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*The art of dialogue
and confidence*

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The purpose of the journal is to create a scientific discussion platform for peer discussion of problems and for the development of optimal solutions in the field of international cooperation, joint research, and publication of its results. Foreign scientists and experts are invited to publish and review the materials submitted for consideration.

The scientific concept involves the publication of scientific papers, including research insights and scholarly results, discussion articles and reviews, in the field of political science, sociology, world economy, cultural studies. The substantive and thematic profile of the journal includes topics reflecting international and regional processes, political, economic, social, cultural aspects of international relations, interstate and intercultural communications, international security and sustainable development

Scientific specialties and branches of science corresponding to them

SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

HISTORICAL SCIENCES

07.00.15 History of International Relations and Foreign Policy /

5.6.7. History of International Relations and Foreign Policy *

SOCIAL SCIENCES

22.00.04 Social Structure, Social Institutions and Processes / 5.4.4. Social Structure, Social Institutions and Processes* (Sociological)

SOCIOLOGICAL SCIENCES/POLITICAL SCIENCES

22.00.05 Political Sociology / 5.4.5. Political Sociology* (Sociological)

POLITICAL SCIENCES/ HISTORICAL SCIENCES

23.00.02 Political Institutions, Processes and Technologies / 5.5.2.

Political Institutions, Processes and Technologies* (Political Sciences)

POLITICAL SCIENCES

23.00.04 Political Problems of International Relations, Global and Regional Development / 5.5.4. International Relations* (Political Sciences)

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Vitaly V. NAUMKIN,
Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
Editor-in-chief of the journal «Russia & World: Scientific
Dialogue»

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF FOREWORD

Dear readers!

The current issue of the journal is devoted mainly to the problems of international, global and regional processes, as well as to the study of a changing society.

The section “International, Global and Regional Processes” is opened by materials of scientific discussion on the right of peoples to reunification, organized by the National Communications Development Research Institution (NIIRK) and conducted with the participation of N.Yu. Ilyin, E.A.Kuzmenko, I.B.Sanakoev, O.A.Gabrielyan, K.L.Sazonova. With this article, the Institute initiated a series of scientific discussions on the problems of the reunification of peoples, on the arguments and mechanisms of reunification, the operationalization of the people’s right to reunification and the possibility of its inclusion into international legal discourse. The problem is considered taking into account the implementation of the political idea “one people – one state”. The materials of this discussion formed the basis of the collective article of the same title by the same authors. The “right of peoples to reunification” is not enshrined as a concept in international law, in contrast to the “right of peoples to self-determination”. In practice, the process of reunification, and first of all – the divided peoples, is taking place. The panelists reviewed historical examples of reunification, noting that they are not always related to the common ethnicity of people living in different territories. They also discussed the economic, political and other reasons for reunification, referring to the international reaction to these processes.

The article by T.V. Marmontova and S.B. Kozhirova is devoted to the problem of cross-border Kazakh-Russian cooperation. The authors focused their attention on transport and logistics. This allowed them, based on an analysis of the dynamics of trade turnover, to come to new conclusions about the development of such cooperation in the medium term. The authors proposed indicators and identified the main vectors of Kazakh-Russian cross-border cooperation in the development of communications. The main

problems faced by business entities in the border areas of both countries are identified. Attention was also drawn to the role of such cooperation on the scale of the EAEU.

Models of post-conflict settlement on the example of the Arab countries were considered in a scientific discussion held by the National Communications Development Research Institution together with the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Based on its materials, I.A. Matveev, S.N. Serebrov and A.L. Khlebnikov prepared an article in which the results of the authors’ research were summarized. Their subject was theoretical models and specific cases of settlement in the regions of the Middle East, North Africa, the Arab world and the challenges associated with them. The reader will be of particular interest to the humanitarian aspect of post-conflict political settlement and economic reconstruction.

An inside look at the unrest in Nukus that took place this summer in Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan) was proposed by S.A. Zhuraev and Akin A.H.. The authors presented the results of the analysis of materials published in the mass media of Uzbekistan and foreign publications from June 26 to July 10, 2022 and an analysis of the opinions of social network users. A survey was conducted among experts – sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, law enforcement officials and specialists from public organizations. Although normal life is now being restored in Nukus, attempts by external forces to discredit the results of the work of the country’s leadership to stabilize the situation have not yet stopped.

The part “Changing Society” is presented by two articles.

V.V.Komleva focused her attention on the method of analyzing the controllability of communication modes, explaining her interest by the fact that the development of methodology and methods for studying them is in its infancy. The author comes to the conclusion that it is impossible to offer an ideal model of controllability of communication modes for all types of societies and states. At the same time, it is possible to describe a typical model for managing communication modes, regularities, organizational logic, resources, tools, and management technologies. The analytical matrix proposed by the author makes it possible to single out the main types of communication modes control, to determine the degree of controllability for these types.

Yu.P.Tikhonov applied a system of criteria for the dependence of the communication mode to study the scale of influence of the United States of America on the formation of a dependent communication mode in Ukraine. The author came to the conclusion that it is the lack of regulation of global communication that allows the United States to influence states and country communication modes in the sphere of information and communication exchange. The author came to the conclusion about the merging of the

communication mode with the political one, due to the affiliation in Ukraine of large media with political figures and the emergence of a relationship between the communication mode and the geopolitical situation, which led to the fragmentation of the communication mode of Ukraine under the influence of external actors.

Three articles are presented in the section “Historical Retrospective and Modernity”. The first of them is an article by P.P. Skorospelov about the Russian project of globalization in the 20th century in the aspect of the military-political strategy of Russia, which the author considered taking into account the continuity – from Nikolai Romanov to Mikhail Gorbachev. Noteworthy is the author’s conclusion that “... in the domestic tradition, a time interval of 150-200 years is the operational memory of public administration.” The reader will be interested in the results of the author’s study of the “special state interests” of the USSR in Eastern Europe, the role of the rise of Asia in changing the geopolitical context of the construction of the Soviet state, the emergence of a common interest in the USSR with China in Korea and Vietnam, and the role of this factor in countering the United States in Asia.

V.V. Popov turned to the issue of the clash of civilizations. Based on the analysis of a large number of written texts, scientific and cultural-historical sources devoted to this issue, the author argues his conclusion about the independent nature of Russian civilization. He views the current international political crisis in Europe as the biggest watershed in the history of the 21st century, as a confrontation between Russian (Eurasian or Orthodox) and Western civilizations.

The rubric ends with an article by A.I. Yakovlev, dedicated to the universality of the “project of Enlightenment” for the West and the East. The author considers the implementation of the European «Enlightenment project» in the XVIII-XX centuries. It is noted that by the end of the 20th century, the universality of this project began to raise doubts in “non-Western societies” that remained faithful to the original foundations of their civilizations, which leads to the need for a new project in a situation of technological revolution and emerging multipolarity of the world system.

The section “Power, Politics, State” is represented by three articles.

Challenges for sustainability and stability are considered by G. D. Tcheremin in the context of the state policy of Russia in the sphere of railway transport. The author considers the problem of sustainability in the face of sanctions to public and private companies of railway transport and competitors close to it, primarily aviation.

The article by E.V. Dumina and S.A. Tyulyakova is devoted to a comparative analysis of the migration legislation of Russia, Germany and Switzerland. The authors explained their choice by the fact that these countries are attractive to migrants. The article considered the protection of the rights of migrants, the

adaptation measures carried out in these countries, the regimes for the stay of foreign citizens in them. Based on the data obtained, the authors proposed recommendations for the implementation of the national migration policy in Russia.

I.N. Gukova addressed the promising forms of socio-political activity of young people in the modern Russian region, noting that “modern teachers face the difficult task of quickly responding to changing conditions, selecting effective educational technologies that will help students understand current events, critically comprehend them to reveal the potential and possibilities of its influence on the political process.” The article has been prepared on the basis of the experience of such work in the Belgorod region, taking into account the relevance of the formation of citizenship in the youth, understanding the factors of destructive political activity and the tasks facing modern political education.

Dear readers!

The editorial board of the journal hopes that the materials of the issue will arouse your interest and that you yourself will become one of our authors in the future.

Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Vitaly Naumkin

INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROCESSES

International Relations

RUSSIA & WORLD: SCIENTIFIC DIALOGUE

**РОССИЯ
И МИР**
НАУЧНЫЙ ДИАЛОГ

The reunification of the people may be a special case of the realization of the people's right to self-determination. The desire of states to preserve their territorial integrity is an important motive for violating their obligations to respect the right of peoples to control their own destiny.

Nikolay Yu. Ilyin, Elena A. Kuzmenko, Inal B. Sanakoev, Oleg A. Gabrielyan, Kira L. Sazonova

The Right of Peoples to Reunification: Scientific and Practical Aspects of the Problem

Interaction in the border zone seems to be one of the main components of relations between Kazakhstan and Russia, both in the format of bilateral cooperation and within the framework of multilateral integration formats developing in the space of Greater Eurasia. In this regard, the content of cooperation is determined, on the one hand, by the interests of regional actors, on the other hand, by the volume of qualitative changes that have occurred in the region since the beginning of the EAEU activities.

Taissiya V. Marmontova, Svetlana B. Kozhirova

*The Main Directions of Kazakh-Russian Cooperation Development in the Border Area:
Transport and Logistics Vector*

The unstable global and regional international situation in the conditions of the transition to a multipolar world, when the collective West is trying to confront new centers of power, determines new principles of studying modern conflicts – their genesis and evolution. One of the tasks becomes the search for optimal ways out of conflicts. Logically, the field of research is the vast geographical region of the Middle East and North Africa and the Arab world, characterized by numerous crises and internal armed conflicts that tend to internationalize.

Igor A. Matveev, Sergey N. Serebrov, Alexey L. Khlebnikov

Models of Post-Conflict Settlement on the Example of Arab Countries

Today life in Karakalpakstan is gradually resuming its normal course. Nevertheless, up to this moment there is detected occasional information influx from outside, aimed to discredit the international image of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The attempts to distort the events that took place and present the actions taken by the state authorities as a ferocious attempt to break up a peaceful demonstration are still being implemented. There are speculations as to objectivity of the investigation regarding the occurrence. It was officially stated that the actions implemented by the law enforcement authorities would be given legal assessment as well. In the event that there is detected wrongful resource to force, the person guilty will be held liable in accordance with the applicable legislation.

Sayfiddin A. Juraev Aylin H. Akin

Unrest in Nukus: Inside View

The Right of Peoples to Reunification: Scientific and Practical Aspects of the Problem

Nikolay Yu. Ilyin^{1a}, Elena A. Kuzmenko^{2b}, Inal B. Sanakoev^{3c},
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Abstract. The article contains the materials of a scientific discussion held in April 2022 by the National Communications Development Research Institution. The authors discuss the following issues: the concept of a “split people”; the right to reunification in the context of equality and the right of peoples to self-determination; historical precedents of the reunification of peoples; legal, social, economic, political and other grounds and mechanisms of reunification; the right to reunification and the problem of territorial integrity of the state; the role of external actors in unification processes; the conflict of national and state identities.

Keywords: people, the right of peoples to reunification, the right of peoples to self-determination, separatism, South Ossetia, unification of Germany, New Eastern policy, nostalgia, ethnic identity, the principle of equality

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Introduction

The right of peoples to reunification is a category that is not enshrined in the international law in terms of precisely the “right of the people to reunification”, in contrast to the “right of peoples to self-determination” (1; 2; 7; 9; 12; 14). Nevertheless, we have observed and continue to observe the implemented practices of reunification and the growth of such initiatives in the current international conditions. This phenomenon is much in need of scientific understanding. At the same time, a number of scientific and practical problems arise, the study of which is necessary in the current conditions of social and political changes. The National Research Institute for the Development of Communications has begun a series of scientific discussions on the problems of reunification of peoples, the arguments and mechanisms for reunification, the operationalization of the people’s right to reunification and the possibility of its introduction into the international legal discourse. This article publishes the research and the materials of the first scientific discussion.

Materials and methods

The materials of the authors’ research were taken from archival sources, published documents, eyewitness accounts describing the experience of the reunification of peoples, interviews, statistical data, data from opinion polls, normative legal acts of the international and national levels.

The variety of sources taken determines the use of various methods of research. Structural-diachronic analysis, content analysis, event analysis, historical retrospective method, comparative analysis, methods of auxiliary historical and sociological disciplines were the main research methods. The basic methodology for studying the issue of peoples’ rights to reunification includes the methodology of conflict theory, the methodology of sociocultural theory, and the methodology of anthropology.

Results

To the issue of reunification of the people in the context of the principle of equality and the right of peoples to self-determination (N.Yu.Ilyin)

In the title of the declared topic of scientific discussion, the word “peoples” are used in the plural form, which, in our opinion, implies two directions for scientific discussion in the context of setting the problem:

the right of one nation to the liberation from foreign domination and to unite the territories in which they live into one state (for example, the unification of the Italian people in the 19th century);

the right of individual nation within a multinational state to reunite with another part of it living outside the borders of this state, for example, the situation with the Ossetian people and the current agenda for a referendum in South Ossetia. This process is more complex both from a political and international legal point of view.

The emergence and development of the principle of equality and the right of peoples to self-determination primarily has a material basis for the first approach.

The right of peoples to reunification can be considered as a view from a certain angle on the principle of nationality¹, which was established in the scientific discourse of European states in the XIX century and represents the justification of the political idea «one nation – one state» (justified by P.Mancini, E.Renan, A.D.Gradovsky, etc.). By itself, this idea was caused by the need to build a state on a national basis, and the principle of nationality was formulated as an abstract dogma about the expediency of building a mono-national state under any circumstances.

In a practical way, this principle was applied, for example, during the liberation and unification of fragmented Italy (what was called the Risorgimento and ended with the annexation of Rome to the Italian Kingdom in 1870). In the works of Italian researchers of that period (Valsecchi, Romagnosi), the ideas of nationalism of the Italian people were developed and then – the connection of this national idea with the principle of legitimacy. It is interesting that the nation in Romagnosi's works was considered as a population to which a certain geographical and spiritual unity was given by nature. This principle was also used during the unification of Germany in 1871: the creation of the state of the German Empire around the Kingdom of Prussia from several dozen independent states with a German population.

In its development, the principle of nationality was formulated as the principle of self-determination of nations, put forward by national liberation movements, objectively directed against the imperialist multinational state, to which it opposes the demand for the creation of national states (23:323) and in modern international law it was supplemented by a provision on the equality of peoples.

The forms of implementation of this principle for the first time were established in the 1970 Declaration on the Principles of International Law. In addition to the formation of an independent state or annexation of an existing state, the establishment of a different political status was recognized as one of the forms. Thus, even then, the right to self-determination, recognized by all peoples, was no longer limited exclusively to the right to separation.

The content of the principle of equality and the right of peoples to self-determination provides for several related rights and obligations. For example, I.P.Blishchenko and V.F.Shavrov in the work «Theory and practice of international law of the USA» in 1985 revealed the principle of equality and self-determination of peoples as follows:

¹ In the XIX century, "nationality" was understood as peoples distinguished by a pronounced cultural and historical identity, and "nation" meant the whole set of citizens of the state.

a) the right of peoples to freely dispose of their destiny, i.e. in the conditions of complete freedom to determine their internal and external political status without outside interference and to carry out their political, economic, social and cultural development at their discretion; б) the right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources; в) the obligation of all states to promote, through joint and independent actions, the implementation of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter; г) the obligation of all states to refrain from any action that deprives peoples of their right to self-determination, freedom and independence; д) the opportunity for colonial peoples to use all means available in the struggle for independence; е) the obligation of all States to contribute to the elimination of colonialism, with due respect for the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned (7:36).

For all the formal simplicity of interpreting the content of this principle, the complexity from a legal point of view is the uncertainty of the concept of "people", which makes it possible in each specific case of the realization of the right to self-determination to take into account the will of the people as well as not to take into account the opinion of the population. Moreover, this may be the position not only of individual states, but also of UN bodies. Thus, the International Court of Justice of the United Nations in its advisory opinion on Western Sahara in 1975 noted that «the application of the right to self-determination can be carried out only in conditions of the free expression of the will of the people concerned»². At the same time, the Uruguayan lawyer E.J. de Arechaga in his work «Modern International Law» in 1983 cites examples when the UN General Assembly did not comply with the requirements for consultation with the population of the relevant territories. In the dispute over the territorial affiliation of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands, the UN General Assembly demanded that Great Britain and Argentina hold negotiations on sovereignty and the transfer of territory and refused to take into account the results of the opinion polls of the population of this territory. And on the issue of belonging of the state of Goa to India, the reunification with the lost territory was regarded by the UN General Assembly as a way to ensure the self-determination of the people and put an end to the colonial status without consulting the population. India then noted that in the case of Goa, it would be absurd to ask Indians living in this territory whether they wish to remain Indians, and the UN General Assembly agreed with that approach. (1:164).

The situation with the interpretation of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples has been somewhat streamlined and limited in connection with the adoption of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975). In addition to the right to self-determination, one more principle has found its consolidation in the abovementioned Final Act – the principle of territorial integrity. The document also gave the interpretation of this principle:

the states "thereunder will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, against the territorial integrity, political independence or unity

² International Court of Justice (ICJ) Reports, 1975, p. 32.

of any participating State and, in particular, from any such action, constituting the use of force or the threat of force. The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation, or other direct or indirect measures of the use of force in violating international law, or the object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of their implementation. No occupation or acquisition of this kind shall be recognized as lawful"³.

Thus, this principle, although it does not contain obligations in relation to peoples exercising the right to self-determination, creates certain obstacles in the implementation of the process of reunification of the people and the secession necessary for this process – the secession of part of the territory from the state. Such a process is lawful only without outside interference, even the representatives of the same people who are the citizens of another state. If the process takes place without secession, then the reunification of the people may not cause great difficulties (Germany, Israel).

Reunion or takeover? The historical foundations of the unification of Germany in 1990 (E.A.Kuzmenko)

The familiar name «Germany» is not so obvious if we are talking about the political situation after the Second World War. If until 1949 «Germany» meant the occupied territories of the former Reich that were not part of the victorious countries, then with the advent of the West Germany (FRG) and the East Germany (GDR), the concept of Germany as one ethno-cultural space, not to mention political, seemed to be leveled. However, it is not so: the idea of a «unified Germany» and nostalgia for it never disappeared, the only question was which of the two German states would become the core of the new Germany. The ethnonym Germans, which appeared as a designation of a political community after the first unification of Germany in 1871, did not disappear anywhere either.

Throughout forty years after the Second World War, the policy of the FRG in one way or another took into account the interests of strengthening the positions of West Germany in German-German relations. Today we would like to consider the historical foundations of this strengthening for the further spread of its influence in the West and the East.

Firstly, the Basic Law of the West Germany had already provided for the levers of a possible reunification, which seemed to be a foregone conclusion, albeit it was postponed for an indefinite period.

The Basic Law of Germany, adopted as the Constitution of Trizonia in 1949 and which is in force up to present day, had already reflected the strategic long-term ambitions of the western part of Germany.

Articles 23 and 24 of the Basic Law are of fundamental importance. Article 23 reveals the full scope of the post-1949 changes in this situation. The text of the article adopted in 1949 said:

³ Final Act of CSC:6. Available from: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/c/39505_1.pdf.

This Basic Law is currently applicable to the territories of Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Greater Berlin, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, Württemberg-Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern. In the other parts of Germany it shall enter into force after their accession...

Thus, the scope of the Basic Law was determined, as well as the likelihood of its expansion at the expense of «the other parts». Article 24 states:

The Federation may, in order to ensure peace, enter into a system of mutual collective security; at the same time, it will agree to limit its sovereign rights in order to establish and ensure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and in relations between the peoples of the whole world,

– so the connection of Germany's future with European institutions is obvious.

The increasingly deepening European integration becomes an important basis for future unification.

Before 1949, Germany was the object, not the subject, of politics. But after the first Berlin crisis, the situation began to change, primarily in relations with the Western European states.

In 1951, Germany had already participated in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. The supreme governing body of the ECSC in Luxembourg became the first supranational body in Europe to which the FRG ceded its sovereign rights (at first for 50 years). With the entry into force of the ECSC treaty, the German heavy industry left after the Second World War, which was the possible basis for German rearmament, was placed under international control. In this way, Germany's neighbors were able to no longer perceive it as a threat, which was a significant achievement in 100 years.

Treaties on the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community followed in 1957. A significant part of German economic power was under international control, and at the same time a vast economic space opened to all the participants. While the 1951 ECSC treaty was still designed for 50 years, the so-called 1957 Rome Treaties were supposed to be «for an unlimited period».

The FRG insisted on an additional protocol to the Rome Treaties and made a protocol statement at the time of signing that intra-German trade and, no less important, the status of community citizens for all Germans correspond to the definition in Article 116, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law, that is, to Germans residing in the GDR as well (Unless otherwise provided by law, a German within the meaning of this Basic Law is anyone who has German citizenship or, as a refugee or exiled person of German nationality, his spouse or descendant, takes refuge in the territory of Germany within the borders that existed up to December 31, 1937).

The exchange of goods between the two German states was equated with the trade within the community. Not the other German state, but the people living in it and the elements of their economy became a part of the EEC in this special way. If the citizens of the GDR were in the territory of the community, then they were to be treated as German

citizens. They enjoyed all the rights of citizens of the community, they could also issue a federal passport for themselves as an identification document and apply, for example, to foreign missions of Germany for help. Such was the practical policy towards Germany as a whole, that had already been understood as a single zone, despite the political borders.

The third aspect that prepared the unification was Willy Brandt's "New Ostpolitik", successfully implemented in the 1970s.

The "New Ostpolitik" draws on the political principle of "change through rapprochement" set forth by Egon Bahr, Federal Minister for Special Assignments under Brandt from 1972 to 1974, for the FRG's relations with the GDR and the countries of Eastern Europe.

If the policy of mutual understanding in the 1960s was largely characterized by a lack of mobility and understanding on the part of both the Western and the Eastern blocs, then at the end of the decade, some international political events favored the resumption of diplomatic negotiations. These favorable factors include, first of all, the fact that the Soviet Union was able to stabilize its own bloc of states after the "Prague Spring" in 1968, the escalation of Sino-Soviet contradictions due to the deployment of Soviet troops to the border with China, as well as the need of the USSR for Western technologies and importing the corresponding technologies to modernize their own economy.

What was special about this political concept was that it focused not only on a specific consensus in the short or medium term, but also on the long-term convergence of the social systems of the East and the West. The political instrument of this policy has become a focus on common interests, therefore, in particular, global peacemaking (reduction of nuclear danger), general humanitarian assistance and the possibility of mutual acceptance of the territorial and power/political status quo.

The New Ostpolitik was initially viewed with skepticism, especially by the CDU/CSU, which saw the policy as contradictory to the connections and integration with the West promoted by Adenauer. Later, all the parties represented in the German Bundestag considered the concluded agreements and the Ostpolitik to be a constructive paradigm of relations.

On September 3, 1971, a quadripartite agreement on Berlin was concluded. Thus, for the first time since 1945, the GDR and the Soviet Union guaranteed the unhindered transit of the West German citizens by road, rail and water to Berlin, as well as the existing links between the FRG and Berlin.

Then a number of other Eastern treaties followed. At the end of 1972, the Basic Treaty was adopted, which revised the relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR. At the end of 1973, the German-Czechoslovak Treaty (Prague Treaty) was signed, which invalidated the 1938 Munich Agreement on the Sudetenland.

Thus, the "New Ostpolitik" launched the mechanisms of political dialogue between the two German states and predetermined the initiator of the future reunification in 1990.

The year of 1989 brought the issue of German unification to the fore and showed how wary the expectations of this unification were on the part of the EU member states. Now we turn to the fourth aspect of unification, which is not so obvious – currency

relations and the position of other states. There was no certainty that German unification would not be a problem for European states, including EU members. Up to this point, France, Italy, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, with about 60 million inhabitants each, formed an equal group of the four leading member states. However, united Germany with its 80 million inhabitants would become the fourth largest country in terms of territory and the second largest population, if Russia was taken into account, the state in Europe with the most powerful economy and the most stable currency. The concern about the potential establishment of German hegemony could not be dismissed. Not only was Great Britain apprehensive about German unification, but France was also vacillating in the face of Germany's dominant economic power, not least in the strength of the Deutsche Mark. In this case, the independence of the German Federal Bank played an important role, whose actions in the money market could affect the economies of other states in the event of insufficient political restraint. Therefore, France made a monetary union a condition for its consent to German unification. In any case, on April 18, 1990, the Federal Chancellor Kohl and the French President Mitterrand jointly informed the European Council of their desire to begin preparations for the creation of the economic and monetary union (which was to enter into force in 1993), envisaged by the Single European Act, as well as for the convening of a government conference on political union. After that, the European Council unequivocally supported German unification on April 28, 1990.

As a result, the Deutsche Mark was integrated into a common currency and thus brought under control in the same way that other elements of the German potential, which were perceived as a threat, were brought under control in the period after the establishment of the ECSC. Thus, the introduction of the euro has become inseparable from the agreement of EU members to German unity.

The final factor in the unification was the position of the USSR. Much depended on what position the great power, the Soviet Union, would take. Unfortunately for the USSR and fortunately for Germany, the leaders had an idealized idea of the need for unification. The leadership of the USSR, headed by M.S. Gorbachev, agreed not to interfere with the free expression of the will of the Germans, thereby granting the go-ahead to the dismantling of the political structure of the GDR and its incorporation into the FRG. Further negotiations on the "2+4" format (GDR, FRG, Great Britain, the USA, the USSR, France) ended with the signing of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany in Moscow on September 12, 1990. In the treaty, the German side recognized "the final nature of the borders of the united Germany", refused from "the production, possession and disposal of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons", and pledged to reduce the German armed forces. For their part, the victorious powers announced the termination of "their rights and responsibilities in relation to Berlin and Germany as a whole" and that "united Germany acquires full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs." On October 3, 1990, the agreement on the unification of the GDR and the FRG came into force.

Political unity raised the question of commemorative unity: what to do and how to deal with a fairly long history of separation, how to interpret and reflect it in public

memory. The category of absorption is even more applicable in this case: the history of the GDR is interpreted mainly in terms of its inferiority and inhumanity, with an emphasis on negative aspects (which cannot be hushed up, but cannot be taken out of context), an attempt was made to level the identity of the GDR, which gave rise to the so-called "Ostalgie" – faced with the paradigm of the abolition of their past, they began to react more sharply to the shortcomings of the new system, to express their rejection of this abolition. The studies of the museum culture of Germany give evidences of the division of people in everyday communication into "ossies" and "wessies" (with a slight disdain for each other), memories of influential contemporaries (for example, Günther Grass), a surge of interest in films, comics, TV shows in style and on the theme of everyday life in the East Germany. For example, Ossiladen, a mail-order store, had around 40,000 regular customers in 2008. According to a survey by the "Stern" magazine, in 2009 57% of the Ossi regretted to some extent that nothing was left of the daily life of the GDR. Accordingly, the unity of cultural and historical memory and the equivalence of identity in the united Germany is being achieved much longer than political institutions.

So, the foundations of the unification were: the thoughtfulness of the Basic Law in accordance with the objectives of the subsequent unification, intensive European integration, currency relations between the EU countries, the New Ostpolitik of the FRG, the position of the USSR. The result of the unification of Germany was a radical change in the geopolitical situation in Europe.

The right of peoples to reunification (Ossetian case) (I.B. Sanakoev)

Theoretical aspects of the problem.

The right of peoples to reunification stems from the special social and scientific relevance of the phenomenon of separation of ethnic communities. This phenomenon can be described in terms of differentiation as a category that can more or less adequately reflect all of its applied and theoretical specificities. In this regard, we can distinguish two aspects of such differentiation, such as current and perspective. The current differentiation of social and political life means the formation of different forms and types of identification: political, social and cultural and economic among the divided ethnic groups. Such characteristics testify in general to the bifurcation and fragmentation of the main forms of life of the ethnosociety. The perspective differentiation can conditionally be divided into several stages:

- the first stage is characterized by the predominance of parallel vectors of development, when the process of social evolution of the divided parts of the ethnic group takes place in a parallel mode while maintaining almost identical social and cultural markers;
- at the second stage, parallel vectors of development begin to diverge gradually, inevitably contributing to the formation of different social and cultural characteristics and the distancing of the divided parts of the ethnic group from each other;

- the third stage of perspective differentiation marks the achievement of certain points of no return, after which we can talk about the disappearance of the once united people from the ethnocultural map of the world and the emergence of two or more fraternal, but already different peoples; this stage is characterized by the completion of the process of evolution of a previously united ethnic group; this circumstance becomes almost irreversible;

In theoretical terms, it is necessary to identify the specifics of the mechanisms of functioning of the phenomenon of ethnic separation. These mechanisms include the following:

- vectors of attraction: they are based on the similarities of the divided parts of the ethnos and are updated in the situations of growing national consciousness, discrimination of group rights, exacerbation of interethnic relations, form the ideology of ethnic irredentism in their direction, are able to start the unification process and, in general, work to overcome the situation of separation;
- repulsion vectors: they are based on existing differences and are updated in the situations of sustainable development, interethnic peace, protection of collective rights, successful integration into the state of residence; in their direction, these vectors form the ideology of unionism in ethnic self-consciousness, impede the unification processes and, in general, contribute to the conservation of the situation of separation.

It should be noted that the parallel functioning of the two types of vectors ensures the dynamic balance of the phenomenon of ethnic separation: if they interact in equilibrium, the phenomenon will stabilize within certain limits. With the dominance of the repulsion vector, the separation will evolve in the direction of strengthening differentiation. With the dominance of the vector of attraction, the separation will be overcome through the various mechanisms of political, economic and social and cultural integration.

Specificity of the Ossetian case.

The emergence of the Ossetian reunification project should be attributed to the time of the collapse of the Russian Empire, since before this period the concept of separation did not exist in the Ossetian self-consciousness. Then for the first time the idea of unification arose in the minds of the Ossetian intelligentsia between February and October 1917 and began to become as declarative forms. The National Council, the highest representative body of South Ossetia, began to carry out practical work in this direction. The idea of unification had received its further development in the Soviet period, when in 1925-1926 the question of the unification of Ossetia was raised. During this period, various projects were put forward for the unification of Ossetia, including the unification as part of Georgia. However, the reunification of Ossetia within the Russian Federation did not suit the Bolshevik leadership of the USSR, since it did not want to aggravate relations with Georgia. The unification of Ossetia within the framework of Georgia also met opposition from Georgia:

Certain forces in Georgia opposed this, although there were attempts to bring in a united Ossetia. The reason was that Georgians were not such a numerous ethnic group and Ossetians could pose some danger in terms of pressure on the Georgian ethnic group. Georgia could absorb South Ossetia separately, but not all of Ossetia, not all the Ossetians, because Georgia did not have so many forces and opportunities at that time" (Expert survey materials, 2010. Author's archive).

It is worth pointing out the political benefits of unification that are obvious to South Ossetians, since the problem of separation as such appeared in connection with the crisis in the ethnic and cultural and political development of South Ossetia. According to expert assessments,

South Ossetia has limited opportunities and resources to realize its ethnic and cultural needs. Therefore, the problem of separation arose, and the South Ossetian side became the initiator of posing this problem. In any case, South Ossetia receives obvious benefits in case of solving this problem (Id.).

In this regard, it can be argued that in the mass consciousness of the population of South Ossetia, the idea of unification is more popular than in North Ossetia.

The idea of reunification is more popular in the south of Ossetia because: firstly, South Ossetians perceive this situation more acutely, because the people feel defenseless in a situation of rather pronounced aggression from a stronger ethnic group, which seeks to level all ethnic and cultural differences; secondly, the stress potential that has accumulated in the south over several decades has had a negative impact on all aspects of the life of South Ossetian society, including the state of national culture; thirdly, one of the factors in the growth of the popularity of the idea of unification in the south was the high confidence of South Ossetians in Russia and the recognition of its role in ensuring the security of the southern part of the Ossetian ethnic group, and therefore the majority of the population of South Ossetia perceives itself as part of the Russian Federation.

The current state of the Ossetian irredentist project can be assessed as a new wave of actualization of both the idea and the political movement aimed at realizing the ultimate goal of the project – joining Russia and reuniting with North Ossetia. In this regard, it should be pointed out that in North Ossetia, according to the latest opinion polls, the idea of reunification is gradually gaining momentum, and in South Ossetia, the reunification idea and project began to become institutionalized: an irredentist political party «United Ossetia» emerged. In 2014, this party won legislative power in the republic (20 out of 34 possible seats), and in 2017, the leader of United Ossetia, A.Bibilov, won the presidential election and headed the supreme executive power. The actualization of the unifying idea should also explain the recent initiatives of the top political leadership of South Ossetia on the need to hold a referendum on South Ossetia's entry into Russia.

Thus, we can conclude that at the present stage, the Ossetian irredentist case (as a right and aspiration for reunification) is becoming more and more relevant in the context of the growth of national self-consciousness of the divided parts of the single Ossetian people and a rather dynamic external environment.

Discussion

Crimean case (O.A Gabrielyan)

So far we have listened to the history of the Ossetian people, we can give many other examples: the Germans have been waiting for reunification for decades, the Karabakh case is also quite clear and has been widely heard in the last 30 years after the collapse of the USSR. These conflicts have their own special history.

The Crimean case had its own. It was expected and unexpected for the Crimeans. Even the prime minister of Crimea came to work that memorable morning and was surprised that he was not allowed into the building of the Council of Ministers. It was an unexpected decision, simply brilliantly executed. Crimeans overwhelmingly made their choice. I myself participated in the preparation of the referendum and witnessed these historical events as a citizen and as a public figure (10).

This case only testifies that someone has to ensure the right of the people to self-determination, the desire only, obviously, is not enough. The Crimeans' 30-year attraction to Russia was justified. Nobody asked the Crimeans in 1954, when a political decision was made to transfer Crimea to Ukraine.

The reunion was ensured by the «polite people» who ended up here in 2014. Therefore, when discussing the «right» to reunification, we must understand who will ensure this right. As a rule, small peoples try to reunite in one way or another with their historical homeland, but there is no way to ensure such a right. Who should ensure this right? If the homeland is able to ensure this unification, then you are lucky. For example, in Germany «the stars are aligned», the political realities developed in such a way that this unification took place. By the way, it was the echoes of this process that turned into a war in Ukraine decades later. If you think that this reunion did not affect this process in any way, then you are deeply mistaken. I believe that the process of today's crisis began then, but at that time it did not cause concern. But later the dominance of Germany in Europe was determined. In fact, the economic IV Reich was built. And what the III Reich tried to do by force: it sent wagons with «gastarbeiters» from the territory of Ukraine during the Second World War. After the eighties, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, this process of economic enslavement is clearly visible today. And the «grateful» Germans are sending weapons to Ukraine for the war against Russia.

And how, in fact, can the problem of reunification be solved? Let's compare the Crimean and the Karabakh cases. Last September, I was invited to Karabakh for the thirtieth anniversary of independence. I saw this situation from the inside, talked to people, analyzed it. I myself am from Baku, but precisely because I am an Armenian, I moved to Yerevan during the Soviet Union. I was clearly given a hint that I was a good guy, but an Armenian... Later I moved to the Crimea. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, I was invited to work. I want to say that these cases are existential: these are not abstract reasoning, but experiences through my own existence in crisis situations. Visiting Artsakh (Karabakh) after the 44-day war, post-war assistance – all this is difficult to experience.

The same personal experience of the situation was in the Crimea. I remember we were brought together by S.V.Aksyonov with a small group of the Crimean Expert Club and he asked: "Guys, who are you with?" Of course, we said that we were for reunification with Russia. And then he said: «Well, then you need to prepare for the referendum, go to the State Council».

For us, for the Crimeans, this is destiny. Before that, I had to be on the Maidan with our anti-Maidan. We saw what happened there. It is no coincidence that such a result was obtained in the referendum in the Crimea. Both Odessa and what has been going on for 8 years in the Donbas region only confirmed our Crimean choice. This was more likely to happen in the Crimea, but we were lucky, and without a single shot we returned to our native harbor. Russia acted as a guarantor of our reunification, it ensured this right.

If you think that the Crimean case is already closed, then this opinion is wrong. Russia finally made a decision on the Crimea. But when Russia demands Ukraine to recognize not only the Donbass and Luhansk republics, but also finally to recognize the Crimea as a part of it, this means that our opponents must agree with this. All these cases are open.

How do I see them closing? The world system is changing and it is not only a matter of world order. The global paradigm, the organization of the entire world order is changing. As a result, the world order will also change, and this will be formalized legally, state and international institutions will change. I draw attention to this because there are many videos on YouTube when economists start reasoning that everything will stop in Russia and we will still feel catastrophic consequences. These experts are completely unaware that the paradigm is changing so fundamentally that it is pointless to argue as they do. Logistic chains will be plundered, but the new ones will emerge. Who said that it would be worse than it was, and the new unprecedented perspectives would not open up?

It seems to me that Russia today has a colossal chance to break out of the quagmire into which it was driven, where they wanted to place the Russian bear and pull out its claws. It did not work out and will never work out, because, in my opinion, and this is not even connected with the personality of V.V. Putin, but with the objective geopolitical processes, where Russia, after all historical cataclysms, is being reborn again. Russia as a civilization is a stronghold that provides the Eurasian geopolitical space with stability.

And what are the perspectives for the reunification of peoples? Returning to the beginning: who will ensure the right to such unification? We have already been seeing these cases, for example, in the Crimea, and now in South Ossetia. As Russia will be restored as a civilizational system, will be self-determining, it will organize the marked space (both its own and around itself). Why do I have such confidence? The world is developing. Huntington was very close to the truth: there is a clash of civilizations. Russia is more than a country. Russia is the Russian world, Russian civilization. Objective parameters testify to this. When the president says: "I am a Russian, a Chechen, a Dagestani," this resonates in everyone in this space.

What is happening in the post-Soviet space testifies, states that none of them took place, because all of them can develop only in alliance with this large political space. This is such a political gravity. Only stability in Russia ensures the existence and development of

these republics. They arose around Russia because security belts are always needed between geopolitical players. Therefore, the question is to build such relations that would give these republics stability and confidence in their future existence.

Objectivity lies in the fact that only in a large macro-region, which Russia is trying to create around itself, small peoples do have a chance to reunite, to ensure their existence in general. It seems to me that we need to be aware of the marked fundamental paradigm shift.

But Russia has a big problem, in my opinion. It lies in the fact that the image of its future has not yet been formed. It should be so interesting and inspiring that the people both inside Russia and outside would be inspired by it and reach out to it. The example of Kazakhstan showed very well that Russia can be a guarantor of stability.

It's all lies about the fact that ideology is not needed. Ideology is a system of values, it always exists, even if it is not declared. It seems to me that we have begun to create this image of the future. After the amendments to the Constitution, it was formulated that we have the priority of traditional values. For us, Victory Banner is sacred. This was also reflected in the Immortal Regiment. Many people in multinational Russia join this movement quite sincerely, voluntarily. This system of values, of course, includes the principle of justice, which has something in common with national unity. Russia has something to build the image of the future from. Summing up, we can say that the task is difficult, but together we can do it.

What is a "people"? How does international law define the theme of belonging to a "people"? (K.L. Sazonova)

There was a well-known Soviet propagandist-ideologist – Comrade Suslov, and he fought, as you know, with «rootless cosmopolitans.» And here is modern international law, fortunately or unfortunately, just the same cosmopolitan to the limit. Including, of course, this is the merit of globalization and global assimilation. There are literally very solitary examples left when it is really possible to clearly say that a person belongs to a certain people ethnographically – for example, the Japanese. Japan even provides legal protection based on ethnicity. There is a known case of the Peruvian dictator Fujimori, who was an ethnic Japanese and then, when he fled from Peru, he was able to receive diplomatic protection in Japan.

The second example is the Jews, who, on an ethnic basis, realized what is called «*alia*», which made it possible to form a significant part of the population of the modern state of Israel.

A third example relevant to international law is indigenous peoples. This is something that international law has really begun to pay attention to, since the indigenous peoples – Indians, Bushmen, Maori, Amamuaka and others – will not be able defend themselves. The only thing they can count on is the protection from those the states to which they have jurisdiction.

Therefore, in fact, everything that we have in relation to ethnicity is connected not so much with blood or cultural and historical community, but with jurisdictional affiliation.

Who you are in terms of blood is absolutely not important. You can be anyone, but the most important thing is what kind of passport you have. Moreover, if you and I think about it and think about «multipatrides» – people who have several citizenships, we will understand how much the problem of belonging to a people has now become more complicated.

The cornerstone of this topic is the question of how to interpret the Charter of the United Nations, which enshrines the «right of peoples to self-determination». It is quite obvious that this problem cannot be solved ethnographically. The fact is that ethnographers single out from 5 to 8 thousand peoples, but at the same time there are just over 200 states on our planet. This means that sovereignty is not connected with the people in the ethnographic sense, but with the people in the jurisdictional sense. Thus, the future obviously belongs to multinational and multi-confessional states. First of all, international law warns us against a literal and stereotyped understanding of «the people». It can be stated that today it is primarily a legal binding.

Conclusion

The right of peoples to reunification can be considered from the point of view of the principle of nationality, which was established in the 19th century, and from the point of view of the implementation of the political idea «one nation – one state». Despite the fact that the existence of multinational states in modern conditions hinders the process of reunification of peoples; practices (or attempts) to reunite peoples, argued by their ethnicity or long-term cultural coexistence within a common territorial entity (states, cities, etc.), are observed in the modern world.

Historical examples of reunions show that the reasons for reunification are not always directly related to the common ethnicity of people living in different territories. It is not uncommon for reunification to be driven more by economic and political reasons. Actually, reunification initiatives arose and arise most often in the conditions of crises and the critical existence of the people and are associated, as a rule, with the deprivation of significant cultural, linguistic, spiritual, social, economic, civil, political needs and rights of people. Ethnicity is used as the main argument for reunification, and, in fact, for improving their position.

At the same time, the reaction of the international community to the realization of the right to the reunification of the people is often ambiguous. Thus, the case of Germany demonstrates the initially wary and even negative attitude of the EU countries towards the perspective of reunification of the FRG and the GDR. A strong Germany meant deepening economic and political risks for the countries of the continent. Therefore, guarantees of political and financial stability became a prerequisite for the consent of France and Great Britain to the unification of Germany. The potential reunification of other peoples is also considered by international actors in a geopolitical key.

International law does not define the concepts of «nation» or «people», but actively uses them in imperative and dispositive norms. The principle of equality and the right of

peoples to decide their own destiny give them the right, in conditions of complete freedom, to determine, when and how they wish, their internal and external political status without outside interference and to carry out their own political, economic, social and cultural development at their own discretion. All states shall undertake to respect equality and the right of peoples to decide their own destiny for the development of friendship between peoples and between all states. At the same time, states must respect the principle of the territorial integrity of other states. The right of peoples to self-determination does not contradict the principle of the territorial integrity of states, but streamlines the processes of implementing this principle. The reunification of the people may be a special case of the realization of the people's right to self-determination. The desire of states to preserve their territorial integrity is an important motive for violating their obligations to respect the right of peoples to control their own destiny. This is dictated by the pragmatic interests of states, the absence or insufficient legal regulation of such processes by the norms of international and domestic law, and other factors that require additional research.

The interpretation of the reunification practices from the point of view of international law is very ambiguous. A number of experts believe that the definition of the concept of «people» should be based on the citizenship of a person, and not on his ethnicity (although such precedents existed for individuals, for example, in Japan). In this regard, appealing to a common ethnicity (as the basis for reunification) may not be accepted by other states, and attempts at such reunification may be interpreted as separatism, attempts to violate territorial integrity, etc.

Against this background, it seems very promising to develop the issues of realizing the right of peoples to reunification, which is being conducted by the National Research Institute for the Development of Communications.

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The Main Directions of Development of Kazakh-Russian Cooperation in the Border Area: Transport and Logistics Vector

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Abstract. The article deals with the issues of bilateral relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation in the border area in the sphere of transport and logistics. The analysis is based on the idea that the study of the situation in the sphere of transport and logistics can be associated with the consideration of the barrier and communicative function of the border.

The authors drew attention to how transparency issues affect the economic aspects of interaction. Based on the dynamics of trade turnover, the peculiarities of cargo traffic, conclusions are drawn about the dynamics of the development of relations for nearest future. As a result, key indicators and the main directions of Kazakh-Russian cross-border cooperation in the sphere of railways were identified. Based on the study of the specifics of transport flows, the dynamics of economic interaction between the border regions of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan is shown.

The main problems that economic entities of the border regions of the two countries regularly face due to logistical problems were formulated. Conclusions are also drawn about how the consistent solution of these problems will contribute to the expansion and deepening of relationships not only in the border area, but also at the country-wide level.

Keywords: economy, transport, logistic, border, integration, barrier

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Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the defragmentation of the space of Greater Eurasia. The administrative-territorial border that defines the territories of the Russian Federation and the Kazakh SSR became the border of the new independent states and acquired an international character. By 2019, it was possible to fully complete the process of delimitation of the state border, which determined the status of territories over more than 7,500 km. As a result, a huge border area with its characteristic systemic communication processes has been formed. The level of cross-border cooperation between Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation is also influenced by such factors as Eurasian integration, the general situation within the framework of «Greater Eurasia», trends in geopolitical processes, etc. A high degree of depth of interaction can be confirmed by a number of figures and facts. 76 out of 85 subjects of the Russian Federation have direct links with various regions of Kazakhstan. The array of the contractual and legal framework of bilateral cooperation includes 400 contracts and agreements of various levels. Issues of cross-border and interregional cooperation are regulated in detail by special and comprehensive programs of the Governments of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation.

