the Kyrgyz SSR during the Great Patriotic War; deportation of various peoples of Russia to the Kyrgyz SSR;

3) in the post-Soviet period: various aspects of Eurasian integration, etc. [9–12].

In its works, the historical community of Kyrgyzstan as a whole quite positively evaluates the common history of the Kyrgyz and Russian peoples, the role of Russian civilization in the formation of Kyrgyzstan as a modern state with a developed society. At the same time, there are also controversial, problematic issues, including:

- the uprising of the Kyrgyz of the Semirechye region of the Turkestan Governorate-General in 1916, which is the subject of a large number of publications;
- the period of Stalin's repressions [1, 2, 5, 6].

Economy

There are several analytical centers in Kyrgyzstan that deal with the topic of Eurasian integration and Kyrgyzstan's position in these projects, partly – other Central Asian states, and only very superficially – Russia. These include the National Institute for Strategic Studies, the

⁵ “The Scientific Heritage of A.N.Bernshtam in the Collections of the Academy of Sciences of the Kyrgyz Republic”, in which the author asserts that A.N.Bernshtam's conclusion about the mass migration of the Yenisei Kyrgyz to the Tien Shan in the 9th-10th centuries, who subsequently formed the Kyrgyz ethnic group and finally prevailed in the post-Mongol period, is undoubtedly of great importance in the concept of ethnogenesis and stages of the ethnic history of the Kyrgyz people). Among other equally significant works concerning Bernshtam's scientific research, it is worth noting “The Scientific Activity of A.N.Bernshtam in Kyrgyzstan in Post-Soviet Historiography”; “Manas in the Research of A.N.Bernshtam” and other works written at the Kyrgyz National University. Of great importance are the works exploring the “legacy” of N.A.Aristov: Turgunbaeva A.S. N.A.Aristov and his contribution to the development of source studies of the history of the Kyrgyz people. Bulletin of the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University. Series: “Culture and Cultural Studies”. 2014. Vol. 14; 3:80–83; N.A.Aristov on the meaning of clan names and tamgas as indicators of the ethnic composition of the Kyrgyz tribes. Bulletin of the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University. Series: Historical Sciences. 2018. Vol. 18; 5:36–40 and others; Madaliev N.A. V.V.Bartold and the Turkestan Circle of Archeology Lovers. Bulletin of the branch of the Russian State Social University in Osh, Kyrgyz Republic. 2011; 9:62–65 and others.

Institute for Strategic Analysis and Forecasting, and the Analytical Center for Economic and Demographic Research at the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University. The centers are relatively large – they employ 15 or more specialists. The Analytical Center for Economic and Demographic Research developed the topic of industrial policy and technological sovereignty, which is in line with Russian priorities. In the “Bulletin of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic named after K.Dikambaev” publishes articles on Eurasian integration, which also concern the state of the Russian economy. Works on economic integration in the format of the Eurasian Economic Union, as well as trade and economic cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and Russia, are also published by the Kyrgyz Economic University named after M.Ryskulbekov⁶.

An analysis of publications by researchers from Kyrgyzstan included in the RSCI database for the period 2020–2024 shows that relatively common research topics that are related to the Russian economy in one way or another are:

- labor migration issues (both from Kyrgyzstan to Russia and around the world);
- analysis of the features and consequences of Eurasian integration (primarily in the EAEU format) – in the financial, tax sphere, digitalization, and functioning of the single labor market;
- security issues (food, economic, demographic, technological, etc.);
- ways to develop tourism.

There are relatively few publications on bilateral relations between Russia and Kyrgyzstan. They are most often devoted to the socio-economic consequences of cooperation and labor migration, in particular, cooperation in personnel training. There are few comparative studies of Russia and Kyrgyzstan in the field of economics.

There are also few publications on the specifics of the Russian economy or Russia's foreign economic relations (with the exception of the EAEU), except for several collective works.

Among the dissertations on economics in Kyrgyzstan, there is not a single one that is devoted to Russia. Many works, especially monographs, are written by authors from Kyrgyzstan together with Russian colleagues, but most often they characterize the Russian economy, trade and economic relations between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, and Eurasian integration in a neutral-descriptive manner or with a touch of constructive criticism. Labor migration from Kyrgyzstan to Russia is critically analyzed, often emphasizing its “forced” nature and the difficulties that labor migrants have to face in Russia.

Legal law

Research on Russian law in Kyrgyzstan is carried out by a limited number of centers and a few researchers. There are no research centers in Kyrgyzstan whose main subject of activity

⁶ For example: Elebesov A.J. The role and importance of the EAEU in the development of the economies of states. M. Ryskulbekov Atyndagy Kyrgyz Economics University of Kabarlary. 2024; 1(62):19–24; Satylganova E.Sh., Elebesov A.D. Problems, ways to solve the calculation and collection of customs duties in the EAEU. M. Ryskulbekov Atyndagy Kyrgyz Economics University of Kabarlary. 2023; 3(60):9–12; Bekov T.N. Ensuring food security in the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union. M. Ryskulbekov Atyndagy Kyrgyz Economics University of Kabarlary. 2022; 4(57):95–98.; Arakelyan A.A. Dynamics of foreign trade relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia. M. Ryskulbekov Atyndagy Kyrgyz Economics University of Kabarlary. 2024; 1(62):9–11, etc.

would be the study of the Russian legal system; only certain aspects of the evolution of Russian law fall into the field of view of Kyrgyz researchers. The points of concentration of researchers who show a stable interest in Russian law and legal studies are the law faculties of leading state universities, especially the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University named after B.N.Yeltsin and the Kyrgyz National University named after J.Balasagyn.

Analyzing the works of Kyrgyz legal scholars touching upon the issues of comparative law and the evolution of the Russian legal system, it can be noted:

1) the greatest interest is aroused by the issues of convergence of national legislations in the EAEU, ensuring labor and social rights of citizens of Kyrgyzstan in the Russian Federation, legal aspects of countering terrorism and extremism, as well as issues of the general Russian (Soviet) and Kyrgyz history of the state and law. Publications devoted to the evolution of Russian law and the analysis of Russian legal norms are very rare.

2) the following prevail in most works:

- recognition of the importance of developing comparative legal studies in Kyrgyzstan, including studying the experience of Russia and other CIS countries, the similarity of many elements of the legal system of Kyrgyzstan with the Russian one (for example, budget legislation);
- positive assessments of the EAEU, especially progress in the field of forming common labor and pension legislation, developing the regulatory framework for international cooperation of the EAEU;
- interest in the prospects for forming a common legal field of the SCO;
- interest in the joint history of the state and law, recognition of the important, system-forming influence of the Russian (Soviet) state and law on the modern state and legal development of Kyrgyzstan. This influence, as a rule, is assessed positively (for example, the “strategically important significance of the creation of the Kyrgyz SSR” for the formation of Kyrgyz statehood is recognized, a positive assessment is given to the Constitution of the Kyrgyz SSR of 1978) [3, 8]. Some works substantiate the thesis on the progressiveness of the legal norms of the Russian Empire in comparison with the previously existing norms of customary law⁷.

At the same time, Kyrgyz lawyers are concerned about:

- the existence of problems and gaps in the legal regulation of the status of Kyrgyz labor migrants in Russia (for example, the problem of dual citizenship, the problem of transferring funds, excessive requirements for medical examination of labor migrants);
- the persistence of discrepancies in the national labor law systems of the EAEU countries that impede the full functioning of the common labor market.

Discussion

Based on the analysis of scientific literature devoted to Russian topics, a number of general and specific recommendations have been developed. General recommendations

⁷ For example: Sopubekova N.T. Judicial system of Kyrgyzstan during the period of its being part of the Kokand Khanate and the Russian Empire (19th – early 20th centuries). *Bulletin of Science and Practice*. 2020; Vol. 6. 3:338–345.

concerning the joint work of the academic communities of the two countries are as follows:

1. Expanding financial mechanisms to support joint educational projects in the field of history and the humanities, educational events, exchange programs and internships based at Russian universities aimed at the youth of Kyrgyzstan. For example, attracting postgraduate students from the CIS countries to internships under the programs of the Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences and in Russian scientific and educational organizations. The ongoing generational change in Kyrgyz universities requires significant investments in personnel training/advanced training/retraining of the teaching staff, in which Russia could take direct part.

2. Holding competitions for joint research by research teams from Russia and Kyrgyzstan based on the Russian Science Foundation or another financial mechanism, supporting Russian research by students and postgraduate students of Kyrgyzstan, as well as joint research by students and postgraduate students of the two countries.

Recommendations for the direction “Russian language and literature”:

1. Introducing a mandatory requirement for textbooks on Russian language and literature to include experts from two countries in the author’s team (at least one author from Russia and one from Kyrgyzstan) in order to take into account national characteristics.

2. Encouraging teachers who prepare schoolchildren for district, regional, republican and international Olympiads in Russian language and literature.

3. Launching academic mobility programs for students studying Russian language and literature, providing for study at Russian universities for at least 1 semester (similar to the Erasmus + programs).

4. Conducting special events to support and motivate students studying Russian (for example, such a practice is developed for the Korean / Chinese languages: a recitation competition, a competition for knowledge of the culture of the country of the studied language).

5. Providing the opportunity to receive a one-time grant for those who defended a dissertation in Russian philology (as motivation for young scientists).

6. Organization of guest lectures by Russian specialists in Russian language and literature on a permanent basis at the faculties of Russian philology in Kyrgyzstan.

Recommendation for the fields of History and Political Science:

To initiate the creation of associations of political scientists, internationalists and historians of Russia and Kyrgyzstan, and other forms of interaction between the academic communities of the two countries by the Russian Association of Political Sciences, the Russian Association of International Studies, the Russian Historical Society and/or leading Russian universities.

Conclusions

Summarizing the development of five areas of research devoted to Russia, we formulate the following conclusions:

1. Taking into account the status and role of the Russian language, the strongest positions in comparison with other sciences in Kyrgyzstan are held by the area of “Russian Language and Philology”.

2. Political scientists, historians, and economists in Kyrgyzstan mainly study those aspects that are related to the politics, history, and economy of Kyrgyzstan and the Kyrgyz people. The study of Russia is limited and fragmentary.

3. The key role is played by the capital's universities of Kyrgyzstan, primarily the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University named after B.N.Yeltsin, the Kyrgyz National University named after J.Balasagyn, and the Kyrgyz State University named after I.Arabaev. The role of regional universities and research centers is less.

4. Despite the fact that in the work of individual centers and researchers there is a negative assessment of the history, politics, economy of Russia, and the ties between Kyrgyzstan and Russia, in general the ideological positions of researchers are positive or neutral.

References

1. Abdrakhmanov B.D., Altymysheva Z.A. Policy of repression implementation in the Kyrgyz SSR in 1937-1938. *Nauchny Dialog* [Scientific Dialog]. 2021; 7:307-324 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.24224/2227-1295-2021-7-307-324>.
2. Abytov B.K. The first All-Union Turkological Congress: repressive and executed. *Tyurkologicheskij zhurnal* [Turkological journal]. 2023; 5(2):7-22 [In Russian].
3. Akbarali K.T. Preparation of the draft of the Kyrgyz SSR in 1978. *Mezhdunarodnyj zhurnal gumanitarnykh i estestvennykh nauk* [International Journal of Humanities and Natural Sciences]. 2022; 7-1(70):186-189 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.24412/2500-1000-2022-7-1-186-189>.
4. Arakelyan A.A. Dynamics of foreign trade relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia. *M.Ryskulbekov Atyndagi Kyrgyz Ekonomikalyk Universitetin Kabarlary* [News of Kyrgyz Economic University named after M. Ryskulbekov]. 2024; 1(62):9-11 [In Russian].
5. Atayarov A.R. The first stage of repression by the security agencies of Kyrgyzstan. The 30s of the twentieth century. *Vestnik KGU im. I. Arabaeva* [Bulletin KGU im. I. Arabaeva]. 2021; 3:1-5 [In Russian].
6. Atayarov A.R. Political repressions against the Kyrgyz military elite and their consequences. *Gumanitarnye i social'no-ekonomicheskie nauki* [Humanities and socio-economic sciences]: Rostov-na-Donu. 2020; 4(113):55-58 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.18522/1997-2377-2020-113-4-55-58>.
7. Baibosunova G.U. Transformation of ethnocultural values of Kyrgyz society and its integration in the Eurasian space (philosophical and cultural analysis). *Social'naya integraciya i razvitie etnokul'tur v evrazijskom prostranstve* [Social integration and development of ethnocultures in the Eurasian space]. 2023; 1(12): 29-34 [In Russian]. EDN: UICINU.
8. Bakalbaev Z.M. Constitutional and legal regulation of the economic development of Kyrgyzstan as part of the USSR. *Bulleten nauki i praktiki* [Bulletin of Science and Practice]. 2022; 8(10):236-239 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.33619/2414-2948/83/32>.
9. Bekov T.N. Ensuring food security in the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union [Ensuring food security in the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union]. *Vestnik Kyrgyzskogo ekonomicheskogo universiteta im M.Ryskulbekova* [News of Kyrgyz Economic University named after M. Ryskulbekov]. 2022; 4(57):95-98 [In Russian].
10. Duishoev E.K. Eurasianism in the context of geopolitics and economics. *Gumanitarnye i socialniye nauki* [Humanities and Social Sciences]. 2023; 99(4):11-16 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.18522/2070-1403-2023-99-4-11-16>.
11. Yelebesov A.J. The role and importance of the EAEU in the development of the economies of states. *M.Ryskulbekov Atyndagi Kyrgyz Ekonomikalyk Universitetin Kabarlary* [News of Kyrgyz Economic University named after M. Ryskulbekov]. 2024; 1(62):19-24 [In Russian].
12. Yelebesov A.D., Satylganova E.Sh. Problems, solutions for calculating and collecting customs duties in the context of the EAEU. *M.Ryskulbekov Atyndagi Kyrgyz Ekonomikalyk Universitetin Kabarlary* [News of Kyrgyz Economic University named after M. Ryskulbekov]. 2023; 3(60):9-12 [In Russian].

13. Zhanteliya N.G., Asipbaeva M.B., Choldoldoeva G.J. A.N.Bernshtam's scientific activity in Kyrgyzstan in post-Soviet historiography. *Mezhdunarodnyj zhurnal eksperimental'nogo obrazovaniya* [International Journal of Experimental Education]. 2021. 3:81-85 [In Russian].
14. Zholdoshev R.J. Tribal ties of the Kyrgyz and Altai peoples according to ethnological data. *Istoricheskaya etnologiya* [Historical ethnology]. 2023. 8(3):327-340 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.22378/he.2023-8-3.327-340>.
15. Kozhabekov M.Ch. A.N. Bernshtam Scientific heritage in the Funds of the Academy of Sciences of the Kyrgyz Republic. *Innovacii v nauke*. [Innovations in Science] Ch. I, Bishkek, 2017; 7(68):19-23 [In Russian].
16. Madaliev N.A. V.V.Bartold and TKLA. *Vestnik filiala Federal'nogo gosudarstvennogo byudzhethnogo obrazovatel'nogo uchrezhdeniya vysshego obrazovaniya «Rossijskij gosudarstvennyj social'nyj universitet» v g. Osh Kirgizskoj Respubliki* [Bulletin of the branch of the Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Education “Russian State Social University” in Osh, Kyrgyz Republic]. 2011; 9:62-65 [In Russian]. EDN: XRZHJJ.
17. Sopubekova N.T. Judicial system of Kyrgyzstan during the period of its being part of the Kokand Khanate and the Russian Empire (19th - early 20th centuries). *Bulleten nauki i praktiki* [Bulletin of Science and Practice]. 2020; 6(3):338-345 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.33619/2414-2948/52/43>.
18. Turgunbayeva A.S. N.A.Aristov and his contribution to the development of Kyrgyz history source studies. *Bulleten KRSU. Series “Kultura i kulturnye nauki”*. 2014; 14(3):80-83 [In Russian].
19. Turgunbayeva A.S. N.A. Aristov on the meaning of family names and tamgas as indicators of the ethnic composition of Kyrgyz tribes. *Bulleten KRSU. Series “Istoricheskiye nauki”*. 2018; 18(5):36-40 [In Russian].
20. Esenaliev T.D., Usmanov M.U., Neelova N.N., Sultanaliyev A.Zh., Isakov G.S. Creation of a system of games for the peoples of Central Eurasia based on the nomadic traditions of the peoples of the Altai civilization. *Nauka, novye tekhnologii i innovacii Kyrgyzstana*: Bishkek. 2022; 6:261-266 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.26104/NNTIK.2022.1.6.054>.

About the authors

Nazgul Zh. ABALOVA. DSc. (Philos.) (PhD). Acting Associate Professor at the Institute of World Languages and International Relations n.a. Sh.Kadyrova of the I.Arabaev Kyrgyz State University/ <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9607-536X>. Address: 51A, Razzakov str., Bishkek, 720026 Kyrgyz Republic. nazdil72@mail.ru

Evgeny F. TROITSKY. DSc. (Hist.). Professor of the Department of World Politics of Tomsk State University. <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6489-7193>. Address: 36, Lenin Ave., Tomsk, 634050, Russia. eftroitskiy@yandex.ru

Anastasia M. POGORELSKAYA. CandSc. (Hist.). Associate Professor of the Department of World Politics at Tomsk State University. <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3003-4757>. Address: 36, Lenin Ave., Tomsk, 634050, Russia. pogorelskaya@mail.tsu.ru

Kanybek A. KUDAYAROV. CandSc. (Hist.), Chief Specialist of the Center for Russian Studies of the J.Balasagyn National University. <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8970-8694>. Address: 547, Frunze str., Bishkek, 720033, Kyrgyz Republic. kana8306@mail.ru

Contribution of the authors

The authors declare no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Received: June 17, 2024. Approved after review: July 12, 2024. Accepted for publication: August 31, 2024. Published: September 23, 2024.

The authors have read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewers for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

CHANGING SOCIETY

Social Structure, Social Institutions and Processes
Political Sociology

In the era of global transit (formational transition), in relations between states and groups of states, along with the usual political and economic contradictions, value contradictions have come to the forefront, which take the form of religious, civilizational-cultural, or national contradictions.

A.I.Yakovlev

Evolution of Value Systems in the "Era of Great Changes": General Challenges and Problems

There are two types of basic institutions (redistributive and market), coexisting in the institutional matrix on the conditions of dominance – complementarity... Dominant institutions determine the essential characteristics of the social system, in particular, the role of the state in coordinating social actions.

P.A.Barakhvostov

Integration Projects and Institutional Matrices

... there is an urgent need to develop a comprehensive knowledge-based model aimed at improving the competence of higher education teachers in the field of artificial intelligence, both for training specialists in the field of AI technology development and its professional use, and for training users in the methods of applying AI in their field, taking into account the direction of training.

S.E.Zhulikov, O.V.Zhulikova

Training Specialists in the Field of Artificial Intelligence at Russia and Central Asian Countries
Universities: Ranking Positions and Cooperation Opportunities

Evolution of Value Systems in the “Era of Great Changes”: General Challenges and Problems

Alexander I. Yakovlev✉

Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

aliv_yak@mail.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7164-1321>

Abstract. The article examines the evolution of the system of traditional values in the era of fundamental changes in the social system. Values of different levels are considered: formational, belonging to a certain social system and changing with the change of the system, as well as civilizational, deep values, generated in a certain religious and cultural space and preserved in the system of ideals and norms of behavior of many generations.

Values reflect and express a certain state of the whole society. With the change of the social system through formational evolution in the West or through “catch-up modernization” in non-Western countries, changes occur in the system of values as an interconnected set of ideals, ideas and norms. Traditional values, as a rule, retreat before the values of “today”, generated by society itself or borrowed from outside. Conflicts of identity and self-identity of the individual and society arise.

In the first decades of the 21st century, in the context of the beginning of the change of the world order, new meanings of development are being developed and sought. The processes of globalization (technological revolution, global migration, flows of goods and information), as well as the West’s desire to maintain the dominant order, while non-Western countries strengthen their importance in the world system, give rise to conflicts of values at different levels. However, not every civilizational challenge becomes a threat to traditional values. In non-Western societies, there is an adaptation of their value system to changed conditions while maintaining fidelity to the ideals and norms of their cultural and religious tradition.

Keywords: values, value system, civilization, formation, tradition, crisis, conflict of values, religion, culture, Modern era

For citation: Yakovlev A.I. Evolution of Value Systems in the “Era of Great Changes”: General Challenges and Problems. *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue*. 2024; 3(13): 120-131, [doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3\(13\)-120-131](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-120-131)

Introduction

In the first decades of the 21st century, it became obvious that the world system was going through an era of transition to a new state, which manifested itself primarily in the material and especially virtual spheres. Less attention was paid to the sphere of spiritual life, the inner world of people and society, in which the phenomena of transition also manifest themselves with natural inevitability. For a person as a subject and object of the historical process, not only material life remains a reality, but also spiritual life, rooted in the foundations of civilization. In the course of changes in social life, contradictions and even conflicts naturally arise between different kinds of ideals, ideas and interests of people. The period of global transition reveals such conflicts no longer at the level of individuals, but at the level of societies and groups of states. Consideration of the processes of social development is possible in a dual system of coordinates: civilizational and formational, considering society as an integral social and industrial organism.

Materials and Methods

The article is of a theoretical nature and comprehends the evolution of the content of the concept of “value” in the countries of the West and the Arab world. The main research method is a comparative analysis of the concepts of domestic and foreign authors devoted to values. The empirical and informational base was the works of Russian and foreign socio-historical and philosophical thought. The scientific novelty of the study lies in the socio-philosophical analysis of the evolution of value as a phenomenon in the era of formational transition.

Values are traditional and modern, Eastern and Western, European and national, or elite and mass, popular and cosmopolitan. In sociology, attempts have been made more than once to build a hierarchy of value systems: hedonistic, etiquette, aesthetic, moral or materialistic and “post-materialistic”. In the coming era, we have to think about the criteria.

Values changed in individual historical eras. Thus, in the New Age, during the implementation of the “Enlightenment project,” in the era of modernity in Western countries that constituted the vanguard of world development, there was an irreversible erosion of the traditional (Christian) system of values and its displacement by the values of capitalist modernity. In the period before the era of modernity, the system of values was built in civilization on the basis of religion, but in the era of modernity, values arise and change in a certain culture: national culture (mass or elite), cosmopolitan mass culture of consumer society, or global youth culture of the Internet, which has acquired almost autonomy.

A new phenomenon is the influence of stable global and regional migration (pendulum and constant) on the spread and preservation of national cultural norms, including values.



They started talking about the onset of the “era of nomads” not tied to a specific “soil”. There are practically no closed societies left in the world. The flows of people, goods, finances and information irreversibly lead to changes in the value systems of individual societies.

Previously, religion, family, school and books were the bearers of values. Now the role of these socio-cultural institutions is weakening uncontrollably, if not disappearing. The almost absolute dominance of the Internet has arrived. At the same time, the state has the capabilities and tools to influence the values and value orientations of society.

In the era of formational transition in relations between states and groups of states, along with the usual political and economic contradictions, value contradictions have come to the fore, which take the form of religious, civilizational-cultural, and national contradictions. But, in essence, it all comes down to the fact that people and societies are guided by different ideas and feelings when making decisions and have different ideals before them in their activities.

Results

A civilization is a stable, ethno-demographic and socio-cultural community that inhabits a certain territory and has for many centuries clearly expressed traditional features and timeless foundations of culture and religious system, worldview and national psychology.

A formation is a special, time-limited, historically determined type of society that has a set of special productive forces, production relations, political system, social organization and culture.

In the space of civilization, one formation system is replaced by another. With the change of eras, the ideas and interests of people change, who, however, as a rule, remain faithful to certain ideals that arise on the basis of values generated in certain civilizations.

Values are reference points in human activity and worldview, generally accepted norms and ideals in the self-identification of a person and society in a specific space and time. Back in 1902, S.N.Bulgakov in his article “The Main Problems of the Theory of Progress” pointed out that “a person needs to have a holistic view of the world... In a word, a person asks and cannot help but ask not only how, but what, why and for what purpose” [1:48]. The problem of the meaning of life is determined and resolved by a certain set of values that both an individual and society develop for themselves in a certain historical period.

Changing the Christian Value System in the West

The Western model gained dominance in the world about 500 years ago. Its qualities gradually became normative for non-Western countries that were embarking on the path of catch-up modernization according to the Western model of development, to which there was no visible alternative. Part of the Western model was a system of values that arose on the basis of ancient culture, Christianity and Roman statehood, later supplemented by the

values of the Reformation and the Enlightenment, and in the 20th century also by the era of consumer society.

Values form an interconnected system. Values have changed in individual historical eras.

Over the centuries, a single Christian European civilization was divided into Western (Atlantic) and Eastern (Orthodox), the boundary was the Great Schism in 1054, the capture and plunder of Constantinople by the Crusaders during the Fourth Crusade in 1204 and the fall of Constantinople under the blows of the Ottomans in 1453, when the Christian West did not come to the aid of its co-religionists. Gradually, the combination of political events and differences in church life determined different aspirations. The German philosopher Johann Herder wrote ironically at the end of the 18th century that in the East the Christian idea “confused the human mind – instead of living on earth, people learned to walk on air... without knowing it, they laid the foundation of the Byzantine Christian Empire... on the religion of monks” [4:499]. In turn, in the West, as S. Runciman noted, the church turned out to be the custodian of Roman laws, its prominent figures had to become lawyers, and the pope took the place of the emperor [9:22]. On the one hand, the peculiarities of statehood and political circumstances, as well as church conflicts, on the other – the difference in interests and aspirations in public life, strengthened the division between East and West.

The further transformation of Christian civilization in the West, where Western and Northern Europe acquired a new quality, is logical. Changes in people’s lives entailed changes in their worldview. In the New Age, during the implementation of the “Enlightenment project”, in the era of modernity in the Western countries that constituted the vanguard of world development, there was an irreversible erosion of the traditional (Christian) system of values and its displacement by the values of capitalist modernity. One of the ideologists of the French Revolution, Baron P. Holbach, in the middle of the 18th century outlined the rational worldview of the materialists of his time, who expected the implementation of the “kingdom of reason”. At the same time, the atheist P. Holbach considered his interest and benefit to be the basis of human behavior. This kind of utilitarian worldview has become an integral element of the modern development model.

The Great French Revolution of 1789 has become a symbol of the New Age. It (in combination with the American Revolution of 1786) meant not only a break with the previous era and its system of values, but also the emergence of a holistic political culture and political system; institutional frameworks were created for a new system of values, ideas and ideals, moral norms and behavior for the future. At the same time, the new system needed to “reduce the significance of Christianity for the sake of the survival of Western civilization itself, for the sake of its, so to speak, competitiveness” [8:22].

Of course, the old order was not passive in the face of such pressure; it resisted. At the beginning of the 19th century, on the European continent, which found itself in the vanguard of world development, the rejection of rationalism and pragmatism was growing, and mysticism and pietism were growing in religious life. In socio-economic life, the culture of possession (profit and gain) was still inferior to the culture of public benefit, based on the

system of Christian values. In painting and literature, the Romantic movement, based on lofty ideals, predominated.

In the 19th and 20th centuries, the transition from the traditional vertical value system, oriented toward the highest absolute value – God, to a horizontal value system, in which there is no hierarchy and spiritual values are equal to profane ones, begins and ends in Western countries. The concept of the sacred has disappeared. The bourgeois value system has done away with a number of old ideals: the principle of justice has been replaced by the principle of charity, the principle of public benefit has been replaced by the principle of the benefit of an individual. However, tradition has not disappeared completely, it has shrunk into a tolerable marginal phenomenon in the space of the new modern order.

In the 19th century, J.Mill and A.I.Herzen wrote about this. The Russian philosopher was initially a European, he wrote: "We need Europe as an ideal, as a reproach, as a good example; if it is not like that, it must be invented." Later he discovered that in the West, "individuals are beginning to fade away, to disappear in the masses... everything is moving towards mediocrity, faces are lost in the crowd." "The bourgeoisie is the ideal to which Europe is striving, rising from all points of the bottom," wrote A.I.Herzen in 1862. "This is the 'chicken in cabbage soup' that Henry IV dreamed of... The bourgeoisie, the last word in a civilization based on the absolute autocracy of property, is the democratization of the aristocracy, the aristocratization of democracy... everything from below is drawn to the bourgeoisie, everything from above falls into it by itself because it is impossible to hold on. The United States represents one middle state" [5:71, 276, 354].

The change of value systems, being a retreat in the civilizational sense, became a grandiose leap into the future in the formational sense. The West, using the results of the Reformation era with its cult of rationality and the Enlightenment era with its conviction in the omnipotence of man, used the fruits of the Industrial Revolution and became the leader of world development.

Conflict of Values in the Non-Western World

In an attempt to overcome their backwardness, non-Western societies were forced to take the Western model of development as a model, which for a long time seemed normative and universal. But back in the early 20th century, M.Weber pointed out: "The first enemy that the 'spirit' of capitalism had to face, which was a certain lifestyle, normatively conditioned and appearing in 'ethical' guise, was a type of perception and behavior that can be called traditionalism," i.e. loyalty to the usual system of values. But, firstly, along with the Western one, there are other types of rationality (Taoist-Confucian, Hindu-Buddhist) [2:80]. And secondly, the desire to improve people's lives (modernization) entailed a change in attitude toward the usual set of values. The process of evolution of value systems is encompassing an increasing number of societies outside the West. The ideals of a consumer society are also being adopted in the East, as backwardness and poverty are overcome there.

