

RUSSIA & WORLD: SCIENTIFIC DIALOGUE

РОССИЯ И МИР

НАУЧНЫЙ ДИАЛОГ

ENGLISH EDITION

Science, Research,
Analytics

Consulting
Projects

Digital Technologies
and Solutions

Publishing
and Media activities

Education
and Training

Humanitarian
communications

*The art of dialogue
and confidence*



RUSSIA & WORLD: SCIENTIFIC DIALOGUE



Information about the journal

The journal «Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue»

– print media (mass media), magazine.

Published since 2021, 4 times a year.

Registration number and date of the decision on registration with the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Communications (Roskomnadzor): PI No. FS77-81013 dated May 17, 2021.

The journal is registered in the National ISSN Center of the Russian Federation

ISSN 2782-3067 (Print)

Archive:

Russian State Library

National Electronic-Information Consortium



Open Access Policy

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» is an open access journal. All articles are made freely available to readers immediately upon publication. The open access is granted in accordance with the Budapest Open Access Initiative (BOAI) definition: all articles are available free of any charge on the public internet, permitting any users to read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of these articles, crawl them for indexing, pass them as data to software, or use them for any other lawful purpose, without financial, legal, or technical barriers other than those inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself. For more information please read BOAI statement.

Founder, Publisher

ANO «National Communications Development Research Institution»

22, building 1, Korobeynikov Lane, Moscow, 119034

E-mail: rw.journal@nicrus.ru



Partners

Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 12 Rozhdestvenka str., Moscow, 107031, Russian Federation. Tel.: +7 (495) 621-18-84 www.orientalistica.com orientalistica@ivran.ru

Address of the Editorial Office

ANO «National Communications Development Research Institution»
 Editorial Office «Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» 22, building 1,
 Korobeynikov Lane, Moscow, 119034
 Russian Federation

Website: <https://www.russia-world.ru/jour>

E-mail: rw.journal@nicrus.ru

Aim and Scope

The purpose of the journal is to create a scientific discussion platform for peer discussion of problems and for the development of optimal solutions in the field of international cooperation, joint research, and publication of its results. Foreign scientists and experts are invited to publish and review the materials submitted for consideration.

The scientific concept involves the publication of scientific papers, including research insights and scholarly results, discussion articles and reviews, in the field of political science, sociology, world economy, cultural studies. The substantive and thematic profile of the journal includes topics reflecting international and regional processes, political, economic, social, cultural aspects of international relations, interstate and intercultural communications, international security and sustainable development

Scientific specialties and branches of science corresponding to them

SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

HISTORICAL SCIENCES

5.6.7. History of International Relations and Foreign Policy

SOCIAL SCIENCES

5.4.4. Social structure, social institutions and processes (sociological)

SOCIOLOGICAL SCIENCES/POLITICAL SCIENCES

5.4.5. Political Sociology (sociological)

POLITICAL SCIENCES/ HISTORICAL SCIENCES

5.5.2. Political institutions, processes and technologies (political sciences)

POLITICAL SCIENCES

5.5.4. International Relations (political sciences)

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Vitaly V. NAUMKIN – DSc (Hist.), Full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, professor, Scientific Supervisor of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

DEPUTY CHIEF EDITORS

Valentina V. KOMLEVA – DSc (Soc.), professor, Deputy Director for Scientific Work of the National Communications Development Research Institution (Russia)

Alina V. GASUMYANOVA – CandSc (Law), Deputy Director for Media Activities of the National Communications Development Research Institution, Deputy Director of the Center for Strategic Studies in the Sphere of Energy and Digital Economy MIEP MGIMO of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (Russia)

EXECUTIVE EDITOR

Valerii A. LETIAEV – DSc (Law), CandSc (Hist.), professor, professor of the Institute of Public Administration and Civil Service, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (Russia)

EDITORIAL BOARD

Nikolay M. ARSENTIEV – DSc (Hist.), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, professor, Director of the Historical and Sociological Institute of the N.P. Ogarev National Research Mordovian State University (Russia)

Kalimash K. BEGALINOVA – DSc (Philos.), professor, Professor of the Department of Religious and Cultural Studies, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Kazakhstan)

Andrey V. VINOGRADOV – DSc (Polit.), Head of the Center for Political Research and Forecasts, Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Editor-in-chief of the scientific and socio-political journal «Problems of the Far East» (Russia)

Vladislav V. VOLKOV – DSc (Soc.), Leading researcher at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, University of Latvia; Professor at the Baltic International Academy (Latvia)

Oksana V. GAMAN-GOLUTVINA – DSc (Polit.), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, professor, Head of the Department of Comparative Political Science of MGIMO of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, President of the Russian Association of Political Science, member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation (Russia)

Alexey A. GROMYKO – DSc (Polit.), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, professor of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

Denis A. DEGTEREV – DSc (Polit.), professor, Head of the Department of Theory and History of International Relations, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia (Russia)

Vladimir K. EGOROV – DSc (Philos.), professor, Head of the UNESCO Department of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Honorary Doctor of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

Alexey E. ZAGREBIN – DSc (Hist.), professor, professor of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Chief Researcher of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

Irina D. ZVYAGELSKAYA – DSc (Hist.), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia), Professor, Head of the laboratory «Center for Middle Eastern Studies» of the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

Arous ZOUBIR – Professor of Sociology, Director of the Laboratory of Religion and Society, University of Algiers 2, Faculty of Social Sciences (Algeria)

Fidel LEON-DARDER – PhD, professor at the University of Valencia (Spain)

Elena A. NAZAROVA – DSc (Soc.), professor, professor of the Department of Sociology of MGIMO of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (Russia)

Mirzokhid A. RAKHIMOV – DSc (Hist.), professor, Head of the Department of Social and Humanitarian Sciences, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan; Director of the Center for Modern History, Head of the Department of Modern History and International Relations, Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Uzbekistan)

Sergey V. RYAZANTSEV – DSc (Econ.), corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, professor, Director of the Institute of Demographic Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

Oleg F. SHABROV – DSc (Polit.), professor, professor of the Department of State Policy, Faculty of Political Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University, President of the Academy of Political Sciences (Russia)

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL

CHAIRMAN

Alexander V. FEDOROV – CandSc (Law), professor, Honoured Lawyer of the Russian Federation (Russia)

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN

Vladislav I. GASUMYANOV – DSc (Econ.), Director of the National Communications Development Research Institution, Head of the Basic Department of Corporate Security MGIMO of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (Russia)

Mikhail V. BELOUSOV – CandSc (Soc.) (Russia)

Armais A. KAMALOV – DSc (Med.), professor, Full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, (Russia)

Slava T. KHODKO – CandSc (Tech.) (Russia)

CONTENTS

Naumkin V.V.

Editor-in-chief Foreword 8

INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROCESSES

International Relations

Gasumyanov V.I.

Actualization of Western Hegemonic Concepts and Ways of Their Implementation: on the Issue of the Policy of “Double Standards” of Western Countries 12

Usupova N.S.

Central Asia and China: Main Aspects and Directions of Interaction in Modern Realities 23

Nadyrov R.N.

The Turkic Factor as a Component of International Relations in Central Asia: the “Turkic World” Construct 36

Abdrakhmanov K.A., Doholyan S.V., Marmontova T.V., Mezhevich N.M., Sapryka V.A., Sitov I.P., Khmeleva G.A., Chernyshov M.M.

Actual Issues of Cross-Border Cooperation Research..... 43

CHANGING SOCIETY

Social Structure, Social Institutions and Processes

Political sociology

Leger I.

Communication Regime of the Republic of Moldova: Assessment of Manageability 64

Kildyushkina I.G., Yakovleva A.Yu.

Silinskaya Volost of the Simbirsk Volga Region: Discourse Analysis of the Way of Life and Spiritual and Cultural Traditions of the Population..... 85

HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE AND MODERNITY

History of International Relations and Foreign Policy

Alikberov E.Sh., Alikberova A.R., Letiaev V.A.

Sino-Indian Rivalry: Sri Lanka. 98

Abduganiev N.N.

Friendship of Peoples as a Historical Factor in the Development of Modern Interstate Relations between Russia and Uzbekistan 106

POWER, POLITICS, STATE

Political Institutions, Processes and Technologies

Chernyshov M.M.

The Evolution of the State as a Process of Increment and Loss of Territory in the Context of the Implementation of the People’s Right to Reunification 122

Letiaev V.A., Wang Yu

Foreign Policy and “Diplomacy of a World Power with Chinese Characteristics”: Based on the Report of the CPC Central Committee to the XX Congress. 143



Vitaly V. NAUMKIN,
Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
Editor-in-chief of the journal
«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue»

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF FORWARD

Dear readers!

The issue begins with an article by V.I. Gasumyanov, that is dedicated to Western hegemonic concepts and ways to implement them. The author analyses the policy of «double standards» of Western countries on the examples of the XX-XXI centuries history. The reasons of such policy are: the benefit of the elites, the promotion of economic interests, colonial thinking, a return to a unipolar model of world development. A striking trigger for such a policy was Russia's Special Military Operation in Ukraine. The author reveals the technologies of the «double standards» policy, thanks to which the «correction» of the image of the countries of the collective West was carried out by : taking advantage of the global information space, ignoring UN resolutions, political destabilization in some states, «correcting» history, implementing programs and projects of «humanitarian influence», organising economic dependence of some countries from the West.

The main attention in the presented issue is paid to the problems connected with the countries of the East, and first of all with the Central Asia region. Based on this material, several articles analyze the political processes of the past and present in the system of international relations in this vast and increasingly important part of the world.

N.S. Usupova presents this problem through the interaction of the states of Central Asia and China. The author reveals the dynamics, content and direction of cooperation between these actors. The priorities of China's policy in Central Asia (with the countries of which China has a common border of 3,300 km) are determined. This is, first of all, support for stability, security, ensuring access to the energy resources of the Central Asian region on a mutually beneficial basis. That's why the main China's aims are the investment in the economies of the Central Asian countries and the development of economic and humanitarian ties with them.

R.N. Nadyrov considers the role of the Turkic factor as an important component in the system of international relations of the states of this region. The author traced the evolution of the «Turkic world» construct from the ideas proposed by N.A. Nazarbaev and T. Ozal to a decision to establish a secretariat for meetings of the heads of Turkic states. The results allowed the author to present the role of the Turkic factor as an institutionalizing factor in the implementation of integration projects in the international political sphere.

The history of the East is the subject of attention of E.Sh. Alikberov, A.R. Alikberova and V.A. Letyaev on Sino-Indian rivalry in Sri Lanka. This South Asian country is located in the zone of strategic interests of India and China, at the crossroads of trade routes in the Indian Ocean. The first border conflict between India and China around Sri Lanka took place 60 years ago, when the country found itself in a zone of conflict of interests of various states. The history gives the authors possibility to show the opportunities for Sri Lanka's foreign policy if it manages to become an important force in ensuring peace and stability in the Indian Ocean, despite the rivalry between China and India.

N.N. Abduganiyev considered the potential of interstate relations between Russia and Uzbekistan in the context of the post-Soviet phenomenon of «friendship of peoples» in order to identify the deep historical foundations and the conditionality of the common path of the two countries. The author understands this phenomenon as a socio-political value and the economic foundation of relations between the two countries, as a test for state maturity in the conditions of the modern multipolar world.

V.A. Letyaev and Wang Yu turned to China's foreign policy and «diplomacy of a world power with Chinese characteristics» based on the report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the 20th Congress. The authors come to the conclusion that the foreign policy strategy of the People's Republic of China, in comparison with the previous ones, will generally remain unchanged. The country in its foreign policy relies on the stability of the domestic political situation, the ideology of the Communist Party of China and the role of the national leader, openness, the modernization of the system and national security potential, social stability, the solution of the Taiwan issue in the format of «one country – two systems», but the power option in a certain acute situation cannot be excluded.

The history of international relations and foreign policy is the subject of attention in a number of articles.

Issues of cross-border cooperation are the topic of an article prepared on the basis of a scientific discussion held at National Communications Development Research Institution (NIIRK). Abdрахmanov K.A., S.V. Dokholyan, T.V. Marmontova, N.M. Mezhevich, V.A. Sapryka, I.P. Sitov, A.G. Stoppe, G.A. Khmeleva, N.M. Chernyshov draw attention to the need to update the Concept of cross-border cooperation of Russia in connection with the entry of new subjects of the Federation into it. The necessity of developing new formats of cross-border cooperation in the conditions of unfriendly relations of neighboring countries is substantiated. Author's models of cross-border cooperation in the management of «platform economics» are proposed.

The problems of power, politics and the state are presented in the articles by M.M. Chernyshov, who summarized the results of the study of the evolution of the state as a process of gaining and losing the territory in the context of the people's right to reunification. The author considers attempts to implement this right in the process of returning the historical territories of Russia in the 17th–21st centuries, specific cases of the reunification of Crimea, Sevastopol, the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions with Russia. The author perceives the annexation of territories as a natural process that should receive international legal recognition.

The changing society, its social structure, social institutions and processes are discussed in two articles.

The first is the article by I. Léger on the communication regime of the Republic of Moldova in terms of assessing its manageability. The author sets the task to determine the features of the normative regulation of the communication regime in the Republic of Moldova, the roles of its actors, the centers of influence on this communication regime. She notes its conditionality by the political regime and dependence on external actors.

I.G. Kildyushkina and A.Yu. Yakovleva are the authors of the second article. They turn to little-studied facts from the history of the Simbirsk Volga region in the second half of the 19th century, which make it possible to comprehend a small region in terms of historical and cultural processes, their origin and development. The article presents the rituals that existed in this region, Christian beliefs that consolidated the established spiritual and moral communication practices.

The editorial board of the journal hopes that the materials of the issue will arouse your interest and that you yourself will become one of our authors in the future.

Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Vitaly Naumkin

INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROCESSES

International relations

RUSSIA & WORLD: SCIENTIFIC DIALOGUE

**РОССИЯ
И МИР**
НАУЧНЫЙ ДИАЛОГ

The “correction” of the image of the countries of the “collective West” was due to their advantage in the global information space, ignoring UN resolutions, deliberate domestic political destabilization, “correction” of history, the implementation of programs and projects of “humanitarian influence”, and the consolidation of economic dependence in other countries. As a result, a profitable vision and a “corrected” image of Western countries were introduced into the mass consciousness. The natural factor of generational change, when many eyewitnesses of unflattering actions left this life, allowed them to «clear» the image of the facts of annexations, genocides, and the use of the principle «all means are good to achieve our interests.»

Gasumyanov V.I.

Actualization of Western Hegemonic Concepts and Ways of Their Implementation: on the Issue of the Policy of “Double Standards” of Western Countries

Analyzing the nature and specifics of cooperation between China and the Central Asian countries, it must be taken into account that one of China’s main interests in Central Asia is to ensure security and maintain stability in the region. That is why China is ready to invest in the economies of the countries of the region.

One of the strategic partners of the Central Asian countries is also Russia, with which China seeks to avoid competition in the region. The Chinese authorities view Russia not so much as a rival, but as a partner, primarily to prevent the strengthening of the West’s position in the region.

Usupova N.S.

Central Asia and China: Main Aspects and Directions of Interaction in Modern Realities

Within the framework of the «Turkic World» construct - in its international political understanding - a primary, formal, institutionalizing structure was created, designed to ensure the development of the interstate integration process, which indicates that the heads of state - the subjects of construction - agreed on general conditional rules, which will be followed by all participants in the integration process.

Thus, the initial stage of the formation of the «Turkic World» construct, implemented exclusively by the willful efforts of the heads of the Turkic-speaking states, has completed.

Nadyrov R.N.

The Turkic Factor as a Component of International Relations in Central Asia: the “Turkic World” Construct

In the context of anti-Russian sanctions, it is necessary to introduce on the border territories of special economic regimes to speed up export-import operations with sanctioned goods. It is necessary to develop scientific and legal foundations for the implementation of cases of joint management of one territory by several states based on the municipal level of management, the development of a common model for the regions of Russia cross-border cooperation. We offer the author’s model of cross-border cooperation in the platform management economy.

Abdrakhmanov K.A., Dokholyan S.V., Marmontova T.V., Mezhevich N.M., Sapryka V.A., Sitov I.P., Stoppe A.G., Khmeleva G.A. Chernyshov N.M.

Topical Issues of Cross-Border Cooperation Research

Actualization of Western Hegemonic Concepts and Ways of Their Implementation: on the Issue of the Policy of “Double Standards” of Western Countries

Vladislav I. Gasumyanov✉

National Research Institute for Communications Development, Moscow, Russia, institut@nicrus.ru

Abstract. The article analyzes historical examples of the XX–XXI centuries, showing inconsistent, contradictory foreign policy of “double standards” of Western countries. The sources of such a policy are: a) the dominance of their own economic and geopolitical interests over the interests of small and medium-sized countries of less economically developed societies; b) reproducing colonial thinking and concepts of hegemonism, which currently determine the political decisions of Western countries; c) attempts to return the world to a unipolar model, putting in economic and military-political dependence on other countries. The example of the “US National Security Strategy” shows how these policies are manifested and consolidated in state strategic documents.

Keywords: «double standards», foreign policy, geopolitics, hegemonism, unipolar model, security

For citation: Gasumyanov V.I. Actualization of Western Hegemonic Concepts and Ways of Their Implementation: on the Issue of the Policy of “Double Standards” of Western Countries. Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue. 2022; 4(6): 20-32, [https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4\(6\)-20-32](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4(6)-20-32)

Introduction

Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as the SVO), in fact, became the trigger for many processes and phenomena that exposed the technologies and principles of the countries of the “collective West”, which had been disguised for a long time. The countries of the “collective West” deliberately ousted the events of past years from the historical memory of the world community, masked their impartial actions on the territories of other countries, and deliberately forgot historical facts that testify to a tough and cynical policy towards others.

The “correction” of the image of the countries of the “collective West” was due to the use of advantages in the global information space, ignoring UN resolutions, due to deliberate domestic political destabilization, “correction” of history, the implementation of programs and projects of “humanitarian influence”, and the consolidation of the economic dependence of other countries. As a result, a profitable vision and a “corrected” image of Western countries were introduced into the mass consciousness. The natural factor of generational change, when many eyewitnesses of unflattering actions passed away, made it possible to “clear” the image of the facts of annexations, genocides, and the use of the principle “all means are good to achieve our interests.”

The real motive of these countries has always been the benefit of elites and interested lobbyists, for whom they sacrificed not only the lives of the inhabitants of other countries, but also the well-being of their own inhabitants. Tough politics and predatory competition did not stop until the desired territory fell into the orbit of their geopolitical and economic influence.

The development of the situation around the SVO, which allowed the world to see the technologies and principles of the West, raised doubts in the world community about the sincerity of these countries. This is confirmed by the UN vote on November 5, 2022, according to which the majority of countries (105) supported, and the third committee of the UN General Assembly adopted the Russian draft resolution on combating the glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to the escalation of modern forms of racism. Against were 52 countries of the “collective West” and their dependent states.

This article analyzes historical facts showing the practice of “double standards” in assessing domestic and foreign political events and phenomena. Historical facts make us think and question the moral and ethical positions of countries that offer themselves to the world as guarantors of peace and stability.

Materials and Methods

The study used archival documents placed in the public domain, research materials by Russian and foreign authors, statistical data, referendum materials, the history of wars and periods of destabilization. The approaches developed within the framework of Western theories of hegemonism (C.Kindleberger, R.G.Gilpin, S.D.Krasner, R.O.Keohane, J.Modelski and others) are analyzed (1; 9; 13; 12; 10) , the theory of vital interests (J.K.Galbraith, P.F.Drucker, L.Thurow, D.P. Goldman, Fukuyama) (8; 5; 3; 11; 7), the concept of attempts to return Pax Americana.

Results

Thanks to the support of the USSR and its position regarding the liberation of peoples from colonial dependence, the countries of the “collective West” were very reluctant but forced to give up their colonies only 50–70 years ago. But “colonial thinking”, reinforced by the idea of cultural superiority and the economic resources of the metropolises, proved to be very tenacious. It is this type of thinking that underlies the modern politics of Western countries. 20th and 21st centuries are replete with examples of ignoring international decisions, the results of the people’s will, power seizures, if this is beneficial to Western countries. The referendum mechanism has been turned by the countries of the “collective West” into a means of solving their geopolitical and geo-economic problems. Let’s give some examples.

In 2013, a referendum was held in the Falkland Islands, in which 99.3% of the inhabitants voted in favor of the status of a British Overseas Territory.¹ These results were beneficial to Great Britain and, of course, recognized by her. She actively referred to the right of peoples to self-determination enshrined in the UN Charter. In the situation with Crimea and other territories, the UK does not recognize this right, just as it does not recognize the results of the will, for example, of the population of Gibraltar, who did not want to leave the EU. Without going into details of the history of the Gibraltar issue, we note that in 2016 the UK ignored the opinion of the inhabitants of Gibraltar, 96% of which voted in the 2016 referendum on the UK’s exit from the EU to remain in the EU². At the same time, when in 1967 the people of Gibraltar voted against the transition to Spanish sovereignty, the UK recognized the results of their will.

The example of the French colony of the Comoros (Greater Comoros (Ngazidja), Moheli (Mwali) and Anjouan (Ndzvani)) shows how France can ignore UN resolutions if they are contrary to its own interests. In 1974, a referendum for independence was held in the Comoros, one of the islands voted to become part of France, and three islands voted to become an independent state. France did not consider the overall vote, but the results for the islands³. Thus, three islands formed an independent state, and one went to France. In 1975, the independent state of the Comoros became a member of the UN. The new nation was defined as including the entire archipelago, that is, together with Fr.Mayotte. The UN General Assembly adopted a series of resolutions entitled “Question of the Comorian island of Mayotte”⁴, according to which Mayotte belongs to the Comoros

1 The results of the referendum: The Falkland Islands will remain British. RIA-Novosti News Agency: official website. Available from: <https://ria.ru/20130312/926804756.html>

2 Residents of Gibraltar voted to keep Britain in the EU. RIA-Novosti News Agency: official website. Available from: <https://ria.ru/20160624/1450559058.html>.

3 Union of the Comoros and Mayotte. Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs of the French Republic: official website. Available from: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/ru/dvustoronnie-otnosheniya/afrika/la-france-dans-la-region-sud-ouest-de-l-ocean-indien/article/l-union-des-comores-et-mayotte>

4 The question of the Comorian island of Mayotte: UN General Assembly Resolution No. A/RES of 10/26/1985/43/14. United Nations: official website. Available from: <https://www.un.org/ru/ga/43/docs/43res.shtml>

in accordance with the principle that the territorial integrity of the colonial territories must be preserved after independence. But France in 1976 vetoed these resolutions, did not recognize the decision of the UN General Assembly in 1979 that Mayotte is part of the Republic of the Comoros, arguing its “acquisition” of the inhabitants on this island by the results of a referendum. To consolidate its position, France held a new referendum in 2009 and, guided by the positive results of the referendum, made Mayotte its overseas department⁵.

Officially, this happened in 2014, before the nationwide referendum in Crimea, the results of which France did not recognize. As well as the results of the popular vote in the DPR, LPR, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, they did not recognize it, supporting the destruction of the inhabitants of these territories by the Ukrainian army.

In order to search for oil, France annexed the island of Bank du Geyser, the right to which is disputed by Madagascar with independence (15:78). Also, Madagascar disputes many nearby islands around, which remained subordinate to France (Bassas-da-India, Europa Island, Glorioso). There is also Tromelin Island, which is disputed by Mauritius. In 2010, they signed a peace treaty for the common use of the island.

The inhabitants of the island of Corsica, captured about two centuries ago, are still trying to gain their independence. However, the local independence movement was recognized by France as terrorist. Trying to talk about its independence and Brittany, in which since 1963 the Popular Front for the Liberation of Brittany has been operating (6).

The geopolitical and geo-economic interests of the Western countries have always been the dominant of their policy both towards their neighbors and towards their former colonies. Even an uninhabited rock Rockall in the Atlantic Ocean was annexed by Great Britain for the sake of exploration and rich fishing. The capture mechanism was simple: in 1955, several military officers landed on the island together with a scientist, hoisted a flag and, on behalf of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, declared the island British, forbidding the passage of foreign ships within a 50-mile zone around the rock (14:627–647). In 1972, the UK declared the island an administrative part of the Harris region of Scotland⁶. In 1982, in response to an international agreement that determined that a person could not survive on this territory, and, accordingly, the UK did not have rights to the continental shelf, the UK landed a survival specialist on the island, who spent 40 days there. As a result, it was concluded that if the rock is habitable, then the waters around it must be British. Despite this, the British right to the continental shelf around Rockall was not recognized. However, the attempts of Ireland, Denmark (Faroe Islands) and Iceland to challenge the state ownership of the island and surrounding waters with the help of international UN institutions remain unsuccessful (4:78–93). The UK ignores these decisions.

5 Union of the Comoros and Mayotte. Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs of the French Republic: official website. Available from: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/ru/dvustoronnie-otnosheniya/afrika/la-france-dans-la-region-sud-ouest-de-l-ocean-indien/article/l-union-des-comores-et-mayotte>

6 Island of Rockall Act 1972. UK Statute Law Database: official website. Available from: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1972/2>

The countries of the “collective West” also practice military seizures. With the help of military forces, Spain in 2002 ousted the Moroccans from the island of Perejil⁷. Both countries claim their rights to the island. Since the island was not mentioned in the treaty granting Morocco independence from Spain, the Spaniards consider it theirs. Moroccans consider it historically their territory. In 2002, the one with the military advantage turned out to be right, namely Spain. Let us note an interesting point in the behavior of the Spanish colleagues – members of the European Union. At a time when most of the EU countries recognized the rights of Spain to Perejil, France and Portugal only regretted what had happened and did not talk about the rights of Spain⁸. Ownership of the island allows Spain to maintain its presence in North Africa, where France has a foothold. In turn, the League of Arab States (except for Algeria, historically associated with France) supported the right of Morocco to Fr. Perehill⁹.

Since 1982, Morocco has laid claim to the city of Melilla as an integral part of its territory¹⁰. In turn, the Spanish government has never recognized these demands, excluding the very possibility of any discussion of the status of its semi-enclaves in Morocco, blackmailing that it will not start discussion until it returns the rights to Gibraltar. According to the position of Spain, it belongs to her under the Treaty of Utrecht, despite the results of referendums of residents who wished to remain with Great Britain.

All these examples show that the countries of the “collective West” cannot be an example and a guarantor of stability and security. The United States cannot fulfill this role either. As soon as the US gained independence, a period of continental annexation began. And if the Republic of Vermont was annexed peacefully (1791), and Louisiana (French Louisiana) was bought from France (1803), then West Florida was annexed, despite the protests of Spain, under the guise that these lands are part of the purchased Louisiana. The annexation of Texas (1845), the occupation during the Mexican-American War, and the annexation of the territory of New Mexico (1846) are indicators of the priority of the principle “who is stronger is right”. Since 1898, the United States has been known for its overseas expansion and capture of colonies in the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea (2).

Numerous war crimes characterize the period of the American occupation of Iraq. The most publicized murder was in Mahmudiya (five American soldiers killed a family of 4, and also committed violent acts against a 14-year-old girl)¹¹, massacre in Mukaradib

7 Jordán, Javier. The confrontation between Spain and Morocco over the islet of Perejil. A Reinterpretation from the Countering Hybrid Threats Perspective. Global Strategy – Universidad de Granada (in Spanish). Available from: <https://global-strategy.org/the-confrontation-between-spain-and-morocco-over-the-islet-of-perejil-a-reinterpretation-from-the-countering-hybrid-threats-perspective/>

8 Ibid.

9 Secretary General of the League of Arab States Amr Moussa supports Morocco's claims to the island of Perejil in the Mediterranean Sea. RIA-Novosti News Agency: official website. Available from: <https://ria.ru/20020814/207329.html>

10 The Prime Minister of Morocco has put forward territorial claims to Spain. Kommersant News Agency: official website. Available from: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4626727>.

11 We have been silent about many crimes but we will not stand rape. The Guardian: official website. Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/oct/20/iraq-middleeast>

(more than 40 people who were celebrating a wedding were killed by American pilots)¹², massacre in Haditha¹³. Only a small part of the accused American military personnel was brought to justice.

The withdrawal of US troops from Iraq began in 2010, by December 2011, the bulk of the US army units had left the country, which led to a renewed increase in violence¹⁴. Thus, the United States and its allies have occupied the territory of a sovereign state for 9 years. This time is characterized by the radicalization of Islamist groups, the growth of the terrorist threat, numerous war crimes by each of the parties to the conflict, and a large number of casualties among the non-military population. The death toll of Iraqis as a result of the US invasion is most commonly estimated to be between 150,000 and 250,000, a large proportion of which are civilians. As a result of the military operation in Iraq, Saddam Hussein's regime was overthrown, and an interim government was formed, which had to find a way out of all the existing contradictions. The coalition forces did not receive an international mandate to conduct the operation, and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in September 2004 explicitly stated that from the point of view of international law, this invasion is illegal¹⁵.