The current dialogue platform, where initiatives to develop bilateral cooperation are being tested, are the Cross-Border Cooperation Forums of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan, which have been held on a regular basis since 2003, currently the event is held under the name «Forum of Interregional Cooperation». Since 2003, 17 forums have been held, where about 200 agreements have been signed. The cities of Russia or Kazakhstan in turn serve as the venues.

The problem in the development of relations is the recurring attacks of representatives of the Russian establishment with enviable constancy in relation to various aspects of the political and social situation in Kazakhstan. The official position of the Russian side, according to Yermek Kosherbaev, Ambassador of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation, is that “such statements do not correspond to the official position of the Russian Federation and run counter to the good neighborly and allied relations of the two states”¹. However, public opinion is very negative about the constant attacks.

Based on all the above mentioned, it is possible to formulate the purpose of the study: to analyze the features of bilateral relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation in the border zone based on an assessment of their transport and logistics vector.

The authors proceeded from the hypothesis that the issues of transport and logistics in determining the situation in the border zone can be explained in the context of studying the barrier and communicative functions of the border.

¹ Malyshev A. Russia and Kazakhstan: cooperation priorities. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 2021, January 10h

Materials and methods

This is a complex of general scientific and special methods of comparative political research. In particular, chronological, comparative-historical methods were useful in order to get a general idea of the situation in the border zone. The issues of assessing the transport and logistics potential were analyzed by comparing and evaluating the data obtained on the basis of the analysis of open data posted on the official portals and in the media.

In general, issues related to the assessment of the cross-border potential of our countries are actively considered in public discourse. At the same time, it is necessary to understand that the constant change of the situation necessitates its constant reassessment. In this regard, there is a need to constantly monitor the situation in order to provide timely expert assessments for making decisions based on verified data. Of the works used within the framework of this topic, we should pay attention to the collective monograph «Cross-border cooperation along the state border of Russia» edited by A.P. Klemeshev, Ya.A. Vorozheina, I.S. Gumenyuk, G.M. Fedorov (6), which analyzed in detail the problems and assessed the situation in the border regions in the Far East, Siberia, the Urals and the Volga region. Analytical interest presents the opinion of M.K. Zhundubaev, who makes an overview of cross-border interactions with an emphasis on the situation in the trade and economic sphere (4); V.N. Ivanov, M.K. Zhundubaev (5). The situation on the Kazakh-Russian border in relation to individual regions is considered by such authors as O.V. Volokh, V.Yu. Pitakov (3); M.K. Zhundubaev (4). At the same time, we should mention that it is impossible to fully study the problem without studying the data of the media and Internet portals, such as the website of the Valdai Club and the EEC.

Results

The Kazakh-Russian border appears to be a political and geographical phenomenon of an impressive scale, the significance of which goes beyond Eurasia. The border has practically no expression on the ground either in a natural or ethnic way, it is of its post-administrative version. Only 4% of the border line are natural boundaries.

The administrative units of the two states interact over a considerable distance, it is well known that the border between Kazakhstan and Russia is one of the longest land borders in the world. The table below shows which regions of Kazakhstan have contact with the regions of the Russian Federation along the state border.

Thus, 7 regions of the Republic of Kazakhstan border on 12 regions of Russia. In the case of our countries, the importance of cooperation near the state border increases due to the fact that such economically developed cities as Omsk, Orenburg, Novosibirsk, Volgograd, Aktope, Atyrau, Petropavlovsk, Ust-Kamenogorsk and a number of others are located near the border, where even in the Soviet period, large industrial complexes were formed for the extraction and processing of raw materials and other mineral resources (4:87).

Table 1. Border between Kazakhstan and Russia²

Regions of Kazakhstan	Regions of the Russian Federation
Atyrau region	Astrakhan region
West Kazakhstan region	Orenburg, Samara, Saratov, Volgograd and Astrakhan regions
Aktobe region	Orenburg region
Kostanay region	Orenburg, Chelyabinsk and Kurgan regions
North Kazakhstan region	Omsk, Kurgan and Tyumen regions
Pavlodar region	Omsk, Novosibirsk regions, the Altai Territory
East Kazakhstan region	The Altai Territory and the Republic of Altai

The deterministic nature of cross-border contacts is also relevant to the issues of interaction at the infrastructure level (6:188).

The border regions represent a zone of economic cooperation, it is in these regions that the interests of the Russian Federation in Kazakhstan are promoted. The formation of the structure of economic complexes of the borderlands is influenced by the vector of counter interests of the potential of innovative cooperation (1:65). Border regions still remain a place where market laws do not fully apply, as a result, investments in these territories come in insufficient volume for the full development of communicative potential (2:3.).

Interaction in the border zone seems to be one of the main components of relations between Kazakhstan and Russia, both in the format of bilateral cooperation and within the framework of multilateral integration formats developing in the space of Greater Eurasia. In this regard, the content of cooperation is determined, on the one hand, by the interests of regional actors, on the other hand, by the volume of qualitative changes that have occurred in the region since the beginning of the EAEU activities.

In this regard, we can recall the unrealized project of regional cooperation associated with an attempt to create the first Eurasian region, which was supposed to include the Atyrau and Astrakhan regions. The failure of the initiative is partly due to the different legal statuses of the regions. Atyrau region is part of a unitary state, and Astrakhan region is a subject of the Russian Federation, which is a state with a federal structure (5:39).

Despite the documented high level of bilateral relations, they cannot be considered ideal. Attention is drawn to a number of systemic contradictions that complicate the situation of cross-border interactions.

The issues related to the weak development of the relevant infrastructure complicate the process of Kazakh-Russian cooperation.

² Compiled from publicly available geographic data.

Table 2. Problems of cross-border cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia³

Problem	Content	Solution Perspective
Problems of a local technical nature	Due to non-compliance with the norms and regulations of the EAEU, their inaccurate interpretation, different speed of implementation of the EAEU norms in the regions	High, only time is needed
Asymmetry in the development of economic cooperation processes	It is expressed in disproportions and excessive use of non-tariff restrictions related to the admission of goods from the EAEU countries to the single market, a set of foreign policy factors that complicate economic relations with third countries	Average, in the long-term time interval
Systemic problems	Due to the fact that in some sensitive areas the limit of integration has been reached, overcoming which will lead to infringement of national interests	In the case of Eurasian integration, such a moment will come, but not soon, there is nothing to fear yet

There are currently 50 checkpoints on the Kazakh-Russian border. Most of these are road and rail, but there is also 1 river checkpoint. At the same time, the question of their condition is quite acute, some of them need modernization. For example, in the case of that part of the border that passes through the territory of the Omsk region from the Russian side, and North Kazakhstan and Pavlodar region from the side of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1020 km of the border have 8 checkpoints, and each of them requires modernization. Within the framework of the current «Program of joint actions between the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the operation of checkpoints on the Russian-Kazakh state border» from 2020 to 2025, it is planned to update six checkpoints each. Access roads and all infrastructure will be reconstructed⁴.

Discussion

Analyzing the territorial distribution of the economic potential of the borderland, it should be stated that approximately 2/3 of its potential falls on Russia, and the remaining third on Kazakhstan. The regions of Kazakhstan bordering with Russia form 36% of the republic's GRP. The regions of the Russian Federation located near the border form 12% of the country's gross regional product. The economic and resource potential of the border regions is a real driver for the development of cooperation.

³ Dodonov V. Progress and problems of Eurasian integration). 2022. Available from: ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/progress-i-problemy-evraziyskoy-integratsii/

⁴ Checkpoints on the border with Kazakhstan are being modernized in the Omsk region (2019). Available from: omskaif.ru/auto/v_omskey_oblasti_moderniziruyut_punkty_propuska_na_granice_s_kazahstanom.

According to statistics for 2021, Kazakhstan's trade with the EAEU countries amounted to \$26.1 billion, an increase of 28% per year. At the same time, the main volumes of trade of Kazakhstan within the framework of the Eurasian five fall precisely on Russia. The share of the Russian Federation in the trade turnover with the EAEU countries amounted to 92.9%, and with Kazakhstan – 23.9%. Russia accounted for 90.4% of Kazakhstan's exports to the EAEU countries. Over the past (2021) year, 31.6 thousand cars and other motor vehicles, 684 thousand tons of iron and stainless steel bars, 590.2 thousand tons of crude oil and oil products, etc. were delivered from Russia to Kazakhstan⁵.

These data give grounds to conclude that it is the connections of the border regions, the so-called «small integration», determine the development of integration on its large contour.

Among the obvious problems in the development of cross-border cooperation is the issue of balance between the contact and barrier functions of the border. Kazakhstan and Russia within the framework of the EAEU are kind of leaders in terms of the number of barriers that negatively affect economic cooperation both in bilateral and multilateral formats. Russia is the leader within the EAEU, the number of barriers is 55. The second position is taken by Kazakhstan, which has 51 barriers⁶. For example, there are a sufficient number of barriers for Kazakh products in the process of their promotion in the Russian Federation. During the period of Kazakhstan's chairmanship in the EAEU, there were qualitative changes in terms of improving the contact function of the border, since even the number of barriers stated above is a historical minimum. In 2019, the number of barriers was 71.

Estimating the carrying capacity of the border is perhaps the most important point in the study of relationships. Indicative here will be the assessment of the intensity of the traffic flow passing through the checkpoints. The full potential of the contact function of the border will be realized in the presence of a modern infrastructure of checkpoints. And in the case of the Kazakh-Russian border, the infrastructure of the checkpoints is worn out and needs to be modernized. According to the Minister of Industry and Infrastructure Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Beibut Atamkulov, by 2025, the traffic flow can grow by 2 times (up to 20 thousand cars per day), passenger traffic – by 4 times (up to 112 thousand people). In this regard, the issue of modernizing checkpoints is of great importance. Currently, the issue of reconstruction of 6 checkpoints is being studied: Syrym, Taskala, Kosak Urlyutobe, Zhana Zhol and Alimbet. The issue of phased reconstruction of another 24 checkpoints will be addressed. This is a serious problem; It's not secret that traffic jams on the Kazakh-Russian border have become an almost regular occurrence. The most cursory analysis of the media gives information about the presence of congestion on the Kazakh-Russian border at the Mashtakovo / Syrym border checkpoints, for example,

⁵ Trade turnover of Kazakhstan with the EAEU countries grew by 28% over the year (2022). Available from: kapital.kz/economic/103557/tovarooborot-kazahstana-so-stranami-yeaes-vyros-na-28-za-god.html.

⁶ The EAEU Heads of State approved the Strategic Directions for the Development of Eurasian Economic Integration until 2025 (2020). Available from: www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/nae/news/Pages/11-12-2020-02.aspx.

in March 2022⁷. Moreover, the situation has a tendency to constant repetition. To develop the transport and logistics potential and timely resolve urgent problems in 2023-2024, the work is planned to modernize checkpoints in the Orenburg, Omsk and Astrakhan regions. Financing of checkpoints in the Saratov, Orenburg, Astrakhan and Chelyabinsk regions will be increased, it is planned to purchase the necessary equipment for control and inspection at checkpoints located in these regions, as well as carry out repair work⁸.

Table 3. Problems of transport and logistics and the ways to solve them¹⁰

Problem	Content	Territory	Ways of solution
Noncurrent infrastructure of checkpoints	Out of the 30 automobile border checkpoints 5 have specialized inspection equipment, which is unstable and periodically breaks down	Crossing points on the border with the Saratov region, the Orenburg region, the Chelyabinsk region, the Kurgan region, the Tyumen region and others	Additional equipment of checkpoints with modern inspection complexes will speed up commercial transit and ensure its safety
The complexity of meeting the requirements of the border service of the Russian Federation (to ensure a technological passage in the cargo compartments of vehicles)	To bring it into line in the inspection zone, the vehicle is unloaded; as a result of the delay, cargo damage has become frequent	Trucks are not fully loaded	The rise of transport costs, the increase of the price of goods

A necessary step for the development of cross-border cooperation is the availability of a modern infrastructure of checkpoints. The understanding of the existence of the problem is present at the state level, as evidenced by the negotiations held in September 2021 between the Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan R. Sklyar and the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation M. Khusnullin, where the subject of discussion was the need to synchronize the construction of highways in order to be able to predict their carrying capacity, the volume of cargo transportation and the social and economic effect¹¹.

Kazakhstan is also taking certain actions aimed at improving the transit potential in the border area. In particular, in December 2021, K.K. Tokayev spoke about Kazakhstan's

7 Traffic jams on the Kazakh-Russian border will clear up as the weather improves (2022). Available from: www.ritmeurasia.org/news--2022-03-22--probki-na-kazahstansko-rossijskoj-granice-rassosutsja-po-mere-uluchsheniya-pogody-59121.

8 Deputy asks to sort out kilometer-long traffic jams on Kazakh-Russian border (2022). Available from: www.zakon.kz/5066962-s-kilometrovymi-zatorami-na.html.

9 Three checkpoints to be upgraded in 2023-2024 on the border between Russia and Kazakhstan (2022). Available from: tass.ru/ekonomika/12549665.

10 Russia-Kazakhstan interregional cooperation forum (2022). Available from: kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66809.

11 Roman Sklyar and Marat Khusnullin discussed issues of cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia (2022). Available from: forbes.kz/news/2021/10/01/newsid_259989.

intention to build two cross-border cooperation centers on the border with Russia. In fairness, it should be noted that Kazakhstan plans to build two similar centers on the border with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. All this will make it possible to level transaction costs and promote the growth of transport logistics in order to increase Kazakhstan's export.

In case of the completion of the construction of the M12 highway (Moscow – Kazan – Yekaterinburg), which can go to Xian (PRC), a highway with a length of 8,500 km will be formed bypassing Kazakhstan¹².

Insufficient development of railway communication can be considered one of the problems complicating the development of cross-border cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia. The main concentration of railway lines falls on the northern section of the border. The western section has three times less railways. The shortest distance by rail between the industrial centers of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation is through the northwestern part of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Volga region. In the case of the border between Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, which affects the east of Kazakhstan, approximately 70% of this region has no connection with Russia by rail. The abolition of the section "Kulunda – Malinovo Ozero – Lokot" due to low load in the early 2000s had a negative effect on the transport and logistics potential¹³. Attempts were repeatedly made (unfortunately, unsuccessful) to restore the railway line «Russkaya Polyana (Irtyskoye) – Granichnaya – Kzyl-Tu».

Assessing the transport and logistics potential at the border of the Omsk and North Kazakhstan regions, it should be noted that the total cargo flow is approximately 10 million tons per year, and transit, in turn, exceeds the specified volume. Large mining and manufacturing enterprises are located here, we are talking about OAO (OJSC) Gazpromneft-ONPZ (Omsk oil refinery), as well as large centers for the extraction of coal and crushed stone in Pavlodar, Petropavlovsk. These enterprises are cargo generating centers. Therefore, the formation of a regional transport and logistics hub «Omsk – Pavlodar» would be a completely rational form of cross-border cooperation.

In the case of the construction of new railway lines between the Pavlodar region and the Russian Federation, as well as towards China, it will be possible to seriously expand the foreign economic contacts of the region both in the north-south and east-west directions (3, p. 155).

Also, assessing the transport and logistics potential of cross-border cooperation, we should point out that its development can be a promising direction to improve bilateral relations. The plans of our countries include the intention to increase the volume of river cargo transportation between Omsk and Pavlodar to 1 million tons per year by 2025.

The issues of railway communication have recently constituted a very sensitive sphere of relations between our countries. In this regard, the presence of pronounced disagreements in the period of 2020–2021 between OAO (OJSC) "RZD" (Russian Railways)

12 Zhukov E. Road of Change: Why Russia is going to build an 8500-kilometer highway to China, bypassing Kazakhstan (2022). Available from: life.ru/p/1470555.

13 Russia-Kazakhstan: railway infrastructure lags behind integration needs (2022). Available from: www.ritmeurasia.org/news--2022-01-28--rossiya-kazahstan-zh-d-infrastruktura-otstaet-ot-potrebnostej-integracii-58369.

and Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ – Kazakhstan railways) is indicative. During the period of strict quarantine restrictions, the transport giants were unable to find a common language on the supply of railcars, which affected the production process of a number of Russian border iron and steel enterprises. The issue had to be resolved at the EEC level¹⁴.

The restriction for the growth of cargo traffic is the poor technical condition of the Bukhtarma, Ust-Kamenogorsk and Shulba shipping locks. It is also necessary to carry out dredging works on the Irtysh. In the event of repair work, it will be possible to organize navigation along the entire length of the Irtysh, and if we take into account the long-term perspective, it will be possible to open a multimodal communication with China¹⁵.

Conclusion

The prospects and state of relations between Kazakhstan and Russia are also determined by how cross-border interactions are developing.

The indicators of cooperation include: trade turnover – both in the border area and in general, mutual investments, passenger and freight traffic, border infrastructure. All this must be taken into account in conjunction with the contact and barrier functions of the Kazakh-Russian border.

Based on the study, we can conclude that there is a direct connection between the policy pursued in the border area and the issues of bilateral cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia. The problems of cross-border cooperation can be formulated as follows:

differences in implementation, untimely execution of agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, that are in force within the framework of the EAEU;

- underperformance of the local authorities of the border regions;
- barriers, exemptions and restrictions in the organization of trade, which, however, are gradually reduced;

- negative balance of Kazakhstan in trade with Russia;
- technically and morally, the border infrastructure is outdated, the number of checkpoints does not meet the needs;

- the network of cross-border transport arteries does not meet the level of needs of the main stakeholders.

Problems are gradually being solved, but the pace and scale of work are low. At the same time, it should be noted that cross-border cooperation is gradually beginning to take on a systemic character in all vectors (trade, investment, etc.).

¹⁴ Zainullin, E. Skorlygina N. Conventions are followed by Kazakhstan. Russian business complains about stopping the entry of empty cars. 2022. Available from: www.kommersant.ru/doc/4683588.

¹⁵ Mishustin said that the trade turnover between Russia and Kazakhstan has returned to the growth trajectory (2022). Available from: tass.ru/ekonomika/13248457.

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Models of post-conflict settlement on the example of Arab countries

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Abstract. The article presents the materials of a scientific discussion related to the topic of post-conflict settlement in the Arab world, organized by the National Communications Development Research Institution together with the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The authors analyze theoretical models and specific cases of settlement in the regions of the Middle East, North Africa, the Arab world and related challenges. The humanitarian aspect of post-conflict political settlement and economic reconstruction, which has been associated with a number of challenges in recent years, is considered.

Keywords: post-conflict settlement, the Middle East, the Arab world, Yemen, Libya, Syria

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Introduction

The unstable global and regional international situation in the conditions of the transition to a multipolar world, when the collective West is trying to confront new centers of power, determines new principles of studying modern conflicts – their genesis and evolution. One of the tasks becomes the search for optimal ways out of conflicts. Logically, the field of research is the vast geographical region of the Middle East and North Africa and the Arab world, characterized by numerous crises and internal armed conflicts that tend to internationalize.

This article analyzes post-conflict reconstruction models in the countries of the League of Arab States (LAS) and analyzes specific country cases (Yemen, Libya, Syria) from the perspective of political settlement and economic reconstruction.

Materials and methods

Country cases (Yemen, Libya, Syria) are analyzed from the point of the prospects for political settlement and their economic reconstruction. The article was prepared by a team of experts on the results of a scientific and practical discussion, which was organized on June 21, 2022 by the National Research Institute for the Communications Development with the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The authors used the visualization method: the bulk layer of the material is summarized in tables, which makes it possible to use the comparative historical method. To implement the objectives of the study, the author's concepts of "conflict" and "crisis" are proposed.

Results

Models of post-conflict recovery on the example of Arab countries (I.A. Matveev)

Because of the ambiguity of the concepts of "conflict" (3) and "crisis" (1), in this study "conflict" is considered as a consequence and culmination of the most acute phase of the crisis. Here we should not forget that crises can be deep and systemic, regularly giving rise to conflict situations. An example is sectarian-torn Lebanon, where the crisis of 1958, the civil war of 1975-1990, the Cedar Revolution of 2005, and the Second Lebanon War of 2006 alternated with periods of economic recovery. Therefore, in this article, "post-conflict recovery" also includes measures to overcome crises.

Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the current state and prospects of a political settlement on the example of six Arab League States (Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Somalia), as well as the PA:

In the cases under consideration, we see signs of a deeply divided society (DDS). This theoretical concept, put forward by the British researcher A. Gelke (5) in relation to the Middle East, is developed by V.V. Naumkin (2). DDS confrontation lines are fueled by negative social phenomena, such as tribalism (tribal strife), confessionalism or sectarianism (taifiyya), as well as regionalism or fraternity, when it refers to the dominance in power and economy of people from certain regions (iklimiya)¹. All six Arab countries and the PNA have problems with

¹ The phenomena of taifiyya and iklimiya are analyzed by the Dutch researcher of Syria Nicholas van Dam with reference to Syrian sources: van Dam N. *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Asad and the Ba'th Party*. London-NY: I.B. Tauris, 4th rev. ed., 2011:181.

Table 1. The state of the processes of political settlement of con-flicts/crises in Arab countries (part 1)

Country	Chronology of the conflict	Characteristics of the conflict/crisis	Lines of confrontation	Degree of internationalization	Status of the peace process/ dialogue	Settlement prospects
Iraq	1990	Systemic internal crisis after the end of the civil war (2017) and external intervention (2011), the hotbeds of ISIS activity	Kurds / Sunni Arabs/ Shia Compradors / Islamic Radicals (ISIS)	High: orientation of local political forces towards external actors (Kurds – West, Shiites – Iran, Sunnis – Arabian monarchies)	The existence of a Kurdish autonomous region, the distribution of the highest state posts on an ethno-confessional basis (muhasasa taifiyya): The president is a Kurd, the head of the parliament is a Sunni, the prime minister is a Shiite coalition in the government, the power of the militia on the ground	Negative: the persistence of GRO and the interference of external authors in Iraqi affairs, the growth of local Kurdish separatism, the continued threat of terrorism
Yemen	2014	Internal armed conflict (hot phase) with external intervention	Sunnis / Shiites compradors / Islamic radicals elites of the North / South tribalism	Very high: military intervention by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, support for the Houthis by Iran	The national dialogue and the peace negotiation process are essentially absent (ad hoc contacts are underway)	Sharply negative in the short and medium term, continued confrontation, possible escalation
Lebanon	2019	Systemic internal crisis of the confessional political system	Confessionalism (taifiyya): Christians / Sunnis/ Shiites Arabs / Armenians/ "Levantines" local population / refugees (Syrians, Palestinians)	High: orientation of confessions to external authors (Christians – West; Sunnis – Arabian monarchies, West, Shiites – Iran); influence of Syria (now reduced due to the conflict in Syria itself)	Ethno-confessional political system based on the National Pact (1943): Maronite Christian President, Sunni Prime Minister, Shiite Head of Parliament	Negative in the short term, positive in the medium and long term, the formation of a national consensus on overcoming the crisis with foreign aid
Libya	2011	Internal armed conflict (hot phase completed in 2020)	Tribalism Regionalism (iklimiya) Compradors / Islamic Radicals	High: support by external actors of the parties to the conflict	A Government of National Unity has been formed (2021), but the national dialogue is unstable, the power of local militias remains	Negative in the short and medium term; positive in the long term: formation of a national consensus on overcoming the crisis based on domestic resources (oil) and foreign aid

Table 1. The state of the processes of political settlement of con-flicts/crises in Arab countries (part 2)

Country	Chronology of the conflict	Characteristics of the conflict/crisis	Lines of confrontation	Degree of internationalization	Status of the peace process/ dialogue	Settlement prospects
PNA	1948 (Arab-Israeli conflict) 2006 (inter-Palestinian conflict)	Armed conflict with external and internal confrontation	Arabs / Jews compradors / Islamists elites of the West Bank / Gaza Strip	Average: Qatar and Iran's support for Islamists in the Gaza Strip; part of the West's support for the PNA authorities	The split of the PNA persists, the confrontation between the Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine (Fatah) and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas))	Negative: the preservation of the GRO in the context of the declining interest of the world community in the Palestinian problem and the process of normalization of relations between a number of Arab countries with Israel (Abraham Agreements 2020). The threat of Islamic radicalism
Syria	2011	Internal armed conflict (hot phase localized in 2020) with external intervention	Arabs / Kurds Sunnis / religious minorities (Taifiyya) Regionalism (iklimiya) supporters of the secular way of life / Islamists	Very high: the military presence of Iran, Turkey, Russia, the United States in Syria; Iran's economic assistance to the SAR authorities	The negotiation process has been taking place since 2012 in the Geneva and Astana formats, and the Syrian Constitutional Committee was established in 2019. There is no national dialogue	Negative in the short term while maintaining sanctions; positive in the medium and long term: the formation of a national consensus on overcoming the crisis on the basis of decentralizing governance (al-la markaziya) and taking into account the interests of local elites, including Kurds and Druze
Somalia	1988	Internal armed conflict, the "failed state" scenario	regionalism: the struggle of local elitetribalismIslamic radicalism	Average: permanent dependence on external humanitarian aid	The Federal Government of Somalia was created (2012), but its powers are limited. There is no national dialogue	Negative: the persistence of GRO, administrative-territorial fragmentation and acute humanitarian crisis in conditions of limited internal resources. Threats of terrorism and radicalism
Libya	2011	Internal armed conflict (hot phase completed in 2020)	Tribalism Regionalism (iklimiya) Compradors / Islamic Radicals	High: support by external actors of the parties to the conflict	A Government of National Unity has been formed (2021), but the national dialogue is unstable, the power of local militias remains	Negative in the short and medium term; positive in the long term: formation of a national consensus on overcoming the crisis based on domestic resources (oil) and foreign aid

national dialogue, consolidation of society in the face of external challenges (intervention of foreign forces, threats of terrorism and radicalism), and the degree of internationalization of crises and conflicts in the era of globalization is increasing. The combination of these factors slows down and even freezes the processes of political settlement.

The situation with economic recovery is hardly better, that is, the elimination of direct and indirect damage from conflicts. It is necessary to draw a line between the stages of this process, in connection with which the article provides the generally accepted differentiation of UNDP (table 3), according to which early recovery is distinguished² and post conflict reconstruction³:

Table 3. Economic recovery (interpretation by UNDP)

early recovery	post crisis recovery
A process dependent on the assistance of external actors, primarily humanitarian aid	A self-sufficient process with a primary reliance on national resources; a shift from humanitarian to official assistance, to development goals

Although it is worth recognizing the universal nature of the UNDP scheme, its applicability for the analysis of any conflicts (by analogy with the well-known parable⁴), it has obvious disadvantages. This is the opposition of both stages: the recovery stages are separated by time, although they often overlap each other. The same disadvantages (conditionality of periodization, arbitrary deadlines, lack of understanding that the stages overlap each other), despite the greater concretization, are also in "country interpretations". An example is the Syrian gradation of the stages of reconstruction (Table 4), which is enshrined in the National Program for the Development of Syria in the post-war period, approved by the decree of the Government of the SAR of February 8, 2017 No. 1549/13⁵.

Table 4. Concepts of early and post-conflict reconstruction in Syria

The first stage (Arabic: al-igasa wa al-istyjaba li al-ikhtyyajat)	The second stage (at-taafi)	The third stage (al-intyash)	The fourth stage (al-istydama at-tanmawiy)
Prompt assistance and response to the vital needs of the economy and the population	Early recovery: elimination of direct consequences of the conflict, stabilization of the economy	Revitalising social and economic life: stimulating business activity, eliminating direct and indirect consequences of the conflict	Sustainable development: solving problems of economic growth and social problems

² UNDP Policy on Early Recovery . UNDP, 22 Aug 2008:7. Available from: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A638DC99C778DD18C12575F3003F55B0-undp_aug2008.pdf.

³ Enabling Local Ingenuity .UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Report, 2008:5. Available from: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A73161A001F3AB6CC12574EA004625C6-undp_oct2008.pdf.

⁴ "Give a hungry man a fish and you will feed him for one day. Give him a fishing rod, teach him how to fish – and you will feed him for life."

⁵ The National Program for the Development of Syria in the post-war period. Damascus: State Commission for Planning and International Cooperation under the Council of Ministers of the Syrian Arab Republic, May 2020. Available from: http://picc.gov.sy/EG8/report/Syria_202.pdf.

Therefore, an overview of the prospects for post-conflict recovery of the economies of the Arab countries (Table 5) is given without breakdown and at the same time taking into account the heterogeneity of the stages of this process (Table 6). All of the above factors determine the features of promising models of post-conflict reconstruction on the example of the seven states of the Arab League (Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Somalia, Sudan). We see both models with an emphasis on national consolidation, an elite agreement based on internal resources and/or external assistance – and decentralization on a consensual basis, taking into account the interests of local elites (as in Syria).

The following are country case studies.

Table 6. How to rebuild: models of post-conflict recovery in the short and medium term

Coutryt	Models of post-conflict recovery	The main characteristics of the model
Iraq	National consolidation with elements of external management	Countering Kurdish separatism and complete economic isolation of the KAR, developing interregional ties, attracting related and unrelated assistance (grants, loans) and investments from the GCC countries, the EU, the USA, Iran, international financial institutions (IMF, IBRD)
Yemen	It will not take place in the near future	Growing fragmentation of economic life, unclear prospects for post-conflict reconstruction (limited by the framework of early recovery)
Lebanon	National consolidation with elements of external management	Establishing a national (interfaith) dialogue, receiving in the short term an assistance (grants, loans) from the GCC countries, the EU, the USA, international financial institutions (IMF, IBRD), in the medium term – attracting foreign investment.
Libya	National consolidation	Establishing a national dialogue, restoration of the oil industry in order to revive the base of economic reconstruction
Syria	Decentralization (al-la markaziya) of governance	Engaging Syrian Kurds in dialogue, economic reintegration, constitutional reform (taking into account the interests of local elites), using the Russian "security matrix"
Somalia	Combination of national consolidation and decentralization	The slogan of federalization, attraction of external donor assistance and investments, economic reintegration while recognizing the de facto independence of Somaliland
Sudan	National consolidation	Concentration of all internal resources in the hands of the Government after the separation of the oil-rich South Sudan

Struggle for Influence in Yemen: Economics and Geopolitics (S.N. Serebrov)

1. Refinement to the typology of the Yemeni military conflict.

The military operation of the Arab coalition «Storm of determination» in Yemen, launched on March 26, 2015, turned into a protracted military conflict that created the largest source of humanitarian catastrophe on the planet and serious threats to

Table 5. The state of economic recovery processes in the Arab countries

Country	Chronological framework	Conflict status	Territorial fragmentation	Fragmentation of society	Income from oil, gas, banking	International consensus on reconstruction	Timeline of the recovery process
Iraq	1980–1988	Iran-Iraq War	No	Yes	Yes	No	Was not completed
	1990–2017	Sanctions / foreign occupation / internal armed conflict with the participation of external actors – the fight against ISIS / the hot phase is over, the problem of terrorism and hotbeds of ISIS activity remains	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	The process is ongoing / completion dates are unclear
Yemen	2014–н/в (2004–2011 – sporadicheskie столкновения)	Internal armed conflict with external intervention / ongoing	Yes	Yes	Yes (limited)	No	The process has not started
Kuwait	1990–1991	Occupation by Iraq / liberation by external actors (multinational forces) / the conflict is over	No	No	Yes	Yes	2 years, the process is completed
Lebanon	1975–1990	Internal armed conflict (civil war involving external actors) / completed	No (but there are zones of informal territorial control)	Yes	Yes	Yes	10 years, the process is completed
	2019	Domestic political and economic crisis / ongoing	Yes	Yes	No	No	The process has not started
Libya	2011–2020	Internal armed conflict with external intervention / the hot phase is over, instability persists	Yes	Yes	Yes (органичны)	Her	The process has not started
Syria	2011	Internal armed conflict with external intervention / the fight against ISIS / the hot phase is localized, the economic crisis continues	Yes	Да	Her	Her	The process is local / completion dates are unclear
Somalia	1988	Internal armed conflict involving external actors / continues with low intensity	Yes (the collapse of a unified state)	Yes	No	No	The process has begun, but is limited
Sudan	1983–2005	Internal armed conflict (second civil war between the Arab North and the non-Arab South) / completed (2011)	Yes: South Sudan gained independence (2011)	Yes	Yes	No	The process is ongoing / completion dates are not clear

international security in one of the most significant regions for the global economy and logistics. The official assignment of the conflict to the international legal category of civil wars (an internationally recognized president plus an Arab coalition against the Houthis rebels) occurred after the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 2216 (April 2015), which contained a demand for the Houthis to “withdraw all forces from all territories occupied by them, including Sana’a” and “the cessation of all activities falling exclusively within the competence of the legitimate government of Yemen”⁶. At the time of the adoption of the Resolution, the territory of Yemen was already under blockade and under massive air attacks from the Arab coalition aviation, and President Abdo Rabbo M. Hadi took refuge in Riyadh, where he spent all subsequent years of the war, up to the transfer of his powers to the Governing Presidential Council 7 April 2022.

Through the efforts of Russia’s representative to the UN Security Council, who abstained from its adoption, the amendments to the text of the document were rejected by the rest of the voters. Later, the question of changing the text of the resolution arose more than once in the expert community, but remained unresolved.

The exceptional strategic geographic position of Yemen, direct participation in the military operation of two foreign regional states (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), large-scale logistical support from the United States and England, deep involvement in internal Yemeni problems of foreign states, hundreds of billions of dollars spent by them over the past seven years, the regular release of hostilities outside Yemen – these and other facts reflect the inadequacy of the adopted concept. To typify this Yemeni crisis, it is more appropriate to recognize it as an intermediate type of conflict – between an internationalized form of civil war and a military regional conflict.

This is reflected in alternative political concepts of the Yemeni crisis, where it is seen as a «proxy war» (between Saudi Arabia and Iran) and a «hybrid war» (in which foreign actors set the tone). Both approaches emphasize the special role of the geopolitical component of the conflict, although they do not fully explain its meaning.

Correcting the definition of the type of crisis is necessary, among other things, to unblock the peacekeeping projects of the UN, international organizations and sovereign actors. They came to a standstill because of the tendentious attitudes of the fundamental documents, which distorted the political realities of Yemen and the region beyond recognition. The former chief curator of the peace transit plan in Yemen, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General Jamal Benomar (2011-2015), who resigned in April 2015, commenting on the situation in Yemen after the start of the intervention, wrote: “Less than a month later ... a UN Security Council resolution demanded from the Houthis to unconditional surrender to the government that left Yemen and went into exile, settled in the hotels of Riyadh. Impossible conditions like these... provided retrospective justification... for continuing the war.” One of the latest examples of the futility of trying to achieve peace in this paradigm was the recent statement by US President George Biden

⁶ S/RES/2216 (2015) c. 3/7. Available from: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2216.pdf.

(February 2021) about “our diplomacy is aimed at ending the war in Yemen, a war that has created a humanitarian and strategic catastrophe.” Already in the summer of 2021, the conflict entered a phase of even more dangerous escalation.

B In 2021-2022, all this did not allow the UN mission (led by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General Hans Grundberg) to return the task of a general political settlement of the conflict to the agenda of the Yemeni negotiations (it had to be abandoned after the collapse of the Kuwait round of negotiations in 2016, which seriously undermined the confidence of the Yemeni participants). The next negotiations in Stockholm (2018) already touched only on particular issues of the humanitarian consequences of the ongoing war.

The political, economic and food situation in the world in 2022 makes a real threat of a humanitarian collapse in Yemen. The relative success of the UN-initiated truce in April 2022, accepted by all Yemeni parties to the crisis for the first time since 2016, will at best only slightly ease the situation, changing it to a “no war, no peace” situation. To guarantee the prevention of collapse, a revision of the international legal framework is required.

War as well as the situation of a fragile status quo (neither war nor peace) generate conditions for further internationalization of the conflict. As early as 2015, hostilities in Yemen encompassed several adjacent regions of Saudi Arabia (Asir, Jizan, and Najran), and by 2022 retaliatory attacks on strategic targets in The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and UAE using Yemeni ballistic missiles and drones had become a threatening regular occurrence. In 2017, U.S. Special Forces conducted a landing operation against militants of the terrorist group Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen's Beida province, in which more civilians were killed, and beginning in 2020 England began to address the security of commercial maritime traffic along the southern coast of Yemen in an anti-Iranian and anti-Husite aspect. In August 2021, it was reported that it deployed a 40-member British special forces team to the eastern Yemeni province of Mahra⁷, the territory of Oman that is hundreds of kilometers away from the Husites.

Yemen controls the international channel Bab el-Mandeb, the waters of the Gulf of Aden and the adjacent shores of the Arabian and Red Seas for a total length of over 1,900 km (about 1,500 km from the south and over 400 km from the west). It also occupies a key position at the junction of the three centers of regional security (the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa), having a serious impact on their state. The geopolitical struggle in Yemen makes it only a matter of time before it escalates into a full-fledged regional conflict.

2. Geopolitical aspects of the military crisis.

The conclusion of the authors of the final expert report of the UN Security Council on the situation in Yemen for 2019 that “multiple conflicts in the country (over five years) have formed a node that does not allow drawing a clear line between internal and external

⁷ British special forces on hunt for drone killers. World News Express.co.uk. By Marco Giannangeli. Aug 8, 2021. Available from: <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1473978/british-special-forces-yemen-drone-attack>.

actors”⁸, confirmed the irrelevance of the binary interpretation of the crisis. Over the years of the war, the strategies of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UAE (which have enormous economic, military and political resources compared to Yemen) in Yemen, were aimed at forming loyal coalitions to oppose the Husis, but that coalitions were also divided with each other by deep internal contradictions. The relationship of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UAE with their Yemeni allies is reciprocal, with loyalty being subject to mutual bargaining, which makes it highly likely that the situation and the balance of power will constantly change in the future.

Domestic and foreign actors in the Yemeni crisis are grouped together on the basis of fundamental geopolitical contradictions. Each actor is trying to expand its own political and ideological influence in Yemen or in the international arena, using the achievements and shortcomings of its partners. The leadership of the foreign actors in the Arab coalition is very contingent.

After the unification of the Arab Republic of Yemen and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1990, long before the start of the war, two geopolitical problems arose: a) the so-called. the “southern question”, which since 2009 has revolved around a demand by the influential (albeit divided) South Yemeni separatist movement Hirak for recognition of the right of the people of the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (called “southerners” – janubiyun) to self-determination and secession from Yemen and b) conflicts that engulfed both the Shafi'i (Sunni) South and the Zaidi (Shi'ite) regions of the North during clashes with the Yemeni association “Islah” (“Reform”), the bearer of the proselytizing Salafi ideology.

In the second half of the 1990s, the baton of the al-Haqq party was taken over by the mass civil movement “shabab al-mumin” (“faithful youth”), whose leader, Seyyid Hussein B. al-Husi, considered it necessary to amend the state confessional policy, depriving monopoly privileges of the Islah party in the field of education. The Houthi leader considered the network of Salafi religious colleges “maahid ylmia”, in which authentic indigenous Yemeni beliefs and customs were mercilessly criticized from the standpoint of their inconsistency with true Islam, a threat to the unique centuries-old cultural identity of the Yemenis, the foundation of their ethno-cultural integrity. Years of bickering between Salafis, Shafi'is and Zaidis in Yemen has been accompanied by mutual accusations of following Saudi Arabia or Iran (4), making the Yemeni conflict part of a wider conflict within the Saudi-Iranian political divisions.

Two bloody civil wars in Yemen, in 1994 (between North and South) and in 2004-2010 (against the Houthis), became the catalyst for the fact that the problems of identity turned into political problems.

The beginning of the military intervention of the Arab coalition in Yemen in March 2015 was accompanied by accusations by the Houthis of the Iranian side, as well as an attempt to transform it into a Sunni-Shia confrontation. This caused rejection of the Yemeni society. The attempt to secure a reputation for Yemeni Zaidis as agents of Iranian

⁸ UN SC 28/04/2020//S/2020/326 Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen: 2-207.

political and ideological influence in Yemen and Arabia did not receive support either from the Sunni majority of the population of Yemen, or at the level of partners of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as part of the Arab coalition. The accusations of the Houthis in the transition from Zaydism to Jaafarism (religious doctrine of Shiite Islam, which is dominant in Iran and Iraq) also did not find influential supporters, including among the Zaydi ulema.

The objective weakness of the Saudi-Iranian and associated Sunni-Shiite causes of the Yemeni military campaign led to the fact that rivalry within the GCC came to the fore. Yemen's role in the regional balance of power as a counterbalance to the dominant contender was indispensable. Although five of the six members of the GCC initially announced their entry into the Arab Coalition (all except Oman), only the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UAE became its real active participants. Oman and Kuwait immediately came out for a political resolution of the conflict, and Qatar, which initially joined the fight, dropped out of the ranks of the Arab coalition in 2017 as a result of the so-called diplomatic conflict with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The unfavorable consequences of the military campaign in Yemen were manifested, among other things, in the development of contradictions in the ranks of the Arab coalition between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the main participants in the Yemeni campaign. The division of the Arab coalition into the Saudi and Emirati flanks, begun in 2016, resulted in their institutional, political, military and functional demarcation. The flanks acquired their own separate headquarters, paramilitary structures, incompatible strategies and vision of campaign goals. Their rivalry for influence over strategic areas of part of Yemen loyal to the Arab coalition has taken the form of armed clashes. The "Islah" party was co-opted into the party of the Internationally Recognized President and took the leading position in the Yemeni coalition of the Saudi flank. The ideology of "Islah" was opposed not only by the supporting forces of the Emirati flank, but also by the UAE itself, which considered "Islah" to be a branch of the banned "Muslim Brotherhood".

The partial withdrawal of the UAE from the military operation in Yemen in the summer of 2019 was accompanied by the transfer of all the previously accumulated military and administrative resources in Yemen to their two strongholds of political influence: the Southern Transitional Council and the National Resistance Political Council. The number of transferred paramilitary units was more than 60 thousand people.

The confrontation between the flanks of the Arab coalition, which was manifested in the capture by the Southern Transitional Council of control over Aden from the Emirati flank in August 2019, was not overcome either by the signing of the Riyadh Agreement (November 2019) on the establishment of a joint government under the leadership of the International Recognized President, or as a result of pressure exerted on their regional partners from the USA and England. Undoubtedly, the radical reshuffling of the party of the internationally recognized president in April 2022, as well as the expected visit of US President John Biden to Saudi Arabia in July, will be focused primarily on reducing the level of confrontation skillfully used by Sanaa for a successful and large-scale offensive operation in 2020–2021.

To integrate the power structures of the rival flanks of the Arab coalition, at least a joint political platform is needed; obviously, the new leader of the Governing Presidential

Council Rashad al-Alimi will be occupied by that task. He will have to bring positions closer on such issues as the integrity of the country and the status of the South, the place of the "Islah" party in the political system of post-conflict Yemen.

The "no war, no peace" situation that has arisen in the crisis zone since April 2022 does not guarantee the fading of the military conflict in the nearest future, but significantly enhances the importance of the economic component of the confrontation between the three Yemeni coalitions, one of which is based on the unrecognized regime of Sana'a, and the other two are on the newly created alliance of the two flanks of the Arab coalition. The new supreme body of executive power of the internationally recognized president must move its activities from Riyadh to Aden, but even this task in modern conditions does not have a simple solution.

3. Two camps and three coalitions: the struggle for resources and influence.

The three coalitions in the Yemen crisis zone are represented by two camps: The Sana'a Alliance (SA), mistakenly referred to as the "Houthis", and the two rival flanks of the Arab coalition camp, which in April 2022 made another attempt to eliminate the dichotomy from the relationship through cooperation in a new authority – the RPS.

The unrecognized coalition regime in Sana'a has been functioning since 2016 as a part of the Ansarullah Houthi movement and the core of the former General People's Congress (GPC) party in power. The State-type regime declared loyalty to the current Constitution of Yemen, and this facilitated its legitimization by the majority of the Yemeni population. It controls about 90% of the territory of the North (the former YAR), where 3/4 of the country's inhabitants live. The UN Security Council expert report quoted earlier notes: the Sana'a regime, "in contrast to the permanent instability in the South, continues to consolidate its influence, and demonstrates military unity and economic efficiency"⁹.

The authorities in Sana'a are pursuing a mobilization policy inside the country under the slogan of consolidating Yemenis to repulse the military intervention of Al Qaeda and "its mercenaries" for the freedom and independence of the country. In foreign policy, they show solidarity with the policies of the "Axis of Resistance" countries, considering the Palestinian problem central among the main political problems of the Middle East. The ideology of this power is a fusion of Yemeni nationalism, based on the notion that Yemenis occupy a priority position in the Arab and Islamic world (which is usually confirmed by references to the Hadith collections and the Koran) with Islamic nationalism, which demands consolidation of all Islamic faiths throughout the Islamic world to oppose the imperialism of the US and its enablers.

The authorities of Sana'a pay great attention to an economic strategy based on self-reliance and national resources, developing agriculture and the defense industry. The regime actively promotes its economic achievements to residents of the rest of the country, keeping, for example, the rial exchange rate in Sanaa at a level almost twice as high as its exchange rate in Aden (where it fell almost twice as fast after the transfer of the Central Bank from Sanaa in 2016, reaching 2022 more than 1,000 rials per 1 US

9 Ibid. 2020;326:7-207.

dollar). The authorities of Sana'a are convincing the Yemenis that the ultimate goal of the military campaign of the Arab coalition is the maximum depletion of Yemen, depriving it of control over oil fields, and in the future – the elimination of its sovereignty and turning it into a colonially dependent territory in the interests of the United States and its partners.