According to the optimistic statement of F.Fukuyama at the beginning of the 21st century, the Great Break that occurred in the West with the previous way of life and the entire

social order for the sake of increasing "freedom and equality – the two things that people in modern democracy value most of all" [10:12] will happen in the East. In non-Western societies, "the way forward seems to promise an ever-increasing level of disorganization and social atomization, while the path of retreat is cut off for us" [10:191].

R.Inglehart and K.Welzel, in their analysis of modernization processes, pointed out that in non-Western societies, "changes in values... lead to important socio-political consequences, values and beliefs evolve in a 'predictable direction'" - "promoting changes in sexual norms, gender roles, family values, religiosity, motivation to work, relationships between man and nature, and people's social and political activity" according to the pattern of "a humanistic culture that emphasizes self-expression", and, in turn, "the values of self-expression are more closely associated with democracy than any other factor" [7:10, 13, 15].

These trends were reinforced at the turn of the century in the context of globalization by the technological factor. Modern technologies differ from the technologies of the twentieth century in that they can directly influence people's worldview and perception of the world, replacing the traditional mentality with a modern, Western one. The Internet has proven to be a powerful "leveler" of culture among young people, continuing the process begun by the 1968 revolution. The Internet unifies national cultures and imposes cosmopolitan "youth uniformity" as a new norm. Youth culture generates its own values, and also reduces and simplifies the cultural space of tradition. The Internet space in the 21st century has become not only a battlefield for political ideas, but also a space for confrontation between cultures.

It is well known what this led to. The former value systems – ideals, ideas and interests – were replaced by a set of "basic interests, needs and passions". "Westernism rationalized man", A.A.Zinoviev pointed out. "It excluded from his 'inner world' everything superfluous, all psychological rubbish, ideological confusion, a tendency to excessive reflection, excessive mediation between idea and deed. But Westernism made man more reliable for building human associations on a huge scale and with a high level of social organization" [6:305, 306, 355].

The English historian E.Hobsbawm, assessing the crisis that engulfed the world capitalist system by the end of the twentieth century, wrote that "even more obvious than the crisis of the world economy and world politics was the social and moral crisis... It was a crisis of the beliefs and ideas on which modern society had been built after the modernizers won their famous battle against the reactionaries at the beginning of the nineteenth century – a crisis of the rationalistic and humanistic initial premises shared by both liberal capitalism and communism... However, the moral crisis consisted not only in the denial of the initial premises of modern civilization, but also in the destruction of the historically established structures of human relations inherited by modern society from pre-industrial and pre-capitalist society, which, as we can now see, created the conditions for the development of the former. This was a crisis not of any one form of social organization, but a crisis of all its forms" [11:20–21].

Value systems serve as norms and regulators of public life, government policy and the activities of individuals, serve as the basis for legal norms, morality and ethics of society, and offer criteria for identification and self-identification of individuals and society. The

Western socio-economic model of industrial society has become normative for all non-Western countries, displacing the vertical value system inherent in traditional societies from all spheres of public life.

Discussion

In the era of the global formation transition in relations between states and groups of states, along with the usual political and economic contradictions, value contradictions have come to the forefront, which take the form of religious, civilizational-cultural, or national contradictions, which was noted by S.Huntington at the end of the 20th century. People and societies are guided by different ideas and ideals when making decisions and in their activities, although they have similar goals. The activities of people are determined by the system of values that is established in a certain era (historical formation) and in a certain community of people, which can be defined as a civilization. Each civilization has a certain religious system, but religion, being the "core" of civilization, still does not fully determine its qualities and properties. Religion is closely connected with the "root" values of civilization, and loyalty to religious foundations subsequently affects the degree of loyalty of society to the system of traditional values. In the material dimension, each new formation is also characterized not only by special material parameters and characteristics, but also by its own version of the value system, determined by the new conditions of economic and social life of people.

In the West, by the end of the 20th century, the capitalist formation not only rejected the Christian value system as outdated and not corresponding to the realities of modern times, but also abandoned the ideals of the Enlightenment. At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, various levels of the value system change to varying degrees, and fragmentation occurs within each level. The lower, social level of values is most susceptible to the impact of socio-economic changes; they determine the norms of behavior. The middle level, including socio-political and aesthetic values, generally corresponds to the norms of the dominant social system (formation), including previous norms; this level determines the ideas and ideals of human activity. The higher, metaphysical level (civilizational, root), expressing the spiritual life of people and society as a whole, is also deprived of its former integrity, contains both fragments of tradition (religious and ethical), and fragments of emerging relativism, atheism and paganism. They are guided by it, determining the meaning of life, or they discard it, not asking themselves such an impractical problem. The widespread trend in the 21st century to move away from real knowledge of life and the past into the virtual world is indicative, in the long term leading to social atomization, the disintegration of ties and human society itself.

Conclusions

In the process of socio-economic development of modern industrial society according to the Western model, interaction between non-Western societies and the West took place, which gave rise to both conflicts and changes in existing value systems [12:108, 220]. In international life, this led to "dialogues of civilizations" in an attempt to create a common humanistic platform for overcoming common problems of world change, as well as global challenges of our time (ecology, terrorism, poverty and hunger in the global South). Not every challenge to civilization and its values is a threat if it does not encroach on the civilizational and cultural identity of man and society.

The change in the world order that is taking place today also gives rise to the problem of changing the system of values that determine the purpose and path of world development.

Problems also arise within individual non-Western societies. These are changes in public life of three types:

- rejection of Western (bourgeois, liberal) values, norms of behavior and morality of modernity, defined as traditionalism or fundamentalism; - acceptance of Western values (bourgeois and liberal) at the expense of belittling one's own value system, which coincides with the West's idea of – the inevitability of the triumph of liberal culture (synthesis);
- a combination of elements of Western and one's own values (socioeconomic and political), which in the understanding of Europeans was called multiculturalism (symbiosis).

The solution to these problems cannot be simple. B.P.Vysheslavtsev, who lived in the USA, wrote about this in the mid-20th century. According to the Russian philosopher, "all the creativity of life, the creativity of history consists in the constant resolution of the conflict of values; we always face an alternative of solutions" [3:126].

An important, almost fundamental, necessity within one civilization is the dialogue between the past and the present, based on historicity as a fundamental quality of civilization, our human existence and thinking.

References

1. Bulgakov S.N. Works in 2 volumes. Vol. 2. Moscow: Nauka, 1993:752 [In Russian].
2. Weber M. Selected Works: The Image of Society. St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2013:766 [In Russian].
3. Vysheslavtsev B.P. The Crisis of Industrial Culture. Moscow: Astrel, 2006:1040 [In Russian].
4. Herder I.G. Ideas for the History of the Philosophy of Mankind. Moscow: Nauka, 1977:703 [In Russian].
5. Herzen A.I. Works in 2 volumes. Vol. 2. Moscow: Mysl', 1986:652 [In Russian].
6. Zinoviev A. The West. The Phenomenon of Westernism. Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 1995:460 [In Russian].
7. Inglehart R., Welzel K. Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy. Moscow: Novoye Izdatelstvo, 2011:462 [In Russian].
8. Kantor M. The Strategy of Leviathan. Moscow: AST, 2014:540 [In Russian].
9. Runciman S. The Eastern Schism: Byzantine Theocracy. Moscow: Nauka, Vostochnaya Literatura, 1998:238 [In Russian].
10. Fukuyama F. The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order. Moscow: AST, 2003:476 [In Russian].

11. Hobsbawm E. Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991. Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2004:632 [In Russian].
12. Yakovlev A.I. Countries of the East in the Era of Globalization: Synthesis of the Traditional and the Modern. Moscow, Institute of Oriental Countries, 2015:392 [In Russian].
13. Yakovlev A.I. Values and Value Orientations against the Background of the Change of Epochs. *Religiya i obshchestvo na Vostoke* [Religion and Society in the East]. 2022; 6:21–48 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.31696/2542-1530-2022-6-21-48>.

About the author

Alexander I. YAKOVLEV, DSc. (Hist.). Professor. Chief Researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7164-1321>. Address: 12, Rozhdestvenka Street, Moscow, 107031, Russian Federation, aliv_yak@mail.ru

Contribution of the author

The author declares no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Received: June 6, 2024. Approved after peer review: June 26, 2024. Accepted for publication: August 31, 2024. Published: September 23, 2024.

The author has read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewers for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

CHANGING SOCIETY

Social Structure, Social Institutions and Processes. Political sociology

Original Article

Sociological Sciences

[https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3\(13\)-132-141](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-132-141)

Integration Projects and Institutional Matrices

Pavel A. Barakhvostov✉

Belarusian State Economic University, Minsk, Belarus
barakhvostov@yandex.by, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8943-5980>

Abstract. In this paper, an attempt is made to understand the reasons for the formation of a particular order in a region based on the institutional approach. The connection between regional order and regional regulation with the type of institutional matrices of integrating countries is shown. It is established that when integrating social systems in order to mitigate possible institutional imbalances, institutions complementary to those dominant in the institutional matrix are used: when integrating X-matrix countries – market institutions and vice versa. The factors blocking regionalism in integration projects involving countries with institutional matrices of the same type include: the presence of one clearly expressed hegemon and its support of supranational regulatory bodies, the presence of federal rather than unitary states in the region. It has been established that for countries with different types of institutional matrix, convergence is possible (for example, cooperation in the security sphere, participation in the Free Trade Zone), but integration in this case will be limited to only certain areas that are of exceptional importance for social systems, with the prevalence of regionalization processes (integration “from below” without the creation of any significant and effective supranational bodies). Factors that hinder the development of both regionalism and regionalization are increasing political differences between countries, polarization along religious lines, manifestations of nationalism and racism.

Keywords: institutional approach, institutional matrix, social system, integration, regionalism, regionalization

For citation: Barakhvostov P.A. Integration Projects and Institutional Matrices. *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue*. 2024; 3(13): 132-141, [doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3\(13\)-132-141](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-132-141)

Introduction

The peculiarity of human civilization is a combination of two trends: integration and differentiation. The latter is based on the separation of certain regions from the world community, understood as a social construction, «the main characteristics of which are both traditional factors (economic, historical, civilizational and cultural) and new factors

of post-modern era (network, communication, virtual)» [56:16]. The formation of regions – a process unfolding on top of the national [8:68], which can be carried out on the basis of regionalism or regionalization

Regionalism is integration «from above», which implies the creation of supranational institutions by national states, which are given certain functions and to which a part of sovereignty is transferred. In addition, the regionalization process (integration «from below») is highlighted, which implies increasing economic, political and sociocultural links between social systems, carried out through the interaction of non-state actors. The implementation of a certain combination of regionalism and regionalization determines the so-called regional order [21]. It is an integral part of regional regulation – a way of social coordination to develop binding norms within the region in one or more problem areas. There are two types of regional regulation: hierarchical and non-hierarchical. The first one involves making decisions by supranational institutions for execution at the level of national states («top down»). The second implies making decisions from the bottom up – based on consensus reached through negotiation, and decisions are often of a recommendatory nature.

The problem of explaining typology of regional orders (and types of regional regulation) is widely explored within functionalism [10], social constructivism [12], geopolitical approach [19] etc. However, there is no satisfactory explanation of their characteristics for different regions of the world. This work attempted to solve the problem within the framework of an institutional approach, complemented by a theory of institutional matrices

Materials and Methods

The methodology of the study is based on two provisions: ideas of structural functionalists about society as a holistic integrated education (T.Parsons), in which interconnected and interdependent subsystems (economic, political, sociocultural) are equal (I.Vallerstein), and the institutionalist idea that regulation of the whole system is carried out through a complex structure of institutions understood in the broadest sense – as sustainable models of interaction in society, certain modes of action and judgements, existing in society outside of the individual [2], the «rules of the game» that structure social action [18]. In this structure, we can distinguish the economic, political and sociocultural basic institutions that form the institutional matrix. Distinguish two types of basic institutions (redistributive and market), coexisting in institutional matrices under conditions of dominance – complementarity. The basic distributive institutions include, inter alia, public property, redistributive relations, hierarchical power hierarchy, communistic worldview (awareness of the priority of rights and interests «We» over «I») [3]. Basic market institutions: private property, buying and selling as an exchange institution, competition; self-government and subsidiarity; individualistic ideology expressing the domination of «I» over «We» [3]. Dominant institutions define the essential characteristics of the social system, in particular the role of the state in coordinating social actions.

Complementary institutions are necessary to ensure the resilience of the institutional matrix, preventing possible institutional imbalances. The institutional matrix with the dominance of redistributive institutions is called a matrix X-type (non-Western), market – Y-type (western) [3]. The type of institutional matrix is related to the occupied social system geographical space [4, 11, 13]. These ideas are used to analyze the characteristics of regional orders (regional regulation).

Results

It was observed that the regional orders in Europe and Asia are significantly different [1, 6, 15, 20]: if in Europe (integration of countries with institutional matrices of Y-type) regionalism is important, as in the European Union, in the second (mainly integration of countries of X-type) – regionalization.

Regionalization is a key mechanism of integration in regions that include countries with different types of institutional matrices. Regionalism is blocked in regions where the powers compete for hegemony with different types of institutional matrices, as is typical of the Asia-Pacific region [5]. The economic interests and objectives of integration are at the forefront, and the integration process is not between nation states but between their economies.

The regional regulation in different regions of the world, particularly in the West and East, is also substantially different. The hierarchical type of regulation is usually predominant in regions that combine countries with Y-matrix, non-hierarchical is characteristic for regions of countries with X-matrix or combining countries with different types of institutional matrices. The institutions of regional regulation are not as rigid as in the EU. Their basis is informal confidence building, bilateral, multilateral meetings of the leaders of countries, bilateral and multilateral agreements on free trade and security issues, consensus (unlike majority votes) decision-making and the non-binding nature of their execution. This feature was called «self-locking multilateralism» [14:116], «permanent sub-institutionalization» [9:330]. The non-hierarchical type of regional regulation is closely linked to the principle of «open regionalism», which implies the possibility of participating in various integration projects.

Discussion

Countries with an institutional matrix of type X have a strong state with a hierarchical system of power, which does not need any coordinating action when integrating: the state itself takes on this function. This leads to the fact that the unification is «bottom up» (at the level of non-state actors), and the main mechanism of integration is regionalization, based on – market (complementary) institutions, which perform a compensatory function in institutional matrices of countries-members of the union. The emphasis in

integration processes is on economic interaction, which is realized through economic market institutions. The Arab world is an example of this region. Despite the high degree of cultural and religious homogeneity, common language and even a common identity, strong supranational organizations with hierarchical type of regional regulation could not be created here. Existing regional organizations are purely ceremonial, symbolic [17, 22]. The spillover phenomenon (a smooth transition from regionalization to regionalism) is blocked by the institutional matrices of the countries in the region.

There are features of integration of countries that were formerly subjects of the same state and have historical and cultural closeness, similarity of administrative and legal systems, common social practices. This is typical, for example, of the Eurasian integration project. In this case, the type of regional regulation is highly dependent on the existence of a hegemon and its level of support by supranational institutions. However, the dominant mechanism of integration is usually regionalization with an emphasis on economic interaction, consensus-based decision-making and a soft commitment to implementation. The presence of a strong hegemon (for EAEU – Russia) blocks the development of regionalism.

Y-matrix countries, in which the construction of power relations is carried out on the principle of decentralization (with developed self-government and subsidiarity), need a coordinating, guiding force when uniting, as was the case, for example, in the EU. This results in the predominance of a regionalism mechanism, based on the use of institutions of redistributive type (complementary to the institutional matrices of the countries participating in the project), as in the previous case, Compensating for the need to reduce institutional imbalances.

Note that, as in the case of X-matrix countries, the presence of a single strong hegemon and its lack of support for supranational bodies blocks the development of regionalism, as in North America, where the US is the unqualified leader. The United States, with its extremely high Y-matrix density (the distributive institutions are weak here), seeks to propagate the principles of the organization of its public system outside and does not support the idea of the need for strong supranational bodies, Whose activities involve bureaucratic intervention «from the top down» in the economy and politics. Moreover, the presence of federal rather than unitary states in the region is a deterrent to regionalism, making regulatory harmonization more difficult. Therefore, the dominant mechanism of integration in North America is regionalization, with business networks as its core.

Convergence is possible for countries with different types of institutional matrix (such as security cooperation or participation in a free trade area), but integration will be limited to selected areas of exceptional importance to public systems, In the prevailing processes of regionalization (integration «from below» without creating any meaningful and effective supranational bodies). This is the case, for example, in Asia, where major powers with X-matrix (China), institutional hybrid matrices (Japan, South Korea) and the strong influence of the US (countries with Y-matrix) are located. Asia is characterized by limited formal institutionalization and contrast between high regionalization and low regionalism, relative weakness of supranational institutions, non-binding implementation of agreements that are adopted on the basis of consensus [16:229]. Economic integration

becomes the focus of integration processes, with regional production networks transplanted from Japan as the basis.

With the expansion of integration projects due to the increase in the number of actors, the strengthening of the heterogeneity of the alliance, the complexity of the decision-making process, the level of regionalism decreases, supranational structures become more «loose» and less effective. This is expected to happen in the case of the merger of the Eurasian integration project and the project «One belt – one way».

Note that the factors limiting development of regionalism and regionalization in the region are increasing political divisions between countries, polarization on religious grounds, manifestations of nationalism and racism.

Conclusions

Thus, in the integration of social systems, institutions additional to those dominating the institutional matrix are used to mitigate possible institutional imbalances: in the integration of X-matrix countries – market ones and vice versa. The factors that block regionalism in integration projects involving countries with a single type of institutional matrix include: the presence of one strong hegemon and their support for supranational regulators, the presence in the region of federal, not unitary states. It has been established that convergence is possible for countries with different types of institutional matrix (such as security cooperation or participation in a free trade area), but integration will be limited to individual areas, are of exceptional importance for public systems, with regionalization processes prevailing (integration «from below» without the creation of any relevant and effective supranational bodies). The factors that hinder the development of both regionalism and regionalization in the region are the growing political divisions among countries, religious polarization, manifestations of nationalism and racism.

References

1. Baikov A.A. Comparative integration. Practices and models of integration in foreign Europe and Pacific Asia. Moscow: Aspect Press, 2012 [In Russian].
2. Durkheim E. Sociology. Its subject, method, purpose. Moscow, Kanon, 1995 [In Russian].
3. Kirdina S.G. Institutional Matrices and Russia's Development: An Introduction to X-Y Theory. Saint- Petersburg: Nestor-Istoria, 2014 [In Russian].
4. Kirdina S.G. The role of institutions and geography in economic development: current controversy in heterodox economics. *Spatial Economics*, 2016; 3:133–150 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.14530/se.2016.3.133-150>.
5. Lagutina M.L. Global region as an element of the world political system of the 21st century. *Comparative politics*. 2015; 2(19):16–21 [In Russian].
6. Libman A. M. "Integration from below" in Central Asia. *Journal of Eurasian Economic Integration*, 2009; 1:006–026 [In Russian].
7. Acharya A. Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2009 [In English]. <https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165X.2010.tb02069>.
8. Ballinger P., Brunswick M. Beyond the "New" Regional Question? Regions, Territoriality, and the Space of Anthropology in Southeastern Europe. *Regions, Regional Identity and Regionalism in Southeastern Europe*. U. Brunnbaer Ethologia Balkanica. 2007; 11:59–79 [In English].

9. Beeson M. Asymmetrical Regionalism: China, Southeast Asia and Uneven Development. *East Asia*, 2010; 27(4):329–343 [In English]. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-010-9121-0>.
10. Flockhart T. The Liberal International Order and Peaceful Change: Spillover and the Importance of Values, Visions, and Passions. *Ethics & International Affairs*. 2020; 34(4):521–533 [In English].
11. Gallup J.L., Sachs J., Mellinger A. Geography and Economic Development. *International Regional Science Review*. 1999; 22:179–232 [In English]. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w6849>.
12. Ghica L.A. Beyond Regional Integration? Social Constructivism, Regional Cohesiveness and the Regionalism Puzzle. *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review*. 2013; 13(4): 733–752 [In English].
13. Hausmann R., Pritchett L., Rodrik D. Growth accelerations. *Journal of Economic Growth*. 2005; 10(4):303–329 [In English]. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10887-005-4712-0>.
14. Katzenstein P., Okawara N. Japan and Asian-Pacific Security. *Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency*, J.J.Suh, P.Katzenstein, and A.Carlson (eds.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004:97–130 [In English]. <https://doi.org/10.1162/016228801753399754>.
15. Katzenstein P.J. A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005 [In English]. <https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501700385>
16. MacIntyre A., Ravenhill J. The Future of Asian regional institutions. *Integrating Regions: Asia in Comparative Context*, M Kahler and A.MacIntyre (eds.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013:245–266 [In English].
17. Murden S.W. The Secondary Institutions of the Middle Eastern Regional Interstate Society. *International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level*, B. Buzan and A. Gonzalez-Pelaez (eds.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009:117–139 [In English].
18. North D.C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990 [In English]. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808678>.
19. Orford A. Regional Orders, Geopolitics, and the Future of International Law. *Current Legal Problems*, 2021; 74 (1):149–194 [In English].
20. Pomfret R. Different Paths to Economic Integration in Europe and Asia. ADBI Working Paper 1063. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute, 2019 [In English]. Available: <https://www.adb.org/publications/different-paths-economic-integration-europe-and-asia>.
21. Solingen E. Regional Order at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences and Grand Strategy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998 [In English].
22. Tripp C. Regional Organizations in the Arab Middle East. *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order*. Fawcett and A.Hurrell (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995:283–308 [In English].

About the author

Pavel A. BARAKHVOSTOV. CandSc. (Polit.). Associate Professor. Associate Professor of the Department of Political Science, Belarusian State Economic University, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8943-5980>. Address: 26, Partizansky Prospekt, Minsk, 22070, Belarus, barakhvostov@yandex.by

Contribution of the author

The author declares no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Received: June 25, 2024. Approved after peer review: July 27, 2024. Accepted for publication: August 31, 2024. Published: September 23, 2024.

The author has read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewers for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

CHANGING SOCIETY

Social Structure, Social Institutions and Processes. Political sociology

Original Article

Sociological Sciences

[https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3\(13\)-142-159](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-142-159)

Training Specialists in the Field of Artificial Intelligence at Russia and Central Asian Countries Universities: Ranking Positions and Cooperation Opportunities

Sergey E. Zhulikov^{1a}✉, Olga V. Zhulikova^{2b}✉

1,2 Tambov State University named after G.R.Derzhavin, Tambov, Russia

^a ssergiuss@yandex.ru, <https://orcid.org/0009-0001-7284-0952>

^b oltamb@yandex.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7424-7247>

Abstract. The introduction of artificial intelligence in the economy, increasing its share in the real sector of the economy and accelerating digital transformation require a large number of specialists in this field. States consider the possibilities and prospects of new technologies, regulate issues of their application, security, cooperation, etc. However, all this is important if there are specialists who can develop, implement, adapt, and improve artificial intelligence technologies. No less needed are specialists who will teach how to use AI, work in AI environments, apply AI in the professional sphere and everyday life. Although Russia is not a world leader in this field (according to ratings), but having a good technological research base due to the historically high level of fundamental physics and mathematics education and strong programming schools, it can become a reliable partner and platform for the creation and development of its own centers for training specialists in the field of AI in the countries of Central Asia based on universities with which Russia has established close ties.

Keywords: Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, artificial intelligence, higher education, rating, cooperation

For citation: Zhulikov S.E., Zhulikova O.V. Training Specialists in the Field of Artificial Intelligence at Russia and Central Asian Countries Universities: Ranking Positions and Cooperation Opportunities. *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue*. 2024; 3(13): 142-159. doi: [https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3\(13\)-142-159](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-142-159)

Introduction

With the advancement of new technologies in today's era, the field of artificial intelligence has become more relevant and compelling all over the world. Having an education in the sphere of artificial intelligence opens up a lot of career opportunities.

The Russian Federation has a number of advantages associated with the Russian education system, which allow us to talk about the high potential for training specialists in the field of artificial intelligence (AI). Such advantages include historically significant physics, mathematics and IT schools, fundamental basic education in secondary school, the existence of a unique system for searching and selecting gifted children through mathematical schools, study groups, and Olympiads [2]. In the Coursera 2020 Global Skills Index study, Russia took the 1st place in the world (out of 60 countries) in terms of technological competencies, and the first one in terms of skills in Data Science¹. A special role in these processes belongs to Russian universities, which conduct educational activities to prepare highly qualified staff in the field of AI technologies.

Most countries in the world have developed and approved governmental and intergovernmental strategies and initiatives aimed at developing artificial intelligence.

Materials and Methods

The sphere of artificial intelligence has grown exponentially over the past few decades, making it one of the most exciting and influential fields of study today. At the same time, in Russia there are very few academic papers and, in particular, defended dissertations on the problems of professional training of staff directly in the field of AI. The examples include the works of K.V.Rozov [5], M.Kh.Badmaeva [1]. In the book of Yu.V.Frolov, T.M.Bosenko [9] statistical data on the training of specialists with the necessary competencies to work in the conditions of economy digitalization are analyzed, and indices are proposed that describe the processes of personnel provision for the digital transformation of the economy in Russia. The main challenges of the digital economy in the field of personnel training, related to the definition of key competencies of the digital economy, bridging the gap between the education system and the labor market, are considered in the study of A.A.Gibadullin and A.V.Karagodin [3]. Monitoring of personnel training for the digital economy is also carried out in the annual statistical digests of the HSE University, dedicated to the main aspects of the digital economy development in Russia [4]. In 2024, the Institute for Statistical Studies and Economics of Knowledge (ISSEK) of the HSE University presented a series of regular information and analytical materials based on specialized surveys to study the

¹ Russia took the 1st place in the Coursera 2020 Global Skills Index study. Available from: <https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2020/07/19/834908-rossiya-global-skills>.

trends, directions and factors of the development and spreading of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in Russia and the world. The results of a comprehensive survey of 1,100 universities and their branches, conducted by the ISSEK of the HSE University in 2023 as a part of the event "Monitoring the creation and results of the artificial intelligence technologies application in order to assess the level of implementation of these technologies in the sectors of the economy and the social sphere" of the federal project "Artificial Intelligence" with the support of the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia, have been published.

The sources include regulations and standards of Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, as well as the results of the EduRank.org and Artificial Intelligence Alliance ratings.

The methodological basis of the study is the structural-functional approach, according to which the system consists of structural and functional components, each structural element contributes to the achievement of the goal, i.e. it has a functional purpose (regulatory framework; demand from the economy; availability of educational programs and experts; statistical data and university rankings, etc.). The research methods are analysis of regulatory documents and publications, university rankings dedicated to the training of AI specialists.

Results

The debate over the need for global regulation of artificial intelligence is gaining momentum, given that AI has become a key tool for millions of people over the past year. The question of how to integrate AI into law is becoming more pressing with more organizations using AI in such areas as medicine, politics, and judicial decisions.

State and legal regulation in the field of AI

In 2019, the Russian President Vladimir Putin approved the national strategy for the development of artificial intelligence for the period up to 2030³. The Federal Project "Artificial Intelligence" has become the main tool for implementing the National Strategy for the Development of AI⁴. The federal project provides for a set of measures aimed at

² Artificial intelligence. The Institute for Statistical Studies and Economics of Knowledge. Available from: <https://issek.hse.ru/mirror/pubs/share/938098220.pdf>.

³ The national strategy for the development of artificial intelligence for the period up to 2030, approved by the Russian President on the 10th of October in 2019 No. 490 "On Development of Artificial Intelligence in the Russian Federation". Garant.ru: Informational and legal web portal. Available from: <https://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/72738946/>.

⁴ The Passport of the federal project "Artificial Intelligence" of the national program "Digital Economy of the Russian Federation" (Appendix No. 3 to the minutes of the Presidium of the Government Commission on Digital Development, Use of Information Technologies to Improve the Quality of Life and Conditions for Doing Business dated 08/27/2020 No. 17). Available from: https://ac.gov.ru/uploads/_Projects/AI_otbor/Passport.pdf.

supporting companies developing AI solutions and supporting the testing of such solutions at Russian enterprises, increasing staffing, developing the science and education system, and creating an infrastructure for the favorable development of domestic artificial intelligence. Much attention within the framework of this project is paid to education – the development of specialized bachelor's and master's degree programs, high-quality training of a large number of specialists in this field⁵.

State and legal regulation in the sphere of AI in Central Asian countries at the level of national strategies has already defined development priorities. A number of legislative initiatives of the governments of Central Asian countries were devoted to the development of ICT infrastructure, innovation and digitalization of economic sectors⁶.

In 2017, the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan adopted Resolution No. 827 dated December 12, 2017 “On Approval of the State Program “Digital Kazakhstan”. A number of provisions of this Resolution indicate priorities for the development of artificial intelligence until 2030. Currently, a number of strategic documents, such as the National Development Plan of the Republic of Kazakhstan until 2025 and the Concept of Digital Transformation, Development of the Information and Communication Technologies and Cybersecurity Industry for 2023-2029, define certain tasks and activities in the field of artificial intelligence⁷. According to the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 24 universities and research centers are engaged in some kind of research or development in the field of artificial intelligence to one degree or another. Communities of machine learning and artificial intelligence specialists are emerging in this sphere. IT schools and universities include modules on artificial intelligence in their training programs. Four universities have the appropriate equipment for processing large amounts of data and training deep learning algorithms: L.N.Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Satbayev University, and Nazarbayev University. At the same time, three universities report underutilization of computing power, and one university reports a shortage of it. Two universities see the need to modernize their equipment.

The concept of digital transformation “Digital Kyrgyzstan 2019-2023” was approved by the Decision of the Security Council of the Kyrgyz Republic No. 2 of December 14, 2018⁸. The main goal of the Concept is to form an open digital society, transit to digital governance, provide digital conditions for citizens when interacting with government agencies and local governments, ensure transparency, reduce bureaucracy and corruption in government

5 The Battle for AI Talent: Difficulties in Finding Specialists in Russia. ICT. Moscow. 2021. November 26. Available from: <https://ict.moscow/news/ai-talents/>.