The US recognition of the Golan Heights as part of Israel is also highly controversial. On December 14, 1981, the Israeli Knesset ratified the Golan Heights Law, according to which the Golan Heights belonged to Israel¹⁶. The law was signed by the President, Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior of Israel and entered into force on the day of signing. The law was condemned internationally: On December 17, 1981, UN Security Council Resolution No. 497 was adopted, according to which Israel's decision to establish its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null and void and has no international legal force¹⁷. However, in December 2017, US President D. Trump decided to recognize the Golan Heights as part of Israel. According to the President of the US Council on Foreign Affairs Richard N. Haass, this step increases the likelihood of instability in the region and destroys the image of the United States as an “honest mediator” in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict¹⁸.

12 US-Hubschrauber greifen Hochzeitsfeier an – Dutzende Tote. Der Spiegel: offizielle Webseite. Available from: <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/irak-us-hubschrauber-greifen-hochzeitsfeier-an-dutzende-tote-a-300701.html>

13 What happened at Haditha? BBC News: official website. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5033648.stm

14 As bombs hit Baghdad, Iraq says about 69, 263 people killed between 2004 and 2011. Alarabiya news: official website. Available from: <https://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/29/197696>

15 Excerpts: Annan interview. BBC News: official website. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661640.stm

16 The Law on the Golan Heights of 12/14/1981. Ministry of Justice of the State of Israel: official website. Available from: https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/DynamicCollectors/list-leg-000?DCRI_UrlName=list-leg-121&skip=0

17 Resolution 497 (1981) of 17 December 1981. UN Security Council Resolutions: official website. Available from: <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ru/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1981>

18 Haass R.N. Present at the Disruption. How Trump Unmade U.S. Foreign Policy. Foreign Affairs: official website. Available from: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-08-11/present-disruption?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=Present%20at%20the%20Disruption&utm_content=20200811&utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017

The presence of the United States is not aimed at the socio-economic and social development of these countries and the achievement of the common good, but at the formation of dependence on the United States. One recent example of this is Afghanistan. During the years of presence in the country, stable institutions of opposition to the Taliban, declared democratic institutions, economic institutions and a model of social welfare have not been formed, but a significant economic dependence on the United States and international institutions controlled by the United States has been formed.

The inconsistency, selectivity and inventiveness of interpretations of the results of referendums, UN resolutions, the causes and results of forceful intervention in the affairs of other countries once again confirm the desire of the “collective West” to keep the world order slipping from the hands. It is unlikely that they will be able to maintain their former relations with the former colonies and countries, which, in their view, are still the “third world”, to which they can dictate their own rules and conditions. But attempts to do so continue. In the new US National Security Strategy of October 12, 2022¹⁹ The United States distributes the roles:

A more integrated Middle East that empowers our allies and partners will advance regional peace and prosperity, while reducing the resource demands the region makes on the United States over the long term. In Africa, the dynamism, innovation, and demographic growth of the region render it central to addressing complex global problems. The Western Hemisphere directly impacts the United States more than any other region so we will continue to revive and deepen our partnerships there to advance economic resilience, democratic stability, and citizen security²⁰.

However, we see how the countries of the Middle East are building their strategies. The United States suffered an obvious setback when it failed to agree with India and Venezuela to abandon the strategic partnership with Russia and when Saudi Arabia, in fact, refused the United States to increase the supply of Saudi oil to world markets above the quotas determined by OPEC+.

The United States believes that it “is in the midst of a strategic rivalry to shape the future international order” and believes that “the need for American leadership around the world is greater than ever”. However, they will «lead the world forward” only on the basis of their values and only with those who share US interests²¹. Countries that offer a multipolar and alternative view of the world pose “the most pressing strategic challenge” to the American vision of the world and are referred to in the Strategy as powers “that combine authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy.” Threateningly sounds the statement that “countries around the world are once again

¹⁹ National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The White House: official website. Available from: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf>

²⁰ Там же.

²¹ Ibid. [...] “We will lead together with our allies and partners and in cooperation with all those who believe, as we do”.

convinced why you should never bet against the United States of America”. Russia and China are declared the main opponents of the United States:

The People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit [...] Russia and the P.R.C. pose different challenges. Russia poses an immediate threat to the free and open international system, recklessly flouting the basic laws of the international order today, as its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine has shown. China “is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to advance that objective”²².

The US believes that it will not be able to compete with major powers that offer a different vision of the world if it does not have a plan for cooperation with other countries. The US thinks in the paradigm of international competition, not in the paradigm of international cooperation, and considers it necessary to understand “how a more competitive world affects cooperation and how the need for cooperation affects competition. We need a strategy that not only deals with both (Russia and China – author’s note), but also recognizes the relationship between them and adjusts accordingly.” In fact, the new “US National Security Strategy” is the desire of the United States to return to the old concept of “Pax Americana” against the backdrop of the benefits that they receive in the conditions of SVO. Actually, the concepts and methods used are also old.

Discussion

The examples considered are very indicative of the resuscitation of hegemonic theories, theories of vital interests and attempts to return American hegemony, including through the non-autonomy of decisions and dependence of the EU countries on the United States. The leaders of Western countries continue to be guided by theoretical models developed within the framework of the theory of hegemony.

From the point of view of these theories, the presence of Western countries in foreign regions and countries is justified by economic interests, but in the end it ends with political influence and military presence. It is declared that international economic stability is a common collective good, beneficial to all, as it allows everyone to develop, enrich themselves and avoid clashes. According to hegemonic theories, small and medium-sized countries have their own interests and the right to demand their implementation, but they do not play a significant role in the production of the international collective good. The contribution of small and medium-sized countries to this type of benefits is small and not significant, but they have great needs to realize their interests. From here the theorists of hegemonism explain the conflict potential of

²² Ibid.

relations. In their opinion, if there are only small and medium-sized state-economies in the world, then the common good (economic stability) will never be created. In this regard, the world needs a hegemon, a leader who will guide other countries to achieve the goals of the current system. This role was assumed by the United States (in fact, theories of hegemonism were developed mainly in the United States). It is explained to the world that the hegemonic state has the power to create the common good, and its motivation is connected with the desire to ensure/preserve its own security and prosperity. From these positions, it is believed that the efforts of the hegemon correspond to the national interests of most countries in the world. Hegemon is able to act autonomously and independently. Within the framework of this concept, the United States is trying to explain its claims to leadership.

The ideas of the neo-realists are very contradictory, according to which not all countries consider the hegemon a senior partner and, for example, the countries of the “third world” perceive leadership not as a common good, but as a phenomenon that the elect have. Note that the United States constantly emphasizes its chosenness. And according to the theory of geo-economic monocentrism, the “periphery” and “semi-periphery” have limited funds for social policy, so people who do not have economic dignity prevail. In other words, it is impossible to be a leader and hegemon without dignity.

Hegemonic thinking largely explains the inconsistency of the positions of the “collective West” in relation to UN resolutions, the results of the will of citizens in different countries, etc., because, according to Western countries, they know better than others what needs to be done for the “common good” and explain this by their economic and political development, the economic and political dignity possessed by the citizens of their countries.

Conclusion

The current international situation shows the attempts of the countries of the “collective West” to revive the hegemonic concepts of the twentieth century. Despite the changed reality, the economic and military-political growth of the non-Western poles of the world order, Western countries continue to view them as a “third world” that needs guidance and prompting. Using calls to achieve the world’s collective good, the West explains its advantage. The US explains why it should be the world hegemon. Without hiding their hegemonic claims and declaring enemies of all those who stand in the way of their dominance, the United States and Western countries use traditional methods of pressure and sanctions, which are already weakly working in the new realities.

The confidence of the international community in the policies of the countries of the “collective West” has been significantly undermined, and the insincerity of the intentions of the Western countries is becoming more and more obvious.

Increasingly, the former Western colonies, the countries of the Middle East, and Africa are recalling a history that was carefully retouched by Western ideologists in order to save the face of “Western democracy.” But an analysis of the relationship of Western countries with former colonies and economically underdeveloped countries shows that during the XX-XXI centuries the policy of the countries of the “collective West” discredited them as guarantors of peace and stability. This happened for reasons of “double standards” in the interpretation of the results of referendums in different countries due to the benefits of the West; for reasons of ignoring UN decisions, which led to a decrease in its role and status in conflict resolution; for reasons of forceful decisions in relation to other countries, due to the dominant interests of Western countries, which led to socio-economic and political crises in these countries; due to the growing instability in the countries where the “collective West” is present, especially the United States.

References

1. Kindleberger Ch., Aliber R. Global financial crises. Manias, panics and crashes. St. Petersburg: Peter, 2010. (In Russian).
2. Prilutsky V.V. American-Mexican border conflicts in the 1870s-1910s // Bulletin of BSU. 2021;3 (49):139-147. (In Russian).
3. Thurow Lester C. The Future of Capitalism: How Today’s Economic Forces Shape Tomorrow’s World). Novosibirsk: Siberian Chronograph. 1999:430. (In Russian).
4. Symmons C. R. Ireland and the Rockall Dispute: An Analysis of Recent Developments. IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin. 1998 Spring:78-93.
5. Drucker P. F. Post-capitalist society. Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann. 1993:204.
6. Erwan Le Quilliec. Les Fronts de Libération de la Bretagne. Paris II-Assas. Mémoire de DEA de science politique. 1997.
7. Fukuyama F. America at the Crossroads. Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy. 2006, Yale University Press.
8. Galbraith J. K. The Culture of Contentment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017.
9. Gilpin R. Global Political Economy – Understanding the International Economic Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
10. Globalization as Evolutionary Process: Modeling Global Change. Ed. by G.Modelski, T. Devezas, and W. R. Thompson. London: Routledge, 2008.
11. Goldman D. P. It’s Not the End of the World, It’s Just the End of You: The Great Extinction of the Nations. New York: RVP Publishers. 2011.
12. Keohane R. O. Understanding Multilateral Institutions in Easy and Hard Times. Annual Review of Political Science, 2020; 23:1-18.
13. Krasner S. D. Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective. Comparative Political Studies, 1988; 21(1). DOI:10.1177/0010414088021001004
14. MacDonald F. The last outpost of Empire: Rockall and the Cold War. Journal of Historical Geography. 2006; 32:627-647.
15. Mohamed el-Amine Souef. Les grands défis de la politique étrangère des Comores, Les éditions De La Lune. 2009:132.

About the author

Vladislav I. GASUMYANOV. DSc(Econ.). Director of the National Research Institute of Communications Development, Head of the Basic Department of Corporate Security, MGIMO of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Address: 22, p. 1, Korobeynikov lane, 119571, Moscow, Russian Federation, institut@nicrus.ru

Contribution of the author

The author declares no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Submitted: November 1, 2022. Approved after peer reviewing: November 10, 2022.
Accepted for publication: November 21, 2022. Published: December 21, 2022.

The author has read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROCESSES

International relations

Original article

Political sciences

[https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4\(6\)-33-49](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4(6)-33-49)

Central Asia and China: Main Aspects and Directions of Interaction in Modern Realities

Nazira S. Usupova✉

Kyrgyz State University named after I. Arambaeva, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
jbekiweva@mail.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8145-0956>

Abstract. The article attempts to determine the significance for China of intensifying its relations with the countries of the Central Asian region, primarily those bordering it – with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. For the countries of Central Asia, cooperation with China is essential for their development. The author comes to the conclusion that the priorities of China's policy in Central Asia are the support of stability, security, as well as the access on a mutually beneficial basis to Central Asian energy resources and the further development of economic ties. In the sphere of economic cooperation, the investment activity of China in the region is considered. The cultural and humanitarian aspect of cooperation between the countries of Central Asia and China is also highlighted: this is the cooperation of regions, educational institutions, the media, art groups, interaction in the field of science, technology, medicine, tourism, etc.

Keywords: People's Republic of China, Central Asia, Russian Federation, international relations, regional security, economic cooperation, investment activity, cultural and humanitarian relations

For citation: Usupova N.S. Central Asia and China: Main Aspects and Directions of Interaction in Modern Realities. *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue*. 2022; 4(6): 33-49. [https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4\(6\)-33-49](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4(6)-33-49)

Introduction

The material presented in the article and its analysis suggest that since gaining independence, the countries of Central Asia have been developing cooperation with a number of countries near and far abroad, but among them the People's Republic of China occupies a special place. This country is today one of the leading partners for the countries of the region, which is explained both by its role on the world stage as one of the leading powers, and by the fact that it is the only country in the world with which relations with the peoples of modern Central Asia cover a huge time historical period. For the first time, we comprehensively consider the main directions of relations between the countries of Central Asia and China, which have developed recently in terms of the interests of each of the countries.

Since the first years of gaining independence, the main direction of the foreign policy of the Central Asian states has been the development of dynamic mutually beneficial cooperation with a number of foreign countries. Among them, China has become a unique foreign policy partner. This is explained by several factors.

1. It is one of the leading world powers that has made a significant leap in its development in a short period of time. If in 1992 the share of China in the world total GDP was only 1.71%, and in the list of developed economies of the world the country occupied the 10th place, then already in 2018 the share of China in the global GDP was 15.86% (in nominal terms), and China became the second largest economy in the world after the United States, pushing Japan to third place and ahead of it by 10%.

2. China is the only non-CIS state with which three of the five countries in the region – Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan – share a common border of about 3,300 kilometers. This factor plays a decisive role in the processes of strengthening relations in all spheres: diplomatic, political, socio-economic, cultural, etc.

3. China is the only country whose relations with the peoples of modern Central Asia cover a vast period of the historical past. In various historical sources, starting from the era of antiquity, one can find many examples that testify to the extensive contacts with China of the peoples living in the Central Asian region.

All this actualizes the topic of the study, substantiates the importance and necessity of expanding cooperation between the countries of Central Asia and China. In this regard, the purpose of our study is to analyze the main directions of the relationship of the countries under consideration in order to determine among them the most optimal and mutually beneficial for all cooperation partners.

Materials and Methods

The material of the study was statistical data characterizing the dynamics of economic cooperation between the countries of Central Asia and China over thirty years of diplomatic relations, articles by Russian and Chinese experts that characterize these countries, as well as the level and direction of their relationship.

Based on a systematic analysis of the identified data, the cooperation of the states under consideration was characterized. The historical-comparative method made it possible to reflect the degree of participation and direction of individual states of the region in relations with China. With the help of the historical-genetic method, the main stages and dynamics of the relationships of the peoples living in the territory of Central Asia and China in various historical eras were analyzed.

Results

Relations between the peoples of the Central Asian region have a long history. So, the most ancient Central Asian people, about which the first mentions were found in Chinese historical sources, dating back to the end of the third century BC, are the Kyrgyz. These sources say that the state of the Kyrgyz “Possession Gegun” as an independent ethnoterritorial formation, arose at the end of the 1st millennium BC (12:133).

In the 2nd century BC, on a vast territory stretching from present-day South-Eastern Kazakhstan and Northern Kyrgyzstan up to the adjoining Tien Shan parts of East Turkestan, the state of the Usuns arose¹. With this state, assessing its military power and the strong power of the rulers, China enters into allied relations.

The most important role in the development of relations between China and the peoples of Central Asia was undoubtedly played by the Great Silk Road, on which cities and entire civilizations arose and flourished. This trade route was a grandiose trade route connecting East and West. It was he who became an important factor that contributed to the development of trade relations in the region, and the peoples of Central Asia first learned about various types of crafts, about sericulture. As S. Pogodin and Zhou Jun figuratively remark:

the network of routes of the Great Silk Road served as an artery through which there was an exchange of religious teachings, works of art, science, languages and technological achievements. Many elements of civilization turned out to be participants in the exchange within the Great Silk Road, along with commercial goods that merchants carried from country to country (2).

The high level of agriculture and other elements of Chinese civilization accelerated the development of productive forces, the formation of various forms of statehood among local peoples².

In the Middle Ages, the Kyrgyz established direct diplomatic relations with the Chinese Tang Empire. The Tang Shu (History of the Tang Dynasty) states that diplomatic relations between the Kyrgyz and China received a new impetus in the early Middle Ages. Thus, in 648, a Kyrgyz embassy was sent to China (1:354–355). Later, in 650–683, two embassies were sent (9:241).

The history of relations between the peoples of Central Asia and China in the era of modern and recent times is divided into two large periods, each of which is about a hundred years old. This is the second half of the 18th - the first half of the 19th centuries (first period) and the second half of the 19th century until 1991 (second period) (4).

As the researchers note, if the first period is characterized by a relatively independent

¹ Chorotegin Tynchtykbek. The ancient state of the Usuns in Tengir-Too. Available from: http://kghistory.akipress.org/unews/un_post:1558.

² Central Asia in International Relations: History and Modernity. Available from: artiklktz.com/artikle/5106

foreign policy of the peoples of the region towards China, then the second, Soviet stage, is characterized by a complete lack of independence in domestic and foreign policy (3:25). During the Soviet Union, relations between the union republics and the PRC developed only in line with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

Truly equal cooperation with the PRC on the basis of independently developed foreign policy priorities began to be developed by the Central Asian states only after gaining independence in 1991. China was among the first countries to recognize the independence of the Central Asian countries. He established diplomatic relations with all five states of the region in the first week of January 1992.

Describing the foreign policy of modern China, experts note that it consistently follows a pragmatic political course based on the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, the development of beneficial economic cooperation and the improvement of its image on the world stage. In its international policy, China is fighting terrorism, extremism and separatism, seeking to ensure that the whole world accepts the concept of «One China»³.

The expert I.E.Denisov characterizes China's foreign policy in a peculiar but precise way:

Today we see not only "China saying no", but also "China saying yes", a country not only challenging some of the principles of the existing world order, but also striving to adapt to international rules and making efforts to become part of world system, of course, taking into account their growing interests (2).

The Chinese authorities understand that the successful modernization of the economy and the development of other areas of public life require a long-term peaceful and stable international and regional environment, the maintenance and preservation of which is the basis of the policy of good neighborly relations. According to researcher D. Pashkin, China identifies 4 main aspects in the development of relations with the countries of Central Asia (7).

1. Chinese analysts understand the strategic importance of the Central Asian region and believe that in the future it will also have a significant impact on the development of world events. In economic terms, Central Asia and its surrounding regions will play an increasingly important role, especially as suppliers of energy resources.

2. Central Asia is China's bridge between East and West. China is very interested in ties with Europe, and in order to establish them, China needs to develop transport infrastructure. In this regard, political and economic cooperation is very important for both China and the Central Asian countries.

3. For China, ties with Central Asia are important in connection with the stability and development of Xinjiang. It is from this part of China, namely this region of China and the three countries of Central Asia that have common borders. According to politicians from Beijing, this is precisely why contacts with the countries of the region should be expanded in accordance with the principles of equality and mutual benefit.

³ Pal Duney. China's influence in Central Asia. Available from: <https://perconcordiam.com/ru/влияние-китая-в-центральной-азии/>

4. China has been connected with the peoples of Central Asia since ancient times, the time of the Great Silk Road. Today, the Great Silk Road can again become the foundation for enhancing cooperation between China and the countries of the region.

Assessing the role and importance of ties with China, one must also keep in mind the fact that a number of leading world powers, as expert Pal Duney rightly notes,

reduced their commitments to the countries of this region or actually put Central Asia at a lower position in the list of their strategic priorities⁴.

In this situation, China remains the best partner for the Central Asian states.

It should be noted that China's relations with countries directly bordering it are developing most actively. These are primarily Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. For example, the People's Republic of China and Kyrgyzstan are neighboring states that share a long joint border of 1,071.8 km. As political scientist Nur Omarov notes, historically and geographically, the territory of Kyrgyzstan and the western part of the PRC are part of a single political and cultural region, represented by kindred peoples who have similar faiths and related languages. This proximity undoubtedly contributes to the development of political and trade-economic relations (4).

The importance of China's relations with the bordering Central Asian states is also determined by the need to ensure regional security and stability, as a result of which the interaction of countries is effectively developing at the bilateral and multilateral levels – within the framework of the United Nations, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Of particular note is the cooperation of countries within the framework of the SCO. From an organization that was originally created to resolve purely border issues, including the demilitarization of the border between China, Russia and the three Central Asian countries that have a common border with the PRC, an organization was created whose goal is not only to resolve border issues, but also to develop economic, political and cultural ties, coordination of efforts in the fight against terrorism. Assessing the activities of the SCO at the present stage, the President of the Russian-Chinese Analytical Center Sergey Sanakoev notes:

The creation of this organization was greeted with skepticism - they said that the organization was not viable, that it would not take place. But 20 years have passed, and we see a completely different result. There is a striking all-round development of the SCO: at the level of interaction between the heads of member states, governments, ministries and departments. During this period, the organization has grown. Initially, in addition to Russia and China, this included Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Now India and Pakistan have joined them, while Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, Mongolia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia and others remain

⁴ Ibid.

observers and dialogue partners. In fact, today the SCO is a weighty influential organization that has covered more than half of the world's population⁵.

In order to counter the "three evil forces", drug smuggling, illegal immigration and cross-border crime, a Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure was created, meetings of the heads of security agencies, defense ministers and prosecutors general of the SCO member states are held regularly.

Using Chinese funds, a border outpost for Tajik soldiers was built several years ago near Tajikistan's borders with Afghanistan and China. In 2016, the governments of Tajikistan and China agreed to build seven border outposts and training centers along the Tajik-Afghan border, and a number of training centers and command posts were built. In addition, China today manufactures and exports military equipment to the countries of Central Asia, as well as providing military technology assistance (11).

Recently, the Chinese partners have also been striving to bring the SCO to a high level of economic cooperation. In this regard, the agenda of the SCO has expanded: issues of economic infrastructures, issues of tariffs, and trade promotion are being addressed. Expert Sergei Sanakoev notes good economic indicators among the achievements of the SCO:

The trade turnover between the members of the association has grown almost 100 times, reaching \$6.6 trillion. It can also be said that, in aggregate, the gross domestic product of the member countries of the organization has grown 13 times during this time. This is a colossal trading volume and excellent dynamics⁶.

The expert's opinion is not unfounded. Indeed, in the first two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, China pursued a cautious policy in the region aimed at resolving security issues, resolving border disputes and developing trade ties. However, since 2010, the role of China in Central Asia has been seriously transformed due to the fact that the rapid growth of the economy at the beginning of the 21st century increased China's needs for resources, markets for goods, and expanded the possibilities of its economic cooperation with the countries of Central Asia.

Today, we can say with full confidence that for the countries of the Central Asian region, the People's Republic of China is one of the leading partners.

China is the largest investor and creditor of the Central Asian countries. China's cumulative direct investment in Central Asia is \$14.7 billion in 2018, according to the PRC Ministry of Commerce. China is investing heavily in Central Asia as part of its "One Belt – One Road" Initiative⁷.

⁵ Uzbekistan as a Central Force in the SCO: What Challenges Await This Union. Available from: <https://uz.sputniknews.ru/20210615/uzbekistan-kak-tsentrlnaya-sila-v-shos-kakie-ispytaniya-jdut-etot-soyuz-19252104.html>

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ "One belt – one way" – to Open the Way for Mutual Gain. Available from: <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cerus/rus/zgxw/t1846717.htm>.

The One Belt, One Road Initiative, announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, is a large-scale initiative to expand China's economic ties with Central Asia, Russia, and Central and Eastern Europe. Today, the One Belt One Road can be described as a flexible mechanism with a strong focus on projects that promote development in the infrastructure construction, energy and transport sectors.

As of December 23, 2021, 138 countries and 31 international organizations have already signed 203 cooperation documents with China under this project⁸. As the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to the Russian Federation Zhang Hanhui noted:

Without a doubt, the Belt and Road Initiative has become the world's largest platform for business cooperation and the most popular emerging international public product to date⁹.

According to the American Enterprise Institute (data as of 2021), over seven years, the countries of Central Asia have received more than \$21 billion of investments under the "One Belt – One Road" initiative (out of \$56 billion in total), mainly for the development of infrastructure and energy. Investments from China have been especially important for the economies of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, where their total amount is now almost 20% of GDP¹⁰.

A number of strategically significant cooperation projects have been implemented, such as the China-Central Asia gas pipeline, the China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan highway, the China-Tajikistan highway. A series of joint projects was launched in the fields of agriculture, water management, electricity, textiles, engineering and manufacturing industries¹¹.

In general, over 30 years, the volume of Chinese investments in Central Asia, starting almost from zero, has reached \$40 billion. China has become one of the largest trade and investment partners of the Central Asian countries¹².

In recent years, China's investment activity in Uzbekistan has been especially high, related to industry, transport, telecommunications, pharmacology, agriculture and water management. Chinese companies are participating in the creation of joint high-tech industrial parks in Uzbekistan. Chinese investments in the economy of Uzbekistan reached \$9 billion by the end of 2021.

The leading country in terms of attracting Chinese investment to Central Asia is Kazakhstan. According to the Monitoring of Chinese Investments in the World, the total volume of Chinese investments and contracts in Kazakhstan under the Belt and Road

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ How will China's Trade Relations With Central Asian Countries Develop? Available from: https://forbes.kz/finances/markets/kak_budut_razvivatsya_torgovye_otnosheniya_kitaya_sostranami_tsentrlnoy_azii/

¹¹ China and Central Asia: Post-Soviet Rise. Available from: http://kz.chineseembassy.org/rus/sgxx/sgdt/202112/t20211231_10478095.htm

¹² Ibid.

Initiative (from 2013 to 2020) amounted to \$18.69 billion. More than half of this amount, \$9.53 billion, went to the energy sector, \$3.81 billion to the transport sector, \$2.65 billion to the chemical industry and \$1.91 billion to metallurgy¹³.

A lot of joint ventures with the participation of Chinese shareholders have been created in the country. The main player is the world's third largest oil company China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which has assets and interests in more than 30 countries around the world. In 1997, CNPC acquired a stake in the Kazakh company Aktobemunaigas and now owns 85.42% of the company's shares. In addition, CNPC is participating in the construction of two oil pipelines (one of them is Kazakhstan-China), as well as in the construction of the Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline (11:12).

Considerable investments were directed by China to the economy of Kyrgyzstan. In addition to loans and direct investment, China has provided more than \$300 million in gratuitous aid to build roads and supply drinking water to remote areas (11:20).

About 400 Chinese companies and 170 Sino-Kyrgyz joint ventures operated in Kyrgyzstan in 2019¹⁴. According to official data, the volume of Chinese investments is 33% of the total volume of direct investments in Kyrgyzstan.¹⁵

Compared to other countries, China's investment activity in Tajikistan was smaller. Thus, according to the Monitoring of Chinese Investments in the World, the only Chinese investment in Tajikistan since the announcement of the "One Belt – One Road" initiative is \$540 million invested in the metallurgical sector in 2019. However, some local sources of information believe that the total volume of Chinese investments in Tajikistan is \$2.03 billion. There are more than 300 companies with Chinese capital registered in Tajikistan. Most investments are directed to energy, textile industry, mines and quarries, agriculture and oil refining.¹⁶

Chinese projects were implemented in Central Asia even during the coronavirus pandemic. Here are just a few of them:

- State oil companies of Kazakhstan and China have established a joint venture in the south of Kazakhstan for the production of steel pipes for the transportation of oil, gas, water and oil products;
- With the support of one of the largest state-owned Chinese conglomerates, China Oil and Foodstuffs Corporation, a large flour mill was modernized in Dushanbe, capable of processing 400 tons of wheat per day;
- In April 2020, three 60-meter turbine blades intended for the 100 MW Zhanatas wind farm crossed the Kazakh border at Khorghos. Zhanatas is the largest wind energy

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ The struggle for Investment and Gray Imports: Kyrgyzstan-China relations. Available from: <https://eurasia.expert/investitsii-i-seryy-import-otnosheniya-kyrgyzstana-i-kitaya/>

¹⁵ 33 Percent of Direct Investments in Kyrgyzstan are Attracted from China. Available from: https://24.kg/ekonomika/143108_33protsesta_pryamyih_investitsiy_vkyrgyzstan_privlekayut_izkitaya/

¹⁶ Is China Moving from Economic Expansion to Military-political? Available from: <https://knews.kg/2019/08/16/kitaj-ot-ekonomicheskoy-ekspansii-v-tadzhikistane-perehodit-k-voenno-politicheskoy/>

project in Central Asia and is being developed by the State Energy Investment Corporation of China. The first phase of the project was put into operation in the summer of 2019¹⁷.

A vivid indicator of the growth of China's relations with the countries of Central Asia was the dynamics and level of trade, which over 30 years has grown from hundreds of millions of dollars to tens of billions of dollars. China today represents the largest market for the main export commodities of the Central Asian countries (oil, natural gas, uranium and non-ferrous metals). For example, China accounts for more than 2/3 of gas exports from Turkmenistan and more than half of uranium exports from Kazakhstan¹⁸.

If China's plans to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060, which implies an increase in gas consumption, at least in the medium term, come true, then the volume of gas imports will continue to grow, and this will positively affect the economy of Turkmenistan and, to a lesser extent, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Since Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan do not share a common border with China, the gas is likely to flow through the territories of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which will also support the economies of these countries.