Sustained economic exchanges between the fragmented territories controlled by all three coalitions have kept the Yemenis from slipping into the humanitarian collapse that could have set in in previous years due to acute shortages of food, fuel, water and medicine.

The flanks of the Arab coalition compete fiercely for the strategic territories and islands of the separatist South: Aden, Socotra, Hadhramaut, Shabwa, Mahra, etc. The support strategy of the emirate flank of the Arab coalition, Socotra, Hadhramaut, Shabwa, Mahra, etc. The strategy of the Arab coalition's emirate flank to support the Southern Transitional Council ensured its relative success in most of the territory of the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, but the question of the future status of the South remains open. The process of political and economic disintegration of the South leads to the transformation of its regions into competing cantons, which does not suit either the Southern Transitional Council, or the Yemeni actors of the unionist flank as part of the forces of the internationally recognized president, as well as the Sana'i Alliance, which consider any projects for the territorial division of Yemen to be contrary to its national interests.

The armed structures of the Saudi flank, loyal to the internationally recognized president, control all the main oil and gas fields in Yemen – the main source of the country's budget revenues. It is obvious that the struggle for this resource will be at the center of any negotiations involving all three coalitions during the "no war, no peace" phase, since only it can provide them with a reliable basis for economic recovery in Yemen.

Humanitarian assistance in conflicts: the main challenges for humanitarian organizations (A.L.Khlebnikov)

Each of the modern conflicts is unique in its own way, having its own reasons, logic, difficulties and peculiarities. The problems concerning humanitarian access and the delivery of humanitarian aid are also unique. However, at the same time, the absolute majority of humanitarian organizations face common to them and large-scale problems¹⁰ in the process of carrying out their work.

In this article we will look at some of the main problems and challenges in the sphere of humanitarian assistance in conflicts.

1. The changing character of modern conflicts.

Despite the noble goals that drive humanitarian organizations, their activities often lead to contradictory results. One of the most important reasons is the changed character of modern conflicts. For the first time after the end of World War II, half of all armed

¹⁰ In this article, "humanitarian organizations" means "international non-governmental organization" (INGOs).

conflicts were colonial wars and interstate conflicts. This type of conflict has practically ceased to exist. According to the Oslo Peace Research Institute (PRIO), today the dominant form of conflict is interstate conflict, often involving external player states¹¹. Today, only two conflicts can be called interstate – this is the conflict between India and Pakistan and between Russia and Ukraine.

One of the key problems today is the internationalization of conflicts – these are civil wars involving external players. According to PRIO research, such conflicts are difficult to resolve politically. The reason is the growth of the parties involved in the conflict: these are both state and non-state (national liberation movements, territorial self-defense units, terrorist organizations, armed groups based on ethnic and / or religious lines, etc.) actors, as a result the distinction between military and civilians becomes more complex. A greater number of participants also complicates the process of political settlement, finding compromises and increases the risk of blocking deals or agreements. All this complicates the ability to deliver humanitarian assistance to all parties to the conflict and the activities of humanitarian organizations in principle, as the distinction between civilian and military assistance is blurred. As a result, there is an increased risk that humanitarian organizations are perceived as biased (not neutral).

One of the key problems today is the internationalization of conflicts – these are civil wars involving external participants. According to PRIO research, such conflicts are difficult to resolve politically. The fact is that many parties are involved in the conflict: these are both state and non-state (national liberation movements, territorial self-defense units, terrorist organizations, armed groups built along ethnic and / or religious lines, etc.) participants, resulting in more complex distinctions between military and civilians. Also, a larger number of participants complicates the process of political settlement, finding compromises and increases the risk of blocking deals or agreements. As a result of all this, the ability to deliver humanitarian assistance to all sides of the conflict and the activities of humanitarian organizations in general becomes more difficult, as the distinction between civilian and military assistance is blurred, and the risk that humanitarian organizations are perceived as biased (not neutral) increases.

2. Working with all parties involved in the conflict.

One of the main ideas and goals of humanitarian organizations is to work with all parties to the conflict, observing the principles of neutrality and impartiality. However, in modern realities the implementation of this task is extremely difficult.

To effectively deliver humanitarian aid, security must be ensured. This requires negotiations with the parties to the conflict and the conclusion of agreements. Any intra-state conflict has at least two sides: the central government and the opposition or the authorities that control de facto the territories. Most often, the number of warring parties is more than two, which complicates the interaction of humanitarian organizations with the parties to the conflict and, as a result, the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Syria is a prime example.

¹¹ Dupuy, Kendra and Siri Aas Rustad. Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946–2017. Conflict Trends, 2018;5, PRIO. Available from: <https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=16988&type=publicationfile>.

The Syrian opposition has been, and now is, fragmented, and aid organizations have to work with multiple, often opposing sides in different territories to gain access to populations in need. It also encourages sides of conflict to use aid and humanitarian organizations for their own benefit, because of what humanitarian organizations perceive as biased.

Although humanitarian organizations are able to work with different sides of the conflict (for example, in Syria), their main work is concentrated in territories not controlled by the central government, which contributes to the viability of various armed opposition groups. That calls into question their neutrality in the eyes of Damascus. There are two main reasons for this: either the central government hinders and/or makes it difficult for them to work in their territories, or they themselves do not want to work with the central government for political reasons. In Ukraine we see the same processes, only mirrored: the vast majority of humanitarian organizations work in the territories controlled by Kyiv, and almost no one works in the territories of Eastern and South-Eastern Ukraine that are not under the control of Kyiv. This ambivalence also contributes to the negative perception of humanitarian organizations.

As a result, the problem of effective communication and interaction with the sides of the conflict is one of the most important and most difficult challenges facing humanitarian organizations.

The question arises: why is this happening?

3. Why is this happening?

A number of studies (Anderson 1996, 1999; Marsden 1997; Cooley, Ron 2002) have identified several situations in which humanitarian organizations can help sustain or even increase violence in conflicts. The provision of medical and/or humanitarian assistance to one of the sides of the conflict is perceived by the other side/s as an illegal act directed against them.

Firstly, rendering assistance to one side is perceived by others as “helping the enemy”, as it helps to maintain its economic and military capabilities. Humanitarian aid targeted at conflict-affected civilian people in need is a valuable resource for warring parties and can be easily redirected to support military resistance, fighting, maintaining the survival of new territorial entities, and so on. As a result, humanitarian aid (including medicines and food) ends up in the hands of the armed opposition, terrorist groups, the army and pro-government militias. Therefore, providing assistance to one side makes it extremely difficult to work with other sides of the conflict.

Second, humanitarian assistance contributes to the “legitimization” of the host. It is common for humanitarian organizations to sign memorandum of understanding with the forces that controls certain territories de facto in order to determine the possibility of providing assistance. This contributes to the recognition of non-state formations, which in turn leads to an erosion of state sovereignty and the destruction of territorial integrity of the country.

Third, the humanitarian aid has a “stabilizing effect” on the territories receiving the aid. The basic infrastructure (hospitals, electrical substations, wells and water pumping stations, schools, roads, etc.) restored or rebuilt by humanitarian organizations, or the aid provided for treatment, education, etc., helps to stabilize the situation by strengthening

the position of those forces that control these territories: they free up the resources needed to conduct combat operations and achieve military goals. For example, this is why many humanitarian organizations refused to work with the Syrian government: if we build roads, Assad will use them for military operations; if we build hospitals, he will treat soldiers there, not civilians affected by war. This creates a narrative that does not allow humanitarian organizations to work with all sides of the conflict.

4. The Paradox of Help.

There are also difficulties for humanitarian organizations because of the participants in the conflict themselves.

For example, there are many reasons (including those listed above) for a particular side of a conflict that humanitarian organizations work with to prevent interaction with other sides to the conflict, and even try to prohibit it. In essence, this is manipulation and/or instrumentalization of humanitarian aid.

Also, employees of the organization working with one of the sides of a conflict become vulnerable to the official authorities if their colleagues start working with the other side. Under these conditions, their activities can be outlawed; they can be expelled from the territories or even subject to criminal liability, which creates security risks for humanitarian workers.

This dilemma often pushes humanitarian organizations, willingly or unwittingly, to violate the proclaimed principles of neutrality and impartiality.

Some of the main problems listed above are only a part of the problems of humanitarian organizations in conflict zones. Undoubtedly, the problems of sovereignization, politicization and instrumentalization of humanitarian assistance should be seriously studied in order to enable the future development of theoretical and practical principles that will help minimize the negative effects of the current principles of humanitarian assistance. We need a broad scientific and public discussion around the conceptual and practical foundations for the provision of humanitarian assistance, taking into account the extensive Western and Soviet experience.

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Unrest in Nukus: Inside View

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Abstract In this analytical article, the authors study the public discussion of constitutional reforms in Uzbekistan. The reasons and necessity of amendments to the legislation are analyzed. The motives underlying the support of the President's ideas by the political parties of the country, including such parties as, among them, the Liberal Democratic, People's Democratic, as well as the Milli Tiklanish and Adolat parties, are investigated. Particular attention is paid to the open and pragmatic work of the constitutional commission established in the Parliament of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The authors explore the substance and the content of the information and psychological influence, including calls for separatist actions from the outside, spread among the population of Karakalpakstan. The causes, conditions and behavior of some youth representatives participating in illegal meetings are analyzed. Observing the information flows in social networks and the Internet, the authors compiled an analytical chronology of the events that took place in Nukus from June 26 till July 3.

Key words: Republic of Uzbekistan, Karakalpakstan, unconstitutional meetings, Nukus, information technologies

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Introduction

In Uzbekistan, since the second half of 2016, large-scale socio-economic, cultural, humanitarian, socio-political projects have been implemented to strengthen the sovereign development of state institutions and the socio-economic potential of the country. The aim of the foreign policy strategy is to establish and strengthen mutually beneficial relations with developed countries and all interested states. Despite the fact that the country's foreign strategy is multi-vector, the states of Central Asia are a priority in Uzbekistan's foreign policy.

The colossal changes that took place during the leadership of the country Sh.M.Mirziyoyev should be noted. New economic conditions for free business were formed in the country. The standard of living of the population has improved. This is facilitated following the example of democratically developed states by the growth of socio-political

activity of civil society institutions, pluralism of opinions, and intensity of dialogue with the people. This is especially noticeable in such areas as ensuring human rights, religious freedoms, and strengthening the positions of the media.

It is necessary to further strengthen and develop these processes. What is happening now in the world confirms that only a state that puts its national interests and democratic values above all else can win. Uzbekistan has everything to move in this direction and gain authority and recognition in the international arena. That's how the presidential election was held in Uzbekistan in 2021, won by the incumbent president Sh.M.Mirziyoyev. During the presidential election of 2021, in the situation of the country entering a new stage of development, the emergence of new features of domestic and foreign policy, as well as a new order being formed in the world, many proposals to Basic Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan were accepted from compatriots on the political and legal aspects of the country's development and changes. At the end of 2021 Sh.M.Mirziyoyev, studied these proposals in detail and summarized them conceptually. He told the public that he would insist on the process be carried out openly, with the direct participation of the people, taking into account popular opinions and proposals. The President proposed to amend the Basic Law of the Republic through a referendum and create a constitutional commission¹. It is important to emphasize that a wide public discussion of constitutional changes attracted the attention of external forces who wanted to organize illegal anti-constitutional rallies to create protest moods, destabilize and split Karakalpak society (2). Now the situation in the Republic has returned to normal².

Materials and methods

To analyze the events in Nukus, the authors used the following research methods: (1) analysis of materials published in the media in Uzbekistan and abroad from June 26 to July 10, 2022. The content analysis method was used to study the opinions of social network users. The text analysis method was used to study the content and provocative nature of posts and discussions of social network users. To determine the objectivity of the provisions put forward and to establish the nature of the actions of participants in illegal demonstrations, an expert survey was conducted, the results of which are presented in a generalized format. The expert groups included sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, law enforcement officials and specialists from public organizations. Alongside the above-mentioned techniques, in the local communities in Nukus were held several field studies.

¹ The project of the Constitutional law of the Republic of Uzbekistan – Regarding making amendments and additions to the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan // Center for development strategy, 2022. URL: <https://strategy.uz/>.

² Svante Cornell. American expert: plans to destabilize Karakalpakstan were frustrated by Mirziyoyev's swift reaction // URL: <https://yuz.uz/ru/news/amerikalik-ekspert-mirziyoevning-tezkor-munosabati-qoraqalpogistonni-beqarorlashtirish-boyicha-rejalarni-barbod-qildi>.

Results

The country is entering a new stage of development, new features are emerging in domestic and foreign policy, a new order is being formed in the world. Therefore, during the presidential elections in 2021, many proposals were accepted from compatriots to strengthen the further development of the country through the introduction of political and legal amendments to the Basic Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan (3). The leader of the country had to accept these proposals, because they came from the people. At the end of 2021 Sh.M.Mirziyoyev, having studied these proposals in detail and summarizing them conceptually, reported the results to the public and noted that he demands that the process be carried out openly, with the direct participation of the people, taking into account their opinions and proposals.

The leading parties of the country are the Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Party «Milliy Tiklanish»³ – supported the ideas of the president and put forward their own initiatives, which were based on the following provisions.

First, the priority directions of constitutional reforms indicated by the president correspond to the tasks set in the charters of these parties.

Secondly, historical and modern experience demonstrate that the state develops only when the necessary conditions for economic activity are created in it and the protection of private property rights is ensured. The Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, as a presidential party, in its political activities considers this the main factor in human improvement because the political, social and cultural freedom is impossible without economic freedom.

Thirdly, the Milliy Tiklanish Democratic Party supports the need to preserve traditional values for future generations, develop the institution of the family and society, and further develop interethnic friendship as the main point of support for ensuring national interests.

The main thing is that the country's leading political parties should not only be the initiators of constitutional reforms, but also active participants in their implementation. All other political parties, civil society institutions, every citizen of the country should also actively participate in this process. Based on this, with the involvement of specialists, practitioners, as well as the public and the media, the Constitutional Commission has been established and is working. It should be noted that such an open and pragmatic a large – scale project is being implemented for the first time.

Manifestation of openness

The Constitutional Commission, created with the participation of deputies, senators of the Parliament, specialists, representatives of public organizations and the media, operates openly and publicly. In modern socio-political conditions, to involve all

³ A legislative constitutional proposal has been given consideration // Official web-page of Oliy Mazhlis legislative house of the Republic of Uzbekist, 23.06.2022. URL: https://parliament.gov.uz/ru/events/fractions/38809/?sphrase_id=8144335.

citizens and especially young people in the process, modern information technologies were used and the website «Mening to Constitutions» was created.⁴ Specialists from non-governmental organizations and political institutions also actively participate in the work. The Constitutional Commission formed by the Oliy Majlis for amendments to the Basic Law is working on in-depth study, analysis and generalization of incoming proposals, bringing them into a conceptual form and transferring them to the relevant state bodies. On June 22, the first results of the activities of this commission were published in the newspapers «Halk Suzi» and «Narodnoye Slovo»⁵. Work collectives continue to discuss proposals for amendments and additions to the Constitution.

Discussion

The publication of the draft law on amendments and additions to the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, according to which the political and legal status of the Republic of Karakalpakstan (RK) is being reviewed, provoked a wave of discontent among the inhabitants of the region. Analytical study of websites (Makan.uz, “basekz”, “OYAN KARAKALPAK”, “Karakalpak patriot”, muharibtv, “Karakalpakstan Sovereignty 74”), Telegram channels (“Ivar Dale” and “Casus Belli”, Bignewsnetwork.com, Nationalpost.com and Politinform.net, «MIG» Ateo_Breaking), Internet publications (ElTuz, “ÁĽĜÁ ĶĀŘĀĶĀĽPĀĶŠŤĀŇ”), allowed to reconstruct the sequence of anti-constitutional events from June 26 to July 3. When the constitutional reforms became most active, destructive forces pursuing unconstitutional goals organized riots and came out with a call to turn Karakalpakstan into a separate state. Illegal demonstrations aimed at carrying out a coup d’état were organized, involving people dissatisfied with social problems, who were intoxicated with drugs and alcohol,

On June 29–30, 2022, the situation around Karakalpakstan began to become tense, which was manifested in the rallying of ethnic Karakalpaks inside the country and abroad around the idea of the unacceptability of depriving the Republic of Karakalpakstan of its sovereign status, in threats to take practical actions to protect its independence. The unfolding events indicated that destabilization of the situation was very possible in case of non-acceptance of retaliatory actions.

From the moment the project was published, a local journalist and blogger D.Tazhimuratov began to act as the unspoken leader of the discontent of the Karakalpaks. He constantly called on his audience to protect the sovereignty of the Republic of Kazakhstan by holding a rally, but only if the amendments to the draft law on the status of the Republic remain in the version published on July 5, he emphasized that the rally itself would be peaceful and agreed in advance with local authorities. However, on July 1, after the end of the Friday prayer near the local mosque, D.Tazhimuratov publicly addressed the assembled

⁴ My constitution. Official web page for the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan. URL: <https://meningkonstitutsiyam.uz/>.

⁵ A legislative constitutional proposal has been given consideration. // Official web-page of Oliy Mazhlias legislative house of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 23.06.2022. URL: https://parliament.gov.uz/ru/events/fractions/38809/?sphrase_id=8144335.

faithful citizens and stated that he had submitted an application to the Khokimiyat of Nukus to hold a sanctions rally on July 5, 2022 on the issue of maintaining the sovereign status of the Republic of Karakalpakstan. His words were met with a standing ovation and received the support of the audience, and the video of the event was replicated in domestic and foreign social media.

A few hours later, a video began to circulate on the network, in which it was reported that law enforcement officers in civilian clothes arrived at the house of D.Tazhimuratov and detained the journalist, members of his family who were in the house, citizens who allegedly witnessed this detention were detained by force. Windows were alleged to have been smashed as a result, and the detainees' blood was on the floor. The incident with the detention became a catalyst that prompted people gathered near the journalist's house to go towards the central dekhkan market of Nukus, chanting the name of D.Tazhimuratov: «Dauletmurat!»

On the way to the market, a crowd of several dozen indignant people turned into a whole protest action with the participation of a thousand residents of Nukus. At the same time, the main protesters' demand was the release of D.Tazhimuratov, while the issue of the status of the Republic of Karakalpakstan was mentioned less frequently.

On social networks and the Telegram messenger, video commentators urged the protesters not to show aggression, to remain calm and not contribute to destabilizing the situation. The editor of the Karakalpak «Makan.uz» Lalagul Kallykhanova addressed various international organizations, such as the UN, the OSCE, as well as the embassies of the USA, Great Britain, Germany in Tashkent, demanding to help Karakalpakstan to withdraw from the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The chairman of the Jokargy Kenes of the RK M.Kamalov and the previously detained journalist D.Tadzhimuratov soon arrived to the protesters, called on citizens to calm down, which had some positive effect. Nevertheless, part of those participants demanded the resignation of M. Kamalov.

At 21:30, the press service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan responded to the events in the RK, and reported that in order to prevent violations of public order and prevent citizens from committing offenses on the territory of the dekhkan market, law enforcement agencies were involved, but then public order was restored⁶.

Videos, showing how several thousand protesters continue to make noise and express their indignation near the theater named after Berdakh on Yernazar Alakuz Street, coincidentally a national hero of the Karakalpaks for the struggle for independence against the Khiva Khanate in the 19th century, began to be actively shared on social media. At the same time, law enforcement officers began firing water cannons, tear gas, and used stun grenades to stop the unsanctioned rally of protesters. Provocative videos also began to appear, in which it was reported that the leader of the unrest, D.Tadzhimuratov, was allegedly a person of non-traditional sexual orientation

⁶ The main aim of the constitutional reform is to secure in practice human honor and dignity, national interests // Narodnoye slovo. 22.06.2022. URL: <https://xs.uz/ru/post/glavnaya-tsel-konstitutsionnoj-reformy-obespechenie-na-praktike-chesti-i-dostoinstva-cheloveka-interesov-naroda>.

At 21.30 press service of the Republic of Uzbekistan Ministry for Home Affairs reacted on the RK events, pointing out that in order to prevent disturbance of public peace and prevent citizens from committing various offences of law on the territory of dekhan market were engaged forces and facilities of law enforcement authorities. There was also a claim that by that moment the public order had already been restored⁷.

Social media users started actively spreading video recordings featuring several thousand protestors keeping roaring and demonstrating their indignation next to Berdakh theatre in Ernazar Alakuz street, being the latter coincidentally karaklapak's national hero who fought for independence against Khuvin khanate in the 19th century. Meanwhile, the law enforcement officers started shooting water cannons, releasing riot control agents, using flashbang grenades in order to stop the unauthorized activities, carried out by the protestors. There also appeared provocative videos, informing that D.Tazhimuratov, the leader who incited the unrest, was a person with non-standard sexual orientation.

On July, 2 at midnight the protestors started withdrawing from the spot, except for those participants who had tried to stage the provocation. Later on, there appeared provocative information, claiming that three military transport aircrafts had left Tashkent heading to Karakalpakstan in order to suppress the protestors. Moreover, a video, featuring a man lying in blood on a lawn, presumably shot by the law enforcement officers, got viral in social media.

Zhokarga Kenes, the Cabinet Council and the RK Ministry for Home Affairs issued a joint statement, pointing out that law enforcement officers had prevented a coup attempt in the region, and by virtue thereof called for joint actions to provide social stability and security, prevent people from injudicious and wrongful actions, solve the emerging problems within the legal framework⁸.

Besides, a video, featuring a participant of the rally, dying because of a serious abdominal wound, got viral in the foreign segment of "Telegram" messenger. This video and another one, actively reposted by social media users, shows presumably a female citizen of Nukus city, claiming that the law enforcement officers coming from the Republic of Uzbekistan humiliate karakalpak people and try to suppress the riots in any possible way. In connection therewith, she appeals to the audience urging to repost the video showing the man who died because of a ball grenade explosion, as much as they can, aiming at Kazakhstan segment of social media by involving Kazakhstan bloggers in the process.

Therefore, all illegal anti-constitutional activities were staged and realized with the help of external means of information technologies, that exercised information influence in order to crash social and political stability. Thus, first news about illegal protest rallies, escalating into violent civil unrest, appeared on web pages, registered abroad and being under the foreign law. The information appeared long before the rallies began. What is more, when the illegal actions started there was created a Telegram channel, that arranged

⁷ Official web page of the Ministry for Home Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan. URL: <https://iiv.uz/ru/latest-news?from=2022-06-15&till=2022-07-15>.

⁸ Karakalpakstan authorities delivered an address regarding the events in Nukus // Nova 24, 02.07.2022. URL: <https://nova24.uz/incidents/vlasti-karakalpakstana-vystupili-s-obrashheniem-o-sobytiyah-v-nukuse/>.

efficiently the undertakings planned. To obtain such success in international information environment one needs specialized and professional training.

Meanwhile, in order to intensify the violent civil unrest and give it conceptual and ideologic coloring there appeared anti-constitutional theses. Pre-prepared video footages in support of the participants of illegal rallies started getting posted internationally.

Afterwards, pre-prepared instructions, elaborated by professionals, were applied to guide the protestors' actions and control the unfolding events. Those instructions were used both in Nukus city and outside the country, some of them being aimed at spreading requests for help in Russian and in English, others being aimed at instruction on how to obtain vehicles, assault on checkpoints in order to obtain weapons, withdraw hunting shotguns from the civilians, teaching how to use clubs, stones and other improvised resources. Professional use of information technologies from the outside the country is established to have exercised a great influence over the outbreak and further development of the events in Nukus. To organize anti-constitutional rallies of such a magnitude one should attract specially trained professionals, organizational, financial, ideologic mobilization, being the time an issue of paramount importance.

Along with these, with a view to exacerbate the violent civil unrest and grant it conceptual and ideologic coloring there appeared anti-constitutional theses, that is, basic ideas. There started to get posted internationally video footages, supporting the illegal rallies and their participants. It should be noted that video footages of such quality cannot be shot in such a short period of time, which implies that they had been prepared in advance. Two hours after the rallies began there appeared sort of instructions on how to regulate forces and activities of the riots, whose emotional charge was at peak. There also appeared moderators. All of them wore red (the clothes being of modern brands) outfit and manipulated the disorders in a masterly fashion. Due to their guidance the magnitude of the protest movement started to amplify. In order to make the rallies grow into violent public disorders, they intoxicated the protestors with psychoactive substances, pretending to be providing them with food. Meanwhile, there were created discourses in well-structured Russian and English languages requesting for help, to be sent to foreign countries, international organizations and mass media.

In the context of critical protest containing comments, the authors were predominantly ethnic karakalpaks, located in other countries. They kept calling to fight "to the bitter end", to "stay strong in the pursuit of their goals", to organize a public protest of all Karakalpakstan citizens. What is more, some local citizens' attempts to call for calm and peaceful coexistence were welcomed with accusations of having betrayed the Karakalpak people⁹.

External reaction: mutual trust and responsibility

In those critical days neighboring states and developed countries (Russia, the USA, the PRC, Turkey), international organizations (the UN, the European Union, the SCO) expressed their attitude to the ongoing events. Let us analyze the main trends of their declarations.

⁹ Interview with Saifiddin Zhuraev about the protest rallies in Karakalpakstan. Khun Uz, 13.07.2022. URL: <https://kun.uz/21477486>.

First, they supported the well-timed particular actions of the country's leadership implemented in order to maintain public tranquility, stability and sustainable development, preserve constitutional system and legislation, supported the steps taken and expressed their respect to sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity of Uzbekistan.

Second, they called Uzbekistan to defend their rights including the right to hold peaceful rallies and speak their mind, according to the international commitments, hold a proper legal procedure in order to investigate into the instigators' and participants' actions in an open and transparent manner, basing on international norms and advanced experience.

Third, they pointed out that such subversive activities cannot be allowed. They expressed their preoccupation because of the events occurred, expressed their condolences to the families of the dead and the victims of those events.

Fourth, they demonstrated their confidence that the policy of Uzbekistan, based on centuries-long wisdom and experience, would make it possible to solve the problems arisen and provide sustainable and continual development of the Republic of Uzbekistan, as well as steadiness of national and social institutions.

Fifth, the nearest neighbors expressed readiness to provide any aid and assistance wanted and expressed their confidence, that under the skillful leadership of the president Shavkat Mirziyoev, Uzbekistan is perfectly able to maintain tranquility and unity in the country.

Pragmatic measures

In those critical days the president visited Nukus twice, he had an encounter with the members of the Republic of Karakalpakstan Zhokargy Kenesa and discussed the problems. The head of the state urgently took appropriate measures to put an end to disorders, provide peace and security to the citizens¹⁰. The most important thing is that the president controlled the situation on the ground, but not sitting in his office. He visited the makhalls, talked to common people, persuaded them that the Uzbek and the Karakalpak peoples' destinies are unique and indivisible. Those meetings, arranged in order to provide peace and tranquility, calmed down the citizens and the protestors. The president also listened to the opinions and the problems of ordinary people and made particular decisions basing on the real state of affairs. He pointed out that the constitution would be modified and improved only according to the suggestions and opinions expressed by the people. After that, the project would be presented for a referendum and the citizens would express their will. The president proposed to keep intact articles 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, regarding the legal status of the Republic of Karakalpakstan. State institutions acting within their authority and according to the law took efficient measures to suppress the adverse effect on Karakalpakstan, prevent wrongful actions with respect to state security and peaceful environment in the country.

¹⁰ RUz spokesman's Telegram-channel URL: https://t.me/Press_Secretary_Uz O'zbekiston Respublikasi Prezidenti matbuot kotibining rasmiy kanali.

At the meeting on July 6, 2022, the president of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoev expressed his condolences to the families of the people who died during the disorders in Nukus and wished the injured a speedy recovery¹¹. The president entrusted to Nigmatill Yuldashev, the general prosecutor, "to investigate profoundly and impartially each case and provide justified legal assessment to the actions of the participants of those events". "The law enforcement officers' actions should also be deeply analyzed. If they resorted to force wrongfully, they should be prosecuted criminally according to the applicable laws", the president declared¹².

In following up the illegal rallies in Karakalpakstan in July, 1-2, 2022, the General Prosecutor's office of Uzbekistan launched a criminal investigation under the article 159, part 4 of the Criminal Code (conspiracy with a view to seize the power or overthrow constitutional order in the Republic of Uzbekistan, to be punished with deprivation of liberty for a period between 10 and 20 years) and other articles. The investigative activities under the criminal case are being held by an operational investigation group composed by the officers of Domestic Intelligence Agency, Ministry for Home Affairs, National guard, headed by the General Prosecutor's office. Specially formed inter-institutional headquarters is to coordinate the group's activities on investigation and intelligence operations. According to the General Prosecutor's office, the investigation group's version is that "particular persons, acting out of selfish motives, under a pretext of discontent with constitutional reforms, chose an aggressive way and violence and tried to destabilize the situation¹³".

As a result of the pragmatic measures being implemented, peace and stability have been restored in Nukus and the neighboring populated localities, life having resumed the normal course. Importantly, the law enforcement authorities make all necessary steps and implement complex measures in order to bring the organizers and participants of the illegal activities to justice. The course of the process gets massive media coverage, involving representatives of both general public and mass media.

Karakalpakstan is a top priority region

A significant fact to mention is that the Republic of Karakalpakstan possesses wide territory and geographically beneficial location in the region. Moreover, Karakalpakstan is the largest among the other regions of Uzbekistan, having rather low density of population and substantial amount of natural mineral resources. The Republic of Karakalpakstan has systemic development problems (in various spheres), that has been forming for quite some time because of the ecological disaster, related to the Aral Sea (the problem of the sea drying out required immediate solution for the region's further development and

¹¹ RUz spokesman's Telegram-channel URL: https://t.me/Press_Secretary_Uz O'zbekiston Respublikasi Prezidenti matbuot kotibining rasmiy kanali

¹² Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan "Regarding announcement of the state of emergency on the territory of the Republic of Karakalpakstan between July, 3 and August, 2, 2022" URL: <https://president.uz/ru/lists/view/5306>

¹³ The General Prosecutor's office communicated the details of the investigation regarding the events in Nukus // Gazeta Uz, 04.07.2022. URL: <https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2022/07/04/tergov/>

the people's welfare). This is the reason why resolution of social and economic problems by developing the regions remains a top-priority task for the Republic of Uzbekistan and its future development. In order to achieve the aims, the initiatives launched by the head of the state are aimed at transformation of Uzbekistan into a new economically powerful country, possessing modern industrial, social and economic infrastructure, transport and communication network and highly qualified personnel.

Social and economic development of the Republic of Karakalpakstan has always been prioritized for Uzbekistan. It is worth noting that one of the first visits, that Sh.M. Mirziyoev realized after being elected the president, was a visit to Karakalpakstan. The president initiated an assembly to be assisted by all the officials holding key positions in the Republic of Karakalpakstan, with the purpose to carefully investigate the situation in the Aral Sea region. According to Sh.M. Mirziyoev,

many claim that the situation in the Aral Sea region is adverse, but not all of them have seen it with their own eyes. That is why today I gathered here the leaders from the whole republic for them to breathe the Aral air, see the conditions and provide a faithful estimate. We will direct substantial funds for Karakalpakstan development¹⁴.

In the context of securing sustainable development, following the president's initiatives, there was established a special "Trust fund for the Aral Sea", aimed at promoting development in the regions facing ecological catastrophe. In 2021, while conversing with Karakalpakstan citizens, Sh.M. Mirziyoev pointed out that he paid special attention to the region, therefore, in the recent years the forces and the resources engaged started to pay off. According to the president,

people came to believe in our way's rectitude. Now we set new goals. All the leaders are now gathered in Karakalpakstan. It is the first time in the history. They came with their recourses, their teams, they elaborate their projects. We are to restore Takhtakupir's ancient glory" (3).

An important fact to mention is that the main changes in Karakalpakstan's social and economic development took place between 2017 and 2021 (the period of Sh.M. Mirziyoev's active reforms). With regard to social protection for the public and creation of worthy living conditions, solving the problem of providing people with decent housing is of paramount importance. In a point of fact, in the recent five years 4 390 thousand of square meters of housing were brought into service, 15.2 thousand places were created in pre-school institutions and 38.3 thousand places were created in schools. In the same period there were established approximately 127 thousand working positions (1).

The business activity index (IDA), calculated by the Center for economic research and reforms in January, 2022, revealed that the Republic of Karakalpakstan demonstrated the fastest growth as compared to other regions (1). The fact that the President's Resolution

¹⁴ "Many claim that the situation in the Aral Sea area is adverse, but not all of them have seen it with their own eyes": President RU, on February, 23, 2022. URL: <https://uznews.uz/posts/53728>

"About the measures concerning complex social and economic development of the Republic of Karakalpakstan between 2020 and 2023" was adopted on November, 11, 2020 gave a new impetus to promoting the key economic sectors according to the "growing points" of its cities and regions.

Nowadays the special attention paid to the region pays off. The changes concern both Nukus capital and country towns, cities, remote villages and makhall that due to the transformation grow into dynamic and progressive economic entities. According to Shavkat Mirziyoev,

in the recent five years we have learned a lot, we now believe something that previously seemed unthinkable. During my first visit I told you that culture would begin in Muynak. This is what is happening. A shining example is the airport. From now on, there will be flight connection between Tashkent-Muynak-Nukus¹⁵.

In order to make efficient the work on development of the Aral Sea area, each of Karakalpakstan regions was assigned to be in charge of one of Uzbekistan's areas. Thus, Nukus capital was assigned to Tashkent area. Complex approach to developing the region and disaster damage control demonstrate high efficiency. For example, growth of the Republic of Karakalpakstan's Gross Regional Product that has been achieved in the recent years, equals to an average rate of 5.4% a year. This is closely connected to the process of constructing primary manufacturing enterprises. Among the most significant industrial plants are Khodzheliyskiy glass manufacturing plant, Kungransky alkali manufacture, multiple production lines manufacturing construction materials and the flagship factory in gas-processing industry, Ustyurtsky gas chemical complex (1).

Conclusions

Provisional results of the analytic study speak to the presumption that all the illegal protest rallies were staged and realized by efforts of information and ideologic influence from outside, using modern information technologies, which manifests itself in the following facts.

First and foremost, the news about the illegal protest rallies that grew into violent civil unrest, started appearing on the web pages, registered abroad and acting under the law of foreign countries. In order to intensify the civil unrest and grant it conceptual and ideologic coloring there almost simultaneously appeared anti-constitutional claims. Pre-prepared video footages in support of the participants of illegal protest rallies started getting posted internationally.

Afterwards, pre-prepared instructions elaborated by professionals were efficiently applied to guide the protestors' actions and control the unfolding events. Those instructions were used both in Nukus city and outside the country, some of them being aimed at

¹⁵ Shavkat Mirziyoev. Muynak region will be assigned in charge of Tashkent area. // Uz Daily, 23.02.22. URL: <https://www.uzdaily.uz/ru/post/67338>.

spreading requests for help in Russian and in English, others being aimed at instruction on how to obtain vehicles, assault on checkpoints in order to obtain weapons, withdraw hunting shotguns from the civilians, teaching how to use clubs, stones and other improvised resources. Professional use of information technologies from the outside the country is established to have exercised a great influence over the outbreak and further development of the events in Nukus. To organize anti-constitutional rallies of such a magnitude one should attract specially trained professionals, organizational, financial, ideologic mobilization, and dispose of a long period of time to plan and implement the project.

The president did not wait the nationwide discussion of the draft legislation to finish, resorting to his right to initiate legislation, he assured the nation that the articles 70-75 of the Constitution would remain intact. This proposal was subsequently supported by Oliy Mazhilis' legislative house, the duration of the nationwide discussion being prolonged. Despite the compromise measures adopted, the disorders continued.

By efforts of the instigators from the neighboring areas there were organized "marches" of large numbers of people, mainly composed by the young generation. The most active participants of the "protest rallies" received money, alcohol and psychoactive substances. The protestors assaulted checkpoints, took possession of impact munition and weapons, launched attacks on the international airport of Nukus city, the building of the Department of Internal Affairs of Nukus city, set fire on cars, inflicted harm to many other buildings. The most grievous fact is that as a result of the unrest dozens of peaceful citizens died.

Supporting the measures implemented to restore law and order in Karakalpakstan, all the main foreign partners of Tashkent, including Central Asian countries, Turkey, the USA, the PRC, as well as the EU and SCO, voiced their support to the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Uzbekistan. Now it is high time to give legal assessment to the actions undertaken by the law enforcement authorities, the anti-constitutional activities performed by the organizers and actual doers of the civil disorders, to reconstruct the entire picture of what happened, names of the casualties. The head of the state demonstrated his willingness to hold an open dialogue by meeting with Nukus citizens and by keeping intact the Constitution articles regarding the status of Karakalpakstan. Today life in Karakalpakstan is gradually resuming its normal course. Nevertheless, up to this moment there is detected occasional information influx from outside, aimed to discredit the international image of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The attempts to distort the events that took place and present the actions taken by the state authorities as a ferocious attempt to break up a peaceful demonstration are still being implemented. There are speculations as to objectivity of the investigation regarding the occurrence. It was officially stated that the actions implemented by the law enforcement authorities would be given legal assessment as well. In the event that there is detected wrongful resource to force, the person guilty will be held liable in accordance with the applicable legislation.

A fact that should be recognized is that there are domestic problems, that can be solved by mutual efforts, by showing mutual respect, kindness and tolerance. It is important to maintain the centuries-long fellowship and fraternity, caring relations between Uzbek and Karakalpak people in order to preserve the peaceful environment and stability currently

reigning in the country. In this respect, the head of the government initiated a wide-scope work, that has been implemented in the recent years, to develop social infrastructure, provide the population with electrical power, natural gas, potable water, improve the state of irrigational and land-reclamation networks in Karakalpakstan. Persistent efforts have been undertaken to protect and restore the ecosystem of the Aral Sea area, to secure sustainable social and economic development in the region.

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CHANGING SOCIETY

**Social Structure,
Social Institutions
and Processes.
Political Sociology**

RUSSIA & WORLD: SCIENTIFIC DIALOGUE

**РОССИЯ
И МИР**
НАУЧНЫЙ ДИАЛОГ

...the first parameter for the analytical matrix of the study of communication regimes – controllability indicators. These will include at least: (1) the ability of the communication regime control center to control and implement the decisions made; (2) the ability of the control center to transfer the communication system from one state to another without conflict; (3) the ability to reach consensus – the consent of the participants in communication about the goals, norms, rules, value constructs, institutions of the communication regime and control measures; (4) the ability to use self-organization mechanisms to regulate communication regimes.

[...] The second parameter of the analytical matrix of controllability of communication regimes is the location of the control center.

[...] The third parameter of the analytical matrix is the conventionality of the communication regimes control center.

Valentina V. Komleva

Methodology for Analyzing the Manageability of Country Communication Modes

The merging of the communication regime with the political one due to the affiliation of large media with politicians indicates a close relationship between the communication regime and geopolitical tasks formed by external control centers, including the United States. All this will not contribute to the formation of a unified sustainable information and communication space in Ukraine and puts under doubt its further existence.

Yury P. Tikhonov

The United States Influence on the Formation of Dependence
of the Ukraine Communication Regime

Methodology for Analyzing the Manageability of Country Communication Modes

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Abstract. Analyzing of communication modes is a new direction not only in Russian, but also in foreign studies. As a result, methodology is just being formed. The article is devoted to the description of the author's methodology, which allows to identify the types of management and the degree of controllability of communication modes in different countries. The author relies on a systematic, cybernetic approach, on the theory of complex systems, uses the matrix method and the method of comparative analysis. Manageability is defined as a measure of control by the management center (management entities that make decisions about rules and communication institutions), taking into account the voluntary consent of the objects of management with the level of their autonomy and subordination. The basis of the author's methodology are three significant parameters: 1) location (inside or outside the country); 2) level of conventionality of the communication regime management centre; 3) assessment of the indicators of manageability. The main criteria of manageability are: the ability of communication mode control centres to transfer it from one state to another without conflict; the ability to achieve the controlled parameters of communication mode; the ability to use the mechanisms of self-organization and self-reflection of control objects to regulate communication modes.

Keywords: manageability, communication regime, communication order, information order, political governance, political regime, communication theories

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Introduction

The controllability of communication regimes is a key direction of research, as it is related to the processes of ensuring the stable functioning of social systems, the rules of domestic and foreign political communication and the degree of political and information sovereignty of the country. The problem of controllability of communication regimes is practically not developed, which is confirmed by a small number of studies. Addressing the issue of controllability in broad terms shows that the most significant studies have been undertaken in system approach (2; 1; 4; 15 etc.). But even in this approach, despite a relatively long history of system research, there is still no unambiguous understanding of what controllability is and how to determine it. This is very significant if we analyze and compare basic Russian works on the problem of controllability (12; 5; 11 etc.). With regard to the controllability of country communication regimes, the situation is exacerbated by the relatively recent introduction of the very concept of "country communication regime" into scientific use (7; 8; 9; 10) and, as a result, the paucity of studies of communication regimes.

Materials and methods

The methodology of the research is based on system, cybernetic and institutional approaches, the provisions of the theory of complex systems, according to which the study of controllability of the communication regime in each particular country can be conducted by analyzing the systemic connections between subjects and objects of communication regimes management and degrees of their institutionalization.

In an empirical study of country practices, the method of comparative analysis, grouping of facts and typology of communication regimes was used. The developed research methodology is based on the method of analytical matrices.

In this method, the collection of empirical material is carried out mainly within the framework of desk research using content analysis of documents, socio-political discourses, media materials, event analysis of the practices of communication regimes in different countries, and then a sociological survey (at the second stage of the study to identify the share of those who agree/disagree with the rules of the communication regime and the share of those who approve/disapprove of the actions of the communications control center) and interviews with experts (if there is a need for further specific information or if there is lack of information in open data sources).

Results

The essence of controllability of country communication regimes

In scientific research, controllability is considered as a combination of three components: order, control, consistency. A.V. Tikhonov considers controllability as a degree of impact of relations or connections of management on social interactions of people in the process of their joint activities (15).

Taking into account this approach, we define the controllability of country communication regimes as a result of the successful implementation of the three main functions of the subject of management:

- 1) arrangement of all relations within the controlled system;
- 2) control and implementation of decisions made;
- 3) consent of the communication participants about the goals, norms, rules, value constructs of the communication regime.

Arrangement and control are achieved as a result of well-targeted influence through the adoption of regulatory legal acts and other regulatory documents, as well as through the establishment of organizations and structures. In other words, due to the institutionalization of communication regimes. Consistency of the goals, values and actions of the communication participants is achieved through the motivated involvement of participants in communication, when the majority of the participants (or each of them) voluntarily and consciously focuses on the goals and strategies adopted in the country. The review by E.E. Tarando on the monograph by M.V. Rubtsova rightly notes:

The basis for achieving communicative controllability is the process of joint creation of the rules of interaction and voluntary compliance with them. At the same time, the main problem of controllability is transformed from the problem of subordination to the person-subject of control into the problem of obeying the rule. This subordination creates the possibility of rational intervention into the process, that is, control. To use communicative controllability, institutional rules must be made as transparent as possible, since communication is disrupted when confronted with latent and shadow factors. (14)

A failure in the implementation of at least one of the three components mentioned above leads to a failure in the controllability of the communication regime. This happens not only because of the errors of the subjects and objects of management of communication regimes, but also due to objective reasons. For example, laws tend to be conservative and create a certain inertia that can lead to the stagnation of communication regimes. This is most clearly manifested in situations where a changing society ceases to agree with the accepted norms of social communication. In this case, the element of voluntariness and consistency of positions of all participants in communication begins to break down. If the subjects of management do not respond adequately and do not give the right feedback to the groups and individuals who do not agree with the old rules and practices

of the communication regime, then the risk of confrontation increases significantly and a favorable situation arises for external intervention.

Communication regime is characterized by the desire of control center for maximum control over communications in society, for which the entire communication system is institutionalized. For their part, the objects of management only partly obey the requirements of the control center, as they strive for a certain degree of freedom, receiving different information, including alternative, from various sources. In communication regimes an underlying problem of public administration is manifested: the struggle of subjects of management for control and the struggle of objects of management for independence. If the conflict deepens and it is impossible to find a compromise, both groups of participants of communication seek external help. And then another problem arises – external influences on the internal political situation in the country in the interests of external actors, up to the loss of independence by national actors in decision-making.

From those positions, the controllability of country communication regimes is a measure of control over country communications by the national control center (subject of management that makes decisions regarding the rules and institutions of intra-country and external communication), taking into account the degree of spontaneity and independence of objects of management that is necessary to meet the demand for free search for information and to keep the system within the given boundaries with the aim of achieving the agreed goals of its existence. In other words, controllability is a measure of control, with which society agrees and within which society voluntarily internalizes and obeys the accepted rules, norms, and restrictions.

Inside the communication regime, the potential for conflict always remains, since on the one hand, the actors of communication tend to strive for freedom and self-expression, on the other hand, for solidarity and affiliation. Disagreement of the majority of the society with the norms and rules of communication, degree of restrictions and control, the goals of state policy leads to social turmoil and creates conditions for the increased uncontrollability of communication regimes. As soon as the control center loses control over social communications, a fork in control arises. Often, in order to maintain controllability, the authorities have to impose negative sanctions and introduce new prohibitive and restrictive measures. An example is the political events in Belarus in 2020 and the laws adopted regarding the media in 2021. For example, a ban on real-time coverage of mass events held with the violation of the law; a ban on publishing the results of opinion polls conducted without accreditation of the organization conducting the survey; granting the prosecutors in Minsk and the regions the right to restrict access to internet resources and online publications that disseminate information aimed at promoting extremism; granting the right to the Interdepartmental Commission on Security in the field of information to decide on the presence of information, the dissemination of which is capable of harming national interests; the right of the Ministry of information to decide on termination of the publication of the media (if, for example, the owner of the online publication received two or more written warnings); a ban on the establishment of mass media by citizens and legal entities of other states and persons without citizenship.