6 Artificial Intelligence in Central Asia: Applications and Regulation. The Times of Central Asia. 23.02.2024. Available from: <https://timesca.com/artificial-intelligence-in-central-asia-applications-and-regulation/>.

7 On approval of the Concept for the development of artificial intelligence for 2024-2029. Available from: <https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/mdai/documents/details/606493?lang=ru>.

8 Decision of the Security Council of the Kyrgyz Republic No. 2 of December 14, 2018, the concept of digital transformation “Digital Kyrgyzstan 2019-2023». A centralized database of Legal Information of the Kyrgyz Republic. Retrieved 2021 May 24. Available from: <http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/216896>.

agencies. The Kyrgyz Republic Digital Code draft was announced at the end of 2022 and presented (published) for public discussion on the Portal for the digital bills creation and discussion on June 26, 2023⁹.

The Decree of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan approved the concept of the digital economy in the Republic of Tajikistan dated December 30, 2019, No. 642. The main objectives of the Concept are the creation of a stable and secure ICT infrastructure for high-speed transmission, processing and storage of large volumes of data, accessible to all organizations and households, as well as the use of predominantly national software by government agencies, local governments and organizations¹⁰. The Strategy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence in the Republic of Tajikistan until 2040¹¹ notes that during the implementation of the first and second stages of this strategy, legal, institutional and infrastructural frameworks will be developed, and the necessary specialists will be trained.

The Republic of Uzbekistan is also actively conducting research in the field of artificial intelligence, including the development and adoption of legislative acts, development strategies and support for scientific projects and academic educational initiatives. By the Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan dated 05.10.2020, the “Digital Uzbekistan Strategy – 2030” was adopted, which, among other points, provides for the adoption of targeted programs for scientific research and innovation projects in the areas of the country's development of the digital economy [10, 11]. The updated Constitution of 2023 lays new foundations emphasizing the importance of the development of the Internet and recognizing it as an integral part of every person's life. The state program “Digital Uzbekistan Strategy – 2030” envisages a wide range of measures to strengthen guarantees for the implementation of citizens' rights to free access to information, including compliance with the law, improving the culture of using information and protecting against destructive information¹².

In April 2024, a discussion of the draft model act “On Artificial Intelligence Technologies”¹³ was held at a meeting of the Standing Commission of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly on Science and Education. The proposed changes to the model code are aimed at developing the educational environment and traditional educational methods, introducing new effective forms of interactivity and multimedia into education. The adoption of this document should contribute to the legal regulation of the system

9 Digital Code Draft of the Kyrgyz Republic. Available from: <https://code.digital.gov.kg/ru/bills/>.

10 Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan No. UP-6079 dated 05.10.2020 “On approval of the Digital Uzbekistan – 2030 strategy and measures for its effective implementation”. National Database of Legislation, 06.10.2020, No. 06/20/6079/1349.

11 Strategy for the development of artificial intelligence in the Republic of Tajikistan for the period up to 2040. Available from: http://portali-huquqi.tj/publicadliya/view_qonunhoviev.php?showdetail=8asosi_id=26592.

12 How Artificial Intelligence is Transforming Legislation in Uzbekistan. Available from: <https://anhor.uz/it-science/artificial-intelligence-legislation-uzbekistan-uzbek-expert/>.

13 A law regulating the use of artificial intelligence appears in the CIS. Available from: <https://snob.kg/rakurs/pro-nashe-zhitie/item/7242-zakon-reguliruyushchij-ispolzovanie-iskusstvennogo-intellekta-poyavitsya-v-sng>.

of development and support of young talents for the CIS countries. Harmonization of legislation should ensure the existence of common rules in this area and create conditions for the identification, support and development of young talents, regardless of their place of residence, social status or financial capabilities of the family. The recommendations will help create a unified legal regulation of interaction with young talents in the Commonwealth countries and will contribute to the formation of a system of support for talented children at regional, state and interstate levels.

Universities and the training of highly qualified staff in the field of AI

Universities around the world offer programs that focus on this cutting-edge field. Universities implement the training of highly qualified staff in the field of AI within two tracks:

Educational programs that have been developed or updated in accordance with the AI competency model. Students studying in this track acquire skills in developing methods and tools for AI technologies and learn how to use them professionally at an advanced level.

Programs of other profiles containing the module “Artificial Intelligence Systems”. Students of such programs learn to apply AI in their area of competence, taking into account the direction of training (specialty) and future field of activity. According to the National Strategy for the Development of AI, the corresponding modules are supposed to be included in all educational programs of higher education in Russia.

However, not all universities are effective in delivering AI programs. To identify the best universities in this field, various ranking systems are being developed to assess the quality of such programs. AI rankings evaluate universities based on a number of factors, including academic staff, the quality of their research output (publications), and the number of successful AI projects. These rankings serve as a valuable resource for prospective students, researchers, and industry professionals interested in getting education or collaborating in this sphere. By reviewing these rankings, people can make informed decisions about which universities offer the strongest AI programs and are at the forefront of AI research.

There are many universities in the field of artificial intelligence that offer exceptional programs for students to develop their skills and knowledge. These universities are known for their expertise and contributions in the field, and their programs are highly regarded by industry professionals and researchers. According to EduRank.org, an independent, metrics-based ranking, 14,131 universities from 183 countries use the world's largest database of research papers containing 98,302,198 scientific publications and 214,951,106 citations to rank universities across 246 research topics. The ranking lists the top universities in the world based on their research output in artificial intelligence (252 million citations processed, 13.4 million research papers received, compiled from 5,743 universities)¹⁴. One

¹⁴ Best Universities for Computer Science in the World. 29.02.2024. EduRank.org. Available from: <https://edurank.org/cs/>.

university that consistently ranks at the top for its AI program is Stanford University. Stanford offers a comprehensive curriculum, including courses covering topics such as machine learning, natural language processing, and computer vision. The university's academic staff are renowned experts in the field and have made significant contributions to the development of artificial intelligence technologies.

Another university that ranks highly in this pioneering field of research is the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which offers a wide range of AI programs at both Bachelor's and Master's levels. The university's research is highly regarded, with its faculty publishing influential papers and leading groundbreaking projects. The University of California, Berkeley, is also known for its excellence in research into emerging computer technologies. Berkeley's program focuses on an interdisciplinary approach that combines computer science, statistics, and cognitive science. The university's labs provide students with hands-on research opportunities and the chance to work with leading experts in the field of AI. Other notable universities in the AI rankings include Carnegie Mellon University, Oxford University, and the University of Toronto. These universities offer excellent programs and have a track record of producing successful professionals in the field. In the 9th place is Tsinghua University of China, which ranks first in Asia in artificial intelligence research. In the 21st place is Nanyang Technological University of Singapore, which ranks second in Asia according to this ranking.

Russian universities are assigned to the European region:

1. Lomonosov Moscow State University, according to this study, is the leader in Russia, ranked 115th in Europe and 322nd in the world.
2. Saint Petersburg State University (242nd in Europe and 618th in the world).
3. National Research University Higher School of Economics (275th in Europe and 719th in the world).
4. ITMO University (374th in Europe and 1008th in the world).
5. Tomsk State University (400th in Europe and 1086th in the world).

In total, 100 Russian universities are represented in this ranking (Murmansk State Technical University ranks 100th, while it ranks 1094th in Europe and 4459th in the world)¹⁵.

A separate section of the ranking is the best universities in the field of “Artificial Intelligence” in Asia¹⁶, where educational institutions from 41 countries are represented (Figure 1). The list of the best universities in Asia is ranked based on their research performance in Computer Science (55.8 million citations, 5.14 million academic papers, 2466 universities in Asia).

In the ranking of the Best Universities for Computer Science in Asia, the top twenty includes 13 universities from China – Tsinghua University, Harbin Institute of Technology, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, University of Hong Kong, Zhejiang University, Beihang University, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Peking University, Xi'an

¹⁵ 100 Best universities for Computer Science in Russia. 29.02.2024. EduRank.org. Available from: <https://edurank.org/cs/ru/>.

¹⁶ Best Universities for Computer Science in Asia. 29.02.2024. EduRank.org. Available from: <https://edurank.org/cs/as/>.

Jiaotong University, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Southeast University, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chinese University of Hong Kong; two universities from Singapore – Nanyang Technological University, National University of Singapore, Japan – University of Tokyo, two educational institutions from Israel – Tel Aviv University, Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, two educational institutions from South Korea – Seoul National University, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology.

We also consider which universities from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan have been included in the EduRank.org the ranking of the Best Universities in Artificial Intelligence and what place they take among universities in Asia and around the world.

The Best Universities in Artificial Intelligence in Asia ranking features 10 best universities in Kazakhstan¹⁷:

1. Nazarbayev University (568 in Asia, 1529 in the world).
2. L.N.Gumilyov Eurasian National University (1034 in Asia, 2415 in the world).
3. Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (1163 in Asia, 2660 in the world).
4. Satbayev University (1775 in Asia, 4063 in the world).
5. KIMEP University (1858 in Asia, 4246 in the world).
6. Kazakh-British Technical University (1916 in Asia, 4368 in the world).
7. Almaty University of Power Engineering and Telecommunications (2062 in Asia, 4751 in the world).
8. International Kazakh-Turkish University (2209 in Asia, 5181 in the world).
9. North Kazakhstan State University (2377 in Asia, 5574 in the world).
10. Karaganda State University (2442 in Asia, 5698 in the world).

In Tajikistan, the ranking highlights two best universities based on their research performance in Computer Science¹⁸:

1. Tajik National University (2670 in Asia, 6417 in the world).
2. Tajik State Medical University (2768 in Asia, 6668 in the world).

In Kyrgyzstan, the ranking highlights 7 best universities based on their research performance in Computer Science¹⁹:

1. University of Central Asia (2413 in Asia, 5765 in the world).
2. Osh State University (2507 in Asia, 6005 in the world).
3. Kyrgyz State Medical Academy (2530 in Asia, 6061 in the world).
4. Kyrgyz National University (2542 in Asia, 6103 in the world).
5. Kyrgyz State Technical University (2638 in Asia, 6341 in the world).
6. American University of Central Asia (2688 in Asia, 6484 in the world).
7. Ala-Too International University (2759 in Asia, 6657 in the world).

¹⁷ 10 Best universities for Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Kazakhstan. 29.02.2024. EduRank.org. Available from: <https://edurank.org/cs/ai/kz/>.

¹⁸ 2 Best universities for Computer Science in Tajikistan. 29.02.2024. EduRank.org. Available from: <https://edurank.org/cs/tj/>.

¹⁹ 7 Best universities for Computer Science in Kyrgyzstan. 29.02.2024. EduRank.org. Available from: <https://edurank.org/cs/kg/>.

Below is a list of 11 best universities in Uzbekistan ranked by analysts based on their research performance in Artificial Intelligence (AI)²⁰:

1. Tashkent University of Information Technologies (1162 in Asia, 2659 in the world).
2. National University of Uzbekistan (1384 in Asia, 3115 in the world).
3. Tashkent State Technical University (1497 in Asia, 3386 in the world).
4. Samarkand State University (1815 in Asia, 4156 in the world).
5. Urgench State University (2115 in Asia, 4890 in the world).
6. Tashkent State University of Economics (2131 in Asia, 4950 in the world).
7. Tashkent Institute of Railway Transport Engineers (2147 in Asia, 4986 in the world).
8. Westminster International University in Tashkent (2320 in Asia, 5427 in the world).
9. Namangan State University (2370 in Asia, 5552 in the world).
10. Andijan State University (2387 in Asia, 5592 in the world).
11. Tashkent State Agrarian University (2450 in Asia, 5711 in the world).

In Russia, in 2023, the Alliance in the Sphere of Artificial Intelligence, together with the Ministry of Education and Science of Russia, developed a rating of Russian universities by the quality of training of AI specialists. The Alliance in Artificial Intelligence Association unites technology companies to develop artificial intelligence in Russia and ensure the country's leadership in the global market. The association's members include Sberbank, Gazprom Neft, Yandex, VK, RDIF, SIBUR, URALCHEM Holding Company, Rusagro Group, Severstal, Samolet Group and others. The ranking of universities by the quality of training specialists in the field of artificial intelligence is a new tool in the ecosystem of education support which the Alliance is creating. The goal of the project is to improve the quality of training new personnel, involve industry businesses in the AI personnel agenda, and provide objective information about universities to applicants and employers. The first version of the rating only considers universities that have bachelor's programs in the field of AI.

According to D.Chernyshenko, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, curator of the national program "Digital Economy": "Among 180 universities from 64 regions of the country that have been included in the rating, 10 of them have grades of A+, A (good quality) B+, B (acceptable quality). The absolute leaders are HSE, MIPT and ITMO. Thus, the TOP-10 Russian universities can already compete for the title of the best ones, which means they train highly qualified specialists and successfully develop science in the field of artificial intelligence"²¹.

Judging by the Alliance rating, the top 10 Russian universities in terms of the quality of training specialists in the field of AI are²²:

Level A+

²⁰ 11 Best universities for Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Uzbekistan. 29.02.2024. EduRank.org. Available from: <https://edurank.org/cs/ai/uz/>.

²¹ Universities rating based on the quality of training specialists in the field of artificial intelligence appeared in Russia. The Alliance in the field of artificial intelligence. Available from: https://a-ai.ru/?page_id=2254.

²² Universities rating. The Alliance in the field of artificial intelligence. Available from: <https://rating.a-ai.ru/#rating>.

- National Research University ITMO (Saint Petersburg);
- National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow);
- Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (National Research University) (Moscow);
- Level A
- Lomonosov Moscow State University (Moscow);
- Saint Petersburg State University (Saint Petersburg);
- Level B+
- Ural Federal University named after the first President of Russia B.N.Yeltsin (Sverdlovsk Region);
- Bauman Moscow State Technical University (National Research University) (Moscow);
- Level B
- National Research Nuclear University MEPhI (Moscow);
- Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University (St. Petersburg);
- Innopolis University (the Republic of Tatarstan).

The rating methodology is based on a mathematical model that actual data-driven and approved by a wide range of experts from the Alliance member companies and academic community. The experts have identified only 4 groups of criteria: demand for graduates in hiring; relevance of the learning process in the field of AI; educational environment; activity in the development of school education²³. To build the model, both open and specially collected data on the quality of education in higher education institutions, survey results, and graduates' salaries information received from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation have been used.

The rating includes 71 universities in the Central Federal District, 39 of which are in Moscow. The ranking includes 29 universities from the Volga Federal District, 24 universities from the Northwestern Federal District, and 22 from the Siberian Federal District.

In the framework of the international industrial exhibition "Innoprom. Central Asia", the first deputy chairman of the board of Sberbank A.Vedyakhin invited Uzbekistan to take part in the ranking of universities in AI. "This is not just a competition. This is an opportunity to look at yourself from the outside and become even better in order to produce excellent specialists who will be in demand both in Uzbekistan and beyond,"²⁴ he said.

According to Sberbank estimates, by 2030, at least 100 universities will be able to annually graduate thousands of high-quality AI specialists who will be able to meet the growing demand for personnel in this field.

In Russia, a lot of work is being done to create an education system in the field of artificial intelligence, e.g., advanced training courses for teachers in the field of AI,

²³ Rating methodology. The Alliance in the field of artificial intelligence. Available from: <https://rating.a-ai.ru/methodology>.

²⁴ Uzbekistan may launch a universities rating based on the quality of training in the field of AI. Gazets.ru. Available from: <https://www.gazeta.ru/social/news/2024/04/22/22846316.shtml>.

conducted by MIPT, Moscow State Pedagogical University, Innopolis University, Digital University 2035 and other Russian educational organizations; educational materials on AI being developed, presented by leading technology companies such as Yandex, Sberbank, VK and others; an international educational project in the field of information technology called "Digital Lesson".

The educational campaign "Digital Lesson" on the topic "Artificial Intelligence in Education" in 2021 united Russian-speaking schoolchildren from 127 countries. Belarus, Germany, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Netherlands, Romania, the USA, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Ukraine and Sweden became the leading countries in terms of the number of people who accessed the lesson materials; compared to 2020, the international geography of the lesson has significantly expanded (previously, 86 countries took part in it)²⁵. This has become possible thanks to the active support of Rossotrudnichestvo and the involvement of Russian schools abroad.

You can organize a lesson or take a class on the topic of "Artificial Intelligence in Education" even after the end of the campaign – all materials will remain publicly available. Through the network of our Russian Houses, schoolchildren around the world meet specialists from the largest Russian IT companies, gain knowledge about cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and thereby improve their digital literacy. Schoolchildren from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and other countries of the post-Soviet territory took an active part in the educational campaign too.

Artificial intelligence technologies are being applied across a variety of industries, including healthcare, finance, transportation, manufacturing, entertainment, and more, to automate processes, improve efficiency, enhance decision-making, and create new products and services.

However, the development and deployment of AI also raises ethical, social, and economic issues, with concerns including job displacement, algorithmic bias, privacy concerns, and the potential for misuse or unintended consequences. As AI continues to evolve, it is important to consider these implications and develop appropriate policies and frameworks to ensure that AI benefits society as a whole.

Learning objectives for AI typically depend on the specific context, level of expertise, and anticipated results. There are some common learning objectives for studying AI such as understanding AI concepts and principles; learning AI algorithms and models; mastering programming languages and tools; data collection and pre-processing; model evaluation and validation; ethical and responsible AI development; problem solving and application development; collaboration and communication skills; continuous learning and adaptation; critical thinking and problem-solving skills. These learning objectives provide a fundamental foundation for acquiring AI knowledge, skills, and competencies that enable individuals to contribute to the development and application of AI technologies across a variety of spheres and industries [6].

²⁵ Artificial Intelligence Digital Lesson unites Russian-speaking children in 127 countries. Available from: <https://ug.ru/urok-czifry-po-iskusstvennomu-intellektu-obedinil-russkoyazychnyh-detej-v-127-stranah/>.

In Russia, there are programs to attract foreign applicants both within the framework of Rossotrudnichestvo and at the level of individual universities. Leading universities (HSE, MIPT, Skoltech) have created world-class educational programs that train specialists in data science and artificial intelligence²⁶. It is also possible to attract specialists from Russia to implement specific projects in the field of information technology.

The Interuniversity Center for Artificial Intelligence was established in the Interuniversity Campus of the Eurasian World-Class Scientific and Educational Center in Ufa. The center's work started in real time from the platform of the International Industrial Exhibition "Innoprom-2024", which takes place in Yekaterinburg, according to the website of the Government of Bashkortostan²⁷.

The Eurasian Center for Digital Technologies (EDCT) of the Ufa University of Science and Technology (UUST) has been launched in Ufa, specializing in the development, testing and promotion of IT products, as well as training specialists. One of the main areas of work is the training, internship and employment of specialists in the humanities and technical fields²⁸.

At the same time, Central Asian countries are also focused on other partners in the development of higher education in the field of artificial intelligence. StrategEast, in partnership with Google, launched a large-scale intercountry project Build with AI for Sustainable Growth, designed for several months and uniting developers from all over the Central Asian and Caucasus region to find solutions to sustainable development problems using AI technologies. The best teams of developers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia will present their projects at the final hackathon in Astana in the fall of 2024. For Google, supporting the program is a part of a targeted effort to teach IT industry specialists how to use AI tools²⁹.

In June 2024, the Forum for the High-Level Regional Policy Dialogue in Central Asia, dedicated to the theme "Facilitating the Transformation of Higher Education Based on Generative Artificial Intelligence", was held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. During the discussions, the participants considered a variety of strategies and initiatives related to the application of generative artificial intelligence in higher education, providing an opportunity for an open dialogue between representatives of various stakeholders in this field.

The forum was organized by Tashkent University of Information Technologies (TUIT), UNESCO Institute for Information Technologies in Education (UNESCO IITE), UNESCO Regional Office in Almaty and the International Centre for Higher Education

²⁶ On the risks and opportunities of implementing artificial intelligence in Central Asia. Available from: <https://e-cis.info/news/566/105167/>.

²⁷ Interuniversity Artificial Intelligence Center of the Eurasian Scientific and Educational Center opens at Innoprom. CIS Internet Portal. Available from: <https://e-cis.info/news/569/119571/>.

²⁸ The Eurasian Center for Digital Technologies UUST has begun operating in Ufa. News in Russia and the world – TASS. Available from: <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/21328923>.

²⁹ A large-scale program Build with AI for Sustainable Growth is being launched for the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Available from: <https://the-tech.kz/zapuskaetsya-masshtabnaya-programma-build-with-ai-for-sustainable-growth-dlya-stran-czentralnoj-azii-i-kavkaza/>.

Innovation under the auspices of UNESCO (UNESCO ICHEI)³⁰. The forum became a platform for constructive exchange of views, summarizing promising experiences and formulating recommendations for stakeholders in the field of higher education in the region and beyond. The speeches and discussions made at the event are intended to contribute to the development of policies and action plans for the management of higher education based on generative artificial intelligence and the professional development of teaching staff at various levels – from the region to individual educational institutions and specialists.

Nevertheless, the prospects for cooperation between Central Asian and Russian universities seem more relevant due to a number of reasons, including historically established neighborly relations, supported by numerous bilateral treaties and intergovernmental agreements, including interregional ones, and joint counteraction to external security threats, extremist groups, drug trafficking, and cooperation in the economic sphere in order to combat unemployment, reduce production levels and trade turnover. It is also worth noting the remarkable differences in approaches to training specialists coming to study from other regions and countries in European-American and Russian universities: the former are often focused on the fact that people who received an education in their countries are recruited to work here, while Russian educational institutions prepare specialists who, after receiving an education, return to their native places and take part in the development of their own regions, contributing to an increase in the level of development of the relevant industries.

Conclusions

Clearly, addressing AI in higher education requires a multi-faceted approach and collaborative efforts among stakeholders, increasing investment in digital infrastructure, capacity building, policy development, and fostering a culture of innovation and adoption across Central Asia. This collaborative effort will allow for parallel advancement of the overall level of improvement in the sector, rather than creating separate highly developed centers and underdeveloped outskirts.

The challenges facing contemporary higher education include the lack of personalized education for students, lack of resources for teachers, and inadequate development of AI courses. In this regard, there is an urgent need to change a comprehensive knowledge-based model aimed at improving the competence of higher education teachers in the field of artificial intelligence, both to train specialists in the field of AI technology transformation and its professional use at an advanced level, and to train users in the methods of applying AI in their area of competence, taking into account the direction of training.

³⁰ UNESCO IITE Co-Organizes Strategic Session on AI in Higher Education in Central Asia. Available from: <https://iite.unesco.org/ru/news/iito-yunesko-stal-soorganizatorom-strategicheskoy-sessii-po-ispolzovaniyu-ii-v-vyshshem-obrazovanii-v-tsentralnoj-azii/>.

Political dialogue provides fertile ground for generating new ideas, strengthening cooperation and exploring future directions of higher education. Cooperation between universities in Russia and Central Asian countries is aimed at increasing digital competence and AI literacy among higher education staff, creating a uniform educational space, and improving the quality of specialists training in the field of artificial intelligence.

References

1. Badmaeva M.Kh. Social and philosophical problems and principles of application of artificial intelligence systems: Theses ... CandSc (Philosophy): 5.7.7 - Social and political philosophy. Ulan-Ude, 2023:237 [In Russian].
2. Gainanov D.A., Klimentyeva A.Yu. Priorities of personnel provision for the digital economy. Kreativnaya ekonomika [Creative economy]. 2018; Vol. 12(12):1963–1976 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.18334/ce.12.12.39679>.
3. Gibadullin A.A., Karagodin A.V. Challenges of the digital economy in the field of personnel training. Aktual'nye problemy ekonomiki i menedzhmenta [Actual problems of economics and management]. 2019; 2(22):33–42 [In Russian]. Available from: https://www.sstu.ru/upload/medialibrary/60c/Aktualnye-problemy-ekonomiki-i-menedzhmenta-02_22_2019.pdf.
4. Digital economy indicators: 2020: statistical digest / G.I.Abdрахmanova, K.O.Vishnevsky, L.M.Gokhberg et al.; Nat. research. University "Higher School of Economics". Moscow: National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2020:360. ISBN 978-5-7598-2194-6. [In Russian].
5. Rozov K.V. Methodology for training future computer science teachers to use artificial intelligence technologies: Theses ... CandSc (Pedagogical): 5.8.2. Theory and methods of training and education (computer science, computer science and computer engineering, higher education level). Novosibirsk, 2024:226 [In Russian].
6. Ryabko T.V., Gurtov V.A., Stepus I.S. Analysis of training indicators for the field of artificial intelligence based on the results of universities monitoring. Vysshee obrazovanie v Rossii. [Higher education in Russia]. 2022; 31(7):9–24 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.31992/0869-3617-202231-7-9-24>.
7. Saveliev A.M., Zhurenkov D.A. National Strategies for the Development of Artificial Intelligence Systems: Experience of Leading Countries and the Situation in Russia. Nauchnyj vestnik OPK Rossii [Scientific Bulletin of the Defense-industrial complex of Russia]. 2019; 3 [In Russian]. Available from: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/natsionalnye-strategii-razvitiya-sistem-iskusstvennogo-intellekta-opyt-stran-liderov-i-situatsiya-v-rossii>.
8. Tedeev A.A. Legal Regime of Artificial Intelligence Technologies (Model of the Kyrgyz Republic). Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. [Bulletin of Moscow University]. Series 26. State Audit. 2023; 4:118–131 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.55959/MSU2413-631X-26-14-4-10>.
9. Frolov Yu.V., Bosenko T.M. Statistical data Research on training for the digital economy in the Russian Federation. Vysshee obrazovanie v Rossii. [Higher education in Russia]. 2021; Vol. 30. 11:29–41 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.31992/08693617-2021-30-11-29-41>.
10. Khoroshilov A.A., Musabaev R.R., Kozlovskaya Y.D. et al. Automatic Detection and Classification of Information Events in Media Texts. Autom. Doc. Math. Linguist. 2020; 54:202–214 [In English]. <https://doi.org/10.3103/S0005105520040032>.
11. Matkovskaya, Y.S. et al. The forecast Of Oil Production in Uzbekistan Based on The Artificial Intelligence System. Science of Krasnoyarsk / Nauka Krasnoyar'ya. 2008; 7(2, Part 2):54–60 [In English].

About the authors

Sergey E ZHULIKOV. CandSc. (Physical and Mathematical). Associate Professor. Associate Professor of the Department of Mathematical Modeling and Information Technologies at Tambov State University named after G.R.Derzhavin. <https://orcid.org/0009-0001-7284-0952>. Address: 33, Internatsionalnaya str., Tambov, 392000, Russian Federation. ssergiuss@yandex.ru

Olga V. ZHULIKOVA. CandSc. (Sociol.). Associate Professor. Associate Professor of the Department of Library and Information Resources at Tambov State University named after G.R.Derzhavin. <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7424-7247>. Address: 33, Internatsionalnaya str., Tambov, 392000, Russian Federation. oltamb@yandex.ru

Contribution of the authors

The authors declare no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Received: June 25, 2024. Approved after peer review: July 16, 2024. Accepted for publication: August 31, 2024. Published: September 23, 2024.

The authors have read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewers for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE AND MODERNITY

History of International Relations
and Foreign Policy

At the initial stages of the conflict, the Government of the Republic of Armenia did not pursue an active policy in the Syrian direction, but over time it began to take concrete steps.

A.G.Petrosian

Syrian-Armenian Relations: Historical Background and Current State

To sum it up, we note that the "Wschud" plan, if we look at it objectively, was very risky for Poland. And, first of all, because until the last days preceding the start of the war, more than half of the Polish army units continued to be deployed in the eastern regions of the country and were aimed against the USSR.

Ia.Ia.Grishin, V.A.Letiaev

Against Whom was the Polish Army Actually Mobilized on the Eve of the "September Catastrophe of 1939"?

Attempts to focus on cultural and historical heritage indicated the importance of this aspect for the formation of national identity, but without concrete and consistent actions, these efforts remained declarative.

B.S.Batyrbayev

The Politics of Memory in Kyrgyzstan: The Formation of National Identity in the Context of the Formation of the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region

RUSSIA & WORLD. SCIENTIFIC DIALOGUE

**РОССИЯ
И МИР**
НАУЧНЫЙ ДИАЛОГ

Syrian-Armenian Relations: Historical Background and Current State

Aida G. Petrosian✉

State Academic University for Humanities, Moscow, Russia
aidapetrosyan05@gmail.com, <https://orcid.org/0009-0007-4407-8554>

Abstract. This article looks into some main aspects of Syrian-Armenian relations. The first section gives an overview of the history of the Syrian-Armenian relations focusing primarily on the period after 1991 when the independence of the Republic of Armenia was declared and official relations with the Syrian Arab Republic were established. In addition, the factors that have contributed to developing bilateral ties are studied. It is noted that the most important of those factors is the presence of Armenian community in Syria which has always served as a link helping maintain friendly relations between the two republics. The second part of the article deals with the Syrian-Armenian relations during the conflict in Syria as well as it studies the role of the Republic of Armenia in sending assistance to the people of the Syrian Arab Republic and in particular – to the Armenian community there. It is concluded that positive experience and background of bilateral ties between Armenia and Syria, absence of evident contradictions in their relations and high appreciation of Armenia's role in providing humanitarian assistance to the Syrian Arab Republic expressed by the Syrian government can serve as a basis for furthering and facilitating relations between the two states and peoples.

The article was prepared at the State Academic University for the Humanities (GAUGN) within the framework of the state assignment of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation (topic No. FZNF-2020-0001 “Historical and cultural traditions and values in the context of global history”).