However, none of the Central Asian states is among the main importing partners of China, only Kazakhstan occupies the 39th position. China is the largest (for Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) or the second largest (for Kazakhstan) importing partner for the countries of Central Asia. The situation is similar with exports - the largest regional partner-exporter of China – Kazakhstan – occupies the 36th line. At the same time, China is the largest (for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) or the second largest (for Kazakhstan) exporting partner.

Unfortunately, due to the coronavirus pandemic, trade between China and Central Asia in 2020 has significantly decreased: by 47% with Kyrgyzstan, about 20% with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.¹⁹ The volume of cargo transportation between China and Kyrgyzstan decreased tenfold²⁰. However, at an online summit dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the countries of Central Asia, the Chinese side announced its desire to increase trade, bringing it to \$70 billion by 2030, to provide the Central Asian states with \$500 million in the next 3 years in the form of gratuitous assistance for the implementation of socially significant projects and 5 thousand quotas for advanced training of specialists in a number of areas²¹.

During the 30 years of cooperation between the countries of Central Asia and China, special attention was also paid to the cultural and humanitarian aspect. Its mechanisms are being improved; intensive ties are maintained between the regions, educational institutions, the media and art groups. Cooperation in the field of science and technology, medicine and tourism is gaining momentum. Cooperation is

¹⁷ China in Central Asia: Humanitarian Aid and Trade. Available from: <https://russian.eurasianet.org/>

¹⁸ Dankov A. Dossier: China's Strategy in Central Asia. Available from: <https://eurasia.expert/dose-strategiya-kitaya-v-tsentrallyy-azii/>

¹⁹ China in Central Asia: Humanitarian Aid and Trade. Available from: [a:https://russian.eurasianet.org/](https://russian.eurasianet.org/)

²⁰ Not Only in Economic Terms. China's Ambitions in Central Asia. Available from: <https://rus.azattyk.org/a/31254979.html>

²¹ Overview: Relations Between China and Central Asian Countries have Entered a New Era. Available from: http://russian.news.cn/2022-01/27/c_1310443680.htm

developing in the areas of academic exchanges, joint scientific activities, translation of literary works, and film screenings. The popularity of China and the Chinese language in the states of Central Asia is growing. More and more representatives of the younger generation from Central Asia come to China to study or do business. Confucius Institutes and Sinology classes have opened and are fruitfully functioning in the region (there are 37 of them in Central Asia in total). Thus, in Kazakhstan, 14,000 students study at five Confucius Institutes; in Uzbekistan, the oldest Confucius Institute in the region at the Tashkent State Institute of Oriental Studies annually admits 1,500 students. There are 4 Confucius Institutes and 21 Confucius classes in Kyrgyzstan, more than 5,000 Kyrgyz students study in China²².

According to the Ministry of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Chinese language is taught in the seven largest universities of the country, in addition, there are 65 Chinese language courses²³.

The Chinese Ministry of Education and the Office of the International Chinese Language Council provide grants to those who wish to receive higher education in the PRC. In 2010–2018, more than 5,000 study grants were issued to applicants from Central Asia, and the number of students from Central Asian countries receiving education in China reached almost 30,000 in 2017²⁴. In turn, many universities in China study the official languages of the Central Asian countries.

Undoubtedly, as in any dynamically developing processes, there are many problems in the relations between the countries of Central Asia and China. Thus, the Chinese authorities are concerned about the revival of Islam in the region, which, they believe, has an impact on the population of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.

As you know, Islam is the dominant religion in Xinjiang. Due to ethnic, cultural, religious factors, the inhabitants of the region are similar to the inhabitants of the countries of Central Asia, as a result of which there are conditions for the inhabitants of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China and the countries of Central Asia to establish good relations. However, according to official Beijing, the processes of Islamic revival in Central Asia can contribute to the spread of Islamic extremist ideology in Xinjiang²⁵.

On the other hand, according to Chinese analysts themselves, for example, an expert from the Institute of Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Zhang Ning,

although extremism poses a threat to the countries of the region, but at the same time it is also one of the factors contributing to the strengthening of cooperation and mutual trust both

22 Interview of the Chinese Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, Ms. Du Deven, to the OTRK TV channel. 2019r. Available from: <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cekg//rus/ggwj/t1790706.htm>

23 Chinese in Kyrgyzstan: There is a Demand. Available from: https://24.kg/obschestvo/49864_kitayskiy_yazyik_vkyrgyzstane_est_spros/

24 Ibid.

25 Xianyun M. Analysis of the Influence of the Islamic Renaissance in the Central Asia States

on security in China's Xinjiang. Problems of the Post-Soviet Space. 2018;5(1):108-115. DOI: 10.24975/2313-8920-2018-5-1-108-115.

between the countries of Central Asia themselves, as well as between China and the republics of the region²⁶.

The imprint on the relations between the countries is also left by various political upheavals, the change of authorities that are taking place in the Central Asian region.

In addition, China's policy in the region is influenced by the activity of another strategic partner – the Russian Federation. Due to the common historical destinies, geographical proximity, socio-cultural proximity, relations between Russia and the countries of Central Asia are actively developing in almost all areas. Russia is connected with the states of the region by a number of integration institutions, including the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Eurasian Economic Union (formerly the Customs Union), and the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

However, on the other hand, as even Russian experts emphasize, for example, V. Paramonov:

relations between China and the region, although deeply rooted in the past, have been developing more dynamically in the last two decades than Russian-Central Asian relations²⁷.

Under these conditions, both China and Russia show their readiness to coordinate efforts in the region, primarily in the areas of politics and security, which is in the interests of the two countries. At the same time, China has been very active in the economic sphere in recent years.

Analyzing China's position in relations with Russia, Russian expert V. Paramonov clearly noted that:

Beijing is still trying to coordinate its policy in the region with Moscow, recognizing its special role in Central Asia, which, by the way, largely explains many of China's successes and achievements. The Russian Federation continues to support or, at least, not actively restrain the process of China's consolidation in Central Asia. First of all, this concerns those areas where China's interests do not contradict Russia's interests, and in some cases even complement them, for example, in the spheres of politics and security, in the context of countering the penetration of radical Islamism into the region, limiting the influence of the United States and NATO²⁸.

Discussion

When analyzing the nature of cooperation between China and the Central Asian countries, it must be taken into account that the main interests of China in Central Asia are

26 Central Asia and Countering Extremism: A View from China. Available from: <https://www.caa-network.org/archives/19683>.

27 Paramonov V. Russia and China in Central Asia: a Conceptual aspect. Available from: https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/magazines/rossia_i_novay/2018_04/16.Paramonov.pdf

28 Ibid.

to ensure security and maintain stability in the region. That is why China is ready to invest in the economies of the countries of the region.

One of the strategic partners of the Central Asian countries is also Russia, with which China seeks to avoid competition in the region. The Chinese authorities view Russia not so much as a rival, but as a partner in order to prevent the strengthening of the West's position in the region.

Conclusion

The material of the article allows us to state that 1. the growing economic power of China turns it into a partner whose experience and activities are of particular interest, 2. the One Belt and One Road initiative implemented by China generally meets the needs of the economic development of the countries of Central Asia and provides them with effective assistance in their crisis situations, 3. China and the countries of Central Asia do not have acute conflict situations or unresolved problems, 4. traditional good neighborliness, trust and friendship between peoples cannot be excluded from our lives; cultural exchange, ties in the field of education, science, art, science, engineering and technology are important for countries.

Despite some problems that exist today in Sino-Central Asian relations, China's strategy towards the countries of Central Asia is a consistent policy of developing economic cooperation and maintaining political stability in the region through mutual cooperation. The countries of Central Asia adhere to the same principle.

References

1. Bichurin N.Ya. Collection of Information about the Peoples Who Dwelled in Central Asia in Ancient Times. MOSCOW-Leningrad, 1950. Part 1. (In Russian)
2. Denisov I.E. Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping: Continuity and Innovation. Politicheskie processy v izmenyayushchetsya mire [Political Processes in a Changing World]. 2017; Vol. 10(5):83-98. (In Russian)
3. Imanaliev M. Essays on the Foreign Policy of Kyrgyzstan. Bishkek: Sabyr, 2002. (In Russian)
4. Omarov N.M. China in Foreign Policy of Sovereign Kyrgyzstan: Main Trends and Prospects. Vestnik Kyrgyzsko-Rossiyskogo Slavyanskogo universiteta [Bulletin of Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University]. Bishkek 2004;4 (4):19-26. (In Russian)
5. Paramonov V. Formation of the geopolitical situation in Central Asia – external factors. Central'naya Aziya i Kavkaz [Central Asia and the Caucasus]. 2000;1(7):156–162. (In Russian)
6. Paramonov V. Russia and China in Central Asia: Conceptual Aspect. URL: https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/magazines/rossia_i_novay/2018_04/16.Paramonov.pdf. (In Russian)
7. Pashkin D.M. Sino-Central Asian Relations in the XXIth Century. Polemika. Electronic Journal. 2003; 16. URL: <http://www.irex.ru/press/pub/polemika/16/pash/>. (In Russian)
8. Pogodin S.N., Zhou Jun. Integration Project: The Great Silk Road (from the History of its Creation). Upravlencheskoe konsul'tirovanie [Management Consulting]. 2017;1:205-210. (In Russian)
9. Suprunenko G.P. Some Information on the Ancient History of the Kyrgyz. Istoriya i kul'tura Kitaya [History and Culture of China]. Moscow, 1974: 236-248. (In Russian)
10. Xiangyun M. Analysis of Influence of Islamic Revival in Central Asia States of Safety in Xinjiang China. Problemy postsovetского prostranstva. [Post-Soviet Issues]. 2018;5(1):108-115. (In Russian) <https://doi.org/10.24975/2313-8920-2018-5-1-108>

11. Taliga H. "The One Belt, One Road" Initiative in Central Asia. A desk study. ITUC, 2021. (In Russian).
12. Khudyakov Y. S. History of Central Asia Nomads Diplomacy. Bishkek: IIMOP KNU, 2003. (In Russian)

About the author

Nazira S. USUPOVA. DSc (Hist.), Acting Professor of the Kyrgyz State University named after I. Arabaev, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8145-0956>, Address: 51-a Razzakova str., Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic, 720035, bekiweva@mail.ru

Contribution of the author

The author declares no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Submitted: October 14, 2022. Approved after peer reviewing: October 29, 2022.

Accepted for publication: November 1, 2022. Published: December 21, 2022.

The author has read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

The Turkic Factor as a Component of International Relations in Central Asia: the «Turkic World» Construct

Rustem N. Nadyrov✉

Kazan (Volga region) Federal University, Kazan, Russia,
nadyrovrn@mail.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0930-2748>

Abstract: The article examines the first years of interstate interaction of the Turkic-speaking states of Central Asia through the prism of constructivism. The evolution of the “Turkic World” construct is traced from the ideas firstly proposed by N.A. Nazarbayev and T. Ozal to the decision to establish a secretariat for meetings of Heads of States. The role of the Turkic factor as a component of regional international relations is revealed. The results of the study indicate the possibility of implementing integration projects in the international political sphere within the framework of the constructivism paradigm, where not only the construct, but also its institutionalizing foundation exist due to the fact that individuals agree to observe conditional rules and to act as if that rules exist, while historically established connections are not an absolutely necessary component of such integration. At the same time, the Turkic factor in Central Asia can be considered as one of the institutionalizing components for regional international relations.

Keywords: Central Asia, the Turkic world, the Turkic factor, Organizations of Turkic states.

For citation: Nadyrov R.N. The Turkic Factor as a Component of International Relations in Central Asia: the “Turkic World” Construct. *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue*. 2022; 4(6): 50-59, [https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4\(6\)-50-59](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4(6)-50-59)

Introduction

The current international political situation has significantly changed the architecture of international relations that has been formed over the past three decades. The clash of civilizations between Russia and the West, the turn to the East creates the need to take a fresh look at traditional Russian partners. In the current conditions, relations with the states of Central Asia are especially important, since they allow reducing the sanctions pressure. The search for asymmetric responses to the challenges of our time requires the study of various models of international integration and their conceptual foundations.

Of significant interest are the integration structures that did not arise as a result of historically established ties. One of them is the Organization of Turkic States, which

includes the Turkic-speaking states of Central Asia, created by politicians based on the Turkic factor.

We recognize international organizations as social constructs. Such a construct is a phenomenon that exists due to the fact that individuals agree, observing conditional rules, to act as if it exists. Therefore, it is important to conceptually comprehend the evolution of the “Turkic world” construct in the context of the influence of the Turkic factor on the development of international relations in Central Asia.

Materials and Methods

The materials of the study are normative-legal acts of the international and national level.

The following methods were used in the work: the historical-genetic method, which allows revealing the Turkic factor in international relations in Central Asia from the point of view of the evolution of relations, their ideological and value foundations; a systematic method that allows you to explore the regional subsystem of international relations as an integral phenomenon, in the unity of all its connections and relations; the method of event analysis, in which the international political process in the region is presented as a series of political events, each of which has a particular impact on the situation as a whole and behind each of which there are specific actors with their own interests and views; a comparative method that allows you to explore legally significant and legally binding acts signed by participants in the regional subsystem of international relations.

Results

Recently, the adjective “Turkic” has been increasingly heard from the lips of politicians of various scales to define various social constructs. One of the most used is the concept of “Turkic world”, filled depending on the context of socio-political, cultural or geographical content. So, thanks to the initiative of R.T. Erdogan, N.A. Nazarbayev, despite the change in his role in the political life of Kazakhstan, continues to be the “Aksakal of the Turkic world.”

However, the content of the key concept «Turkic world» is not unambiguous. Hence the uncertainty of the concepts derived from the “Turkic world”, including the “Turkic factor”.

In the expert community, various attempts are being made to meaningfully comprehend these concepts. One of the possible approaches can be a concept that is based on the sign of territoriality, that is, on the basis of the historically established territory of the settlement of Turkic-speaking peoples. This concept was guiding for Turkish politicians

during the disintegration of the Soviet Union (9:45), and remains so today¹. Domestic experts perceive the historically established borders of the settlement of Turkic-speaking peoples as the borders of the Turkic world only for the purposes of cultural interaction, as evidenced, for example, by the statement about the need to form polycentric cultural centers in Russia and the countries of Central Asia to level the role of Turkey as the center of the Turkic world², made during the international forum "The Turkic factor in the humanitarian dialogue between Russia and the countries of Central Asia".

The conceptual choice as a criterion for constructing the concept of "Turkic world" of a linguistic feature is an appeal to identity. Moreover, identity, by its very nature, can also be considered as a constructed phenomenon.

Language is one of the universally recognized markers of self-identification of individuals. S. Huntington, who singled out the Turkic sub-civilization of Islamic civilization (7:57), directly pointed to the language as a significant sign of civilizational identity. At the same time, in the international political circulation, the limits of the Turkic world must be considered limited by the territory of recognized Turkic-speaking states. Turkic-speaking Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan can be seen as the Central Asian part of the Turkic world.

However, the analysis of the linguistic situation even within the states of Central Asia does not allow us to speak of an identificationally significant linguistic identity. Despite the geographical proximity and the resulting common historical destiny, the territory of the four Turkic-speaking states of Central Asia is inhabited by speakers of five Turkic languages (excluding representatives of non-titular Turkic-speaking peoples, for example, the Uighurs), which, according to the classification of Turkic languages, belong to four groups (1). When compared with the "other", which in relation to the Central Asian Turkic languages can be Russian, Chinese or Farsi, one can speak of a certain degree of identity of the Turkic languages of the region. The struggle for increasing the degree of identity of the Turkic languages is one of the goals of Turkish policy in the Turkic-speaking space. The transition from Cyrillic to Latin and further to a common alphabet – these are its initial stages, which, despite the difficulties, can be achieved. At the same time, it should be noted that the Russian language continues to remain in the position of the lingua franca for Central Asia, which, among other things, is evidenced by the initiative of the President of Kazakhstan to create an organization to support and promote the Russian language under the auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent States³.

The processes of decentralization in the "late" USSR, which ended with the disintegration of the Union itself, created the necessary conditions for the return of the «Turkic factor» to the political foreground after decades of oblivion.

1 Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan ve Bahçeli, Türk Dünyası Haritası ile poz verdi. [President Erdogan and Bahçeli posed with a map of the Turkish World.] Haber7.com. Available from: <https://www.haber7.com/siyaset/haber/3163248-cumhurbaskani-erdogan-ve-bahceli-turk-dunyasi-haritasi-ile-poz-verdi>

2 The Turkic factor today. The Center for Geopolitical Studies "Berlek-Unity". Available from: <http://berlek-nkp.com/meropriyatiya-obschie/7871-tyurkskiy-faktor-segodnya.html>.

3 Putin Supported Tokayev's Proposal to Create an Organization to Promote the Russian Language. Gazeta.Ru. Available from: www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2022/10/07/18743683.shtml.

The beginning of such a return can be considered the official visit of the President of Turkey T. Ozal at the invitation of the President of the Kazakh SSR N.A. Nazarbayev in March 1991. On March 15, 1991, they signed the "Cooperation Agreement between the Kazakh SSR and the Republic of Turkey", which became the first international treaty of Kazakhstan (the text of the agreement was prepared by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kazakh SSR)⁴. It follows directly from the preamble that the desire for cooperation is motivated by the historical commonality of cultures, language and traditions of peoples⁵.

Despite the normative declaration of the historical commonality of cultures, language and traditions of peoples, it was objectively possible to speak only about a certain linguistic community, since one can speak about the commonality of cultures and their constituent part "traditions only in relation to the Middle Ages.

Thus, the leaders of Soviet Kazakhstan and Turkey in the international political space launched the process of forming such a construct as the "Turkic world", the driving force of which was the inter-Turkic linguistic affinity. As an equally important reason for this process, one should mention the ideology of Turkism, which is the conceptual basis of inter-Turkic unity. But since both sides repeatedly assured about the absence of pan-Turkic aspirations (4:113; 3; 5:102), we will not take it into account, although we will not forget about its presence.

The next significant step was the holding at the end of October 1992 in Ankara of the first summit of the heads of Turkic-speaking states, in which the presidents of all independent Turkic-speaking countries took part. As a result of the summit, the Ankara Declaration was signed, which became the basis for interstate multilateral cooperation of the Turkic-speaking states at the highest level and proof of the acceptance by the leadership of Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan of the spatial construct proposed by N.A. Nazarbaev and T. Ozal.

Of conceptual interest is the preamble of the Ankara Declaration, which contains the motives of the parties that prompted them to start cooperation in the chosen format: «Halklar arasındaki ortak tarih, dil ve kültürden kaynaklanan özel bağları kaydederek...»⁶ (the parties declare the existence of special ties based on the common history, language and culture of the peoples).

A feature of the Ankara Declaration is that on the part of the Republic of Turkey, the document was also signed by the Prime Minister, which, in the conditions of a parliamentary republic, speaks of the importance the Turkish leadership attached to what was happening.

Years later, at the VII summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States, N.A. Nazarbayev, recalling the meeting in the Turkish capital, actually reproducing the

4 Arystanbekova A.H. 30 Years Ago, the First Visit of the President of Turkey to Kazakhstan Took Place. *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*. Available from: <https://kazpravda.kz/articles/view/30-let-nazad-sostoyalsya-pervii-vizit-prezidenta-turtsii-v-kazahstan> (дата обращения 26.09.2020).

5 Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR №336 dated May 28, 1991 "On Submitting For Ratification to the Supreme Soviet of The Kazakh SSR the Agreement on Cooperation Between the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic and the Republic of Turkey" Information and legal system of regulatory legal acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan «Әділет». Available from: <http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P910000336>

6 Ankara Bildirisi (1992). Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler İşbirliği Konseyi. [Ankara Declaration (1992). Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking Countries.] Available from: http://turkkon.org/Assets/dokuman/11_AnkaraBildirisi1992_1.DevletBaskanlariZirvesi_20140418_104048.pdf.

content of the preamble of the Ankara Declaration, said that "only the first months of the history of the new independent states in Central Asia were going on, but already at that time we clearly understood the special significance of relations between our fraternal peoples based on commonality history, language, culture and traditions". Through the Ankara Declaration, according to the first President of Kazakhstan, the will and determination of the fraternal countries "to develop mutual cooperation in the wide area of the Turkic world" was recorded⁷.

At the same time, the Nazarbayev–Ozal initiative was a bid for leadership within the framework of the emerging construct, at the same time for leadership at different levels.

Turkish claims to leadership in the Turkic world at that time were taken for granted in the post-Soviet republics, because Ankara assumed an unspoken obligation to ensure the favorable integration of the newly emerging states into the world community (6).

Claims N.A. Nazarbayev were claims for leadership in the Central Asian part of the Turkic world, which was tantamount to claims for leadership in post-Soviet Central Asia, which could not be fully realized against the will of Uzbekistan. The constant competition between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, rooted in the Soviet period and continuing to the present, has determined that there is still no regional leader (2:7).

The second summit of the heads of Turkic-speaking states took place on October 18–19, 1994 in Istanbul. As a result of the summit, the presidents signed the first Istanbul Declaration⁸, the content of which was in line with the international agenda. Considerable attention was paid to the issues of peace, security and stability. Thus, the parties called for a peaceful resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, issues related to the situation around Tajikistan and Afghanistan, as well as the situations in Cyprus, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The parties agree to provide assistance and show solidarity in the event of war, natural disasters and other emergencies⁹.

Education is one of the most significant aspects in the issue of forming the identity of an individual; it is also the main tool for homogenizing the language environment. Therefore, for example, the Kyrgyz-Turkish University "Manas" financed and managed on a parity basis implements the following mission:

joint training of those who strive for lifelong education, including representatives of Turkic-speaking states and communities, the training of highly qualified, with moral principles and universal values, a high sense of responsibility to society, modern, able to compete in the

⁷ The VII summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States was Held in Baku. Official website of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Available from: <https://ru.president.az/articles/34442>

⁸ İstanbul Bildirisi (1994). Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler İşbirliği Konseyi. [The Istanbul Declaration (1994). Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking Countries.] Available from: http://turkkon.org/Assets/dokuman/10_IstanbulBildirisi1994_2.DevletBaskanlariZirveBildirisi_20140418_103924.pdf. (date of application: 30.01.2018)

⁹ Bışkek Bildirisi (1995). Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler İşbirliği Konseyi. [The Bishkek Declaration (1995). Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking Countries.] Available from: http://turkkon.org/Assets/dokuman/09_BiskekBildirisi1995_3.DevletBaskanlariZirveBildirisi_20140418_103851.pdf. (date of application: 30.01.2018).

international labor market, able to contribute to the world education system, including the education system of the Turkic world of personalities¹⁰.

The first intermediate result of the development of the Nazarbayev–Ozal initiative was the Tashkent summit, held in October 1996. The key event of the meeting was the decision to establish a secretariat for meetings of heads of state¹¹. The Secretariat was entrusted with the functions of preparing materials for meetings of the heads of Turkic-speaking states and heads of foreign affairs agencies, holding events aimed at promoting the language, culture and achievements of the Turkic-speaking states, and providing opportunities for publications about the life of the Turkic peoples.

Within the framework of the "Turkic World" construct – in its international political understanding – a primary institutionalizing structure was created to ensure the development of the interstate integration process, which indicates that the heads of state – the subjects of construction – have agreed on general conditional rules that all participants will follow. integration process. Thus, the initial stage of the formation of the "Turkic world" construct, realized by the willful efforts of the heads of the Turkic-speaking states exclusively, has ended.

The Istanbul meeting in 1994 can be considered the next step in the process of constructing the Turkic world, since the initiative of Nazarbayev–Ozal moved into practice.

Separately, it should be said in connection with the Second Summit that the Turkish side focused on the situations in Cyprus, as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is an attempt to consider (in accordance with the ideas of a certain part of the Turkish elite (8)) these states that arose on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire as an integral part of the Turkic world. Thus, the boundaries of the implementation of the Nazarbayev–Ozal concept are being fixed.

In August 1995, the third summit meeting of the heads of Turkic-speaking states took place in Bishkek. The most important in the context of promoting the Nazarbayev–Ozal idea was the decision to establish joint higher educational institutions

Conclusion

The fruit of the political thought of Nazarbayev–Ozal, which has turned from abstraction into an applied version in five years, confirmed the possibility of implementing integration projects in the international political sphere within the framework of constructivism, where not only the construct, but also its institutionalizing basis exist due

¹⁰ The Mission of the University. Kyrgyz-Turkish University "Manas" official website. Available from: http://intl.manas.edu.kg/ru/about_manas/mission (date of application 20.02.2021).

¹¹ Taşkent Bildirisi (1996). [The Tashkent Declaration (1996). Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking Countries.] Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler İşbirliği Konseyi. Available from: http://turkkon.org/Assets/dokuman/08_TaskentBildirisi1996_4.DevletBaskanlariZirveBildirisi_20140418_103822.pdf. (date of application: 30.01.2018).

to the fact that individuals agree, observing conditional rules, act as if they exist. At the same time, the Turkic factor in relation to Central Asia can be considered as one of the institutionalizing components for regional international relations.

References

1. Baskakov N.A. On the classification of Turkic languages. *Izvestiya AN SSSR. Otdelenie literatury i yazyka*. [Izvestia of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Department of Literature and Language]. 1952; XI(2):121–134. (in Russian)
2. Zvyagelskaya I.D. The Middle East and Central Asia: Global trends in regional variant. Moscow: Aspect Press, 2019: 224. (in Russian)
3. Koritsky S.A. The Turkic summit in Antalya. The official website of the Institute of the Middle East. URL: <http://www.iimes.ru/?p=5165> (in Russian).
4. Parubochaya E.F. The Summits of the Turkic States (1992–2001): a real platform for rapprochement? *Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta* [Bulletin of Volgograd State University] 2011; Ser. 4, History; 1(19):113–120. (in Russian).
5. Parubochaya E.F. The Summits of the Turkic States (2006–2010): a real platform for the rapprochement of countries. *Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta* [Bulletin of Volgograd State University]. 2011; Ser. 4, History; 2(20): 98–105. (in Russian)
6. Troitsky E.F. Turkey's policy in Central Asia (1992–2000). URL: <http://sun.tsu.ru/mminfo/000063105/328/image/328-084.pdf> (in Russian).
7. Huntington S. Clash of Civilizations. Moscow: AST, 2017:576. (in Russian).
8. Abdullah Gül. Horizons of Turkish Foreign Policy in the New Century. [Yeni Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikasının Ufukları]. URL: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/BAKANLIK/BAKANLAR/AbdullahGul_kitap.pdf (in Turkish)
9. Davutoğlu A. Strategic Depth. The International Position of Turkey. [Stratejik Derinlik. Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu]. Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2013. 584 p. (in Turkish).

About the author

Rustem N. NADYROV. CandSc(Hist.). Assistant of the Department of International Relations, World Politics and Diplomacy of the Kazan Federal University. <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0930-2748>. Address: room 318, Pushkin str., 1/55, Kazan, 420111, Russian Federation, Nadyrovrn@mail.ru

Contribution of the author

The author declares no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Submitted: October 14, 2022. Approved after peer reviewing: October 29, 2022.

Accepted for publication: November 1, 2022. Published: December 21, 2022.

The author has read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROCESSES

International relations

Original article

Political sciences

[https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4\(6\)-60-83](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4(6)-60-83)

Topical Issues of Cross-Border Cooperation Research

Kairat A. Abdrakhmanov^{1a}, Sergey V. Doholyan^{2b}, Taissiya V. Marmontova^{3c}, Nikolay M. Mezhevich^{4d}, Viktor A. Sapryka^{5e}, Igor P. Sitov^{6f}, Galina A. Khmeleva^{7g}, Mikhail M. Chernyshov⁸ⁱ

¹International Science Complex "Astana", Astana, Kazakhstan

²Institute of Socio-Economic Research – a separate division Dagestan Federal Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Makhachkala, Russia

³Kazakhstan Institute of Public Development, Astana, Kazakhstan

⁴Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

⁵Institute of Cross-Border Cooperation and Integration, Belgorod, Russia
Belgorod State National Research Institute, Belgorod, Russia

⁶Saint Petersburg State University of Economics, Saint Petersburg, Russia

⁷Institute of International Studies of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University) Russian Foreign Ministry, Moscow, Russia

⁸Samara State University of Economics, Samara, Russia

⁹Institute of Market Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
National Research Institute for Development Communications, Moscow, Russia

^aoffice@isca.kz, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5389-0608>

^bsergsvd@mail.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4609-448X>

^ct.marmontova@kipd.kz, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9162-297>

^dmez13@mail.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4312-4228>

^esapryka@icbci.info, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0506-3644>

^fipsitov@yandex.com

^gas.xxsg@yandex.ru

^hgalina-a-khmeleva@yandex.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4953-9560>

ⁱmcherny@bk.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0811-1867>

Annotation. The National Research Institute for Development Communications (NICRUS) initiated an expert project «Models of cross-border cooperation: current theoretical and methodological approaches». Within the framework of it, leading scientists and experts on integration and regional development conducted an analysis of topical issues and approaches to the study of cross-border cooperation. The article presents the main theses of the project's foresight session and an expert assessment of trends in cross-border cooperation in the context of the transformation of the world order.

Keywords: cross-border cooperation, integration, region, macroregion, novorossiysk federal district, cross-border management, model of cross-border cooperation.