Parameters of the analytical matrix of controllability of country communication regimes

One of the main indicators of controllability is the ability to transfer the system from one state to another without conflict. The Belarusian case of 2020-2021 demonstrates the controllability of the country's communication regime through the conscious updating of the norms and rules of socio-political communication by government institutions. As a result, the communication regime remained under the control of the conventional control center – the current government, although it was the contradictions that arose during the socio-political conflict of August 2020 that pushed for such changes. Note that in cybernetics, where the term “controllability” was introduced, controllability is closely related to subordination; so cybernetically, controllability means the ability of a system to achieve controlled parameters. Thus, the second indicator of the controllability of communication regimes is the ability of government institutions to achieve controlled parameters of the communication regime. What is meant here is a wide range of parameters set by the communication regime of a particular country.

The third indicator is related to the ability of the authorities to use the mechanisms of self-organization and self-reflection of objects of management to regulate communication regimes. The point is that in modern conditions of non-equilibrium, non-linearity and the rise of self-reflection of communication participants, it is increasingly difficult to keep controllability of communication regimes through control and subordination. The autonomy and self-organization of social actors increasingly determine their reactions to the regulatory influences of the authorities up to confrontation. In this regard, it is appropriate to use the creative energy of self-organization to form communication regimes that is to involve self-organizing communication networks and information channels, especially citizen journalism, in communication with the authorities.

To summarize, we derive the first parameter for the analytical matrix of the study of communication regimes – controllability indicators. These will include at least: (1) the ability of the communication regime control center to control and implement the decisions made; (2) the ability of the control center to transfer the communication system from one state to another without conflict; (3) the ability to reach consensus – the consent of the participants in communication about the goals, norms, rules, value constructs, institutions of the communication regime and control measures; (4) the ability to use self-organization mechanisms to regulate communication regimes.

The second parameter of the analytical matrix of controllability of communication regimes is the location of the control center. Most frequently, the control center that establishes the rules of the communication regime and controls their implementation is the institutions of state authority. They make laws, they regulate communications in society, they impose sanctions for non-compliance with the rules, and they reward the most loyal participants in communication.

In a situation of low trust in state subjects of communications management and high trust in non-state actors, provided that the norms and rules proposed by non-state actors are valuable, the center of communications control is shifting towards alternative centers. Examples of such alternative centers of communication regimes management can be government institutions of other states; religious organizations; mass media and other information channels (including citizen journalism); power-wielding groups that came into conflict with each other as a result of a split in the elites; civil institutions (for example, international NGOs); business (owning communication and information channels); security institutions (in case of their contradictions with the current government); supranational authorities and other actors. An attempt to take control of the communication regime by actors who are alternative to state institutions was demonstrated in Belarus in 2020.

The third parameter of the analytical matrix is the conventionality of the communication regimes control center. Conventional control centers are those that have the right to legitimately establish communication rules, lay down the foundations of state information policy, establish communication institutions, monitor the implementation of rules and impose sanctions for their non-compliance. Non-conventional control centers are self-proclaimed centers making decisions regarding the norms and rules for the implementation of decisions of conventional centers.

Acceptance by the society of non-conventional centers often leads to non-conventional behavior of certain groups of civil society.

Thus, we offer at least two approaches to grouping the control centers of country communication regimes:

- 1) as regards to the degree of their conventionality, we single out conventional and non-conventional centers for managing country communication regimes;
- 2) as regards to the location of the control center, we distinguish external and internal centers for managing country communication regimes.

The location of the control center outside the country is considered by us as a special case of controllability, which does not always give rise to uncontrollability of regimes on the part of national control centers. Conventionality / non-conventionality and the location of the centers – official regulators underlie the methodology for the primary analysis of country communication regimes developed by us.

Matrix for analyzing the communication regimes management types

Within the framework of the given matrix, the analysis is carried out along two axes: 1) we determine where the communication regimes control center is located; 2) we determine whether it is conventional (legitimate) or not. The matrix that allows determining the types of management of communication regimes is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Matrix for the analysis of communication regimes management types

Degree of conventionality	Conventional	1	2
	Non-conventional	4	3
		Internal	External
		The location of communication regimes control center	

At the intersection of the axes of conventionality and the location of the control center, four types of management of communication regimes are formed.

Type 1: The conventional communication regimes control center is located within the country. An example of this type is the communication regime of the Russian Federation, in which, despite the federal system, the communication regime control center is located at the federal level. Decisions are made in the Presidential Executive Office, in the Security Council of the Russian Federation and in a number of “think tanks”.

Harmonization and adoption of the norms and rules is carried out in the State Duma and in the Federation Council. At the preparatory stages, various kinds of civil institutions can be involved, for example, civic chambers and expert councils. Law enforcement and security agencies monitor the implementation of the norms and rules. The federal component is contained in the specific features of the formation of regional communication regimes that do not contradict the basic norms and rules developed for the entire territory of the Russian Federation. A multi-component Russian society (in relation to religions, ethnic groups, climatic conditions, regional societies, etc.) creates the preconditions for the diversity of regional communication regimes, in which informal regulators (traditions, customs, stereotypes) of the living population are sometimes manifested (for example, the Chechen Republic, the Republic of Tatarstan and etc.).

Type 2: conventional control center is located outside the country.

The actions of a control center of this type, as a rule, are consistent with the actions of the national center (state authorities). Most often, such practices occur in integration associations with the presence of supranational governing bodies. An example would be the European Union and the system of country communication regimes formed within the common European communication space, voluntarily dependent on a common European control center.

Type 3: non-conventional center is located outside the country.

This type of communication regimes control, as a rule, is short-lived, as it evolves over time towards the first or second type. An example of an attempt to establish this type of control can be the Republic of Belarus, when, for a short period of time, efforts were made by alternative actors located in Poland to seize control of communications and regulate them according to other norms and rules. It should not be denied that these norms and rules were approved and supported by part of the Belarusian society (but not the majority). However, the conventional control center utilized all available resources to return to the first type of communication regime and by 2021 through the adoption of a number of regulatory

legal acts and sanctions against external alternative centers and finally secures the status of the only internal communication regime control center in the country. If the majority of the society agrees with the accepted rules and norms, then in the near future, external alternative actors are unlikely to be successful in controlling the communication regime.

Type 4: non-conventional center is located within the country

An example of this type can be the communication regime in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, where the conventional center no longer ensures the controllability of the communication regime and the Taliban (banned in the Russian Federation) establishes control over communications.

The identified types of management of communication regimes do not deny the presence of transitional or mixed types, do not deny the presence of «halftones» and «non-pure» types of control, which can be identified while analyzing numerous country practices.

For a detailed analysis of the communication regime in a particular country, at least the following questions have to be answered:

Table 1.

To identify the location of the control center	To identify the degree of conventionality/non-conventionality
Who establishes (consults, develops, adopts) the legal framework for the communication regime in a particular country?	Who authorized and entrusted these particular subjects of management of communication regimes with the functions of establishing the legal framework?
Are decisions on the rules of communication in the country made influenced by traditions, customs, religion and other informal factors?	What are the reactions of the control center to non-compliance with the norms and rules established by it due to the more significant role of traditions? / Is it possible to not comply with the norms and rules with impunity due to the higher role of traditions?
Who decides on the punishment for the infringement of rules and regulations and/or on rewarding the most loyal participants?	Who authorized exactly these subjects of management and entrusted them with the functions of imposing sanctions (punishment and reward) with regard to the objects of communication regimes management?
Are there multiple facts of mass protests of management objects dissatisfied with the accepted norms and rules of socio-political communication?	What is the proportion of citizens who approve the decisions and actions of the control center?

At the second stage of the primary study of country communication regimes, it is proposed to analyze the conventionality and location of the control center, taking into account the attributes of controllability of communication regimes (discussed above). This will reveal the features of controllability in a particular type of management of communication regimes. Schematically, the relationships between controllability attributes and types of management are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. The matrix of qualitative study of the characteristics of the controllability of country communication regimes in different types of their management

Criteria for controllability of CR	TYPE 1 of CR MANAGEMENT The conventional communication regimes control center is located within the country	TYPE 2 of CR MANAGEMENT The conventional control center is located outside the country	TYPE 3 of CR MANAGEMENT The non-conventional center is located outside the country	TYPE 4 of CR MANAGEMENT The non-conventional center is located within the country
Control and implementation of the decisions made (specific features are identified in each type of CR)				
The ability of the authorities to transfer the communication system from one state to another without conflict (specific features are identified in each type of CR)				
Consensus – the consent of the participants in communication about the goals, norms, rules, value constructs, institutions of the communication regime and control measures (specific features are identified in each type of CR)				
The ability of the authorities to use self-organization mechanisms to regulate communication regimes (specific features are identified in each type of CR)				

Accepted abbreviations:

CR – communication regime

The cells of this table are filled in with the qualitative information for each specific country. The main goals are:

- to identify and characterize the center / centers of management of the country's communication regime;
- to identify and describe the factors and conditions under which the controllability of the communication regime in the country is maintained / lost;
- to identify and analyze the main norms and rules of the country communication regime, on which public agreement has been reached;
- to identify and analyze the norms and rules of the country communication regime, which create controversy and even confrontation;
- to identify potentially conflict-generating parameters of the communication regime.

Discussion

The described methodology is used by the author of the article in the process of a comprehensive comparative study of country communication regimes. Comparison of the results obtained for different countries makes it possible to attribute certain communication regimes to specific types of management and determine the degree of their controllability, as well as to identify transitional types and subtypes of communication regimes management. The results of our studies of the communication regimes of foreign

countries were partially presented and discussed at scientific discussions¹ and will be presented in further publications.

Undoubtedly, the proposed research methodology using matrices and typology of communication regimes can be supplemented and expanded by other methods and approaches. New ideas come in the process of empirical analysis and comparison of country practices. Therefore, we are interested in attracting a wide range of participants to jointly explore country communication regimes.

Conclusions

The controllability of country communication regimes can be defined as a measure of control on the part of the control center (subjects of management that make decisions regarding the rules and institutions of communication) with the voluntary consent of the objects of management with the degree of their autonomy and subordination. Regime is reproduced when society voluntarily internalizes and recognizes the accepted rules, norms, restrictions, institutions and structures that regulate communications and information.

Each country has its own context for the emergence of one or another type of communication regime, and it is possible to understand this regime only in the context of each specific country. As a result, it is impossible to offer an ideal model of controllability of communication regimes for all types of societies and states. At the same time, it is possible to describe a typical model for managing communication regimes, regularities, organizational logic, resources, tools, and management technologies. The proposed analytical matrix allows distinguishing the main types of management of communication regimes (based on the parameters of location and the degree of conventionality of the control center) and determining the degree of controllability of communication regimes for these types (based on the achievement of the main indicators of controllability).

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¹ Begalinova K.K., Gribin N.P., Komleva V.V., Kotiukova T.V., Nazarov R.R., Ospanova A.N., Panov V.S., Smolik N.G., Turgunbaeva A.S., Cheremenina E.G. Communication regimes in Central Asia: scientific discussion, Russia and the World: Scientific Dialogue. 2021; 1(2): 96-137. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2021-1-2-96-137>. (In Russian). Volkov V.V., Vorotnikov V.V., Komleva V.V., Starikov A.D. The Communication Regimes of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia: A Scientific Discussion. Russia and the world: a scientific dialogue. 2021; 1 (2):138-161. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2021-1-2-138-161>. (In Russian).

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Contribution of the author

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Formation of Dependent Communication Regime of Ukraine: United States Impact

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Abstract. The article is devoted to the issues of the influence of external actors on country communication modes and their dependence as the result. This influence is a consequence of the unsettled global communication, which allows hegemony to influence states and country communication modes in the field of information and communication exchange. The communication regime of Ukraine, which was not previously the subject of scientific research, and its formation under the influence of external actors are of particular importance in the context of the current geopolitical situation. Based on the designed system criteria of dependence of the communication mode, which include the commonality of the past and its influence on the modern structure of communication, the language of communication (actual and official), the presence of preferences / restrictions on the activities of communication channels, the participation of foreign actors in rulemaking, the development of strategies in the field of information and communication exchange, dependence on external decision-making centers, communication coverage (territory control, broadcast to the whole territory), investments and financing of the communication sphere, ownership of communication media, the author analyzes the impact of the United States on the communication regime of Ukraine. The influence revealed as a result testifies not only to the dependence of the communication regime, but also in the context of the current conjuncture of international relations allows us to judge the fragmentation of the communication regime of Ukraine under the influence of external actors, which in the future will not contribute to the formation of a single stable information and communication space in Ukraine.

Keywords: communication regime, influence, dependency, hegemony, Ukraine, USA, information security, information sovereignty, world order

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Introduction

Issues of expanding somebody's influence in international politics are always the subject of interest of researchers and politicians. With the development of international law and international relations, with the integration of the world, there was more and more a need to learn how to limit somebody's influence, to create measures to restrain hegemony. In our time, WTO and UN standards significantly limit the methods of economic and forceful influence on states. So the need to influence others in their own interests was partially limited, but did not disappear, which forced states to look for new ways of influence, including those in the non-military sphere. The sphere of information and communication exchange, despite attempts to institutionalize global communication, remains one of the least regulated. The lack of regulation made it easier for the hegemony to spread influence and increase the dependence of other states. In order to counter this influence, new forms of local institutionalization of global communication appear which has become the subject of research. In 2020, the National Research Institute for the Development of Communications introduced the category "communication mode" into scientific circulation and began research on country communication modes as the basis for the institutionalization of modern global communication (2). One of the possible classifications is based on the typology associated with the dependence of communication modes. It has not yet been developed, but it is a key one in assessing the influence of foreign states on communication regimes.

The communication regime of Ukraine is an example of a clash of interests and influences of global leaders – the main beneficial owners are the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the European Union, which influence Ukraine to varying degrees, including its information and communication sphere. This is recognized both by Ukraine itself and by the international community. Despite the transition to military methods of resolving the conflict that has arisen between global leaders with the start of a special military operation conducted by the Russian Federation since February 24, 2022¹, the information and communication sphere still remains one of the key aspects of this confrontation. Disinformation, propaganda, fake news, blocking of information channels, other phenomena affecting information and communication channels demonstrate the relevance of the problem of influence and prospects for the functioning of the communication regime of Ukraine under the influence of external actors. The impact of the United States of America as one of the key actors in the system of international relations will be discussed in this article.

¹ Address of the President of the Russian Federation dated February 24, 2022. Available from: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843>.

Materials and methods

To study the influence of the United States on the formation of the dependence of the communication mode of Ukraine and to identify its peculiarities, the system of criteria for the dependence of country communication regimes was developed, taking into account the model of a complex empirical study of the country communication mode developed by V.V. Komleva (3), H. Schiller's dependency theory (8), J. Galtung's structural theory of imperialism (5), and critical theories of the Frankfurt School (6). On this theoretical and methodological basis, four areas of influence of states were identified, that groups of criteria were distinguished and are listed below.

Table 1. Criteria of dependency of country communication regime on foreign states

Group	Criteria
A. Historical and cultural criteria	A1. The commonality of the past and its influence on the modern structure of communication
	A2. Language of communication (actual)
B. Regulatory and legal criteria	B1. Language of communication (official)
	B2. Preferences / limitations of communication channels
	B3. Participation of external actors in legislative process, development of strategies in the field of information and communication exchange
C. Political criteria	C1. Dependence on external decision-making centers
	C2. Communication coverage (territory control, broadcast to the whole territory)
D. Financial and economic criteria	D1. Investments and financing of the communication sphere
	D2. Ownership of the means of communication

This system of criteria allows us to perform a comprehensive analysis of the influence of foreign states on the communication regime and its main elements of a particular country: context (historical, cultural, political, regulatory constants), practices and discourses and their relationship with norms and laws, actors (for this study, both internal actors and external ones that have a political and economic impact on internal ones are relevant).

The sources used were: Ukrainian regulations in the sphere of information, statistical data and materials of the non-governmental organization Reporters Without Borders, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) (recognized as an undesirable organization by the decision of the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation on 04.08.2022). Also, for the purposes of the study, official information was used from the websites of USAID, NATO, the US State Department, the White House, the website of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and media materials.

Results

Historical and cultural criteria

The specificity of the United States of America as a subject of influence on Ukraine and its communication regime is the absence of a common historical past, which is due to both geographical remoteness and the youth of the American state. However, since 1991, the history of relations between sovereign states has developed because of the US policy in the post-Soviet space. The importance of Ukrainian-American relations in the context of curbing Russian ambitions was emphasized by the well-known American political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski: "Any new Eurasian state based solely on the power of Russia, without Ukraine, will inevitably become less European and more Asian every year (1)".

This would further consolidate the Euro-Atlantic partnership, moving Russia away from it. In the period from 1991 to 2014, there was a trend towards gradual distancing through the integration of Ukraine, its elites, and the transformation of the worldview of the population towards Europe.

The model of Western Ukrainian identity, which was historically formed under the influence of Poland and Austria-Hungary, was taken as a basis (4). It is noteworthy that in the current cabinet, 11 out of 23 ministers come from Western Ukraine, 7 from Central Ukraine (Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy), 2 from the Dnipropetrovsk region, 1 from the Zaporozhye region, 1 from the Kharkiv region, which clearly demonstrates that the Western Ukrainian origin dominates among the executive authorities². The color revolution in 2014, which had the ideological basis of the pro-Western course of Ukraine and European integration, which were curtailed by the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich, fixed the gap between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. This is the beginning of a protracted political crisis within the country, where both pro-Russian and pro-European sentiments have historically coexisted without significant predominance. Pro-Western undertakings have been repeatedly supported by the US leadership, which was expressed in investments in areas that previously depended on the Russian Federation, in parallel they imposed sanctions on the Russian Federation for interfering in the internal affairs of Ukraine since 2014³. Thus, the United States systematically dismantled the communication system historically associated with the Russian Federation, simultaneously focusing on Western Ukrainian patterns while strengthening communication ties with the EU and the United States.

A distinctive feature is the use of the Ukrainian language by the United States in the interaction as a means of constituting self-identity (in slogans, news, when creating information resources focused on Ukrainians). It is obvious that the attitude towards this manner, which defiantly emphasizes respect for culture, identity and forms the horizontal equal dialogue, is positive, since it allows to emphasize the statehood, as well as to move

² Ukraine Cabinet of Ministers. Government portal. 2022. Available from: <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/uryad-ta-organi-vladi/team>.

³ Crimea is Ukraine (Antony J. Blinken Press-statement, Secretary of State). Department of State. 2021. Available from: <https://www.state.gov/crimea-is-ukraine/>.

away from Russia and the common historical past. In parallel with this, there is a gradual replacement of the Russian language with English in the teaching system: despite the status of both languages as languages of international communication, official languages of the UN, English is positioned as more popular. This contributes to further integration with the West, more and more people are learning English.

Regulatory and legal criteria

In Ukrainian legislation, the only state language is Ukrainian; its widespread use is enshrined in the law of Ukraine "On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language". This law establishes Ukrainian as the only state (official) language, fixes its mandatory use in all spheres of public life, proclaiming the Ukrainian language the basis of state building and self-determination of the Ukrainian nation, an element of the country's constitutional system⁴. The law establishes that knowledge of the Ukrainian language is the duty of every citizen of Ukraine (Article 6). Thus, the Ukrainian authorities establish their own rules of communication, which go against the established practice of the widespread use of the Russian language and other languages of regional importance (for example, Hungarian in Transcarpathia). The law additionally establishes the requirements for mandatory knowledge of the Ukrainian language for public positions – from the president to ordinary employees in the areas of healthcare, education, finance, civil and military service (Article 9). The laws of Ukraine are necessarily published in the state language and are officially translated only into English, which, in turn, emphasizes the importance of this language. There is no official translation to other languages that are actively used in communication.

The attitude towards the English language is also manifested in Art. 25 of the Law, which does not require the English-language media to publish mandatory parts of the circulation in Ukrainian. This is an exception for media in foreign languages in Ukraine⁵. The absence of restrictions, the openness of the communication regime significantly simplify the activities of foreign actors on the territory of Ukraine and create comfortable conditions for the formation and retransmission of Western discourse by local media based on samples used by Western sources.

Ukrainian legislation was created not only by managers within Ukraine, but also by representatives of external forces influencing them. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) played an active role, which shortly before the 2014 revolution, launched the RADA (Responsible Accountable Democratic Assembly) program, which is implemented jointly with a number of Ukrainian non-profit organizations. The goal of the program is to create a representative, accountable and independent Parliament,

⁴ On ensuring the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language: law of Ukraine (document 2704-VIII, current version – revision of 01.01.2022, basis – 1089-IX). The Ukraine Verkhovna Rada. Ukraine Legislation. Available from: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2704-19#Text>.

⁵ On ensuring the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language: Ukraine law (document 2704-VIII, current version – revision of 01.01.2022, basis – 1089-IX). The Ukraine Verkhovna Rada. Ukraine Legislation. Available from: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2704-19#Text>.

the Ukraine Verkhovna Rada. Within the framework of this program, there is an exchange of practices on the involvement of civil society in the legislative process, their participation in monitoring and independent control over the executive branch. The program includes expert consultations, educational programs for Ukrainian civil servants and members of Parliament for the exchange of experience. One of the areas of activity is the analysis of the work of the parliament and the development of proposals for its reform⁶. This program confirms the active involvement of the United States in the work of the Verkhovna Rada, testifies to the influence of the United States on ongoing reforms, including the transformation of legislation, through expert consultations and reports. The involvement of non-profit organizations, in turn, activates work with civil society and the population, thereby legitimizing the ongoing changes, and makes it possible to enlist its support.

Political criteria

The United States, as a rule, rarely participates in integration associations themselves, but actively uses this mechanism to consolidate states in order to simplify their interaction with them and achieve partial harmonization and control. A vivid example is the Euro-Atlantic partnership founded during the Cold War. Its main format is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Despite the military-political nature of this association, it provides security in various areas. In particular, the Strategic Concept 2010 includes information and cyberspace in the concept of security, which requires additional protection and attention of the alliance in view of the growing threats in this sphere⁷. This document applies exclusively to NATO members, which Ukraine is not now, but NATO actively interacts with partners in the spheres of its activity, including with Ukraine. Thus, one of the NATO trust funds under the Partnership for Peace program was implemented by 2017 and is aimed at improving protection against cyber threats, developing technologies and creating a monitoring center to counter threats in the field of information security. In 2016, the NATO-Ukraine platform was created to counter hybrid warfare, aimed at strengthening the resistance of society and the state to information pressure and countering the disinformation that arose with the outbreak of the crisis in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea in 2014⁸. Thus, we see that Ukraine, not being a member of NATO, is actively integrated into the cooperation and military-political activities of the bloc, which supports it in suppressing the informational influence of the Russian Federation, simultaneously strengthening the influence of the United States. Further integration with the bloc, as well as any integration, will lead to the delegation of certain powers to the supranational level, which will further strengthen the influence of external decision-making centers.

At the same time, the coverage of influence in the field of communication is gradually decreasing due to political reasons: if before 2014 Ukraine was an integral communication

⁶ About USAID RADA Program. Available from: <https://radaprogram.org/en/node/5>.

⁷ Strategic Concept 2010. NATO. Available from: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_82705.htm

⁸ Relations with Ukraine. NATO. 2022. Available from: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm.

space within the borders of 1991, after the events of Euromaidan, the reunification of Crimea with the Russian Federation and the formation of the then self-proclaimed Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics communication in these territories was again directed towards the Russian Federation and its communication regime. With the start of a special military operation, the influence of the United States and the controlled decision-making center has noticeably decreased – a number of Ukrainian territories are currently under the physical control of the Russian Military Forces, and Russian television and radio broadcasting is being established in these territories⁹. Although the United States does not recognize these territorial changes, at the same time it loses control over communication over part of the territory of Ukraine, which indicates the fragmentation of its communication regime.

On the territory controlled by the internal center in Kyiv, the United States has control over the discourse formed by the national media. Also carry out broadcasting a number of American media resources, including: CNN, CNBC, VOA, Radio Liberty Ukraine (RFE / RL). All of them were actively involved in the public awareness campaign during the 2019 presidential election, which indicates their active participation in political coverage and broadcast from a certain point of view. This is important – according to USAID, 74% of the population in Ukraine depend on television sources of information. The main instrument of US influence on the communication regime of Ukraine is the financing of the national media and communications system through various programs, which will be discussed below.

Financial and economic criteria

The key institutional investors in the Ukrainian economy are the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) and USAID¹⁰. The latter, among other things, is actively implementing a program to ensure cybersecurity for critical infrastructure, which is also related to the logistics of communication in the country and ensuring its sustainability. 27% of foreign direct investment received by Ukraine in 2019–2020 relates to the field of IT technologies, in total, \$40 million has been invested since 2017 in the field of information security¹¹. In the same years, the popularity of traditional media is rapidly declining and there is a growing interest in Internet communication through social networks and news sites, which indicates the transformation of the communication system and requires new principles for ensuring its security. USAID investments have also launched a number of new media projects on television and radio stations. In particular, the show Countdown was created in an interview format, where there are “moderated debates and fact-checked discussions” (7). A number of

⁹ Ukrainian TV towers will stop broadcasting to Crimea. RIA News. 2022. Available from: https://ria.ru/20220421/veschanie-1784625753.html?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop.

¹⁰ EBRD, USAID and AmCham help Ukraine develop capital and organised commodity markets. Available from: <https://www.ebrd.com/sites/Satellite?c=Content&cid=1395298836767&d=Touch&pageName=EBRD%2FContent%2FContentLayout>.

¹¹ Ukraine: an FDI snapshot. Investment Monitor. 2022. Available from: <https://www.investmentmonitor.ai/analysis/ukraine-fdi-snapshot-foreign-investment>.

educational historical and scientific projects were also launched, aimed at a young audience ("Divatska istoriya Ukrainy" ("Amazing History of Ukraine"), "Sho? Yak?" ("What? How?")). External financing of these projects affects the position broadcast within the framework of these projects, which can influence the perception of their own history, the transformation of the identity of Ukrainians under the influence of external actors.

The issue of ownership of communications media in Ukraine remains extremely difficult. Information by the non-profit organization Reporters Without Borders point to regime-dependence of the operating media and a lack of transparency as the main risks for pluralism in the media space. We see that a number of media outlets belong to political figures or persons affiliated with them¹². The US Department of State report on the observance of human rights assesses non-profit organizations and also states the partial freedom of the press, the ownership of the share of the media by oligarchs who own companies registered offshore, despite the direct prohibition of the law on the ownership of offshore structures by media companies¹³. Such a scheme not only reduces the transparency of funding, but also raises the question of the impact on the broadcast position. In this regard, it is difficult to assess the ownership of the media and the influence of the United States on this financial and economic aspect.

Conclusion

The analysis allows us to conclude that the communication regime of Ukraine is highly dependent on the United States, which is a key player in the international arena and, in particular, one of the main subjects of influence on the communication regime of Ukraine. This dependence is provoked by the successful exploitation of Ukraine's desire to become sovereign from the Russian Federation, to find its own identity, which de facto it made the state dependent on the United States. The United States most actively influences in the regulatory, legal, financial and economic spheres (investing in communication infrastructure, advising on the transformation of the legal system, its openness), which allows the American media, NGOs and political institutions to successfully broadcast their discourse throughout the country. The lack of historical unity is not an obstacle to building a new communication model – since the United States is not the only player influencing Ukraine in the context of the Euro-Atlantic partnership, the commonality of Western Ukraine with European culture, which is opposed to Russian influence and a common historical past, is taken as the basis for self-identity. Partnership and active cooperation within NATO makes it possible to give the information and communication sphere a military-political character and invest in further opposition to Russian information and communication influence.

¹² Media ownership monitor. Ukraine. Reporters without borders. 2021. Available from: <https://www.mom-rsf.org/en/countries/ukraine/>.

¹³ 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ukraine. Department of State. URL: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/ukraine/>.

It can be concluded not only about the dependence of the communication regime of Ukraine, but also about its fragmentation, since the influence of the United States is not the only one and is opposite to the influence of the Russian Federation. The merging of the communication regime with the political one due to the affiliation of large media with politicians indicates a close relationship between the communication regime and geopolitical tasks formed by external control centers, including the United States. All this will not contribute to the formation of a unified sustainable information and communication space in Ukraine and puts under doubt its further existence.

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HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE AND MODERNITY

History of International Relations and Foreign Policy

The rise of Asia changed the geopolitical context of the construction of the Soviet infrastructural empire. Instead of weak neighbors, dynamic centers of power appeared. The desire to use common interests with China in Korea and Vietnam to shackle the United States in Asia was an important element of the Soviet strategy. The back-to-back model made it possible to use the dynamics of the emerging multipolarity in the world as a multiplier of the military-political potential of the USSR.

[...] In the national tradition, 150–200 years is the operational memory of public administration. The historical experience of Russia and the USSR as a world power in the XX century can become the basis for the development of a model of the political and military strategy of modern Russia in the period of long-term strategic rivalry between the great powers.

Pyotr P. Skorospelov

The Russian Globalization Project in the XX Century. Anatomy of a Military-Political Strategy

This, in fact, is about the biggest turning point in the history of the 21st century – this is the confrontation between the Russian (it is sometimes called the “Eurasian” or “Orthodox” civilization) and Western civilizations. The outcome of this conflict situation depends largely on our success in Ukraine. In this case, we can say with confidence that the Western coalition against our country, which the Americans have been putting together for so long, will fall apart: the inhabitants of Western countries are not used to putting up with economic victims.

Veniamin V. Popov

Once Again about the Clash of Civilizations

The world needs a new project. The world develops according to the united laws, but, apparently, the new model should no longer be European-universal, but globally multivariate, giving the birth to the new multipolar world. For the East, as, indeed, for Western society, an important goal arises – to find a new harmony of society to replace the lost old one.

Alexander I. Yakovlev

Universality of the «Enlightenment Project» for the West and the East

The Russian Globalization Project in the XX Century. Anatomy of a Military-Political Strategy

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Abstract. The article discusses the main components of the military-political strategy of Russia in the «short» 20th century – from 1900 to 1991. Special attention is paid to how the foreign policy and the use of Armed Forces were planned. Reconstructing the intellectual ideas that created the framework of the foreign and military policy of the Russian state at that time, the author focuses on the elements that unite the leaders of Russia of the 20th century from Nikolai Romanov to Mikhail Gorbachev. Such issues as the «globalization» of the USSR in world affairs, relations with neighboring Asian centers of power, such as China and Iran, the sphere of «special state interests» of the USSR in Eastern Europe are discussed in the work. The evolution of Russian military strategy in the 20th century is studied: from betting on victory in the World War in the first half of the century to focusing on the actions of expeditionary groups during the Cold War. The article analyzes in detail the strategic deterrence measures carried out by the Armed Forces of the USSR in the 1950–1970. The issue of the resources of military-political strategy is considered separately.

Keywords: Russian Empire, USSR, globalization, Asia, foreign policy planning, the use of armed forces.

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Introduction

We often search for the “image of the future” in the past. Thus, the “Putin consensus” was formed at the beginning of the 21st century, as a return to the Soviet tradition interrupted in 1991. At the beginning of the century, they tried to complete what the Politburo headed by Gorbachev failed to do in the second half of the 80s. Now the concept of “Historical Russia” is based on rethinking the legacy that the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union left us, including the military-political sphere, in the “short” twentieth century (1900–1991).

This, as evidenced by the strategic planning documents of this period, corresponds to the minimum “operational memory” of the state administration.

Let’s try to figure out what the last Russian tsar and the Soviet Politburo were trying to achieve in world affairs? How the goals of foreign and military policy were determined, what were the “desirable foundations of the future world”? And, of course, how significant was the continuity in the military-political sphere during the “short 20th century”.

Materials and methods

The article is based on the research methodology of the “grand strategy” laid down in the E. Lutvak work “Strategy. The logic of war and peace”, and continued by A. Vess Mitchell, as well as prominent representatives of the Russian school of strategy, such as A.A.Svechin (23) and A.A.Kokoshin(7).

The source base for the study was, first of all, the archival funds of the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, the Foreign Policy Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, related to the activities of the highest authorities in Russia in the 20th century.

Results

“Tsargrad” mirage. Continuity of foreign policy goals of the Russian Empire and the USSR

Continuing the tradition established during the reign of Alexander III, the leadership of the Russian Empire at the turn of the XIX–XX centuries determining the goals of foreign and military policy proceeded from the fact that Russia acquired her borders in the 18th century and the further expansion is inexpedient. It was believed that the current military-political tasks were connected with the struggle for dominance in Asia – in Persia, Manchuria and Korea. What about Europe, the goal was to save the status quo.

The views of the leading circles in St. Petersburg on the goals of the foreign and military policy of the Russian Empire were most fully set out in the report of the War Minister A.N.Kuropatkin in 1900. The “historical tasks” of Russia in the 20th century were: the need to take control of the Bosphorus and ensure free access to the Mediterranean Sea through the Dardanelles, firmly consolidate its position on the Great Ocean (in addition to Port Arthur, get a naval base in southern Korea) and gain access through Persia to the Indian ocean (to create a naval base in Chakhbar, similar to Port Arthur). As it was noted in the report, holding in its hands the railway lines between the Pacific Ocean and the Baltic Sea, and having “tentacles” in the Straits, Indian and Pacific Oceans, Russia will be a “formidable

industrial rival to the great powers of the whole world" (8)¹. These tasks were planned by Kuropatkin for the future, for children and grandchildren, for a state whose population was to reach 400 million in the 20th century ("God bless," Minister of Finance S. Witte commented on the program outlined by Kuropatkin) (8:250–284)². The War Minister was well aware that these "very modest" tasks (in comparison with what was achieved by the Russian army in the 18th–20th centuries) "deeply affect the interests of the whole world", therefore, we must prepare for their "joint opposition in mastering the Bosphorus, access to the Indian Ocean and to the possible difficulty of our activities on the Great Ocean". Actually, this was happened (8:250–284).

According to D.Lieven, these Russian ambitions "should be viewed in the context of the era of imperialism, when Britain seizes Egypt to get the Suez Canal, and the United States occupies the Isthmus of Panama to control a key military and trade route from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific" (11:22). The tsarist government wanted to create an "infrastructural empire" similar to the British one, but not a maritime one, but a continental one. In practice, the solution of "historical tasks" by the tsarist government was initially viewed as a long-term project that did not involve significant military–political efforts. As Nicholas II believed, "it is possible only to outline the goals of our policy on the issue of the straits, and the capture of the Dardanelles, of course, as the most desirable. But when and how this goal can be achieved – it is impossible now to say. It depends entirely on the circumstances"³.

The stake was placed on bilateral agreements with weak neighbors and multilateral diplomacy among the great powers. Russia was not preparing for decisive operations in the event of local conflicts in the East. Japan was preparing, that predetermined the unsuccessful outcome of the Russian-Japanese war of 1904–1905 for Russia. As A.A.Svechin wrote: "The tragedy of the tsarist army in 1904 was that it was preparing to fight in the West, but had to act in the East" (22:105). The defeat in this war and the delimitation of spheres of interest in Asia (1907) achieved with England determined that there was only one region left where it seemed possible to change the status quo – the zone of the Black Sea straits. The tsarist government was prompted to intensify actions in this direction by fears that the progressive weakening of Turkey could lead to its disintegration or transformation into a German protectorate, like British Egypt (33:154). And "the straits are in the hands of a strong state – this means the complete subordination of the economic development of the entire south of Russia to this state," wrote Foreign Minister S.D.Sazonov to Nicholas II November 23, 1913⁴. Attempts to resolve the issue of the functioning of the Black Sea

¹ Kuropatkin A.N. The Most Submissive Report of the Minister of War in 1900 March 14 (26), 1900. Russian Federation State Archive. Fund 601. Inventory file 1. File folder 445. Paper 66-67; Kuropatkin's report actually summed up the discussion that unfolded at the beginning of 1900 between the Foreign Ministry, the military and naval departments and the Ministry of Finance on protecting the paramount interests of "Russia in connection with the Boer War".

² Ibid.

³ Resolution of Nicholas II on a note by F.F. Martens about the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits ... Russian Federation State Archive. Fund 543. Inventory file 1. File folder 668. Paper 70.

⁴ Sazonov's report to Nicholas II, November 23, 1913. MOEI. Moscow. 1931, Vol.I:397.

straits through diplomacy were unsuccessful (26)⁵. By 1914, the tsarist government was convinced that it would be possible to resolve the issue of the straits only in the event of a pan-European war⁶.

Many contemporaries understood the danger of such a scenario. As the former Minister of Internal Affairs P.N.Durnovo wrote: "the main burden of the war will fall on Russia", "the war, regardless of its outcome, will weaken Russia and divert its attention [from solving its historical tasks] to the West", "Russia will be plunged into hopeless anarchy, the outcome of which is difficult to foresee"⁷. For Russia, participation in the First World War ended approximately as Durnovo predicted in his famous note (11:7). However, despite the collapse of the Russian Empire in February 1917, the tasks laid down by the tsarist government at the turn of the XIX–XX centuries was surprisingly resilient. The idea of a world revolution was buried near Warsaw in August 1920, but the discussion on foreign policy initiated by I. Stalin in February 1924 points to a gradual return to traditional approaches.⁸ One can speak of an almost complete coincidence of the military–political goals of the USSR and the "historical tasks" of Russia at the beginning of the century by the time the Soviet Union entered World War II.

This is evidenced both by the maps found in the Stalin fund in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History with outlines of the Soviet security zone from the Barents Sea to the Persian Gulf made by his hand in August 1939, and by the directives for the trip of V. Molotov to Berlin in November 1940⁹. Stalin's geopolitical projects were developed in the documents of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs related to the planning of the post-war world order. The task of guaranteeing the security of the USSR was associated by Soviet diplomats for a long time with the need to exit the war with advantageous strategic borders (based on the 1941 borders), with the weakening of Turkey's role as a "sentinel on the straits", as well as use of transit routes through Iran to the Persian Gulf. At the same time, it was proposed to maintain the existing Anglo-Soviet agreement on Iran (in fact, on its division into spheres of influence). The main tasks of the USSR policy in the Far East were the return of South Sakhalin, Port Arthur, and the Chinese military railway, ceded by Russia

⁵ We are talking about the negotiations of A.P.Izvolsky with A. Erengel (1908) and the so-called "demarche" by N.V.Charykov (1911). Izvolsky's proposals assumed the right of free passage through the Straits for the military ships of Russia and other coastal states, while they would be closed to the military ships of other countries. In the same direction, it was proposed to Charykov to negotiate with the Turks (the Ottoman government "obliges ... not to impede the passage of Russian military ships through the straits", as it was said in the draft Russian-Turkish agreement sent to Charykov by the Foreign Ministry). Neiratov – Charykov October 2 (September 19), 1911 MOEI. Series II. Vol. 18(2):61. It should be noted that the idea of a strong alliance with Turkey, as an option for resolving the issue of the functioning of the Black Sea straits, was considered preferable by the Foreign Ministry and Nicholas II, as the best, as is evidenced, among other things, by published documents related to Charykov's demarche (MOEI. Series II. Vol. XVIII and XIX).

⁶ Journal of the special meeting, February 21(8), 1914. MOEI. Moscow, 1931; Series II. Vol. I:376.

⁷ Note by P.N.Durnovo [February 1914] Krasnaja nov'. November-December 1922:187, 197.

⁸ The discussion materials are in Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History. Fund 82. Inventory file 2. File folder 1139.

⁹ Political maps of Europe marked by I. Stalin [August 1939]. Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History. Fund 558. Inventory file 11. File folder 511. Some directives for the Berlin trip, November 9, 1940. Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History F. 82. Inventory file 2. File folder 1161. Paper 149.

to Japan. It can be said that the main documents of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, related to the planning of the post-war world order, continued the "historical tasks of Russia" formulated in Kuropatkin's report (19)¹⁰.

In an effort to expand Soviet influence in the zone of the Black Sea straits and in the Mediterranean, Moscow has been increasing pressure on Turkey since the spring of 1945. On March 19, 1945, the USSR denounced the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of December 17, 1925, as inconsistent with the new situation. During negotiations in Moscow in June 1945, the Soviet side demanded to change the mode of operation of the Black Sea straits. The USSR sought the recognition of the Black Sea as closed to warships of non-Black Sea countries with the provision of the Black Sea countries with complete freedom of passage of their warships from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and the right to participate, together with Turkey, in controlling the functioning of the straits by providing it with a naval base in the straits zone¹¹. Stalin actively raised this question to the allies in Potsdam (21:335–336). At the same time, the USSR sought bases in the Mediterranean, demanding in negotiations with the allies the provision of guardianship over Tripolitania (part of modern Libya) and a base on one of the Dodecanese islands. In the autumn of 1945, the Soviet leadership stepped up pressure on Iran. It sought to grant oil concessions in the north of Iran (on the model of the Anglo-Iranian agreement of 1933), supported the struggle for autonomy in Iranian Azerbaijan and refused to confirm the timing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the northern part of the country (21:335–336).

Thus Stalin began to implement the project of an infrastructural empire. However, resistance from the United States and Great Britain did not allow these intentions to be realized. "If you come to the goal exhausted and can hardly stand on your feet, then you get the appropriate attitude," Khrushchev described the situation that had developed for the USSR weakened by the war in one of the tape recordings of his memoirs¹². Stalin's hopes for the possibility of continuing constructive cooperation with the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition were not realized¹³. The security border of the USSR was determined by the line of advance of the Red Army.

10 The evolution of the military goals of the USSR in the Second World War is fully shown in the works of M. Narinsky. For example: Narinsky M. Europe: the problem of borders and spheres of influence (1939-1947). *Svobodnaja mysl'*. 1998; 3:82-93.

11 Kavtaradze, Vinogradov – Molotov, February 6, 1945. Foreign Policy Archive. Fund 06. Inventory file 7. File folder 711. File 47. Paper 1.

12 Khrushchev N.S. *Memories*. Moscow, 1999. Vol. II:604.

13 The correspondence between Stalin and Molotov in 1945-1946, stored in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, testifies that the ongoing negotiations with the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition on the issues of the post-war order of the world at that time served as an important factor for the Soviet leadership, preventing him from to go "through" in Turkish or Iranian issues. Thus, at the moment of the climax of the Iranian crisis in November-December 1946 (when the Iranian government sent troops into Iranian Azerbaijan), Stalin telegraphed Molotov to New York demanding "to make all possible concessions to Byrnes in order to finally end the [peace] treaties" and thus complete the territorial and political reconstruction of post-war Europe. Attempts to gain a foothold in the Mediterranean were also sacrificed to this goal. Druzhkov to Molotov, November 27, 1946; Molotov – Druzhkov, December 14, 1946. Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History. Fund 558. Inventory file 11. File 103. Paper 26; File 104. Paper 74.

Globalization of the USSR in the second half of the 20th century

After World War II, Stalin's geopolitical aspirations would only lead to the formation in the early 1950s new "sanitaire cordon". This is a system of military-political blocs along the perimeter of the borders of the socialist camp, created with the leading role of the United States. "We were under siege, to put it bluntly," Khrushchev recalled this period¹⁴. Since 1957, Khrushchev and Mao Zedong have been contemplating a transition to an offensive strategy: "how to turn the Cold War into a factor unfavorable to the Americans"¹⁵. The task of "decomposing" the pacts (NATO, SEATO, Treaty of Baghdad) was at the heart of the Soviet-Chinese coalition strategy. Khrushchev planned to solve this problem through "a special way of implementing foreign policy by threatening war to the imperialists"¹⁶.

It was a series of connected successive regional military-political crises, which since 1958 acquired the character of a coordinated geopolitical offensive: in the summer of 1958, the USSR carried out military maneuvers in the south in order to keep Turkey and Iran from opposing Iraq; in September 1958, during the Second Taiwan Crisis and the "artillery blockade" of the islands of Matsu and Jinning, the USSR was ready to send TU-16 bombers to operate against the ships of Chiang Kai-shek and provide nuclear security guarantees to the PRC; in November 1958, the II Berlin Crisis begins, the most largescale and longlasting (it dragged on until 1962). As the Berlin crisis escalated, the scale of ongoing political and military activities grew. The deployment of a group of Soviet troops in Cuba (Operation Anadyr) can be considered in the context of measures to fetter the United States on the eve of the resolution of the Berlin issue.

The Shah of Iran was the first of the American allies to flinch when in 1962 he gave assurances that American missile bases would not be located on his territory (28:423–444). After the outbreak of the Cyprus crisis in 1964, a similar agreement was reached with Ankara¹⁷. The balance of power along the perimeter of the Soviet borders began to change in favor of the USSR, which freed Moscow's hands to go to the ocean. Khrushchev set about transforming the Soviet Navy into an ocean fleet. Since 1959, a military shipbuilding program has been implemented, according to which it was planned to build 700 large surface and submarine ships by 1965. In 1958–62 attempts were made to organize a permanent base for the Soviet Navy in the ports of Albania, Indonesia, Cuba and on the Pacific coast of China. Khrushchev paid special attention to Egypt and Indonesia, where the bulk of Soviet economic and military aid to third world countries went. There in the early 1960s. Expeditionary groups of Soviet troops operated. Realizing the impossibility of realizing the dream of the straits, Khrushchev decides to "jump over" them, trying to gain a

14 Khrushchev N.S. The specified work. Vol. III:451.

15 From Antonov's diary. Recording of a conversation with Mao Zedong, October 14, 1959. Foreign Policy Archive. Fund 0100. Inventory file 52. Folder file 443. File 11. Paper 228.