Keywords: Syrian-Armenian relations, Republic of Armenia, Syrian Arab Republic, Armenian community of Syria, Syrian conflict

For citation: Petrosian A.G. Syrian-Armenian Relations: Historical Background and Current State. *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue*. 2024; 3(13): 162-172, [doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3\(13\)-162-172](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-162-172)

Introduction

Relations between Armenia and Syria have a long history, considering the centuries-old ties of the peoples of the two countries. The special (and symbolic) significance in the history of this relationship is that, following the 1915 genocide, tens of thousands of Armenians have found refuge on Syrian territory. The community became the basis for the development of Armenian–Syrian relations.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Syrian Arab Republic, both sides have always emphasized the friendly nature of their relations and noted the need to develop bilateral cooperation. However, both Syria for Armenia and Armenia for Syria have never been a key political or economic partner.

In the context of the Syrian conflict, Armenia has actively helped Syria, which was highly appreciated by the Syrian state and gave rise to predictions about the possible strengthening of Armenian–Syrian ties.

The objectives of this article are to define the specifics of relations between Armenia and Syria and to identify factors that could contribute to their further development and deepening.

Materials and Methods

The source base of the research is the material from interviews conducted by the author during field studies in Yerevan (March 2019, July 2022), Damascus and Aleppo (February 2022).

Due to the lack of Russian-language works on most aspects of the problem under consideration, the author refers to the works of Armenian researchers in Armenian, Arabic and English (generally also very small)

Results

From the history of Armenian–Syrian relations

The Armenian–Syrian relations are not treated in this article as exclusively inter-State, since they are based on a rich and long history of relations between the two peoples. Many researchers believe that the historical experience of the links between Armenia and Syria is one of the most important factors determining the nature of the relationship between the two states already at the present stage [1; 7].

Special attention is always given to the role of the Syrian people in saving the Armenians¹, who were in Syria after the genocide of 1915 [6]. The establishment of an Armenian community in that country in the following years was key to establishing and maintaining Armenian–Syrian contacts.

During the Soviet period, the history of Armenia gradually established links between Soviet Armenia and Armenian communities in different countries of the world, including Syria.

Since about the middle of the 40's XX the leadership of the Armenian SSR has started to create institutional framework for establishing contacts with compatriots from the diaspora². In 1944, the Armenian Society of Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries was established and in 1962 it opened a department for relations with Armenian communities. Later, in 1964, the Committee on Cultural Relations with the Diaspora Armenians was established, one of whose main tasks was to establish and develop contacts with the communities of the Armenian diaspora [3:92–104].

There were, of course, difficulties along the way, such as the conflict between the three main Armenian parties in the diaspora over their ties with Soviet Armenia. While the Social Democratic Party «Gnchak» and the Liberal Democratic Party «Ramkwar–Azatakan» were flexible, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation «Dashnakzut» was uneasy for ideological reasons.

Both the Armenian Society's cultural relations with foreign countries and the Committee on Cultural Relations with the Diaspora Armenians were concerned exclusively with establishing contacts with «progressive forces» in the diaspora (these included the Communist Parties and the Armenian national parties «Ramkwar–Azatakan» and «Gnchak») [3:93–94].

The efforts of the Committee on Cultural Relations with the Diaspora Armenians have included bilateral visits, meetings with representatives of Armenian community structures in different countries, financial assistance to communities, The delivery of Armenian literature to communities and distribution of Soviet magazines and newspapers, retraining of teachers from community educational organizations in the Armenian SSR [3:108–117].

The Armenian community in Syria was among those communities of the diaspora that maintained ties with Soviet Armenia, and many Armenian community structures in Syria actively participated in activities and programmes conducted by the Committee on Cultural Relations. At the same time, the Syrian Armenians, who have successfully integrated into Syria's social, economic and political life, have enjoyed a sympathetic attitude from the Syrian leadership. This probably contributed to the fact that during his visit to the USSR in 1979, Syrian President Hafez Assad visited the Armenian SSR [1:91]. The Russian Federation is a well-known example of this.

Thus, the Syrian Armenian community became a bridge that helped to lay the foundations for establishing a dialogue between the Republic of Armenia and the Syrian Arab Republic.

1 According to some data, they numbered about 225 thousand. people [9:167].
2 No contacts have been maintained before for political and ideological reasons.

The establishment of diplomatic relations

The beginning of the establishment of official bilateral relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Syrian Arab Republic was established by the agreement «On the establishment of relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Syrian Arab Republic» March 1992. The same year, the Embassy of the Republic of Armenia in Damascus was opened³. Five years later, in 1997, the Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic was opened in Yerevan⁴.

The diplomatic representation of Armenia in Syria is not limited to the embassy in the Syrian capital: there are an Armenian consulate general in Aleppo (since 1993) and an honorary consulate in Deir ez-Zor (since 2010). The opening of the Armenian Consulate General in Aleppo was due to the large number of Armenian population (according to data from the beginning of 2000, about 50,000 people [4:518]). As for Deir ez-Zor, this city has an important historical and symbolic significance for the Armenians of Syria, since it is directly linked to the events of the 1915 genocide.

The start of the Armenian De-Assembly in Syria was made possible largely by the efforts of the local Armenian community. Community representatives provided material support for the opening of the embassy in Damascus and facilitated contacts between the members of the mission and local authorities and society⁵.

The establishment of a deponence between the Republic of Armenia and the Syrian Arab Republic was accompanied by numerous high-level bilateral visits, as well as preparation of a broad legal and contractual framework. Thus, the parties signed agreements on cooperation in various fields (the most important of them – «On economic cooperation between the Republic of Armenia and the Syrian Arab Republic» (1992), «On economic and technical cooperation between the Ministry of Industry of the Republic of Armenia and the Ministry of Industry of the Syrian Arab Republic» (1992), «On military and technical cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Armenia and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic» (2001))⁶, as well as memoranda of understanding and cooperation between the two countries' line ministries and other entities.

In the legislative bodies of two republics, inter-parliamentary friendship committees were formed: in the National Assembly of Armenia – parliamentary group «Armenia–Syria» friendship, in the People's Council of Syria – Syrian-Armenian Friendship Committee. Their activities allow a wide range of issues relating to the development of relations between States to be included in the discussion.

Since 2009, the Syrian-Armenian Business Council has been in operation to promote trade and economic ties between the countries.

3 Until 2007, he was headed by the Interim Chargé d'affaires, after the upgrading of the status of the Armenian Department in 2007. – Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador.

4 Until 2017, the office was headed by a temporary representative in affairs, after which – the level of representation was increased.

5 Petrosyan A.G. Author's interview archive (Yerevan, 2019; Damascus, Aleppo, 2022).

6 Bilateral relations (Syria). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia. Available from: <https://www.mfa.am/ru/bilateral-relations/sy>.

But, despite the existence of a broad framework for bilateral cooperation, underpinned by both historical ties between the two peoples and established formal contacts since 1992, during the 1990s and then into the 2000s it was not high-level.

The relatively low level of trade and economic cooperation between the two countries (despite the potential) researchers explain the following reasons: logistical obstacles (Turkish blockade of the Republic of Armenia and lack of direct land routes between Armenia and Syria); financial and economic difficulties in both countries, limiting mutual investment; bureaucratic complications; non-competitiveness of prices; lack of mutual interest [2:125, 129; 5:31, 35].

In the political sphere, relations at the official level between Syria and Armenia, although they developed initially relatively actively, but in the early 2000s. Became characterized by some «cooling». This was due to the Syrian-Turkish rapprochement and, as a consequence, the Syrian leadership's unwillingness to jeopardize these relations [2:127–129]. This did not mean a complete cessation of official Armenian–Syrian contacts; it was generally only a reduction in their intensity and level.

Bilateral relations during the Syrian conflict

In the context of the conflict in Syria, Armenian–Syrian relations have entered a new phase of development.

With the beginning of the armed action, the Republic of Armenia could not remain on the sidelines. Armenia's attention was due to: the presence of an Armenian community in Syria, forced migration of a large number of Syrian Armenians to Armenia, geographical proximity of Armenia to the Middle East region.

During the years of conflict in Syria, the Armenian authorities continued to maintain official contacts with the Syrian government. Armenian diplomatic missions in Syria did not cease operating under the conditions of war. The Consulate General of the Republic of Armenia in Aleppo was the only one that did not close during the entire conflict, despite the difficult situation in Aleppo and serious security threats during the years of active military operations⁷.

The Armenian missions, along with their main functions (one of the key ones was the issuance of passports to Syrian Armenians who decided to obtain Armenian citizenship), served as a coordination function between various structures within the Armenian community in Syria, between Armenian communities in different Syrian cities, and between the Armenian community in Syria and Armenian communities in other states⁸.

Thanks to the activities of the Embassy and Consulate-General of the Republic of Armenia in the Syrian Arab Republic and their direct links with local Armenian organizations and associations, up-to-date information was promptly transmitted

⁷ Interview with the ambassador: Tigran Gevorgian. Available from: <https://news.am/rus/news/285710.html>.

⁸ Petrosyan A.G. Author's interview archive (Yerevan, 2019; Damascus, Aleppo, 2022).

to the state structures in the Republic of Armenia on necessary assistance, its distribution⁹.

In the initial stages of the conflict, the Government of the Republic of Armenia did not have an active policy in Syria, but over time it began to take concrete steps.

Since October 2016, Russian technical and logistical assistance has been provided to Syria from Armenia for the humanitarian aid of the Syrian people¹⁰.

Armenian authorities also decided to send a humanitarian mission to Aleppo in early 2019¹¹. Its main activity is demining and medical assistance to the local population. The mission members organize special seminars to inform people about security and provide assistance during the post-war period of adaptation. They also deliver and distribute humanitarian supplies and provide social assistance to the population.

Along with the mission to Aleppo, there is an Armenian humanitarian presence in the Damascus suburb of Darayya. Armenian specialists within the framework of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) have been working here since December 2021. They are demining agricultural land and civilian sites. The presence of Armenian experts on this mission is positively perceived by the Syrian authorities, who for their part have insisted that demining work be carried out by experts from Armenia¹².

Of course, the presence of the Armenian community was crucial for sending humanitarian aid and humanitarian missions to Syria for the Republic of Armenia. However, as already mentioned, the actions of the Republic of Armenia on the Syrian side were not dictated by this factor alone.

The purpose of the Armenian mission in Aleppo is to assist the entire Syrian people, not exclusively the Armenian community in Syria, as has been repeatedly stressed by the Armenian side. This was also mentioned when sending humanitarian aid, which was sent with the mark «Fraternal Syrian people with warm wishes of peace from Armenia»¹³. This position was certainly well received by the Syrian side and contributed to the Armenian–Syrian rapprochement.

That was the background to an event occurred that also contributed greatly to the strengthening of Armenian–Syrian relations. The unanimous adoption in February 2020 by the People's Council of the Syrian Arab Republic of a resolution recognizing and condemning the genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire¹⁴.

According to some researchers, the decision was influenced by political context, namely – another intensification of Turkish-Syrian relations against the background of the

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, Available from: <https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2016/09/30/stat-syria/6537>.

¹¹ The mission is based on an agreement with the Russian Federation and carried out with technical assistance from the Russian side. Armenian humanitarian mission in Syria. Available from: <https://ru.armeniasputnik.am/gumanitarnaya-missiya-armenii-v-sirii/>.

¹² Petrosyan A.G. Author's interview archive (Yerevan, 2019; Damascus, Aleppo, 2022).

¹³ Humanitarian aid from Armenia arrived at the Khmeimim airbase in Syria. Available from: <https://newsarmenia.am/news/armenia/gumanitarnaya-pomoshch-iz-armenii-pribyla-na-aviabazu-khmeimim-v-sirii/>.

¹⁴ Syria People's Assembly Resolution. Available from: https://www.armenian-genocide.org/Affirmation.790/current_category.7/affirmation_detail.html.

situation in Idlib¹⁵. But the adoption by the Syrian parliament of a resolution condemning the Armenian genocide cannot be seen as a purely political phenomenon, especially since the serious deterioration in relations between Syria and Turkey has come much earlier. The resolution was made possible by the active work of the Syrian-Armenian Friendship Committee and the activities of Armenian structures in Syria aimed at forming public opinion on the problem of recognition of genocide¹⁶.

Finally, another factor that could promote the development of Armenian-Syrian cooperation would be a more active participation of the Armenian side in the reconstruction of Syria, for example through investments by Armenian entrepreneurs in certain sectors of the economy (especially energy and real estate). These issues were discussed at meetings of representatives of Armenian business with the Syrian leadership¹⁷. But there is still no significant progress in this direction due to objective reasons related to the economic and political situation in both states.

But it is noteworthy that the President of the Syrian Arab Republic during a meeting with the delegation of the Republic of Armenia in late 2018 stated that Armenia's position in the conflict and its support allow it to be classified as a state, Whose participation in Syria's post-conflict reconstruction will be the most preferred¹⁸.

Armenian researchers also pointed out that the humanitarian presence of Armenia in Syria has created advantages for Armenia during the period of post-conflict reconstruction of Syria (in the field of health, construction and so on) [8:130].

Conclusion

Armenian-Syrian relations have always been characterized by the traditional friendly ties between the two countries and peoples; contacts between them go back centuries.

In different periods of history, these relationships had different «fullness». During the Soviet period, Armenia's history was concerned only with cultural ties of the Armenian SSR and predominantly with the Armenian community in Syria (although this created a basis for the development of Armenian-Syrian relations). Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Syrian Arab Republic, a high level of official contacts has emerged and a desire to establish strong bilateral cooperation in various fields. During the 2000s. The intensity of these contacts has slightly decreased

¹⁵ Syria's recognition of the Armenian genocide was a response to Turkey's actions in Idlib. Available from: <https://am.sputniknews.ru/20200213/Priznanie-Siriey-Genotsida-armyan-stalo-otvetom-na-deystviya-Turtsii-v-Idlibe-22043425.html>.

¹⁶ Siriayi Khorhrdarani Hauyots tseghaspanutyan chanachman banadzev paymanavorvats e voch miayn artaqin, ayl naev nergin gortsonov. A. Pashayan. Available from: <https://www.tert.am/am/news/2020/02/17/pashayan/3212941> Petrosyan A.G. Author's interview archive (Yerevan, 2019; Damascus, Aleppo, 2022).

¹⁷ Assad voghjunel e Hayastani Janqer Hetpaterazmakan Siriayi Verakangman Gortsum. Available from: https://www.azatutyun.am/a/29663016.html?fbclid=IwAR285_C0gf9R5a_i1j2EY2l3I9FheYxRcDx5R3CSzYKVZOSEFDUblLFII.

¹⁸ Ibid.

against the background of the Turkish-Syrian rapprochement, but this has not had serious negative consequences.

It was given new impetus during the Syrian conflict, when Armenia's actions in providing humanitarian assistance to Syria created preconditions for deepening political cooperation and developing economic relations between the two countries.

Overall, given the positive mood and signals from both sides, Armenian-Syrian relations today have a wide perspective. The basis will be a traditionally positive perception of each other, the presence of the Armenian community in Syria and possibly the participation of Armenia in the processes of reconstruction of Syria.

References

1. Poladian A. Armenian-Syrian Relations: Historical Cooperation. Damascus: Dar Al Sharq, 2017:166 [In Arabic].
2. Ghahriyan M., Vardanyan G. Armenia and Syria – What Shapes the Relations? Bulletin of the Institute of Oriental Studies. 2021; 1(XXXIV):120–142 [In English].
3. Armenia – Diaspora Relations: From 1918 till current days. Ed. by E.Minasyan. Yerevan: YSU Publishing House, 2017:244 [In Armenian].
4. Armenian Diaspora. Ed. by H.Ayvazyan. Yerevan: Armenian Encyclopedia Publishing House. 2003:732 [In Armenian].
5. Hovhannisyan A. Armenian-Syrian Trade and Economic Relations (1991–2011). Bulletin of Yerevan university. International Relations, Political Science. 2014:30–4. [In Armenian].
6. Hovhannisyan N. Armenian Communities of the Middle East and Syria and Their Prospects. Crisis in Syria: Challenges for Christian Communities. World Council of Churches Conference. 2014:12 [In Armenian].
7. Israelian A. From the History of Armenian-Syrian Diplomatic and Political Relations. Armenians of Syria. Ed. by A.Dakessian. Beirut: Haigazian University Press, 2018:393–39. [In Armenian].
8. Grigoryan S. The Syrian Conflict in 2011–2020. Yerevan: YSU Press, 2020:216 [In Armenian].
9. Topuzyan H. History of the Armenian colonies of Syria and Lebanon (1841–1946). Yerevan: Publishing House of the Armenian SSR, 1986:369 [In Armenian].

About the author

Aida G. PETROSIAN. Lecturer at State Academic University for Humanities. <https://orcid.org/0009-0007-4407-8554>. Address: 26 Maronovsky Lane, Moscow, 119049, Russia. aidapetrosyan05@gmail.com

Contribution of the author

The author declares no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Received: June 15, 2024. Approved after peer review: July 4, 2024. Accepted for publication: August 31, 2024. Published: September 23, 2024.

The author has read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewers for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

Against Whom Was the Polish Army Actually Mobilized on the Eve of the “September Catastrophe” of 1939?

Iakov Ia. Grishin^{1a}✉, Valerii A. Letiaev^{2b}✉

¹Kazan Federal University, Kazan, Russia

²Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Moscow, Russia

^agrishin.42@mail.ru, <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9453-6070>

^bvalerii@letiaev.ru, <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7540-3099>

Abstract. The article is dedicated to the 85th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II. This issue remains relevant, especially due to the current confrontation between the West and Russia. In political, public and scientific discourse, the USSR is often blamed for Poland's defeat. The authors draw attention to a number of facts related to Poland's preparation for the future war, the plans East (“Wskhud”) and West (“Zahud”), the mobilization plans of the Polish army before the war of 1939. Using documents, memoirs and scientific research, the authors aim to answer the question: against whom was the Polish army actually mobilized on the eve of the “September catastrophe” of 1939?

Keywords: international relations, Poland, Pilsudski, Rydz-Śmigły, Beck, “Zahud”, “Wskhud”, mobilization plans, settlers

For citation: Grishin Ia.Ia., Letiaev V.A. Grishin Ia.Ia., Letiaev V.A. Against Whom Was the Polish Army Actually Mobilized on the Eve of the “September Catastrophe” of 1939? Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue. 2024; 3(13): 173-187, [doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3\(13\)-173-187](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-173-187)

Introduction

In 2024, it will be 85 years since the outbreak of World War II. A huge number of scientific works have been written about this event, also in Poland. In Polish modern literature, we can find that the blame for German aggression and for the defeat of Poland is often on the Soviet Union, due to its Treaty signing with Germany on August 23 in 1939.

This incorrect and subjective interpretation absolutely does not stand up to criticism. It does not take into account many facts, including Neville Chamberlain's policy of Germany “appeasement”, which was carried out by France and Great Britain. This policy was aimed at “maintaining peace in Europe” through minor concessions to Nazi Germany. Hitler used this policy in an attempt to prevent the creation of a Franco-Polish military alliance acting against his country. This policy did not stop Hitler and on April 28, 1939, he announced the termination of the 1934 non-aggression pact with Poland. And after that, in August 1939, negotiations began between Germany and the Soviet Union on concluding a Non-Aggression Pact.

The reasons for the outbreak of World War II and Poland's defeat are different, they can be found in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth itself. Hitler would obviously have proposed a different plan before starting a war against a state that was developed, strong, both economically and militarily, and had reliable allies, including the Soviet Union.

At that time, a lot of people in Europe understood that in the upcoming battle with Germany, Poland would inevitably suffer defeat due to its backwardness in all respects and its unpreparedness in military terms. And in order to be convinced of that, it is enough to consider the problem of the Polish armed forces mobilization on the eve of the war.

This issue has been considered in many works in Russian and other languages, primarily Polish. For achieving the goal of our study, the works of the following authors have been analyzed, in which similar ideas are discussed. There are some works by Soviet, Russian and foreign scholars such as H.Baldwin [1], L.Garth [2], A.Dybkovskaya [3], T.Jędruszcak [4], Z.Załuski [5], L.M.Lamov [6], M.I.Meltyukhov [7], Yu.Mukhin [8], D.M.Proektor [12], E.Radetsky [14], K.Tippelskirch [15], J.F.S.Fuller [16], W.Shirer [17]. There are also Polish academicians, for example, E.Duraczyński [18], T.Jurga [19], T.Machalski [20], F.Peplowski [21], W.Pobóg-Malinowski [22], A.Pragłowski [24], M.Staniewicz [26], German historian H.Sznajder [27]. The proceedings of a scientific conference held on the initiative of the Poland National Defense Ministry in 1959: «Sesia naukowa poświęcona wojnie wyzwolenczej narodu polskiego 1939-1945» [25] and the conference at the Polish Academy of Sciences in 1966: «Wojna wyzwolenicza narodu polskiego w latach 1939-1945. Więzlowe problem» [28] are important for this research too. To some degree, the above-mentioned authors considered issues related to mobilization activities in Poland. The conducted research is based on the conclusions already made by other researchers, and also allowed to obtain new results in accordance with the stated goal.

The authors of this article have identified a scientific problem of “hidden mobilization” which hasn't been mentioned before. The emphasis has never been on Poland preparing for war not with Germany, but with the USSR. In addition, it has been revealed that there are large discrepancies in the academic works regarding the number of mobilized units of the Polish army. This is of great importance in assessing the reasons for Poland's defeat, since the Polish command did not manage to transfer units from the east to the west in a timely manner.

The goal of the article is to determine the significance of the Polish armed forces mobilization on the eve of World War II and its role in the country's defeat in the war with Germany, and to answer the question of whom the Polish army was actually mobilized against before the "September catastrophe" of 1939.

The authors' article is the first of two works published in succession in two issues of this journal, devoted to the Polish mobilization of 1939. Accordingly, a more detailed analysis of the references is presented in the first article, and the second one lists the main authors whose findings have been used in it.

Materials and Methods

The materials of the proposed article are documents (first of all, this is the publication "The Year of Crisis 1938-1939. Documents and Materials", published in 2 volumes in Moscow in 1990¹, as well as the texts of the documents presented in the works of other authors, primarily Polish, as well as the data from the German military journal "Die Gebirgsruppe", which were cited by H.Baldwin [1]); the documents also in the publication «Polskie sily zbrojne w drugiej wojnie światowej»²; personal sources: F.Halder's war diary³, Soviet diplomat I.M.Maisky's memoirs⁴, W.Churchill memoirs⁵, Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck's memoirs (in the notes of his secretary, presented in E.Duraczyński's work [18]), Z.Zaremba's memoirs (Wojna i konspiracja)⁶, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland T.Artsishevsky's note about a conversation with Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative N.I.Sharonov in Warsaw on September 1, 1939 (introduced in the publication "The Year of Crisis 1938-1939. Documents and Materials", in Moscow, in 1990)⁷; Polish media materials (a youth newspaper "Bunt Mladykh", the newspaper "Kurier Vilensky", these materials are taken from L.M.Lamov's work [6]); Brauchitsch's directives on the attack plan of July 3, 1939⁸, published in the Military History Journal in 1969, the data on the mobilization plan of Poland, presented in the publication Wojna wyzwolenia narodu polskiego w latach 1939-1945 [28]; academic literature presented by the Soviet, Russian and foreign authors.

The use of general academic methods of analysis and synthesis makes it possible to study these basic documents, personal sources, and media materials to achieve the goal of the study. The methods of systematization and comparison are used to understand the systematicity and effectiveness of the mobilization activities, to identify and verify discrepancies in the number of mobilized units of the Polish army contained in various academic and documentary sources, as well as in personal data. The historical-genetic method

is applied to understand the genesis and characteristic features of the mobilization process at its various stages, including its "hidden" part, to identify the determinacy of the process under study by political, ideological, and economic factors of influence. The SWOT analysis method is also used to assess the internal and external factors that influenced decision-making process in Poland during this period. This allows us to examine the pros and cons of the country's policy, the opportunities and threats that existed for Poland in the 1930s.

Results

As a result of the conducted research, a number of academic issues related to the study of the mobilization of the Polish Army on the eve and at the beginning of World War II have been identified.

The army of any state has its own strategic goals, objectives, directions, and in this regard, the Polish Army was no exception. Poland had two main directions: the East ("Wskhud") and the West ("Zahud"). At the same time, as the Polish writer Zbigniew Żałuski noted, the East was the main direction:

'Poland, as a bourgeois-landlord state, has had its frontier facing the East throughout its entire existence. Out of fear for its dominance over the lands seized in the East, the government of bourgeois Poland concentrated its attention, its efforts, its forces on the eastern border' [5:45].

During the entire interwar period, the establishment of Poland did incite hatred towards the Soviet Union. The idea that it was its main external enemy became the mission of those responsible for the defense of the Polish state, and encouraged them to have combat training and army education. This was expressed in the corresponding acts of the state authorities of that time, as well as in the content of the relevant orders and points of military regulations, which is discussed in more detail below.

The "sanation" propaganda media systematically published articles concerning the issues of preparation for war against the USSR. One of the first appeared 10 years before the start of Hitler's aggression against Poland.

It is noteworthy that the authors of numerous anti-Soviet publications portray the Soviet Union as a weak state experiencing a crisis. This indicates an underestimation of the USSR, which led to widely circulated boastful statements such as: "We will always cope with the Soviets." One of their authors was Colonel A.Malyshko, who confidently claimed that the Poles would always defeat the eastern enemy, "having such wonderful soldiers as our guys." To tell the truth, he further stipulated that it could be defeated "if only we maintain harmony in our own home" [26:208]. Consequently, not all was good in the Polish state. As M.Staniewicz writes,

It would be useless to search in the "Psheglenda Infantry" or other military journals for articles on the fight against the German infantry. Such questions did not interest either the Sanation

1 The Year of Crisis 1938-1939. Documents and Materials. 2 Volumes. Moscow, 1990.

2 Polskie sily zbrojne w drugiej wojnie światowej. Tom 1. Cz. 1. London. 1951.

3 Halder F. War diary. V. 1. Moscow, 1968.

4 Maisky I.M. Soviet diplomat's memoirs. Moscow, 1987.

5 Churchill W. The Second World War. V. 1. Moscow, 1997.

6 Zaremba Z. Wojna i konspiracja. London, 1957.

7 The Year of Crisis .1938-1939. Documents and Materials. 2 Volumes. Moscow, 1990.

8 Brauchitsch's directives on the attack plan of July 3, 1939. Military History Journal. 1969; 8.

practitioners or theoreticians. However, in Germany, Pilsudski's works were published, specially prepared by the Polish General Staff and provided with a preface by ... Goering (the preface to the German edition of Pilsudski's book "The Year 1920" was written by Field Marshal von Blomberg) [26:208].

The youth was brought up in an anti-Soviet way, and they accepted the slogans of the adults. Thus, the youth newspaper "Bunt Mladykh" published the appeal "We must destroy Russia and at its expense acquire lands." Such calls were supported by the newspaper "Kurier Vilensky." In particular, it was written in it that the youth were doing the right thing by trying to implement Marshal Pilsudski's plans to destroy the Soviet Republic [21]. Such ideas were established by the Polish establishment. And this policy was not limited to anti-Soviet propaganda. In Poland, for many years, even during Pilsudski's lifetime, a war plan with the eastern neighbor as the main enemy, codenamed "Wskhud", was being intensively developed. Its preparation was completed, many years later, on the eve of the Nazi invasion (March 1939). There is a paradox that they were going to fight a country that did not pose any threat to the Poles. This fact was confirmed by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Józef Beck, back in 1937. He was not afraid, as his secretary wrote, "that war would come from Russia." In September of the same year, giving vent to his convictions about the weakness of the USSR, he said that the 1932 non-aggression pact was sufficient for us [18:96].

In accordance with this plan, operational tasks were being developed, cartographic work was carried out, the personnel of the Polish army were trained in an anti-Soviet way, Polish intelligence was actively working concerning the Soviet regime [21], maneuvers and exercises were being conducted. Even in the conditions of an obvious threat from Germany, the policy of the Polish leadership remained unchanged. In accordance with the "Wshud" plan, a significant part of the financial and material resources was intended for preparing for war against the USSR. New strategic railway lines, highways and dirt roads, bridges, bakeries, warehouses, etc. were being built on the border with our country. In addition, as L.M.Lamov noted,

the network of airfields is increasing. The government strives to have one airfield for every 40 kilometers of the border. Of the 390 airfields built in Poland, 242 of them are located on the Polish-Soviet border [6:132].

The construction in the eastern direction was terminated only in April 1939, which is confirmed by Polish researchers themselves [28:99], i.e. 4 months before the Nazi aggression.