For citation: Abdrakhmanov K.A., Doholyan S.V., Marmontova T.V., Mezhevich N.M., Sapryka V.A., Sitov I.P., Khmeleva G.A., Chernyshov M.M. Topical Issues of Cross-Border Cooperation Research. *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue. 2022; 4(6): 60-83.* [https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4\(6\)-60-83](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4(6)-60-83)

Introduction

On October 4, 2022, after the adoption of the relevant constitutional laws, 4 new subjects became part of the Russian Federation: Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, Kherson and Zaporozhye regions. This historic event and its consequences made it necessary to change the list of Russian border and border geostrategic territories. If after the return of Crimea and Sevastopol to Russia in 2014, the countries of the collective West, having reduced the scale of investment interaction with Russia, limited themselves to a small package of economic and individual sanctions, then the new stage of anti-Russian sanctions in 2022 has an unprecedented scale and completely paralyzed cross-border cooperation on the western borders of Russia (with the exception of Belarus).

Along with the negative trends in Russia's relations with European countries, in 2022 there was an intensification of economic ties in the southern (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Iran, India, Turkey) and eastern directions (PRC).

The need to change Russia's foreign policy strategy, the so-called "pivot to the East", was proclaimed back in 2012 as a factor in the development of Siberia and the Far East. In 2014, the development of cooperation with Asian partners helped Russia absorb the negative consequences of worsening relations with the United States and its allies. In 2022, there is a large-scale reversal of Russia's economic ties to the south and east, already in the interests of the economy of the whole country. The importance of the Black Sea and Caspian areas of cooperation is growing, including the development of the international North-South transport corridor to gain wide access to the goods of Azerbaijan, Iran and India.

The definition of the geographical boundaries of cross-border cooperation (municipality, region, macro-region), the choice of specific approaches for various territorial levels (1) are being updated. It is necessary to improve the definition of border areas, which currently establishes the existence of a land border as a mandatory criterion. Because of this, many regions with significant potential are not included in cross-border cooperation (for example, St. Petersburg, the Arkhangelsk and Novgorod regions, and others). It is advisable to expand the criteria for classifying a region as a border area, taking into account transport accessibility, the intensity of international relations with neighboring countries, the possibility of using waterways (coastal navigation), the unity of the ecosystem, ethnic culture, and others. Also, in the new geopolitical conditions, there is a need to identify specific formats for Russia's cross-border cooperation for the CIS countries (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine), the EAEU (Belarus, Kazakhstan), the European Union (Poland, Latvia,

Lithuania, Estonia, Norway, Finland), the Asia-Pacific Region (China, Mongolia, North Korea).

To discuss these problems and develop common approaches to research on the platform of the National Research Institute for the Communications Development with the participation of leading scientists from Moscow, St. Petersburg, Dagestan, Samara and Belgorod regions, an expert project "Models of cross-border cooperation: topical theoretical and methodological approaches" is being implemented. This article reflects the results of the first foresight session of the project.

Materials and Methods

The research materials were scientific publications, publications in periodicals, questioning of experts. In the course of the study, general scientific methods were used, including methods of system analysis, synthesis, and methods of expert assessments, modeling, and others.

Results

Experience of cross-border cooperation in new conditions

Cross-border cooperation as a format of economic and humanitarian integration remains relevant for Russia, despite the tension in relations with European countries.

The modern world is moving from globalization to the formation of separate macro-regions. Insufficiently integrated frontiers of these macro-regions can be a source of instability, and in the context of aggravated global confrontation and rivalry, they can be contested by neighboring unfriendly states. On the contrary, the establishment of strong ties in the border areas, the removal of the barrier functions of the border with neighboring friendly states can be considered as a natural and necessary step in terms of the formation and development of a single Eurasian space.

The change in the list of border territories is directly related to the prospects for Russia's relations with its neighbors, especially along the entire perimeter from the Norwegian border to the Azerbaijani one. Now this border performs mainly a barrier function, and the line of the Russian-Ukrainian border is an open military confrontation (which brings to the fore the task of ensuring border security to the detriment of everyone else). In this regard, on the western borders (with the exception of the Belarusian one), humanitarian, economic and political ties of the border territories turned out to be frozen.

It is important to consider cross-border cooperation from the standpoint of the development of Russian regions and the improvement of the welfare of the population. At present, the standard of living in the western border regions of Russia is significantly

inferior to the countries of the European Union and even the Republic of Belarus. For neighboring states to be interested in long-term cooperation with Russian regions, they must be attractive and successful in the socio-economic and humanitarian spheres. Special federal support is needed for the accelerated development of border areas, including through the implementation of large-scale infrastructure projects at the interregional and macro-regional levels.

One of the organizational and managerial decisions could be the creation of a new Novorossk macro-region and federal district by separating the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol from the southern macro-region and the federal district, including the Donetsk and Lugansk republics, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions in this structure. The experience of integration into the Russian legal and administrative space accumulated by Crimea and Sevastopol will help speed up these processes in the new territories.

When creating programs for the development of border areas, a thorough analysis of what underlies cross-border cooperation is necessary. For some, this is trade and economic cooperation, for others it is just trade, for others it is cultural ties, for others it is the separation of families, friends, human contacts that have developed over decades. Basically, these are "linear" ties, but multi-vector, systemic ones are needed, for example, the creation of joint ventures, a system of mutual investments. Not a single cooperation, not a single agreement, not a single integration scheme works if people do not see its results, if they do not understand that it is beneficial for them. The benefits of cross-border cooperation must be confirmed by concrete visible results.

Historically, border areas were attractive because, along with legal channels of commodity flows, there were smuggled supplies of products and raw materials, which provided additional benefits to economic activity. So Odessa in 1817 received the status of a free port (duty-free trade regime), which instantly increased business activity dozens of times, turning the provincial city into one of the world's major shopping centers. The well-known expression "all smuggling is done in Odessa" reflects real economic processes, including the production of counterfeit goods.

Under the conditions of international sanctions, Russia is forced to use such means as compulsory licenses, parallel imports, "shadow fleet". This opens up opportunities for the introduction of special economic regimes for the Black Sea and Caspian border regions, focused on export-import operations with sub-sanctioned goods. In this regard, it is important to reconsider the definition of border regions, expanding their list by those that have opportunities for coastal navigation (primarily along the Black Sea - to Turkey and the Caspian Sea - to Iran).

Such formats of cross-border cooperation will help, on the one hand, control the "gray commodity flows" by the state, and, on the other hand, mitigate the responsibility of the state for the forced violation of international law.

Such prospects apply to a lesser extent to cross-border cooperation in the Baltic Sea area, although they are possible for a number of regions (for example, St. Petersburg, the Kaliningrad region) in the presence of a European partner country.

The regions adjacent to the Russian-Chinese border are in completely different conditions. 30 years ago they were transformed into transit regions. The modern multiple increase in commodity flows makes it necessary to form transport and logistics hubs in them as soon as possible. And here we are talking about cross-border cooperation.

From 2007 to 2021, significant theoretical and practical experience in cross-border cooperation has been accumulated, primarily with the countries of the European Union and Norway.

Although the Russia-EU programs have never reached the highest level of cross-border cooperation defined by the EGTC standards, Russia has gained valuable experience in mastering the advanced tools and understanding of the necessary level of institutionalization of this process. The standards of European cross-border cooperation programs can be used in all Russian border areas. In this regard, it is optimal to develop a common model of cross-border cooperation for all Russian regions. And the specifics of each of them can be taken into account at the local level in the course of the actual implementation of international obligations.

In this regard, an example already functioning in Russia is the interregional cooperation of the Russian Federation with the CIS countries, where model agreements are supplemented by road maps and well-developed plans and developed plans for their implementation. Unification has another positive effect - a unified approach to the state's participation in future cross-border cooperation programs.

Cross-border cooperation is part of the integration process; its full implementation largely depends on the actual intentions of the parties involved to implement the integration. This depends not only on economic feasibility, but also on the political will of the parties involved. It is unacceptable to use the formats of cross-border cooperation for economic development and the gradual separation of the involved territories from Russia.

Practice shows that the region as a whole has economic capabilities that allow it to conduct effective economic activity even with geographically distant partners. Therefore, an artificial focus on cross-border ties can harm the rational distribution of available resources. At the same time, in a depressed economic and social situation, in order not to lose the competition for labor resources, a number of Russian border municipalities need to create more comfortable living conditions for the population and significantly improve their well-being. But the infrastructure projects necessary for this require significant investments, and the interaction of state bodies and the synchronization of existing legal regimes is most often beyond the competence of municipal authorities. In this regard, cross-border cooperation programs should be organized by the decision of the federal authorities of the countries involved with the formation of the budget for programs in the areas of cross-border cooperation (based on the complexity of the tasks for sustainable development of territories) from public funds, and be supervised at the level of interested federal ministries.

Although the municipality is the basic management level of cross-border cooperation, it should also be possible to determine the geographical scope of cross-border programs in each case separately, depending on the actual characteristics and needs of municipalities.

In some cases, it may be expedient to involve, for example, regional capitals, since economic, scientific, human resources are concentrated in large cities and it is unreasonable to refuse to use them for a positive effect from the proposed projects.

Cross-border cooperation and integration

Even in the context of a limited geography of cooperation, a low level of cooperation and economic ties at the regional and municipal levels, the importance of cross-border cooperation is that it increases the degree of integration in supranational entities (the Eurasian Economic Union, the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization etc.).

Within the framework of the Union State, all regions of the Republic of Belarus cooperate with almost all regions of Russia. Therefore, bilateral cooperation has gone beyond the geographical boundaries of border areas and has become an integral part of a multidirectional integration process. A new special cross-border cooperation program is needed, focusing on three Belarusian (Vitebsk, Gomel and Mogilev) and three Russian (Bryansk, Pskov and Smolensk) regions (4). This program can be adopted at the level of the Union State and should be aimed at strengthening socio-economic, political and humanitarian bilateral contacts.

There are more than seventy centers in Russia with the term "Eurasian integration" in their names (6). And Eurasian integration, including in the European-Asian Economic Union, is impossible without the cooperation of the regions, which are an integral part of the countries that are members of the union. Therefore, the level of cross-border cooperation will inevitably affect the effectiveness of integration processes not only within the EAEU, but also in the SCO, and also, to a certain extent, in the CSTO.

It is necessary to classify cross-border cooperation, which depends on both current interstate relations and the prospects for integration projects (5). This will allow us to come up with standard software solutions and cases for specific border areas.

Conceptual and programmatic components of cross-border cooperation

The task of socio-economic development of border geostrategic territories is set in the Strategy for Spatial Development of the Russian Federation until 2025. This task is also present in the development strategies of the subjects of the Russian Federation.

Russia has adopted the Concept of Cross-Border Cooperation. Over the past twenty years, two editions of this concept have already been adopted in Russia - in 2001 and in 2020. Significant changes have been made to the latest edition, taking into account the current international situation. In February 2021, the Government of Russia approved a plan for the implementation of the Cross-Border Cooperation Concept. An analysis of these documents shows that a number of provisions again need to be revised, taking into account the new geopolitical realities. There is a need to revise agreements with the EU countries on

participation in the programs of the Black Sea basin and the Arctic. It is important to consider the implementation of some other provisions (including the promotion of international transport corridors, export-import, transit transport links and bilateral transport).

In 2015, the Concept for the Development of Border Territories for the Regions of the Far Eastern Federal District was adopted. It defines the «Far Eastern border territories» as the territories of municipalities of the regions bordering the PRC and the DPRK. The concept describes their current state, specifies the goals, objectives and priority areas of state policy, names the time frame, risks and expected results of the concept implementation. Certain provisions of the Concept need to be updated, taking into account the priority of the "Eastern vector" in Russian foreign policy (7). At the same time, this Concept is an example of creating a specific strategic planning document in the field of cross-border cooperation for a specific macro-region of Russia. In our opinion, this experience should be extended to other macro-regions defined in the Strategy for Spatial Development of the Russian Federation until 2025, which have border areas.

At the same time, it must be remembered that cross-border cooperation is not only the presence of a common land border, but also a system of economic and humanitarian international relations at different levels (2). Therefore, in defining border areas, one should take into account not only the border factor, but also the potential of international relations, transport accessibility, and ethno-cultural community.

Cross-border models of cross-border cooperation

Overcoming the stereotypical perception of the border as a barrier to multidimensional integration has led to the emergence of the phenomenon of cross-border partnerships, which is focused on the implementation of joint projects and the development of border areas (8). Cross-border relations are established between at least two partners operating on both sides of the border. Such cooperation is carried out, as a rule, on the microscale of specific conditions of the transboundary environment, determined by the political, economic and socio-cultural contexts (Figure 1).

As the Scandinavian experience shows, cooperation in cross-border partnerships, as a rule, is based on short-term relationships, which subsequently do not always lead to sustainable long-term relationships. At present, for cross-border cooperation, Russia uses methods of vertically oriented management, where the main subject is the state (an agreement is signed, a plan of joint actions is developed, the authorities carry out organizational work and control the implementation of the plan). In our opinion, this does not sufficiently take into account the factor of motivation and stimulation of stakeholders (primarily local communities and businesses), which deprives cross-border cooperation of flexibility. In this regard, for the transition of a short-term cross-border partnership to a long-term one, a flexible problem-oriented approach is needed, based on the application of the best practices of project and program management and digitalization.

The tools of a flexible problem-oriented approach are programs, projects, and a digital platform. The goal of the program may be to improve the level and quality of

life of the population of the border regions on the basis of cross-border cooperation. The program should be implemented on the principles of equal and mutually beneficial cooperation, respect, sovereignty; it should support the exchange and transfer of experience, the implementation of innovative approaches, interaction between authorities, business and the population. Financing of such a program should be carried out on a parity basis. For the countries of the European-Asian Economic Union, the operator of financing is the Eurasian Development Bank. The priorities of the program are determined by the goals, priorities, key strategies and plans of the participating countries. Program beneficiaries can collaborate on any topic within the identified priorities.

For the development of cross-border interaction, it is promising to use modern models based on the ecosystem approach within the framework of the platform economy. A digital platform of the Russian Export Center has been created in Russia, where potential exporters can receive the necessary information on various aspects of foreign economic activity, consultations, and receive training. Regional offices of the Russian Export Center, in our opinion, could become a link between potential participants in cross-border cooperation. It is also possible to create a separate regional platform with the possibility of further integration with the platform of the Russian Export Center.

A diagram of such a model of cross-border cooperation is shown in Figure 2. For its implementation, it is necessary to create a platform to which all potential participants in cross-border cooperation (state and municipal structures, interested business and representatives of the local community) can be connected. Participants of the cross-border partnership can use the platform to generate requests for solving problems, create and implement joint projects (including those with the possibility of state co-financing).


In the future, such a platform will make it possible to create an interstate electronic document management that will reduce the time and cost of processing (including customs) projects and transactions. In general, the ecosystem approach and the platform economy imply a significant expansion of the range of services demanded by participants in cross-border interaction.

Expert assessment of factors and levels of cross-border cooperation

For the purposes of the study, a questionnaire survey was conducted among the participants of the foresight session. Based on the analysis of the results of the survey, conducted using the methods of expert assessments, the influence of cross-border cooperation factors for the levels of government (municipality, region, macro-region) is highlighted.

Figure 3 shows the results of assessing the impact on the development of the basic elements of cross-border cooperation for different levels of the subject of management (municipality, region, macroregion). Experts note a high (7–8 points) degree of influence A (the presence of cooperation between economic entities) at all levels of government,


Figure 1. Model of flexible cross-border management (by G.A. Khmeleva)



Source: compiled by the authors

the presence of a border contact line (B) has an average degree of influence (5–6 points). Influence C (transport and logistics corridors) is maximum at the level of the macro-region (8 points) and region (7.4 points), minimum – at the level of the municipality (5 points). Guarantees of foreign investment and property (D) are the most significant at the level of the macro-region (8 points) and the region (7.6 points), the least – at the level of the municipality (5.4 points). Administrative and customs barriers (E) have the maximum impact at the regional level (8 points), the minimum – at the level of the macro-region (5.5 points) and the municipality (6.2 points). F (cross-border trade) influences to the maximum extent at the level of the municipality (8.2 points), to the minimum extent – at the level of the macro-region (5.5 points) and the region (6.2 points). Family and personal ties (G) are the most significant at the level of the municipality (7 points) and the region (6.4 points), the least - at the level of the macro-region (4 points). For elements H (common language) and I (common culture), the influence at different levels is approximately the same (6.4–7 and 6.4–6.6 points, respectively). The importance of element J (common historical roots) is the same at the level of the region and municipality (5 points) and increases at the level of the macro-region (6.75 points).

Thus, at the level of the municipality, F (cross-border trade), G (family and personal ties) and I (community of culture) influence to the maximum extent. At the regional level - B (border contact line) and E (administrative and customs barriers). At the macro-region level - A (the existence of cooperation between economic entities), C (transport and logistics corridors), D (guarantees of foreign investment and property), H (common language) and J (common historical roots). The results obtained can be used in determining the subjects of jurisdiction and powers of the federal government, subjects of the Russian Federation and municipalities in the field of cross-border cooperation.

Figure 2. Diagram of the cross-border cooperation model in the platform management economy (by G.A. Khmeleva)

The experts ranked the formats for realizing the potential of cross-border cooperation for different levels of the subject of management (the results of the assessment are shown in Figure 4).

According to the assessment, A. (cross-border production clusters) has a significant impact at the level of the region and macro-region (8 points), and at the level of the municipality - only an average (6 points). B (free economic zones) is recognized as the most effective at the regional level (8.6 points), less effective at the macro-region level (7 points) and municipality (6 points). International cross-border territories (C) have the greatest impact on the realization of the potential of cross-border cooperation at the level of the region (8 points) and the macro-region (7.6 points), and to the least extent - at the level of the municipality (5.8 points). D (transit centers) has approximately the same impact at all levels (municipality - 6.8; region and macro-region - 7.4). Joint management of the same territory by several states (E) is recognized by experts as significant at the municipality level (8 points), at other levels the levels are considered minimal (region - 5 points, macro-region - 4.25 points). Thus, the experts believe that the size of the territories of joint management and functionality will be close to the size and functions of the municipality.

The results of the assessment by experts of the localization of the potential for cross-border cooperation and the use of digital technologies for different levels of the subject of management are presented in Figure 5. The geographical boundaries of the potential for cross-border cooperation are most localized at the level of the municipality (8.6 points) and the region (7.2 points), to a lesser extent degree - at the macro-region level (5.2 points). The use of modern digital technologies is most significant at the level of the region (8 points) and macro-region (7.6 points), to the least - at the municipal level (6.6 points). The possibility of creating an integral system of indicators and a model of the impact of cross-border cooperation on the development of the territory is attributed


by experts to a greater extent to the level of the macro-region (8.8 points) and the region (6.8 points) and slightly to the level of the municipality (4 points). This indicates the need to form management structures in the field of cross-border cooperation, mainly at the macro-regional and regional levels.

Experts assessed the prospects for Russia's cross-border cooperation formats for a number of CIS countries, the EAEU, the European Union, and the Asia-Pacific region (Figure 6). Based on the aggregate scores, three countries received a score close to the maximum: Kazakhstan (88.5% of the maximum), Belarus (84.9%), China (78.1%). For Kazakhstan, the main prospects are associated with the organization of cross-border production clusters and the creation of transit centers (9.5 points). For Belarus, the creation of free economic zones received the highest rating (9.25 points). For China - the creation of transit centers (8.8 points). For these three countries, the cases of joint management of the same territory by several states (E) received the lowest score.

The second group of countries with high prospects: Azerbaijan (67.6%, priority - the creation of transit centers - 9 points, at least - cases of joint management of the territory - 4 points) and Mongolia (58.8%, priority - the creation of free economic zones, at least - creation of international cross-border territories - 4.75 points).

The third group of countries has medium prospects: Finland (43.2%, priority - the creation of transit centers - 6.5 points, minimum - the creation of international cross-border territories - 3 points), North Korea (37.2%, priority - the creation of cross-border production clusters - 5 points, minimum - creation of international cross-border territories - 2.5 points), Georgia (38.8%, priority - creation of free economic zones - 5.5 points, minimum - international cross-border territories - 2.6 points).

The fourth group of countries has low prospects: Ukraine (26%, priority - E. cases of joint territory management - 5 points, at least - international cross-border territories and transit centers - 1 point), Poland (22%, priority - cross-border production clusters - 5 points, minimum - E. cases of joint management of the territory), Norway (21.2%, priority - E. cases of joint management of the territory - 3 points, minimum - the creation of free economic zones - 1.6 points). Although almost all formats of cross-border cooperation between Russia and Ukraine are now recognized as unpromising, experts identify as a likely option for the joint management of the same territory by several states, when, under a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine, Ukrainian territories that need to be controlled by both countries may be under Russian control (possibly also with the participation of the UN) - now this refers to the small territories of the Mykolaiv and Kharkiv regions of Ukraine. The need for joint control of territories may be caused, in particular, by the prevention of repressions against Ukrainian citizens who collaborated with the Russian military administration. All this indicates the need for the earliest possible development of scientific and legal foundations for the management of such territories, the conditions for their socio-economic and humanitarian development. The high assessment of Norway was influenced by the presence of a free economic zone on the Svalbard archipelago, where two mining companies mainly operate - the Norwegian Norske and the Russian Arktikugol.

Figure 3. The influence of the basic elements of cross-border cooperation on the development of different levels of the subject of management (municipality, region, macroregion)

Source: compiled by the authors on a survey of participants in the foresight session


Experts assess the prospects for the fifth group of countries as low. The group includes Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia with estimates for all cooperation formats of 15% of the maximum, the most promising for the creation of transit centers – 2 points, the least is for the E (cases of joint territory management) - 1 point.

A number of regions of Russia do not have a land external border, but they carry out active external relations, having a sea border in the zone of small cabotage. The experts assessed the prospects for cross-border cooperation with the CIS countries, the European Union, the USA, Turkey, Iran, South Korea and Japan (Figure 7).

In the context of anti-Russian sanctions, the use of the potential of the Caspian Sea border area has the greatest prospects, as there is an almost twofold increase in cooperation with Iran (+3.25 points) and small prospects for cooperation with Turkmenistan (+0.26 points).

At the Black Sea border area, there is an increase in prospects in cooperation with Turkey (+0.75 points) and a significant decrease with Romania (-1.75 points) and Bulgaria (-2 points).

For the Baltic Sea border area, experts also note a decrease in the potential for cooperation with Denmark (-2.75 points), Sweden (-3.25 points), Germany (-3.75 points).

Figure 4. Ranking of formats of cross-border cooperation potential by importance for different levels of the subject of management (municipality, region, macroregion)


Source: compiled by the authors on a survey of participants in the foresight session

In the Asia-Pacific direction, experts assessed the intensity of the decrease in the potential for cooperation as the maximum: with the United States (-3 points), South Korea (-3.5 points), Japan (-4 points).


As we see in Figure 7, a comparison by experts of the prospects for multilateral ethnocultural interaction shows that for the regions of the countries of the Russian World (-0.1), the East Asian cultural sphere (+0.05) and the Uighur-Mongol-Tungus-Manchu peoples (+0.2) the impact of anti-Russian sanctions is considered minimal. For the regions of the Baltic Sea countries (-4.8) and the Arctic Council (-3.55) - the maximum. To a lesser extent, the introduction of anti-Russian sanctions affected the interaction with the regions of the Central Asian countries (+1.2), and for the regions of the Turkic world (+1.5) and the Black Sea (-2.15) the impact is more significant.

The experts assessed the degree of statistical indicators (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J) to determine the potential for cross-border cooperation for different levels of management entities (municipality, region, macro-region), the results of the assessment are shown in the diagram (Figure 8). All indicators were considered significant. Experts recognized the regional level as the key for all indicators (77.8% of the maximum), the second place was taken by the municipal (69.4%), and the macro-regional (62.75%) was third. In two cases (indicators F. area of international migration and H. transport infrastructure and accessibility), the importance of the macro-region exceeds the importance of the municipality. In one case (I. income of the population and consumer demand), the significance of the municipality and the region coincided at the maximum point.


The results of the assessment can be used to determine the potential of cross-border cooperation in strategic planning, in budget planning, in the distribution of functions between executive authorities of different levels.

Figure 5. Assessment of localization of the potential of cross-border cooperation and the use of digital technologies for different levels of the subject of management (municipality, region, macroregion)

Source: compiled by the authors on a survey of participants in the foresight session

Figure 6. Assessment of the prospects of Russia's cross-border cooperation formats for the CIS countries, the EAEU, the European Union, and the Asia-Pacific region

Source: compiled by the authors on a survey of participants in the foresight session

Figure 7. Assessment of the prospects for the potential of cross-border cooperation of Russia in the situation of only a maritime border in the zone of small cabotage with the CIS countries, the European Union, the USA, Turkey, Iran, South Korea, Japan

Source: compiled by the authors on a survey of participants in the foresight session


Conclusion

Because of the change in the state border line of Russia, changes are required to the list of border and geostrategic territories.

It is necessary to update the Concept of cross-border cooperation of Russia, to develop appropriate concepts for all macro-regions of Russia.

It is necessary to improve the definition of the border area, taking into account not only the presence of a land border, but also a sea border in the small cabotage zone, as well as the overall potential for cross-border cooperation in the region, transport accessibility, and ethnocultural community.

Now most of the western border of Russia performs a barrier function. It is necessary to create new formats of cross-border cooperation in the conditions of unfriendly relations between neighboring countries.

Figure 8. Assessment of prospects for the use of multilateral ethno-cultural interaction

Source: compiled by the authors on a survey of participants in the foresight session


It is expedient to create in Russia on the basis of the Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, the Donetsk and Luhansk republics, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions of a new macro-region and a federal district.

A special federal program is needed to accelerate the development of border areas, including through the implementation of large-scale infrastructure projects.

At the level of the Union State, it is expedient to implement a special cross-border cooperation program for the Vitebsk, Gomel, Mogilev, Bryansk, Pskov and Smolensk regions.

In the context of anti-Russian sanctions, it is necessary to introduce special economic regimes in the border areas to speed up export-import operations with sanctioned goods.

It is necessary to develop scientific and legal foundations for the joint management of one territory by several states at the municipal level of government.

Figure 9. Assessment of the adequacy of statistical indicators (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J) to determine the potential of cross-border cooperation for different levels of the subject of management (municipality, region, macroregion)

Source: compiled by the authors on a survey of participants in the foresight session

The development of a common model of cross-border cooperation for the regions of Russia is relevant. The author's model of cross-border cooperation in the platform management economy is proposed.

All levels of government (municipality, region, macro-region) are significant for the implementation of the function of cross-border cooperation. For the formation of control and monitoring systems, the main managerial link is the regional one.

In modern conditions, Russia has the greatest prospects for cross-border cooperation with Kazakhstan, Belarus and China (along the land border), with Iran and Turkey (along the sea border).

For the countries of the Russian world, the Uighur-Mongol-Tungus-Manchurian peoples and the East Asian cultural sphere, anti-Russian sanctions had practically no effect on the prospects for multilateral ethno-cultural interaction. For the countries of Central Asia and the Turkic world, the prospects are slightly reduced. For the Black Sea countries, the decline is more significant, while for the countries of the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Council, the prospects are assessed as very low.

It is necessary to continue the joint research work of a group of experts in the field of cross-border cooperation between Russian regions (macro-regions) in the new conditions.