16 The wording of the so-called report of "Polensky" – Report of the Presidium of the Central Committee at the October Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU [No later than October 13, 1964]. Nikita Khrushchev. 1964. Moscow, 2007:197.

17 Gromyko – Podgorny, with the project application, an indication of the delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR sent to Turkey, December 28, 1964. Foreign Policy Archive. Fund Ref. on Turkey. Inventory file 76. Folder file 354. File 12. Paper 46.

foothold in key points along the sea route from Europe to the Far East, primarily in the area of the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca (24).

In the second half of the 1960s the Politburo confidently formulates the tasks of “loosening” the northern and southern flanks of NATO and puts forward a strategy for improving relations with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, tying them economically in order to transfer them “to positions of non-alignment” and thus create a buffer security zone along all the southern borders of the USSR. Since the second half of the 1960s the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is beginning to attribute Egypt, Syria and Algeria to the “sphere of vital interest”, just as “the United States is trying to do this in relation to the countries of Latin America”. However, the process of creating a “sphere of vital interest of the USSR” was difficult. As a result of the two-time military defeat of the Arab allies of the USSR (in 1967 and 1973) and A. Sadat’s reorientation to a separate deal with Israel, the goal set by Stalin “to wedge into the Mediterranean, having achieved bases and bridgeheads there”, was not achieved. As a stronghold in the Middle East, the USSR was left with Syria only.

The USSR approached the goal of creating an “infrastructural empire” only in the second half of the 1970s. The first step was the unexpected success of the Cuban project in Africa (Angola 1975; Ethiopia 1978) (36). The real breakthrough came in 1979 after the conclusion of a military-political alliance with Vietnam. The USSR received the Cam Ranh naval base, which allowed it to control the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Cam Ranh, where the 17th operational squadron of the Navy was based, became the largest naval base of the USSR abroad (16). This was followed by the signing of agreements on the establishment of similar bases in Tartus (1981) and Aden (1983). This is how the world chain of Soviet naval bases developed near to the main sources of oil and other resources for the economies of Western countries, strategic straits and sea lanes from the Mediterranean through the Indian Ocean to the Far East (4:292–293).

As A. Solzhenitsyn wrote in a personal letter to L. Brezhnev: “Who would have thought that the eternal dream of the straits, without coming true, would become, however, not needed – Russia will step so far into the Mediterranean Sea and into the oceans”¹⁸. By the mid-1970s, a system of views had developed in the so called Andropov Doctrine in the military-political circles of the USSR. It was based on the thesis that nuclear parity made a direct clash between the USSR and the USA insane. It was believed that in conditions when the boundaries of confrontation in Europe and the Far East were strictly delineated, the struggle was now being waged where a direct clash could be avoided – in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Therefore, the USSR needs bases and a fleet in the World Ocean as strongholds for rendering assistance to the peoples fighting against imperialism (4:32). This system of views was based on the ideas of the First Main Directorate of the State Security Committee, which proposed focusing on a limited number of strategically located states that would be economically «low-intensive». At the same time, reference was made to the experience of Great Britain, which, by controlling only a few points on

¹⁸ Solzhenitsyn A.I. – Brezhnev, September 5, 1973 President Archive. Fund 3. Inventory file 67. File 245. Paper 3 (Then it was made public and known as the “Letter to the Leaders of the Soviet Union”).

the map – Gibraltar, Malta, Suez, Aden, Singapore – secured dominance on the sea route from Europe to India (9:112).

The world communist movement served as an outer shell, inside which the Soviet project of globalization was placed, and the core of the “world system of socialism” was outlined by the contours of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Inside, the “world socialist system” was divided into the USSR and its sphere of “special interests” in Eastern Europe, united by membership in the Warsaw Pact, and independent centers of power allied to Moscow – Cuba and Vietnam, each of which had its own sphere of interests – respectively in Africa and Indochina.

“Globalization” made the USSR vulnerable to US military and political pressure in the Caribbean (Cuba, Nicaragua), Africa (Angola) and the Middle East (Syria). Syria became the main front of the confrontation in the early 1980s. After the start of Israel’s aggression in Lebanon in the summer of 1982, Assad turned to the USSR for military support. The Politburo decides to send an air defense and air force expeditionary group to Syria. But a year later, under the new General Secretary – Andropov, the Politburo, fearing a repeat of the Caribbean crisis, refuses to actively use military force to expand the Soviet sphere of interests and switches to geopolitical defense (4:335–342).

Understanding the vulnerability of the external contour of Pax Sovietica forces Gorbachev’s Politburo to make the program for resolving regional conflicts the center of gravity of counteracting the American policy of “neo-globalism”¹⁹. Appropriate decisions were made on Afghanistan and Kampuchea in 1986, and on Angola in 1988. By the end of 1989, Moscow had achieved a settlement of the main regional crises, retaining its position in the third world. Gorbachev did not plan to abandon Pax Sovietica. However, unlike Brezhnev and Gromyko with their stake on the Arab East, M. Gorbachev staked on “Asia” (the Indo-Pacific region), believing that “civilization in the 21st century will go in the East”²⁰. The elements of Gorbachev’s Asian strategy were: the desire to deal with India as a “world power”, including support for its regional aspirations and naval ambitions, an emphasis on interaction between India and the strategic ally of the USSR in the Asia-Pacific region – Vietnam, with the possible involvement of Indonesia, the completion normalization process with China. The turn of the USSR to Asia was supposed to lead to the formation of a new architecture of international relations, which assumed the strengthening of the role of the UN (to constrain US foreign policy) and the formation of “open” regional organizations, such as “USSR – India – China”, with the possible involvement of Brazil (modern RIC (Russia – India – China) and BRICS). New “network” structures were to become a counterbalance to such military-political alliances as NATO. And access to the emerging markets of the Indo-Pacific region was supposed to provide the Soviet economy with a leading position in the world economy (42:310–311).

The “historical tasks” of Russia formulated by Kuropatkin were basically solved by the end of the Brezhnev period. The main braces of Pax Sovietica were completed during

¹⁹ About measures to strengthen our opposition to the American policy of neo-globalism. Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU, September 4, 1986. *Istochnik*. 1995; 2:70-72.

²⁰ Politburo, December 4, 1986. In the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Moscow, 2008:110.

the globalization of the USSR in the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s. The USSR successfully withstood the last “siege” of the socialist community during the President R. Reagan period. The economic foundation of Pax Sovietica was formed. In contrast to Soviet trade with Western countries, which was mainly an exchange of Soviet raw materials for technology and food, trade with developing countries consisted of the exchange of industrial equipment produced in the Soviet Union for industrial and agricultural raw materials. If we add the arms trade, then the position of the USSR in the world economy in the late 1980s, especially its economic position in the third world, looked impressive.

The USSR and the rise of Asia in world affairs in the 20th century

Historically, Russia's security was determined by the situation, which became significant in connection with the “rise of Asia” in world affairs in the 20th century. At the beginning of the XX century Russia's neighbors in Asia were three empires that were in a state of decline – Turkish, Persian and Chinese. When Kuropatkin formulated the historical tasks of Russia, economic and political penetration into them was conceived as an ordinary colonial affair. For 100 years the situation has fundamentally changed – in the East and South, Russia now has the neighbors that are dynamic centers of power: Japan, China, Iran, Turkey. This situation matured gradually, and the task of adapting to the changing geopolitical landscape arose before the military-political leadership of the USSR only in the second half of the 20th century. Stalin's theses about the emergence of a revolutionary situation in East Asia after the victory of the Chinese revolution and the shift of the center of the world revolutionary movement from West to East laid the foundation for the Soviet approach to the problem of the rise of Asia²¹.

It was on this basis that at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s there was a delimitation of spheres of interest between Moscow and Beijing, and the inertia of these agreements operated throughout the entire period of the Cold War and continues to operate today. The Chinese call the emerging model of relationships “back-to-back”. A very elegant description of it was given by analysts of the First Main Directorate of the State Security Committee in the mid-1970s: “The USSR and the PRC turned their backs to each other, i.e. the least developed and remote from the center regions. The USSR is turned to face Europe, to the West, China – to the Pacific Ocean and Southeast Asia. The economies of the two countries are not competitors to each other, they naturally complement each other. ... China's strategic interests lie in Asia” (9:118–119).

The back-to-back model gave the USSR colossal geopolitical advantages in strategic competition with the United States. Despite the escalation of the struggle for leadership in the world communist movement between Moscow and Beijing, during the negotiations

²¹ These ideas were voiced on July 10 in their original form – in the form of Stalin's toast during the reception of the Chinese delegation headed by Liu Shaoqi. As K. Kovalev recalled, the Chinese leaders were inspired by Stalin's statements that the Chinese communists should become the head of the peoples of East Asia and lead them (Goncharov S. Stalin's dialogue with Mao Zedong. Problems of the Far East. 1992; 1-2-3:80).

between Khrushchev and Mao Zedong in the summer of 1958 and the negotiations between A. Kosygin and Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in February 1965, the agreements of 1949–1950 were confirmed, including readiness for coordination in the military-political sphere. In February 1965, the USSR and China agreed on the goals of the coalition strategy in Asia: to help the “Anglo-American bloc” get bogged down in Southeast Asia. It was supposed to strategically forge the “Anglo-American bloc” by supporting the “special war” of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the territory of South Vietnam; to give continued assistance to Indonesia in its confrontation with Malaysia, which was supported by the British; to strengthen the air defense of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The main thing at the same time was to prevent the escalation of local conflicts into a world war²². It should not be forgotten that the Soviet Union considered the war in Vietnam (and before that – in Korea) in the context of the struggle between the US and China for predominant influence in Asia. Having bound the USA in Indochina, the USSR got the opportunity to strengthen its positions in the Middle East, in the Arab countries and India, which were of great political, economic and military interest to it²³.

The crisis of the back-to-back model was caused by internal processes in China associated with the start of the Cultural Revolution (1966). In 1969, Mao Zedong's fear of possible Soviet intervention in the Chinese unrest, under the influence of the Czechoslovak events, led Beijing to the decision to launch a preemptive strike, provoking a series of major clashes on the border (Damansky, Dulaty, Zhalanashgol). For 10 years after the “border war” in 1969, the “Chinese” policy of the Politburo was reduced to unsuccessful attempts to negotiate with the Chinese from a position of strength, which became one of the reasons for the rapprochement between Beijing and Washington. The result was a positional impasse and an increase in fear of military danger in the East (6:77–109)²⁴. When the expectations of changes after the death of Mao Zedong are not justified and Brzezinski begins to play the “Chinese card”, the Politburo in the summer of 1978 finds a way out through a military-political alliance with Vietnam. Planned as a fleeting operation of the Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea turned into a regional war between China and Vietnam, which lasted for a decade (1979–1988). The USSR, carrying out strategic deterrence measures in the Far East (the largest of them is the military operation Vostok-79), de facto became a participant in its active phase (18). The unpreparedness of the Chinese army for a large-scale military conflict on two fronts at the same time – with the USSR and Vietnam, the economic problems of

²² Recordings of negotiations between Khrushchev and Mao Zedong July 31 – August 2, 1958. Russian State Archive of Contemporary History. Fund 52. Inventory file1. File 498; Chinese transcripts of Kosygin's talks in Beijing have been translated into English and are available on the Cold War International History Project website: Record of the Fifth Contact between Premier Zhou, Chen Yi and Kosygin, 10 February 1965. Available from: <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/165486>; Minutes from Conversation between Kosygin and Mao Zedong, February 11, 1965. Available from: <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118039>; Record of Conversation with V. D. Moskovsky, February 16, 1965. Available from: <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114980>.

²³ Gromyko A. In the Central Committee of the CPSU. About our further line and some measures in relations with the USA. April 6, 1970. Russian State Archive of Contemporary History. Fund 3. Inventory file 68. File folder 1242. Paper 59-91.

²⁴ Kapitsa M.S. On different parallels. Moscow, 1996:77-109.

China, created the prerequisites for the normalization of Soviet–Chinese relations (32)²⁵.

The “secret” contacts between the USSR and the China on the issue of improving interstate relations that began after Brezhnev’s Tashkent speech (March 1982) led to a revival of economic and cultural ties with the understanding that China would be ready to normalize political relations only if the USSR ceased military the political encirclement of the China (the so-called “three conditions” – to withdraw Soviet troops from the Chinese border and withdraw them from the Mongolian People’s Republic, to stop military assistance to Vietnam). With Gorbachev coming to power, already in 1986, the Politburo made a decision on the transition to a full-fledged normalization of relations with the China. In the Cambodian question, the strategic line of the Politburo was determined in March 1987 (the goal is national reconciliation according to the Afghan model). The turning point came a year later, when the Vietnamese leadership decided to withdraw Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea, removing the main obstacle to the normalization of Sino–Soviet and Sino–Vietnamese relations. In turn, the Chinese leadership decides to normalize completely the relations with the USSR. Already in January 1989, Moscow informed Beijing about the planned reduction in the troops in the East in 1989–1990 and decides on the withdrawal of the 39th Army from Mongolia. On May 15–18, 1989 M. Gorbachev traveled to Beijing. A line under the past was drawn (6:110–115; 42:33–46, 100–102, 196).

The Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran was the beginning of the emergence of another center of power in Asia. Faced with the formation of an “arc of crisis” in the Persian Gulf, the Politburo faced a choice: either to improve relations with the new regime in Tehran, considering it as one of the varieties of the national liberation movement, or, fearing an outbreak of “Muslim fanaticism” in the southern “underbelly” of the USSR, go to the policy of containment. Iraq’s attack on Iran in August 1980 indicated a false way out of the situation of uncertainty – the Politburo decided to balance in Iranian policy, but “toward Baghdad”. The same time, Brezhnev hesitated on the Iranian issue almost to his death. In October, at his insistence, the Politburo decides to deploy a Soviet air defense group in Syria. The relationship between the confrontation between the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel (backed by the United States and France) and the situation in the Persian Gulf, where Iraqi troops were defeated during successful offensives by Iranian troops, was no secret to the Politburo. At the talks in the Kremlin on June 26, 1982, H.Assad explained that if Syria held out, with any change in the regime in Iraq, after Saddam, either pro–Syrian or pro–Iranian forces would come to power. In any case, the new regime will be anti–American. This is where the geographical factor can play its role. According to the Syrian leader, through Iran and Iraq, Syria will receive direct access to the Soviet Union by land. In November 1982, Brezhnev dies, not having managed to form a consensus in the Politburo on policy towards Iran, as he succeeded in the Chinese situation. The concept of a “land bridge” to the Mediterranean was shelved until the second decade of the 21st century.

²⁵ On the understanding by the main command of the People’s Liberation Army of China of their unpreparedness for a large-scale conflict with the participation of the USSR: Chen L. Operational Idealism: Doctrine Development of the PLA under Soviet Threat. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 2017;5:663-695.

Gorbachev did not dare to change the direction of Iranian policy, despite the existing in 1986–1987 “window of opportunities”. The Iranians offered the USSR to establish a strategic partnership against American penetration into the region. Diplomatic contacts took place on the background of gaining by the Tehran strategic initiative at the front. However, the “balanced, equidistant line” in the Iran–Iraq conflict won in the Soviet leadership. As a result, the United States, which teetered on the brink of war with Iran for much of the 1980s, avoided a new Vietnam. The settlement of relations with Iran took place only at the end of the Gorbachev period, in January–February 1989 (27:103–108; 40; 34)²⁶.

The rise of Asia presented the Politburo with a dilemma: how to build policy towards new centers of power along the perimeter of the USSR, by delimiting spheres of interest or balancing. Stalin chose the first option and delineated “spheres of responsibility” with the leadership of the new China in 1949–1950. Brezhnev had to resort to balancing after the “border war” of 1969 and an unsuccessful attempt to resolve relations with China from a “position of strength”. The result of the balancing policy was a long period of military confrontation. The balancing policy turned out to be economically unprofitable, which seriously complicated the position of the USSR in its confrontation with the West. The situation began to stabilize only after the start of the military conflict, and in fact – the regional war between China and Vietnam in 1979. By the turn of the 1980s – 1990s, the situation “as if by itself” returned to the “back to back” model, first of all, due to the lack of a counterweight to China. The situation was approximately the same in the Middle East, where the Soviet leadership also initially opted for a balancing strategy. However, Iraq was first exhausted by the war with Iran, and then defeated by the United States. The Soviet leadership had to build bridges with Tehran. The practice of relations with new centers of power in Asia in the second half of the 20th century showed that the delimitation of spheres of interest or the model of “strategic partnership”, in the language of modern diplomacy, is the least expensive way to build relations with strong neighbors.

Vienna system 2.0

The creation of a sphere of “special state interests” of the USSR in Eastern Europe was not originally planned by Stalin and was the result of the devastating consequences of the Second World War. After the defeat of Germany, the weakening of France and Italy, the USSR turned out to be the only strong “land” power in Europe. A similar situation arose on the European continent after the Napoleonic Wars. At that time, its international legal design was the Vienna system, which was based on the unity of the great powers, behind which was a bipolar system, the poles of which were the Russian and British empires (43).

²⁶ Shevardnadze E. When the iron curtain collapsed. Moscow, 2009:103-108. Soviet-Iranian relations during the Gorbachev period are covered in detail in the article: Nunan T. Doomed to Good Relations. *Journal of Cold War Studies*. 2022; 1:39-77. “Twilight war” between the US and Iran in the 80s, brinkmanship in the second half of the 80s – see the study based on declassified American documents Crist D.. *The Twilight War*. N.Y. 2012.

The desire to use the experience of the XIX century when planning the post-war world order was typical for the diplomacy of the “big three” countries. Therefore, Soviet diplomacy proposed restoring the Vienna system under new conditions “on the basis of an amicable delimitation of security spheres in Europe on the basis of the principle of immediate neighbourhood”. Britain’s interest was seen in ensuring the balance of power in Europe and eliminating the “prerequisites for a third world war”. The USSR, in turn, was interested in keeping England as a powerful power, “because we may need such an England to balance in the face of US imperialist expansion”²⁷. That turned out to be wrong. Already in September 1946, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, N. Novikov, stated an agreement between the United States and Great Britain “on the partial division of the world on the basis of mutual concessions, close coordination of their policies at international conferences”²⁸. The “foundations of the future world” project in the form in which it was conceived in the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs during the war years, was not realized. The position of the USSR as the strongest power in Europe was challenged by the United States almost immediately after the end of World War II. Since Stalin was not going to share the role of European hegemon with anyone after the end of World War II, in the summer of 1946 the USSR shifted from betting on the preservation of the anti-Hitler coalition to a policy of strategic rivalry with the United States²⁹. From that moment, the key goal of Soviet policy was to oust the United States from Europe. All Soviet leaders from Stalin to Gorbachev fought for this.

Nevertheless, the system-forming elements of the “Vienna System 2.0” – the United Nations and its core, the Security Council, laid the foundation for a sustainable world order. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the scales gradually tipped in favor of the USSR, especially after the US defeat in Vietnam. The 1970s is the heyday of the “Vienna System 2.0”. After the US defeat in the Second Indochina War, the USSR dominated Europe in military-strategic terms (44). To consolidate the new balance of power, the Politburo is taking steps to neutralize the factor of American nuclear weapons in Europe. The topic of disarmament is becoming the core of negotiations with the United States. At the same time, the Politburo relied not so much on negotiations on strategic offensive weapons, but on the conclusion of an agreement between the USSR and the USA on the non-use of nuclear weapons against each other, hoping that it would undermine America’s influence in Europe. The conclusion of such an agreement would bind the United States in such a way, Gromyko liked to say among his employees, that it would not be clear whether they would come to the aid of the Europeans or not. Leonid Brezhnev negotiated this with Nixon, Ford and Carter. In parallel, there were attempts to consolidate the Soviet military-political hegemony in Europe through political actions aimed at “loosening” the northern and southern flanks of NATO³⁰.

27 Litvinov M. Note On the prospects and possible basis for Soviet-British cooperation, November 15, 1944. Foreign Policy Archive. Fund 06. Inventory file 6. File folder 143. File 14. Paper 37-38, 81-86.

28 Novikov N.V. US foreign policy in the post-war period. September 22, 1946. Foreign Policy Archive. Fund 06. Inventory file 8. File folder 45. File 759. Paper 15.

29 The key moment here was the discussion by the Soviet leadership in May 1946 of the American draft treaty with Germany. The materials of the discussion were published in the collection: The USSR and the German Question. 1941-1949. Moscow, 2002. Vol. II.

30 He writes in detail about the significance of the initiative on the non-use of nuclear weapons in his memoirs: Alexandrov-Agentov A.M. From Kollontai to Gorbachev. Moscow: 1994:232.

The USSR, however, turned out to be “tied” to its sphere of special interests in Eastern Europe, which Khrushchev was already beginning to perceive as a political and military burden. By the time of Brezhnev’s death the attitude to the socialist countries as “let them do what they want” was already widespread on Staraya Ploshad’ (so called The Old Square)³¹. And by the time Gorbachev was elected General Secretary, they began to prevail. In 1986, the Politburo assesses the existing trade and economic relations in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance as a burden on the Soviet economy³². By the beginning of 1989, Gorbachev’s formula had developed: to deal with Eastern Europe as with China³³. And in the military-political field, the thesis inherited by Gorbachev from Khrushchev is reinforced: the most effective way to oust the United States from Europe is a mutual, phased withdrawal of Soviet and American troops, in which the Americans go overseas, and the USSR withdraws troops for several hundred kilometers³⁴. This is the geopolitical meaning of the idea of a “Common European Home”, which was more important than the treaties on the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range missiles and strategic offensive weapons. Protracted disarmament talks pushed European security issues, including the future of Eastern Europe, to the very back of the Soviet-American agenda. The Politburo did not feel the shift in the worldview of the Reagan administration that occurred in the fall of 1987 – the readiness to deal with the Soviet Union “as with China”³⁵. The “Chinese mode” invented by J. Schultz opened the way to some serious agreements, but the Politburo was in no hurry – the “big deal” was thought to be possible only with the next administration.

The Soviet peace offensive announced by Gorbachev in his UN speech in December 1988, aimed at resolving European security issues has stalled. George W. Bush, after his election as the President of the United States, took a pause in the negotiations, which lasted until May 1989. Nevertheless, until late autumn, the Politburo was sure that, despite the unrest in Poland and Hungary, the situation in Eastern Europe was developing acceptable. The priority for Moscow was to avoid getting involved in the internal political crisis of one of the Eastern European countries. Appropriate decisions excluding the use of military force were made by the Politburo in March 1989. The prospects of a “new Yalta” with the Americans were seen as real not only on Staraya Ploshad’ (so called The Old Square): March 30, 1989, Scowcroft proposed to Bush a complete withdrawal of Soviet and American troops from Central Europe as the best variant of the European settlement for the USA. Veterans of American politics, Kissinger and Brzezinski, spoke about the same during their meetings with Gorbachev³⁶.

Everything changed after the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 and G. Kohl’s bet on the destabilization of the Krenz-Modrow government and the forced unification of

31 Chernyaev’s diary, entry dated November 11, 1982. National Security Archives Fund. 2. 1982. Paper 50.

32 Ibid., July 3, 1986. Paper 69.

33 Notes by Chernyaev at a meeting of the Politburo on January 21, 1989. Available from: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/rus/text_files/Masterpiece/1989-01-21.pdf

34 Dobrynin A.F. Purely confidential. Moscow, 1997:607.

35 Non-paper Prepare of by the Secretary of State. Nov. 18. 1987. FRUS. 1981-1988; Vol. VI:530.

36 From a conversation with H. Kissinger, January 17, 1989. Answering the challenge of time. Moscow, 2010:221-223; Recording of M.S. Gorbachev with E. Krenz November 1, 1989. Available from: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/rus/text_files/Masterpiece/1989-11-1.pdf

Germany through the “Anschluss” of the GDR. The meaning of what was happening was understood in Moscow immediately. Kohl’s rejection of the Ostpolitik model and the return to Adenauer’s paradigm of “change through force” after some hesitation was supported by the United States, which had a decisive influence on the positions of other Western powers. The logic of the Bush administration has changed, as the American analysis of the prospects for perestroika pointed to a high probability of its failure and the removal of Gorbachev. The risk of a repeat of “Hungary” in the GDR, as it became clear during the summit in Malta in December 1989, was minimal (45:174).

At a meeting in the Kremlin on January 26, 1990, the Soviet leadership, which had previously abandoned the use of military force as an instrument of influence on the situation, decides to bet on delaying the process of German unification. The decision looks justified. If the German issue had “survived” in limbo until August 2, the invasion of Iraqi troops into Kuwait would have radically affected the balance of power in Europe. But Gorbachev did not have enough patience and steadfastness – for the first time he faltered in Washington on May 31, agreeing in principle to the membership of a united Germany in NATO (much to the surprise of the Americans and the Soviet delegation), and finally “surrendered” in July at negotiations with Kohl in Moscow and Arkhyz on July 15–16. After that, in fact, only the amount of compensation for the withdrawal of a group of Soviet troops from Germany was discussed with the Germans (46:118–119,124).

What were the consequences of the loss of Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany for the fate of the USSR and the project of “Russian globalization”? After all, Gorbachev already wanted to get rid of the sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and do business with it as with China. It seems that the main consequences were associated with the expansion of NATO to the East, and they began to threaten Russia’s military security only in connection with attempts to drag Ukraine and Georgia into the North Atlantic Alliance. Not the retreat from Europe, but the collapse of “Historical Russia” and the policy of the US and NATO aimed at taking advantage of the temporary weakening of the Russian state in their interests, have created problems that affect the security of our country so seriously that “there is nowhere to retreat further”.

Planning for the armed forces use

Strategic planning in the field of defense in Russia since the end of the 19th century. and in the 20th century, focused on the Great (World) War. There are three groups of plans related to Russia’s entry into World Wars I and II and planning for its participation in a world conflict during the Cold War.

The main idea of the operational plan of the Russian high command for the First World War was that by going on the offensive of the Northwestern Front in East Prussia and the Southwestern in Galicia, create a situation for a decisive offensive into Silesia and further to Berlin (38). The slogan “to Berlin” went against the goals of Russia in the war and the realities of the military strategy of that period. As A.A.Svechin wrote, the tsarist

government, which dreamed of the Bosphorus, was hardly on the politically correct path, believing that the keys to the Bosphorus were in Berlin (23:242).

The unsuccessful experience of Russian participation in the First World War led to a rethinking of the goals of military planning. The plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR approved on October 5, 1940. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks assumed: “in the West, the main group should be in the South-Western Front, so that with a powerful blow to the directions of Lublin and Krakow, and then to Breslau in the very first stage of the war cut off Germany from the Balkan countries. The strategic goal of the operation planned in the West stemmed from the political goals of the war, as they were determined by the Soviet leadership, was limited in nature – it lacks the task of completely mastering the territory of any state, capturing any capital – primarily Berlin (3:63).

A detailed analysis of the USSR preparation for war, which laid the foundation for the modern approach, was carried out by the USSR Ministry of Defense at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s under the leadership of Marshal A.M.Vasilevsky. The main conclusion was that the planning of the use of the armed forces by the Soviet General Staff as a whole was adequate in that political and military situation, and it is advisable to use this experience in the development of modern operations. The reasons for the June tragedy of 1941, the USSR Ministry of Defense was sure, should be sought in the qualitative state of the Red Army, as well as in the specific circumstances of military operations. It can be said that approaches to planning the armed forces of the USSR after the war were formed on the basis of understanding the concept of the strategic offensive operation of the Red Army to the West in 1940–1941 (7:207-208).

The views of the Soviet General Staff on the use of armed forces in the war in the West, as they developed by the end of the 70s deserve special attention. After the 1960s, when the world war was conceived as an exchange of nuclear missile strikes, formed at the turn of the 70s and 80s. approaches to the use of the Armed Forces is the result of the hard work of the General Staff, aimed at finding such an option in which the first and subsequent strategic operations can be completed without the use of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet General Staff hoped to win the initial period of the war (and the war as a whole) without giving NATO any time to decide on the use of nuclear weapons. To do this, the first strategic operation had to be carried out in a short time with jewelry accuracy. Its goal is to defeat the first (and only) strategic echelon and the nearest reserves of the NATO armed forces. The operation was planned to a depth of 600–700 kilometers. The General Staff believed that the defeat of the main NATO forces on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and the occupation of the main ports on the North Sea and in the Benelux countries would make the further continuation of the war with the prospect of the massive use of nuclear weapons senseless for the United States (29:212–217; 37; 41). The concept of Marshal N.V. Ogarkov was no less risky than the plans of the General Staff of the Red Army in 1941, if only because the fighting would have to be carried out under the constant threat of the use of nuclear weapons by the enemy. If the Blitzkrieg failed, there was also the risk of a transition to a long conventional war, in which the superiority of the US military and economic potential would play an important role against the USSR.

Russia's military doctrine throughout much of the Soviet period was radical. It was only at the very end that Gorbachev began to break this tradition. In his opinion, the task of ousting the United States from Europe was easier to solve through a mutual phased withdrawal of American and Soviet troops. This meant abandoning the pronounced offensive nature of the Soviet military strategy. The transition to a defensive military doctrine looks justified in the specific conditions of the second half of the 1980s.³⁷ However, Gorbachev went further. In the context of the conflict with the military, dissatisfied with the disarmament initiatives of the political leadership, its doubts grew in the ability of the military in general to ensure the achievement of political goals by military means. In these doubts, Gorbachev was strengthened by an unsuccessful experience in Afghanistan³⁸. Gorbachev began to fear the use of military force, its use as a strategic deterrence, which influenced the course of events in Eastern Europe in 1989, and then the internal crises in the USSR in 1990-1991.

Korean model

After the Second World War, the central task of the Soviet military-political strategy was defined as follows: the efforts of the USSR in "spheres of its vital interest" should not lead to conflict with the "atomic powers" and, especially, to a world war. Although Soviet military planning continued to be oriented towards a "big war", Khrushchev already understood its perniciousness in modern conditions. Hence it was the stake on the model of the Korean War, which assumed the participation of the USSR in regional wars and local conflicts by expeditionary groups. This approach was fully accepted by Brezhnev. From the second half of the 1960s, the creation of expeditionary groups, which were based on the Air Force and Air Defense, went on, as a rule, in unity with the deployment of operational squadrons of the Navy on the main sea lanes. This created the framework of the strongholds of the Soviet infrastructure empire in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Soviet expeditionary groups participation in local conflicts of the second half of the 20th century pursued clear military-political goals. The military efforts of the USSR during the Korean and Vietnam Wars were associated with the task of tying down the United States in the Far East in order to ease their military and political pressure in Europe, to create conditions for strengthening the positions of the Soviet Union in areas of its state interests – in the Middle East. In the Middle East, during operations Kavkaz and Kavkaz-2, the goals of the USSR were to consolidate its permanent military presence in Egypt and Syria and create bases there to support the activities of the 5th operational squadron. That made it possible to control the approaches to the strategically important Bosphorus and Gibraltar (1).

A special case is Afghanistan. This was a special operation of the USSR State Security Committee to change the regime in Kabul, carried out with the support of the Armed Forces. And the opposition of Marshal Ogarkov to the introduction of troops into Afghanistan was

³⁷ The Defense Council approved the main provisions of the new defensive doctrine in December 1986.

³⁸ To the Politburo November 13, 1986 Answering the challenge of the time:605.

connected, first of all, with the unwillingness to weaken the groups in the main, from his point of view, theaters of war – in the West and in the East (12; 5)³⁹. The "introduction" of troops to Poland was prepared according to the same model: it was planned to mobilize only one army to support the Polish Army during the announcement of a state of emergency ⁴⁰.

Measures of strategic deterrence

During the Cold War, the USSR sought to avoid a grand war with nuclear powers, relying on strategic deterrence measures. And the Soviet leadership succeeded at least three times. The first measure that had geopolitical consequences was carried out in 1956 as part of the so-called "suppression of the counter-revolutionary rebellion" in Hungary⁴¹. The United States and NATO did not have military-political opportunities to intervene in the Hungarian events. So for all administrations in Washington, the thesis that Western interference in the Soviet sphere of interests in Eastern Europe can only provoke a new "Hungary" has become an axiom. Therefore, the goal that was set in Washington in relation to Eastern Europe until 1989 was its "Finlandization".

The second measure of strategic deterrence was connected with the events in Czechoslovakia. In 1968, the "military alarm" at the beginning of the year, associated with the aggravation of the military-political situation in Vietnam and Korea, ended in August-September with Operation Danube, in which up to half a million troops of the Warsaw Treaty Organization took part. Returning from a meeting of the Politburo at which it was decided to send troops to Czechoslovakia, Minister of Defense A.A. Grechko announced to the leadership of the Ministry of Defense: "This decision will be implemented even if it leads to a third world war" (14:218,223). The entry into Czechoslovakia of a group of Warsaw Pact troops was unexpected for NATO. Military units from the states of the Warsaw Pact countries entered Prague 5 hours after crossing the border. Operation Danube was a successful rehearsal for a strategic offensive operation to the West (1:285–286). It became clear to European leaders, primarily to German Chancellor W. Brandt, that American security guarantees were of a formal nature (44)⁴².

The next measure of strategic deterrence, which had geopolitical consequences, was carried out during the active phase of the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979). In terms of the number of military forces and equipment involved, the Vostok-79 exercises were comparable to Operation Danube (18). The large-scale measures of strategic deterrence carried out by

³⁹ See: Lyakhovsky A. The tragedy and valor of Africa. Moscow, 2004: 201-203, 207, 224, 234-258. The fact that the introduction of troops was considered as a concomitant measure to the elimination of Amin by the forces of the special forces of the KGB and the GRU: Grinevsky O. Secrets of Soviet diplomacy. Moscow, 2000: 307.

⁴⁰ Suslov, Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, Chernenko in the Central Committee of the CPSU, August 28, 1980 Available from: <https://sites.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/august28.htm>.

⁴¹ On the experience of the Soviet troops fighting in Hungary: a note by G.K. Zhukov to the Central Committee of the CPSU, November 12, 1950 The Soviet Army: years of reforms and trials. Moscow, 2018:64-68.

⁴² Trachtenberg M. The Structure of Great Power Politics, 1963-1975. Cambridge History of the Cold War. Cambridge. 2010. Vol. 2. The relationship between the Czechoslovak events of "ostpolitik" and detente was well understood by A.A. Gromyko, as he liked to remind his colleagues in the Politburo.

the USSR during this period convinced the Chinese leadership of the futility of military confrontation with the USSR.

Summing up, we should talk about the evolution of Russian military strategy in the 20th century: from betting on victory in the world war in the first half of the century to betting on the actions of expeditionary groups in local conflicts as a special form of strategic actions in the second half of the century. They were carried out by the USSR allied forces with the participation of expeditionary groupings of the armed forces of the USSR itself in order to tie down the forces of the “main enemy” and create conditions for a decisive strike in the main theater of operations, which could take the form of both real hostilities and strategic deterrence measures (demonstration of combat capabilities). The latter became the main form of employment of the armed forces in the West and East.

Political and military strategy and resource potential

To describe the actions of Russia in the world in the XX century the ratio of the dependence of the cycles of rise and fall of the great powers on their industrial and financial potential is not suitable. Starting from the Muscovy, Russia solved the tasks of dominating its immediate geopolitical environment and the tasks of strategic rivalry with other great powers in the West and in the East, without relying on the superiority of its military and economic potential. Russia's economic base in the 20th century was only 9–12% of the world's GNP. At the same time, the ratio of military-economic potentials during the Cold War – when Russia and the Warsaw Pact were strategic rivalry with the United States, Western Europe and Japan at the same time was significantly worse than in the first half of the century – when it acted in an alliance with the United States and Great Britain.

The share of defense spending in the country's economy after the peak during the war of 1941–1945 since the late 1950s was stable and fluctuated within 7–8% of GNP (15:105). For comparison, after a similar peak during the Second World War and the Korean War, the share of military spending in the US GNP was in the 1960s–1970s about 8% and then decreased to 5–6% in the 1980s. (35:393–394). In addition to spending on military needs, it is necessary to take into account the funds allocated for military and economic assistance to the allies. On October 23, 1985, at the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact Organization in Sofia, Gorbachev named the quantity of more than 11 billion rubles of aid to allies in the third world. For comparison with defense spending (63.4 billion), the funds for ensuring national security are not large (about 75 billion rubles, in 1985 amounted to less than 10% of GNP – 777 billion rubles) (15: 108). The funds were certainly considerable, but the Politburo was more concerned about the inefficiency of agriculture and the need to purchase grain from abroad than military spending and aid to the allies. It was not military spending or even a collapse in oil prices, but errors in financial and economic policy that first caused the collapse of the financial system, and then a deep economic crisis that engulfed the USSR in the late 1980s (39:177–183).

Results

How a great power with limited military and economic resources was able throughout the 20th century to conduct strategic rivalry simultaneously with several, as a rule, economically more powerful opponents? Russia managed to solve this problem thanks to the presence of a political-military strategy, which, on the whole, was of a well-thought-out character. Clear geopolitical goals: the creation of an infrastructural empire similar to the British – united all the leaders of Russia from Nikolai Romanov to Mikhail Gorbachev. The coordinate system laid down by Kuropatkin determined the geopolitical goals of Russia and the USSR in the first half of the 20th century (until the death of Stalin), and in the subsequent period (until the end of the Cold War) – the military goals of the Soviet Union in the event of a third world war. At the same time, the struggle for the freedom of sea communications was transformed from the task of direct control over the straits to the desire to “jump over” them, gaining a foothold in strategic points along the sea route from Europe to the Far East. Given the absolute superiority of the United States in the nuclear field in the 1950s, this path seems appropriate. By the end of the Brezhnev period, the main braces of Pax Sovietica had been created.

The desire to avoid overexertion has played an increasingly important role for the Politburo since the second half of the century. It is no coincidence that immediately after Stalin's death, the Soviet leadership made the first attempt to get rid of the military-political burdens associated with the special interests of the USSR in Eastern Europe. Gorbachev's idea of doing business with Eastern Europe as with China looks, at first glance, reasonable. However, its implementation, underestimation of the importance of the buffer security zone along the perimeter of the borders turned the retreat into a flight, and seriously affected the disorganization of the state administration system in the USSR and the demoralization of its leadership at the time of the acute internal crisis in the country.

The rise of Asia changed the geopolitical context of the construction of the Soviet infrastructural empire. Instead of weak neighbors, dynamic centers of power appeared. The desire to use common interests with China in Korea and Vietnam to shackle the United States in Asia was an important element of the Soviet strategy. The back-to-back model made it possible to use the dynamics of the emerging multipolarity in the world as a multiplier of the military-political potential of the USSR.

The evolution of the Russian military strategy – from betting on a major war in the first half of the century to betting on local wars in the second – led to the emergence of a coherent model of military and political actions, involving the use of absolutely superior forces and means in the framework of rapid military operations (or strategic deterrence measures) in the immediate geopolitical environment of the USSR, and beyond – actions on the model of the Korean War by expeditionary groups, the basis of which was the Air Force and air defense. The creation of expeditionary groups in remote theaters of military operations was, as a rule, in unity with the deployment of operational naval squadrons on the main sea communications. All this created the framework of the Soviet infrastructural empire.

The «Russian Globalization Project» took place at the turn of the 1970s – 1980s. His subsequent crisis and the collapse of the USSR were connected with the specific mistakes of the Gorbachev Politburo in domestic and economic policy, which led to the formation of an alternative political center in Moscow headed by Boris Yeltsin. Nevertheless, the idea of a continental infrastructure empire is still alive. «One Belt, One Road» is Chinese President Xi Jinping's bid to build a Chinese infrastructure empire (30)⁴³. The demand for this approach is also evidenced by the political and military strategy of modern Turkey (31).

The creators of projects in the field of long-term foreign policy planning considered the “past as a springboard” for constructing an image of the future. The historical tasks set by Kuropatkin were based on the analysis of the previous 200 years of Russian history. And Stalin's diplomats described the foundations of the future world basing on history. In his turn, Foreign Minister Gromyko based his ideas on the ideas of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs during the war. Thus, in the national tradition, 150–200 years is the operational memory of public administration. The historical experience of Russia and the USSR as a world power in the XX century can become the basis for the development of a model of the political and military strategy of modern Russia in the period of long-term strategic rivalry between the great powers.

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Once Again About the Clash of Civilizations

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Abstract. The article contains a number of arguments defending the idea that Russian civilization is independent and separate and explains the conclusion that the current confrontation between Western and Russian civilizations is essentially a civilizational conflict.

Keywords: civilization, culture, cultural differences, cultural code, identity, dialogue of civilizations, clash of civilizations

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Introduction

The article notes that S. Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations, created at the end of the 20th century, is correct. Western civilization, seeking to extend the time of its hegemony, in essence, challenges all other civilizations, in particular Chinese, Indian, Russian, Islamic, African, Latin American.

Materials and methods

The article is based on the application of general scientific analysis and synthesis, comparative-historical, historical-genetic methods of studying written texts devoted to the problems of dialogue and the clash of civilizations, identities and cultural codes. These are the works of S.Huntington, I.Muteferrik, M.Ferguson, E.Hobsbawm, H.Mackinder, E.Weizsaker and A.Wiikman, V.Klyuchevsky, D.Likhachev, G.Belinsky, F.Dostoevsky, N.Trubetskoy, L.Gumilyov, A.Solzhenitsyn, E.Primakov and others.

Results

In 1993, the American scientist Samuel Huntington published the article "The Clash of Civilizations", later he developed these thoughts in the book of the same name (6).

He argued that global politics is becoming multicivilizational. The main lines of the break run along cultural differences, at the same time, the main thesis of his reasoning was that the conflict between Western and Islamic civilizations is the essence of modern politics.

The book expressed the idea that the West will oppose itself to all other civilizations (West against the rest).

The West, Huntington wrote, conquered the world not by the superiority of its ideas, values, or religions, but by its superiority in the use of organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact.

After the period of great geographical discoveries in the last 500 years, the era of colonial conquest began, when the Western powers seized the territories of other peoples, and not just territories, but all their wealth. It was this imperialist exploitation that enabled the West to pull ahead. It has always been. During the existence of the Soviet Union, the United States and Western Europe were forced to act with an eye on the USSR, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West ceased to be shy.

The events in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and other parts of the world are a vivid example of this.

It is noteworthy that more and more European political scientists are striving to raise the idea of Western civilization to the shield. This idea manifested itself during World War I, when the struggle against Germany and its allies, the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, was conceived by English-speaking liberals as a war of Western civilization against Eastern despotism.

Huntington revived the ideas of Western civilization as a way to dramatize that a set of values is in danger from new threats: migrants, terrorists and liberal relativists.

After the end of the Cold War, many believed that this would help overcome the division of East and West – after all, there was no point in the existence of NATO. At the end of the Cold War, French President François Mitterrand even put forward the idea of a new organization – a European confederation, which would include Soviet Russia, but not the United States.

It is noteworthy that since the end of the 19th century, the principle formulated by the English writer R.Kipling has been established in political science, that the West is the West, and the East is the East, and they will never come together.

For most of the 20th century, the ideological confrontation between capitalism and socialism, the USA and the USSR, has always been at the center of events. It was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union that civilizational differences came to the fore.

Taking into account the thesis put forward by Huntington about the hostility of the West and Islam, the Iranian idea of a dialogue of civilizations became a kind of response to this new

concept¹, which at the end of the 20th century received its formalization in UN documents. This idea was largely undermined by the terrible terrorist attack in September 2001.

Subsequent events showed that the axis of world politics is the attempts of Western civilization, and above all the United States, to ensure its dominance by any means.

Quite indicative: since 1991, Russia, having abandoned communist ideas, switched to the rails of a market economy; it seemed that now the ground for contradictions had disappeared, but here the real essence of Western civilization manifested itself – to impose its vision, its views on everyone without exception, by any means. Изменение баланса сил на земном шаре в конце концов привело к тому, что американцы сделали вывод о том, что их главными противниками, препятствующими осуществлению идеи мирового господства, являются Россия и Китай.

The collapse of the USSR with renewed vigor emphasized the civilizational differences between the states of the globe ².

The German sociologist Max Weber suggested that Europeans had some kind of cultural advantage (1).

In 1731, Ibrahim Muteferrika asked the question:

Why did the Christians, who were once a despicable people, relatively small in relation to the Muslim population, insignificant, weak in nature and character, for some time now spread throughout the world, captured many countries and even began to clearly defeat the victorious Ottoman army of the Sublime Porte (2).

The same phenomenon was noted by the Chinese, who in the 15th century clearly overtook the Europeans in all respects, but then the years of rapid development gave way to stagnation.

M.Ferguson in his book "Civilization" noted that «the main source of power that distinguishes the West from the rest of the world has become 6 groups of unique institutions and ideas related to them:

- competition;
- science (a way of knowing, explaining, transforming nature, which gave the West, among other things, an overwhelming military advantage);

1 Dialogue among Civilizations. The Round Table on the Eve of the United Nations Millennium Summit. Available from: [https://unesdoc.unesco.org/in/documentViewer.xhtml?v=2.1.196&id=p::usmardef_0000123890&file=/in/rest/annotationSVC/DownloadWatermarkedAttachment/attach_import_d9c19a4b-e217-46d0-a35f-8e51f53094b3%3F_%3D123890eng.pdf&locale=ru&multi=true&ark=/ark:/48223/pf0000123890/PDF/123890eng.pdf#%5B%7B%num"%3A165%2C"gen"%3A0%7D%2C%7B"name"%3A"XYZ"%7D%2C32%2C685%2C0%5D](https://unesdoc.unesco.org/in/documentViewer.xhtml?v=2.1.196&id=p::usmardef_0000123890&file=/in/rest/annotationSVC/DownloadWatermarkedAttachment/attach_import_d9c19a4b-e217-46d0-a35f-8e51f53094b3%3F_%3D123890eng.pdf&locale=ru&multi=true&ark=/ark:/48223/pf0000123890/PDF/123890eng.pdf#%5B%7B%num)

It is no coincidence that many Western political scientists, in particular N. Ferguson, emphasized that the USSR should be attributed to Western civilization. Civilization is a way of life that characterizes a social, cultural, political, sometimes linguistic, religious community (civilization is the largest unit of social organization, by the way, this is a French word). Starting around 1500, Europeans are breaking out ahead of all Eastern civilizations. No civilization of the past reached such a level as the Western: in 1500, future European empires occupied about 10% of the earth's land surface and covered about 16% of the planet's population. By 1913, 11 Western empires (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Russia, Great Britain and the USA) controlled almost 3/5 of the land and the same population and 79% of world production. This phenomenon still needs serious research.