The Law on the Protection of Border Regions, adopted on June 9, 1936, was also about the preparation for war with the USSR. Referring to this law, local chiefs, as L.M.Lamov writes, evicted Belarusian and Ukrainian peasants en masse from the designated zone at their own discretion. With such harsh methods, the "sanation" sought to ensure "peace in the rear" [6:132]. The system of military settlements, which began to be introduced soon after the seizure and occupation of Ukrainian and Belarusian lands in 1920, also

served this purpose. Its essence was that in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, large allotments (20-25 hectares) of the best and most easily cultivated land were allocated free of charge to military colonists. In 1939, they owned over 360 thousand hectares of truly best land [6:62]. They were selected from among former Polish legionnaires, reserve officers and non-commissioned officers, most of whom fought against Soviet Russia in 1920, as well as gendarmes, police officers, officials and other "reliable Polish members" [14:81; 10:37]. The colonists created numerous farmsteads and received funds for organizing a strong kulak (rich peasant) economy [11:20]. The Polish government relied on the colonists in carrying out the policy of both colonization of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, and Polonization. The chiefs were selected from among them. The colonists' farms served as a kind of stronghold for the Polish military in preparation for war with the USSR, and their owners were a kind of political agents, reporting on all "unreliable members." Polish intelligence did not disdain them either [11:26; 10:37]. Incidentally, the Ukrainian and Belarusian peasantry hated the colonists and called them dogs [9:26]. Obviously, the "sanation leadership" indulged itself in the crazy idea of a "campaign against the Bolsheviks." And the Polish army was oriented toward the fight against the Soviet Union, Russian and Polish researchers confirm that [13:38; 28:132]. For the sake of accuracy, it should be noted that even under Pilsudski, attempts were made to develop plans for Germany. But they remained just a draft and did not turn into the "Zahud" plan. They returned to it a little over 5 months before the Polish catastrophe. The "sanation leadership" showed surprising carelessness in strengthening the western borders, turning its back on them while simultaneously declaring that Poland "was safe", which is confirmed by the results of research by Polish authors, such as M. Staniewicz [26:208]. The western direction was completely abandoned until the beginning of 1939. That is, by and large, there was no plan for defense against German aggression. Z.Załuski also noted: "our government was inactive when it was necessary to prepare the western border for defense" [5:45].

Life forced the Poles to pay attention to the "Zahud" plan 11 days before the liquidation of Czechoslovakia by Hitler, that is, on March 15, 1939. By this time, the Reich was already different than when the Nazis had come to power. Based on the fact that the German military potential in 1939 exceeded the Polish one by 2 times, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth would not have been able to wage war on Germany without the help of the Allies.

However, they believed that they should not expect too much military assistance from Western countries and that they should rely on themselves to hold out. Therefore, the plan was defensive. The battle of the main forces was supposed to be conducted in the western territory of the country in three stages. In the first stage, it was supposed to delay the movement of German troops to the main line of defense. By agreement, 40 French divisions would begin fighting after 15 days of mobilization before England and France entered the war, and the bombing of the British aviation was planned to be carried out in the first days of the war. In the second stage, it was supposed that the Polish armies would retreat to the main positions (110-240 km) in order to drag out the fight until the French pulled German troops out of Poland. In the third stage, the Poles, as L.Garth writes, counted on the success

of counterattacks⁹, which, in their opinion, the Polish army was capable of despite the lack of mechanization [2:1].

At the same time, defensive actions inside the country in case of necessity to abandon the main position were not worked out. There was only a general view, which was not brought to the consciousness of the executors, i.e. the army commanders. The intention of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief did not represent a thoughtful and worked out holistic strategy. Before the start of the war, they managed to prepare the general principles and the tasks of the operational units in the first phase of the war, as well as the scheme of transportation, communications, etc. Not a single part of the scenario was "lost" before the war, either by the high command, their headquarters, or the army. The "Zahud" plan underwent certain changes during the development. As a result, as the Polish researcher T.Machalski stated, the echelon of the Polish defensive front was created by such armies as "Modlin", "Pomozhe", "Poznan", "Lodz". "Prussians", "Carpathians", "Krakow", the "Narev" operational group, the Supreme Command Reserve - "Wyszkow", the "Kutno" reserve [20:143–144].

Following the executive orders concerning the initial troop groupings, mobilization measures were also taken. In general, the mobilization system in Poland on the eve of the war lagged behind the mobilization systems of other capitalist countries in many ways.

At the core of Poland's mobilization plans, as K.Tippelskirch and other authors wrote, was a military-theoretical concept, according to which it was believed that the future war would begin in the same or almost the same way as the First World War, that is, having gone through the "classical" stages of mobilization, concentration, deployment of armed forces and, finally, the actual beginning of military action [11:134; 15:24]. As J.F.S.Fuller noted, the Poles continued to think in terms of leisurely military action [16:72]. However, the German command, according to K.Tippelskirch, did not intend to understand war in such an outdated form [15:24].

The Polish mobilization plan envisaged bringing the armed forces to a state of combat readiness both throughout the country and within the territory of one or several corps districts. It was burdened by class and national nuances: it allowed the mandatory proportional movement of class and national elements within individual units. This was supposed to ensure greater combat capability of the army in a clash with a specific enemy.

In determining the reasons for Poland's defeat in September 1939, researchers W.Pobog-Malinowski and T.Jędruszczyk pointed to one of the main ones - the general mobilization began too late. Announced on August 30, it was carried out on August 31. Moreover, the culprits in this case were the British and the French, who put pressure on the Poles so as not to anger Hitler prematurely (by negotiating with him) and not to provoke him [22:36; 4:231]. There is no need to deny the fact of the delay in general mobilization. However, in this case, it is not taken into account that the Polish military command used the second option 5 months before the start of the war, which was noted by M.I.Meltyukhov

9 The reliance was on the Supreme Command Reserve.

[7:337–338], K.Tippelskirch [15:16] and W.Pobog-Malinowski [22:36], that is, classified, "quiet", hidden, gradual or partial mobilization.

There were four of them in total. On March 23, 1939, the commanders of the operational units received instructions regarding the defense of the territory entrusted to them. Along with the executive directives of a strictly operational nature, the first covert mobilization was carried out, 36 days before Hitler denounced the Non-Aggression Pact (1934), and a little over five months before the start of the war. Several divisions and one cavalry brigade (KB) were mobilized at that time. Headquarters units of several armies were created, and the first movement of Polish troops to the western border was carried out. The second partial mobilization took place from August 13 to 18, when the troops were concentrated closer to Gdansk. The third covert mobilization was carried out on August 23 and affected all armies, as well as the reserves of the Supreme Command, aviation, air defense, railway troops, and army headquarters. Three days later, the fourth secret mobilization began: the troops moved to the concentration area and were regrouped. On August 30, an order was issued for the armies and operational groups of the first echelon to occupy their initial positions. As we can see, the Polish command was conducting mobilization at full speed. M.I.Meltyukhov wrote that the mobilization in Poland was carried out in secret from its allies, who feared that these Warsaw actions could push Germany into war [7:338].

But this was no secret to Germany. They were keeping a close eye on it in Berlin. There are diary entries by the Chief of Staff of the German ground forces, F.Halder. He wrote on March 15, 1939:

'The latest data on Poland. Mobilization in Poland will be completed on August 27. Consequently, we will lag behind the Poles with the end of mobilization. In order to complete mobilization by the same date, we must begin it on August 21, then on August 27 our 3rd and 4th line divisions will also be ready¹⁰'.

F.Halder did not keep his records for propaganda purposes. He was responsible for preparing the war with Poland and in the event of a failure of the mobilization he could pay for it not only with his career.

Thanks to the hidden mobilization in Poland, a certain number of wartime units were created, reserve units stipulated by the plan were formed (regiments, separate battalions and artillery divisions, and they were for the time being classified as regular units). It was envisaged, as K.Tippelskirch wrote, to unite the reserve units into 10 divisions [15:16]. According to D.M.Proektor, by the morning of September 1, the mobilization plan was fulfilled by 60% [13:42].

But many studies do not mention this side of the issue at all.

One can easily imagine the situation in Poland if preliminary preparations had not been carried out. The Germans would obviously have needed several days, a week at most, to completely occupy the country.

10 Halder F. War diary. V. 1. Moscow, 1968.

When analyzing the problems of Polish army mobilizing, it should be remembered that its delay was influenced not only by the position of London and Paris, but also by the economic weakness of the country. A significant role was played by fears of excessive costs associated with maintaining a mobilization army for a long time. As a result, the second day of mobilization coincided with the beginning of German aggression [28:138]. As reality showed, mobilization issues were not resolved in the country in the best way, including the placement of mobilization bases and warehouses. Not everything was good with the construction of fortifications. Only a part of the planned work was completed due to late loans. The allocated millions turned out to be useless. It should be noted that the forces of the first echelon were deployed along the entire main line of defense, 1,500 km long. The width of the defense zone of an infantry division ranged from 12 km to 70 km. On average, one division had up to 41 km of the defense front. As a result, in the main direction of the German tank groups' attack, there was only one 7th infantry division with the task of defending a strip 35 km wide. In the directions where the main defensive efforts were concentrated (within the framework of individual operational directions), about 50% of the infantry and artillery and 70% of the tanks were deployed.

From a comparison of these figures, it is easy to conclude that the concept of the Polish defensive grouping developed by the High Command was more than risky. Considering the limited available forces, in comparison with the extended front, such a grouping led not to their concentration, but to their dispersion [19:288–289].

According to K.Tippelskirch's conclusion,

“such a dispersion of the army, which wanted to cover everything and was not strong anywhere, could not lead to success in a war against a superior, purposefully advancing enemy. If, at all, it is worth talking about some strategic value of this plan, it should be explained only by a completely obvious underestimation of the enemy's forces and capabilities” [15:24].

Unlike the Polish command, the German command concentrated from 80% to 90% of the infantry and artillery and 100% of the tanks in each of the separate operational directions to deliver the main attack. Overall, it concentrated about 80% of the infantry, over 80% of the artillery and 100% of the tanks for offensive operations in the main directions. The Germans managed to create a serious superiority of forces and resources. The Polish disposition of forces was fatal. T.S.Yurga generally writes that they were scattered [19:288–289]. There was also low operational efficiency. And between the inner flanks there were gaps of up to several tens of kilometers. In practice, all this meant the abandonment of active defensive actions in favor of passive defense [19:288–289], which is also confirmed by D.M.Proektor [13:42].

The implementation of the fatal plan by the Poles “gave the Germans the opportunity to achieve in certain operational directions such a balance of forces that did not allow any attempt at counteraction on the Polish side” [13:42]. It should be emphasized that, in addition to military and economic considerations, political ones also had a significant influence on the deployment of Polish forces along a front of about 1,500 km, as well as on the formation

of the main defensive position along the borders with Germany, which, among other things, showed the creation of a visible defense of no more and no less than every inch of land.

Let us cite the opinion of the French military specialist L.Faury, a long-time director of sciences at the Higher Military School in Warsaw (1921-1928) on the issue of the defense of the Poland western territories:

“Without taking into account what the Polish command wants to undertake in a defensive war with Germany, two points are obvious and there can be no doubts or hesitations regarding them. The Poles cannot leave any forces in the Pomeranian Corridor, because they will be pressed against the Vistula and cut off; they cannot move forces to the operational dead Poznan salient, because the enemy will surround them, cut them off from the main forces and defeat them one by one” [24:79].

Contrary to L Faury's opinion, about a third of all Polish forces

“were concentrated within the Polish Corridor (or close to it), where the troops were exposed to the risk of double envelopment - from East Prussia and from the West. The weakness of the first echelon forces, as well as their erroneous deployment, were not compensated for by either the reserves of the operational units, or the reserves of Edward Rydz-Śmigły. This was evidenced not only by the numerical strength of the reserves, but also by their low mobility and striking power. These were exclusively infantry divisions and cavalry brigades. The lack of anti-tank weapons became one of the greatest weaknesses of the Polish defense system. The command system adopted in the Polish plan was also unfavorable. Its weakness was aggravated by the old means of communication and their quantity. The basis of the central communication system in Poland was wire means, pole-type overhead lines. Their main nodes were located in large populated areas, and they were the first targets for German bomber aircraft. Consequently, it could be assumed that it would be difficult to command the armed forces even during the period of fighting for the main line of defense. And after its abandonment and during the period of retreat, the leadership could be completely paralyzed” [28:138].

To sum up the examination of the two plans, we note that the “Wskhud” plan, if we look at it objectively, was fundamentally very risky for Poland. And, first of all, it is because until the last days preceding the outbreak of war, more than half of the Polish army units continued to be stationed in the eastern regions of the country and were aimed against the USSR.

Thus, according to Russian researchers, to the east of the Polish capital, not far from the borders of the USSR, the Poles had 17 regular, 5 reserve infantry divisions, 7 cavalry brigades and 1 tank-motorized brigade, that is, 30 units. Slightly to the west of Warsaw and in its area there were 13 regular, 4 reserve infantry divisions, 4 cavalry brigades and 1 tank motorized, that is, 22 units [13:38; 11:148]. D.M. Proektor drew attention to the fact that, in accordance with the mobilization plan, military units located in the east had to be simultaneously transferred along several railways to the West across the entire country at

a distance of 500-800 km. This required a total of up to 700 echelons [13:39]. The reckoning followed immediately, since the Polish command did not manage to transfer units from the east to the west in a timely manner. Before providing evidence for this, let us pay attention to the fact that there are large discrepancies regarding the number of mobilized units of the Polish army.

Conclusion

The mobilization of the Polish armed forces on the eve of World War II was carried out in four stages. There was also a “hidden mobilization”, the factual side of which was not considered by many researchers. In academic literature, especially Polish, there was no emphasis on the fact that Poland was preparing for war with the USSR, and not with Germany. And this is of great importance in assessing the reasons for Poland’s defeat, since the Polish command did not have time to transfer units from the east to the west in a timely manner, which significantly affected the country’s defeat in the war with Germany, in addition to its unpreparedness in economic, socio-political, and ideological terms. The “Wskhud” plan turned out to be extremely risky for Poland. Before the start of the war with Germany, more than half of the Polish army was aimed at the USSR and was on the eastern border. Based on this, we can conclude that in fact, on the eve of the “September catastrophe” of 1939, the Polish army was mobilized against the USSR, which became the fatal mistake of the Polish government, leading to a catastrophic result for it, which became the beginning of the Second World War.

References

1. Baldwin H. Battles won and lost. Moscow, 1997 [In Russian].
2. Garth L. The Second World War. Moscow, 2002 [In Russian].
3. Dybkovskaya A. History of Poland from ancient times to the present day / A.Dybkovskaya, M.Zharyn, Ya.Zharyn; edited by A.Sucheni-Grabowska, E.Ts.Krul. Warsaw: Scientific Publishing House PVN, 1995:380 [In Russian].
4. Jędruszcak T. Poland facing the German threat. History of military affairs in Poland: selected issues: dissertations, essays. Warsaw: Publishing House of the Ministry of National Defense of the Polish People’s Republic, 1970:594 [In Russian].
5. Załuski Z. Pass to history. Moscow, 1967 [In Russian].
6. Lamov L. M. Poland and its army. Moscow, 1937 [In Russian].
7. Meltyukhov M.I. Soviet-Polish wars. Moscow, 2004 [In Russian].
8. Mukhin Yu. Crusade to the East. Victims of World War II. Moscow, 2004 [In Russian].
9. On the liberated land. Sputnik agitatora [Agitator’s companion]. Moscow, 1939; 19 [In Russian].
10. On the liberated land. Sputnik agitatora [Agitator’s companion]. Moscow, 1939; 18 [In Russian].
11. The initial period of the war. Moscow, 1974 [In Russian].
12. Proektor D.M. German-Polish War. Voennno-istoricheskij zhurnal [Military History Journal]. 1959; 9:15–27 [In Russian].
13. Proektor D.M. War in Europe. 1939-1941. Moscow, 1963 [In Russian].
14. Radetsky E. Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Mirovye hozyajstvo i mirovaya politika. [World Economy and World Politics]. 1939; 11 [In Russian].
15. Tippleskirch K. History of the Second World War. Vol. 1. St. Petersburg, 1996 [In Russian].
16. Fuller J.F.S. Second World War. 1939-1945. Moscow, 1956 [In Russian].
17. Shirer W. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. Moscow, 2003 [In Russian].

18. Duraczyński E. Poland in Pre-September Europe. Nowe drogi [Nowadays]. 1989; 8 [In Polish].
19. Jurga T. Defense of Poland. 1939. Warszawa, 1990 [In Polish].
20. Machalski T. Pod prąd. Światła i cienie kampanii wrześniowej 1939 roku. London, 1964 [In Polish].
21. Peplowski F. Polish Intelligence in the USSR 1921-1939. Warszawa, 1996 [In Polish].
22. Pobóg-Malinowski W. The Contemporary Political History of Poland.. T. II. London, 1967 [In Polish].
23. Polish Armed Forces in the Second World War. Tom 1. V. 1. London, 1951 [In Polish].
24. Pragłowski A. The September Campaign. Kultura. Paris. 1959; 9 [In Polish].
25. Scientific session devoted to the liberation war of the Polish nation 1939-1945. Warsaw. Wydawnictwo ministerstwa obrony Narodowej, 1959 [In Polish].
26. Staniewicz M. The September Klenska in the context of international relations 1938-1939. Warszawa, 1952 [In Polish].
27. Sznajder H. The experiences of the operative Polish people “Militarwissen szatliche Rundszan”. 1942; 3 [In Polish].
28. The liberation war of the Polish nation in the years 1939-1945. Problems of liberation. Ed.E.Wiśniewski. Warsaw. 1966 [In Polish].

About the authors

Iakov Ia. GRISHIN. DSc. (Hist.). Professor of the Department of International Relations, World Politics and Diplomacy, Institute of International Relations, History and Oriental Studies, Kazan Federal University. <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9453-6070>. Address: 1/55, Pushkin str., Kazan, 420111, Russian Federation. grishin.42@mail.ru

Valerii A. LETIAEV. DSc. (Law), CandSc. (Hist.). Professor. Professor of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7540-3099>. Address: 53/2, building 1, Ostozhenka Av., Moscow, 119034, Russian Federation. valerii@letiaev.ru

Contribution of the authors

The authors declare no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Received: July 12, 2024. Approved after peer review: July 20, 2024. Accepted for publication: August 31, 2024. Published: September 23, 2024.

The authors have read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewers for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

The Politics of Memory in Kyrgyzstan: The Formation of National Identity in the Context of the Formation of the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region

Baktybek S. Batyrbayev✉

Kyrgyz National University named after Zhusup Balasaga, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan

baktybatyrbaev@gmail.com, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1534-1337>

Abstract. The article examines the role of legal norms and institutions in the formation of national identity, the influence of memory policy on legislation, cultural heritage and historical memory. Important in the formation of identity in our time is the new perception of historical facts from the point of view of their legal assessment and interpretation. The states of the post-Soviet space use legal instruments to influence the formation of self-identification, setting a specific vector of development. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the impact of the new Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic and the approved development concepts on the formation of civil identity, as well as the historical and legal analysis associated with the 100th anniversary of the formation of the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region. The study presents a new look at the role of law in the preservation and transmission of historical memory, the formation of national identity in Kyrgyzstan.

Keywords: Kyrgyzstan, politics of memory, national identity, Constitution, cultural heritage, historical memory, Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region, legal aspects

For citation: Batyrbayev B.S. The Politics of Memory in Kyrgyzstan: The formation of national identity in the context of the formation of the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region. *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue*. 2024; 3(13): 188-199, [doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3\(13\)-188-199](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-188-199)

Introduction

In 2024, the 100th anniversary of the formation of the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region is celebrated, which makes it especially important to study the legal aspects of the politics of memory in Kyrgyzstan and their impact on the formation of national identity. This is an analysis of the legislation regulating memorial events, the protection of cultural heritage and historical monuments, as well as the mechanisms of legal support for the preservation and transmission of historical memory to future generations. The study of these aspects allows us to understand the role of legal norms and institutions in the formation of national identity through the preservation of the historical heritage of the autonomous region.

In the 21st century, humanity is faced with problems of self-identification at the international and personal levels caused by changes in climate, demography, economics, politics, culture and the information sphere. Legal assessment and interpretation of historical facts is important. The states of the post-Soviet space use legal instruments to give the processes of self-identification a certain direction of development. The constitutional enshrinement of the attitude towards the historical past is an important aspect by which one can judge the general and specific approaches of the states that were formerly part of the USSR to the Soviet period of history. The models of studying the historical past in the post-Soviet states vary: some countries restore pre-Soviet constitutions or refer to them, such as Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania; others recognize the importance of the Soviet period without negative assessments, including obligations to preserve national heritage, such as Turkmenistan, Moldova and Kazakhstan. There is also an appeal to the distant past, epics and heroes, emphasizing the centuries-old history, as in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Tajikistan and Armenia.

The Constitution of Turkmenistan (1992) enshrines loyalty to ancestors and responsibility for heritage, the Constitution of Kazakhstan (1995) emphasizes the unity of the people and the duty to preserve heritage. The Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic (2021) enshrines loyalty to the traditions of ancestors and the duty to develop culture and preserve heritage. The Constitutions of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus enshrine continuity with the USSR and obligations to preserve heritage and historical truth¹. These constitutional provisions reflect the basic principles that exist at the present stage and demonstrate the importance of official memory policy and memorial laws for the formation of national identity in post-Soviet states.

¹ Dorskaya A.A. Preservation of a common historical past and processes of self-identification of states and peoples of the post-Soviet space. *Education and Law*. 2023; 10:17-19.



Materials and Methods

The study of legal aspects of memory policy and their impact on the formation of national identity in Kyrgyzstan is relevant. Understanding how legal norms and institutions contribute to the preservation and transmission of historical memory allows us to understand the mechanisms of national identity formation. In the context of ongoing global changes, such studies help not only to preserve cultural and historical heritage, but also to ensure stable and cohesive development of society.

The theoretical significance of the work is determined by the multi-level nature of the phenomena of memory policy and national identity, as well as the multidimensionality of their functioning, which required the use of interdisciplinary approaches that synthesize the achievements of law, political science, history and sociology. The study as a whole is based on such epistemological principles as the logical-reflexive approach in combination with the problem-contextual one, the principles of historicism, the dialectical relationship of the general, the particular and the individual, integrity and complementarity.

Among the most significant foreign authors engaged in the study of the formation of national and state identity of the post-Soviet republics, one can single out R.Herman, T.Hopf, D.Chekel [19-21].

The problems of development of Central Asian countries in Russia are studied by scientists from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Institute of International Relations and World Economy of the Russian Academy of Sciences [9, 11, 13-15, 18] and other educational and research institutions [8, 10, 16-17].

Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the self-awareness of Kyrgyzstanis and the ways of perceiving the past by different generations born and raised in a changing society [1, 3-5]. Identity is considered as a historical phenomenon subject, changing in its character and nature, in the processes of formation and manifestation associated with the life destiny of the people, the individual and the country.

Results

In 1991, Kyrgyzstan, along with other post-Soviet countries, embarked on a project to create a national state. The new state faced the task of legitimizing new institutions, statuses and power relations, introducing new beliefs and values. The first president of the Kyrgyz Republic, A.A.Akayev, proposed two key ideas at the state level: "Kyrgyzstan is our common home" and "Kyrgyzstan is a country of human rights."² Однако из-за размытости программ политической элиты и недостаточной готовности страны эти попытки внедрения идеологических установок потерпели неудачу.

² Koichuev T. On the national idea. *Reforma*. 2002; 3(15):59–60.

During the period of K.Bakiyev's term as president, the program "Heritage of the Kyrgyz and the Future" was developed within the framework of the national project "Culture". The main goal was to form a civil political nation and establish new perspectives for studying cultural heritage and defining national identity³. However, due to the change of power, the program was not implemented.

After the April 2010 events in Kyrgyzstan, the new political elite attempted to revive the propaganda of the moral values of the Manas epic, making it the basis of historical memory. The Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, by its resolution of December 9, 2014, approved the draft law on civic-patriotic education and sent it to the Zhogorku Kenesh for consideration. In this draft, civic-patriotic education is defined as a purposeful process of personality formation, the purpose of which is love for the Motherland, respect for state power and cultural heritage, as well as responsibility for one's choice and development of abilities (Article 3). The purpose of civic-patriotic education is to unite society and achieve state goals; the objectives are the formation of national self-awareness, patriotism, respect for the rule of law, legal culture, consolidation of society and the education of a healthy lifestyle (Article 4)⁴.

However, this draft law was not adopted, and the President of the Kyrgyz Republic signed the Decree "On the Days of History and Memory of Ancestors"⁵. This Decree emphasized the importance of the history of the Kyrgyz people, including the establishment of the Great Kyrgyz Khaganate and the struggle for statehood, and noted the influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution on the development of the region. Attempts to focus on cultural and historical heritage indicated the importance of this aspect for the formation of national identity, but without specific and consistent actions, these efforts remained declarative.

The analysis showed that the problems that Kyrgyzstan faced after gaining independence were largely due to insufficient preparation for the new status and the absence of consistent programs. Effective formation of national identity required not only the development of conceptual programs, but also their implementation through coordinated actions of all branches of government and the active participation of civil society. Without such efforts, the country continued to face problems in the areas of stability and national unity, which, in turn, hindered its sustainable development and progress.

Today, political and legal processes aimed at creating and strengthening national identity in Kyrgyzstan require clear conceptualization and practical implementation.

The need for a unifying civic identity in Kyrgyzstan was realized after the protest movement in October 2020, which followed the disputed elections, which ended in

³ The Heritage of the Kyrgyz and the Present. The Heritage of the Kyrgyz and the Future: National Project "Culture". Bishkek: Ilim, 2009:3–4.

⁴ On the draft Law of the Kyrgyz Republic «On civic-patriotic education in the Kyrgyz Republic»: Resolution of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic of December 9, 2014, No. 698. Available from: <https://novopokrovka3.mektebim.kg/wp-content/uploads/sites/240/2023/03/polozhenie-o-grazhdansko-patrioticheskom-vospitanii.pdf>.

⁵ On the establishment of Days of History and Memory of Ancestors: Decree of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic of October 26, 2017, UP, No. 231. Available from: <https://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/69431/edition/858547/ru>.

a political crisis and a change of power. The preamble to the new Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic of May 5, 2021, enshrines as a basic provision fidelity to the traditions of ancestors, as well as the precepts of Manas the Magnanimous - a hero who united the Kyrgyz people in the fight against external and internal enemies, performed military feats, called for living in unity, peace, harmony and in harmony with nature. In accordance with the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, the state undertakes to develop the culture of the people of Kyrgyzstan, preserving customs and traditions that do not infringe on human rights and freedoms. The sacred tradition of the people is the respect for elders and the respect for the younger. The Constitution guarantees the protection of the historical, material and spiritual heritage of the people of Kyrgyzstan⁶.

In order to implement the principles enshrined in the Constitution, the development of civil identity in the Kyrgyz Republic is ensured by creating equal opportunities for the participation of all citizens in the socio-economic and socio-political life of the country. The state undertakes to guarantee equal conditions for all citizens, regardless of their ethnic or social background, so that they can actively contribute to the development of society. Particular attention is paid to preserving the diversity of cultures and traditions, strengthening tolerance in society. This is necessary so that every person, regardless of their origin or cultural characteristics, can feel respected and accepted. Tolerance and respect for diversity require a willingness to actively interact, cooperate and work together between different social groups and ethnic communities. This approach contributes to the formation of a unified society, where each citizen contributes to the general well-being and prosperity, feeling an integral part of the state community.

In 2020, the Decree of the President of Kyrgyzstan approved the Concept for the Development of Civil Identity "Kyrgyz Jarany" for the period from 2021 to 2026⁷. The concept is aimed at forming a common civil identity in the country, uniting all citizens, regardless of their ethnic, religious or social background. It is based on the principles of equality, respect for diversity, voluntariness and interaction in order to create a favorable environment for strengthening national unity and increasing tolerance in society. The Concept provides for various strategic directions, including the formation of a conscious perception of identity, strengthening the state language, creating equal opportunities in governance and increasing trust in political institutions.

The Concept on the spiritual and moral development and physical education of the individual of the Kyrgyz Republic, adopted on July 24, 2021, highlights civic identity as a key aspect of personal development, defined as an individual awareness of belonging to the civil community of the state. The goal is to form a comprehensively developed personality, deeply imbued with the spiritual and cultural values of his people, knowing his native language as a key component of the cultural heritage. The main tasks include:

⁶ Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic of May 5, 2021 (adopted by referendum (popular vote) on April 11, 2021). Available from: <https://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/112213/edition/1202952/ru>.

⁷ The concept of development of civil identity - Kyrgyz language in the Kyrgyz Republic for the period 2021-2026 (as amended by the Decree of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic of May 15, 2023, UP, No. 124). Available from: <https://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/430346/edition/1253187/ru>.

maintaining state integrity, ensuring information security, preserving national wealth and spiritual and moral values, as well as stimulating a healthy lifestyle and developing patriotism. The concept is also aimed at strengthening respect for the state and native languages, observing the norms of public behavior, including patriotism and honest work⁸.

Historical and legal analysis in connection with the 100th anniversary of the formation of the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region is of particular importance for the formation of national identity in the course of implementing the basic norms of the Constitution of 2021, the concept of "Kyrgyz Jarany" and the "Concept of spiritual and moral development and physical education of the individual". In light of the Decree of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic S. Japarov dated October 24, 2023, dedicated to the celebration of the 100th anniversary of this event, recognition of the wisdom and heroism of the ancestors who carefully protected and preserved the territory of Kyrgyzstan for centuries comes to the fore⁹. The formation of the national state of the Kyrgyz people was a long and complex process, accompanied by intense political struggle. The formation of the autonomy of the Kyrgyz within the Turkestan ASSR began in 1921, and in 1924, delegates to the 12th Congress of Soviets of the Turkestan ASSR expressed a demand for recognition of the Kara-Kyrgyz people as an independent nation. The Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Turkestan ASSR on national-territorial demarcation in 1924 granted the Kyrgyz the right to create the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region within the RSFSR. This formation united the Kyrgyz land and people into a single whole, creating the prerequisites for preserving national identity¹⁰. This event created favorable conditions for the development of the national economy and culture, for the organization of state institutions, education and courts operating in the native language.

During the Soviet period, Kyrgyz statehood went through several stages of development. With the creation of the autonomous region and the autonomous republic, the territory and borders were defined, institutions and attributes of statehood were established. The formation of the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region in 1924, the Kyrgyz Autonomous Region in 1925, and then the Kyrgyz SSR as a union republic within the USSR became the determining factor that opened the way to the independence of the Kyrgyz Republic in 1991. A plan of celebrations was approved, which includes annual events at the national and local levels dedicated to historical events, the memory of ancestors and historical figures.