References

1. Dokholyan S.V. Methodological approaches to the assessment and analysis of the competitiveness of the region. Issues of structuring the economy. 2009;1:46-50. (In Russian)
2. Komleva V.V., Zhulikova O.V. International humanitarian cooperation: the Eurasian context: scientific report. Moscow: Scientific Library. 2020: 68. (In Russian)
3. Marmontova T.V. The Kazakh-Russian border area in the "Greater Altai" region as an emerging functional region. The World of the Greater Altai. 2015; №1(1): 81– 88. (In Russian)
4. Mezhevich N.M. Cross-border cooperation and practice of euro regions in the North-West of Russia and in the Republic of Belarus: practical experience, legislative support. Saint Petersburg: Levsha Publishing House. 2009:260. (In Russian)
5. Sapryka V.A. Models of cross-border and interregional cooperation. Belgorod: BNIU "BelGU", 2016:220. (In Russian)
6. Stoppe A.G. The communication component of Eurasian cooperation in the modern geopolitical situation. Problems of the modern economy. 2019;3 (71):22-24. (In Russian)
7. Tsvetkov V.A., Zoydov K.H., Medkov A.A., Chernyshov M.M. Formation of global Eurasia: problems of transit systems conjunction. Moscow: IPR RAS, 2018: 131. (In Russian)
8. Khmeleva G.A., Umerbayeva S.K. The economic potential of the border location as a factor of increasing the level of socio-economic development of the region. Bulletin of the Samara State University. Economics and Management. 2015; № 9/1 (131): 48-54. (In Russian)
9. Khmeleva G.A. Platform Approach-the Future of Cross-Border Cooperation in the Digital Era. Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems. Digital Technologies in the New Socio-Economic Reality. 2022; 304: 189–196. DOI:10.1007/978-3-030-83175-2_26
10. Medeiros E. Cross-border cooperation in Inner Scandinavia: A Territorial Impact Assessment. Environmental Impact Assessment Review. 2017;62:147–157. DOI:10.1016/j.eiar.2016.09.003

About the authors

Kairat A. ABDRAKHMANTOV. Director of the "Astana" International Scientific Alliance <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5389-0608>. Address: 8 Kabanbay Batyr h., Astana 010000, Republic of Kazakhstan, office@isca.kz

Sergey V. DOKHOLYAN. DSc(Econ.). Chief Researcher of the Institute of Socio-Economic Research – a department of Dagestan Federal Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Makhachkala, Russia, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4609-448X>. Address: 75 Yaragaskogo str., 8th floor, Makhachkala, 367030, Russian Federation, sergsvd@mail.ru

Taissyia V. MARMONTOVA. CandSc(Hist.), Analyst-Manager of the Centre of Social Processes Studies, Kazakhstani Institute the Public Development, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9162-297>, Address: 33a Abaya str., 0100000, Nur-Sultan, Republic of Kazakhstan, t.marmontova@kipd.kz

Nikolay M. MEZHEVICH. DSc(Econ.). Professor. Head of the Centre of Belarusian Studies, Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences. <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4312-4228>. Address: 11 (3B) Mokhovaya str., Moscow, 125009, Russian Federation, mez13@mail.ru

Viktor A. SAPRYKA. DSc(Soc.). Director of the Institute of Cross-Border Cooperation and Integration. Head of the Department of Social Technologies and Public Service of the Belgorod State National Research University, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0506-3644>. Address: 85, Pobedy str., Belgorod, Russian Federation, 308015, sapryka@icbci.info

Igor P. SITOV. Advisor to the Rector of St. Petersburg State University of Economics. Postgraduate student of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Address: letter A, 30-32, Griboyedov Canal nab., St. Petersburg, 191023, Russian Federation, ipsitov@yandex.com

Alexander G. STOPPE. Professor of the Department of International Relations and Russia Foreign Policy, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University), The Russian Foreign Ministry. Leading Researcher at the Investment Development Centre of the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation. Member of the Interacademic Council for the Development of the Union State. Address: 76 Vernadsky Avenue, Moscow, 119454, Russian Federation, As.xxsg@yandex.ru

Galina A. KHEMELEVA. DSc(Econ.). Professor of the Department of World Economy of Samara State University of Economics, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4953-9560>. Address: 141 Sovetskaya Armiya str., Samara, 443090, Russian Federation, galina-a-khmeleva@yandex.ru

Mikhail M. CHERNYSHOV. CandSc(Econ.). Head of the Laboratory of Spatial Development Problems of the Institute of Market Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Adviser to the National Research Institute for Development Communications. <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0811-1867>. Address: 47 Nakhimovsky Ave., Moscow, 117418, Russian Federation, mcherny@bk.ru

Contribution of the authors

The authors contributed equally to this article.

The authors declare no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Submitted: November 2, 2022. Approved after peer reviewing: November 20, 2022.

Accepted for publication: November 25, 2022. Published: December 21, 2022.

The authors have read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work.



CHANGING SOCIETY

**Social Structure,
Social Institutions
and Processes
Political sociology**

The period after the acquisition of the statehood of the Republic of Moldova is associated with the adoption of new legal principles regulating communications and information flows. The established regime is characterized, first of all, by the dependence of the media sphere and its mobilization by political and administrative elites in order to reproduce the mechanisms of power (the political continuum). The imperfect regulatory framework and its irregular application allows the concentration of media and economic assets in the hands of a small number of individuals. The media sphere does not position itself as the fourth power, but the phenomenon of mass communication is mobilized by the elites to protect their interests. In the Republic of Moldova, the boundary between the media space and power (economic and political) is very blurred. The Moldovan communication regime is based on a biased view of information, which reflects the division of the political field.

Leger I.

Communication Regime of the Republic of Moldova: Assessment of Manageability

Uniqueness and diversity are important properties that attract the attention of researchers, especially for understanding the "image of the future" or clarifying the "meanings" of historical and cultural processes in the regions of Russia in the 19th century.

The authors have studied the historical, cultural, economic, spiritual and moral communication practices and political constants in which the region operates.

The ways of resolving conflicts in the sphere of national / state identity in the past, which may be important for resolving at the regional level in the future, are considered.

Kildyushkina I.G., Yakovleva A.Yu.

Silinskaya Volost of the Simbirsk Volga Region: Discourse Analysis of the Way of Life and Spiritual and Cultural Traditions of the Population

Communication Regime of the Republic of Moldova: Assessment of Manageability

Ilinka Leger✉

The National Communications Development Research Institution, Moscow, Russia, ilinkaleger@outlook.com, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8545-8173>

Abstract. The article presents the results of a study of the controllability of the communication regime of the Republic of Moldova, carried out on the basis of a special methodology for comparative studies of country communication regimes. The main components of the communication regime, indicators of controllability, the location of the decision-making center, the degree of conventionality are analyzed. The peculiarities of the normative regulation of the communication regime, the system of its actors, the centers of influence on the communication regime of Moldova are examined. The problems of the communication regime in the country are revealed: non-execution of laws regulating communications and information; the concentration of the media in the hands of a narrow circle of persons and political forces; politicization of information; preferential re-broadcasting of foreign media content; low level of media literacy of the population; weak influence of civil institutions on the legislative regulation of the communication regime. The idea is affirmed that the communication regime is conditional on the political regime and that the communication regime of Moldova depends on external actors.

Keywords: Communication regime, Republic of Moldova, political regime, information sovereignty, information space, media sphere

For citation: Leger I. Communication Regime of the Republic of Moldova: Assessment of Manageability. *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue*. 2022; 4(6):86-109, [https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4\(6\)-86-109](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4(6)-86-109)

Introduction

The study of communication regimes is a new area in the study of national and international socio-political processes. The problem of regimes should be actualized under the conditions of fragmentation of the world communication and under the conditions of the increased role of communication in political

processes. For the first time, the concept of “communication regime” was introduced in the works of V.I. Gasumyanov, V.V. Komleva (3, 6, 7), who continued their research at the National Research Institute for the Development of Communications (NRIDC) together with their colleagues - N.P. Gribin, M.E. Zvonova, Yu.P. Tikhonov, Yu.R. Sheveleva et al. (4, 5, 9, 10). Comparative studies and scientific discussions regarding the results of the investigation of controllability of communication regimes in different countries are conducted at the NRIDC. The research concerned, in particular, the countries of Central Asia (1), Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (2), Belarus (8). It is assumed that the established communication regime in the Republic of Moldova is driven by the economic and electoral interests dependent on external factors, which affects its manageability and the features of the country’s sovereign development. This hypothesis was tested during the research, and its results are presented in this article.

Materials and Methods

The analysis of the controllability of the communication regime in Moldova was carried out on the basis of the methodology developed by V.V. Komleva (6, 7) and tested in a number of studies. The methodology is based on a number of criteria that allow to assess the degree of independence (or dependence) of the communication regime by determining the location (inside or outside the country) and the degree of conventionality of the communication regime control centre. While carrying out the analysis and interpretation of the results we relied on the classical works of Yu. Habermas, N. Viener, L. von Bertalanfi. Comparative and narrative sources were used. The source base is divided into six groups: national normative legal acts of the Republic of Moldova; ratified bilateral treaties within the framework of communication policy; international legally binding treaties and documents in the field of communication; official declarations of heads of state and documents of state official bodies; scientific research of the international law, political science and communication; and finally, a special group of narrative sources including mass media publications and Internet resources. The study was conducted in the period from November 2021 to May 2022 under the supervision of Doctor of Sociology, Professor V.V. Komleva.

Results

The results of the study are presented according to the criteria by which the communication regime of Moldova was analysed.

Criterion 1. Location of the centre for decision-making and management of the communication regime (inside or outside the country)

The control centre is located inside the country. Regulatory control of information flows and information security is provided by the following actors within the responsibility established by law: Parliament, Government, President of the Republic of Moldova, Supreme Security Council, Information and Security Service, Ministries (Ministry of Economy and Infrastructure, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Ministry of Education, Culture and Research), Prosecutor's Office, judicial authorities, Coordinating Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting, the Supervisory Council of the National Television and Radio Public Broadcaster "Teleradio-Moldova", the Central Election Commission, the National centre for Personal Data Protection¹. The most important actor in implementation and control is the Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting.

De jure, almost all media outlets that disseminate information in Moldova are located (registered) on the territory of Moldova. However, the political change in the country's leadership has led to the emergence of contradictory geopolitical orientations. Pro-Russian parties and pro-European parties followed one another in power, and all this happened amid concealed corruption and economic interests that prevented the development of a clear and effective legislative framework for regulating the media. The Moldovan media landscape is subject to a biased view on the news, where different political trends collide. The lack of media independence and political and economic interests has left an opportunity for foreign forces to interfere and influence the Moldovan communication regime. De facto, therefore, it is fair to say that the control centre of the communication regime is located inside the country, but at the same time external pressures on the Republic are so strong that the communication regime of Moldova cannot be determined without them.

Depending on the change of political course, the position of the most significant media changes rapidly. They can either take a position of support for government policy or they can go into opposition overnight. The lack of consistency affects citizens' trust in the media and creates problems for objective information processing. Thus, the pro-Russian media group enjoyed the generosity of the authorities until 2009, when Vladimir Voronin's Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova was replaced by the Alliance for European Integration (AEI), uniting right-wing and centre-left parties. Despite the AEI's pro-European orientation, the leaders of the political movement, including Vladimir Filat and Vladimir Plahotniuc, neglected their declared will to resist Russian influence in Moldova because of their personal economic interests. For example, one of the TV channels owned by Vladimir Plahotniuc, PRIME TV, broadcast programs from the most popular Russian governmental channel "Channel One" until 2019. The latter owned 4 out of 5 TV channels broadcasting at the national level, and then transferred two of them to a new company set up by one of

¹ The Concept of Information Security of the Republic of Moldova. Law № 299 21.12.2017. (Item 28). 2017. Available from: https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=105660&lang=ru

his relatives when the law on limiting the number of broadcasting licenses was passed in March 2017². The arrival of Socialists with the election of Igor Dodon in 2016 revived the pro-Russian political position in the government. In 2020, Maya Sandu, the head of the pro-European Action and Solidarity Party, was appointed the President of the Republic of Moldova. She clearly stated her desire to bring Moldovan communication practices in line with European standards. Since the situation in Moldova is extremely unstable, the typology of various media positions in relation to the control centre should be considered with respect to the date when this article is published.

The influence of various political and economic forces in the media space of Moldova is very dynamic. For example, in 2019-2020, the channels that supported the regime were: Moldova 1 (State RM-RM); Moldova 2 (State RM - RM); GRT-Gagauziya Radio Televizionu (State RM - RM).

"Neutral" channels criticizing the state and opposition parties: Jurnal TV (Viktor Tsora – Germany/RM); TV8 (Alternative Media Public Association-RM); ProTV (CME Media Enterprises, Ronald Loder – Netherlands/Bermuda/USA).

An off-and-on support of the control centre is characteristic for Plahotniuc's media empire (he has been living abroad since 2019) (13)³. He owns PRIME TV; Publika TV; Canal 2 (formally owned by Lilian Bushtyuk, an employee of Plahotniuc's media holding General Media Group); Canal 3 (formally owned by an employee of Plahotniuc's media holding General Media Group Lilian Bushtyuk)(14)⁴; CTC Mega (formally registered to Victoria Rusu); Familia Domashniy (formally registered to Victoria Rusu). After V. Plahotniuc went abroad⁵ his media empire weakened the spheres of influence of the Socialist Party and former President Igor Dodon⁶.

A number of experts note that the following channels are connected with the Socialist Party: Channel One in Moldova⁷ (Media Invest Service, Vadim Chubara and Igor Chaika (Russia) until August 2021. The channel was sold to Russian citizens Samvel Grigoryan and Natalia Ermilova⁸); Accent TV (Media Invest Service, Vadim Chubara and Igor Chaika - Russia until August 2021. The channel was sold to Russian citizens Samvel Grigoryan

² Rosca Allax Media in Moldova: Between Freedom and Monopoly. Foreign policy research institute. September 13, 2017. Available from: <https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/09/media-moldova-freedom-monopoly/>

³ Barbăroşie Lilianax Unde se află Vlad Plahotniuc? Dificil de spus. 06 octombrie, 2020. Available from: <https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/unde-se-afl%C4%83-vlad-plahotniuc-dificil-de-spus/30878398.html>

⁴ Nikolai Pohlitsky, the Owner of the media. How the media market was reshaped in Moldova in a year. Website Newsmaker.md. May 4, 2020. Available from: <https://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/hozyain-media-kak-v-moldove-za-god-perekroili-rynok-smi/>

⁵ Pursued V. Plahotniuc for fraud and embezzlement of public money in Moldova, Russia, the European Union, the USA.

⁶ Nikolai Pohlitsky, the Owner of the media. How the media market was reshaped in Moldova in a year. Website Newsmaker.md. May 4, 2020. Available from: <https://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/hozyain-media-kak-v-moldove-za-god-perekroili-rynok-smi/>

⁷ In Moldovan: Primul în Moldova.

⁸ Igor Chaika no longer owns the Primul în Moldova and Accent TV channels. Website Point.md. August 24, 2021. Available from: <https://point.md/ru/novosti/obschestvo/igor-chaika-bol-she-ne-vladeet-telekanalami-primul-in-moldova-i-accent-tv/>

and Natalia Ermilova); NTV (Exclusiv Media SRL, Corneliu Furkultse - RM); TNT-Exclusive (Exclusiv Media SRL, Corneliu Furkultse - RM); Ren TV (Intermedia SRL, Vyacheslav Fiodor - RM); and finally, RTR (Rosmediacom - RF, Valentina Stetsko - RM, Galina Syrbu and Oksana Borshevich - RM) is registered in Moldova and works from there, but half of the capital comes from the Russian government.

The current communication regime control centre actually gets little declared support from the national media, with the exception of state channels. However, the media of Jurnal TV, Pro TV and TV8 cannot be considered to be in opposition to it. The Western funding that Jurnal TV and Pro TV receive de facto puts them in the same geopolitical orientation with the current government. Plahotniuc's media empire is also not subject to government repression and calls for order, which can be explained by its weakening after Plahotniuc left abroad. At the same time, he weakened politically, but retained many ties within the political and economic establishment. Finally, the media close to the Socialist Party are numerous and Moldovan authorities regularly call them to order as regards the broadcast content and positions taken on political issues. They represent opposition forces in relation to the current government, but it is difficult to call them "alternative" media, since they have been part of the Moldovan media landscape for many years and have a big audience. As for the financing of the media and their property, direct funding from foreign Powers is relatively limited, but the issue of foreign programs rebroadcasting remains very problematic. So, the main paradigms of the Moldovan communication regime are the lack of production of national content and the concentration of the media in the hands of a limited number of politically interested persons using the media space to promote their electoral interests and their preferred geopolitical sphere.

Faced with the influence of the Socialist Party and the media empire of Plahotniuc, it is difficult to determine the channels of influence of Maya Sandu. In fact, the results of the presidential election showed that the majority of votes in her favour came from the capital Chisinau and the Moldovan diaspora, which makes up to 1/3 of the total population of Moldova. The Moldovan diaspora voted 93% for the candidate in the second round (15)⁹. Social media was an important tool in the previous political campaign, and the current president was able to invest in these new means of communication. Facebook has recorded that the number of interactions caused by the posts of presidential candidates (Sandu and Dodon) has doubled compared to 2016¹⁰. Moldovans living abroad were mobilized through Facebook groups in each city/country of emigration, usually serving as a platform for mutual support. One of the support groups for candidate Maya Sandu reached 72,000 members just a few days after its creation. Live chats were purposefully organized for the diaspora through social networks in which candidates participated. Maya Sandu also produced videos on Tiktok and mobilized local influencers by giving interviews on their

⁹ Cenuşa Dionis. Moldova has a new President: strong popular vote for a "weak" political institution. Eastern Europe Studies centre. 20 November 2020. Available from: <https://www.eesc.lt/en/2020/11/20/moldova-has-a-new-president-strong-popular-vote-for-a-weak-political-institution/>

¹⁰ Mediapoint (Moldova) and MEMO 98 (Slovakia). 2020 Moldova, Presidential election, Social media monitoring final report. 17 December 2020. P.5. Available from: https://memo98.sk/uploads/content_galleries/source/memo/moldova/Final%20report/final-report.pdf

Instagram, Youtube and Facebook channels. Facebook and Instagram sponsored content received 19,398 euros from Maya Sandu's campaign team, compared to 2,291 euros from Igor Dodon¹¹. Maya Sandu relied on social media to attract the young and urban electorate, while the Socialists preferred audiovisual channels and the press, to which rural and elderly electorate is more sensitive.

In Moldova, the main secondary channels in the field of communication (websites and other information resources of analytical centres) are: Centrul pentru Jurnalism Independent (centre for Independent Journalism), Asociația Presei Independente (Association of Independent Press), Institutul pentru Politici și Reforme Europene (Institute of European Politics and Reforms), WatchDog.md (community of analytical centers of civil society in the Republic of Moldova). Funded mainly by Western international organizations, they are the main observers of the political and media scene in Moldova and the first actors in improving media literacy, which is actually poorly regulated by the Moldovan government. Despite the fact that they are very critical of government structures, civil society organizations are behind the adoption of significant legislative acts concerning the regulation of the media. However, the application of law remains difficult due to corruption and lack of political will. Therefore, the influence of think tanks and other civil society organizations remains very relative.

Criterion 2. The degree of conventionality of the decision-making and communication regime management centre

Conventional control centers are those which have the right to legitimately establish communication rules, formulate the foundations of state information policy, create communication institutions, monitor the implementation of rules and apply sanctions for non-compliance. Unconventional control centers are self-proclaimed decision-making centers regarding the norms and rules for the execution of decisions of conventional centers. The consent of the public with unconventional centers often leads to unconventional behaviour of certain groups.

The Government of Moldova is a conventional centre for decision-making and regulatory actions in the communications sector. The main regulatory acts adopted recently are:

1. In November 2018, the Code on Audiovisual Media Services of the Republic of Moldova was adopted¹². It regulates audiovisual media and their distribution, includes measures to protect the individual, society and the state. Finally, it defines the "hate speech". It should be noted that "This Code transposes the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2010/13/EC of March 10, 2010", the purpose of which is to harmonize European legislation in this area.

¹¹ Mediapoint (Moldova) and MEMO 98 (Slovakia). 2020 Moldova, Presidential election, Social media monitoring final report. 17 December 2020. P.30. Available from: https://memo98.sk/uploads/content_galleries/source/memo/moldova/Final%20report/final-report.pdf

¹² The Code of the Republic of Moldova on Audiovisual Media Services. Code No. 174 of 08-11-2018. Available from: https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=120081&lang=ru (date of appeal: 21.07.2022).

2. On January 12, 2018, the so-called law “On Anti-propaganda” came into force and was integrated into the Code on Audiovisual Media Services. This is aimed at ensuring Moldova’s information security by preventing too much external influence. The law prohibits the broadcasting of any analytical, political or military programs, except those produced on the territory of the countries that have ratified the European Convention on Cross-Border Television. The law directly concerns the Russian Federation, which is not a member of the Convention. It should be noted that the law does not apply to rebroadcasting of Russian entertainment programs.

In 2020, the parliament repealed the provisions of the “On anti-propaganda” law on the eve of inauguration of new President Maya Sandu. The paragraphs of the article establishing quotas for broadcasting in favour of European or national products were cancelled. Military-related programs produced in countries that had not ratified the European Convention on Cross-Border Television were again allowed to be broadcast in Moldova.

With the start of the military conflict in Ukraine, programs devoted to military topics from the Russian Federation were again banned on the ad hoc basis in March 2022. On June 2, 2022, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova officially amended the wording of Article 17 of the Code on Audiovisual Media Services - Part (4), paragraph (a): “suppliers of audiovisual media services must not broadcast, and distributors of audiovisual media services must not retransmit audiovisual television and radio broadcasting programs with informational, informational-analytical, military and political content that were produced in the States other than the Member States of the European Union, the United States of America, Canada, as well as in the States that have ratified the European Convention on Cross-Border Television, with the exception of films and entertainment programs, not containing militaristic content¹³”. The law was signed by the President on June 19 and published on June 24 in the Official Journal.

3. In December 2017, the Information Security Concept of the Republic of Moldova was adopted¹⁴, in which information security is defined as “the status of protection of information resources, as well as individuals, society and the state in the information space”. The protection of the national space is also considered, and the risks of propaganda and media aggression (internal and external) are a matter of concern for the security of society. State administrative bodies are appointed responsible for the implementation of information security programme within the framework of the regulatory system established by certain institutional entities (see section Criteria 1).

4. In June 2018, the Parliament adopted the National Concept for the Media Development of the Republic of Moldova¹⁵, which should serve as a guideline for state policy

13 Law No. 143 of 02-06-2022 on Amendments to the Code of the Republic of Moldova on Audiovisual Media Services No. 174/2018. Published: 22-06-2022 in Monitorul Oficial No. 185 article No. 347. Parliament of the Republic of Moldova. 2022. Available from: https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=131800&lang=ru (date of appeal: 26.07.2022).

14 The Concept of Information Security of the Republic of Moldova. Law No. 299 of 21-12-2017. Available from: https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=105660&lang=ru (date of appeal: 21.07.2022).

15 The National Concept of development of mass Media of the Republic of Moldova. Law No. 67 of 26-07-2018. Available from: https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=105449&lang=ru (accessed: 07/21/2022).

regarding the media. The strategy has 4 components: cybersecurity, media and information security, strengthening operational capacity, internal coordination and international cooperation.

5. The Information Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova for 2019-2024 and the Action Plan for its implementation¹⁶. The strategy, which came into force in 2019, is aimed at implementing the EU Directive on Network and Information Security (NIS), which pursues the following objectives: ensuring the security of information cyberspace and investigating cybercrime; ensuring the security of the media information space; strengthening operational capabilities; increasing the effectiveness of internal coordination and international cooperation in the field of information security.

The implementation of the strategy is extremely important because although the Moldovan regulatory authorities are the centre of decision-making, the decisions taken are often subject to failures on the part of the objects of communication regime. The Moldovan Government and state bodies do not ensure systematic compliance with existing laws, and sanctions often depend on a system of corruption that permeates the political and economic class. As a result, some violations of the law are not punished. Most often, the reason is that the Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting (CTR) does not enjoy political and institutional independence. Moreover, with regard to cybersecurity and media literacy issues, the Moldovan state does not have enough funds to implement its policy, despite regulatory achievements. State bodies have very few resources to implement state policy in this area¹⁷.

For this reason, despite the increase in the number of legal instruments regulating communications and information policy, public confidence in the neutrality of the media remains very limited. As for the opinion of society on public actions and foreign relations of Moldova, the results are more nuanced than it may seem at first glance. According to a survey conducted by the “Public Opinion Barometer” in June 2021, 56% of the population believe that the country is actually governed by an institutional body (President, Parliament or Prime Minister). Thus, the indicator of confidence in the actions of the state and the legislature is significantly higher than the indicator of those who believe that the country is governed from abroad or by a hidden group within the country, whose total indicator is 30.8%¹⁸. Moreover, President Maia Sandu is the Moldovan politician whom the citizens trust the most. Her party is also leading in the polls¹⁹. In addition, 1.5 years after the election, the government still enjoys democratic legitimacy (in terms of trust) to govern the country and regulate communications.

16 The Information Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova for 2019-2024 and the Action Plan for its implementation. 2019. P.3. Available from: <https://rm.coe.int/3-moldova-strategy/168097eceb>

17 Centrul pentru Jurnalism Independent, Moldova Country Report 2021. 10 February 2022. P.6. Available from: https://cji.md/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ML_Moldova_Country_Report_2021-1.pdf

18 Poll “Barometer of Public Opinion”. Question: “In your opinion, who actually runs the Republic of Moldova?” June 2021. Available from: <http://bop.ipp.md/ru>

19 Mikhalkina Alina, Sandu and PAS. How their trust ratings in Moldova changed in six months. Website Newsmaker.md. December 17, 2021. Available from: <https://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/opros-iri-maje-sandu-doverayut-vdvoe-bolshe-chem-igoryu-dodonu/>

As for the influence of the European Union and the Russian Federation on Moldova, the survey by the Barometer of Public Opinion from June 2021 shows that 70.6% of Moldovans believe that the country has good relations with the European Union, 54.6% believe in good relations with Russia. Almost a third of respondents (29.8%) believe that relations with the Russian Federation are poor, while only 8.2% noted troubled relations with the EU. The United States enjoy a lower plebiscite than the European Union: 60.8% of respondents rate relations with Moldova as good, and 15.7% as bad²⁰. However, these results should be compared with the answers to the question «Which country, in your opinion, should be the main strategic partner of the Republic of Moldova?» The Russian Federation has higher indicators (32.5%) than, for example, Romania (28.1%)²¹.

Above we noted such a feature of Moldova's communication regime as unpunished non-compliance with the adopted laws regulating communication and information processes. This conclusion correlates with the results of the Public Opinion Barometer survey; according to which 28.8% of the population believes that the courts are completely dependent and only 8.6% of the population believe that the courts are completely independent. In general, the share of the population inclined to admit the lack of independence is 48.8%, and the share inclined to admit some independence is 41.3%²². Therefore, confidence over the ability of the country's judicial system to resolve disputes and ensure compliance with the law is extremely relative. The results obtained in relation to the independence of the prosecutor's office are about the same as in relation to the courts.

Criterion 3. Assessment of controllability indicators

3.1. Controllability criterion: the ability of communication regime control centres to transfer it from one state to another without conflict

A major step in the state regulation of communications and information was the adoption of the Code on Audiovisual Media Services of the Republic of Moldova in 2018. In a report on disinformation, in which the Moldovan analytical centre Watchdog participated, V. Gotisan, a media sphere analyst in Moldova, explains that the adoption of the Code allowed us to make a step forward from a regulatory point of view by clarifying the law. However, there is still no signs of its implementation in real conditions²³. Thus, we are no longer talking about the quality of legislation, but about the ability and political will of public services to implement it. Since television remains the most widespread means

²⁰ The survey "Public Opinion Barometer". Question: "How do you assess the current relations of the Republic of Moldova with the following countries/organizations? EU / Russian Federation". Ionia 2021. Available from: <http://bop.ipp.md/ru>

²¹ The survey "Public Opinion Barometer". Question: «Which country, in your opinion, should be the main strategic partner of the Republic of Moldova?» Ionia 2021. Available from: <http://bop.ipp.md/ru>


²² Poll «Public Opinion Barometer». Question: «What do you think about the level of independence of law enforcement officers?» Ionia 2021. Available from: <http://bop.ipp.md/ru>

²³ Disinformation resilience index in Central and Eastern Europe in 2021. EAST centre. 2021. Available from: <https://east-centre.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/DRI-report-2021.pdf>

Figure 1. Republic of Moldova Public Opinion Barometer

In your opinion, who rules the Republic of Moldova in actuality?
Perioda: 06.2021

■ Parliament
■ Prime-minister
■ Some circles of interest inside the country
■ Some circles of interest outside the country
■ Someone else
■ Don't know/No answer



Number of respondents: 1161

Copyright © 2022 Public Opinion Barometer.
Institute of Public Policies.

Accessed: 11.05.2022

Available: <http://bop.ipp.md>

of information dissemination in Moldova, special control had to be carried out over the implementation of the provisions of the Code.

In the period from 2021 to May 2022, in order to strengthen the manageability of the communication regime in Moldova, amendments were made to the legislation. In 2021, the Parliament strengthened control over the Supervisory Board of the public company "Teleradio-Moldova" and the Council on Television and Radio (CTR). If the Parliament rejects the annual report of the Council on Television and Radio, then all its members have to resign. The CTR and the Supervisory Board had nine members each, and now their number in both structures will be reduced to seven, of which three are now proposed by the Parliament, one by the President and the Government, and two by civil society and non-governmental organizations [Law No. 158 04.11.2021 "On Amendments to the Code of the Republic of Moldova on Audiovisual Media services" No. 174/2018. Published on 05.11.2021 in Monitorul Oficial No. 273 article No. 363]

In March 2022, the Constitutional Court received a request to verify compliance with the Constitution from the deputy of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova S. Litvinenko (Action and Solidarity Party). The Court recognized Article 28 (prohibition for non-profit organizations to carry out the activities of a private provider of audiovisual media services²⁴) of the Code on Audiovisual Media Services as unconstitutional (art. 16, 46 and 54 of the Constitution) and abolished it. In fact, the court's decision states: "The Constitutional Court notes that this situation indicates a different appeal to legal entities

²⁴ Code on Audiovisual Media Services of the Republic of Moldova No. 174 of 08.11.2018, as amended by ZP241 of 16.12.20, MO353-357 of 22.12.20, MO273/05.11.21 of Article 363 of 05.11.21, ZP60 of 17.03.22, MO98-105/08.04.22 of Article 169.

of private law, depending on the orientation of their activities for profit, that is, if they are commercial or non-profit organizations, regarding the possibility of providing audiovisual media services". [Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova No. 6 of 10.03.2022 in part (1) of Article 28 of the Code on Audiovisual Media Services (Appeal No. 78a/2021). Published on 03/25/2022 in Monitorul Oficial No. 80–87 article No. 43].