- property rights (rule of law as a way to protect society);
- the medicine;
- consumer society (a way of life in which the production, sale and purchase of goods play a central role);
- work ethic (a moral concept and mode of action that arose partly in Protestantism) (4).

The English scientist reflects the point of view of the majority of Western political scientists who believe that the West will always be «ahead of the rest of the planet» and that its achievements are due primarily to the intellectual efforts of the elite. In fact, the rise of the West occurred largely through the capture of the vast wealth of Latin America, and then the colonization of many countries in Africa and Asia. The exploitation of the labor of local residents was colossal, which was reflected in numerous stories and novels and other works of fiction – slave labor actually cost nothing.

Museums in London, Paris, Berlin, which exhibit only a small fraction of the exported wealth, give an idea of the scope of the predatory operation that was carried out by the powers of the West in developing countries.

Noteworthy is the remark of one of my Arab friends, who, analyzing the current Libyan drama, argued that the West cracked down on M. Gaddafi primarily because he put forward the idea of compensating the imperialist powers for their former colonies. This is what angered the ruling circles in a number of European states most of all, because it is known that Gaddafi actually met all the demands of the West – he paid reparations for supposedly blown up planes, abandoned programs for the production of chemical and atomic weapons, etc. (5:66)³.

Western civilization was already in decline, it was the 5th century AD. This is now continuing: the population of the West is clearly degenerating, the elites of the West are gripped by fear of an ecological apocalypse, the West has lost confidence in itself. The last anniversary report of the Club of Rome reads: "The old world is doomed. A new world is inevitable!"⁴The authors of the report of the Club of Rome in December 2017, E. Weizsijker and A. Wijkman, believe that the planet is degrading, authoritarianism and fundamentalism are on the rise, and speculative capital is triumphant.

Today's crisis –

is not cyclical but intensifying, it is not limited by the nature around us, but includes a social, political, cultural, moral crisis, a crisis of democracy, ideology and the capitalist system⁵.

3 Many historians believe that the discovery of America is the main reason for the success of the West and that Western Europe without the New World “would remain ... a backward region of Eurasia, borrowing technology, adopting culture and receiving prosperity from the East” (this, in particular, writes F. Fernandez Armesto in the book “America. A History of Two Continents”, published in London in 2003:66). Perhaps, without American lands and African slaves, there would be neither the “European miracle” nor the Industrial Revolution.

4 Available from: <http://www.planet-kob.ru/articles/6832>

5 Ibid.

The authors believe that in the 80s of the last century there was a degeneration of capitalism, within which financial speculation became the main source of profit. 98% of financial transactions are now of a speculative nature: from 21 to 32 trillion dollars are hidden in offshore zones.

The main idea of the report is that a radical change in the paradigm of the development of our civilization is necessary. Hence the harsh criticism of capitalism, the rejection of materialism and reductionism, the call for an alternative economy, a new enlightenment, a holistic worldview and a planetary civilization. The degeneration of the West is clearly felt in European concerns about the Islamization of the continent: Breivik turned out to have a large following – in early February 2018, 28-year-old right-wing extremist Luca Traini was detained in Italy, who was accused of trying to kill six Africans in Central Italy. He was associated with neo-fascist parties.

The degradation of the West is manifested in a number of other aspects.

Russia is an independent civilization (along with Chinese, Indian, Western, Islamic, etc.).

A special character lies in the cultural code of Russians:

- an alloy of various nationalities, nationalities, beliefs;
- 1/3 in Europe, 2/3 in Asia.

By the will of fate, Russia found itself at the crossroads of world civilizations between Europe and Asia and was formed due to geographical, historical, demographic, cultural parameters as an inseparable integrity of the western and eastern sides, as an independent, unique civilization.

In the Eurasian space, for centuries, the two largest world religions – Christianity and Islam – coexisted as religions of two ethnic groups: Slavic and Turanian. Dialogue became the form of their interaction.

Throughout history, Russian civilization has emerged as a unique multi-ethnic, multi-confessional integrity and community. The Soviet people, as the heir to this civilization, represented a higher stage, because the process of mutual enrichment, merger developed rapidly and in an ascending fashion. Soviet civilization is a historically short form of an attempt to build a society on the basis of justice, to create a system that corresponds to humanistic ideals. The attempt was not entirely successful, but it is wrong and immoral to evaluate it completely negatively. It had a huge impact on world events.

D.S.Likhachev defined Russia as a synthesis of Russian Slavic culture on the basis of Byzantium and Scandinavia in an organic combination with Finno-Ugric, Turkic, Tatar-Mongolian peoples, through which the culture of China and India was perceived.

V.G.Belinsky and F.M. Dostoevsky recognized that the fundamental feature of the Russian national character is the ability to assimilate all sorts of features of any national type. Russian culture and civilization have absorbed the best achievements of many neighboring peoples and nationalities. Such a process of mutual enrichment, in fact, creates the prerequisites for the restoration in a more active form of Russia's Eurasian role.

L.N.Gumilyov, who is called the great Eurasianist of our time, skillfully described the ideas of the age-old community, the interconnectedness of the peoples inhabiting the boundless spaces of Eurasia from the Baltic and the Carpathians to the Pacific Ocean,

believing that it is in Eurasia that peoples are connected not by one or another one-sided series of signs, but by commonality historical fates. Eurasia is a huge continent not only as a space, but also in a single historical and cultural sense.

Of exceptional importance is his concept of the complementarity of the peoples of Eurasia, their complementarity, which creates a fertile ground for dialogue, and this was reflected in his saying, which has become a textbook: "You cannot strive to make people like yourself, but you must learn to live in harmony with them."⁶

The diversity of landscapes of Eurasia has a beneficial effect on the ethnogenesis of its peoples. Everyone found a place acceptable to him. And with a wide variety of geographical conditions for the peoples of Eurasia, it has always been much more profitable to unite. Disintegration deprived of strength, resistance, ability to protect. To disunite in the conditions of Eurasia meant to make oneself dependent on one's neighbors, who were by no means always merciful and disinterested. Therefore, the political culture of Eurasia has developed its own original vision of development paths. The Eurasian peoples built a common state based on the primacy of the rights of each people to a certain way of life.

Thus, the rights of every person were ensured. As long as each nation retained the right to be itself, a united Eurasia successfully held back the onslaught of both Western Europe and China. When, with perestroika, this traditional and sound idea for our country was abandoned and they began to be guided by European principles (to make everyone the same), they mechanically transferred the principles of Western European civilization to the conditions of Russia, where geographical conditions and a different historical path were completely different, this turned into a tragedy. It is necessary and necessary to study other experience, but remember that this is ANOTHER experience and from it you can take only what will be useful for our conditions:

- it is impossible to preserve one's identity in a turbulent age of technological change without culture, which is «our common national civilizational code, reveals the creative principle in a person»;
- our focus on the future, the fusion of traditions and values ensure "the continuity of our thousand-year history";
- our goal is to save the people and the well-being of citizens;
- the mixing of blood contributed to the incredibly high level of Russian culture and special intellectual wealth.

Russia is an independent civilization. It belongs neither to the East nor to the West. Geography and historical processes have always caused this duality in assessments. The struggle between Westerners and Slavophiles is well known. Sometimes we are called European, sometimes Eurasian, sometimes Orthodox civilization, perhaps the term "Eurasian" is closer to the truth.

It should be borne in mind that for most Arabs, for example, we are still the West. For most Europeans, we do not belong to their civilization at all. For a number of centuries, the

⁶ Gumilyov L.N. Humanity is above all. The conversation was conducted by A.Sabirov. *Izvestia*, 1989, June 24. The interview was provided by the public organization "L.N.Gumilyov's Foundation". Available from: <http://gumilevica.kulichki.net/articles/Article45.htm>

Russian elite strove for Europe – at first they «cut through a window», then they wanted to go over with the whole team.

In this regard, it is appropriate to mention the idea expressed by our famous diplomat A.P. Kromarenko, that this thesis turned out to have great historical meaning:

Without the “Soviet challenge” there would be no post-war “socialization” in the Western European economy. America developed in the same vein as a result of F.D.Roosevelt and post-war government measures (3).

Beginning with Alexander Nevsky, who chose to be a tributary of the Golden Horde rather than lose faith and culture under the rule of the Teutonic Order, Russia has invariably opted for sovereign modernization in the long run, which ensured the country's independence and its right to historical creativity. Without this choice, the whole of European and world history would have been different.

Approximately the same thoughts were expressed by Vladislav Surkov in an article in *Russia in Global Affairs* magazine in April 2018⁷. He believes that an important milestone in asserting the independence of Russian civilization was 2014, when Crimea returned to Russia again: “This event is the completion of Russia’s epic journey to the West, the cessation of repeated and fruitless attempts to become part of Western civilization, to intermarry with the “good family” of European peoples.»

V.Surkov believes that for the 4th century Russia went to the East and for another 4 centuries to the West and did not take root either there or there. Both roads have been completed. Now the ideologies of the third way, the third type of civilization, the third world, the third Rome will be in demand.

Moscow in the late 1990s and back in the early 2000s tried to enter Europe, to become part of the West (we actively sought visa-free entry into the EU, which our oligarchs needed first of all).

Russia has a special mentality. Mayakovsky said: «The Soviets have their own pride, we look down on the bourgeois.» A lot distinguishes us from European and Asian civilizations, although we have taken a number of features from both sides. At the same time, the mixing of blood, vast geographical expanses, the nature of peasant labor, and the continental climate left their mark on the character of the Russians. As a rule, they lived well with the conquered peoples and nationalities, Orthodox and Muslims and other religions fruitfully cooperated for three centuries. Commitment to the native land, the Fatherland, is in our blood: “Two feelings are wonderfully close to us. In them the heart finds food: Love for the native ashes, Love for the fatherly coffins” (A.S. Pushkin «Two feelings are wonderfully close to us...»).

Russia won World War II, but if rationality had triumphed, Germany should have won. Until now, many in the West find it difficult to believe that the Soviet Union was able to defeat Nazi Germany after the defeat in the summer of 1941 and 1942, to win the Battle

⁷ Vladislav Surkov. The loneliness of a half-breed. Available from: <https://globalaffairs.ru/authors/vladislav-surkov/>.

of Kursk. The well-known English historian and journalist, author of numerous books about World War II, Max Hastings, in an article dedicated to the 70th victory over Germany, wrote:

If Hitler had not attacked Russia and the Russians had not resisted with a stamina and a spirit of self-sacrifice that is unattainable in Western democracies, we might have continued to fight him to this day. It is highly unlikely that the British and American armies could ever defeat the Wehrmacht on their own⁸.

The crisis of Western civilization manifests itself in various forms. Patrick Deneen, a professor at the University of Notre Dame (near Chicago), has published *Why Liberalism Failed*. The author believes that

this beautiful concept failed because it was flawed at its very foundation, this doctrine assumes that a person goes to his goals without noticing the society around him, since liberalism allows him to break the ties completely, which makes him a man – a culture, a people, in general with other people, family, the idea of the common good (9).

The main conflict of modernity develops not so much between specific states, no matter how powerful they may be or may seem. This is a conflict between non-national structures of world governance and those political forces that remain committed to the historical memory and national identity of their peoples. The former seek to finally suppress the identity of peoples and the independence of states, to impose on them a single totalitarian system of a “democratic” (in fact, an oligarchic) order and a single primitive standard of consumer attitude to life and the world around them. The latter want to preserve state sovereignty, develop their political tradition, form their national economy in the interests of their country and their citizens, and not world capital, and remain in the field of traditional culture.

Globalization has given impetus to progress in a number of developing countries, but is stalling due to attempts at universalization and the imposition of a single cultural, political, economic, and social space. Reverse processes have begun – for the preservation of identity, one’s own culture – and, most importantly, there is an explosion of dissatisfaction with inequality, an unacceptable gap between rich and poor, injustice, rejection of methods of violence, interference in internal affairs.

Even yesterday, American leadership seemed unshakable to many in the world, and the White House was sure that it was forever, because the Americans, as President Barack Obama categorically asserts, are «an exceptional nation.» Therefore, Washington proclaims, America is allowed to impose its only correct model of democracy everywhere in the world by any means and demand from other, «non-exclusive nations», unconditional execution of orders from Washington. So it is in many ways in recent times and is happening, of course, not everywhere and not always. But this “rule” worked because it was based on fear, on an

⁸ Max Hastings for The Daily Mail. The Daily Mail. May 7, 2015.

elementary intuitive human fear of force, the use of which turns into submission, death, ruin, defeat, and this fear grew to the scale of entire peoples, states, continents. But now the map of the rulers of the world has begun to change, and this is recognized by sober politicians in the West.

The United States understands that new centers of power are now rising: individual states with growing economies, alliances of such states, and the dynamics of whose actions will inevitably narrow the space of undivided influence of the United States, and competition on the issue of shaping the contours of the 21st century world order will intensify.

There is a process of dispersal of global economic power and, accordingly, political influence, new major centers of power are emerging, primarily in the Asia-Pacific region. The most obvious fact is China's leap forward, which, thanks to unprecedented rates of economic growth over the course of three decades, has become the second, and according to purchasing power parity calculations, already the first economy in the world.

Another example is the success of the Iranian Republic, which, in terms of the level of education of its population, is quickly moving forward into the ranks of the advanced states of Asia and thereby proves the plurality of development models.

It is quite obvious that international relations at the present time are too complex a mechanism to be managed from a single center. A reliable solution to the problems of the modern world can only be ensured through serious, honest cooperation between leading states and their associations in the interests of solving common problems. Such interaction should take into account the multicolored nature of the modern world, its cultural and civilizational diversity, and reflect the interests of the main components of the international community.

Today, more than ever, we need to restore the culture of compromise, relying on diplomacy, which can be difficult, even exhausting, but which remains, in fact, the only way to ensure a mutually acceptable solution to problems by peaceful means. Russian leaders constantly focus on these tasks in their speeches.

Russia, being an alloy of various nationalities united around the Russian people, a synthesis of many religions, primarily Orthodox-Muslim, being in its deepest essence one of the branches of European civilization, at the same time has never merged with the West and has its own cultural matrix, its own spirituality.

Proposed several years ago by E.M.Primakov, the «Russia-India-China» formula will continue to operate in the future, since only Russia can play the role of mediator between Beijing and Delhi. This is especially relevant in connection with the fact that it is Eurasia that is destined to play a key role in future international affairs. Under these conditions, emphasizing and strengthening the Eurasian essence of our civilization is the most important task. And here the following three points are of particular importance.

First, a consistent, purposeful line to protect the community of Orthodox and Muslims in Russia as one of the main bonds of Russian statehood. This is all the more relevant since the number of Muslims will grow over time, and the constructive interaction and mutual understanding of these communities has been and remains a hallmark of our civilization.

Secondly, against this background, the importance of emphasizing and enhancing the role of the titular nation of Russia, the Russian people, is growing, which should be the

pivotal line of all national policy. In every possible way encouraging the cultural development of all nationalities and confessions, nevertheless, it should always be borne in mind that the unifying and cementing foundation of our civilization is the Russians, on whose shoulders lies the historical responsibility of preserving our civilization.

In this regard, even atheists should recognize the importance of Orthodoxy in ensuring the interests of both the Russian state and civilization.

Thirdly, we must clearly realize that it is Russia's historical responsibility to maintain not only good relations, but also the widest cooperation, including economic cooperation, with the former republics of the Soviet Union, with the exception of the Baltic states.

Of course, we are not talking about the restoration of the Soviet Union, in today's conditions it is impossible, nevertheless, and the creation of a Eurasian Union like a confederation or something similar should be one of the priorities of our policy.

Naturally, Ukraine should also be one of the links in this association, whose authorities are now trying to disrupt mutual understanding with Moscow in an attempt to assert their independence. These attempts go against the mainstream of the historical process. Ukraine, like Belarus, is civilizationally very close to Russia, and the current attempts by the Kyiv authorities to dissociate themselves from us are ultimately doomed to failure.

Back in 1990 A.I.Solzhenitsyn in the article «How can we equip Russia?» wrote that it is imperative to maintain the closest ties between Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

Unfortunately, all these historical postulates are better understood by our opponents, sometimes better than we ourselves. In particular, the notorious Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Assistant to the President of the United States, consultant at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in the 1990s, professor of American foreign policy at the Advanced School of International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, in the article «Premature Partnership», published in 1994, stressed that the main task of the United States is for Russia «to be able to define itself simply as Russia» and not to extend its influence and leadership to the former Soviet republics⁹. This he called «the assertion of geopolitical pluralism within the former Soviet Union.» He made a special emphasis on Ukraine – «without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine ... Russia automatically turns into an empire.»

With the collapse of the Russian Empire and the all-Russian foundations of identity, identities began to emerge among Ukrainians, in Belarus and Transcaucasia, once regions of a single country.

To identify the South Russian population, they began to actively use the ethnonym «Ukrainian», discarding the old concept of «Little Russian». The Ukrainian idea was actively adopted by the Bolsheviks. The Soviet leadership introduced Ukrainian identity into the mass consciousness, at the same time comparing it with the Russian one and emphasizing that Ukrainians are an independent nation.

As a guide, Lenin's theses on the national question were taken, which emphasized the need for state consolidation into separate republics of territories with a population speaking

⁹ Brzezinski Z. Premature partnership: Abstract / RAS Institute for Scientific Information in Social Sciences; V.V. Alexandrov. Moscow, 1994.

the same language. At the same time, his identity with nationality was proclaimed. Self-consciousness, as the most important component of historical codification, was not taken into account at all.

We can cite the opinion of Eric Hobsbawm, who in his work «The Nation and Nationalism after 1780» noted that

the communist regime began to independently and purposefully create ethnolinguistic national-administrative units. Create where they did not exist before and where no one seriously thought about them. For example, the Muslims of Central Asia or Belarusians.

The idea of the Soviet republics of the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik or Turkmen «nation» was more of a purely theoretical construction of Soviet intellectuals than the original aspirations of any of these peoples (7:119, 263, 264)

The accelerated construction of a new history, the substantiation of ethnic socio-cultural and other identity, while denying and purposefully discrediting the past, was accompanied by a serious conflict potential. As a result, the consciousness of the population of many post-Soviet countries is fragmented, contradictory and fragmented: consolidating principles are weak, local identities prevail (8).

We are bound by long-standing strong ties with the Ukrainian people, and we must literally restore our fraternal cooperation brick by brick, although this may take years: the common historical fate of our peoples leaves us no other choice.

Today's Ukraine and its authorities are somewhat reminiscent of Russia in the 1990s. Then the people who came to power in the Kremlin tried to change the character of Russians, to integrate into the West. The result was several economic disasters, which we are not able to fully overcome even today¹⁰.

On February 7, 2019, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine approved amendments to the constitution regarding the country's course towards membership in the European Union and NATO. From now on, in the preamble of the Constitution, the wording about «the European identity of the Ukrainian people and the irreversibility of the European and Euro-Atlantic course» is fixed.

In addition, Article 102 of the Basic Law is supposed to prescribe that the president will become «the guarantor of the implementation of the state's strategic course» for membership in the EU and NATO (previously P.A. Poroshenko has repeatedly stated that the final decision on this issue will be made at a referendum).

It is noteworthy that one of the founders of Russian Eurasianism N.S.Trubetskoy, in an article «On the Ukrainian Problem» written in 1927, argued that «Ukrainian culture was

¹⁰ Unfortunately, those who came to power in Moscow in the 1990s did not read S. Huntington's books *The Clash of Civilizations: Torn Countries: The Failure of the Change of Civilizations*. For a torn country to redefine its civilizational identity, at least three conditions must be met. First, the political and economic elite of the country must enthusiastically accept and support this aspiration. Second, society must at least tacitly accept (or strive for) a redefinition of identity. Third, the predominant elements in the host civilization (in most cases the West) must at least be willing to accept the convert. The process of identity redefinition can be long, intermittent and politically, socially, institutionally and culturally painful. At the moment, this process has not been successful anywhere" (Huntington S. *Clash of Civilizations*. Moscow, 2020:227).

an individualization of the all-Russian culture» and that Ukrainians and Belarusians should associate with Russians on the basis of the organizing principle of their common Orthodox faith.

The current Ukrainian politicians did not learn this lesson, but our Chinese partners understood it well, they did not break the civilizational root of Chinese society through the knee, but pragmatically linked Chinese traditions with the scientific and technological achievements of the late XX – early XXI century)¹¹.

Western political scientists, and even some officials, have repeatedly said that Russia is «too» a big state. For example, former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright explicitly stated that the Americans should take Siberia from Russia.

It must be clearly understood that this line of thought and action is constantly preserved in the minds of many leaders of Western civilization.

In January 2019, one of these Kremlinologists, Janusz Bugajsky, published an article in the influential Washington newspaper *The Hill* with the remarkable title «Managing Russia's Disintegration.»¹² He not only calls to prepare for a possible scenario of the collapse of the Russian state, but also strongly recommends that the West contribute in every possible way to this collapse and bring it closer by all possible means. Bugajsky advises the US to promote «self-determination of Russia's disparate regions and ethnic groups.»

Washington should promote regional and ethnic self-determination within the Russian Federation: the collapse should be justified logically – while the expert explains which region of Russia should gain independence, and which should be annexed to Finland, Ukraine, China and Japan. This is the opinion of a leading analyst at the American Center for European Policy Analysis, which is funded by leading enterprises in the American military-industrial complex and US government agencies¹³.

Today's turbulent, turbulent events, perturbations and crises in international relations are largely determined not just by rapid technological shifts, but also by the West's unwillingness to accept the loss of world dominance (the British Financial Times called this the onset of «uncertainty times» a few months ago).

Russia's special military operation in Ukraine does not mean that Russians and Ukrainians do not belong to the same civilization. We have much more in common than differences. This was best demonstrated by the Little Russian writer N.V.Gogol, who better than others showed the main character traits of both Russians and Ukrainians. All his works are written in Russian.

Ukrainians and Belarusians and I make up one historical community, we have a common history, destiny and mentality.

The fact that the West managed to push Russia and Ukraine together is its undoubted success, but it does not at all deny the obvious truth that we belong to the same civilization (some Western researchers call it Orthodox).

¹¹ Unfortunately, even the most intelligent politicians in Ukraine do not fully understand historical trends. Similarly, the deputy of the Verkhovna Rada, who registered as a presidential candidate in the elections on March 31, 2019 and who is considered a politician loyal to Russia, said in an interview with the Deutsche Welle website on January 23, 2019 that Ukraine's civilizational choice is Switzerland or Singapore.

¹² Bugajski Janusz. Managing Russia's dissolution. . Available from: <https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/424511-managing-russias-dissolution/>.

¹³ Kornilov V. Russia is divided between Finland, Ukraine and China. RIA Novosti, 01.18.2019. Available from: <https://ria.ru/20190118/1549518050.html>.

According to the correct expression of V. Surkov, the unnatural and counter-historical disintegration of Russia was stopped at the beginning of the 21st century, and it again became a community of peoples, gathering new lands around itself¹⁴.

The correct political course of our country will become an effective means of survival and exaltation of the Russian nation. Over time, our country is becoming more and more attractive to other states. A distinctive feature of the modern Russian state is trust – according to the old Russian tradition, it rests on frank communication and interaction between the ruler and citizens.

Such an evolution indicates that disappointment in Russia's European choice and its new Eurasian orientation were the result of a long and painful process, a reaction to the development of the international situation, and not a consequence of the initial anti-Europeanism of Putin or the Russian elite as a whole. The policy of the West after the collapse of the USSR, Moscow was actually put in a hopeless situation; she was faced with a choice: to completely submit to the geopolitical goals of the United States and its allies, to abandon its own approaches to security, or to reorient itself from a pro-Western to some other policy. But, as Vladimir Putin noted in his Address to the Federal Assembly in February 2019, "Russia cannot be a state if it is not sovereign. Some countries can, Russia can't." And she chose a course to create her own center of power in Eurasia

The course towards turning Russia into an independent Eurasian center of power and world influence is now becoming the official policy of the Kremlin and the main line of thought of most Russian experts on foreign policy strategy. Vladimir Putin, who in 2000 discussed with Bill Clinton the possibility of Russia joining NATO, when taking office in May 2012, said that "the historical perspective of the state and our nation today depends", in particular, "on our ability to become leaders and center of attraction for all of Eurasia. In September 2013, during a meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, he noted that «Eurasian integration is a chance for the entire post-Soviet space to become an independent center of global development, and not a periphery for Europe or Asia»¹⁵.

In the conditions of the growing division of the modern world, new problems and challenges will become more and more relevant; it is they who will demand the unification of efforts for the survival of mankind.

14 Vladislav Surkov, the presidential administration's chief intellectual, a decade ago called the need to "not fall out of Europe, cling to the West" as an essential element in the construction of Russia. Today, he announces the end of "repeated and fruitless attempts to become part of Western civilization" and predicts her 100, maybe 300 years of loneliness. Former Westerner Sergei Karaganov writes about Russia's depletion of the "European pantry" and establishes an entire intellectual movement that develops the concept of "Greater Eurasia", in which Russia will take a central place (Lukin A.V. The idea of Greater Eurasia. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*. 03.04.2019. Available from: https://www.ng.ru/ideas/2019-03-04/7_7523_ideas.html).

15 Director of the Center for East Asian and SCO Studies at MGIMO MFA of Russia A.V. Lukin, in an article published in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* on March 4, 2020, emphasizes that in order for Russia to become a true Eurasian center, it is necessary to develop a clear strategy, and "not use the Western direction of foreign and foreign economic policy situationally." Secondly, it is necessary to formulate and actively pursue policies that would be aimed at rapid economic growth. Thirdly, it is necessary to pursue a skillful, balanced policy towards Beijing. And fourthly, an active line in Eurasia is important so that other states of the region recognize Russian leadership. . Available from: https://www.ng.ru/ideas/2019-03-04/7_7523_ideas.html.

As for our line in the future world, the Eurasian essence of our civilization requires the establishment of the broadest ties not only with Europe, but also with Asia. Unfortunately, we cannot get rid of the fact that Russia is a country of extremes, which was already noticed by Vasily Klyuchevsky. This is due, according to this eminent historian, to three reasons:

- firstly, the vastness of our territory (which was especially pronounced in the 19th century);
- secondly, it is the continentality of our climate – long, cold winters and relatively short hot summers;
- thirdly, this is the nature of peasant labor (and until the 20th century, peasants made up the bulk of our population): very intensive work during field work in summer and autumn and a long winter period of preparation for new sowing.

By the way, Alexander Herzen also wrote about this in his Past and Thoughts: he said that we are not people of *juste milieu* – the "golden mean".

That is why some of our scientists said that our historical development goes in a spiral.

These trends can also be traced in modern Russian history. In the late 90s and early 2000s, it was argued that we are part of the European civilization that the main thing for us is to almost unite with Europe, in any case, to get visa-free entry to the states of the European Union.

Starting from the 10s of the 21st century, they began to talk much more about the Asian direction of development of our country. In the face of tougher sanctions from European countries, we must make a priority course to the East, that is, Asia.

However, we must not forget that a third of our country is in Europe, and 2/3 – in Asia, and that the Eurasian essence of our civilization requires us to have the widest ties with both Europe and Asia. In future international relations, the Eurasian orientation will manifest itself even more clearly, but we must understand that the project that our Chinese friends are promoting – «One Belt – One Road» – and which we want to match with our plans for Eurasian integration, is not being used, to put it mildly, with support from neither the United States nor India. The latter is especially important. That is why, proposed many years ago by Eugenij Primakov, the formula "Russia-India-China" becomes in demand and relevant, since only Moscow can play the role of conciliator between Beijing and Delhi. This is precisely the peculiarity of our Eurasian civilization.¹⁶

16 The idea of Eurasianism is spreading more and more in Russia. Emerging after the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, this concept postulated Russia as a Eurasian state shaped by a deep history of cultural exchanges between people of Turkic, Slavic, Mongolian and other Asian nationalities. In 1920, Prince Nikolai Trubetskoy, one of several Russian émigré intellectuals who developed this theory, published *Europe and Mankind*. It contained a sharp critique of Western colonialism and Eurocentrism. He urged Russian intellectuals to free themselves from their obsession with Europe and rely on the "legacy of Genghis Khan" to create a great Russian-Eurasian state covering the entire continent. Trubetskoy's Eurasianism was a recipe for an imperial renaissance without communism, a harmful, Western imported doctrine, in his opinion. Instead, Trubetskoy emphasized the ability of a revived Russian Orthodoxy to provide cohesion across Eurasia, "meticulously caring for the believers of many other religions practiced in this vast region." The banner of Eurasianism was raised by L.N. Gumilyov, who in his works argued that ethnic diversity is the driving force of world history. According to his theory of ethnogenesis, an ethnic group under the influence of a charismatic leader could develop into a "superethnos" – a power spread over a vast geographical area.

Eurasian geopolitics, Russian Orthodoxy and traditional values shaped the image of Russia during the reign of V.V. Putin.

He has repeatedly emphasized that Eurasia is an important geopolitical zone: in 2013, he declared that the “genetic code” of Russia and its many peoples would be protected from extreme Western-style liberalism. In July 2021, he announced that “Russians and Ukrainians are one people.” On the eve of the special operation on February 24, 2022, he called Ukraine “a colony with a puppet regime, where the Orthodox Church is under attack,” and NATO uses its territory to attack Russia.

The world’s lack of enthusiasm for Western sanctions against Russia highlights the concern of most countries of the world about the escalation of the conflict between Western and Russian civilizations, which possess the largest stocks of nuclear weapons (of the 10 most populous countries, only the United States insists on economic sanctions – neither Indonesia nor China, neither India, nor Nigeria, nor Brazil are going to follow the West). The recent despicable and vile Russophobic actions, as Jordanian-American Joseph Massad wrote on 11.03.2022, show that the nature of American or Western European political culture under fascism or liberalism is not so different when it comes to heaping racist contempt and fabricated fantasies of chosen enemies.¹⁷

In order to somehow justify their hypocritical policy in the West, the thesis of the struggle between democratic and autocratic states is actively promoted, while the latter include all those countries that do not want to follow American policy.

Behind the hypocritical talk and today’s actions of the so-called collective West, Vladimir Putin 03.16.2022, there are hostile geopolitical goals. They do not need, they simply do not need a strong sovereign Russia, and they will not forgive us either our independent course or the fact that we are defending our national interests.

According to Putin, Russians are characterized by their readiness to always help a friend – and this is a universal value for all peoples and representatives of all faiths in Russia ... and the best confirmation of this is the way our guys fight, how our guys act during this military operation: shoulder to shoulder, they help, support each other, and if necessary, then, like a brother, they cover with their bodies from a bullet on the battlefield. We haven’t had such unity for a long time.

All this caused a frenzied anti-Russian campaign in the West. As noted by the famous American scientist of Iranian origin Hamid Dabashi, in essence, this amazing wave of Russophobia means “denigrating an entire civilization”:

Classical European and American Russophobia rears its head and reconnects with its fascist roots, demonizing Russians with breakneck speed and insidious tenacity; we Muslims who

are still fighting Islamophobia in Europe and the United States are sadly familiar with the mechanism of how renewed Russophobia manifests itself¹⁸.

The strengthening of radicalist tendencies in the West, the unprecedented strength of the Russophobic campaign indicate the danger of revealing fascist sentiments, especially considering that the West strongly encouraged the revival of Nazi organizations in Ukraine.

In this regard, the coming period in international affairs will be difficult, because the West is not yet able to give up its claims to world domination. It is likely that the West will follow Russia into confrontation with China.

Conclusion

This, in fact, is about the biggest turning point in the history of the 21st century – this is the confrontation between the Russian (it is sometimes called the “Eurasian” or “Orthodox” civilization) and Western civilizations. The outcome of this conflict situation depends largely on our success in Ukraine. In this case, we can say with confidence that the Western coalition against our country, which the Americans have been putting together for so long, will fall apart: the inhabitants of Western countries are not used to putting up with economic victims.

Our success in the Ukrainian operation will, in fact, deal a colossal blow to the West’s claims to world domination.

The West, primarily the United States, also took up arms with attacks on the PRC, although the Chinese civilization is already 5,000 years old, and America as a state has existed for a little less than 250 years. Today we are witnessing a confrontation between Western civilization and the rest of the world, which, by the way, S. Huntington warned about. In essence, the harsh anti-Russian campaign in the West means the desire of the current elites, who do not quite adequately assess the existing balance of power, to reverse the course of the historical process and by any means preserve their past dominance.

But these desperate attempts are doomed to failure: the idea of Western political scientists that all nations will eventually try to be like the West and strive to imitate it is being shattered by reality.

Most of the world – even Western political scientists are forced to admit – remains indifferent to attempts to punish Russia and even sympathizes with Vladimir Putin (it is noteworthy that only 37 countries out of 200 considered it possible for themselves to join the anti-Russian sanctions, and the largest oil exporters of the Persian Gulf – Saudi Arabia

¹⁷ The Gulf News newspaper noted on 03.05.2022 that people in the third world were surprised by the intensity of emotions shown by Western leaders and the media regarding the conflict between Russia and Ukraine – such a humane reaction has never been observed in relation to conflicts in developing countries, because it was about conflicts among the “uncivilized” citizens of the world: the world has never seen such a hypocritical campaign as it is now. Available from: <https://gulfnews.com/photos/news/gulf-news-overnighter-fun-drive-2022-tilal-swaihan-experience-in-pictures-1.1646489324652>.

¹⁸ Al-Jazeera website, 04.21.2022: “Malignant anti-Russian sentiments in Europe and, accordingly, in the United States date back at least to the Napoleonic Wars, when Russia was portrayed as the barbaric antithesis of “Europe”. In a fictitious document known as the “Testament of Peter the Great” (forged in the early 19th century and repeatedly revived every time there was a war in the Crimea), the Russian emperor is attributed with the desire to conquer Europe and subjugate its people. The same delusional phobia will later be recycled for the Arabs and Muslims who “reclaimed Europe.” Available from: <https://www.aljazeera.com/search/21.04.2022>.

and the UAE – in a tough form refused to increase oil production, despite the colossal pressure from Washington). Some call it a global culture war. However, the majority of the world's population is not satisfied with the terrible Western machine of social inequality. Residents of Asian, African, Latin American countries want to be guided by their own views and values, and not adapt to Western ones.

This obvious truth is gradually beginning to be recognized by some American political scientists: David Brooks, in an article in *The New York Times* on April 8, 2022, noted that Western values are not world values – “in fact, we are complete cultural outcasts in the West.”

Joseph Henrich, a Canadian research scientist (Professor and Head of the Department of Human Evolutionary Biology at Harvard University), makes approximately the same conclusion in his book “*The Strangest People in the World*”: “We are strange people, very individualistic, fixated on ourselves, focused on control ... we focus on ourselves – our qualities, accomplishments, and aspirations – rather than our relationships and social roles.” It is now obvious to everyone that Protestant Europe and the English-speaking countries have moved away from all other world cultures and now act as some kind of “foreign cultural peninsula”. And this gap is becoming more and more tangible.

The rejection of Western liberalism, individualism is gaining strength in various regions of the globe. As David Brooks has noted, “The criticism that so many people make about the West and American culture – that they are too individualistic, too materialistic, too indulgent – is not wrong.”

That is why the success of our military operation in Ukraine will inspire the majority of people around the globe to more courageously defend their independence, the right to determine their own policy and destiny.

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Universality of the «Enlightenment Project» for the West and the East

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Abstract: The article is devoted to the problem of the emergence and disclosure of the potential of modern industrial society as the implementation of the European «Enlightenment project» in the XVIII-XX centuries. The main principles and stages of the formation of an integral ideological and political system, which served as the ideological basis for the emergence of a model of modern industrial society in Western European countries, and in the future – the spread of this model around the world as a normative one, are shown. At the same time, by the end of the 20th century, the universality of the “Enlightenment project” gradually raised doubts in non-Western societies that did not experience the fundamental upheavals of the Reformation and bourgeois revolutions, but remained faithful to the original foundations of their civilizations. In turn, in the Western «core» of modern society, the potential of the «Enlightenment project» was completed, during which its ideals came into conflict with its principles. In the 21st century, the development of a new project that meets the conditions of the technological revolution and the features of a multipolar world system becomes an urgent task.

Keywords: Enlightenment project, West, East, modern society, modernization, ideals, values, principles

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Introduction

The turn of the century was for the world community the beginning of the transition to a new situation in economic and social life. The main trend of world development in the context of globalization has been the strengthening of the role of the East, the entire Eastern world as whole and individual giant countries, the strengthening of their significance and independent role at the economic and political level.

Meanwhile, earlier the West was at the forefront of globalization and became its main beneficiary, proposed or imposed on the world several centuries ago its development project. Therefore, when the accumulated contradictions provoked a global crisis of

the world system in the first decades of the 21st century, this led not only to an increase in contradictions between the West and non-West, but also to the completion of the development of a bourgeois industrial society according to the European model – what can be called the “Enlightenment project”.

Western historians, sociologists and economists seemed to have their eyes opened; one after another they stated the completion of the centuries – previous development of the West according to this project. For example, N.Fergusson wrote: “Yes, probably, at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, I clearly understood: Western power, which lasted 500 years, has come to an end” (29:9).

Obviously, the completion of the “Enlightenment project” is a challenge for the West, which is forced to develop a new development project that meets the conditions of the Fourth technological revolution and the socio-political system that has developed in Western countries. This is no less important for the countries of the East, which have completed, with varying degrees of success, the process of catching-up modernization according to the Western model and are faced with the need to determine the prospects for their development and the degree of participation of the West in it.

The belief remains that the Enlightenment project was universal and there could be no other way of development for the world. But was it?

The question of why the West rules has occupied European and Eastern thinkers for more than two centuries, since the beginning of the 19th century, when its leading role in world development was determined. In search of an answer to this question, according to I. Morris, “an overwhelming number of assumptions and theories were created” (23:19): from the assumption of simple luck (accident) to statements about the decisive role of the geographical factor or European culture (predetermination) (23:17–42). The dominance of Eurocentrism led to the conviction that the East was doomed to the role of a slave, that it had no choice for the future either. In politics, the dominance of the neo-liberal idea was established, formulated by M. Thatcher as TINA (from the English: There Is No Alternative), supported by the theory of the “end of history” by F.Fukuyama, and poetically expressed by H.Belloc in 1898 (23:18):

Everything will be as we want.
In case of various troubles
We have a machine gun «Maxim»,
They don't have a «Maxim».

Indeed, the development of the countries of the West and the countries of the East that followed them in the course of catching-up modernization was based on the European model. This model was formed in the XVIII-XIX centuries as an industrial, capitalist, democratic, enlightened society. The origins of this model lie not only in the consistent development of productive forces and economic relations, determined by the specific

conditions of the countries of Western Europe (these processes were in the East as well), but also in an integral system of ideas that captured several countries (this is the “core” of Western Europe). Collectively, they were called the “Enlightenment Project”. The project was successfully implemented in the West by the middle of the 20th century, and later, in the era of globalization, it not without reason was claimed to be universal.

Although it would be strange to ignore the high efficiency of the European “Enlightenment project”, in the parameters of which we all still live, it would be strange to reduce the history of the world only to the history of the West.

Materials and methods

The main attention is paid not only to the economic, but also to the ideological and spiritual components of the project. The integrity and novelty of the social system that arose on the basis of the project was given by a set of ideas, among which the principle of unlimited faith in the human mind dominated, which opened up the possibility of rebuilding society on rational grounds, and the no less important principle of absolutisation of private interest and private property, which opened up unprecedented opportunities for unlocking the potential of an individual in free competition.

In this article, the author sought to identify such an aspect of the problem: how and why the “Enlightenment project” could not be fully implemented in non-Western, Eastern societies, not only in the economic sphere, but also in the non-material sphere, the active expansion of Western culture did not lead to the establishment of its dominance in Eastern societies. An important question is why in the East there was no alternative to the European project (which, according to formal indicators, was possible). These issues are relevant, since the crisis of transition has gripped Western society, and in the already modernized countries of the East, there is a rethinking of the Western model of development, previously implemented as a normative one.

The study involved both philosophical and historical works of different eras of the Western and Eastern worlds, which made it possible to consider the role of the European “Enlightenment project” from different points of view. The author used the basic methodological principles and methods of historical science, among the most effective and promising are the systematic method, the method of historical perspective, and the comparative method.

Results

The concept of “Enlightenment project” is more suitable for understanding the past centuries than the concepts of “modern society”, “industrial society”, “modern era”, “European civilization” or “capitalist formation”, since it allows a comprehensive consideration of economic and non-economic factors of development of countries in

their unity, in historical interdependence, including after the end of the European Age of Enlightenment, allows us to comprehend the entire “Enlightenment project” on a global scale.

In this case, the concept of “project” is an idea extended in time and space, developed at the level of ideas, a plan of social organization. The prerequisites for the formation of the foundations of modern society (economic, technical, social) arose in different parts of the world, but only in Western Europe (due to geographical and political factors) in the 18th-19th centuries did they form an integral system that was comprehended and accepted by the European elite in as a guiding idea. Within the framework of the project, a model of a modern society was formed, the implementation of which in the countries of Europe (and then the world) led to the emergence of regional, subregional and country models with their own characteristics in economic, social, political, cultural and spiritual life, which nevertheless did not cancel them. common root.

It is worth clarifying that the concepts of “West” and “East” are not just geographical concepts (synonymous with the concepts of Europe and Asia), but also the designation of various civilizations, large ethno-national and socio-cultural communities inhabiting a certain territory and possessing special features that are timeless culture, worldview and national psychology. At the same time, in the formational socio-economic understanding, “the elements of similarity between the West and the East far outweigh the differences that took place until the 19th century,” stated I. Morris (24:25). Later, in the course of the catching-up modernization of the East, formational differences significantly weakened, although they did not disappear at all.

Why Europe?

Why did Europe turn out to be a generator of development, and why did the European project form the basis for the subsequent development of the world on a global scale? Is it predestination or coincidence? These questions still occupy many researchers: economists, historians, anthropologists.

In the Middle Ages, different models of the development of the social system arose: the Byzantine Empire, the Chinese Empire, the Arab Caliphate, in the 20th century – the USSR, the Soviet project. They were based on various civilizational pillars, but were equally successful variants (models) of socio-economic, political, cultural and spiritual development. And yet they failed to become leaders, the “keys to the future” were in other hands.

In the Byzantine Empire, which abandoned the ideological heritage of the Roman Empire in the 4th century,

the state ideal consisted in respect for the earthly order, fixed by God in His book – the Bible ... – A.Guillou pointed out. – Byzantine culture diligently preserved the values of the past and was cautious about the present... The Byzantines sought to preserve and pass on to their descendants the inviolability of their traditions, based on homogeneity, on the combination of secular and religious life. This can explain the lack of inventiveness and improvement of the means of

production” and the fact that “the structure of the Byzantine economy failed to adapt to the policy of expansion... (9:392–394).

If the ideal of the Roman Empire was the Power of the State, before which everyone bowed, then in Byzantium, the Church, which determined the Orthodox unity of the state and subjects, formulated a different state ideal: “piety is higher than well-being (italics is our – the author)” (9:394). The Byzantine Empire collapsed in 1453, but the Chinese Empire was rising on the other side of the earth.

In the turbulent internal political life in China, the ideals of virtuous government and respect for traditions were not questioned. At the beginning of the 16th century, Ming China asserted itself as “the true center of world civilization”, and the surrounding world was viewed as “a barbarian periphery with which only vassal relations are possible” (2:257). For a millennium, the character of Chinese civilization was determined by the fidelity to the wisdom of the ancients, who knew the “will of Heaven”. At the same time, since 1405, the seven famous sea expeditions of Zheng He to the states of Southeast Asia, to the shores of India, Ceylon, the Persian Gulf and the eastern coast of Africa (which Europe was not capable of at that time) became an indicator of China’s economic power. The rise of a new world center was interrupted by the Manchu invasion and exacerbated by a deep internal crisis that led to the fall of the Ming dynasty. The population explosion and socio-economic rise that followed in the 17th and 18th centuries were already limited to the borders of the empire. The dynastic crisis, combined with the intensification of state exploitation of the Chinese countryside, led to an increase in social tension in society, which was taken advantage of by external forces – European countries. All this stopped the further disclosure of the potential of Chinese society.

The Arab caliphate in the 8th-12th centuries also claimed the universality of its project in terms of political, military, economic, religious and cultural indicators. A huge state arose, stretching from the Pyrenees in the west to the Indus in the east, in this geopolitical space for the first time since the time of Alexander the Great, East and West, the heritage of European Antiquity and the ancient cultures of the East, united. In this space, connected in addition to the political power of the caliph by one dominant language and one dominant religion, Arabic science, culture and economy, actively borrowed by Europeans, rapidly developed. However, the weakness of economic and political ties between various parts of the vast caliphate, the constant rivalry of various groups and clans within the ruling elite held back the development of the caliphate and led to its collapse. In turn, the Islamic worldview, based on the inviolability of the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, formed a passive worldview. The abundance of natural resources also encouraged contentment with the existing order. Ultimately, the Caliphate split into pieces and fell, giving way to the Ottoman Empire, which no longer claimed its own geopolitical development project.