⁸ On approval of the Concept on spiritual and moral development and physical education of the individual: Decree of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic dated July 24, 2021. UP № 313. Available from: <https://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/430539/edition/1084953/ru>.

⁹ On the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the formation of the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region: Decree of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic dated October 24, 2023. Available from: <http://kkao.archive.kg/ru>.

¹⁰ Extract from the Resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of October 14, 1924 on the formation of the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region within the RSFSR. Available from: <http://kkao.archive.kg/ru>.

Conclusions

The need to form a common civic identity in Kyrgyzstan, noted in the new Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic of May 5, 2021, reflects the state's desire to affirm its commitment to preserving cultural heritage and traditions. Adopted development concepts, such as "Kyrgyz Jarany" and "The Concept of Spiritual and Moral Development and Physical Education of the Individual", emphasize the importance of ensuring equal opportunities and supporting tolerance to achieve unity of national identity. Of particular importance are events aimed at celebrating the 100th anniversary of the formation of the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region, which is important for the formation of national identity. The formation of the autonomous region in 1924 and its subsequent transformation into the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic within the Soviet Union was an important milestone on the path to the independence of the Kyrgyz Republic in 1991. The plan of events dedicated to historical events, which includes holding events annually on November 7 and 8, 2024 at the national and regional levels, is part of the strategy to preserve and strengthen national identity.

References

1. Abytov B.K. Russian Orientalists about Kyrgyz and Kyrgyzstan. *Voprosy vostokovedeniya*. [Issues of Oriental Studies]. 2022; 1:8–15 [In Russian]. https://doi.org/10.52754/16948653_2020_1_1.
2. Dorskaya A.A. Preservation of a common historical past and processes of self-identification of states and people of the post-Soviet space. *Obrazovanie i pravo*. [Education and Law]. 2023; 10:16–21 [In Russian].
3. Kaliev A.S. Kutlugjon I. Formation of civil identity in the Kyrgyz Republic. *Talqin va tadqiqotlar ilmiy-uslubiy jurnali* [Talqin and research scientific-artistic journal]. 2023; 17:176–181 [In Russian].
4. Kamchybekova S., Abdullaeva Zh. Kyrgyzstan Population Civil Identity in the Ethnic Aspect. *Byulleten' nauki i praktiki*. [Bulletin of Science and Practice]. 2021; 7(7):270–276 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.33619/2414-2948/68/35>.
5. Kangeliev A.N. Kyrgyzstan Population Civil Identity in the Ethnic Aspect. *Vestnik KRSU*. [Vestnik KRSU]. 2014; 11(14):41–45 [In Russian].
6. Koichuev T. About the national idea. *Reforma*. 2002. Vol. 3(15):59–60 [In Russian].
7. Koshbakova B.M. Patriotism as one of the forms of self-identification of the individual in Kyrgyzstan. *Mezhdunarodnyj zhurnal gumanitarnykh i estestvennykh nauk*. [International Journal of Humanitarian and Natural Sciences]. 2022; 4–2:11–16 [In Russian].
8. Kurnykin O.Yu. The Phenomenon of "Multiple Identity" in Modern Kyrgyz Society. *Izvestiya AltGU* [Izvestia of Altai State University]. 2021; 6(122):73–78 [In Russian].
9. Malyshev D.V. Post-election Kyrgyzstan – a peaceful transfer of power? *Svobodnaya mysl'* [Svobodnaya mysl']. 2018; 4(1670):147–156 [In Russian].
10. Molodov O.B. Formation of identity of the population of modern Kyrgyzstan. *The Newman in Foreign policy*. 2017; 38(82):72–74 [In Russian].
11. Muslim Near and Middle East: Modern Processes, History and Historiography: A Collection of Articles / Ed. V.Ya.Belokrenitsky, N.M.Mamedova, N.Yu.Ulchenko; Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2021:528 [In Russian].
12. The heritage of the Kyrgyz and modernity. Kyrgyz heritage and future: National project "Culture". Bishkek: Ilim, 2009:108 [In Russian].
13. Attitudes towards Russia in Central Asia (history, politics, culture): (collective monograph) / Ed. N.P.Kosmarskaya; Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2021:202 [In Russian].
14. Pritchin S.A. In the mirror of transitology: features of the processes of change of power in the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus. *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Seriya*

25. *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya i mirovaya politika*. [Bulletin of Moscow University]. Series 25: International Relations and World Politics. 2021; 4(13):7–42 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.48015/2076-7404-2021-13-4-7-42>.
15. Semenova N.K. Transport horizons of Eurasia. Economic and geopolitical "traps" and opportunities / Ed. S.G.Luzyanin. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2023:292 [In Russian].
16. Formation of regional identity and the politics of historical memory: a collection of scientific articles. *Dnevnik Altajskoj shkoly politicheskikh issledovaniy*. № 37. [Diary of the Altai School of Political Studies. №. 37]. Modern Russia and the World: Development Alternatives / ed. by Yu.G. Chernyshov. Barnaul: Alt. Univ., 2021:309 [In Russian].
17. Khan N.R., Atambaev B. Problems of religious identity of the Kyrgyz: Phenomenological and sociological analysis of proselytism. *Nauchnyj rezul'tat. Sociologiya i upravlenie*. [Research Result. Sociology and management]. 2023; 9(2):145–158 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.18413/24089338-2023-9-2-1-1>.
18. Central Eurasia: The Eurasian space (legacy of the past, challenges of the present, an example of something different). Issue 5: *Sat. Art.* / Ch. ed. A.Yu.Skakov; Institute of Oriental Studies RAS. M.: IV RAS, 2022:208 [In Russian].
19. Checkel J. Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution. *World Politics*, 1993; 45(2) [In English].
20. Herman R. Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War / P.Katzenstein (ed.). *The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics*. N.Y., 1996 [In English].
21. Hopf T. Managing Soviet Disintegration: A Demand for Behavioral Regimes. *International Security*, 1992; 17(1):44–75 [In English].

About the author

Baktybek S. BATYRBAYEV. CandSc. (Law). Associate Professor of the Department of Criminal Procedure and Forensic Science of the Law Institute of the Kyrgyz National University named after Zhusup Balasagyn. <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1534-1337>. Address: 547, Frunze str., Bishkek, 720033, Kyrgyzstan. baktybatyrbaev@gmail.com

Contribution of the author

The author declares no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Received: June 17, 2024 Approved after peer review: July 29, 2024. Accepted for publication: August 31, 2024. Published: September 23, 2024.

The author has read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewers for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

POWER, POLITICS, STATE

Political Institutions, Processes and Technologies

In 144 countries of the world, more than 380 thousand people took part in the voting, the overwhelming majority of whom (72.3%) voted for the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin. At this point, the question of what the non-systemic opposition managed to do can be considered closed: "Nothing".

Y.B.Bocharov

The Results of the President of Russia Elections in Foreign Countries in 2024 and the Fiasco of the Non-Systemic Opposition

Symbolic policy, reflected in normative legal acts, is a one-sided activity of the state, directly related to the tasks of ideology - to unite, mobilize citizens to move in the direction determined by the political establishment; it may or may not correspond to socio-political expectations, traditions, mass political consciousness.

V.N.Tabak

On the Issue of Symbolic Politics in Modern Moldova (1989-2023)

RUSSIA & WORLD. SCIENTIFIC DIALOGUE

**РОССИЯ
И МИР**
НАУЧНЫЙ ДИАЛОГ

The Results of the President of Russia Elections in Foreign Countries in 2024 and the Fiasco of the Non-Systemic Opposition

Yuri B. Bocharov✉

Director of the Information Warfare Research Institute, Israel
yurabig@gmail.com, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0345-0173>

Abstract. In the article, a personal view of an Israeli student on the results of the presidential election in Russia in 2024. The issues of organization of voting of citizens of the Russian Federation living outside its territory are considered. Analyzed the possible and taken actions of the unsystematic opposition to discredit and fail to vote in the elections of the head of the Russian state in precincts located outside the borders of the territory of Russia. During the research, the results of the elections were considered from different points of view: in the regional aspect, by specific countries and by the election commission of a separate precinct. It was concluded that the non-systemic opposition (primarily located in the EU) has no real opportunities to actively influence the electoral behavior of Russians living outside the Russian Federation at the time of the elections.

Keywords: electoral process, election of the President of the Russian Federation, voting, electoral behavior, non-systemic opposition

For citation: Bocharov Y.B. The Results of the President of Russia Elections in Foreign Countries in 2024 and the Fiasco of the Non-Systemic Opposition. *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue*. 2024; 3(13): 202-221, [doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3\(13\)-202-221](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-202-221)

Introduction

According to Russian legislation, citizens of Russia permanently residing abroad or temporarily on business trips, on tourist trips and for other reasons outside of Russia during the period of preparation and holding of elections of both the President and deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation have the right to vote and perform other electoral actions in the same manner as citizens of the Russian

Federation residing on the territory of Russia¹. At the same time, the presence of a second citizenship does not affect the right of Russian citizens to participate in elections.

At the same time, the organization of the electoral process and the possibilities of exercising their constitutional right to vote while outside the territory of the Russian Federation differ significantly in a number of respects from this process in Russia. The differences are mainly related to the organization and operation of polling stations abroad, the formation of their staff and the conduct of mobile and early voting.

In this regard, in the overwhelming majority of countries in the world where a large number of Russians live (are at the time of the elections) who have the right to vote in Russian elections, polling stations and the number of members of their commissions are formed based not on the actual number of voters, but on the capabilities of Russian diplomatic missions in these countries to open polling stations (precinct electoral commission) and staff them with responsible workers.

According to the Central Election Commission, as of January 1, 2024, 2,002,787 Russian voters live outside the Russian Federation. Based on the situation in the world and the capabilities of Russian diplomatic missions, voting in the 2024 Russian presidential elections was planned to be held only in 144 countries around the world, where 286 polling stations were organized. The total number of precinct election commissions abroad has decreased compared to the 2018 presidential elections, when 394 precinct election commissions were opened. This is due to the closure of 26 Russian foreign missions in unfriendly countries, a reduction in the number of embassy and consulate employees due to the mass expulsion of Russian diplomats, and the refusal of the authorities of some states to ensure the security of Russian diplomatic missions and Russian citizens visiting them during the elections.

In the 2024 elections, the precinct election commission was mainly located in the embassies or consulates general of the Russian Federation, but in some countries (for example, in Angola, Hungary, Zimbabwe, Iraq, India, Malaysia, Nepal, Thailand) the commissions traveled to other cities to provide Russians with the opportunity to exercise their right to vote. In a number of countries in Africa and Latin America, one precinct election commission served two countries at once. At the same time, either early or mobile voting was organized in almost a hundred precinct election commissions.

On the one hand, the geopolitical situation in the world in connection with the events in and around Ukraine has divided the world into a number of opposing blocs. Almost 50 countries are part of the bloc "at war" with Russia, if not directly, then indirectly, introducing economic and political sanctions both against the state and against some of the diplomatic missions of Russia, on whose territory voting is usually organized. In this regard,

¹ Federal legislation on elections and referendums in Russia. Available from: <http://www.novgorod.izbirkom.ru/zakonodatelstvo-o-vyborakh-i-referendumakh/federaln-zakon/index.php>.

the number of precinct election commissions opened outside the territory of Russia has decreased by almost a third.

On the other hand, the composition of voters voting outside the territory of Russia has changed dramatically. Usually, the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation operates data on the number of foreign voters based on the consular records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. It is assumed that most of these voters have long been living outside Russia and have a different opinion of it than before leaving it. During these elections, the number of Russians “temporarily” abroad increased several times, despite the fact that many of them left not for countries with traditional emigration geography, but according to the principle of “where it was possible to go” – and they left first of all for neighboring countries of the post-Soviet space, as well as for countries with a visa-free or simplified visa regime for Russians, and mainly for “resort” countries of the world.

Against the backdrop of all these events abroad, the non-systemic Russian opposition has become more active (not without active financial and ideological support from the West). Trying to prove its importance, promoting the thesis about the illegitimacy of power in Russia due to the alleged presence of administrative resources and pressure on voters, the opposition tried to demonstrate using the example of elections in the “free world” (free from Russian influence) that Russians living here will vote radically differently. And this “free” vote will confirm the opposition’s thesis about the lack of real support by Russians for the policy of President V.V.Putin.

Thus, the scientific novelty of the study is predetermined by the formulation of the problem: to assess the real influence of the non-systemic opposition on members of the Russian foreign community and the presence of support among such citizens.

Materials and Methods

The methodological basis of the research was modern methods of scientific cognition of social and legal reality, concrete historical, statistical, and systemic analysis. General scientific methods include the general dialectical method, analysis and synthesis, deduction and induction, etc.

The empirical basis of the study was made up of: data from the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation for a foreign constituency for March 2024 (in general and in the context of individual countries, states, precinct election commission), information from news agencies and other media, data from statistics and analytical centers, the author’s experience of working in a precinct election commission during the 2024 Russian presidential elections.

The author’s theoretical position was formed under the influence of such scientists as S.A.Avakyan, M.V.Baglai, G.V.Barabashev, I.B.Gasanov, N.V.Grishin, A.V.Zemlyanov, Yu.N.Lebedeva, A.V.Makarov, T.Yu.Nesterova, O.S.Morozova, G.N.Chebotarev, V.E.Chirkin, K.F.Sheremet, B.S.Ebzeev, G.O.Yarygin and others [1–4, 6–9, 11, 16].

Results

An analysis of the results of the Russian Presidential elections abroad shows that the restrictions imposed on Russia led to a decrease in voter turnout, while protest votes and provocations organized by the opposition led to the fact that the final result for the incumbent President was the lowest for the entire period of presidential elections outside the territory of the Russian Federation, but still exceeded 72% (see Table 1). That is, in the end, Russian President Vladimir Putin clearly won abroad. It should be taken into account that the limited capabilities of the Central Election Commission and the Russian Foreign Ministry to organize elections outside the territory of the Russian Federation due to the situation in the world also affected the decrease in the number of open precinct election commissions, which led to a decrease in the share of voters compared to the previous elections.

Table 1. Voting results for the presidential elections of the Russian Federation abroad

Year	Number of countries	Number of election commissions	Number of voters	Number of voters for the winning presidential candidate	%
2004	140	353	273 131	232 502	85,13
2008	142	363	330 183	283 298	85,80
2012	147	384	441 931	323 686	73,24
2018	145	393	474 366	403 306	85,2
2024	144	286	380 961	275 249	72,25

Source: compiled by the author on the materials of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation.

According to the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, 380,961 voters voted abroad in 144 countries around the world, which is only 4.35% of the total number of voters who took part in the elections in Russia in 2024, and approximately 19% of those eligible to vote and living outside the territory of the Russian Federation.²

At the same time, the percentage of those who used their right to vote early abroad was almost ten times higher than in Russia (see Table 2).

However, it is precisely because of the specifics of organizing voting abroad that ten times fewer people were able to use the opportunity to vote outside the polling station or at home than in Russia. At the same time, in Russia, voters took three times more ballots with them “as a souvenir” than abroad. This is most likely due to the fact that voting abroad was organized mainly at diplomatic mission facilities, where a limited number of voters

² Data from the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation for the foreign district for March 2024. Available from: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1jwP7_GrNAFyr1okSUYgoos7NmKcKoDEKx_OrKdqIwE/edit?gid=0#gid=0.

were allowed in, which allowed members of the precinct election commission to monitor their actions in order to avoid provocations, which were talked about so much before the elections. These “losses” are the difference between the ballots issued and those found in the ballot boxes (see Table 2).

At the same time, candidates L.E.Slutsky and N.M.Kharitonov received twice as few votes (in percentage) outside the territory of the Russian Federation as they did inside Russia. This is mainly due to the absence of any advertising of these candidates abroad and the lack of information about their real activities outside the Russian Federation. But V.A.Davankov, for whom the non-systemic opposition called to vote as an alternative to V.V.Putin, received four times (in percentage) more votes abroad than inside Russia. Nevertheless, his modest result of 16.5% indicates the absence of real opposition among Russian citizens living abroad. It is because of this “protest” voting that the result of the winner of the elections, V.V.Putin, who received an absolutely victorious result not only in the world outside Russia as a whole, but also in individual regions, is slightly understated.

Table 2. Comparative analysis of voting in the territory of the Russian Federation and abroad

Data from the PEC protocols	Abroad	% of the total number of those who voted abroad	In the Russian Federation	% of the total number of those who voted in the Russian Federation
Total votes	380 961		87 576 075	
Early voters	73 199	19,21	2 100 202	2,40
Voting at the PEC on election day	301 971	79,27	73 447 089	83,87
Mobile voting on election day	5 791	1,52	12 028 784	13,74
Number of invalid ballots	26 147	6,87	1 193 278	1,37
Number of valid ballots	354 577	93,13	86 204 291	98,63
Number of ballots «stolen» by voters	237	0,06	17 806	0,20
Votes for each registered candidate (% of the number of voters)				
Davankov V.A.	63 388	16,65	3 362 484	3,85
Putin V.V.	275 249	72,25	76 277 708	87,28
Slutsky L.E.	7 495	1,97	2 795 629	3,20
Kharitonov N.M.	8 445	2,22	3 768 470	4,31

Source: compiled by the author on the materials of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation

Protest movement and attempts to disrupt the vote

In the run-up to the elections, there were many publications that the non-systemic opposition was preparing for provocations during the elections of the President of the Russian Federation. Anti-Russian propaganda was supposed to act through negative posts on social networks. According to preliminary information, the bet was on local protest actions of activists, attempts to “stir up” the topic of those mobilized for the SVO and “anti-war” sentiments, delegitimization of the political leader V.V.Putin using tools known within the framework of the phenomenon of “hybris syndrome” [10].

No one expected to completely disrupt the elections, but they tried to discredit them.

As the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs M.Zakharova stated in a special commentary to TASS, “Western opponents of Moscow have been actively trying to disrupt the presidential elections in Russia for the past year. Our enemies have been stirring not in a week, not even in a month, but, it seems to me, they have been doing everything in the past year to either disrupt the elections, prevent them from being held, or distort the idea of the elections in various ways”³. She explained that paid opposition was also used, which turned out to be “agents of influence and simply mercenaries.” It should be noted that the change in the tasks of the non-systemic opposition in the context of the increasing confrontation between the West and Russia is also noted in scientific studies [5, 12, 14, 15].

The attempts at destabilization were so serious that the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation took special measures to counteract all possible negative impacts. As stated by the head of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation E.Pamfilova, “The West intends to disrupt them, and certain work is already underway in this direction. We understand that they are already working to simply disrupt the Russian presidential elections. Enormous funds have been allocated by Western countries, primarily the United States. All centers are working, starting with the Baltics, Poland, which are preparing, all the Khodorkovskys, Kaspars and all the other “runners” who, like rats, fled the country, are gathering. They are all now thinking about how to demolish Russia”⁴. According to her, more than 100 countries are watching to see if Russia will withstand this pressure or not. But Pamfilova assured that Russia is ready for the upcoming elections.

According to the assessment of the Duma commission investigating interference by foreign states in Russia’s internal affairs, Mikhail Khodorkovsky has joined the work on “delegitimization”⁵, who quietly resumed the work of the Open Russia structure⁶.

Several well-known opposition groups were particularly active in the information space, calling on everyone to unite and act as a united front of “resistance”, but later,

³ Russian Foreign Ministry: Western enemies have been doing everything they can to disrupt the Russian presidential elections for the past year. TASS. 16.03.2024. Available from: <https://tass.ru/politika/20250185>.

⁴ Pamfilova announced the West’s intention to disrupt the Russian presidential elections in 2024. TASS. 24.04.2024. Available from: <https://tass.ru/politika/17589659?ysclid=lxedzjqwbc379531607>.

⁵ «Baba Yaga Against.» How the Fugitive Opposition Prepares for the Russian Presidential Elections. REGNUM. 17.04.2024. Available from: <https://regnum.ru/article/3852317>.

⁶ *This organization is recognized as undesirable in the Russian Federation.

having quarreled among themselves for leadership, each went their own way. The question of a single leadership has always been raised in the non-systemic opposition, largely due to mercantile interests. All Western state and public structures that finance various types of Non-Governmental Organizations / Non-Commercial Organizations and conduct one or another activity against Russia, first of all want to give money to really operating opposition structures or, so to speak, “effective” leaders of public opinion. It was for this “bread and butter” that there was a confrontation between the so-called leaders of “protest” public opinion, and it was for this activity that protest groups were formed abroad, mainly in European countries, from among Russians who had recently left the country due to the events around the SVO.

Approximately a year and a half after the start of the SVO, the head of VTsIOM V.Fedorov stated on the air of the radio station “Moscow Speaks” that the number of citizens who have left Russia since the start of the SVO, according to various estimates, is from 500 to 800 thousand people⁷. According to Fedorov, the exact number of those who left cannot be named, because the data of sociologists, customs and border services do not reflect the real picture of such migration. At the same time, initially the overwhelming majority left for countries with a visa-free regime for Russians. According to various studies, the largest number of such Russians were accepted by Kazakhstan and Serbia (150 thousand people each), the top three countries are closed by Armenia (110 thousand people)⁸.

Among the main destinations chosen by Russian citizens were also Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, the United Arab Emirates, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Spain, Israel, Mongolia, Latin American countries, the Baltic States, Canada and the United States. Subsequently, a number of EU countries, including Latvia and the Czech Republic, suspended issuing visas to Russian citizens; Finland, Poland and the Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) stated that they would not provide asylum to Russians fleeing mobilization. On the contrary, Germany offered asylum to Russian oppositionists and conscripts who did not want to fight with Ukraine.

Naturally, this group of refugees became the main platform for the work of all structures of the non-systemic opposition. The ideological meaning of Western support for relocates is analyzed in great detail in the article by L.L.Khoperskaya [13].

Research previously conducted by us on the example of Israel⁹, show that among those voting in Israel in Russian elections (both Duma and presidential) a certain tendency can be traced: the longer a Russian lives in a “foreign” country, the more “pro-Russian” his views become, the more often he votes for the ruling party and for President V.V.Putin. However, this time, literally within a year before the elections, both refugees from Ukraine

⁷ The head of VTsIOM named the number of citizens who left Russia since the beginning of the SVO. #GOVORITMOSKVA.18.07.2023. Available from: <https://govoritmoskva.ru/news/372241/>.

⁸ Russians have emigrated in huge numbers since the war in Ukraine. 23.08.2023. Available from: <https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2023/08/23/russians-have-emigrated-in-huge-numbers-since-the-war-in-ukraine>.

⁹ Bocharov Yu. On the reasons for the lack of real opposition among Russian voters abroad (using the situation in Israel as an example). Citizen. Elections. Power. 2022; 1(23). Available from: <https://www.rcoit.ru/upload/iblock/cc0/cv44e1vjz7c6xfgu9q5c8rk0cjkslk5y/>.

Table 3. Voting results by regions of the world

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Total
Regions	post-Soviet space	Europe	Middle East	other countries of Asia, Oceania and Australia	Africa	North America	South America	
Number of countries	14	32	17	19	39	2	21	144
Polling stations	90	51	34	41	43	6	21	286
Voted (people)	173 777	118 366	40 957	30 384	5 584	5 661	6 232	380 961
Valid ballots	167 492	105 625	37 672	27 994	5 441	4 712	5 641	354 577
Invalid ballots	6 252	12 621	3 234	2 368	140	944	588	26 147
“Stolen” ballots	33	120	51	22	3	5	3	237
Candidates								
Davankov V.A.	14 034	27 024	8 701	9 428	604	1 803	1 794	63 388
%	8%	23%	21%	31%	11%	32%	29%	17%
Putin V.V.	150 002	71 004	26 907	16 573	4 555	2 688	3 520	275 249
%	86%	60%	66%	55%	82%	48%	57%	72%
Slutsky L.E.	1 347	3 786	1 058	950	135	84	135	7 495
%	0,8%	3%	3%	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%
Kharitonov N.M.	2 109	3 811	1 006	1 043	147	137	192	8 445
%	1%	3%	3%	3%	3%	2%	3%	2%

Source: compiled by the author on the materials of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation.

and Russia went to Israel en masse. And this mass of frightened or offended people created a certain mood in society, while “dissatisfaction” was massively poured out in a negative light for Russia in local and Russian-language media.

In this regard, assuming a model of action of the main opposition groups based in Europe, and the geography of the main flows of refugees both in the CIS countries and in Europe and the world, the author tried to analyze how strong the “protest movement” is in these countries and could influence the course of the elections.

Overall results of voting outside the territory of the Russian Federation

As noted above, more than 380 thousand people took part in the voting in 144 countries of the world, the overwhelming majority of whom (72.3%) voted for the President of the Russian Federation V.V.Putin. At this point, the question of what the non-systemic opposition managed to do can be considered closed – “nothing”. But let’s look specifically at

the regions and countries. There, a slightly different picture opens up, deserving attention for its study and analysis in order to develop and adopt appropriate measures. Initially, the author divided the entire territory outside the Russian Federation, where there was a precinct election commission, into regions by geographic features: the post-Soviet space, Europe, the Middle East, the remaining countries of Asia, Oceania and Australia, Africa and America, which we will divide into North and South together with Central America. The Baltics were considered separately. Also, Transnistria was considered separately from the voting in Chisinau (Moldova), and all their indicators were summarized in the section of the post-Soviet countries.

As can be seen from Table 3, President V.V.Putin did not lose the elections in any of the regions. If we assume that the opposition chose V.A.Davankov as an alternative candidate to the current President of the Russian Federation, then the maximum total success (in percent) for him, and therefore for the opposition, was recorded in South and Central America, Asia, Oceania and Australia. And although V.V.Putin did not lose in these regions, he had the lowest overall rating there. The highest rating for L.E.Slutsky and N.M.Kharitonov was recorded in Europe and the countries of Asia, Oceania and Australia, the lowest – in the CIS.

Voting results by region

In the region of the Post-Soviet space, we will consider the situation in all the former republics, including Moldova and the Baltic countries (although the latter are already members of the EU, a large percentage of both Russian-speaking citizens and those with Russian citizenship live there). There were no polling stations in Georgia and Ukraine. In Abkhazia, 30 precinct election commissions were opened, in South Ossetia – 12 precinct election commissions and in Transnistria – 6 precinct election commissions, and early voting was also organized everywhere.

In total, almost 45.6% of all those who took part in the elections voted in this region. At the same time, in the region itself, almost 50% of those who voted were in Abkhazia and Transnistria, and in them, V.V.Putin received more than 95% of the votes. Residents of these regions clearly associate their future and well-being with Russia, which is why such a high percentage of votes for the current President. In Kazakhstan, with 9,670 voters, V.V.Putin received 4,073 votes, or 48.74%, and V.A.Davankov – 4,001 votes (47.88%), but taking into account the invalid (spoiled) 1,301 ballots (13.45%), it can be considered that the opposition won. But according to the data presented above, more than 150 thousand “refugees” entered this country. Thus, the opposition managed to activate only slightly more than 2.5% of the electoral opportunities available there – potential voters – for a show fight with Russia.

The opposition gained slightly more than a third of the votes in Armenia and Uzbekistan, but this is still about 3% of the number of “refugees” who entered these countries.

In Abkhazia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Belarus, there was practically no confrontation – the figures were about 5%.

Table 3. Voting results by regions of the world

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Total
Regions	post-Soviet space	Europe	Middle East	other countries of Asia, Oceania and Australia	Africa	North America	South America	
Number of countries	14	32	17	19	39	2	21	144
Polling stations	90	51	34	41	43	6	21	286
Voted (people)	173 777	118 366	40 957	30 384	5 584	5 661	6 232	380 961
Valid ballots	167 492	105 625	37 672	27 994	5 441	4 712	5 641	354 577
Invalid ballots	6 252	12 621	3 234	2 368	140	944	588	26 147
“Stolen” ballots	33	120	51	22	3	5	3	237
Candidates								
Davankov V.A.	14 034	27 024	8 701	9 428	604	1 803	1 794	63 388
%	8%	23%	21%	31%	11%	32%	29%	17%
Putin V.V.	150 002	71 004	26 907	16 573	4 555	2 688	3 520	275 249
%	86%	60%	66%	55%	82%	48%	57%	72%
Slutsky L.E.	1 347	3 786	1 058	950	135	84	135	7 495
%	0,8%	3%	3%	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%
Kharitonov N.M.	2 109	3 811	1 006	1 043	147	137	192	8 445
%	1%	3%	3%	3%	3%	2%	3%	2%

Source: compiled by the author on the materials of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation

In Azerbaijan and Moldova, the opposition also had minimal results – approximately 15%.

In the three Baltic countries, 527 ballots were spoiled, or 12.74% of those issued. Almost half of them were in Estonia (224 ballots, or 9.19%) and Lithuania (203 ballots, or 26.3%). In Lithuania, with 770 voters, V.A.Davankov received 302 votes (39.22%), and V.V.Putin – 229 votes (29.74%), but taking into account the spoiled ballots, the opposition can be considered a success. At the same time, Putin clearly won in Estonia (75.22%) and Latvia (70.61%). That is, the anti-Russian position of these countries is yielding results, and the Russians are forced to mimic in order to survive. Despite the almost million-strong influx of “refugees” from Russia to the post-Soviet countries, especially to Central Asia, none of them showed any particular desire to demonstrate their attitude to the Motherland and practically did not react to the calls of the opposition. Most likely, these people became temporary “refugees” and, perhaps, are ready to return to Russia after the end of the Central Asian War, therefore they do not want to position themselves as participants of the non-systemic opposition.