Finally, in April 2022, the Parliament decided that the transition to digital terrestrial television in the Republic of Moldova should be completed no later than May 1, 2022, and provided state support for the first two years of operation [Law No. 60 of 17.03.2022 "On Amendments to Certain Regulatory Acts". Published 08.04.2022 in Monitorul Oficial No. 98-105 article No. 169]. In early May 2022, Deputy Prime Minister-Minister of Infrastructure and Regional Development of the Republic of Moldova Andrei Spynu said that the modernization process, which began 14 years ago, had been completed and covered 98 percent of the country's territory²⁵. The process took a long time, but this example shows that despite state's limited resources political will is an important factor for the implementation of legislative measures.

However, in most cases, the issues of media regulation, especially audiovisual, are at the centre of public debate and cause strong political opposition depending on political changes. This hinders political continuity in legislative decisions and their implementation. The most striking example of this problem is the law "On Anti-propaganda". The following changes in Article 17 of the Code until today have been presented above, but now we will more precisely consider the process that led to the adoption of the latest amendment of the law and future problems in its implementation. Since 2020, the decision to re-authorize the broadcast of content related to military topics was criticized by the current political majority. Despite the growing instability in the region, this provision was not reviewed by the current parliament until June 2, 2022. However, in the context of the military conflict in Ukraine, a state of emergency was introduced in the Republic of Moldova and legislative provisions were circumvented by an ad hoc measure of the National Commission for Emergency Situations (CES). In fact, in this regard, on March 2, 2022, the CES banned the retransmission of Russian information programmes and military-related programmes in Moldova. The Socialist Party responded to this measure with a press release stating that the fines imposed by the CTR were directed exclusively at channels dissatisfied with the government, and that they symbolize: "the dangerous trend of introducing censorship in the media, including on television"²⁶. On the part of civil society, the trend is quite contrary: Moldovan associations of journalists condemn the inaction of the CTR and believe that this allows pro-Russian content to spread. Director of the Asociația Press Independente in Petru Macovei believes that "Our media market is oversaturated with Russian-language products, but the Audiovisual Council does not want to take any measures, although the Code of

²⁵ Moldova Switched to Digital TV Broadcasting. CIS Internet portal. 4 May, 2022. Available from: <https://e-cis.info/news/567/100087/>

²⁶ The SPRM Condemns the Approach of the New Composition of the Broadcasting Council towards to Some Media. SPRM website. March 11, 2022. Available from: <https://socialistii.md/psrm-condamna-modul-in-care-noua-componenta-a-consiliului-audiovizualului-adopta-hotarari-in-raport-cu-unele-instituti-media/>

Audiovisual Media Services, in the form in which it exists, provides for some possible steps. The fact is that the members of the council do not want to come into conflict with the ruling Socialist Party, which controls a large share of the television media market"²⁷.

Thus, the Government and the Presidency, which currently enjoy a political majority, are able to issue new legislative provisions. However, the ability of the communication regime control centre to transfer these provisions from one government to another without conflict (in accordance with the political change) is extremely relative. The Communication Regime Control centre is experiencing difficulties in confronting its political opponents, who enjoy strong media influence, and continues to be seriously criticized by civil society organizations. As a result, the legal framework for the media is extremely unstable, as is the political situation in the country. Besides the lack of economic resources, the lack of continuity of State policy hinders the real implementation of legislative provisions.

3.2. Controllability criterion: ability to achieve the target and controlled parameters of the communication regime

The most important target indicator is information sovereignty. The issue of information sovereignty is a new form of expression of the problems of external influence, to which Moldova is particularly susceptible. The recent tensions over the broadcast of Russian military-related content illustrate the lack of consensus in the Moldovan political community, as well as the lack of economic and political resources for the government to achieve its goals. Even before the new law "On Anti-propaganda" came into force, the CTR was instructed to ensure compliance with the temporary ban on military content programs produced in the Russian Federation. This turned out to be quite difficult for the CTR and sheds light on the difficulties of implementation that the law "On anti-propaganda" will face in its new form.

After the decision of the CES, the new Chair of the CTR, Liliana Vitsu, advocated "a return to the provisions of Article 17 [of the Code of the Republic of Moldova on Audiovisual Media Services], which relate to the protection of national audiovisual space, as well as the share of at least 50% of European content"²⁸ in order to clarify the legal basis of the CTR and its activities. In other words, she already wanted to establish a real legal continuity, but not on the principle of ad hoc decisions that contribute to greater political manipulation. However, she acknowledged that "the CTR is a weak institution in terms of human and technical resources", and admitted she is concerned that if the legislation on disinformation is changed, it will complicate the task of her department as it will mean new sanctions that will need to be applied.

Indeed, the CTR has already experienced difficulties in enforcing current provisions which are relatively weak. For example, due to the decision of the Emergency Committee, cable operators suspended the broadcasting of some Russian cable TV channels, for example,

²⁷ Index of Resistance to Disinformation in Central and Eastern Europe in 2021. EAST centre. 2021:167. Available from: <https://east-centre.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/DRI-report-2021.pdf>

²⁸ The new Chairman of the Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting (CTR) Liliana Vitsu: "The War in Ukraine has Shown Us that we are Still Vulnerable to External Propaganda", March 18, 2022. Website media-azi.md Available from: <https://media-azi.md/ru/noua-presedinta-ca-liliana-vitu-razboiul-din-ucraina-a-demonstrat-ca-suntem-inca-vulnerabili-la-propaganda-din-exterior/>

Nostalgia, MIR or RTVi. However, according to the Internet portal Newsmaker.md, owners of satellite dishes can watch Russian information programs²⁹. Prior to that, the channels PRIME TV, Moldova 1, Jurnal TV, Primul in Moldova (First Channel in Moldova) and NTV-Moldova were closely monitored by the Council on Television and Radio. According to the results of the monitoring, the CTR fined NTV-Moldova 5,000 lei (18597 rubles), and Primul in Moldova, which is close to the Socialists, was fined 20,000 lei (74390 rubles). CTR stated that these two TV channels did not give their viewers any point of view different from the one provided by the Russian Federation, and therefore did not treat the events in Ukraine fairly. Centrul pentru Jurnalism Independent, a Moldovan NGO, stated that after February 24, Primul in Moldova, NTV-Moldova and RTR-Moldova “preferred to broadcast films or other types of programs, ignoring the topic of war”³⁰ or occasionally showed it in television news. On March 17, NTV and RTR were again fined for “one-sided coverage, mixing of facts and opinions and other violations of the Code of Audiovisual Media Services”³¹.

Thus, the ability of the State to achieve target and controlled indicators is estimated as relatively low. Fines are sporadic, and their amounts are very small. The decisions of the CTR are more political symbolism than unified and comprehensive control. Information sovereignty is still far from being achieved, as it is subject to external influences, which Moldova, not having sufficient resources, is trying to limit. In addition, the mechanisms of political patronage and corruption make it difficult to effectively implement legislative provisions. Finally, the cybersecurity, information security or media literacy sectors do not have sufficient human and financial resources to help the country and its population protect themselves from cyber attacks and disinformation, despite the growth of both phenomena with the development of new technologies. All these factors must be integrated so that the law “On anti-propaganda” should become meaningful and effective, and not just a geopolitical confrontation.

3.3. Controllability indicator - the ability to use self-organization mechanisms of management objects to regulate communication regimes.

The civil society of Moldova is organized through the associations specializing in the protection of human rights, freedom of speech, journalistic and political issues. One of the goals of the National Concept for the Development of Mass Media of the Republic of Moldova³² – internal coordination and international cooperation. Therefore, it is a generally recognized fact for the Moldovan state that the construction of a communication

²⁹ Newsmaker.md .Available from: <https://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/otkuda-zhiteli-moldovy-poluchayut-informatsiyu-o-voyne-v-ukraine/>

³⁰ Case Study. News and speeches from Moscow with elements of propaganda in favour of the Russian Federation, broadcast by three TV stations in the Republic of Moldova. March 17, 2022. Website CJL.md. Available from: <https://cjl.md/en/case-study-news-and-speeches-from-moscow-with-elements-of-propaganda-in-favour-of-the-russian-federation-broadcast-by-three-tv-stations-in-the-republic-of-moldova/>

³¹ The CTR imposed sanctions on RTR Moldova and NTV Moldova for one-sided coverage, mixing of facts and opinions and other violations of the Audiovisual Media Services Code. Website Media-azi.md . March 17, 2022. Available from: <https://media-azi.md/ru/ca-a-sanctionat-rtr-moldova-si-ntv-moldova-pentru-reflectare-unilateral-a-mestec-dintre-fapte-si-opinii-si-alte-incalcari-ale-csma/>

³² The National Concept of Development of Mass Media of the Republic of Moldova. 2018. Available from: https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=105449&lang=ru

regime should include the easing of political and social tensions in order to ensure an internal consensus that promotes a dynamics which is favorable for information security. However, the Moldovan government is still trying to impart to a “power – society” dialogue the same strength as it has in the “media – power” subsystem. Indeed, as we have seen, the integration of the media and the authorities is quite strong, not least because they are based on common financial interests. On the other hand, the Moldovan government does not finance civil society organizations whose projects are financed by foreign, mainly Western, organizations.

This allows organizations to remain critical of government decisions, but the feedback between society and the authorities is low. For example, we have told above about the reform of the Code on Audiovisual Media Services, aimed at reconsidering the operation activities of the CTR, adopted at the end of 2021³³. While the amendment to the law was in draft form, seven NGOs, including the centre for Investigative Journalism, the Independent Press Association, the Electronic Press Association and RISE Moldova, joined together to express their concern about the bill. Of particular concern in the joint statement is the appointment of members of the supervisory board of the public company Teleradio Moldova by the President, the Government and the Parliament. “Public television can fulfill its mission only if the government renounces the levers of influence that it can use to promote its interests”³⁴. Their request remained unanswered by the State authorities, despite the respected status of these organizations in this area. In addition, members of civil society condemn the lack of political independence of the country for many years.

However, it can be noted that after the Covid-19 pandemic, some TV channels, such as TV8 and Jurnal TV, or news sites on the Internet, Agora.md, Nokta.md, Newsmaker.md, Cotidianul.md, and the newspaper Ziarul de Gardă, were involved in debunking fake news. These media outlets also have good relations with civil society organizations, which encourage more journalists to participate in initiatives to improve media literacy and good intelligence. These connections help to nourish the “media – society” subsystem, which was previously very weak. A news website launched in 2014 Newsmaker.md is an attempt by a new generation of media to participate in the improvement of journalism and media literacy in Moldova, an attempt to talk to young people in the language that is understandable and interesting for them. Most of its readers are people aged from 25 to 34. Newsmaker.md has a Telegram channel, pages in Facebook, Instagram, a YouTube channel and account in Twitter, where the audience is very active. The peculiarity of this project is that it is published in Russian and Romanian. The editorial board claims to be independent and publishes a list of permanent donors to the project. The project is funded by the Open Society Foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy and the Foundation for Human Rights of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The project is also

³³ Law No. 158 of 04-11-2021 on Amendments to the Code on Audiovisual Media Services of the Republic of Moldova No. 174/3.

³⁴ “Teleradio-Moldova”: Controlled and (not) Dependent? Website Noi.md. 25 Nov. 2021. Available from: <https://noi.md/ru/analitika/teleradio-moldova-podkontrolinoe-i-ne-zavisimoe>

funded from the funds of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) within the framework of the European Union's Confidence-building Measures Program³⁵.

Thus, the Government of the Republic of Moldova is experiencing difficulties in establishing links with civil society organizations and implementing national programs to improve the communication regime where the Government and civil society could cooperate. In other words, the Moldovan government does not use civil society initiatives enough to regulate the communication regime. As a result, Moldovan civil society organizations look for help from foreign countries and are mainly funded by Western organizations. Although civil society is gradually developing, the self-organization of the population is not yet a sufficiently structured system with sufficient support to become a real counter-force.

Discussion

The conducted research has revealed a number of problems in the controllability of the communication regime in the Republic of Moldova, which can be brought up for scientific discussion and become lines of further research.

The concentration of the media in the hands of a narrow group of individuals. Only in November 2015, and with the active mobilization of civil society organizations, the Parliament amended the law on mass media, obliging companies to openly publish the name of their owners. After that, it was publicly revealed that V. Plahotniuc owns 4 out of 5 national TV channels and 3 radio stations (Publika TV, PRIME TV, Canal 2 TV, Canal 3 TV and Publika FM, MuzFM and Maestro FM). According to estimates of Moldstreet.md, these 4 TV channels occupied 70% of the audiovisual market (16)³⁶, that is, Plahotniuc's political party, the Democratic Party of Moldova (DPM), occupied a dominant position in the media market, thereby providing large-scale influence and, in fact, controlling information and communications in the country. Plahotniuc is not an isolated case. Igor Dodon and his Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM) at the time of his presidency were associated with three television stations: Accent TV, NTV Moldova and Exclusiv TV. Ilan Shor, a businessman and the leader of the Shor Party, was the actual beneficiary of Alt TV and Euro TV (now Televiziunea Centrala – TVC) (17)³⁷. To counteract the established practice, in March 2017, amendments were adopted to the country's legislation limiting the number of broadcasting licenses (two licenses per person). However, the expected advantages for media pluralism were not observed.

To circumvent the law, for example, General Media Group (V.Plahotniuc) decided to transfer the rights to Canal 2TV and Canal 3TV to a new company called Telestar Media

(headed by V.Plahotniuc's close associate). In 2017, DPM de facto retained the same number of audiovisual channels as before³⁸. Currently, the "tradition" that has developed in Moldova continues to be preserved. All the media are strongly connected with the political and business establishment of the country, where the control centers are located.

We have identified an attempt to form alternative control centers for the communication regime of Moldova by NGOs getting Western investments. One cannot say that these attempts are unsuccessful (they periodically exert pressure on political forces, demanding changes in legislation), but so far these centers do not have a significant impact on the communication regime of Moldova.

High level of information politicization and political propaganda. The majority of the population believes that the media are not independent, especially because of the close proximity between the political elite and the owners of the media. The politicization of the information space is extreme, especially during election campaigns. Each media outlet supports its candidate or party.

In November 2020, Magenta Consulting Agency conducted a survey on "Public Perception of Mass Media and Media Skills in the Republic of Moldova"³⁹. The interest of the report is in the possibility to compare the results of 2018 and 2020. Despite the fact that between 2018 and 2020, the share of the population who believe that the media work under pressure decreased by 11%, the total share of those who believe that the media are influenced remained at the same level (85% in 2018 and 84% in 2020). The level of trust in the independence and objectivity of information sources in Moldova is assessed as extremely low. The media are considered primarily as tools of political propaganda.

Political and media news is currently defined by the military actions in Ukraine. In this context, the celebration of Victory Day on May 9, 2022 became a divisive issue between the pro-Russian and pro-European political classes. Although the authorities decided not to organize an official parade, they allowed spontaneous commemorative meetings. However, the wearing of the St. George ribbon was prohibited. The Centrul Pentru Jurnalism Independent website conducted a study of the media processing of the day performed by 10 Moldovan Internet news portals.

Kp.com (Komsomolskaya Pravda), Aif.md (Arguments and facts in Moldova) and Ntv.com (NTV) emphasized the presence of representatives of the Socialist Party in the ranks of the marching. Tv6.md, owned by Ilan Shor, focused on members of the Shor party. Besides, the research notes the use by these sites of distorted or exaggerated statements and facts against President Maya Sandu or in connection with the situation in Ukraine: "mixing of facts and opinions, manipulation of statistics, (intentional) exaggerations related to the president's health, (intentional) associations between possible provocations and terrorist

³⁵ About the project Website Newsmaker.md. URL: <https://newsmaker.md/rus/o-proekte/>

³⁶ Gogu Nadine, Who really rules the airwaves in Moldova? Open Democracy website. 28 March 2016. Available from: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/who-really-rules-airwaves-in-moldova/>

³⁷ Zgibartsa Laura. The Fourth Power in the Making: regulation and reform of the Media in Moldova. March 2020. №11.

³⁸ Rosca Alla. Media in Moldova: Between Freedom and Monopoly. Foreign policy research institute. 13 September 2017. Available from: <https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/09/media-moldova-freedom-monopoly/>

³⁹ Magenta Consulting, National Study. Population Perception of the Media And Media Skills in the Republic of Moldova. November 2020. P.18. Available from: https://internews.md/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/INTERNEWS_Final-report_24.11.20_EN.pdf

attacks and Ukrainian refugees»⁴⁰. In general, the study carried out by the Centrul Pentru Jurnalism Independent indicates the absence of secondary sources confirming these statements, including the public television website Trm.md. Finally, the website Jurnal.md is accused of not representing a balanced opinion, not giving the people against whom their articles are directed the right to reply. For example, a former member of parliament criticized Igor Dodon's decision not to comply with the law and wear a St. George ribbon, furiously calling it a "military ribbon". Igor Dodon's position on this issue is not presented in the article. Only Newsmaker.md and Publika.md are not subject to criticism in the study.

The attitude of the media towards May 9 quite accurately reflects the political preferences of the news sites. The lack of nuances is striking, and the information politicization takes the form of exaggeration of facts or partial communication of information to readers who cannot form a free opinion by reading one media outlet.

Low level of media literacy of the population. Media literacy concerns the ability of society to access information and critically perceives and comprehends it. This aspect of information dissemination is very important today due to the multiplication of information channels (official publications, traditional media channels, publications of individuals in social networks, information channels in messengers, etc.). The Covid-19 pandemic and misinformation around the issue of vaccines have shown how important it is that the population could independently recognize fake news and other elements of disinformation. In the face of this pandemic, the Moldovan authorities managed with great difficulty to stop the spread of fake news in Moldova. The Centrul pentru Jurnalism Independent believes that "In the Republic of Moldova there is no national policy, concept and strategy operating in particular in the field of media literacy, and there is no specially designated institution or body that would monitor it within its mission".⁴¹

Initiatives of civil society organizations and some mass media are aimed at solving this problem. For example, in November 2020, the Newsmaker (one of the most popular Russian-language Internet portals in Moldova, but promoting an anti-Russian agenda) decided to address the issue of media literacy by creating the first online series in Screenlife format (in Russian)⁴².


Problems of production of national media content. The study revealed the phenomenon of "retransmission", which is massively practiced by Moldovan channels, despite the tasks of increasing national content, including in Romanian. The Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting pays special attention to political news content, but the issue of entertainment content also comes into view. On March 30, 2021, Bravo TV, which mainly broadcasts cartoons, was sanctioned by the Council "for the lack of its own product

⁴⁰ Gututui Olga, Case Study. 9 May on 10 News Websites: Impartiality vs. Deviations from Deontology. Centrul Pentru Jurnalism Independent. 31 May 2022. Available from: <https://cji.md/en/case-study-9-may-on-10-news-websites-impartiality-vs-deviations-from-deontology/>

⁴¹ Centrul pentru Jurnalism Independent, Moldova, Country Report 2021. P.4

⁴² The President without a mask. Episode 1. Website Newsmaker.md. November 26, 2020. Available from: <https://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/prezident-bez-maski-pervyy-v-moldove-serial-v-formate-screenlife-epizod-1-video/>

Figure 2. The share of respondents who believe that the news in the Republic of Moldova is influenced by politics. 'Q29. In your opinion, is the news in the Republic of Moldova influenced by politics?



Source: Survey Magenta Consulting, National Study, Population perception of the media and media skills in the Republic of Moldova. November 2020. P.18.

and product in Romanian"⁴³. By law, the channel had to broadcast at least four hours of its own production, including 80% in Romanian. Moreover, the cartoons were not dubbed or voiced in Romanian. In 2022, the tasks related to broadcast content became particularly relevant. In the context of changing political orientations of the Moldovan authorities, the strategy of ousting Russian-language content and strengthening English- and Romanian-speaking content is being applied. If initially the retransmission of content was due to the fact that Moldovan companies were reluctant to invest in the production of local content, now the retransmission is connected with the political goals of the current government of Moldova and with the strengthening of the positions of Western media investors in Moldova.

The Moldovan authorities believe that the question of programmes production on the national territory, especially on political, social and military issues, is fundamental in ensuring the information sovereignty of Moldova. Among the initiatives in this area, we can highlight the creation of the first MEDIACOR digital media production centre on the basis of Moldovan State University at the end of 2021⁴⁴. Its foundation was funded by the US Embassy, USAID, the Governments of Sweden and the UK, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Culture, the State University of Moldova and the COR Association.

Conclusion

The period after achievement of the statehood in the Republic of Moldova was marked by the adoption of a new legal framework regulating communications and information

⁴³ Bravo TV, which mainly broadcasts cartoons, sanctioned by the BC for lack of its own product and product in Romanian. Media site-Azi. March 30, 2022. Available from: <https://media-azi.md/en/bravo-tv-care-difuzeaza-preponderent-desene-animat-sanctionat-de-ca-pentru-lipsa-de-produs-propriu-si-in-limba-romana/>

⁴⁴ MEDIACOR digital-media production centre inaugurated at Moldovan State University. Website Moldpres.md. November 17, 2021. Available from: <https://www.moldpres.md/en/news/2021/11/17/21008765>

flows. The established regime is characterized, first of all, by the dependence of the media sphere and its mobilization by political and administrative elites in order to reproduce the mechanisms of power (political continuum). The imperfect regulatory framework and its regular application make it possible to concentrate media and economic assets in the hands of a small number of individuals. The media sphere does not position itself as the fourth power, and the phenomenon of mass communication is mobilized by elites to protect their own interests. In the Republic of Moldova, the border between the media space and the dynamics of power (economic and political) is considerably blurred. The Moldovan communication regime intersects with a biased view on information, which reflects the division in the political field.

The controllability of the communication regime in the Republic of Moldova, despite the laws adopted, is not perfect on the part of the current political authorities. The latest regulatory documents adopted in Moldova are aimed at harmonizing standards with the European Union. First of all, it is clear that Moldova is experiencing difficulties with creating its own legislation system, as well as its own media content. Therefore, it is constantly dependent on foreign policy choices, which have a strong impact on the domestic political life of the country. The lack of independence, combined with high political instability and weak institutions, makes the control centre of the communication regime dependent on external resources. After the victory of Maya Sandu and the pro-European bloc, the United States and the European Union saw that their opportunities in Moldova were growing. Thanks to the latest changes in Article 17 of the Code, they could see the growth of their influence in the media sphere. Secondly, it should be noted that pro-Russian and pro-European influence is currently carried out through different channels. Since television is the dominant medium of information, Russia has long valued its presence on screens. The language helps, and Russian influence is transmitted directly to viewers through information programs (political influence) or entertainment (cultural influence) broadcast on Moldovan channels. Thus, according to recent polls, "about 23% of the RM population believe that Russia protects the unrecognized republics of Donbass ("Donetsk People's Republic" and "Lugansk People's Republic") from attacks by Ukraine, another 15.2% believe that Russia is conducting an operation to liberate Ukraine from Nazism⁴⁵". 40% think that "Russia's invasion of Ukraine is not justified by anything." Despite the adoption of pro-European legislation on the media, half of the public opinion is still mobilized in favour of a profound mutual understanding with Russia. Unlike them, European states or the United States do not have such direct channels of communication with the Moldovan population. As we have already noted, their influence is exerted at the legislative level, and on the secondary sources of information: NGOs, analytical centers, elite training, etc. Thus, Western funding is aimed at a more elite audience and therefore covers a smaller part of the population so far. The task of the EU and the USA is to use the political climate

⁴⁵ Ekaterina Dubasova, More than 40% of Moldovan citizens consider Russia's invasion to Ukraine is not justified by anything. What else the survey showed. Website Newsmaker.md. May 10, 2022. Available from: <https://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/opros-watchdog-iipis-405-respondentov-schitayut-vtorozhenie-rossii-vukrainu-neobosnovannym/>

favorable to them in order to promote and, in fact, make Russian channels of information and communication outsiders of the communication regime in Moldova.

New technologies and new media have had a certain impact on the communication regimes in Moldova, but their impact remains very limited. Despite the evolution of the regulatory framework, its implementation is still conditioned by the weakness of civil institutions and personal interests of a limited number of actors. This undermines the possibility for developing balanced relations between the Power - Media, Power - Society and Media - Society subsystems.

References

1. Begalinova. K. K., Gribin. N. P., Komleva. V. V., Kotyukova. T. V., Nazarov. R. R., Ospanova. A. N., Panov. V. S., Smolik. N. G., Turgunbaeva. A. S., Cheremena. E. G. Communication regimes in Central Asian countries: a scientific discussion. *Russia and the World: Scientific dialogue*. 2021; 2:96-137. (In Russian)
2. Volkov, V. V., Vorotnikov, V. V., Komleva, V. V., Starikov, A.D. Communication regimes of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia: scientific discussion. *Russia and the world: Scientific dialogue*. 2021; 2:138-161. (In Russian)
3. Gasumyanov, V. I., Komleva, V. V. Communication modes as a factor of inter-country interactions: problem statement. *International life*. 2020;10:38-49. (In Russian)
4. Gribin, N. P. Communication regimes of Central Asian states in the context of national security interests of the Russian Federation. *Russia and the world: Scientific dialogue*. 2021;2:80-95. (In Russian)
5. Zvonova, M. E. Friendliness of country communication regimes on the example of Russian-Estonian relations. *Observer*. 2021;10 (381):40-53. (In Russian)
6. Komleva, V.V., Barakhvostov, P.A., Kalacheva, I.I., Mezhevich, N.M., Rogalsky, S.G., Vorotnikov, V.V., Kachura, A.G., Lazorkina, O.I., Stoppe, A.G. The communication regime of Belarus: stability and factors of formation. *Russia and the world: Scientific dialogue*. 2022; 2:132-163. (In Russian)
7. Komleva, V.V. Controllability of country communication regimes. *Communicology*. 2022; V. 10. 1:139-154. (In Russian)
8. Komleva, V.V. Country communication regime as a socio-political phenomenon. *Russia and the world: Scientific dialogue*. 2021;1:13-26. (In Russian)
9. Communication regime of Belarus. Scientific discussion. NIIRK. 2022. URL: <https://nicrus.ru/1304kommunregim/>. (In Russian)
10. Tatarov R.A. Friendliness of communication regimes of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova in the realities of fragmentation of the world communication order. *Russia and the world: scientific dialogue*. 2022;2 (4):63-75. (In Russian)
11. Tikhonov, Yu.P. The causes and forms of fragmentation of the world communication order. *Russia and the world: dialogues. Materials of the Fifth International Scientific and Practical Conference*. 2021;March 18-19, edited by V. V. Komleva, E. A. Kuzmenko. Moscow: Publishing House "Scientific Library", 2021:96-110. (In Russian)
12. Sheveleva, Yu.R. Communication mode as a factor of reproduction of political power. *Questions of Political science*. 2021:2535-2551. (In Russian)
13. Barbăroșie, L. Unde se află Vlad Plahotniuc? Dificil de spus. Octombrie 06, 2020. URL: <https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/unde-se-afl%C4%83-vlad-plahotniuc-dificil-de-spus/30878398.html>
14. Rosca, A. Media in Moldova: Between Freedom and Monopoly. Foreign policy research institute. September 13, 2017. URL: <https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/09/media-moldova-freedom-monopoly/>
15. Cenusă, D. Moldova has a new President: strong popular vote for a "weak" political institution. Eastern Europe Studies Center. November 20, 2020. URL: <https://www.eesc.lt/en/2020/11/20/moldova-has-a-new-president-strong-popular-vote-for-a-weak-political-institution/>
16. Gogu, N. Who really rules the airwaves in Moldova? Open Democracy. March 28, 2016. URL: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/who-really-rules-airwaves-in-moldova/>
17. Zgibartsa, L. The Fourth power in the process of formation: regulation and reform of the media in Moldova. March 2020. *Media Forward*;11. (In Russian)

About the author

Ilinka LEGER. Master's degree in International Relations (INALCO – France). Master's degree in State and Municipal Administration (RANEPA – Russia). Trainee of the National Communications Development Research Institution, Moscow, Russia, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8545-8173> Address: 22, building 1, Korobeynikov Lane, Moscow, 119034, Russian Federation, ilinkaleger@outlook.com.

Contribution of the author

The author declares no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Submitted: April 5, 2022. Approved after peer reviewing: April 8, 2022. Accepted for publication: April 15, 2022. Published: December 21, 2022.