Europe, by virtue of its youth as a geopolitical entity, unlike the “tired” empires, possessed the historical energy of the “barbarians” who came to the ruins of the Western Roman Empire. In the Renaissance in the XIV-XVI centuries, they again turned to the ideas of antiquity, but not to the greatness of Rome – the state, but to the achievements of the

culture of Rome and Greece: the importance of a free person and free thinking increases; the individual comes out of “medieval anonymity” and is freed from “social restrictions”. Moreover, “religious medieval thought is questioned, there is a demographic rise, technical achievements, sea travel develops, a new aesthetic appears, Christianity is rethought and rejuvenated” (13:10, 13).

Being formally a weak element of the world system, an outsider in terms of economic and social indicators, Europe sought to strengthen itself, and since it had fewer resources than the centers of the then world, the way out was guessed in the transition to intensive methods of development. The outsider is looking for opportunities to make a breakthrough and sometimes finds it. Social systems in the East were closed and striving for sustainable peace, the emerging European system immediately opened itself to the world and launched a process of continuous and irreversible change. Everything began to move, and the new system, step by step, went beyond its geographical boundaries, offering or imposing its development model on everyone. According to A.M.Petrova, “a comparative analysis of the economic past of these two macrocivilizations” allows us to say that Western Europe

by the beginning of the 19th century managed only to catch up with Asia and only slightly overtake it in terms of GNP per capita. Another question is that this was done in an extremely short historical period – in just a few centuries (34:79).

This happened due to the fact that a successful combination of objective circumstances has developed on the European continent: geographical, demographic, political and economic. F. Braudel emphasizes the importance of meat nutrition based on animal proteins and animal draft power, which led to an increase in the population and life expectancy of a working person, and also qualitatively increased the efficiency of agriculture (3). The heterogeneous community of European states was able to respond more flexibly to external and internal threats than the centralized eastern empires. But Europe was able to show its potential thanks to the use of a certain system of ideas, in which the heritage of Antiquity, the borrowed achievements of Eastern cultures, the bold acquisition of secular thought in the Renaissance and the revolutionary break with tradition in the Reformation were closely intertwined.

Answering the question “why?” J. Goldstone first of all noted that “Europe owes its success not to its traditional culture, not to its geography, not to its form of government, or even to its technological development before 1700. In fact, I believe, even in 1750 Western Europe was no different from the rest of the world, including Russia and China, the Ottoman and other empires. They were all largely agrarian states ruled by hereditary monarchs who claimed ever more absolute power over their subjects. J. Goldstone saw the secret of Europe’s success in the established dominance of a secular worldview, “the triumph of skepticism and freethinking”, as well as “undermining the absolute authority” of political and religious leaders, that is, the Church (11:13).

The onset of the “Age of Reason”, the era of faith in human capabilities to transform the world for the sake of “progress” became the ideological prerequisite for economic and

political revolution. Changes in self-awareness, worldview and outlook, going on in Western European society decade after decade, have changed people's attitudes and the nature of society itself. Man was and remains both the object and the subject of the historical process. A new level of consciousness and conditions for unlocking the potential of people created new opportunities. Of course, it was not the Europe of thinkers and poets that gained power, but the Europe of merchants, entrepreneurs and bankers.

I. Morris argued with this approach, without denying the importance of the above arguments, reasonably pointing out the importance of the geographical factor that allowed Europe, in conditions of equilibrium with the East in 1500–1700, to strengthen due to Atlantic trade, which qualitatively increased the resources of the “core” of the European economy and activated European business and finance. Another, equally important advantage of the West, acquired by it already in the 18th century, is a new source of energy, coal, which discovered the power of steam. The “accumulation of technology” that was absent in the East was supported by the spread of literacy among a growing population. According to I. Morris, “somewhere between 1750 and 1800” “the level of development of the West caught up with the level of development of the East, putting an end to the era of the East that lasted twelve centuries” (24:433).

Of course, there can be no simple answer to a complex question. The new state of Western society arises as a result of a combination of objective and subjective conditions in the economic and non- economic spheres of life.

Irreversible change in people's lives

The ideology of the “Enlightenment project” is, first of all, the rejection of the entire previous social system of the Middle Ages, which changed the usual order in the economy, spiritual, social, political and cultural life of European society. In other words, this is an all-encompassing project that totally changes society and offers a person existence in the parameters of a new life, a new system of values, norms of behavior and morality, in new economic conditions of management and new social relations. At the same time, the rejection of the previous heritage did not mean a break with it: society, like a living organism, was transformed from one state to another, links with the previous state.

These changes did not occur, of course, all at once, but gradually: in economic life (the appearance of manufactories and a new source of energy, the expansion of the use of technical inventions, the activation and expansion of trade relations, the emergence of financial institutions), in social life (the change from the rule of the nobility to the rule of the bourgeoisie), public life (national states with centralized power are being established, the idea of an enlightened monarch serving the “common good” arises), cultural life (desacralization of knowledge, the emergence of printing, the expansion of the space of education, the emergence of new forms of communication between people, the intensive circulation of new ideas), everyday life (new amenities and norms of life appear), spiritual life (the Catholic Church is losing its absolute authority, faith becomes a personal matter of

a person), international life (the norms and rules of the Westphalian system of international relations are being approved, there is a wide expansion of European states in Asia and Africa, the colonial system of the West is being created on three continents), there are spheres of political and legal life, separated from power (culture, institutions and norms of political and legal life are being formed).

The project arose in a certain social environment and changed this environment, but the environment also influenced the project (for example, the “Faust project” that arose in the 18th century evolved into the “accountant project” by the beginning of the 21st century).

The changes affected a small part of European society, 5-10-15%. Nevertheless, it was this minority that became the vanguard of socio-economic development and gradually, decade after decade, drew ever wider sections of the population into its sphere of influence.

P. Shonyu calls the irreversibility of the changes that have begun as an important feature of the Enlightenment: “The originality of the 18th century lies not in individual modifications, but in the fact that it was at this time that changes acquired the ability to lead other changes”, which allows us to talk not about addition, but the multiplication of change. P. Shonyu uses the concept of “growth factor of the Enlightenment”, the manifestation of which entailed “continuous growth” in the 19th century, and “explosive changes” in the 20th century (33:28, 34). Later, M. Spence developed the thesis about the world, parts of which live “at different speeds”.

The emergence of new ideas was supported by economic factors.

In economic life, during the industrial revolution, the importance of industry, replacing handicraft production, sharply increases, national markets arise, and cities begin to grow as industrial, commercial and public centers of life. The “coal revolution” and technical inventions allow mass creation of new products and increase labor productivity; a less labor-intensive and more energy-intensive economy emerges.

The sharp expansion of transatlantic trade and the growth of the influx of resources from the colonies, along with a large amount of energy used, accelerated the development of Western European countries, which made a qualitative breakthrough from a low level of socio-economic position. The well-being of people was increasing, their access to food distribution systems was being facilitated, and the level of consumption and the quality of life were increasing.

The great bourgeois revolutions in Great Britain and France established new norms of social and political life: new principles of democracy and the rule of law, new structures of political and judicial power, and in the sphere of spiritual life – the principles of humanism and “Christian secularism”, anti-clericalism and steadily growing atheism. The cult of freedom and reason replaced the cult of God. An important part of the social change was the institutional change in the life of the European countryside and the European city, generated both by lofty ideals and practical considerations of a growing layer of entrepreneurs and merchants.

On the whole, the achievements of the internal development of European countries and their external expansion established the West as a leader in world development, and its

successful development model (despite its uniqueness) as a normative one, which sooner or later all non-Western societies were forced to recognize.

European universalism of the “Enlightenment Project”

The “Enlightenment Project” arose and began to be implemented in Western Europe, turning this small tip of the Eurasian continent into the core of a new society of modern times. Already in the 18th century, the space of the Enlightenment, and later on, even more so – the “Enlightenment Project”, noticeably went beyond the geographical boundaries of greater Europe. First, North America, as an overseas Anglo-French addition to Europe, and later the colonial and semi-colonial countries of the East turned into a space in which the ideas of the “Enlightenment project”, which became Euro-American, were realized, albeit to varying degrees and in different ways. At the same time, the humanism of the Enlightenment had certain limits and was hardly noticeable outside the European continent: Europeans arrogantly ignored other civilizations and other cultures, declared themselves “masters of the world”. At first, little attention was paid to this in the non-Western world, and then it turned out to be impossible to dispute. It was the established economic and military-political domination of the West (Eurocentrism in the broad sense of the term), personified by the dollar and the Colt revolver (“Maxim” machine gun), that allowed the countries of Western European (Euro-American) culture to gain a leadership position in world development, to offer or impose on the rest of the world their vision of world economy and international relations.

The world was offered a new system of values, which included not only universal values (the concepts of good and evil, justice and injustice), but also the values of European Christian civilization (the ten commandments, evangelical ideals and moral norms), as well as the values of the Enlightenment (human freedom, progress, humanism, democracy).

Value is a social definition of objects and phenomena of the surrounding world, revealing their positive or negative value for a person and society in an ideal and concrete form. Values are considered by society as stable, meaningful and normative. On the basis of values, a system of ideals is formed – goals that the individual and society should struggle for.

Along with secular humanism, rationalism, progress, and pragmatism became the new values of the coming “Age of Reason”. The system evolved and new values emerged. K.Dawson wrote:

During the last part of the 19th century, the spirit of Western culture changed, and it was already an era of materialism, both in thought and in action. The new biological theories of evolution and natural selection were crudely interpreted in such a way as to justify the struggle for existence between states and classes and the survival of the «fittest» or most prosperous (14:314).

Theories of “reasonable egoism” and “struggle for existence” appeared, justifying the justice of the rule of the strong and destroying the former organic harmony of Western European society (6).

At the same time, the principles of “right of force” and “competition” existed in public and international life along with the weaker principles of “equality” and “humanism”.

Intellectuals in the countries of the “first echelon of capitalist development” and the “second echelon” argued about the significance of the project, sometimes questioning it. Attention to the concepts of civilization, cultural-historical types and culture in the context of capitalist development in the works of N.Danilevsky, O.Spengler, F.Braudel and other thinkers testifies to the awareness of the importance of non-material aspects of development. And the belated discovery of the vastness of the civilizational heritage of Eastern societies could cast doubt on the universal significance of Western civilization, the normativity of the Western model and the universality of the Western project, but it did not.

Over the controversy and disputes of intellectuals in European and Eastern capitals, the economic development of the industrial formation from the 19th century asserted its dominance and inclusiveness, the beginning of a new global cycle of socio-economic and political development, the alternative to which was not visible. Indeed, in itself, the successful development of the agrarian and handicraft economy, for example, in China, ultimately did not lead to expanded economic growth, and therefore forced non-Western countries to accept sooner or later the intensive type of development of the Western model.

Self-negation of the “Enlightenment project” in the West

The “Enlightenment Project” was implemented in Western Europe and North America by the middle of the 20th century. Thanks to this, the countries of European culture managed to realise remarkable achievements in their socio-economic development.

True, the discrepancy between high educational ideals and the real capitalist system caused disappointment and resistance among the masses, conflicts and crises periodically arose. In economic life, free market competition also gave rise to negative phenomena and crises of a cyclical nature. However, these processes were overlapped by the positive features of this model for an ever wider segment of the population.

In the second half of the 20th century, crisis phenomena in Western countries acquired a systemic character. Crises were not limited to the sphere of economy or politics, they captured the spheres of culture and spiritual life, a striking example was the 1968 revolution (4; 6). For two and a half centuries, the ideas of the great Enlighteners have become vulgarized and simplified, and the principle of liberalism, devoid of the restraining framework of Christian values, has turned into a neoliberal principle of permissiveness.

Nevertheless, the inertia of the development of engineering and technology, along with the purposeful economic policy of the leading Western states, made it possible to extend the existence of the capitalist, bourgeois system within the existing system for another half a century.

The economic implementation of the “Enlightenment project” was based on the achievements of the industrial and scientific and technological revolutions, which created new productive forces (new industry, new energy) and global systems for the supply of raw materials and goods. Innovation spurred development, development increased savings, the

population and life expectancy of people grew, and their quality of life improved. At the turn of the 20th–21st centuries, the technological revolution complicated the structure of productive forces due to digitalization, the Internet, robotics, nanotechnologies, etc. The era of industrial development is over. The question is: did it increase the volume of the Good for people, what the great figures of the Enlightenment aspired?

The question is rhetorical. Emmanuel Todd wrote in 2017:

Free trade and free movement of capital, on the one hand, make it possible to increase the rate of profit, but on the other hand, they lead to a decrease in incomes of citizens, an increase in inequality, a global drop in demand, and as a result of the unbridled pursuit of profit, they cause more and more new economic crises. The development of technology brought to the man of the most advanced world not freedom, but oppression. The fear of unemployment, together with a decline in the standard of living, resulting in a reduction in its duration, led to the fact that modernity began to resemble an escape in the opposite direction from civilization – into slavery. And such a rollback over the course of just one generation is shocking to any person who has known the dreams of freedom that blossomed in the 1960s” (29:8).

The events of recent years, and especially the Covid pandemic, show the paradoxical result of the “Enlightenment project”: in the non-material sphere, partly in the economic one, it turned into its own nihilistic self-denial.

At first glance, this is understandable in technology and economics, where, based on the principle of progress, the new principles denies and replaces the old. But if earlier the sphere of economic life developed to meet the needs of a person – always limited for natural reasons, now new models of products and norms of behavior are imposed on a human consumer based on human desires which are always unlimited and generated by advertising.

In the non-material sphere, the system of values and norms of behavior that underlay the “Enlightenment project” are rejected. The values of democracy (an independent point of view and political activity) are devalued in the era of “liberal democracy” and replaced by conformism, the principle of “managed democracy” in the conditions of manipulating people’s minds through «communication wars» in the information space. The state has lost the function of an integrator of society, which is in a state of fragmentation and atomization. There has been a transition from the state and society limiting the power of violence to the recognition of the legitimacy of violence in the intellectual sphere (the dictate of the point of view of power in the media or minorities in public life). So democracy imperceptibly gives way to oligarchy and ochlocracy.

The experience of scientific research of physicians who offered vaccination during the “Covid” period is rejected by an allegedly enlightened society in the countries of European culture. Education is rapidly losing its necessity and value, giving way to information from a variety of sources. There is a prospect of a “new illiteracy” of the medieval type, when human knowledge is limited to a set of applied skills and abilities.

The polarization of Western society according to material, intellectual and cultural criteria again leads to social stratification according to medieval norms: the first estate is a

narrow layer of the ruling elite, combining power and property, the second estate is a group of specialists serving the needs of the elite, and the third estate is hired workers in the broadest sense of the term and the self-employed. Social mobility is increasingly difficult. Each of the estates has a different level of rights and opportunities, has its own level of economic consumption, knowledge and skills.

The consistent and logical development of the ideological basis of the “Enlightenment project” led to a complete rejection of the system of Christian values and a rethinking of universal values, affirming instead the values of a neoliberal society. Some “universal values” and “rational morality” are proposed, based on the principles of liberalism and the achievements of biotechnology (the creation of a “new human nature”), as opposed to the religions that come to life in the 21st century, national and ethnic values of different civilizations. On the other hand, superstition and pagan cults are being revived in a modernized form.

The norms of morality, which consider labor as a necessary and self-sufficient value, have been replaced by the norms of the optionality of labor, and entertainment, which was previously considered an acceptable recreation, is gradually turning into the main pastime and goal of human life. Comfort and consumption (shopping) have become the goal of existence.

The value of the family and family relations, moral norms, respect for elders and respect for authorities turn out to be outdated and unnecessary. The values of all-encompassing tolerance are being absolutized, examples of which are attempts to abandon the concepts of “male” and “female”, the disappearance of masculinity as a positive ideal.

The results of the centuries-old culture of the West in literature, fine arts and music are equated with handicrafts of profane mass culture. The “Gutenberg era” is over, and the book has become just one (and not the most important) of the media. The historical memory of society disappears, and with it “the connection of times breaks up”.

True, in spite of this, the man of the West “sacredly believes in the progressiveness of his modern society” (29:29). And this gives him confidence that, for example, the bombing of countries in the Middle East with drones will ultimately lead to the emancipation of local women and the development of democratic relations.

But everything that had a beginning has its end.

John Gray in a book with the eloquent title “Wake for Enlightenment” writes:

We cannot even rule out the possibility that the Western tradition is not amenable to renewal, and its continued existence is a danger to other cultural foundations that can still be fruitful” (12:347).

His pessimism we see here: “The disintegration of the old moral forms and pre-existing religions with their humanistic and universalist pretensions, following the Enlightenment, may be a prelude to the irreversible – and probably not much to be regretted – decline of the West. Western cultures may not be able to absorb the changes in

traditional conceptions of ethics and science, in theoretical thought in general, following the rejection of the axial Western tradition, whose culmination is the Enlightenment, and the result is nihilism” (12, pp. 347-348). Nevertheless, the author also sees a light in the gloomy future, believing that “any opportunities for the healing of culture from the nihilism generated by the Enlightenment may be associated with non-Western peoples, whose task then will be in part to protect themselves from the wreckage of the Western shipwreck” (12:349).

True, there is also an opposite point of view. S. Pinker expressed it best of all in the book *Enlightenment Continues*. In defense of reason, science, humanism and progress (2018). The author condemns “progressophobia” and categorically rejects the “bleak assessment of the state of affairs in the world”, which is “hopelessly erroneous, like the theory of a flat earth, and completely untrue” (25:13). In confirmation, he cites dozens of graphs, in which, using a large statistical economic of the 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st centuries, he shows a steady and qualitative improvement in human living conditions: an increase in life expectancy, a decrease in infant mortality, an increase in the average energy value of the daily diet, a reduction in the share of the poor, reduction in the working week, the growth of literacy in the world, the reduction of violence against children and sexual discrimination, the growth of domestic amenities, and finally, the growth of well-being, etc. These data are irrefutable, but no one is going to deny them. There is no need to defend the mind against perfectly reasonable contemporaries.

The fact is that S. Pinker and optimists like him evaluate the implementation of the “Enlightenment project” based on the goals set three centuries ago. Basically, these goals have been achieved, the project has been implemented.

But over the centuries, life has changed qualitatively. New goals arose, new problems, conflicts appeared, and not in economic life, which the “Fathers of the Enlightenment” could not have even imagined.

Based on the fact that a person is both a subject and an object of social life, one must take into account his worldview and worldview, on the basis of which he acts. That is why the spiritual component of any activity is so important, that specific system of norms, values and meanings that either separates one civilization from another, or brings them closer to each other.

In the 18th century, a unique combination of material, political, cultural and spiritual factors brought to life the “Enlightenment Project”. But all these factors have changed over the centuries and the change of dozens of generations of people, and the attitude towards them has also changed.

W. Sombart in his work “*Bourgeois. Sketches on the history of the spiritual development of modern economic man*” (1913) wrote that in order to understand the nature of the development of the capitalist spirit, it is necessary to investigate, first of all,

what is the ideal, what are the central life values that modern economic man is guided by. But here we immediately stumble upon a terrible shift in a person’s attitude to personal values in a narrower sense, a shift that, it seems to me, has become decisive for the rest of the structure of

life. I mean the fact that the living person, with his happiness and sorrow, with his needs and demands, has been pushed out of the center of the circle of interests and two abstractions have taken his place: profit and business. Man, therefore, ceased to be what he remained until the end of the early capitalist era – the measure of all things (15:169).

A hundred years after the publication of W. Sombart’s book, the primacy of human interests over ideals has become the norm, and such a hierarchy is the basis of the value system of modern society.

All this allows us to talk about the crisis of the system – the crisis of the civilizational foundations of society and the exhaustion of the creative principle of the “Enlightenment project”.

The entire process of implementing the “Enlightenment project”, that very “ascent of the West”, took place in the West not only at the expense of its own resources and capabilities, but also to a large extent due to the exploitation of the natural and human resources of the non-West. This determined the absolute leadership of the West for 500 years.

Nevertheless, according to E. Todd, not in China or Brazil, but “it is in the USA, Europe and Japan that the rules of the game of economic globalization are determined”. And it is this triad that, starting in the 1980s, has engaged the active population of the third world, who has recently mastered literacy, thereby “jeopardizing the development of third world countries, depriving them of specialists and destroying the local middle class”. At the same time, he continues, “Russia, the old European power, the only country that retains independence from the system of globalization, managed to hold on to its positions” (29:12), in other words, to stay on the “edge of a cliff” of the “Enlightenment project”.

Where has the catch-up modernization led the East?

The implementation of the “Enlightenment project” showed the enormous potential of the new formation, which is opening up in the European countries of the “first” and “second” echelons of capitalist development.

The Western project was challenged not by huge China or the fragmented Arab world, but by small island Japan, which defeated a strong European power in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. At the same time, the possibility of such a challenge has arisen in a country that has achieved great success in carrying out catch-up modernization according to the Western model. And in the future, this eastern country adopted the norms and values of the European “Enlightenment project” (consistently combining them in symbiosis with the original Japanese ones), unlike the vast majority of the countries of the East.

The desire of domestic orientologists to gain a new view on the modern development of the countries of the East was manifested in a large number of works and is concentratedly expressed in the collective work “*Concepts of Modern Oriental Studies*” (2013). The countries

of the East are currently experiencing crisis processes, but the crises are of a different and not of a systemic nature.

The fact is that the catch-up modernization in the countries of the East took place mainly in the socio-economic (formational) sphere and only indirectly influenced the civilizational basis. Faith and culture in special ethno-national incarnations over the centuries have shaped such a worldview and worldview of Eastern societies, which could not even be replaced by a Western one even in decades of modernization (as happened in the economic life of the countries of the East).

The “Enlightenment Project” turned out to be alien to non-Western countries, although in terms of their economic and cultural development before the start of the industrial revolution and transatlantic trade, they were not inferior, but in some ways even surpassed the countries of the West. In their contacts with the East, the Europeans became stronger in the idea of their own superiority (“civilization”) over the rest of the world. Scientists of the East have written a lot about the falsity of the universalization of the “Enlightenment project”, it is enough to name the book “Orientalism. Western Concepts of the East” by Edward Said (28), published in 1978, and “Provincializing Europe” in 1999 by Dipesh Chakrabarti (31).

Meanwhile, in the regions of the Middle East, South and East Asia, the money economy and maritime trade successfully developed, the level of handicraft labor increased, manufactories appeared, and all this was supported by a powerful demographic factor – a growing population, as well as huge natural resources and the inseparability of the link between power and property. The economic model of reproduction and the principle of extensive development dominated there, while the principle of intensive economic development was already established in the West.

In the East, there were no backbone foundations of the “Enlightenment project”: Christianity in the integrity of its institutions and doctrinal doctrines; the Renaissance with the approval of an anthropocentric approach to life; the era of the Reformation, which changed the hierarchy of spiritual and economic values; the era of bourgeois revolutions, which approved the principles of democracy and atheism in spiritual life, and in public life – the principles of activism, pragmatism and egoism.

In the countries of the East, in contrast to the West, the changes that took place did not radically affect the non-material spheres of society (social structure, state, education), did not weaken and, moreover, did not destroy traditional values and norms of life, did not change people’s worldview so dramatically. There, the grounds for fighting the theocracy or asserting the principles of “reasonable faith”, religious tolerance and freedom of conscience or national religion turned out to be much weaker. Individualism could not supplant the values of the communal principle and family patriarchy. The spiritual and philosophical searches of people did not go beyond the traditional paradigm of spiritual salvation as the goal of life, while in the West the goal of life was transferred from the inner world to the outside, the goal was the free development of the human personality, not constrained by anything in its economic and intellectual activity, apart from law and order. The East was offered a universalistic and secular image of man.

Nevertheless, the myth of independence, national liberation and sovereignty arose there, which belonged to the spheres of politics and international life. Non-Western societies used the Western model of industrial society to make a breakthrough from backwardness and underdevelopment. True, this model was turned “upside down”: instead of society, the state became the main subject of development. And people expected to ensure their freedom and protection of rights from the state, and not from themselves.

And there (as a prerequisite, and then part of the process of modernization) at the end of the 19th century, the phenomenon of “enlightenment” arose as a tool to overcome social inertia and backwardness, including criticism of the negative aspects of public life and demands for the development of European-type education, freedom of speech and the press.

At the same time, arrogant Eurocentrism was rejected. In the second half of the 19th century, the struggle for national liberation intensified in South Asia and the Middle East, during which the Eastern leaders believed it possible to use borrowed European norms, values, institutions and structures for building statehood on the basis of the “Enlightenment project”. But in the twentieth century, the countries of the East did not want to remain in the “waiting room”, literally following step by step along the path of European Modernity. For example, in India, after achieving national independence, they rejected Mill’s “classical position” that “universal education must precede universal suffrage” and decided on universal suffrage despite the fact that the bulk of the country’s population remained illiterate.

In the course of the catch-up modernization that unfolded at the end of the 19th century and throughout the 20th century, the countries of the East were forced to make a leap in their development in order to overcome backwardness, poverty and underdevelopment. The consistent formation of a capitalist economy in a democratic way from below turned out to be impossible for them both due to the lack of internal sources of development and the presence in their economies of a powerful external factor – colonial and semi-colonial powers and Western capital, which had their own interests. The weakness or absence of national capital forced the state to play a leading and active role in economic life; therefore the development of the capitalist economy and market relations was not accompanied by an adequate development of democratic principles in political life, as happened in the original “project”. It was necessary to look for other sources of growth and development – all this destroyed such an attractive Western model of the industrial economy, the dominance of market relations. This also entailed the rejection of the path of the Western economy: from growth to development based on the industrial revolution and growth at a new level to meet the needs of the population; development based on the scientific and technological revolution and the transition to new growth; development based on the technological revolution to meet the desires of the population. For the countries of the East, the main task was and remains precisely economic growth – to meet the needs of the population.

Thus, the Western model was partially implemented, and by the end of the 20th century, the model of reproduction of the “two-track economy” and “two-track social

development” and the development of enlightenment was becoming widespread in the East and determined the direction and nature of its future development.

The East choosing the path of development

Doubts about the universality of the “Enlightenment project” and the normativity of the Western model of modern society arose in the countries of the East by the end of the 20th century after the first decades of socio-economic modernization. When “people were satisfied”, they asked themselves questions “how to live?” and “what to live for?”, although the values of economic growth and economic wealth have retained their significance. But their importance has declined compared to the traditional values of justice, tolerance, helping other people and others pushed aside by modernization.

During the period of modernization, the relationship between European and Eastern principles in the sphere of culture proceeded in the form of symbiosis, less often – synthesis. For example,

traditional needs, principles, norms, values inherent in pre-bourgeois societies are superimposed on the elements of the bourgeoisization of culture. There is a bizarre, sometimes grotesque, but usually viable and sustainable interweaving of new and old (34:476).

In the countries of the East, the attitude towards the European project as an alternative to the traditional way of life – not to a model of socio-economic development – was ambivalent, according to the principle of “attraction and repulsion”.

There is some double irony in the fact that colonialism first tears us away from our past, and then forces us to turn to the colonialists for information about this very past, argued the Europeanized Egyptian Nadia Wassef, Europeans invented Egyptology, and then began to teach it to the Egyptians”. French archaeologists created the Egyptian Antiquities Service in the middle of the 19th century, but a century later it came under the control of the Egyptians (7:54).

Comprehension of one’s own culture became possible only through the mediation of European, Western culture. So, you could see many monuments of Ancient Egypt in the museums of London, Paris and Berlin.

The same author notes the stagnant nature of Egypt’s development before the impact of an external factor – the West: “We became victims of our own pyramidal scheme: we console ourselves with the idea that we built the pyramids, and do not notice how our houses are crumbling around ...” (7:57). An effective response to the stagnation was the catching up modernization of Egypt in the middle of the 20th century, and then of other Arab countries that followed the successful Western model of an industrial society. Nowadays, in the sphere of culture, the rejection of Western principles is increasingly common, the attractiveness of tradition – religious, national, everyday – is growing. In the documents of the XVII Congress of the CPC (2007), the use of the ideas

of Confucius to build the theoretical system of Chinese socialism has already become noticeable: the concept of “social harmony”, which is based on the value orientations of early Confucianism, is declared an essential attribute of socialism with Chinese characteristics. It is recognized that the main ideas of Confucius “are taken into account in the formation of the country’s internal political course”, the organic combination of “the principles of a market economy and the regulatory role of Confucian culture”, the assertion of “priority of the spiritual over the material”, raising the level of civil morality and patriotism, for “harmonious coexistence of various strata of society” (2:9).

Similarly, in Saudi Arabia, which by the beginning of the 21st century had achieved great success in realizing the economic parameters of the Western model of modern society, in the long-term plan for the socio-economic development of the kingdom Vision-2030, the authorities put the preservation of the traditional values of Islam in the first place (2:10). Features of economic and political life in modernized Iran are also explained by the Islamic nature of society and the state. Of course, various kinds of compromises arise in real life, but the very preservation of spiritual guidelines in the 21st century sharply contrasts the experience of the development of Eastern societies with the “Enlightenment project” with its steadily growing dominance of the principles of liberalism, economic centrism and rationalism.

Nevertheless, R.Inglehart and K.Wenzel in their analysis of the processes of modernization in the countries of the East note changes in the system of values in the course of overcoming prejudices and obsolete customs. In their opinion, “the change in values... leads to important socio-political consequences...” The authors point out that “the values and beliefs of the inhabitants of less developed countries” are radically different from the values and beliefs of «members of advanced societies», but evolve in a “predictable direction” – “contributing to a change in sexual norms, gender roles, family values, religiosity, motivation for labor, relations between man and nature, social and political activity of people”, according to the pattern of “humanistic culture, which emphasizes self-expression”, and, in turn, “self-expression values are more closely related to democracy than any other factor” (16:10, 13, 15).

It is impossible not to note such an important and fundamental difference in the perception of the “Enlightenment project” in the West and in the East as the complete acceptance of the idea of progress in the first case and rejection in the second. The concept of progress is ambiguous: it is also progress, success; development from the lowest to the highest; improvement of systems in the process of development. Naturally, in Eastern society the idea of progress was accepted as an improvement, as a change for the better. But a precise understanding of progress in the context of the “Enlightenment project” implies a complete replacement of the old and obsolete with the new and better. If this is indisputable in economic and technical terms, then in the sphere of non-material life, in relation to religion, value systems and ideals, such nihilism is misunderstood in Western society and rejected in Eastern society.

At the same time, the potential danger of the complete displacement of the tradition by the “Enlightenment project” was recognized by the Eastern leaders. The

creator of modern Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, recalled that when the cultural identity of the society was threatened, he ordered to reduce the scope of the use of English in teaching, because “we could lose the good that was in Chinese schools: discipline, self-confidence, morality instilled in students and social values based on Chinese traditions and culture. I wanted to keep it all” (19:149). After all, language is the bearer of a certain culture and certain values. And today, in the speech of modern young people in China and Japan, there are a lot of anglicisms, and in their fashion and behavior – borrowings from American popular culture.

Another example of outward adherence to the “Enlightenment project” is provided by the Middle East. Fatahi Mohaddam, an Iranian-born professor at Georgetown University, draws attention to the fact that Arabs in general, unlike Europeans, live in a space of “living history”:

for them, history remains an active component of their individual life and in their living culture, and is not a museum value. The most distant past is often even more alive than the present. And it is not in some abstract sense that people remember their past, but in practice – the distant past is an integral part of their everyday thinking, activity and living identity... (34:100).

Thus, in contrast to the West, the society retains the “connection of times” and historical memory, the basic values of culture, and even more so the core of Arab history – Islam.

Basically, the authorities and society in the countries of the East, quite possibly, without realizing it, implemented it in fragments, mainly in the economic sphere of life, creating industry, infrastructure, cities. Nevertheless, the former harmony of society, the correspondence of all spheres of its life to each other, turned out to be violated in the “orientalized” “Enlightenment project”.

Conclusion

It would be strange to deny the benefits of the implementation of the European “Enlightenment project”. The world as a whole began to live better in economic terms, life expectancy and the level of education have increased, and the level of comfort has increased unprecedentedly.

At the same time, the Age of Reason seems to have ended. The goals that the Fathers of the Enlightenment set for mankind at the end of the 18th century were achieved in the 20th century, but by the beginning of the 21st century, the ideals of the Enlightenment were rejected, moreover, they turned into their opposite.

It is impossible to deny or cancel the leadership and innovation of the West in the course of its implementation of the “Enlightenment project”. The development of the entire world system turned out to be within the parameters of the project proposed by

the West and sought to achieve the goals set there. No other development option has arisen and could not have arisen in the process of implementing the project, that is, a race for the leader, which it turned out to be impossible to overtake. It's a different matter now, when the ideas and principles of the Enlightenment are well-known and assimilated to varying degrees by non-West, and technology and technology have ceased to be the absolute property of the West.

At a new level of development, the countries of the East, which used (each in its own way) the Western model of modern society and significantly reduced the gap with the West, can return to the old point of divergence, the point of choosing the path. At that time, the West suppressed or objective conditions did not allow a different, non-Western development project to open up, models of socio-economic development with a different ideological and value base to appear. The dominance of ideologies, now launched during the Enlightenment, has ended, and both the principles of ruthless competition and traditional ideals are returning to replace them. Now the basic principles of, for example, Chinese civilization – harmony and concord – are becoming increasingly known as an alternative to European principles. At the same time, in the arrangement of the modern world, as always, the economic power of the state remains the decisive argument.

After the collapse of the bipolar world system, the features of the new system become visible: two global powers – the USA and China, regional-global powers – the Russian Federation, India and Great Britain, regional powers – Poland, Germany, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, etc. China has already made an application for a new development project, and soon we can expect this from the United States, which is able to propose new goals and principles of development. The Russian Federation, which does not have global authority and influence, which suffered irreparable damage in the demographic and intellectual potential in the 20th century during the revolution, the Civil War and two World wars, can focus on survival on its own project. India's ambitions are hampered by the complexities and problems of internal development, and Great Britain has long been a natural part of the Anglo-Saxon American world.

The world needs a new project. The world develops according to the united laws, but, apparently, the new model should no longer be European-universal, but globally multivariate, giving the birth to the new multipolar world. For the East, as, indeed, for Western society, an important goal arises – to find a new harmony of society to replace the lost old one.

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POWER, POLITICS, STATE

Political Institutions, Processes and Technologies

Russian state policy in the field of railway transport undergoes a deed crisis. The crisis was caused by a host of factors, first of all, by extensive sanctions of varying degrees of intensity.

George D. Tcheremin

State Policy on Railway Transport of Late 2019 – early 2022:
Challenges for Sustainability and Stability

Due to the current situation in geopolitics, the problem of migration has become the focal point in the modern world. The United Nations considers migration as a positive phenomenon that contributes to achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals, improving the quality of life of people around the world, and to bolstering the economic growth. However, today there are many problems related to migration processes...

Evgeniya V. Dumina, Sofya A. Tyulyakova

Comparative Analysis of the Migration Legislation of Russia, Germany and Switzerland

Modern teachers face a difficult task to respond quickly to changing conditions, select effective educational technologies that will help students understand the events taking place, critically comprehend them, identify their potential and opportunities to influence the political process [...]

Along with the development of socio-political activity of the young people with a positive orientation, there is a need to prevent manifestations of destructive social and political behavior among the youth.

Irina N. Gukova

Promising Forms of the Growth of Socio-Political Activity
of the Youth in Modern Russian Region

State Policy on Railway Transport of Late 2019 – Early 2022: Challenges for Sustainability and Stability

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Abstract: The article deals with the problems of state policy in the field of railway transport. Are analyzed two approaches to the state policy in the field of railway transport, the forms of ownership in the situation of sanctions on railway transport and competitors close to it – first of all, this is the aviation transport. The question is about the effectiveness of public policy to achieve the stability and sustainability of transport. The article analyzes the goals, implementation, and effectiveness of the state policy in the field of railway transport from the end of 2019 to the beginning of 2022 under the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and sanctions. The question of the role of ideology in the formation of the concept of public policy and the ways of its implementation is raised. The role of the driver, conductor and police for security on the territory of transport, including in the conditions of a pandemic, is being studied. A comparative analysis of the goals of state programs is carried out.

Keywords: state policy, stability, sustainability, railways, aviation, sanctions, biopolitics

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Introduction

Russian state policy in the field of railway transport undergoes a deed crisis. The crisis was caused by a host of factors, first of all, by extensive sanctions of varying degrees of intensity. So, in 2018, JSC “Russian Railways” and “Uralvagonzavod” already faced serious problems¹, and in the period under investigation they found themselves

even in a more difficult situation as the result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Even greater complications were brought with a new wave of sanctions related to the military events in Ukraine in 2022.

Current political situation shows that regardless of the affiliation and form of ownership sanctions can be imposed on state authorities, and both state-owned and private companies. Thus, a lot of Russian ministries and institutions, state and private companies, the biggest banks of Russia as well as government officers and individuals, including those from business circles have come under large-scale sanctions from the USA, Great Britain and the European Union². The sanctions affected, for example, P.O.Aven and M.M.Fridman (“Alfa-Bank”), O.Y.Tinkov (“Tinkoff Bank”), A.A.Mordashev (“Severstal”), G.N.Timchenko³ (“Volga Group”; Council Decision 2022). The transport industry got under a great pressure as well: JSC “Russian Railways”, “Aeroflot”, aircraft factories, a number of transport engineering enterprises and even personally the Minister of Transport of the Russian Federation V.G.Savelyev.

The period of time we investigate is important because the historical events happening now are unique and without any known precedent. A lot of mechanisms and methods of regulation which are the results of the implemented state policy are currently being subjected to a test for strength by both external and internal political, economic and demographic circumstances.

We need to recall that “state policy is an internally oriented system of actions, and guiding norms and values have a basic, system-forming character” (8:35). In the period under research Russia experienced a serious political event, that is the change of the Prime Minister and the government.

Let us also note the problem of goal-setting as the foundation of state policies. With this, there arises the problem of not only the effectiveness of the state policy itself, but of the methods by which the government seeks to give stability to the economic processes. In our case these processes are connected with the public sectors such as railways, aviation and oil and gas sector.

All mentioned above can be treated both within the political context and beyond. Liberal discourse develops the issue of nationalisation of such industries as railways, and rises the question if railways can function better and not be unprofitable, demanding budget funds for their maintenance, but be profitable and in demand from legal consumers and individual passengers. Conservative discourse polemizes that unprofitability is an objective phenomenon, and the task for state policy is to build the stable system to support the industry. If we turn to the current Russian communists, we will see that they stand for the earlier models of railway management based on the Soviet

¹ Rodionov D. Trump launched a “rail war” against Russian Railways. Free Press. 26.02.2022. Available from: <https://svpressa.ru/economy/article/258252>; Nikolsky A., Mukhametshina E., Churakova O., Bocharova S. How “Uralvagonzavod” was on the verge of bankruptcy and what saved it. Vedomosti, 06.03.2018. Available from: <https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/06.03.2018/752833-uralvagonzavod> (in Russian).

² Abdullina, A. Russian aviation will get its wings broken, Kommersant, 26.02.2022. Available from: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5236969> (in Russian).

³ Keffer L. The UK has imposed new sanctions against Russian companies and bankers. Kommersant, 24.03.2022. Available from: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5271930> (in Russian).

Union practices and also turn to the pro-social rhetoric concerning the issues of labour and wages⁴.

There is a problem of not only effectiveness of the state policy but of the methods with which the government seeks to give more stability to the processes related to the nationalised economic sector (clearly, it is railways in our case).

The purpose of the research. At present the Russian Federation has got under unprecedented hard political and economic conditions. In this regard, it seems necessary to conceptualise the recent challenges to the stability and sustainability of the political system, in particular, in the sphere of railway transport which, like many other industries, has fallen under sanctions. Thus, after such conceptualisation, it will become possible to proceed to the development of the response to these challenges both in political and economic aspects.

Materials and methods

The materials for the research are, first of all, the latest historical facts, professional literature, and relevant documents of the Government of the Russian Federation.

The research methods we have applied are the following ones: general scientific method, qualitative event-analysis (based on mass media materials), content analysis (applied to the documents of the Government of the Russian Federation).

Results

Stability in the context of railways can be understood in different ways.

First of all, we should mention the definition which is classical for the railways – engineering stability and stabilization measures. Obviously, we include in this the very design of the railway track, resistive action against landslides and landfalls (4), snow control (1), etc., and also engineering safety measures. This stability may concern traffic (2), i.e. the continuity of transportation and the accuracy of schedule.

In this aspect, in our opinion, stability should be understood as the regularity of pace of railway networks, low accident rate, good pace of new railway tracks construction and low frequency of postponements for various projects of governmental programmes.

Sustainability connected with the concept of stability will reveal itself in economic dimension – low inflation of tariffs of various types. Here an important role for us will play the decisions of the Central Bank of Russia – one of the main macroeconomic regulators the

⁴ Gavrilov S.A. Russian railways are a strategic object, they are not subject to privatization. The official website of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation – KPRF.RU, 30.05.2016. Available from: <https://kprf.ru/dep/gosduma/activities/155646.html>; The history of Russian railways: starting with a lag, and ending with a collapse. The official website of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation – KPRF.RU, 10.01.2011. Available from: <https://kprf.ru/crisis/edros/97283.html> (in Russian).

goal of which is fighting inflation and keeping it low by any means, and of the bodies on other levels of government: Federal Anti-Monopoly Service (FAS) in the context of checking natural monopoly entities and Federal Tariff Service (FTS – until 2015, abolished).

Further on, stability will be treated as related to the security issues both on the rail roads themselves and in relation to the adjacent infrastructure – security at railway stations (as one of the most crime-prone environments). Transport facilities are quite vulnerable to terrorist attacks and to other criminal encroachments. We might come across this both abroad and in our home country, for example, in the case of “Nevsky Express” in 2009.⁵ Here we, of course, talk about security as the security of a police type and character – about direct disciplinary control of railway stations, railway roads and adjacent infrastructure.

In the literature devoted to technical safety of railways, a thorough attention is paid to the issue of human factor. Railway transport is defined as “a complex technical control system in which a man is not only the user of the result of the process, but also is a part of the system (and not always reliable enough) that performs the functions of the operator of a particular subsystem”. At the same time, a big importance is attributed to the problems of health, psychological stability and compatibility, physical fatigue of the railway personnel (5:427, 429; 6:9, 21). Statistical data indicate that in most cases the reason for accidents on the railways is precisely the human factor.⁶ Indeed, in this sense the political as the regulatory function of the state policy becomes a particular foundation for the types of regulation and “normalisation” of human behaviour (7:89).

Here we came across the issues investigated by Michel Foucault and his work “Security, territory, population”. Is the political governance exercised to its full extent in the formation and implementation of national policy? How exactly does the national policy act at the railways in the final reckoning? To what extent do disciplinary authorities show themselves in the behaviour of railway personnel and end-user passengers? Can the government successfully solve the problem of discipline through the state policy? To what extent does the train conductor inherit the role and functions of pastoral care and guidance? And to what extent does the train driver do it? Let’s remember what Foucault writes about similar issues:

Behaviour – is the action of the verb “lead”, the action of the guide, leading, guidance if you will, but also the manner how people behave, how they allow somebody to behave, how they are led, and, finally, how they react to the guidance, which is the action of the guide. (7, p. 259)

During the pandemic in the air transport sphere – which is quite close to railways – we could witness different manifestations of discontent up to violent clashes:

⁵ Kosorukov, A. Four years have passed since the explosion of the Nevsky Express train in the Tver region. Komsomolskaya Pravda – Tver, 27.11.2013. Available from: <https://www.tver.kp.ru/online/news/1596491>. (in Russian).

⁶ UIR: statistics of accidents on railways. Materials of the International Union of Railways UIC Safety Report 2020. Railways of the world, 19.06.2021. Available from: <https://zdmira.com/articles/mszhd-statistika-proisshествij-na-zheleznikh-dorogakh>. (in Russian).

For about 800 passengers of 3 flights arrived from Asian countries there were only 3 Rospotrebnadzor (Federal Service for the Oversight of Consumer Protection and Welfare) specialists, that is why people had to wait for the issuance of certificates for several hours. As result, the Russians who fell under the isolation regime lost their temper. It was decided to take the exit from the airport by assault. Surprisingly, three police officers couldn't stop the vengeful crowd", – said one of the witnesses of the incident, and added that many tourists left without receiving their documents. Another passenger noted that she managed to wait for her turn, but the forms for the resolutions were over⁷.

What, if not the problem of revolt and epidemics, can bring us closer to one more important topic raised by Michel Foucault which comes from the issue of guidance – political management and state interest (in our case it is its derivative – the state policy) which is implemented through the institute of the police in the broad sense of this concept?

With regard to political issues, in our way of thinking, there are two possible approaches to understanding the subject and object of possible research.

The first presupposes an additional identification of the political aspect in a number of areas listed above. In this sense, the political stability will become a concept with a narrow meaning, and will primarily include geopolitical issues, such as the issue of geopolitical bridges (Russia as a transit territory or the New Silk Road alternative to it). Also this approach allows to include into it a dispute between the conservatives and the liberals about the best form of ownership for railways: which of them – private or public – will be best suited to such a country as Russia which is unique in every sense?