In the 32 European countries under consideration (excluding the Baltics and Moldova), there was a wide range in the number of those wishing to vote.

Thus, in 11 countries, from 100 to 1,000 people voted, in 10 countries – from 1,000 to 3,000, and in 11 countries – from 3,000 to 6,000.

In Germany, 8,359 people voted, and in Cyprus – 52,269 people (44.69% of all voters in the region). Of these, 36,870 (69.21%) voted early, and Putin received 88.27% of the votes here. Perhaps Cyprus is used as a “country dacha” by many Russians who are closely connected to Russia for work (business), and they are satisfied with the current state of affairs, and, as a result, such a high percentage of votes for the incumbent President. In total, just over 118 thousand people (31.1% of the total number of voters in the world) participated in the elections of the President of the Russian Federation in 32 European countries. 12,621 ballots (10.67% of the total number issued) were declared invalid (spoiled). V.A.Davankov (and the opposition along with him) clearly won in 16 of the countries under consideration. Thus, in Montenegro Davankov gained 68.89%, in Serbia – 67.42%, in the Czech Republic – 59.89%, in the Netherlands – 56.88%, in Poland – 53.50%, in Great Britain – 53.07%, in Portugal – 51.65%, in Slovakia – 51.08%. In another group of countries V.A.Davankov gained less than 50%, but more than V.V.Putin. For example, the opponent of the current President of the Russian Federation in Denmark gained 48.24%, in Croatia 48.17%, in Austria – 47.05%, in Spain – 45.57%, in Finland – 45.30%, in Slovenia – 44.71%, in Ireland – 43.72%, in Hungary – 43.14%.

If we take into account our assumption that invalid (spoiled) ballots and votes cast for V.A.Davankov can be interpreted as a “success” of the opposition, then Luxembourg, Sweden, Switzerland and France can be added to the above list. As a result, despite all the negative press, publications on the Internet and calls to “prove” something to Russia, all that the non-systemic opposition was capable of was 27 thousand (22.85%) for Davankov and 12 thousand (10.67%) spoiled ballots. And all this is presented as a success?

In 17 countries of the Middle East, more than 41 thousand people voted at 34 precinct election commissions, and the spread in the number of voters is large. On average, 500 people voted at the precinct election commissions of Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In the Emirates and Israel, just over four thousand. The maximum number of voters was in Turkey, where 15,352 people voted at 4 precinct election commissions (36.5% of all voters in the region). At the same time, 7,695 people voted in early voting in Ankara, and the minimum percentage of spoiled ballots and the maximum percentage for V.V.Putin (67.63%) in Turkey were recorded here. But at the precinct election commission in Trabzon (Turkey), only 350 people voted, with 64.47% voting for Davankov and 24.36% for Putin.

As noted above, in this region, the opposition “won” by a small margin in Israel, where Davankov gained 53.49% and Putin – 42.69%, with 18.52% of the ballots being spoiled.

In the UAE, Putin gained 53.45% and Davankov – 42.47%. And even taking into account the spoiled ballots (8.73%), the result is clear and not in favor of the opposition.

Perhaps all Russians who were at that moment on vacation, on a business trip, or “on the run” in the countries of the Middle East, in one way or another connect their fate with today’s Russia, because in the other 15 countries V.V.Putin received from 70% to 95% of the votes.

In the region of Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania, voting was held in 19 countries at 41 precinct election commissions. The opposition achieved small successes only at 4 precinct election commissions: at two in Vietnam and at one in India and Thailand. As a result, V.A.Davankov won in Vietnam and Brunei (in the latter, the minimum number of voters was recorded – only 32 people). And taking into account the spoiled ballots, Malaysia and Japan can be added to the opposition’s victory. However, in all other countries, V.V.Putin’s victory was clear – in half of these countries, the current President of Russia received from 51 to 85%, while Davankov’s result did not exceed 45%.

Perhaps the Russians in these “resorts” had no time for the elections, although in Thailand at the precinct election commission located in Phuket, 4,570 people voted, of which 48.24% voted for Putin, and 38.93% voted for Davankov.

The elections were held in 39 African countries at 43 precinct election commissions, although in practice representatives from 49 countries took part in the voting, since many precincts served two countries at the same time. In this region, V.V.Putin clearly won at all commissions with a final result of 81.62%, despite the fact that at almost half of the precincts his result was under 90%. V.A.Davankov gained 10.82%, and his best result was in Morocco – 33.81%. Of the 5,584 voters in the region, only three ballots were taken (“stolen”) “as a keepsake”. So there is definitely no point in discussing the actions of the opposition in this region.

The elections in South and Central America were held in 21 countries, where 21 precinct election commissions were opened. In this region, as in Africa, some precinct election commissions served two countries at the same time, so that in fact, citizens of the Russian Federation who were present at the time of the elections in the territory of 25 countries of the region took part in the voting. In a third of the precinct election commissions, the number of voters was from 20 to 100, in a third – from 100 to 300, the largest number of voters was in Argentina – 1,616 people. In the region as a whole, V.V.Putin received 56.51%, and V.A.Davankov – 28.8%, but he was first in Argentina (54.89%) and in Paraguay (52.94%), where only 68 people voted. In Uruguay, Putin and Davankov received the same number of votes (78 each), which gave each of them 43.09%, but taking into account the 9.39% of invalid (spoiled) ballots, we can recognize the opposition’s “victory”. The highest percentage of invalid (spoiled) ballots in the region was recorded in Argentina – 19.86%. It is hard to imagine that candidate V.A.Davankov was so well known in Argentina; most likely, either Russian citizens permanently residing here are dissatisfied with Russia’s policy, or Russian “refugees” have reached South America, although clearly not in such numbers as in the post-Soviet countries and the EU.

In North America, three precinct election commissions were opened in the United States and Canada. In both countries, Putin clearly won, gaining 42.23% in the United States and 55.84% in Canada. Davankov, respectively, had 34.56% and 27.67%. But if we return to counting all invalid (spoiled) ballots as the opposition’s “success”, then in Canada, with 13.17% of such ballots, Putin still won, but in the United States, with 18.92% of invalid ballots, we can talk about a symbolic victory for the opposition. By the way, two thirds of the spoiled ballots ended up at a precinct in New York, a city of emigrants, which most likely indicates that the wave of “refugees” from Russia has reached the United States. However, these are clearly not the figures that the non-systemic opposition has been talking about so much.

Election results in Israel

The author of the article took part in these elections as an observer from the Public Chamber of Russia at polling station № 8096 on the territory of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Haifa (Israel).

The time voters spent in the voting booths allowed us to judge whether they were really voting or spoiling the ballot paper by writing on it. When the votes were counted, it turned out that almost every fifth ballot paper was spoiled (mostly with some notes and appeals). Judging by what was happening near the polling station, we could guess what exactly the representatives of the non-systemic opposition in Israel were trying to achieve. The general leadership and a large group of young people (judging by the conversations, those who had recently arrived in the country) were trying to delay the voting by creating a line. As a result, the line stretched along the street for almost a kilometer, and many who wanted to vote needed from three to five hours to get to the polling station. The opposition was trying to achieve this by making voters get tired of standing and leave the line, thereby reducing the number of actual voters.

A group of observers was on duty near the polling station almost the entire day, trying to conduct a survey of voters about their preferences for candidates, the reasons that made them come to the elections, and the length of their stay in the country. At the same time, it was clear that almost every hour they reported on the results of their work to some headquarters.

A total of 4,597 people voted at three polling stations in Israel, where Davankov received 43.5%, Putin – 34.8%, Slutsky – 1.48%, Kharitonov – 1.63%. The hours-long queue did not greatly affect the desire of those who came to vote. Thus, 1,683 people voted at the polling station in Haifa, which is approximately the same as the number of participants in the last parliamentary elections in 2022. In the presidential elections in 2018, the turnout was slightly higher at 1,963 people, but 507 of them voted early. It is worth considering that previously in Israel, up to 12 precinct election commissions were opened and early and mobile voting was practiced for elderly voters living in nursing homes. This time, such a practice was practically not there, and the number of precinct election commissions was four times smaller, so the turnout in the country as a whole was significantly lower than in the elections in 2018, when 12,164 people voted. Although at those precinct election commissions where voting took place in 2024, the turnout was almost identical to 2018. The problems that arose in the work of the precinct election commission are related to the technical capabilities of the commissions, which limit the service of a large mass of voters.

At the same time, activists of the non-systemic opposition in Haifa (almost a hundred representatives) after the end of voting time tried to force their way into the precinct in order to allegedly continue voting. But everyone understood that in this case the law was being violated, and the entire vote at the precinct could be declared invalid, which is what the opposition was essentially seeking. As a result, the local police had to restore order, and they quickly dealt with it. If we assume that all invalid, or rather spoiled, ballots and votes cast for V.A. Davankova, – this is the result of the paid work of the opposition, then all that they collected in Israel was

2,850 votes. And this is taking into account the fact that with the beginning of the SVO, almost 70 thousand people arrived in Israel from Russia, in addition to the 150 thousand who were previously listed in the Russian consulate in Israel; given that many of those who arrived were not temporary refugees, but had the right to repatriation to Israel.

So we can safely assume that at the time of the elections there were about 220 thousand Russians in the country. And of this entire mass of people, as if “escaping” from the war and mobilization, and therefore, in the opinion of the non-systemic opposition, clearly critical of the Russian government, only 1.17% of those who had the right and opportunity to do so wanted to express their public “protest” against Russia. And this is all the work of the opposition?

Although, of course, it can be stated that, given all other conditions, the opposition in Israel won the elections.

Final opposition figures by region

Based on the author’s postulate that invalid (spoiled) ballots and votes for V.A. Davankov are the work of the foreign opposition, let us consider these indicators in a regional context. Table 4 presents the author’s calculations of percentages from the final figures of Table 3.

Thus, in the territory of the post-Soviet countries, voting was organized in 14 countries (excluding Georgia and Ukraine, but taking into account Abkhazia and South Ossetia), which amounted to 9.7% of the total number of countries where voting was held (144). In the post-Soviet countries, 90 precinct election commissions were organized – 31.5% of the total number of precinct election commissions created in the world (286), where 45.6% of voters voted from the total number of voters who took part in the voting abroad in general (380,961). There were 6,252 invalid ballots in the region, which amounted to 3.6% of the total number of such ballots abroad in general (26,147). As a result, we can assume that the opposition gained 11.6% of the votes in this region from the total number of voters (invalid (spoiled) ballots (3.6%) plus votes for V.A. Davankov (see Table 3 – 8%)).

In the EU countries, the non-systemic opposition gained 33.5% of the votes. But the opposition gained the maximum number of votes both in the countries of South and Central America (48.5%), and in the countries of Asia and its south-eastern part (38.2%). These countries had the smallest number of voters, so even several hundred “dissatisfied” tourists and refugees were able to “demonstrate” the strength of the opposition. At the same time, as can be seen from Tables 3 and 4, there were very few Russian refugees who took part in the voting in Africa, so the opposition had the worst results here.

Conclusions

This study analyzed not only the results of elections outside the territory of the Russian Federation, but also the ability of the non-systemic opposition to influence the mood of Russian citizens abroad. We relied on the following information: firstly, two

Table 4. Regional voting results and opposition figures

Regions	1 Post-Soviet space	2 Europe	3 Middle East	4 Asia, Oceania, Australia	5 Africa	6 South Americaa	7 North America
Number of countries (in % of the total number of countries – 144)	9,7%	22,2%	11,8%	13,2%	27,1%	1,4%	14,6%
Precinct Electoral Commission (in % of the total number of precinct electoral commissions – 286)	31,5%	17,8%	11,9%	14,3%	15,0%	2,1%	7,3%
Voted (in % of the total number of voters – 380,961)	45,6%	31,1%	10,8%	8,0%	1,5%	1,5%	1,6%
Invalid ballots in the region (in % of the total number of invalid ballots – 26,147)	3,6%	10,7%	7,9%	7,8%	2,5%	16,7%	9,4%
“Opposition” in the region (total: % of invalid ballots (line above) + % of votes for V.A.Davankov (according to data from Table 3)	11,6%	33,5%	29,1%	38,8%	13,3%	48,5%	38,2%
% of votes received by a candidate in the region from the total number of votes received abroad (according to Table 3)							
Davankov V.A.	22,14%	42,63%	13,73%	14,87%	0,95%	2,84%	2,83%
Putin V.V.	54,50%	25,80%	9,78%	6,02%	1,65%	0,98%	1,28%
Slutsky L.E.	17,97%	50,51%	14,12%	12,68%	1,80%	1,12%	1,80%
Kharitonov N.M.	24,97%	45,13%	11,91%	12,35%	1,74%	1,62%	2,27%

Source: the author's calculations based on the Table 3 data.

million citizens of the Russian Federation (declared by the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation), who, according to the consular service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, were listed in countries around the world, and, secondly, unverified data from the opposition press, which stated that the number of “refugees” from Russia during the period of the SVO also amounted to two million people.

Based on the experience and position of the author, in the issue of the confrontation between candidate V.V.Putin and the non-systemic opposition in the elections of the President of the Russian Federation abroad, the “forces” were actually equal. As noted earlier, the longer a Russian lives abroad, the more he begins to support Russia's policy in the world. It can be hypothetically assumed that the majority of Russians who permanently and for a long time live abroad would hardly succumb to the agitation of the non-systemic opposition.

At the same time, the “refugees” from Russia are those whom the non-systemic opposition could count on, especially since substantial sums of money were allocated for its work.

As a result, it can be assumed that initially those who were neutral or supported Russia, compared to those dissatisfied with its policies, were in a ratio of two to three. That is, the non-systemic opposition had an electoral base of almost 2.5 million people. And what is the result?

The non-systemic opposition elected candidate V.A.Davankov as its representative, it also called for spoiling ballots, but this candidate, having gained 25% of the votes, won only 41 precinct election commissions (14.33%), and taking into account the invalid (spoiled) ballots counted by the author of the article as his victory, another 15 precinct election commissions (5.24%) out of the 286 organized precinct election commissions. In total, based on these two indicators, the opposition can be recognized as having won in 26 countries of the world (18.05%) out of 144.

In almost 20 countries of the world where the opposition's victory was recorded, the leadership of these countries is actually in a state of war with Russia, and it is natural that local mass media are working against Russia and V.V.Putin. Nevertheless, the opposition won in these countries with a minimal advantage, which shows that representatives of the Russian diaspora, not afraid of threats and pressure from both the government of the country of residence and the non-systemic opposition, came and supported the policy of the current President of Russia V.V.Putin. Many leaders of the non-systemic opposition living in Europe came to these sad conclusions almost immediately after the elections. After all, during the voting process, according to exit polls, they made emotional reports, articles, notes about Russia's defeat in many European capitals, but after a couple of days all this topic faded away.

At the same time, the overwhelming majority of “leaders” of the non-systemic opposition are corrupt and acted according to the principle: the main thing is to shout louder before the elections so that they continue to finance the “struggle”, but the promised result was not achieved with the “mastered” funds. If the allocated millions, which were written about, were in fact effectively spent and as a result brought less than 90 thousand votes (both votes for the candidate and spoiled ballots) from the two million foreign electorate, then we can conclude about the extremely low influence of the opposition “leaders” and technologies. The share of oppositionists in the general population of the foreign electorate can be considered in the overwhelming majority of countries almost as a statistical error.

References

1. Avakyan S.A. Constitutional reform 2020 and Russian parliamentarism: reality, solutions, expectations. Vestnik Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo oblastnogo universiteta Seriya: Yurisprudenciya [Bulletin of Moskovskiy gosudarstvo oblastnogo universiteta Series: Jurisprudence. 2020; 3:7–33 [In Russian].
2. Avakyan S.A. People's representation and parliamentarism. Vestnik universiteta im. O.E.Kutafina (MGYA). [Vestnik University im. O.E.Kutafina (MGYA)]. 2019; 9:37–48 [In Russian].
3. Hasanov I.B., Ebzeev B.S. Enlightened freedom of choice is a political imperative of our era. Izbiratel'noe zakonodatel'stvo i praktika [Electoral legislation and practice]. 2017. № 2. S. 3–11. [In Russian].

4. Grishin N.V. State electoral politics: the subject area of a new scientific direction. Kaspijskij region: politika, ekonomika, kul'tura [Caspian region: politics, economy, culture]. 2014; 3(40):71–83 [In Russian].
5. Grishchenko L.L., Izmaylov A.A. Unsystematic opposition is a modern threat to public security. Akademicheskaya mysl' [Academic thought]. 2022; 2(19):183–189 [In Russian]. EDN XCAPHX.
6. Zemlyanoy A.V. Significance of the principles of electoral law for guarantees of observance of the electoral rights of Russian citizens permanently residing or temporarily located outside the territory of the Russian Federation. Yuridicheskaya nauka. [Legal science]. 2021; 4:21–27 [In Russian].
7. Lebedeva Y.N. The current state of active and passive electoral law. Vestnik Habarovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta ekonomiki i prava [Bulletin of the Khabarovsk State University of Economics and Law]. 2020; 1–2(102–103):156–162 [In Russian].
8. Makarov A.V., Nesterova T.Yu. Electoral commission as a subject of legislative initiative in the legislation of the Russian Federation. Gosudarstvennaya vlast' i mestnoe samoupravlenie. [State power and local self-government]. 2015; 5:7–11 [In Russian].
9. Morozova O.S. Participation of citizens living abroad in national elections: foreign experience and domestic practice. Fundamental'nye issledovaniya. [Fundamental researches]. 2014; 5–4:876–880 [In Russian].
10. Moskalenko O.A., Irhin A. A. Hybris-syndrom and technological delegitimization of power. Polis. Politicheskie issledovaniya. [Polis. Political studies]. 2024; 1:36–51 <https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2024.01.04>. EDN: RPWOKU. [In Russian].
11. Priority activity of CEC of Russia (four interviews with Elloy Pamfilova). Grazhdanin. Vyborny. Vlast'. [Citizen. Choice. Power]. 2019; 4(14):9–49 [In Russian].
12. Seleznev PS, Kramer AD. Minarchism as a philosophical basis for the convergence of the right and the unsystematic opposition of liberal segments in Russia. Humanities. Gumanitarnye nauki. Vestnik Finansovogo universiteta. [Bulletin of the Financial University]. 2023; Vol. 13, 5:129–134 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.26794/2226-7867-2023-13-5-129-134>. EDN VKAZCZ.
13. Hoperskaya L.L. Relokanty from Russia – 2022: a social, psychological and political phenomenon. Voprosy politologii. [Question of political science]. 2023; Vol. 13, 3(91):973–987 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.35775/PSI.2023.91.3.009>. EDN FBGPBL.
14. Chelnokova M.L. Countering unsystematic opposition in social networks. Voprosy politologii. [Question of political science]. 2024; Vol. 14, 2(102):540–549 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.35775/PSI.2024.102.2.017>. EDN HMYFJF.
15. Chelnokova M.L. Technologies for countering the destructive influence of the Russian unsystematic opposition in Runet. Voprosy politologii. [Question of political science]. 2023; Vol. 13, 9–1(97–1):4390–4398 [In Russian]. <https://doi.org/10.35775/PSI.2023.97-1.9-1.009>. EDN JVHEYP.
16. Yarygin G.O. Internet-voting and its implementation prospects for Russian citizens living abroad. ANI: ekonomika i upravlenie [ANI: economics and management]. 2016; 3(16):261–268 [In Russian].

About the author

Yuri B. BOCHAROV. CandSc. (Polit.). Director of the Information Warfare Research Institute. <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0345-0173>. Address: Haifa, Israel. yurabig@gmail.com

Contribution of the author

The author declares no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Received: June 10, 2024. Approved after peer review: June 30, 2024. Accepted for publication: August 31, 2024. Published: September 23, 2024.

The author has read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewers for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

POWER, POLITICS, STATE

Political institutions, processes and technologies

Original Article

Political Sciences

[https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3\(13\)-222-237](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-222-237)

On the Issue of Symbolic Politics in Modern Moldova (1989–2023)

Vera N. Tabak✉

Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia

vera.tabak@bk.ru, <https://orcid.org/0009-0005-6649-9865>

Abstract. The article examines the evolution of narratives of symbolic politics in modern Moldova (1989–2023), including among the political “rights”. The analysis of documents and political discourse allowed the author to identify three key narratives: Russia as a threat, European integration as a national idea, the myth of the identity of the Romanian and Moldovan languages (language narrative). Particular attention in the article is paid to the dynamics of political narratives, their coherence. The current policy of Moldova in constructing the Romanian identity among Moldovans, reflecting the interests of ethnic minorities (“unionist Romanians”), provokes social disunity, which is confirmed by the growth in the number of opposition forces and protests, and in recent years – in a decrease in trust in the foreign policy vector of the republic (European integration). However, the nationalist ideological trend, in general, is developing, overcoming “multi-vectorality” and neutrality.

Keywords: symbolic politics, narratives, state identity, state nationalism, Republic of Moldova, European integration

For citation: Tabak V.N. On the Issue of Symbolic Politics in Modern Moldova (1989–2023). *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue*. 2024; 3(13): 222–237. [https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3\(13\)-222-237](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2024-4-3(13)-222-237)

Introduction

The normativization of ideological narratives in concepts, doctrines, programs, strategies allows for their legal categorization, giving political ideas an official, mandatory (and in some cases, binding) status. Of course, the state occupies a special position in the sphere of symbolic politics, since it has the ability to impose the methods of interpreting social reality that it supports through the power distribution of resources [3:11]. A feature of normative legal acts as a channel for representing ideas is their time limitation. In this regard, acts of “long-term use” have a prolonged effect – conceptual, strategic ones, which, after

coming into force, create the basis for subsequent rule-making in a strictly legal sense, and are the basis for subsequent ideological policy. Another feature of the narratives contained in basic documents is the a priori expectation of their legitimacy, in other words, legality allows for their presence in the political space, even in the absence of legitimacy. This idea is presented in a veiled form in the words of the theorist of symbolic politics Edelman, who argued that the optics of this paradigm significantly distort real political connections, since in practice, government actions do not so much satisfy or fail to satisfy the needs of citizens as they influence their perception of reality, changing their needs and expectations [3:6].

In other words, symbolic policy reflected in normative legal acts is a one-sided activity of the state, directly related to the tasks of ideology – to unite, mobilize citizens to move in the direction determined by the political establishment; it may or may not correspond to socio-political expectations, traditions, mass political consciousness. Of course, normative legal acts as sources of political ideas do not create socio-political reality at one moment, but are rather peaks containing their “peak values”, or external forms – formulations. The study of these formulations allows us to trace the dynamics and vector of movement of the socio-political thought of the country.

Materials and Methods

Aspects of the symbolic policy of modern Moldova have often become the object of analysis, most often they are considered in the context of disputes about identity and ethno-civil construction [6–7], including in connection with the problem of Gagauzia and Transnistria [2, 5], competition of integration projects [4, 9, 10], the European integration course of Moldova [1]. In recent years, fundamental works of Moldovan historians V.P.Stepanov, P.M.Shornikov have been published, studying the symbolic field of Moldova in the context of ethno-political construction [7] and state ideology [11]. This study is based on the works of these authors. At the same time, it introduces into scientific circulation and interprets in a new way a number of provisions of key legal acts of Moldova.

The relevance of considering Moldova's symbolic policy is due to the deterioration of Moldovan-Russian communications, which affected various interaction tracks in 2021–2023 – both political-diplomatic, cultural-informational, and economic. A kind of apogee of the anti-Russian course being pursued was the approval of amendments to the National Security Strategy in 2023, in which Russia is named as one of the key threats¹. However, the idea of Russia as a threat is not new and is actually based on a long-existing political and linguistic base. This idea is closely linked to the idea of Moldova's European integration. Another key narrative is the idea of the absence of the Moldovan language, its artificial construction, which can easily be transformed into a narrative about the artificiality of the

¹ At the invitation of experts in the field of Russian-Moldovan relations, Valentina Komleva took part in a discussion on the communication regime of Moldova. NIIRK. Available from: <https://nicrus.ru/events/valentina-komleva-prinyala-uchastiye-v-diskussii-o-kommunikatsionnom-rezhime-moldovy/>.

Moldovan ethnic group. All three key narratives are aimed at forming a model of a nation-state in Moldova that is hostile to all ethnic groups, including the titular one – Moldovan. Let's consider the evolution of each of them.

Results

Language narrative (the myth of the identity of the Moldovan and Romanian languages; the myth of the artificiality of the Moldovan language)

In 1989, the Moldavian SSR adopted the law “On the Functioning of Languages on the Territory of the Republic of Moldova” No. 3465-XI², which transferred the Moldavian language to the Latin script, that caused misunderstanding among the population. At the same time, the Russian language was deprived of its status as the state language in the Republic. According to T.P.Mlechko, only 68% of the population spoke Moldavian³, thus, a significant part of the population, namely Russian-speaking citizens, were deprived of their rights.

The language issue became one of the reasons for the conflict with Transnistria and Gagauzia in the early 1990s. The Declaration of Independence of Moldova, adopted on August 27, 1991, stated that the proclamation of the Romanian language as the state language and the return of the Latin alphabet to it are an expression of the democratic movement for the national liberation of the population of the Republic of Moldova. Along with the language law, an important role was played by the final documents of the Great National Assemblies held in Chisinau in 1989–1991, as well as the laws of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova on the State Flag of April 27, 1990, on the State Coat of Arms of November 3, 1990 and on the change of the official name of the state of May 23, 1991.

In reality, it was not so much a movement for liberation as a desire to unite ideologically and politically with Romania – after all, Moldova actually adopted Romanian national symbols – the flag and coat of arms of the country, and approved the translation of the language into the Latin alphabet. Xia standards of the Romanian language began to prevail in the media and the education system of Moldova back in the 60s of the 20th century. [11:15], it is the Law on the Functioning of Languages that should be considered as the starting symbolic event from which the formal-legal life of the narrative about the artificiality of the Moldovan language should be counted.

The Declaration of Independence contained words about the “ethnic space of the formation of a national state” – the national factor was emphasized twice, which is a contrast to the Soviet (multinational) model and indicates the intention to build a nation-state model.

² On the functioning of languages on the territory of the Moldavian SSR: Law No. 3465 of 01.09.1989. Available from: https://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/Закон_от_01.09.1989_№_3465_«О_функционировании_языков_на_территории_Молдавской_ССР».

³ Mlechko T.P. Russians and Russian-speaking space of the Republic of Moldova: trends and results of transformation processes. Available from: <https://ru.mapryal.org/filecache/upload/files/7-russkie-i-russkoyazychnoe-prostranstvo-moldovy.pdf>.

On July 29, 1994, the current Constitution of the Republic of Moldova was adopted, where the state language is defined as Moldovan, functioning on the basis of the Latin script.

In the future, not only the language will be subject to Latinization (in all educational institutions of Moldova since 1992, only Romanian began to be taught, the original Moldovan language in the Cyrillic script has been preserved only in Transnistria⁴), but also the entire cultural and ideological field: Moldavian literature, Moldavian history will be absorbed by Romanian ones. Writers who wrote in Moldavian, the rulers of medieval Moldavia, will be declared Romanians, despite the fact that the Romanian state was formed only in the second half of the 19th century, and the Moldavian Principality has existed since the middle of the 14th century.

It is surprising that those Romanian figures who suppressed the Moldavians during the years of fascist occupation will enter the pantheon of glory, and it will turn out that they came with Hitler to liberate their lands... The policy of imposing Romanian identity will begin to lead to the expected results: a gradual decrease in the number of people who consider Moldavian and Russian languages to be their native languages is observed, the number of those who call themselves Romanians or consider Romanian to be their native language is increasing (table 1).

Table 1. Some information about the self-identification of the Moldovan population (1989–2014)

Census year	Number of people who called themselves Romanians	Number of people who called Romanian their native language	Number of people who called themselves Moldovans	Number of people who called Moldovan their native language	Number of people who called themselves Russians	Number of people who called Russian their native language
1989 (Moldavian SSR) ⁵	0,06%	No data ⁶	64,5%	62%	13%	23%
2004 (Republic of Moldova without the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic) ⁷	2,17%	16,5%	75,8%	60%	5,9%	11,3%
2014 ⁸ (Republic of Moldova without the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic)	7%	22,8%	73,7%	55%	4%	9,4%

Source: Compiled by the author based on public statistical data.

⁴ The history of the naming of the state language in Moldova. TASS. Available from: <https://tass.ru/info/17287309>.

⁵ The data are calculated on the basis of the All-Union Population Census of 1989 “Distribution of the Population of the Moldavian SSR by the Most Numerous Nationalities and Language”. Available from: https://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_lan_89_mo.php

⁶ In 1989, 32% of Romanians considered Romanian their native language.

⁷ Results of the 2004 population census. Demographic, national, linguistic, cultural characteristics. Available from: <https://web.archive.org/web/20151114001813/http://www.statistica.md/newsview.php?l=ru&idc=168&id=2358>; Mlechko T.P. Russians and Russian-speaking space of the Republic of Moldova: trends and results of transformation processes. Available from: <https://ru.mapryal.org/filecache/upload/files/7-russkie-i-russkoyazychnoe-prostranstvo-moldovy.pdf>; Some results of the 2004 census in Moldova. Available from: <https://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2006/0249/analit08.php>.

⁸ Characteristics – Population1 (population by district, gender, age, ethnicity, native language) // Population and Housing Census in the Republic of Moldova, 12–25 May 2014. Available from: <https://statistica.gov.md/ru/perepis-naseleniya-i-zilishh-2014-122.html>.

In 1995, when joining the Council of Europe, one of Moldova’s obligations was to join the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The Convention stipulated that countries that had acceded to it would periodically inform the Council of Europe about the implementation of the Convention, on the basis of which the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe would issue resolutions containing recommendations to the country, including for the adoption of urgent measures⁹.