The author has read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

CHANGING SOCIETY

Social structure, social institutions and processes

Political sociology

Original article

Sociological sciences

[https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4\(6\)-110-123](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4(6)-110-123)

Silinskaya Volost of the Simbirsk Volga Region: Discourse Analysis of the Way of Life and Spiritual and Cultural Traditions of the Population

Irina G. Kildyushkina^{1a}✉, Anastasia Yu. Yakovleva^{2b}✉

¹Research Institute for the Humanities under the Government of the Republic of Mordovia, Saransk, Russia

²Tatar State Philharmonic named after Gabdulla Tukay, Kazan, Russia

^airakil1967@mail.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6902-5941>

^b8nastya8@list.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2142-7113>

Abstract: The article presents a number of unknown facts from the history of the Simbirsk Volga region in the second half of the 19th century. They make it possible to show the origin and development of historical and cultural processes in the Silinsky volost of the Ardatovsky district. The features of the geographical location and climatic conditions of the territory, the occupations of the local population (gardening, horticulture, beekeeping, industry, handicrafts, other crafts, etc.) are shown. Attention is focused on the welfare and health of peasants, their poll - tax, redemption funds, payments and other expenses connected with household life, habits, including deviant behavior, are considered. The spiritual and moral practices that existed in the province, Christian beliefs and rituals of observing ancient customs during wedding ceremonies, burials, rituals to combat epidemics, which remain outside the field of view of the scientific community, are presented.

Keywords: way of life, local history, spiritual life, Silinskaya volost, Ardatovsky uyezd, Simbirsk Volga region, "Simbirskie gubernskie vedomosti"

For citation: Kildyushkina I.G., Yakovleva A.Yu. Silinskaya Volost of the Simbirsk Volga Region: Discourse Analysis of the Way of Life and Spiritual and Cultural Practices of the Population. *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue*. 2022; 4(6): 110-123. [https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4\(6\)-110-123](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4(6)-110-123).

Introduction

Russia in the XIX century is important for the formation of the “image of the future” or the clarification of “meanings” in the past. The authors have studied the historical, cultural, economic, spiritual and moral communication practices of a particular region. The ways of resolving conflicts in the sphere of national / state identity in the past, which may be important for settlement at the regional level in the future, are considered.

The purpose of the study is determined by two aspects: firstly, the need to recreate a holistic picture of the development of the Silinsky volost’ of the Ardatovsky district of the Simbirsk province in the second half of the 19th century, the introduction of new facts into scientific circulation, which allows not only to identify inaccuracies, but also to revise previously drawn conclusions; secondly, reassessment of the problems that have emerged and the experience of their solution at the regional level. This may be of importance in determining the strategy for the development of the territory.

Materials and Methods

New materials that have not yet entered the scientific circulation, studied in the synergistic context of local studies of local lore and the concept of passionarity of L.N. Gumilyov (4; 7; 8), allow to get a fresh look at the political, socio-economic, cultural, religious and confessional processes that took place in one of administrative-territorial units. Turning to archival documents and materials, including messages from the clerk of the Silinsky volost’ board of the Ardatovsky district, Pyotr Varlamov¹, published in the unofficial section of the Simbirsk Provincial Gazette for 1866, messages from the Secretary of the Simbirsk Provincial Statistical Committee M.V. Arnoldov and at the same time the editor of the indicated newspaper, we will try to compare them to recreate the analytical matrix about the Silinskaya volost’ of the Ardatovsky district of the Simbirsk Volga region.

To form the theoretical and methodological basis of the study, the scientific works of A.A. Akulova, S.A. Arutyunova, O.N. Astafieva, E.A. Zhuravleva, L.Yu. Kompleeva, G.I. Koroleva-Konoplyana, I.A. Kuptsova, N.B. Lebina, L.G. Skulmovskaya, V.V. Shalina, G. Cherner and others, devoted to understanding the imperial heritage of Russia, were taken, however, they did not take into account regional features in the formation of a regional model of government. The source base was the funds of the Central Archive of the Nizhny Novgorod Region, the fund for the Ardatovsky district (Silinskaya, Talyzinskaya volosts) of the Central State Archive of the Republic of Mordovia, the People’s Archive of the Samara and Simbirsk provinces, and other materials on the history and statistics of the Simbirsk province.

¹ Here and further, when mentioning P. Varlamov, the following sources will be used: Varlamov P. Description of the Silinsky volost’. Simbirsk provincial gazette. 1866. No. 5, 15 Jan.; No. 6, 18 Jan.; No. 7, 20 Jan.

In the process of studying written texts as sources, summarizing and interpreting the results obtained, the following scientific methods were used: a systematic method, a synergistic approach to the study of social processes and phenomena, methods of general scientific analysis and synthesis, historical retrospective, historical-genetic, continuity. This made it possible to create an integrative picture of ethnocultural genesis in the province, taking into account the concept of passionarity of L.N. Gumilyov and the functional of culture Yu.V. Bromley. The province is shown as a developing, multifaceted phenomenon with complex spiritual, moral and social relations. When constructing it, the authors proceeded from the principles of historicism, objectivity and consistency of humanitarian knowledge.

Results

In the second half of the XIX century the split has not yet affected the territories of the Ardatovsky district. However, in the understanding of the Russian commoner, the Simbirsk province was considered one of the richest in Russia in terms of specific local beliefs (2; 3), a detailed description of which would take up a lot of space. In this regard, we will only mention the most important of them, which existed within the boundaries of the former Silinsky volost², while characterizing the geographical position of the territory, agricultural facilities, industrial infrastructure and socio-cultural sphere, features of spiritual and moral traditions, habits of the local population.

According to the 1st revision (1721), the landlord village of Silino was part of the Verkhopyansky camp of the Alatyry district. According to the “List of Populated Places in the Simbirsk Province” (1863), this was already an owner’s village in the Ardatovsky district, consisting of 33 households (266 people), in which there was a church. There are episodic historical data about the Silinsky volost’, taken from the Fund for the Ardatovsky district, which partly characterizes the activities of the local population:

There is no bank under the Volost’ Board, the big Moscow road from the city of Simbirsk to the city of Moscow passes through the volost’. There are no bazaars in the volost’, but on July 8 in the village of Lipovka there is annually a rather insignificant fair called “Kazanskaya”, established for the needs of the peasants of the surrounding villages. The inhabitants of the volost are mostly engaged in arable farming, but a small part in the summer goes to work in the field. An insignificant part of the inhabitants is engaged in handicraft industry, namely tailoring and blacksmithing, and then in their free time from field work and these occupations do not constitute the main trade in agriculture³.

² The village of Silino is now the Ardatovsky district of the Republic of Mordovia, the administrative center of the Silinsky rural settlement; it is located on the Mena River, 28 km from the district center and 39 km from the Ardatov railway station. Available from: <https://ru.wikipedia.org>.

³ Funds for the Ardatov district of the Simbirsk province. Cases for genealogical information search and lovers of local lore. Silinsky volost’ (1897-1917). Available from: <https://forum.vgd.ru/post/531/72850/p2203418.htm>.

According to P. Varlamov's description, the Menya River divided the Silinsky volost" into a mountainous and ravine left-bank part and a lower right-bank part, imperceptibly rising to the forest. Between the villages of Neusypaevka and Soldatskoye, on the right side, the Rumleyka stream with steep banks flowed into it, starting from the forest dachas of the specific peasants of the village of Monadyshi. In the same place, near the village of Ulyanovka, the river Vachka carried its waters to the Menu from the cottages of the village of Chedaevka, Chedaevsky volost"t, the so-called Startsev corner⁴.

It was this place that was known for its Spas-Preobrazhensky Monastery, which, according to legend, was plundered by robbers. The clergy subsequently lived there, who moved to Chedaevka after the construction of a new church. Since the 17th century, the annual Spassky Bazaars and the best⁵ fairs (two days on June 26, August 6 and in winter from December 19 to 25, on the feast of Spyridon of Trimifuntsky, highly revered in the vicinity⁶), from Startsev Corner were transferred to the village of Bolshoye Talyzino (2)⁷, later renamed to Torgovoe Talyzino. A half-ruined church and a century-old pine tree, as witnesses of that time, existed in the second half of the 19th century.

Lush meadows stretched along the Mena, while the rest of the land along its banks was cultivated. The total area of all arable holdings in the Silinsky volost, registered with seven owners⁸, was approximately 7,000 hectares, haymaking – 470,88 hectares, for profitable livestock – 87,2 hectares; estates and hemp plants occupied 78,48 hectares of its territory, wood forest and shrubs – 359,7 hectares⁹. There were no other water systems, except Meni, Rumleyka and Vachka mentioned by P. Varlamov. In small oxbow lakes, formed between the mouths of Menya and Vachka, carp lived. It is noteworthy that in the river waters themselves with a width of 2 to 6 meters, apart from minnow and char, no other fish were found¹⁰. In the

⁴ The Spas-Preobrazhenskaya Hermitage, popularly called "Startsev Ugol", is now located near the village of Gorki, at the junction of the borders of the Republic of Mordovia and the Sechenovsky district of the Nizhny Novgorod region - the starting point for the spread of Orthodoxy in the Mordovian land. A divine service is held here every year on Spirits Day. In deep ravines in ancient times, the elders read prayers, Seraphim of Sarov, St. Luke Voyno-Yasenetsky appeared. Secretly, under the guise of stove-makers, Metropolitans John (Snychev) and Manuel (Lemeshevsky) visited these places. By their petitions, the weak and seriously ill were healed, and the destinies of pious Christians were arranged. There are many legends about "Startsevy Ugol" and Ivan the Terrible's campaigns against Kazan. The desert was abolished and revived. Schema-nun Margarita built the last women's community in this place. In the 1930s, it was destroyed by destroying the cells and chapels, the monks were shot and buried right there in the ravine. According to legend, the church with the monks went underground, where the hill rises now. Four springs with water of different composition were hammered out of it.

⁵ Funds for the Ardatov district of the Simbirsk province. Cases for genealogical information search and lovers of local lore. Talyzinsky volost' (1897-1917). Available from: <https://forum.vgd.ru/post/531/72850/p2203418.htm>

⁶ Larkina O. (2003) Schema Nun Margarita. Available from: https://blagovestsamara.rf/-public_page_8209

⁷ This is confirmed by the information contained in the TSANO documents. Fund 4. Inventory № 1a. Case 18. Fairs of 1780; Fund 61. Inventory № 216. Case 84. Fairs of 1865; Fund 60. Inventory № 236. Case 127a. Fairs of 1906 Also see: Ledrov S. (1920s) Map of the Nizhny Novgorod Region Fair in the XVII – first third of the XX century. Available from: <http://ledrov.ru/history/bazary-yarmarki/64-yarmarki/>

⁸ There were no forests owned by the peasants.

⁹ People's Archive of Samara and Simbirsk provinces. Silinsky volost' (2022). Available from: <https://mmdvshg.forum2x2.ru/f22-forum>.

¹⁰ The "brother" of the char is a predator from the salmon family, a rare species, useful in its properties, looks similar to trout.

loamy soil on the banks of the rivers, there was an admixture of stone, in the channel – shale, impregnated with oil, brought up along the river by spring waters. The soil was fertile, black earth, the humus content in its humus layer reached 12%; the subsoil composition is loamy. In some settlements, for example, in the village of Monadyshi, bricks were made from local clay.

They enriched the land mainly with manure from the barn, taken out by the peasants to the paddocks they got into the allotment. In the understanding of P. Varlamov, the peasants, "would have started with much more zeal if there were no communal ownership" to such a method of increasing its productivity and quality. The author did not write about the results of fertilizing plots with bone (bone fertilizer), which began on the estate of Mr. Grebner, but about agricultural implements, he noted that they were an ordinary plow and a harrow with iron teeth, for removing bread – a sickle; Grebner also introduced the loosening tool he invented.

Basically, the inhabitants of the village were engaged in arable farming as a means of maintaining life. A small part of the peasants in the summer went to the grassroots places for field work¹¹. According to P. Varlamov, the peasants, having received an insignificant allotment of land, rented and cultivated free land plots. The three-field system of field cultivation did not stand out from the rest in the volost - one field was sown with rye, the other with spring crops, consisting mainly of oats and buckwheat; then peas, spelt, barley and millet were sown (for themselves, not for sale). Until 1846, even spring wheat was grown in these parts, which had to be abandoned (it stopped producing good yields). As a rule, 2/3 of the spring field was sown with oats, the rest with small grain breads. In technical terms, according to the observations of the volost clerk, the process looked like this: for winter crops, the land preliminarily rested, after which it was harrowed twice. Rye was sown with a plow, as the peasants were convinced that this way the ear was larger and the grain more bulky. Seeds for winter crops were always used only from compressed and threshed rye before sowing ("not fresh", one-year-old cereal lying in the bins was considered unreliable in this regard). The field has been plowed under spring crops since spring, harrowed and sown. Since there were no seeders, it was sown manually for the economic tithe at the rate of: rye – 12 conditional land volumes, oats – 20, peas – 9, millet – 1, barley – 24, buckwheat – up to 16, spelt 55½ measures. The first spring sowing in the district began with oats and peas immediately after the snow melted (with the advent of the opportunity to plow), and ended no later than May 15th. The second in turn in the sowing campaign was millet and barley, the last one was buckwheat (it was planted in the last days of May or in the first days of June).

The voluminous and heavy, boring weeding in spring bread, oats, barley, spelt and millet fell to the lot of women and children. Productivity was reduced by climatic conditions, pests and diseases of agricultural crops. Local frosts harmed buckwheat more than others, and droughts (for example, in 1864) nullified all the efforts of the peasants in crop production. Huge damage to winter crops was caused by a breadworm that destroyed

¹¹ Funds for the Ardatov district of the Simbirsk province. Cases for genealogical information search and lovers of local lore. Silinsky volost' (1897-1917). Available from: <https://forum.vgd.ru/post/531/72850/p2203418.htm>

entire fields. Young pea seedlings were affected by an unknown gray booger, millet - smut caused by smut fungi, which reduced grain yield by 20–30%. Ergot, which is not uncommon in rye, affected both people and livestock with poultry everywhere (for example, there was a lot of it in the 1863 harvest).

Grain was threshed mainly by machines, giving along with drying grain in rigs, folding it into a barn, transporting straw, according to P. Varlamov's estimates, 15 silver kopecks per 100 sheaves (compared to the manual method, less than 20 silver kopecks for this type of work and did not take due to the lack of grain dryers). The cost of harvesting grown grain from tithes with advance payment from autumn to winter reached 2–5 rubles, with summer hiring – 3–3.5 rubles. There was no export of sheaves by hire. A winter worker, according to his assumption, could be hired for the period from autumn incantation to Easter for 8–10 rubles, in summer - from Easter to autumn incantation – for 20–25 rubles; an employee – 3–6 and 2–8 rubles, respectively. For example, in 1866, the price of approximately 170 kilograms of rye in the city of Ardatov was 4 silver rubles, its transportation over a distance of 20–30 versts was no more than 15 and 20 silver kopecks. Grass was mowed with ordinary scythes in small wet ravines near the Meni River and in forest clearings, as a rule, once a year. The harvest of hay was poor, as cattle grazed there and young grass grew only a little over a month before it was mowed.

According to P. Varlamov, there were 880 cattle with calves, 704 horses, 1,220 sheep and 576 pigs in the volost. Determining the ratio of livestock to the entire amount of convenient and inconvenient land (7,157 acres), he tentatively made the following calculation: for every 10 acres of land there was one horse, for 8 acres – one head of cattle, for 6 acres – one sheep and for 12 a tithe is one pig. Due to the lack of fodder and poor maintenance, local cattle were extremely small in stature. In winter, all of them, together with the sheep, kept in closed, but cold yards. They were fed with spring and rye straw, with the exception of sheep and horses, which occasionally got hay, and mash from all the leftovers for dairy cows and horses. From early spring, after the snow melted, all the cattle, exhausted from winter starvation, were driven out to the meadow, where during the summer they ate a little. More prosperous peasants from the autumn bought at cheap prices for fattening, slaughtering or reselling to larger merchants small and large cattle, sheep. For example, in the fall of 1865, the price, according to the volost clerk, was 1.5 silver rubles. It happened that after the slaughter, up to 3 silver rubles were obtained due to the high cost of fat, which reached 5 silver rubles per 16 kg. As regards cattle, in autumn it was possible to buy an average cow for 8–10 silver rubles. Goats were not kept in peasant farms, but there were quite a lot of piglets. Being picky in care and feed, these animals were considered profitable. Wealthy peasants also bought pigs for fattening with peas, and after slaughter they sold the meat at the Ardatovsky Bazaar, where the price of pork reached more than 1.5 silver rubles per 16 kg. From poultry, they preferred to keep only chickens.

Horticulture in the Silinsky volost was in a miserable state and developed poorly: for their own needs, the peasants grew only cabbage, cucumbers, carrots and onions. Potatoes were sown relatively recently in the fields, which were stored in pits, the surplus was sold at neighboring bazaars at 10–25 silver kopecks per certain volume. Russian hemp, flax and

tobacco were also cultivated in scanty volumes only for themselves. The first crop was sown on the estate, on fertilized land, the second – in the field, the third – in the garden from local seeds. Gardening as a separate branch of the economy was also weak. In addition to 2–3 landlord estates that cultivated various varietal apple trees and some cherries, only peasants in the village of Lipovka were engaged in it. Small gardens were not rented out, and the fruits were sold at the surrounding bazaars. Beekeeping was not a developed branch of agriculture at all; they were mostly used by old people.

There were no water and steam mills in the volost', only "windmills" that were easy to use, with the exception of several mills in the village of Siline. The value of each such windmill, according to P. Varlamov, did not exceed 150 silver rubles, but they grinded badly. There were also two mills that worked horses, and four fairly profitable oil mills for the production of hemp oil, the press cake from which served as excellent fodder for livestock.

Some residents in their free time from field work, not to the detriment of arable farming, were engaged in handicrafts – tailoring, blacksmithing; horse treatment; this is known from an article by a member of the Simbirsk Provincial Statistical Committee, Mr. Fon Grebner; digging wells in the surrounding villages (Silino village); brewing (up to 10 excellent brewers from the village of Lipovka were annually sent around Russia for this). The only one-day fair in the Silinsky volost' in the village of Lipovka, insignificant in terms of turnover, was timed to coincide with the summer holiday in honor of the Kazan icon (July 8)¹². The peasants of the nearest villages brought sheep, calves and small cattle to it. Local residents bought everything they needed for themselves here. However, according to the volost clerk, the turnover of the fair was insignificant, and there were no own bazaars.

The welfare of the peasants was low. To pay the tax, the peasants brought the last rye or a sheep or a cow necessary for the household to the market. The peasant paid for each family member annually 3 rubles and 20 kopecks podushnja ¹³, pastushnyje ¹⁴ – up to 60 kopecks; for the volost' board – up to 40 kopecks, horses – 17, for the salary of the volost coachman – 15 kopecks; for recruits¹⁵ – 20 kopecks; for repairing roads – 17 kopecks, for bridges – 15 kopecks, for sotsky – 2 and church warden – 2 kopecks. Moreover, the clergy collected 25 kopecks during the year. In total, this amounted to 5 rubles 33 kopecks per person. If we add to the indicated amount money for redemption from serfdom and payments for land, money for drinking in a tavern (67 kopecks), then up to 15 silver rubles were collected. It turned out that each peasant family, consisting of an average of 3 males, spent up to 45 rubles in silver. If we add other expenses associated with household life (buying salt, firewood, various utensils, shoeing horses and partially purchasing clothes), the costs turned out to be large. The life of the peasants would be difficult without free rentable land, from the cultivation of which they benefited. There were few capitalists who had the opportunity to provide loans in the district. If a man borrowed money, then he returned it at least 12% per annum.

¹² Funds for the Ardatov district of the Simbirsk province. Cases for genealogical information search and lovers of local lore. Silinsky volost' (1897-1917). Available from: <https://forum.vgd.ru/post/531/72850/p2203418.htm?>

¹³ Podushnja – per capita tax.

¹⁴ Pastushnyje – payment to shepherds for grazing cattle.

¹⁵ Conscription, established in Russia by the number of souls after the first revision of 1722.

At the same time, the peasant, having become independent, did not lose heart. On the contrary, he used every opportunity to have a drink somewhere. On all holidays, including July 8 and November 8, honored after Easter and the Nativity of Christ, he brewed 6 buckets of hemp beer per person, bought wine, meat or fish to drink during all week long. At that time, he did not take on any economic affairs and did not think about whether the grain perished in the field or not. In general, the level of drunkenness in the volost not only did not decrease, but increased annually. According to the Silinsky and Lipovsky volost's, only in these rural cemeteries in 1865 5 people were dropped from drunkenness. According to P. Varlamov, it was commonplace in the 1860s to bury the dead from drinking in common rural cemeteries, to which the Silin people reacted with sincere indignation. The peasants were firmly convinced that deviation from ancient customs is terrible, which will inevitably entail crop failures, since some deep forest ravine should be a decent place for the burial of a drinking person. In the case of his burial in a common graveyard, in order to avoid the upcoming, in their understanding, misfortunes, the coffin with the deceased is required not to be lowered, but to be thrown into the grave, sticking aspen stakes around it as a talisman against evil spirits¹⁶.

Thus, a vicious circle was that could not be broken: on the one hand, drunkenness ruined able-bodied people, therefore, undermined the economy of the region and the country as a whole, and on the other hand, it was unprofitable for the state to eradicate it. In other words, the active rejection of drinkers existed simultaneously with the tradition of drinking that permeated all sections of society, giving rise to a tolerant attitude towards alcohol (5; 6; 9:46–47, 107; 10; 12).

Belief in slander and whispering also played an important role, especially in wedding ceremonies. For example, for fear of causing damage to the newlyweds by some doctor treating horses¹⁷, who enjoyed great honor in the village, he was plentifully treated. P. Varlamov noted that he drank as much beer and wine as he desired. The Silin peasant, in order to cleanse himself of the disease during an epidemic and mass deaths of livestock, always buried the first fallen animal in the place where it died. Allegedly, this ritual was bound to prevent the general death of cattle. If, nevertheless, the process developed, then the herd was driven through the Living Fire: in the morning, all other fire was carefully poured (extinguished) in all rural huts, and 2–3 hefty guys started rubbing wood against wood. Other peasants chose a convenient ravine, dug a ditch in it so that a small but convenient arch was formed for driving the worldly herd. The holy fire was laid out on top of the ditch above the vault, and all the cattle were passed through it (11).

The state of health of the Silin residents themselves was poor. The peasants, dressed badly, not for the weather, often caught colds. And huts heated with straw harmed health and vision. Huge disasters, as in 1863, were caused to the population, cattle and poultry by

¹⁶ In the pagan traditions of many peoples before the advent of Christianity, aspen was considered an effective remedy against witchcraft and otherworldly creatures; the Slavs especially believed in the saving power of this tree.

¹⁷ So the healer treating horses was called with disdain; and a bad, ignorant doctor; a self-taught healer.

parasitic ergot on cereal plants. It turned out that when eating such bread, miscarriages occur in all cases without exception among local pregnant women. The next year, there was a fever among the adults of the Silins, several times a year, and the little ones died from a smallpox epidemic. The county doctor, specially posted, apparently did not bring any benefit due to the lack of medicines (Table 1 below shows the death rate of the local population in 1865).

Table 1. Indicators of the mortality rate of the population of the Silinsky volost in 1865

The number of deaths among the population of the Orthodox faith	Men	Women
age		
up to 1 year	21	31
1 – 5 years	4	5
5 – 10 years	2	1
10 – 15 years	–	1
20 – 25 years	3	3
25 – 30 years	–	1
30 – 35 years	1	1
35 – 40 years	–	–
35 – 40 years	–	3
40 – 45 years	1	1
45 – 50 years	–	–
50 – 55 years	1	2
55 – 60 years	1	2
60 – 65 years	3	–
65 – 70 years	1	–
70 – 75 years	1	–
75 – 80 years	–	1
over 80 years	–	–
Total:	40	52

Source: Varlamov P. Description of the Silinsky volost (Ending) // Simbirskie gubernskie vedomosti. 1866;7. January 20.

According to P. Varlamov's estimates, the indicators of the general mortality of the population in the Silinsky volost in 1865 of the children under the age of 5 years accounted for 65%. Among all the dead persons in the age group over 80, there were no persons of other confessions, except for Orthodoxy. The volost clerk expressed deep sympathy for pregnant women who experienced unheard-of barbarity during childbirth; more than a third of all

children born died from the inability to handle newborns. The peasants were ready to see a doctor, but there was no one to go to. “Dark”, illiterate men, naturally gifted with good mental abilities, in his opinion, realized the benefits of literacy, they learned the basics of literacy from the clerk of the volost government or from former courtyard people. From such teachers learned to read and write 23 people for 897 men of the male population of the volost’, or 2.5% for every 100 men.

Conclusion

The foregoing allows us to conclude that the ethnocultural identity of the Silins was determined by their way of life, the dominance of agriculture, a combination of communal land use and religiosity. Peasant farms retained a consumer character, had dynamics, but did not go beyond the boundaries of the traditional archaized agrarian subsystem, the economy of the Simbirsk Volga region. They were based on the “peasant farm”, labor-intensive and costly in nature, far from the optimal principles of the organization of production. The spiritual and cultural sphere was dominated by an archaic cult of veneration of ancestors, communicative rituals of communication between the “world of the living” and the “world of the dead”. The results of the work can contribute to further vernacular research on this issue.

References

1. Akulova A.A. [and others] *Tolerance and Culture of Interethnic Communication* / ed. E.A. Zhuravleva, V.V. Shalina. Krasnodar: Enlightenment-South, 2009: 307 p. (In Russian).
2. Arnoldov M.V. *Fairs and Bazaars in the Simbirsk province. Materialy dlya istorii i statistiki Simbirskoj gubernii*. Simbirsk: Simbirsk Province stat. com., 1866; 3:21–40. (In Russian).
3. Arutyunov S.A. *Peoples and cultures: Development and interaction*. Moscow: Nauka, 1989: 250 p. (In Russian).
4. Astafieva O.N. *Synergetic Approach to the Study of Sociocultural Processes: Opportunities and Limits*. Moscow: MGIDA, 2002: 326 p. (In Russian).
5. Bromley Yu.V. *Ethnographic Study of the Functions of Culture. Traditions in Modern Society: A Study of Ethnocultural Processes*. Moscow: Nauka, 1990: 5–17. (In Russian).
6. Kompleeva L.Yu. The culture of alcohol consumption in the Middle Volga Village during the NEP. *Izvestiya Penzenskogo gos. ped. un-ta im. V. G. Belinskogo*, 2012; 27: 722–724. (In Russian).
7. Koroleva-Konoplyanaya G.I. The L.Gumilyov theory of ethnogenesis. *Socio-political journal*. 1994; 7/8:121–125. (In Russian).
8. Kuptsova I.A. The dynamics of Russian provincial culture in the context of historical transformations of Russian civilization. *Moscow*, 2011: 377 p. (In Russian).
9. Lebina N.B. *Encyclopedia of banalities: Soviet everyday life: Contours, symbols, signs*. St. Petersburg: Dmitry Bulanin, 2006: 442 p. (In Russian).
10. Pivtsaykina I.A. „Blue Danubes“, or Peculiarities of „National Evil“. The problem of drunkenness and moonshine brewing according to the materials of the Mordovian Press in the middle of the 20th century. *Center and Periphery*. 2009; 1:117–121. (In Russian).
11. Skulmovskaya L.G. *Contradictions of the multidirectional development of the region culture in modern conditions*. Ekaterinburg, 2005: 346 p. (In Russian).
12. *Hold on to the Good: Churches and religious associations in the Russian State, the Soviet Union and Independent States that emerged after its disintegration* / ed. G. Cherner and others; transl. from Germany: Yu.A. Golubkin. Kharkov: Maidan: Folio, 1999: 480 p. (In Russian).

About the authors

Irina G. KILDYUSHKINA. CandSc (Hist). Docent, Leading Researcher at the Department of Regional Studies and Ethnology, Research Institute for the Humanities under the Government of the Republic of Mordovia. <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6902-5941>. Address: 3, L. Tolstoy st., Saransk, 430005, Republic of Mordovia, Russian Federation.

Anastasia Yu. YAKOVLEVA. PhD (Hist. of Arts). Artist of the State Orchestra of Folk Instruments of the Republic of Tatarstan, Tatar State Philharmonic named after Gabdulla Tukay. <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2142-7113>. Address: 73, Pavlyukhina st., Kazan, 420049, Republic of Tatarstan, Russian Federation.

Contribution of the authors

The authors contributed equally to this article.

The authors declare no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Submitted: October 14, 2022. Approved after peer reviewing: October 25, 2022.

Accepted for publication: November 5, 2022. Published: December 21, 2022.

The authors have read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE AND MODERNITY

History of International Relations and Foreign Policy

RUSSIA & WORLD: SCIENTIFIC DIALOGUE

**РОССИЯ
И МИР**
НАУЧНЫЙ ДИАЛОГ

Sri Lanka, given its location, is a vital link in China's strategic "OneBelt – One Road" Initiative in terms of maritime transport corridor. But proximity to India and their long historical and cultural ties mean it has a key place in New Delhi's politics as well. Thus, there is a strong possibility that the country will become an arena of competition and geopolitical rivalry between the two Asian powers.

Alikberov E.Sh., Alikberova A.R., Letiaev V.A.