The second approach will treat the areas listed above as some sub-areas. In this approach such type of policy as state policy will find its expression in setting a particular model of political management of the strategic economic sphere – railways – through specialised forms of power/governance. In the context of Russian management model for the current system of public power we will single out the problematic issues and forms of their manifestation which concern directly the railway system in the three branches of power. In the judicial branch we will pay attention to court decisions and their dynamics between parties to trials: between transport prosecutor's office and railways as legal entities, between contractors and public clients, etc.

In the legislative branch, the work of parliamentary committees will be important for us, as well as their work on improving, first of all, federal laws on railway transport in the context of the country's Basic Law.

In the executive branch, the regulatory function of the state, the work of inspectors in relation of implementation of the guide-lines prescribing a particular procedure for actions on railway roads, compliance of the construction and operation with the requirements of the adopted legislation will be of primary importance. Here we should mention the coming out disciplinary power exercised by the state.

⁷ The quarantined Russians took the exit from the airport by storm. Lenta.ru, 20.03.2020. Available from: <https://lenta.ru/news/2020/03/20/shturm/> (in Russian).

Thus, with the second approach we can see a bright manifestation of the political problematic issues: freedom and/or security, the problem of their correlation, the model of state power in this branch of industry and interaction of the concepts "man" and "state" with the account for the form of ownership for JSC "Russian Railways". In the long run, the choice of the optimal model of interaction between the entities and objects mentioned above brings to stability and sustainability of railways as the result of public policy.

When choosing optimal models, let us get back to the issue of goal-setting in state policy on the example of comparative analysis of two programmes of the Government of the Russian Federation in the field of transport. They are interesting to us because they both were approved under different Presidents and Prime Ministers, both are arranged in the linear sequence and quite relevant in this sense.

From 2008 to 2019, Strategy for the development of railway transport in the Russian Federation till 2030 was in effect in Russia based on the the Edict of the Government of the Russian Federation No.877-r, dated 17.06.2008. It set the following goals:

The goal of the Strategy is to create conditions for

- sustainable social and economic growth of Russia,
- increasing mobility of the population and optimisation of the movement of goods,
- reinforcement of economic sovereignty, national security and defensive capacity

of the country,

- reduction of the cumulative transport costs of the economy,
- improvement of the competitiveness of national economy
- ensuring Russia's leading positions on the basis of advanced and innovative

development of railway transport harmoniously linked with the development of other economic sectors, types of transport and regions of the country⁸ (Development Strategy 2008)

In 2021, this Edict ceased to be in force and effect and a new Edict of the Government of the Russian Federation No.3363-r dated 27.11.2021 was adopted. It is the Edict "On approval of Transport Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2030 with a forecast for the period up to 2035".

In it we can see a slightly different approach to goal-setting, particularly:

The strategic goal in implementation of the Strategy measures is to meet the demand of economy and society for competitive and high-quality transport services:

- Goal 1 "Improving spacial connectedness and transport accessibility of territories";
- Goal 2 "Increasing mobility of the population and development of domestic tourism";
- Goal 3 "Increasing volume and speed of cargo delivery, including transit, and development of multimodal logistics technologies";

⁸ Strategy for the development of railway transport in the Russian Federation till 2030 (Edict of the Government of the Russian Federation No.877-r, dated 17.06.2008), Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation. Available from: <https://mintrans.gov.ru/documents/1/1010>. (in Russian).

• Goal 4 “Digital and low-carbon transformation of the industry and accelerated introduction of new technologies”⁹.

We should note the key (Development Strategy 2021) difference between Strategy-877 from Strategy-3363: in dynamics we might observe that fewer goals have been set – 4 instead of 6, the main goal has become more utilitarian – we can see the supply of economic demand as the biggest priority.

The matter is not only the textual attributing of subjectivity to the concept of economy, though it is important to note this fact as well. But what is more important is the disappearance of the statements connected with leadership, outperformance and innovation, which were quite often mentioned during the presidency and premiership of D.A.Medvedev. Strategy-3363 was adopted under M.V.Mishustin at the post of the Prime Minister, and we can see the absence of these notions and their replacement with more measurable categories – volume, speed, mobility, and the presence of conceptually important words like “territory” and “population”.

Conclusion

Thus, we can conclude the following.

Firstly, during the period under investigation the state policy in the area of railway transport in its conceptual expressions has become closer to the concept of “bio-power” through different disciplinary and guide practices.

Secondly, in our opinion, this process has a strongly pronounced determinant of external threat bringing the state to an increasingly active stand.

Thirdly, the result of such practices will lead to stability and sustainability.

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⁹ Transport Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2030 with a forecast for the period up to 2035 (Edict of the Government of the Russian Federation No.3363-r, dated 27.11.2021), Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation. Available from: <https://mintrans.gov.ru/documents/8/11577?type> (in Russian).

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Comparative Analysis of the Migration Legislation of Russia, Germany and Switzerland

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Abstract: The article reveals the peculiarities of national legislation in the sphere of migration in Russia, Germany and Switzerland. These countries are very attractive for migrants within their regions, so the topic of improving legislation is relevant for all of them. A comparative analysis of a number of norms has been carried out, the results of which demonstrate the most effective methods and approaches of working with migrants: protection of their rights, adaptation measures, modes of stay of citizens on the territory of the country. Based on the data obtained, recommendations for changing the national migration policy are proposed.

Keywords: migration legislation, comparative law, comparative studies, migration flows, migrants, changes in legislation, migration policy.

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Introduction

The relevance of conducting a comparative study in the field of migration legislation is due to the intensification and politicization in the last decade of international migration of various types: labour, political, economic, religious, climatic. Migrant flows entail a serious social burden on states, contribute to an increase in the level of criminality in society, therefore, the experience of other countries can be useful in the development of migration policy.

The purpose of this study is to conduct a comparative legal analysis of the migration legislation of three countries located on the European continent: Russia as a key player in

the field of Eurasian security and stability, Germany as one of the founding countries of the European Union and Switzerland, which is not a member of either the European Union or the Eurozone, but is an important participant in political and trade-economic relations with EU countries.

Materials and methods

The main regulatory legal acts in the field of migration policy, as well as a number of author's materials of Russian and foreign researchers devoted to the problems of labor migration, especially illegal, were studied in order to determine the most effective regulatory practices for managing migration processes among the above-mentioned states.

Based on the data obtained during the study, it can be concluded that the topic of migration as a legal phenomenon is currently not fully studied.

The main methods as comparative legal and juridical analysis together with the criteria analysis were used in the course of the work.

Thus, a comparative legal analysis of the migration legislation of selected countries was carried out according to the following criteria:

- 1) the goals and priorities of migration policy, enshrined in national legislation;
- 2) the grounds for the presence of foreigners in the territory of the host country (visa and residence permit);
- 3) the main channels of immigration: family reunification, economic (labour) and humanitarian immigration;
- 4) the main state bodies exercising powers in the field of migration.

The study was conducted from October 2021 to January 2022.

Results

Operationalization of concepts

There is necessity to distinguish the concepts of «refugees» and «migrants», because different regulatory legal acts apply to these categories of citizens. The main difference is that a person recognized as a refugee is entitled to specific international protection¹, predetermined by the norms of international refugee law, and the legal status of migrants is a subject to national legal regulators (3).

To date, there is no unified concept of «migrant» in international law (it is assumed that this term covers all cases when a person «makes a decision on migration freely» for

¹ The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of July 28, 1951. *Bulletin of International Treaties*. 1993; November 1:9.

reasons of «personal convenience» and without the intervention of an external coercive factor»²).

So, in 2019, all three countries studied – the Russian Federation, Germany and Switzerland – were among the top 20 countries in Europe in terms of the number of migrants: from the data in the diagram (4), it follows that Russia ranks the 1st, Germany the 2nd, and Switzerland the 12th (see Figure 1). People move to the Russian Federation mainly from neighboring countries, and to Germany and Switzerland – from Eastern Europe and Middle Eastern countries.

State-legal regulation of migration activity in Germany

In 2020, approximately 220,000 more people moved to Germany than left the country. Compared to the previous year, when there were about 327,000 more immigrants than emigrants, the migration surplus in 2020 was significantly lower. Taking into account the presence of more than 13 million migrants in the country in 2019, Germany had the largest number of people born abroad among all European countries in the population; in the period 2015-2019, the number of immigrants in the country increased by almost 3 million people. According to the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis)³, net immigration across German borders has been declining for the fifth year in a row after the political situation in the Middle Eastern states has stabilized. It is noteworthy that in 2020, 15,000 Germans chose Switzerland to move, hoping for an even better standard of living, a solid salary, very moderate taxes, objective justice against the background of other European countries.

Currently, migration processes in Germany are regulated by a number of normative legal acts, to which quite a lot of changes and additions have been made in the last decade, as well as new laws designed to strengthen the national refugee protection system have been adopted. However, the provisions affecting ensuring the human right to a more dignified life as the main value of the welfare state are set out in the highest normative legal act – the Basic Law of Germany (German: Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland). Thus, Chapter 1 of the German Constitution⁴ establishes the obligations of the State to fulfill its international humanitarian obligations (Article 25), and also guarantees the provision of asylum to persons in need (Article 16-a).

The legal basis of the migration legislation of Germany is the Law «On Residence, Employment and Integration of Foreign Citizens in Germany» (German Aufenthaltsgesetz)⁵,


² Glossary of terms in the field of migration / ed. by R. Perrush. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. – 2005:96.

³ Migration 2020: Starker Rückgang der registrierten Zu- und Fortzüge. Statistisches Bundesamt. Available from: https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2021/06/PD21_306_12411.html.

⁴ Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz. Available from: <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/BJNR000010949.html>.

⁵ Gesetz über den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integration von Ausländern im Bundesgebiet 1) (Aufenthaltsgesetz – AufenthG). Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz. Available from: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/aufenthg_2004/inhalts_bersicht.html.

Figure 1. The ratio of the number of migrants to the population in 20 European countries



Source: McAuliffe, M., Hadria, B. (2020) World Migration Report, International Organization for Migration (IOM), pp. 14-28.

adopted in a new edition in 2005, which establishes the basic rules for entry and exit to the territory of Germany, the procedure for obtaining a residence permit, residence regimes for education or exercise labour activity, administrative issues, as well as deportation and social integration of migrants.

In 2016, Germany remained the main destination country among the OECD countries, as over 1.7 million new international migrants arrived there this year (more than twice as many as were registered in 2000, but less than in 2015 when the numbers were 2 million people, most of whom were refugees). When considering the issue of regulating spontaneous migration flows during the crisis of 2015-2016, it is worth mentioning the Law «On Granting Asylum» (German: Asylgesetz)⁶ to refugees. The document was initially

⁶ Asylgesetz (AsylG). Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz. Available from: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/asylvfg_1992/inhalts_bersicht.html.

rather procedural in nature, describing in detail the mechanism for obtaining asylum on the territory of Germany, but Germany was forced to deal with the legal implementation of Directives 2013/32/EU⁷, and 2013/33/EU, providing for amendments to this regulatory legal act. In particular, the term «refugee» was included in the text of the Asylum Law, which currently regulates the procedure for recognizing all forms of protection of human rights of a person who has arrived in Germany and is seeking political asylum (5).

In 2018, Germany continued to receive the largest number of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe and ranked fifth in the world by this indicator. The largest number of refugees arrived in Germany from the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq and Afghanistan. As a reaction to the new migration crisis in 2019, the German Parliament urgently adopted the so-called law «On the Procedure of Expulsion» (German *Geordnete-Rückkehr-Gesetz*)⁸, according to which the procedure for the deportation of illegal migrants is significantly simplified. Migrants who do not have the status of a permanent resident of the EU, who intentionally provided the migration services with false information about their identity or citizenship, will be fined and denied the right to permanent residence in the country legally.

Today, Germany conducts selective promotion of external migration, the main selection factors are knowledge of the German language (not lower than the B1-B2 level), the availability of specialist qualifications (university diploma or diploma of vocational training), confirmed by the German specialized agency, as well as work experience and age (2). The main reason for refusing naturalization in Germany is the restriction for dual citizenship.

Obviously, due to the demographic aging of the population, the German economy is in dire need of migrants, but only those who are able to stop the reduction of the labour force in the country. In 2012, Germany joined the European program «Blue Card» («EU Blue Card»)⁹, the essence of which is to attract promising and highly qualified foreign specialists in exchange for granting them an official work permit and a residence permit. The next measure designed to ensure the implementation of the employment program for both specialists with higher education and for representatives of working specialties was the entry into force on March 1, 2020 of a new migration law¹⁰, that facilitates the procedures for obtaining a work permit for personnel from non-EU countries. Having studied this law, we will note two main innovations that, in our opinion, deserve special attention:

7 Directive 2013/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on general procedures for granting and revoking international protection and Directive 2013/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing standards for the reception of persons who have applied for international protection. Legal reference system «Garant».

8 Bundestag stimmt für Gesetzentwürfe zum Asyl- und Aufenthaltsrecht. Deutscher Bundestag. Available from: <https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2019/kw23-de-ausreisepflicht-645888>

9 Directive 2009/50 – Conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment. European Council. Available from: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu>

10 The Skilled Immigration Act (*Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz*). Available from: <https://fachkraefteeinwanderungsgesetz.de/gesetzestext/>

1) rejection of the so-called positive list (German *Positivliste*), which lists popular specialties that presuppose the presence of vocational education;

2) refusal by the Federal Labour Agency to check a suitable candidate for priority (that is, whether a specialist from Germany or another EU country can fill the vacancy).

Migration legislation of the Swiss Confederation

At the beginning of the XX century, Switzerland began to be actively resettled from border states, as a result of which by 1914 the share of migrants was up to 15% of the country's population. However, Swiss legislation was characterized by a rotational and isolationist nature. So, when in the interwar period and after the Second World War the country needed labour, «temporary» labour contracts were introduced, after which employees must immediately leave the country. Switzerland does not have such a need for workers today. Currently, about 25% of foreigners from all residents live in the country, but the Swiss government, with the introduction of restrictions on rights, plans to reduce the scale of new immigrants. These processes are described in detail in the works of such researchers as I.Steiner (2019), F.Vanner (2018), N.Voronina (2018), N.Koroleva-Borsodi (2017), etc.

The official statistics of the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) for 2020 states that the increase in the share of the foreign population in Switzerland from 2019 to 2020 was 1.9%.¹¹

Swiss migration legislation has undergone many changes in the last decade, including due to the widely used practice of decision-making through a referendum. The basis of legislation on migrants in Switzerland is the Federal Law «On Foreigners» (*Ausländer- und Integrationsgesetz, AIG*)¹², adopted in 2005. According to chapter 5 of this law, there are 8 types of residence permits in Switzerland, each of which corresponds to a certain type of identity card. In accordance with Article 33 p. 2 AIG, the main grounds for residence may be obtaining a work permit and/or a residence permit, renaturalization, obtaining citizenship by marriage or family reunification.

Switzerland is an active member of many international organizations (the World Trade Organization, the Council of Europe, etc.) and ratifies international agreements, in this regard, free movement procedure is provided for EU and EFTA citizens, as well as their family members and employees sent to Switzerland by their employers¹³.

11 Statistik Zuwanderung Ausländerinnen und Ausländer in der Schweiz. Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement EJPD, 2020: 25.

12 Bundesgesetz über die Ausländerinnen und Ausländer und über die Integration. Die Publikationsplattform des Bundesrechts. Available from: <https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/2007/758/de>.

13 Abkommen zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft einerseits und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten andererseits über die Freizügigkeit. Die Publikationsplattform des Bundesrechts. Available from: <https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/2002/243/de>.

Table 1. Typology of identity cards for foreign citizens in the Swiss Confederation.

Type B identity card Temporary residence permit	For temporary residents (foreign citizens who stay in Switzerland for a certain purpose for a long time, with or without the right to work)
Type C identity card Residence permit	For permanent residents (foreign citizens who have been issued a residence permit after their stay in Switzerland for 5 or 10 years. The right to stay in the country is not limited)
Ci Type Identity Card Temporary residence permit with the right to work	This document is issued by the cantonal authorities to the working spouses and children of employees of foreign missions or intergovernmental organizations
Type G ID card Permit for residents of border areas of neighboring countries working in Switzerland	For persons who regularly cross the border (foreign citizens living on the border territory of a neighboring country and working in the adjacent border area of Switzerland)
Type L identity card Permission for short-term stay	For conducting labor activity for a short period of time, as well as for other types of temporary stay
Type F identity card Temporarily placed foreign citizens	For temporarily placed foreign citizens. This document is issued by the cantonal authorities on the basis of an order of the Federal Migration Agency
Type N identity card Asylum seekers	For asylum seekers. This document is issued by the cantonal authorities on the basis of a decision of the Federal Migration Agency
Type S identity card Persons in need of protection	For persons in need of protection. This document is issued by the cantonal authorities on the basis of a decision of the Federal Migration Agency

The Federal Constitution of Switzerland assigns to the Confederation the issues of entry/ exit, stay and settlement of foreigners on the territory of the country (Article 121)¹⁴. State regulation of migration flows is carried out at three levels: local, regional (at the canton level) and federal, where the main executive body is the State Secretariat for Migration (Staatssekretariat für Migration, SEM). The presence of migrants in Switzerland is monitored by the Federal Department for Foreign Citizens (DFAE), the Swiss Refugee Council, the Federal Immigration, Integration and Emigration Service (JMES), individual departments of the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs, as well as human rights organizations and the Swiss Red Cross office. Such a wide list of control and supervisory bodies and a system of organizations for working with migrants make it possible to develop an effective structure for working with foreign citizens in Switzerland: it promotes accelerated adaptation in society, shortening the time for obtaining documents, and increasing the protection of migrants' rights (including labour rights).

Migration legislation of the Russian Federation

The Russian Federation accepts migrants mainly from neighboring countries who come to the country for the purpose of employment.

¹⁴ Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation. Die Publikationsplattform des Bundesrechts. URL: <https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/1999/404/en>.

Migration statistics provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs¹⁵, demonstrates an increase in the number of visiting citizens and paperwork for official employment (and/or obtaining a work patent). The table below shows a significant increase in the number of migrants in 2021 in relation to 2020. The increase in the flow of migrants is primarily due to the abolition of antiquarian restrictions on crossing the border, as well as the resumption of economic activity in all the spheres of society. Migrant workers are again free to get a job, obtaining permits. There is a reason to believe that this dynamic will continue to develop in 2022.


Table 2. Comparison of indicators of migration flows of the Russian Federation in the period January-December in 2021 and 2020.

Qualitative indicator	Quantitative indicator	
	for January-December 2021	for January-December 2020
Invitations have been issued to foreign citizens and stateless persons	263 368	138 279
Visas issued to foreign citizens and stateless persons	216 442	224 666
Temporary residence permits issued to foreign citizens and stateless persons (initially)	153 989	120 653
Issued residence permits to foreign citizens and stateless persons (initially)	252 512	220 013
The number of facts of migration registration of foreign citizens and stateless persons	13 392 897	9 802 448
Work permits issued to foreign citizens and stateless persons, total	93 031	62 686
Including	highly qualified specialists	46 691
	qualified specialists	6 830
Patents have been issued to foreign citizens and stateless persons	2 221 826	1 132 593
In total, notifications received on the conclusion of employment contracts with foreign citizens and stateless persons engaged in labour activity	1 673 342	1 330 650
Including	on the basis of a work permit	67 515
	without a work permit on	705 447
	the basis of a patent	900 380

Let us consider the main provisions of Russian legislation in this area.

The main provisions of migration legislation are presented by federal laws and resolutions of the Government of the Russian Federation. The administrative status of

¹⁵ Summary of the main indicators of the migration situation in the Russian Federation for January – December 2021. Official website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. Available from: <https://xn--b1aew.xn--p1ai/dejatelnost/statistics/migracionnaya/item/28104434>.

Figure 2. Origin of migrants arriving on the territory of the Russian Federation, 2021

a foreign citizen in the Russian Federation is determined by Federal Law No. 115-FZ of 25.07.2002 «On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation». This regulatory legal act defines the legislative concept of «a foreign citizen», the procedure and duration of temporary stay in the country, the necessary documents, and a number of other provisions¹⁶.

Special federal laws have been adopted to regulate the entry procedure¹⁷ and the procedure for migration registration¹⁸. These powers are assigned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. A number of public services are now performed remotely on the official website of the department, which helps to introduce digital accounting, thereby increasing the accuracy and quality of data processing.

It is noteworthy that in the Russian Federation the categories of «foreign citizens» and «stateless persons» are clearly distinguished, but are regulated by the same legislative acts.

Since, as mentioned above, «migrants» and «refugees» belong to different categories of citizens, on February 19, 1993, Russian parliamentarians adopted a separate Federal Law No. 95-FZ «On Refugees»¹⁹. It interprets the concept of «refugee», regulates the

¹⁶ Federal Law No. 115-FZ of July 25, 2002 "On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation". Legal reference system «Garant». Available from: <https://base.garant.ru/184755/>.

¹⁷ Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 15.08.1996 "On the procedure for leaving the Russian Federation and entering the Russian Federation". Legal reference system «Garant». Available from: <https://base.garant.ru/10135803/>.

¹⁸ Federal Law No. 109-FZ of July 18, 2006 "On migration registration of foreign citizens and stateless persons in the Russian Federation". Legal reference system «Garant». Available from: <https://base.garant.ru/12148419/>.

¹⁹ Federal Law No. 95-FZ of February 19, 1993 "On refugees". The official Internet portal of legal information. Available from: <http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=8nd=102021709>.

basic rights of refugees, social guarantees enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, international treaties of the Russian Federation and generally accepted norms of international law. In addition, this law also describes the procedure and grounds for the loss or deprivation of refugee status.

International agreements of the Russian Federation sometimes make adjustments to generally accepted norms and make «exceptions» for citizens of some countries. For example, citizens of the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union (the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic) do not need to obtain a work permit in the State of employment²⁰. This norm is similar to the simplified requirements for employment of citizens of EU member states and the agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the European Union.

A number of researchers (1) note the imperfection of Russian migration legislation, because it does not fully meet the social, demographic and economic needs of the modern Russian society. By attracting temporary migrants, while not contributing to the resettlement and integration of citizens on a permanent basis, such regulatory legal acts in the field of migration create additional problems and difficulties for the employers. The concept of the state migration policy of the Russian Federation states that the effectiveness of migration policy depends on the quality of legal regulation, as well as on the practical application of the migration legislation of the Russian Federation, the degree of awareness of foreign and Russian citizens about the requirements of the legislation of the Russian Federation and measures of responsibility for their violation²¹. This implies the special importance of improving the regulatory framework in regulating migration processes. In this regard, it seems relevant to apply the results of the analysis.

Comparative legal analysis of legislation regulating migration issues in Russia, Germany and Switzerland

Summarizing the provisions of the German migration legislation, it can be concluded that it is selective in relation to migrants, depending on their work qualifications. In general, the regulatory and legal framework of the Federal Republic of Germany, undergoing multiple changes, seeks to strengthen measures in relation to foreign citizens in the country, conducting selective assistance to external migration (mandatory knowledge of the language, a diploma of vocational training or higher education, certain work experience and age qualification). Germany, being a member of the EU, is obliged to focus on the European Union and ratify the normative legal acts adopted at the Union level, which greatly affects the political situation at the interstate level and public sentiment within Germany, because often the adopted documents diverge from the interests and needs of the German society.

²⁰ Article 97 of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union of May 29, 2014 (Astana). Legal reference system «Garant». Available from: <https://base.garant.ru/70670880/>.

²¹ Article 12 of the Concept of the State migration policy of the Russian Federation for 2019-2025. Official website of the President of the Russian Federation. Available from: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58986>.

Table 3. Criteria-based comparative analysis of the migration legislation of the Russian Federation, Germany and Switzerland.

Comparison criteria	The Russian Federation	The Federal Republic of Germany	The Swiss Confederation
The goals and priorities of migration policy enshrined in national legislation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Determination of the legal status of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation; – regulation of relations between foreign citizens, on the one hand, and public authorities, on the other hand 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Control and restriction of the influx of foreigners to Germany; – regulates the entry, residence, employment and integration of foreigners; – serves to fulfill Germany's humanitarian obligations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fulfillment of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – economic (labour); – scientific; – cultural requests of the Swiss society
Grounds for the presence of foreigners in the territory of the host country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Temporary residence permit; – residence permit; – visa; – migration card; – passport (entry into citizenship); – temporary identity card of a stateless person 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Visa D; – Residence permit; – blue card; – permanent residence permit; – passport (entry into citizenship) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Identity card of types B, C (residence permit), Ci, G, L, F, N, S; – Schengen visa; – passport (entry into citizenship)
Legally regulated grounds for immigration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Family reunification (Russian relatives); – employment in the Russian Federation (within the framework of a specialized list); – citizenship of the USSR; – a program to assist the voluntary resettlement of compatriots living abroad to the Russian Federation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Family reunion; – marriage; – humanitarian immigration; – resettlement program; – labour / student 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Family reunion; – marriage; – humanitarian immigration; – fulfillment of obligations under international law
The main authorized bodies for migration control	The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (the Main Directorate for Migration Affairs)	The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM); – the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA); the Federal Immigration, Integration and Emigration Service (JMES) – the Federal Department for Foreign Citizens (DFAE); – the Swiss Refugee Council

Swiss legislation does not necessarily comply with European procedures, but the country actively ratifies international legal acts, so it is international norms that have an impact on migration legislation. Domestic regulation is not well developed, however, an extensive system of identity cards and multilevel regulation of migration processes create order and clarity of registration and socialization procedures. In addition, Switzerland has the widest list of bodies from the countries represented that are engaged in the control and adaptation of migrants in the society and in employment.

Russian legislation describes in detail all the main points related to the registration procedure, via all the necessary form completion that is required for living and working in the territory of the Russian Federation. On the one hand, the legislation of the Russian Federation, like Swiss, is subject to the norms of international law, on the other hand, like German, widely implements the norms of agreements of interregional organizations of which it is a member (the EAEU, the Union State of Belarus and Russia, etc.).

Let us consider the main positions for analysis from the point of view of the legislation of three jurisdictions.

Based on a comparative analysis of Russian and foreign experience in regulating migration processes, best practices have been identified and practical recommendations have been formulated for specialized structural units of executive authorities and international institutions.

Thus, the analysis of the current legislation regulating migration issues showed that the modern migration legislation of Russia, Germany and Switzerland has a number of differences: for example, it differs in the degree of how much details it has. Germany has the largest number of regulatory legal acts considering these processes, as well as the fastest pace of improvement of legislation in the field of migration.

Facilitated migration measures between Switzerland and Germany are determined by the peculiarities of active cooperation within the framework of geopolitical historical proximity. For Russian citizens, entry to these states is provided according to the rules of the Schengen area. Russia has simplified migration procedures with the EAEU countries, that is, its closest neighbours.

Nevertheless, all three jurisdictions have a number of similarities in the field of legislative regulation of migration flows:

1) All three countries are broadly guided by the norms of international law and ratified interstate agreements, and actively implement the norms in national statutes.

2) Taking into account the fact that in Switzerland the system of classification of types of identity cards (in the actual sense: the administrative status of foreign citizens) is the most perfect, it can be stated that all three countries have a fairly clear diversification and regulation of the statuses of foreign citizens, work permits. The Swiss experience related to a clear system of identity cards for foreigners could be useful for improving the legislation of other countries, simplifying registration procedures and making it more understandable for migrants.

3) In Russia, Germany and Switzerland, competent authorities have been established to work with migrants and their socialization, which function according to

the administrative-territorial division of the country: at the local, regional and federal levels. The largest number of specialized services, each of which has a specific area of responsibility, operates in Switzerland, and borrowing this experience can increase the level of efficiency of socialization of migrants in Russia and Germany. The involvement of public organizations (for example, the International Committee of the Red Cross) plays a positive role in increasing the level of protection of the rights of refugees.

4) In all the jurisdictions represented, there is a special procedure for registering highly qualified specialists who have arrived in the country, since states are interested in their potential economic efficiency.

5) Russia, Germany and Switzerland are attractive countries for migrants within their regions, so the topic of improving legislation is relevant for all the states.

Conclusion

Based on the information above, it can be concluded that in terms of improving legislation in the field of migration processes regulation, an exchange of experience and constructive cooperation are necessary, which, of course, will be an undeniable advantage for the state and personal levels of the organization of society. It is assumed that the Russian Federation, on the one hand, Germany and Switzerland (as members of the Schengen area), on the other hand, have the potential to provide facilitated migration procedures for their citizens.

Due to the current situation in geopolitics, the problem of migration has become the focal point in the modern world. The United Nations considers migration as a positive phenomenon that contributes to achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals, improving the quality of life of people around the world, and to bolstering the economic growth. However, today there are many problems related to migration processes, so the world community needs to «promote orderly, safe, legal and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of a planned and well-thought-out migration policy.»²².

Thus, it is necessary to consolidate the efforts of all States in ensuring the rights of migrants, following the norms of international law, as well as constantly improve national legislation in this industry in connection with the dynamically changing situation. It is important to effectively coordinate the work of executive authorities and eliminate existing gaps in legislation so that the following tasks are achieved:

- ensuring a high level of socialization of migrants into national societies;
- respect for the rights and freedoms of all citizens;
- improving the level of social protection of migrants;
- the phenomenon of migration as a positive factor for the development of national economies;

²² Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Resolution A/RES/70/1 of September 25, 2015. UN official website. Available from: <https://undocs.org/ru/A/RES/70/1> (Accessed: 22.12.2021).

- promoting the development of civil societies;
- reducing the level of criminogenicity in the immigrant environment;
- slowing down the pace of demographic aging of society.

The Swiss experience of the extensive structure of bodies working with migrants is useful for the Russian Federation. The introduction of a similar system can help accelerate the pace of integration of migrants in society, reduce the level of criminality among migrants, as well as ensure the labour and social rights of this category of persons. In this regard, the issue of the return of the Federal Migration Service (abolished in 2016) is being updated, however, the resumption of its activities will be associated with adaptation, consulting and preventive tasks, and the functioning of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia will continue its activities in the field of registration and issuance of documents, licensing of labor activity.

The German experience in promoting selective migration policy will satisfy the desire of the state to achieve the goals and objectives stated in the Concept of Migration Policy of Russia. For example, it is important to attract highly qualified specialists to work, which meets the tasks of developing the country's economy, as well as ensuring the entry into the Russian Federation and the stay on its territory of foreign citizens who want to develop economic, business, professional, scientific, cultural and other ties, study the language, history and culture of the country, who are able through their work, knowledge and competencies to contribute to the economic, social and cultural development of Russia. A similar system is provided in the Russian Federation: mandatory testing of knowledge of the Russian language, the basics of history, culture of the country, as well as the main provisions of legislation. The adoption of this measure has demonstrated a positive result.

Proceeding from the tasks described above, we consider that it is necessary to take into account the changes in the national legislations of the represented jurisdictions of a number of norms related to migration processes in order to achieve a higher level of control of migration flows. In particular, it is proposed:

- 1) toughen penalties for administrative offenses and criminal offenses up to expulsion and/or extradition for violation of national legislation, in particular labour;
- 2) provide for mandatory procedures for medical examination, collection of fingerprint data;
- 3) to make the employment procedure for foreigners clearer and more transparent, guaranteeing them protection of labour rights, while strengthening tax control.

In conclusion, we add that the implementation of the proposed measures, in our opinion, can become an effective tool for regulating migration flows in Russia, Germany, Switzerland and other countries characterized by an active migration policy.

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Promising Forms of the Growth of Socio-Political Activity of the Youth in Modern Russian Region

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Abstract: The article deals with the problem of the socio-political activity of young people in modern Russia and its civic position. Regional experience is analyzed on how to politically activate the youth. On the example of the Belgorod region, the forms of the growth of the socio-political activity of young people, including youth representation and youth public associations, are considered. Much attention is paid to the professional education of political science students as the most socially and politically active part of the student body, to the areas of prevention of destructive political behaviour. Problems are identified that impede the socio-political activation of young people, primarily students who are not political scientists, students of colleges, lyceums, colleges and schools. Among the problems are an insufficient level of knowledge about political life, a low level of awareness of ongoing political events, and an unformed civic position. Promising, in the author's opinion, forms of growth of social and political activity of young people with interest and leadership qualities are proposed – participation in the activities of youth parliaments, youth governments, youth election commissions, specialized political science clubs. There is a need for mass political education and prevention of destructive political activity among the youth.

Keywords: youth socio-political participation, youth, social responsibility, disruptive political activity, political education

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Introduction

An important condition for the political development of modern Russia is the successful integration of young people into the socio-political relations, the effective use of their potential in the interests of the society and the state. Having a high degree of adaptability to political and socio-economic changes, «... the youth acts as a driving force of social development and represents a strategic resource of the state, which is more

important than raw materials, fuel and financial resources» (16; 17). Understanding the significant role of the youth in solving current and future challenges facing the society and the state gives reason to talk about the need to involve the young people in socio-political processes.

Studies show a fairly high potential for political activity of the youth (9; 12; 16), nevertheless, the political sphere of life is not a priority for them. According to the results of all-Russian studies, more than 80% of the young Russians are either not interested in politics, or do not have a definite opinion about it.

Only 19% of Russians at the ages between 14 to 29 are really interested in politics. This is explained not only by a weak understanding of the notion of political activity and a lack of comprehending of «how politics works», but also by the fact that the daily worries of the young people have little to do with what they consider as politics.¹

The same trend can be observed in the individual regions of the Russian Federation, young people do not attribute politics to the priorities of their interests, and interest in it is more situational than permanent (30).

The level of the youth's interest in political events is rather low; the same can be said about the willingness to defend their rights and interests, about the desire to take part in politics itself. Thus, we can understand that the young people do not associate their personal political participation with the fate of the country, they do not believe that it can influence the adoption of important decisions (30).

In practice, such an attitude reflects in political and legal nihilism, and low electoral activity.

Neither does socio-political activity attract Russian youth as a «way of expressing socially significant needs and interests.» The researchers have recorded a tendency towards its atomization, towards the dominance of individualistic behavioral strategies in the process of social activity, and the unwillingness to solidarize on a positive basis (4). Modern young people are more inclined to help with money than to be in public organizations and political parties: charitable contributions are made by 25% of Russians aged 25-34 years, which is 10% higher than the national average; more than 80% of respondents do not want to be in public organizations of various kinds².

Young Russians are not prone to identify the realization of their own interests with public and state goals, which indicates the lack of formation of their civic position.

Situational interest in political life, lack of systematic knowledge about politics, about a civil position and lack of life experience make young people vulnerable to the influence of various kinds of populist, radical and extremist forces:

¹ The Russian "Generation Z": attitudes and values, conducted by the German Foundation. Friedrich Ebert together with the Levada Center (2022), Vedomosti, Available from: <https://www.vedomosti.ru/society/articles/2020/04/29/829352-molodezhi-ravnodushni>.

² Young people are ready to help others and motivated by the idea of duty (2022), Available from: <https://rg.ru/2021/07/23/issledovanie-molodezh-gotova-pomogat-drugim-i-motivirovana-ideej-dolga.html>.

In case the socio-economic and political situation in the country is unfavorable, the possibility of manipulation of young people is possible. The events in Moldova, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, where one of the main driving forces was the youth can come as examples of this (7).

In order to preserve socio-political stability and the successful development of Russian society, the socio-political activation of the youth based on a civic position, as well as effective forms of its development, is of particular importance.

Materials and methods

The empirical base of the research includes documents and materials of educational institutions, law enforcement agencies, public associations (statutory documents, reports, databases), which allow to identify the goals and objectives of their activities, official statistical and information-analytical materials, as well as the results of sociological research of various research centers of the Russian Federation and regional research groups that fix the focus and the level of socio-political activity of the young people in the Russian Federation and its regions, materials of the Internet information and communication network.

The regulatory framework is represented by the Federal Law of the Russian Federation «On the Youth Policy in the Russian Federation» (2020)³, the Fundamentals of the State Youth Policy in the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025 (2014)⁴, the Law of the Belgorod Region «On the Youth Support» (2013)⁵, the Strategy of Socio-economic Development of the Belgorod Region for the period up to 2025⁶, programs on civic education and patriotic education.

The main methods used in this study are data analysis, content analysis of social networks, descriptive statistics. The main scientific approaches are: systemic, structural-functional, comparative, normative.

The problem of socio-political activity of the youth and the forms of its development in various aspects finds theoretical and methodological justification in the works of Russian and foreign researchers. For the first time, the phenomenon of socio-political activity of citizens was reflected in the classical works of the foreign authors G.Almond, S.Verba (2), D.Easton (17), G.Lasswell (19), and of the domestic authors G.G.Diligensky (11),

³ Federal Law of the Russian Federation of 30.12.2020 No. 489-FZ "On Youth Policy in the Russian Federation" (2020), Available from: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_372649/.

⁴ Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 29.11.2014 No. 2403-r "On approval of the Fundamentals of the State Youth Policy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025" (2014), Available from: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_171835/5416a7ecf3afe3ff052deb74264bbf282e889ef/.

⁵ The Belgorod Region Law No. 223 dated 03.09.2013 "On Youth support in the Belgorod Region" (2013), Available from: <https://base.garant.ru/26352635/>.

⁶ Resolution of the Government of the Belgorod Region dated 25.01.2010 No. 27-pp "On approval of the Strategy of socio-economic development of the Belgorod Region for the period up to 2025" (2010), Available from: <https://zpp.bgunb.ru/resource/25012010.pdf>.

V.V.Petukhov (24), L.V.Smorgunov (27), S.A.Pfetzner (26), S.N.Chirun (31), O.N.Yanitskaya⁷. The socio-political activity of young people with an emphasis on specific age and social characteristics is studied by V.P.Babintsev (3), I.M.Ilyinsky (14; 15), O.A.Koryakovtseva (18). A comprehensive consideration of the factors (political, social, legal) influencing the socio-political activation of the youth is reflected in the scientific works by O.Y.Garanin (6), A.G.Masalov (20), V.V.Pavlovsky (23). The role of political socialization in the development of the skills of political participation of young people is revealed in the scientific papers by P.I.Babochkin (5), R.Y.Zulyar (13), V.N.Pomazanova (25). The importance of political education, in particular, at the university, in the process of which the civic activity of future specialists is formed, is raised in the studies of I.A.Chikharev (32), O.V.Stoletova (28), N.N.Denisenkova (10), Zh.V.Boyko (8). They also emphasize the importance of political education at the university, in particular in the process of which the civic activity of the future specialists is formed. The researches by S.V.Aleshchenko (1), P.A.Merkulov (22), O.A.Koryakovtseva (18) are devoted to the development of socio-political activity of young people based on the interaction of state authorities and civil society institutions in the context of state and public youth policy.

Results

The theoretical analysis of the scientific works testifies to the unity of views of modern scientists expressing the importance, the need to activate the socio-political potential of the modern Russian youth for the further development of the society, the formation of its active citizenship.

The analysis of the modern practices of working with the young people in the political segment makes it possible to identify a variety of forms and directions of the development of the youth activity. Russian and regional experience demonstrates that the youth representation and membership in youth associations, considering the development of citizenship as a priority goal, is quite promising. In most subjects of the Russian Federation, youth representation includes such forms of collective activity organization as the Youth Parliaments, the Youth Governments, the Youth Councils under legislative and executive authorities, etc. For example, in the Belgorod Region, the Youth Government has been working since 2004, it is an advisory body under the Regional Government, acting on a voluntary basis. The priority objectives of the structure are to acquire knowledge and practical skills in the field of public administration, preparation for professional activity in the structural divisions of executive authorities. To achieve these goals, they use the following methods of activity development among the youth: participation in strategic sessions on territorial development; participation in the discussions of regional development concepts; participation as members of expert commissions; participation in targeted excursions to regional enterprises, representing the various sectors of the economy. The competitive

mechanism has shown its effectiveness, the winners are included in the regional personnel reserve, receive proposals for cooperation.

The Youth Parliament of the Belgorod Region began its work in 2021⁸. This form of work with young people involves the development of legislative skills, increases legal literacy and civic responsibility. The development of activity goes through the direct participation of the youth themselves in the development and consideration of the youth initiatives, through the discussion of draft laws of the Belgorod Regional Duma in the field of youth policy implementation.

Thus, the youth representative structures effectively socialize, create an opportunity for the use of the potential of the youngsters in the political and socio-cultural development of territories, the youth can come as a personnel reserve for the state authorities and for the local government, an instrument for the inclusion of the youth in the work of the civil society. There are other forms of socio-political activation of the young people in the region, such as the Youth Election Commission, youth councils of territories, student unions, school self-government.

Youth associations are also one of the most effective forms of involving young people in the socio-political process, a mechanism for their preparation for participation in the political life of the region, or of the country. Despite the fact that the political socialization of the youth is not prescribed in the statutory documents of youth associations as a goal, it is carried out in the process of implementing current tasks through practical activities. Performing the traditional functions of aggregation and articulation of interests for public organizations, being involved in youth policy, they «... act as the most important mechanism for designing the future of the country, society and the state» (33). The formation of a civic position among young people is carried out through work in the youth branches of political parties. In the Belgorod region, the most famous are the «Molodoya Gvardiya» (the Young Guard) and «LKSM» (The Leninist Communist Youth Union of the Russian Federation), which in modern conditions demonstrate the formation of a civic position on the example of active patriotism (actions «Volunteers for Donbass», «Unaddressed Donorship» and humanitarian actions in the border region).

Special attention should be paid to the youth political science associations functioning at the specialized departments of universities in the region. A scientific discussion club of young political scientists has been working at the Belgorod State National Research University since 2014. The members of the Club are the students from the 1st up to the 4th year of education with the «Political Science» major. On the one hand, it represents

...a certain model of civil society: this is a scientific community, an interest club, and a platform for making judgments on current political issues. This is an example of an effective educational technology. The club is a model of extracurricular developmental education and upbringing. It forms a positive intellectual environment, being the most accessible infrastructure for

⁸ Resolution of the Belgorod Regional Duma of 25.02.2021 No. P/5-29-7 "On approval of the Regulations on the Youth Parliament under the Belgorod Regional Duma" (2021), Available from: <https://www.belduma.ru/meetings/mparlament/postmp.pdf>.

exchanging opinions, comparing positions, developing proposals, strategic concepts for solving various socio-political problems, and allows applying theoretical knowledge in practice (8).

On the other hand, the Club was created on the basis of a student initiative. The motivational side is significant in «cognitive independence» and indicates the degree of involvement of a student who is a future young specialist in politics into vibrant the socio-political activity.

In order to get acquainted with the practical side of the state authorities' functions, with the duties of the local self-government and civil society institutions, such activities as educational excursions, including field trips, thematic round tables on acute social topics, meetings with representatives of the expert community, business games («elections of the President of the Russian Federation», «elections to the State Duma The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the Belgorod Regional Duma», etc.) can be carried out.

One of the tasks of student associations is the integration of students into the socio-political process, the formation of their civic culture. During the work of the Club, more than 200 extended meetings were organized and held with the involvement of university students and the students of high schools and gymnasiums in Belgorod. The format of the meetings provides a wide range of opportunities for the young people studying at school or in areas of training not related to political science to gain knowledge about politics and apply them in practice. Meetings with politicians and civil servants of the city and of the region, with representatives of election commissions, with the leaders of regional branches of political parties are especially vivid, as they reveal different aspects of work in the political sphere, participants share their experience with students, while the young people have a personal opportunity to get answers to an array of urgent questions. Such forms of work, on the one hand, provide the value orientation of the professional training process with the inclusion of students in professional and value-based activities, that in its own turn, contributes to the effective formation of professional competencies; on the other hand, they politically socialize the non-political students and form their cognitive activity. In case of being systematic, such forms will allow to build effective communication between the youth and the authorities and increase the level of trust in between.

Conclusion

The considered forms of development of socio-political activity of the youth constitute a didactic basis for the organization of «cognitive independence» of the young people, form its political consciousness and civil culture. In the future, in our opinion, it is necessary to pay more attention to mass political education, which is carried out through the system of schools, through secondary vocational and higher education. The priority task of such education is the formation of citizenship, political socialization. Modern teachers face a difficult task to respond quickly to changing conditions, select effective educational technologies that will help students understand the events taking place, critically

comprehend them, identify their potential and opportunities to influence the political process.

Media projects can also be one of the directions of political socialization of young people. As an example, we can cite the project «Youth Radio – NEON», implemented by political science students of the National Research University «BelSU» (The National Research University «Belgorod State University»). Weekly political information, live broadcasts with experts and educational podcasts help the young people who do not have a political science education to critically perceive political information coming from different sources, to navigate its diversity.

Along with the development of socio-political activity of the young people with a positive orientation, there is a need to prevent manifestations of destructive social and political behavior among the youth. Specialized centers at educational institutions help in this matter, in BelSU it is the Center for Civic and Patriotic Education of Students, the Center for Intercultural Communication, the Center for the Prevention of Extremist Manifestations in the student environment of the National Research University «BelSU». The Belgorod Region became the first Russian region to officially adopt regulations on the activities of cyber friends in accordance with the Federal Law of the Russian Federation «On the Protection of Children from Information Harmful to Their Health and Development»⁹. Cyber Squad represents voluntary associations of like-minded people aged 18 and over and was created with the aim of intensifying the counteraction to the spread of illegal information on the Internet that can harm the health and development of the younger generation, the formation of positive content and the support of a comfortable and safe environment on the Internet¹⁰.

Of great importance in preventing the destructive activity of young people is their socially useful employment. Already today, at the state level, it is necessary to realize not only the ideological and educational, but also the economic feasibility of financial investments in organizing the socially useful youth employment, which will save much more money than those spent today on overcoming deviant manifestations in the youth environment.

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