The said committee published reports in which it gave an unambiguous assessment of the shortcomings of the ethnic policy, which did not improve over the years, and Moldova simply did not fulfill many of its promises.

The Law on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities and the Legal Status of Their Organizations of 2001 guaranteed pre-school education, primary, secondary, higher and post-university education in the Moldovan and Russian languages and the creation of conditions for the implementation of the rights to education and training in the native language (Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian, Hebrew, Yiddish, etc.). The law enshrines an important provision that persons belonging to national minorities have the right to participate in the management of public affairs¹⁰. However, according to historian P.M.Shornikov, who compared the Law to a set of “declarations of good wishes,” the legislative framework for the formation of a nation-state has not changed [11:137].

In the Concept of National Policy of the Republic of Moldova¹¹, adopted in December 2003, recognized the independence of the two languages. The document stated: “Linked by a common origin, having a common basic lexical fund, the Moldovan national language and the Romanian national language each retain their linguonym / glottonym as an identifying feature of each nation – Moldovan and Romanian.” In accordance with the document, Moldovans are recognized as a state-forming nationality and “together with representatives of other ethnic groups: Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauz, Bulgarians, Jews, Romanians, Belarusians, Gypsies (Roma), Poles and others – make up the people of Moldova, for whom the Republic of Moldova is a common homeland.”

It goes on to talk about the need to teach the Moldovan language as a national priority for Moldova, and notes the status of the Russian language in accordance with current legislation – as a language of interethnic communication used in various areas of state and social life, and notes the Moldovan-Russian bilingualism characteristic of Moldova. The concept postulates the goals of national policy, including the development of all ethnic and linguistic communities, the development of traditionally correct interethnic relations, and overcoming the consequences of the civil conflict of the late 80s – early 90s 20th century, which deformed interethnic relations in Moldova, neutralization in accordance with human

⁹ Council of Europe on the implementation by the Republic of Moldova of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: conclusions and recommendations (Information note). Available from: <https://ksrs.md/2022/10/27/совет-европы-об-исполнении-республик/>.

¹⁰ The Law “On the Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities and the Legal Status of Their Organizations”: 20 years since its adoption and implementation issues. Available from: <https://ksrs.md/2021/11/30/закон-о-правах-лиц-принадлежащих-к-на>.

¹¹ On approval of the Concept of National Policy of the Republic of Moldova: Law No. 546 of 19.12.2003. Available from: <http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&lang=2&id=312846>.

rights legislation and the requirements of the Constitution of the incessant attempts at de-Moldovanization, denial of the existence of the Moldovan nation and Moldovan statehood, discrediting of Moldovan history, ignoring the ethnonym “Moldovans” and the glottonym “Moldovan language”, immediate creation of the necessary conditions for mastering the Moldovan language by persons who do not speak it, the inadmissibility of narrowing the scope of use of the Russian language in various areas of the life of the state and society¹². According to P.M.Shornikov, the adoption of the Concept allowed for a step away from the course of forming a nation-state to the project of a nation-state [11:172]. However, further events will show that subsequent steps logically following from the text of the Concept were not taken.

On December 5, 2013, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova recognized the Declaration of Independence of 1991 as part of the country's constitution and the supremacy of the Declaration over the Basic Law. The decision to adopt the relevant amendments to the Constitution was blocked by the parliamentary opposition¹³. During the presidency of I.N.Dodon, the Law “On Normative Acts” (2017) was adopted, which prescribed the development of texts of all legal acts of the republic in Romanian as the state language, and the Government was instructed to bring the documents into compliance with the requirements of this law within six months, but this decision was not implemented¹⁴, since I.N.Dodon did not support the nationalist course of the parliament.

The new Education Code adopted in 2014 repealed a similar law in force since 1995 and radically changed the opportunity to receive education in Moldovan and Russian languages that had existed for the past two decades: from now on, the state provides the educational process only in Romanian. Russian is not even mentioned as a language of instruction in the code¹⁵.

In December 2016, the Government approved the Strategy for Strengthening Interethnic Relations in the Republic of Moldova for 2017–2027¹⁶, developed with the support of the Office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities¹⁷. As follows from an analytical review carried out by a group of Moldovan experts¹⁸, The strategy does not aim

¹² Ibid.

¹³ History of the issue of naming the state language in Moldova. TASS. Available from: <https://tass.ru/info/17287309>.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Sidorov M. National minorities in Moldova: legal protection and real situation in society / Foundation for the support and protection of the rights of compatriots living abroad. Available from: https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/stati/natsionalnye_menshinstva_v_moldove_pravovaya_zashchita_i_realnoe_polozhenie_v_obshchestve_2267/.

¹⁶ On approval of the Strategy for Strengthening Interethnic Relations in the Republic of Moldova for 2017–2027: Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Moldova No. 1464 of 30.12.2016. Available from: <http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&lang=2&id=369024>.

¹⁷ Sidorov M. National minorities in Moldova: legal protection and real situation in society / Foundation for the support and protection of the rights of compatriots living abroad. Available from: https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/stati/natsionalnye_menshinstva_v_moldove_pravovaya_zashchita_i_realnoe_polozhenie_v_obshchestve_2267/.

¹⁸ The tone and conclusions of the document are clearly pro-Romanian, as they effectively impose the idea of demoldovenization: “Since the term “Moldovanism” has been discredited from the point of view of important political players and activists, it seems that the use of the concept of “Moldovan civic identity” should be avoided, and instead the concept of “civic identity of the Republic of Moldova” should be encouraged.”

to address key issues, concerns and questions such as the integration of ethnocultural communities, language learning, representation of minorities at the political and state level, and there are no mechanisms for its implementation or benchmarks for regular assessment.¹⁹

Also, in 2017, the head of state attempted to hold a referendum, one of the issues of which was the teaching of the subject “History of the Republic of Moldova” in educational institutions of the country instead of “History of the Romanians”, but the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova prohibited the referendum²⁰. In 2020, the Law on the Functioning of Languages on the Territory of the Republic of Moldova will be adopted, which will retain the provision on multilingualism (Russian as a language of interethnic communication can be used along with Moldovan in various areas of state activity), but the Constitutional Court recognizes its contradiction with the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, including because it gives Russian-speaking residents a privileged position. The Constitutional Court also noted that “the legislator, having enshrined Russian as a language of interethnic communication, gave it a status that is not provided for by the Constitution”, “the priority of the Russian language, which is the language of one of the national minorities, puts it on the same level as the state language and infringes on the languages of other ethnic communities living in the republic”²¹.

In March 2023, during the presidency of M.Sandu, the Parliament of Moldova approved the renaming of the state language from Moldovan to Romanian. According to the amendment, the words “Moldovan language” in all legislative acts are replaced by the words “Romanian language”. This also applies to the words “state”, “official” and “native” language. In addition, the text “functioning on the basis of the Latin script” is excluded from the Constitution, which is considered obsolete²².

European narrative (Moldova's belonging to the European family of states)

Already in the Declaration of Independence of 1991, Moldova, recognizing the irreversibility of the democratization processes taking place in Europe and in the world, declared its desire to establish political, economic, cultural and other ties, primarily with European states and with countries around the world.

¹⁹ Groza Yu. Strengthening social cohesion and common identity in the Republic of Moldova. Key issues and practical recommendations / Yu.Groza, M.Jopp, V.Kulminsky. Chisinau, 2017:19. Available from: <https://www.ipis.md/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Social-Cohesion-and-Common-Identity-RU.pdf>.

²⁰ Romanian citizens have banned Moldovan citizens from expressing their opinion in a referendum. Available from: <http://www.evedomosti.md/news/grazhdane-rumynii-zapretili-grazhdanam-moldovy-vyrazhat-svoe>.

²¹ The Law “On the Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities and the Legal Status of Their Organizations”: 20 years since its adoption and implementation issues. Available from: <https://krsr.md/2021/11/30/закон-о-правах-лиц-принадлежащих-к-на/>.

²² The Moldovan Parliament approved the renaming of the state language to Romanian. TASS. Available from: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/17287143>.

A significant shift in the process of rapprochement and deepening of cooperation between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union was the first fundamental document – the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which laid the foundation for the process of European integration of the Republic of Moldova. The Agreement, which entered into force in 1998, four years after its signing in 1994, granted Moldova the status of an EU partner for conducting a full-fledged political dialogue and strengthening legal and economic cooperation. In the Foreign Policy Concept of 1995, this agreement was considered as the first step towards gradual entry into the European Union – a long-term goal of the foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova [9:9]. The integration of the Republic of Moldova into the European Union became the “strategic objective of foreign policy” of Moldova in the Programme of Activities of the Government of I.Sturza for 1999–2002: “The rule of law, economic revitalization, integration into European structures” [9:9].

The idea of rapprochement with Europe in Moldova was inextricably linked with the need to resolve the Transnistrian conflict – after all, a country that has failed to implement European principles and ideals cannot join the EU. In practice, this was expressed in attempts to literally “over the knee” to solve the problem – since 2001, Transnistria has been under a blockade by Moldova. The Transnistrian case is truly a bone in the throat of European integrationists, because by the very fact of its existence it demonstrates the absolute distance of Moldova from the principles of the European community. Only in 2023, European integrationists changed their rhetoric, indicating the possibility of Moldova joining the EU without Transnistria, i.e. with an unresolved territorial conflict, which once again demonstrates double standards and exposes their true intentions.

The strategic course of Chisinau demonstrates the consistent implementation of the course towards European integration of Moldova: the EU-Moldova Action Plan (2004), entry into the Eastern Partnership program (2009), signing of the Association Agreement with the EU (2014). The Association Agreement became a legal reflection of the strategic nature of Moldova’s relations with the EU, the goals of which are political association and economic integration. However, this nature of strategic relations was not reflected in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Moldova [9:17].

From cooperation through the geopolitical direction, the idea of the EU is transformed into an ideal image: a modern European democratic state is formulated as an ideal for Moldova. And if earlier it was about establishing ties with such states, now it is about identifying with them, becoming one with them. Literally, the National Security Strategy of Moldova for 2023 states: Moldova should behave as a de facto member of the European Union²³.

The Strategy sets out the need for careful preparation of the country for accession to the European Union by approximately 2030; in the future, Moldova sees itself as a member state of the European Union, contributing to the development of the European

²³ On approval of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova: Resolution of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova No. HP391/2023 of 15.12.2023. Președinția Republicii Moldova. Available from: https://presedinte.md/app/webroot/uploaded/Proiect%20SSN_2023_Ru.pdf.

project, fully controlling its territory; accession to the EU is a national security goal (in this regard, the binary thesis is actively promoted in the media: Russia – aggression, war; Europe, EU – peace). The goal of the Strategy is to gradually bring the Republic of Moldova into line with the provisions of the Strategic Compass for Strengthening the Security and Defense of the European Union in the Next Decade, which was adopted on 21 March 2022. Russia is called the main and long-term threat to the European Union; In addition to condemning the annexation of Crimea and the special operation in Ukraine, the EU accuses Russia of seeking to establish spheres of influence, pointing to the armed attack on Georgia, de facto control over Belarus, the presence of Russian troops in protracted conflicts, such as in Transnistria, and also talks about Russian armed “aggression” against Ukraine²⁴. In 2020, the thesis about the threat to Romania from Russia’s actions (especially in the Black Sea region) was included in the text of the National Security Strategy of Romania (Articles 119, 121)²⁵.

According to the Moldovan strategy, the European Union and other strategic partners should be actively involved in resolving the Moldovan-Transnistrian conflict.

Thus, we see that over the years, the European narrative has become firmly associated with Russian “aggression” in the public legal space. Let us consider its evolution in more detail.

Anti-Russian discourse

The Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation (2001) defined relations with Russia as a strategic partnership. It was signed by the leader of the communists V.Voronin, and at that time the communists received an absolute majority of mandates in the Parliament of Moldova. This was associated with great hopes for an improvement in bilateral relations, especially since the head of state promised to solve the problem of the Russian language and even considered the initiative of Moldova joining the Union of Russia and Belarus. However, the head of state soon reneged on his promises, and after 2003, when Moscow failed to implement the plan for the reintegration of the country according to the so-called “Kozak Memorandum” (a plan for the “federalization” of Moldova, since Transnistria was granted broad autonomy), a deterioration in relations between the two sides began, which lasted until the presidency of I.N.Dodon. At that time, the country’s president V.Voronin explained the refusal to sign the document by the fact that “the process of developing the Memorandum should have been implemented with the active diplomatic participation of European institutions (OSCE, EU, NATO, European Commission) and other European structures.” V.Voronin also noted that “having designated

²⁴ Aleshin A.A. The European Union has developed its first defense strategy. Available from: <https://www.imemo.ru/news/events/text/evrosoyuz-razrabotal-svoyu-pervuyu-oboronnuyu-strategiyu>.

²⁵ The National Defense Strategy for the period 2020-2024 was approved by Decision no. 22 of the joint meeting of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies of June 30, 2020, which was published in the Official Gazette, Part I, no. 574 of July 1, 2020. Available from: https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Documente/Strategia_Nationala_de_Aparare_a_Tarii_2020_2024.pdf.

the priority of the European vector of Moldova's development and pursuing a course towards European integration, resolving the Transnistrian issue behind Europe's back would be incomprehensible to European institutions and unpromising for Moldova."²⁶

The disagreements between Russia and Europe in the 2000s, as well as the irreconcilable position of European democratic structures regarding the political and legal order in Russia, have played a significant role in the formation of the anti-Russian discourse. In this regard, the ECHR decision No. 349 of 2004, which recognized Russia as an "aggressor" in the "Russian-Moldovan war of 1992" and "occupier of the eastern part of the Republic of Moldova" [11:148], is not surprising. Further Moldovan discourse regarding Russia will be associated with the development of a pro-European direction²⁷. Thus, the Government Activity Program for 2005–2009 will no longer consider cooperation with the Russian Federation, but will instead emphasize the need for cooperation with partner countries within the CIS [9:12]. During the period of acting President Marian Lupu's tenure, progress was made in developing bilateral relations, and the discourse regarding Russia was characterized by moderation. M. Lupu stated that "Moldova's European integration cannot happen at the expense of... friendly relations with Russia," which are part of Moldovan identity²⁸. In 2011, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was extended, preserving the role of the Russian Federation as a strategic partner. Also in 2011, the CIS Free Trade Zone Agreement was signed [9:16]. The 2011 National Security Strategy affirmed the idea of integrating the country into the European Union, as well as a close strategic partnership with the United States of America. Russia is still listed as a country with which a strategic partnership will be conducted. Thus, by deepening and forming cooperation with the West during this period of time, at the turn of the 2010s, Moldova does not consider Russia a threat, despite the fact that the idea of withdrawing Russian troops from Transnistria is already being repeated constantly.

Moldovan President Nicolae Timofti (2012–2016), a lawyer, expressed regret after the end of his presidential term that he "failed to ban Soviet symbols, as well as the Communist Party, during his two-year rule," calling this his main failure. In 2012, the ruling alliance's deputies adopted a resolution "On condemnation of the totalitarian communist regime" and a law banning the hammer and sickle symbol, which was protested by the communists. Following the negative verdict of the Venice Commission regarding the Moldovan authorities' ban on communist symbols, the Constitutional Court declared this resolution unconstitutional²⁹.

²⁶ Russian settlement plan rejected in agreement with Putin? REGNUM news agency. Available from: <https://regnum.ru/news/188193.html>.

²⁷ Let us recall that in 2004, Moldova and the EU moved to integration programming by adopting the EU-Moldova Plan, and the EU Neighbourhood Policy programme was launched.

²⁸ The End of the Alliance for European Integration. International Life. Available from: <https://interaffairs.ru/news/printable/388>.

²⁹ News of the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova. Timofti called his inability to ban communist symbols his main failure. Union of Communist Parties – CPSU. Available from: <http://skpkpss.ru/19-03-2014-novosti-pkrm-glavnoj-svoej-neudachej-timofti-nazval-svoyu-nesposobnost-zapretit-simvoliku-kommunistov/>.

The presidency of I.N. Dodon, from the point of view of political and legal regulation of discourse, was marked by the failure of the initiative to hold a referendum on four issues, including the return of the subject "History of Moldova" in 2017³⁰. In the future, President Dodon will adjust some of his ideas – calls for the cancellation of the Association Agreement with the European Union, sharp attacks on Euro-Atlantic integration and the need for the rapid closure of NATO institutions in Chisinau will disappear from his rhetoric³¹. The idea of a referendum on foreign policy vector will give way to the concept of a "balanced foreign policy" and neutral status³². Under the "pro-Moldovan" President I.N. Dodon, a Memorandum of Cooperation between Moldova and the Eurasian Economic Union was signed, after which the republic received observer status in the organization³³. However, according to some political scientists, Dodon's problem was that "he is guided in his foreign policy by the Association Agreement with the European Union, which Moldova signed in 2014," which excludes the participation of the Republic of Moldova in the Eurasian integration project led by Russia³⁴.

A sharp degradation of relations and, as a consequence, discourse regarding Russia will occur during the presidency of M. Sandu³⁵, under which Moldova will withdraw from dozens of cooperation agreements with the Russian Federation and the CIS. The celebration of May 9 will be canceled, and the wearing of the St. George ribbon will be prohibited. In the National Security Strategy of Moldova for 2023, the position towards Russia will be completely tough and categorical. Of the 6 main risks to the national security of Moldova, 3 will be related to the Russia. In particular, the document states that "the threats to national security for Moldova are: 1) the military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the ambitions of the Russian government to create a land corridor to the Republic of Moldova by military means, which creates conditions for the violent change of the constitutional order of our country and the liquidation of its statehood; 2) hybrid operations carried out by the Russian Federation against the Republic of Moldova in the political, economic, energy, social, information, cyber and other areas, aimed at undermining the constitutional order, disrupting the country's European course and / or disintegration of the state; 3) the illegal military presence of the Russian Federation in the Transnistrian region and the exercise of control over the separatist entity."

³⁰ Albu S. What will Igor Dodon's presidency 2016–2020 be remembered for? Available from: <https://regtrends.com/2020/10/30/chem-zapomnitsya-prezidentstvo-igorya-dodona-2016-2020/>.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ "I am not a pro-Russian, but a pro-Moldovan politician." The political path of Igor Dodon. TASS. Available from: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/9988413>.

³⁴ Results of Igor Dodon's presidency – a view from Transnistria. PolitNavigator. Available from: <https://www.politnavigator.net/itogi-prezidentstva-igorya-dodona-vzglyad-iz-pridnestrovyia.html>.

³⁵ Commentary by the official representative of the Russian MFA M.V. Zakharova in connection with the anti-Russian statements of the Moldovan leadership 02.14.2023. Russian MFA. Available from: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1853931/; Commentary by the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry M.V. Zakharova on the situation in Moldova 08.25.2023. Russian Foreign Ministry. Available from: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1901666/.

Conclusions

The legal framework for symbolic politics in modern Moldova (1989–2023) demonstrates a move away from Russia. Despite the initiatives of individual politicians and the vivid rhetoric regarding multi-vector or dual-vector policies, Moldova is generally moving in a Euro-Atlantic direction. Russia's relations with the West have a significant impact on this process, but they should not be seen as a reason, but as a convenient pretext – an external circumstance that has allowed Moldova to implement the “nation-state” project for three decades. Each time, the Moldovanist (or pro-Russian) forces find convincing (and not so convincing) reasons to justify the ineffectiveness of the fight against this process.

Let us cautiously assume that there is only one convincing justification for the success of the former and the failure of the latter – an unspoken social contract that allows local residents to agree and not resist the process taking place before their eyes – so latent that even sociological surveys regularly conducted in Moldova cannot reveal it. Proof or refutation of this hypothesis can be found in the course of further in-depth study of the national identity of Moldovans.

References

1. Voronovich A.A. The role of European memory policy in the state historical policy of Moldova and Ukraine in the 2000s. *Political Science*. 2018; 3:204–230 [In Russian].
2. Donay L., Grishin O.E. Gagauzia: The path to independence or maintaining the status quo? Problems of the Post-Soviet Space. 2015; 2(4):45–60 [In Russian].
3. Malinova O.Yu. Symbolic politics: Outlines of the problem field. *Symbolic Politics: Coll. of scientific papers / RAS. INION. Center for Social. Scientific and Information Research. Dept. of Political Science; Ed.: Malinova O.Yu. Issue 1: Constructing Ideas about the Past as a Power Resource. Moscow, 2012* [In Russian].
4. Pavlyuk K.A. Moldovan identity: two projects, two paths of the country's development. *Discourse-Pi*. 2021; 3:142–159 [In Russian]. https://doi.org/10.17506/18179568_2021_18_3_142.
5. Plekhanov A.A. Reasons for the aggravation of the ethno-political situation in Gagauzia. National and ethnic processes in the regional political space: Materials of the All-Russian scientific and practical conference with international participation, Saratov, October 17–18, 2013 / Edited by: V.S.Slobozhnikova, V.A.Trukhanov. Saratov: Saratov State Law Academy, 2014:424–431 [In Russian].
6. Statis V.N. Between Russians and Romanians. *Rusin*. 2012; 1(27):130–136 [In Russian].
7. Stepanov V.P. Ethno-political construction of civil identity on both banks of the Dniester (1989–2014): monograph: scientific ed. Preface by prof. M.N.Guboglo; Rus. In-t Strat. Res.; Pridnestrovian State University named after T.G. Shevchenko, Institute of History and Public Administration. Moscow; Tiraspol, 2015 [In Russian].
8. Tkach A.V. Reconfiguration of the foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova in the Context of European Integration and Cooperation with the Russian Federation and the CIS. *Science Time*. 2019; 10(70) [In Russian].
9. Fadeeva L.A., Plotnikov D.S. Moldova's problematic European identity: “Battles for History”. *Modern Europe*. 2017; 6(78):132–143 [In Russian].
10. Shen L., Du Y., Suo L. Vectors of Moldova's Foreign Policy against the Background of the Russian Special Military Operation. *Political Science Issues*. 2023; Vol. 13, 10-1(98-1):5251–5259 [In Russian].
11. Shornikov P.M. State doctrine of the Republic of Moldova. Moscow: ISPIRR, 2023:335 [In Russian].

About the author

Vera N. TABAK. DSc. (Hist.). Assistant at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences and Mass Communications, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation. <https://orcid.org/0009-0005-6649-9865>. Address: 49/2, Leningradsky Ave., Moscow, 125167, Russian Federation. vera.tabak@bk.ru

Contribution of the author

The author declares no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Received: June 13, 2024. Approved after peer review: July 29, 2024. Accepted for publication: August 31, 2024. Published: September 23, 2024.

The author has read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewers for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

The National Communications Development Research Institution

invites you to join our scientific projects

The results of joint scientific research are published in journals, collective monographs, and are represented in scientific reports.

The developed recommendations and proposals are directed to government agencies and international organizations.

Communication modes and communication procedures in international practice: the international scientific laboratory is available to the scientists and experts from Russia and foreign countries. Thematic areas of research are:

- theory and methodology of countries and regions communication regimes research;
- modulation and fragmentation of the global communication order;
- models and types of country communication regimes;
- sociocultural factors of formation and reproduction of communication regimes;
- political factors of formation and reproduction of communication regimes;
- controllability of communication regimes;
- friendliness of communication regimes;
- problems of information security in some types of communication regimes;
- the influence of new actors and new practices on the rules and structures of communication regimes.

The first rating of the friendliness of communication regimes – the international expert group is available to the scientists, analysts, specialists in the field of international relations, political regionalism, international communication, information policy, social engineering, public relations, mass media. The National Communications Development Research Institution has developed a methodology for analyzing and evaluating the friendliness of country communication regimes. The first rating of the friendliness of the countries' communication regimes was published in December 2021. We invite scientists and analysts from different countries to join the experts.

International Humanitarian Communications is a scientific project available to the scientists and experts from Russia and foreign countries. The project is being implemented for developing and testing the models and technologies of international humanitarian communications for developing good-neighborly relations. Thematic areas of research are:

- systems of international humanitarian cooperation in integration organizations (CIS, SCO, EAEU, EU and others);
- institutionalization of international humanitarian communications;
- cross-border models of humanitarian communications;
- strategies and priorities of the language and cultural policy of the neighbor countries;
- the policy of social memory in the neighbor countries;
- digital formats of international humanitarian communications.

The Neighborhood Belt is a scientific project available to the scientists and experts from Russia and foreign countries. The Neighborhood Belt is a group of countries with which the Russian Federation borders, and countries with which Russia does not directly border, but historically has or is establishing cultural, economic, political ties.

The project is aimed at finding new directions, promising participants, models and technologies for the development of good-neighborly relations, prevention of possible conflicts and improvement of mutual understanding between countries and peoples. Project participants are free to choose research topics, provided that international teams are formed and they correspond to the concept of good neighborliness. The concept of good neighborliness reflects the meaningful and valuable side of the neighborhood – peace, mutual assistance, respect for each other's values and traditions, expansion of spheres and instruments of cooperation.

Digital solutions for intercultural, interethnic, and interfaith dialogue. Monitoring of digital projects is available to the authors of the projects dedicated to intercultural, interethnic, interfaith dialogue from Russia and foreign countries. The purpose of monitoring is to identify and support the best projects in the field of intercultural, interethnic, interfaith dialogue in the digital environment. The National Communications Development Research Institution promotes the popularization and implementation of the best digital solutions for the development of intercultural, interethnic and interfaith dialogue.

International Non-profit organizations and Civil Communications is an international laboratory, available to the experts from Russia and foreign countries. The purpose of the scientific project is to develop proposals for optimizing the use of the resources of Non-profit organizations for the development of good-neighborly relations and friendly civil dialogue. Thematic spheres of research are:

- organizational and legal, cultural, political, economic factors of the activities of international Non-profit organizations;
- models and work methods of international Non-profit organizations.

Scientific diplomacy is a scientific and publishing project available to the scientists from Russia and foreign countries. The project is aimed at the development of scientific communications in the neighborly countries and the development of models of international scientific cooperation. Thematic spheres of research are:

- state policy and strategies of countries in the field of international scientific cooperation;
- improving the directions and tools of cross-country scientific communications;
- diplomatic mission of scientists;
- new cooperation forms for Early-career scientists.

The National Communications Development Research Institution contributes to the development of international mobility programs for Early-career scientists. Graduate students and Early-career scientists from different countries are included in research scientific Institute's projects groups and common projects of The National Communications Development Research Institution and scientific and educational Russia and foreign institutions.

In the next issues of the journal «Russia & World: Sc. Dialogue» we will continue to take you through the projects of The National Communications Development Research Institution. You are able to discuss your participation with the project managers by sending an application to: komleva@nicrus.ru.

RUSSIA & WORLD: SCIENTIFIC DIALOGUE

Peer-reviewed academic journal

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Vitaly V. NAUMKIN – DSc (Hist.), Full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, professor, Scientific Supervisor of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia).

DEPUTY CHIEF EDITORS

Valentina V. KOMLEVA – DSc (Soc.), Professor, Deputy Director for Scientific Work of the National Research Institute for the Communications Development (Russia)

Alina V. GASUMYANOVA – CandSc (Law), Deputy Director for Media Activities of the National Research Institute for the Communications Development, Deputy Director of the Center for Strategic Studies in the Sphere of Energy and Digital Economy MIEP MGIMO (University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia

EXECUTIVE EDITOR

Olga V. ZHULIKOVA – CandSc (Soc.), Associate Professor, expert of the National Communications Development Research Institution (Russia)

Editor-translator – DSc. (Filol.) Leah E. Bushkanets

Proofreader – CandSc (Filol.) Ilya A. Emelin

Languages for publishing articles in the journal: Russian, English.

LAYOUT AND PREPRESS

Publishing House «Project Media Group» (Department of media-projects)
5, 2d building, 1st floor, 2d office, Gagarinskiy pereulok, Moscow Tel. +7 495 146 83 02

Signed in the press on 24.09.2024

Printed in the LLC «Podol'skaya fabrika ofsetnoj pečati» 80/42, Revolyucionnyj prospect, Podolsk, Moscow oblast
Circulation 2000 copies

ISSN 2782-3067



9 772782 306007 >

> УДК: 327 ББК 66.4


perspéctum

ЧЕЛОВЕК И МИР
ДИАЛОГ

ЕРСПЕКТИВА
ПОКОЛЕНИЕ ПОИСКА

Subscribe to Perspéctum magazines

explore the life and traditions
of Russia and 27 countries around





"Amazons of the Russian avant-garde" - this is how, following the poet B. Lifshitz, today we call the artists N. Goncharova, A. Exter, L. Popova, O. Rozanova, V. Stepanova and N. Udaltsova, whose work became an important part of 20th century art and a source of inspiration for the design of this issue.

The cover design was created based on the works of L.S.Popova.

Lyubov Sergeevna Popova (1889- 1924) was a Russian and Soviet artist known for her work in the Avant-garde movement. She was born in Ivanovskoye, Zvenigorod district, Moscow Region, and studied with Konstantin Yuon. Popova was one of the most active members of the Supremus group led by Kazimir Malevich and took part in the famous "5x5 = 25" exhibition in September 1921.

The exhibition was visited by Vsevolod Meyerhold. He was impressed by the talent of the artist and invited her to work at his theater. Lyubov Popova worked at the Institute of Artistic Culture, created by Vasily Kandinsky, where she engaged in scientific research. She became the first female teacher at VKHUTEMAS, a Soviet school of art, architecture and design. She was its secretary and one of the founders of its main (propaedeutic) department.

In 2012, a crater on Mercury, the planet closest to the Sun, was named after Lyubov Popova.