Sino-Indian Rivalry: Sri Lanka

Russia is the legal successor of the USSR not only on its own territory. As a legal successor, it also bears obligations within the framework of the international treaties concluded by the USSR. And with this activity, it makes a significant contribution to the development of interstate relations in the post-Soviet space.

Russia proceeds from the free and harmonious development of cultures, languages, religions of all peoples living on the territory of the states that emerged after the collapse of the USSR, and which was then their common homeland.

Keeping in mind the historical ties between Russia and Uzbekistan, both states came to understand that the friendship of peoples (as a post-Soviet phenomenon) can and is becoming for these countries a socio-political value and a foundation for the development of bilateral relations. This is the historical significance of the contribution of the two countries - both in a bilateral and multilateral format within the framework of the CIS - to building a new world order.

Abduganiev N.N.

Friendship of Peoples as a Historical Factor in the Development of Modern Interstate
Relations between Russia and Uzbekistan

Sino-Indian Rivalry: Sri Lanka

Eduard Sh. Alikberov^{1a}, Alfia R. Alikberova^{2b}, Valerii A. Letiaev^{3c}

^{1,2,3} Kazan Federal University, Kazan, Russia

^a Eduard_alikberov@mail.ru, <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1129-4863>

^b alfiakasimova@gmail.com, <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5094-3010>,

^c valerii@letiaev.ru, <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7540-3099>,

Abstract. The article is devoted to Sri Lanka, one of the zones of strategic interests of China and India. Both Asian states are forming new consumer markets, building new sea corridors, and in the busiest maritime trade corridor in the world – the Indian Ocean, their competition for control over key transport arteries is becoming more and more evident. In the current conditions, the value of control over logistics is determined not so much by the volume of trade and benefits, as by the ability to consistently generate added value. Thus, Sri Lanka, being at the center of the strategic priorities of India and China in South Asia, turns into a zone of vital interests of the two Asian dominant forces. The study shows the weaknesses and strengths of Sri Lanka, which can affect the further balance of relations between the three states.

Keywords: Sino-Indian relations, Sri Lanka, one belt– one road, Indo-Pacific region, China, India

For citation: Alikberov E.Sh., Alikberova A.R., Letiaev V.A. Sino-Indian Rivalry: Sri Lanka. Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue. 2022; 4(6): 126-137. [https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4\(6\)-126-137](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4(6)-126-137)

Introduction

2022 marks the 60th anniversary of the first border conflict between China and India. In December 1962, the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, took the initiative to conduct a conference to mediate a settlement of the Sino-Indian conflict. Subsequently, Sri Lanka, using its close partnership relations with the two Asian giants, offered them to visit Sri Lanka, and it was the beginning when the mediation between the two countries was built.

Sino-Indian relations continue to be complex and multifaceted 60 years later. With the growing influence of these states, the competition between them has long gone beyond their territorial boundaries and it has influenced the entire Asian region. This rivalry could not but affect Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka's strategic location has shaped its history for millennia. Even in ancient times, Sri Lanka was an important point on the way between Rome and China which are two

great empires. At the moment, due to the shift of political and economic growth centers in the Asian region, we continue to observe a situation where the position of Sri Lanka in the sea corridor between East and West is crucial not only from a geostrategic point of view, but also in the sphere of maritime logistics, trade and security issues.

The globalization of the world economy is creating new consumer markets, including the Asian region, increasing traffic along seaborne transportation routes. In general, up to 50% of vessel traffic in the world and 70% of oil products transportation are carried through the Indian Ocean¹. Every year, more than 60,000 ships pass near the borders of Sri Lanka. Together with the advantage of its geographical location, Sri Lanka has found itself in a zone of conflict between the interests of world and regional powers.

Materials and Methods

The theoretical study was formed by the works of Russian orientalists (1–5) and foreign scholars (7), including Chinese (8) and Indian researchers (6), which analyze in detail the economic and political role of each country participating in these trilateral relations, including global and regional levels. The main research methods were the dialectical method, the method of comparative research, content analysis, and the structural-functional method. The principle of consistency, which seems to be a synthesis of analytical and intuitive approaches, made it possible to put forward the systemic relationships of the object of study with its constituent components, which differ significantly if we consider them separately. The compliance with the principle of consistency is a prerequisite for understanding the logic of the emergence of certain phenomena in order to create a sustainable mechanism for preventing undesirable situations in Sino-Indian relations. The sources of information were official statements, decisions, legal acts of the government, foreign countries, international institutions, including reports and think tank reports. The analysis helped to extract a large amount of important data.

Results

The Indian Ocean, due to its importance, is turning into a zone of rivalry between China and India. Seaborne transportation routes across the Indian Ocean are of strategic significance for increasing trade and economic relations and ensuring energy security for the rapidly growing economies of India and China.

Sri Lanka is a vital link in China's strategic One Belt One Road initiative in terms of the seaborne transportation route, taking into account its location. But both the proximity

1 International Transport Workers' Federation (2019). Transport 2040: Automation, Technology, Employment – The Future of Work / World Maritime University. London. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330778040_Transport_2040_Automation_Technology_Employment_-_The_Future_of_Work

to India and long-standing historical and cultural ties mean that it occupies a key position in New Delhi's politics. Thus, there is a great potential for the country to become an arena of the competition and a geopolitical rivalry between the two Asian powers.

China, since the second half of the 20th century, has become the largest arms exporter to Sri Lanka. Beijing, in addition to small arms, actively supplies offensive weapons, ordinance and aircraft. The defense and security cooperation between China and Sri Lanka was intensified during the Sri Lankan Civil War between 1983 and 2009, where China's support came in various forms from the development of humanitarian relations to the implementation of large investment projects and financial integration².

An important event in bilateral relations took place in 2007 with the Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa official visit to Beijing. During the visit, contracts were signed for the supply of Chinese Jian-7 jet fighters, anti-aircraft guns, JY-11 3D air surveillance radar, armored personnel carriers and other weapons³.

In recent years, visits by high-ranking officers of the two countries have become more frequent, reinforcing the coordination of military departments. In 2012, during a Chinese Defense Minister's visit to Sri Lanka, a \$100 million grant was given to build army camps⁴. China has committed itself to providing military training to officers of the Sri Lankan army to achieve the goals of strengthening the cooperation between the two countries.

The growing transfer of arms and cooperation between China and Sri Lanka has been of concern to India. One of the irritants was Sri Lanka's permission in 2014 to enter the port of Colombo for two Chinese submarines and a warship. The fact of the presence of Chinese submarines in the port caused great concern among the Indian command, due to the fact that the Chinese Navy is regularly present in the Indian Ocean region performing various tasks, including the fight against piracy, which is very acute in the Indian Ocean, however, Chinese submarines presence in this region were relatively rare until recently. Despite the lack of protest from India, this was seen as a serious breach of trust between New Delhi and Colombo, as well as an increase in relations tensions with Beijing.

The deployment of Chinese submarines cannot be seen as a clear provocative action by Beijing, but New Delhi regards these actions as a decrease in India's naval superiority in the region, which it sees as its historical zone of influence. The Chinese officials' frequent visits to Sri Lanka have become a concern, along with a speculation about the possible construction of an aircraft maintenance facility in the port city of Trincomalee, which India considers a strategic location in terms of national security.

The prospect of using the territory of Sri Lanka as a possible base for the PRC is another factor in the confrontation between India and China in the Indian Ocean in the

² China and Sri Lanka: Between a Dream and a Nightmare. The Diplomat. 18.11.2016. Available from: <https://thediplomat.com/2016/11/china-and-sri-lanka-between-a-dream-and-a-nightmare/>

³ Meera Srinivasan. Rajapaksa's VISIT PART of the India-China 'Great Game' in Sri Lanka? The Hindu. 26.11.2016. Available from: <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/Rajapaksa's-visit-part-of-the-India-China-'Great-Game'-in-Sri-Lanka/article16702864.ece/>

⁴ Rowand Michael. China Made a Failed Bet on Sri Lanka's Rajapaksa Family. Foreign policy. 05.09.2014. Available from: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/13/china-sri-lanka-rajapaksa-family-corruption/>

context of the PRC's implementation of a program to create a chain of deep-water ports / bases of the PRC Navy called the "String of Pearls", stretching from Hainan Island, along the northern coast of the Indian Ocean and the eastern coast of Africa. The competition between China and India in the Indian Ocean is largely driven by the robust growth dynamics of the economies of the two Asian giants. There appears to be a new strategic focus on the seaborne and coastal regions adjacent to sea routes connecting the energy-rich Persian Gulf with Asia's energy-dependent economies. Any disruption of supply chains would definitely harm the economy not only of the Asian region, but of the entire global economy. There is a critical dependence of China on seaborne trade logistics routes through which most Chinese escorts and energy imports are exported.

In response to China's activity, India is also making significant efforts to develop the security cooperation with Sri Lanka. For the first two decades after independence, Sri Lankan military officers were trained in Indian military academies. During the civil war despite the existing restrictions on the supply of offensive weapons, India actively supplied the official authorities of Sri Lanka with defensive weapons, interacting at the level of intelligence activities.

At present, there is still an interaction in the field of military-technical cooperation. In 2017, the Indian Navy donated an offshore patrol vessel to the Sri Lanka Coast Guard for training and surveillance purposes. Previously, the Indian Navy also transferred two patrol vessels to Sri Lanka in 2006 and 2008, respectively. Prior to handing over the vessels, Sri Lanka Coast Guard personnel were trained in the operation and maintenance of the vessels⁵.

In 2014, Sri Lanka ordered two state-of-the-art offshore patrol vessels from India for a value of more than \$140 million⁶, making it the first ever purchase of a new offshore vessel. Custom built for the Sri Lankan Navy by Goa Shipyard Limited, the vessels entered service in 2017 and 2018, becoming the largest vessels of its kind in the Sri Lankan Navy. Providing these ships by India was seen as strengthening the coastal borders of Sri Lanka, which is in the interests of India's national security.

India has also held numerous joint military exercises with Sri Lanka in various formats. Bilateral Mitra Shakti exercises have been organized between the two countries since 2013⁷. In recent years, the exercise has focused on counter-separatism and counter-terrorism operations, with an emphasis on greater use of modern communications, intelligence and modern technology. In 2019, the seventh exercise was conducted to improve the interoperability and effectiveness of India and Sri Lanka.

SLINEX is another format of joint military exercises. This is a series of naval exercises between two fleets. First held in 2005, these exercises have helped the two navies strengthen each other's interactions. The goal is to enable the navies of both countries to improve their

⁵ India hands over off-shore patrol vessel to Sri Lanka. Indianexpress. 05.07.2017 Available from: <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-hands-over-off-shore-patrol-vessel-to-sri-lanka-4829842/>

⁶ First Indian warship exported to Mauritius. CGS Barracuda. 21.12.2014 Available from: <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/nation-world/cgs-barracuda-first-indian-warship-exported-to-mauritius/slideshow/45590323.cms>

⁷ India-Sri Lanka joint military exercise in Pune. Dailymirror. 11.10.2017 Available from: <https://www.dailymirror.lk/article/India-Sri-Lanka-joint-military-exercise-in-Pune-138203.html>

own capabilities and operational efficiency, which is critical to maintaining security in the region. The SLINEX 2017 naval exercise, arranged near Visakhapatnam, was dedicated to the fight against piracy. SLINEX subsequent exercises greatly expanded their scale, in which the Sri Lankan Air Force also took part for the first time. The last exercise took place in October 2020⁸.

The third exercise format, dubbed “Dosti”, is a trilateral exercise of the navies of three countries including India, the Maldives and Sri Lanka. The exercise was first held in 1991 between India and the Maldives and subsequently expanded to include Sri Lanka in 2012. These exercises are aimed at achieving interoperability. In connection with the geostrategic importance of the coastal regions of the three countries, there is a need to ensure their security and the one of the entire Indian Ocean. In addition, India and Sri Lanka have also participated in larger joint military exercises with other countries.

Thus, thanks to various confidence-building measures between the military departments of the two countries, India has now been able to reach a level of cooperation with Sri Lanka that China will most likely never achieve due to strong cultural ties in the first place, as well as a common security space. India bears a special responsibility for bringing peace and stability to South Asia.

It can be stated that India is still an important ally in the field of defense and security of Sri Lanka and continues to intensify steps in the field of military-technical cooperation. While China is currently building up its defense ties with Sri Lanka mainly through military sales, Beijing is potentially ready to develop cooperation in other spheres as well.

On the other hand, although India is not the main exporter of weapons to Sri Lanka, nevertheless has a confident leading position in the training of military officers. In addition, interactions between the militaries of the two countries remain at a high level and continue to grow thanks to the annual joint military exercises.

Looking at the situation from the perspective of Sri Lanka, Colombo needs to carefully approach the issue of balancing between major powers, to effectively manage interactions with various actors to ensure and protect national interests. Getting too close to China could create problems with India, while tilting towards India could affect Chinese arms imports and other aspects of their bilateral relationship. Therefore, it is extremely important for Colombo to try to maximize its own benefits without antagonizing any of the major powers.

In addition to the military aspect of the competition between India and China in Sri Lanka, the trade and economic rivalry for influence in Colombo also plays a key role.

The government of Sri Lanka has a clear vision of where it should be in today's world. Sri Lanka is reshaping to enhance interaction with both historical and new trading partners, leveraging its geostrategic position to become a modern trade and logistics hub in the Indian Ocean as well as a transshipment port for trade in the Bay of Bengal. In order to fully realize its potential, Sri Lanka is actively pursuing integration processes with regional players actively involved in the international division of labor, deepening specialization and diversifying production, and ensuring deep technological cooperation in the Indian Ocean.

⁸ India-Sri Lanka to hold SLINEX military exercise. GKtoday. 05.07.2017 Available from: <https://www.gktoday.in/topic/india-sri-lanka-to-hold-slinex-military-exercise/>

One of these associations is BIMSTEC, which is an organization of countries around the Bay of Bengal: Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand and two landlocked states - Bhutan and Nepal. In 2021, India accounted for 79% of merchandise exports to Sri Lanka among all BIMSTEC member countries and 87% of merchandise imports to Sri Lanka⁹. Colombo also comes up with various initiatives, as earlier Sri Lanka presented the regional initiative of the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace (IOZOP)¹⁰. Sri Lanka is also seeking to further integrate with the world by implementing reforms to facilitate trade and encourage productive foreign investment.

Economic and trade interaction between India and Sri Lanka

India and Sri Lanka have a dynamic and growing trade and economic partnership that has expanded significantly in recent years. It has been influenced by the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISFTA), which entered into force in 2000. India has traditionally been one of Sri Lanka's largest trading partners. In 2020, India ranked second in terms of trade with Sri Lanka. The total amount of trade between the two countries in 2020 was \$3.6 billion¹¹. Sri Lanka's exports to India have increased significantly since 2000 when the ISLFTA came into effect. It is worth noting that 60% of all Sri Lanka's exports to India were carried out under a free trade agreement in the period of 2018-2021.

In addition to being Sri Lanka's largest trading partner, India is also the largest investor in Sri Lanka. A number of leading companies from India are actively implementing investment projects in Sri Lanka. Foreign direct investment from India was about \$1.7 billion from 2005 till 2021.

The Indian investment portfolio includes investments in petroleum retail, tourism and hotel, manufacturing, real estate, telecommunication, banking and financial services. Likewise, investments by Sri Lankan companies in India are also growing and taking advantage of India's growing economy and huge consumption market. Brandix is one of the examples, which has invested about \$1 billion in garment production in Visakhapatnam. MAS holdings, Damro, LTL Holdings invest in the freight servicing and logistics sector.

Economic and trade interaction between China and Sri Lanka

After the end of the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009, the Sri Lankan government launched a program of mostly development-oriented infrastructure to revive its economy. To achieve this goal, the Sri Lankan government needed international assistance to build much-needed

⁹ BIMSTEC and Sri Lanka: A Potential Agenda for 2018-2020. Available from: <https://lki.lk/publication/bimstec-and-sri-lanka-a-potential-agenda-for-2018-2020/>

¹⁰ Kupriyanov A., Wijayabahu K. International Relations in South Asia: Russia's and Sri Lanka's views. RIAC: Policy Brief № 24. 21.11.2019. Available from: https://russiancouncil.ru/activity/policybriefs/mezhdunarodnye-otnosheniya-v-yuzhnoy-azii-vzglyady-rossii-i-shri-lanki/?sphrase_id=63456938.

¹¹ India-Sri Lanka Economic and Trade Engagement (overview). High Commission of India (the official website). Available from: https://www.hcicolombo.gov.in/Economic_Trade_Engagement.

infrastructure in a country that had been ravaged by three decades of war and civil unrest. However, in order to avoid pressure from global governance institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, the Sri Lankan government was looking for an alternative option to obtain a credit line on acceptable terms. With the development of the One Belt One Road strategic initiative, the Chinese authorities announced the allocation of \$900 billion to create a global transport and investment infrastructure, including loans and credit lines to the states participating in this project. Sri Lanka sees China's Belt and Road Initiative as an effective development strategy to attract a large influx of foreign investment to the country to solve infrastructure problems and support sustainable economic development.

The total cost of Chinese investment in infrastructure in Sri Lanka between 2006 and July 2021 was \$12.8 billion¹².

We want to give some examples of the completed projects in the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative in Sri Lanka. These are Norocholai power plant, which provides about 40 percent of the country's electricity supply; the expressway connecting the airport with Colombo; Colombo International Container Terminals (CICT) that have become the fastest growing container terminal in Asia and a Moragahakanda project.

The reservoir in Sri Lanka ensured the dynamic development of the country's agriculture and communal services.

Colombo Port City is the largest project that is in the process of implementation, it should be a new driver of economic growth in Sri Lanka.

Obviously, Sri Lanka is trying to balance between India and China in order to benefit from cooperation with them, but at the same time, Sri Lanka does not consider a situation where it may become almost absolutely dependent on anyone.

Conclusions

India and China are well aware of the need to maintain peace in the Asia-Pacific region, not only for their own interests, but also for the interests of those who seek to achieve a solution of global security issues. However, the existing tangle of contradictions between them and China's strategic interest in the Indian Ocean still threatens its small island states to come under great pressure.

In this case, Sri Lanka should act proactively, taking into account its increased interest in developing cooperation with both China and India, in order to reduce the tension in China-India relations, emphasizing the fact that there is sufficient strategic space for cooperation and development of both countries globally and in the Asian region particularly, without encroaching on the national sovereignty.

In developing the priorities of Sri Lanka's foreign policy, one of the fundamental points should be the understanding that Sri Lanka should not become the arena of Sino-

¹² Rumors behind 'China debt trap': How Western and Indian Conspiracists Smear China-Sri Lanka Cooperation Shanghai and Chen Runze in Colombo. Published 06.02.2022 Available from: <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202202/1251536.shtml>

Indian rivalry. It should strive to be a constructive force that determines the fate of the two emerging Asian giants separately, thereby contributing to peace and stability in the region and, in turn, acquiring its unique international positioning, as it happened 60 years ago.

References

1. Grishin Ya.Ya., Letyaev V.A. On the way to the "Chinese Dream". Kazan: Grumant, 2021: 276. (In Russian).
2. Lokshin G.M., Kobelev E.V., Mazyrin M. The ASEAN Community in the modern world. Moscow: ID "FORUM", 2019: 296. (In Russian).
3. Uyanaev S.V. Russia – India – China: in the contours of the new world order. Moscow: ID "FORUM", 2019: 322. (In Russian).
4. Yurlov F. N., Yurlova T. F. History of India. XX century. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2010: 211. (In Russian).
5. Yakovlev A.G. Russia, China and the world. Moscow: IDV RAS, 2002: 472. (In Russian).
6. Acharya A. India-China Relations: An Overview. The Peacock and the Dragon India-China Relations in the 21 Century. New Delhi, 2000: 491.
7. Raditio Klaus Heinrich. Understanding China's Behavior in the South China Sea. A Defensive Realist Perspective. Palgrave Macmillan, 2018: 221.
8. Zhang Li. China-Indian Relations: Strategic Engagement and Challenges. IFRI, 2010: 37.

About the authors

Eduard Sh. ALIKBEROV, CandSc(Hist), Senior Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, World Politics and Diplomacy of the Institute of International Relations, Kazan Federal University. <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1129-4863>. Address: 1/55 Pushkin str., Kazan, 420111, Russian Federation, eduard_alikberov@mail.ru

Alfiya R. ALIKBEROVA, CandSc(Hist), Associate Professor of the Department of Altaic Studies and Chinese Studies at the Institute of International Relations, Kazan Federal University. <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5094-3010>. Address: 1/55 Pushkin str., Kazan, 420111, Russian Federation, alfiakasimova@gmail.com

Valerii A. LETIAEV, DSc(Law), Professor of the Department of International Relations, World Politics and Diplomacy of the Institute of International Relations, Kazan Federal University. <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7540-3099>. Address: 1/55 Pushkin str., Kazan, 420111, Russian Federation, valerii@letiaev.ru

Contribution of the authors

The authors contributed equally to this article.

The authors declare no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Submitted: October 1, 2022. Approved after peer reviewing: October 15, 2022.

Accepted for publication: October 30, 2022. Published: December 21, 2022.

The authors have read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

Friendship of Peoples as a Historical Factor in the Development of Modern Interstate Relations Between Russia and Uzbekistan

Nazirjon N. Abduganiev✉

All-Russian Public Organization Assembly of Peoples of Russia, Moscow, Russia,
nazir1970@yandex.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0667-544X>

Abstract: The article examines the historical ties between the peoples of Russia and Uzbekistan both in a bilateral and multilateral format within the CIS, their historical unity during the Great Patriotic War, in the post-war period and today. "Friendship of peoples" is considered as a socio-political value and economic foundation of international relations between Russia and Uzbekistan. The author shows that the historical potential of "friendship of peoples" as a post-Soviet phenomenon has not been sufficiently studied. In some countries, the elites are underutilizing the historical potential of "friendship of peoples" as a post-Soviet phenomenon. Understanding the significance of the "friendship of peoples" is a test of state maturity in the conditions of the modern multipolarity of the world.

Keywords: friendship of peoples, V. Putin, Sh. Mirziyoyev, Russia, Uzbekistan, Stalingrad, cooperation, historical memory, good neighborly relations.

For citation: Abduganiev N.N. Friendship of Peoples as a Historical Factor in the Development of Modern Interstate Relations Between Russia and Uzbekistan. *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue*. 2022;4(6):138-157, [https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4\(6\)-138-157](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4(6)-138-157)

Introduction

The study is devoted to the current state of relations between Russia and Uzbekistan. Both countries, together with China, India and other friendly states, are actively participating in the creation of a new world order.

The idea of the study is as follows: 1. to reveal the features of the manifestation of the thesis of the President of Russia V. Putin in modern conditions:

The strength of Russia is in the free development of all peoples, in diversity, harmony of cultures and languages, in the dialogue of Orthodox and Muslims, followers of Judaism and Buddhism¹.

1 Thoughts on Russia: The President on the Most Important. Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2016:16.

2. to identify the features of the role of Russia in the post-Soviet space:

The Russian Federation is the legal successor of the USSR Union on its territory, as well as the legal successor of membership in international organizations, their bodies, participation in international treaties, as well as in respect of obligations and assets of the USSR Union outside the territory of the Russian Federation provided for by international treaties².

The former Soviet republics took into account the historical and legal realities. The Eurasian Economic Union was created – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Belarus (which is also building a Union State with Russia). But for Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, the reality that developed after the collapse of the USSR became a severe test of state maturity.

The Republic of Uzbekistan withstood severe tests of state maturity and began not only to restore ties with Russia interrupted in 1991, but also to strengthen them in every possible way. Both states are currently strengthening thanks to the joint activities of the presidents of the two countries, V. Putin and Sh. Merziyoyev. The process of integration is going on in all areas: politics, economics, culture, this is an example for other states of Central Asia, which makes an invaluable contribution to the creation of a new world order (15). And the experience of the Republic of Uzbekistan in this process, in our opinion, is leading in comparison with such states of the region as Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (16).

The purpose of the study is to consider the deep historical foundations and conditionality of the common path of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Uzbekistan in the current complex system of international relations.

Materials and methods

To study the problem, the author used the following sources: the Constitution of the Russian Federation, documentary, statistical data, published memoirs and texts of speeches by contemporaries of the events, primarily the work of Academician E. M. Primakov. A special place is occupied by treaties regulating relations between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The main scientific methods were: historical-genetic, comparative-historical. The author proceeded from the fact that in the historical ties between the peoples of Russia and Uzbekistan in the 20th century of post-Soviet history 1. we are connected by the sacred history of the Great Patriotic War, 2. the past manifested itself in the dramatic events associated with

2 The Constitution of the Russian Federation: New Edition. With the Amendments Approved During the all-Russian Vote on July 1, 2020. Moscow: Phoenix, 2021:19-20.

the collapse of the USSR, since many people both in Russia and in In Uzbekistan, and in other republics, they hoped that life would still get better. President of the Russian Federation V. Putin emphasizes that people were promised a common currency, a common economic space, and a common armed forces, but all this remained only promises, there was no big country. And subsequently, people were simply passed from hand to hand, just like a bag of potatoes³.

Without understanding the historical component of Russia's succession to the legacy of the former USSR, it is difficult to understand the foundations of modern relations between Russia and Uzbekistan.

Results

The peoples of Russia and Uzbekistan, under the leadership of the popularly elected presidents V. Putin and Sh. Mirziyoyev, are building their future on a solid foundation of the positive experience of the past and on the undoubted successes of the present. First of all, we note the policy of historical memory of the years and results of the Second World War. On June 24, 2020, a parade was held on Red Square in Moscow dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War. Along with Russian military personnel, many countries, including Uzbekistan, took part in it. President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev was among the statesmen at the festive celebrations. Such a representative participation of fraternal Uzbekistan in commemorative events is the deepest tribute to the heroic participation of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, when representatives of all nationalities of the Soviet Union came out to defend the common Motherland. Despite the fact that the fighting took place far beyond the borders of Uzbekistan, every Uzbek family experienced its hardships and suffering.

Uzbek warriors, together with warriors of other peoples of the USSR, fought stubbornly for their homeland. Great moral support for the Uzbek front-line soldiers and other soldiers of the Soviet Army was the letter of the Uzbek people, signed by 2412 thousand people and published in the Pravda newspaper on October 31, 1942. In the Republic, the 389th, 12th, 162nd and 69th rifle divisions, the 21st and 44th cavalry divisions, the 90th and 94th separate rifle brigades, the 128th Guards Turkestan Mining rifle division, etc. For courage and heroism shown on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, 120 thousand representatives of Uzbekistan were awarded orders and medals, and 280 of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (9:128–129). Huge work has been done to restructure the national economy of Uzbekistan for a military version. More than 90 collective farms and state farms were evacuated to Uzbekistan. In 1941–1943. Uzbekistan received over 1 million evacuees, including 200,000 children. In 1941–1943 about 240,000 people were placed and provided with jobs in Tashkent alone. By decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan and the Council of People's Commissars of the Uzbek SSR, the People's Commissariat of Education of Uzbekistan created in October 1941 central children's evacuation center, then

³ Putin V.V. Russia, Looking to the Future. A Weighty Word from The President. Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2018:130-131.

republican, regional, city and district commissions for the placement of evacuated children (3:739). People's concern for children manifested itself in different ways. Tashkent blacksmith Shaakhmed Shamakhmudov and his wife Bakhri Akramova adopted fourteen children. Many Soviet people followed their noble example. Pravda Vostoka, for example, reported that in Tashkent alone, 643 families and 69 collectives took evacuated children for upbringing. In June 1942, 30 wagons with food, clothes and shoes were sent to the children of heroic Leningrad from the students of Uzbekistan. Such facts have become the norm of life (8:103).

In the autumn of 1941, 31 higher educational institutions and 7 military academies were evacuated to Uzbekistan from the western regions of the country, 17 of which were located in Tashkent. Among them were the Kiev Industrial Institute, the Kharkov Transport Institute, the Moscow Institute of Architecture and Textiles, the Leningrad Conservatory, etc. During the war, with the help of the central structures, the Uzbek branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in accordance with the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of October 27, 1943, was transformed into the Academy of Sciences Uzbek USSR. During the war years, prominent scientists worked here: academicians B.D. Grekov, V.V. Struve, Corresponding Members of the USSR Academy of Sciences M.A. Chatelain, S.V. Bakhrushin, V.I. Picheta, A.Yu. Yakubovsky and many others (1:7–8, 23, 26). Many artists changed their pencil and brush for a rifle and a machine gun, becoming among the defenders of the Motherland – the Hero of the Soviet Union S. Abdullaev, N. Gerasimov, I. Kochetov, B. Hamdami, S. Malevich and many others (1).

Doctors, paramedics, and nurses went to the front along with the military units formed on the territory of Uzbekistan. Let's name some of them: O. Gulmirzaev, Maryam Yusupova, A.M. Shakirov (7:139-140). More than 113 military hospitals were located in Uzbekistan, over which 750 enterprises, institutions, collective farms, and state farms patronized. In 1942, disabled people were registered, they were provided with material assistance, most of them were employed. Particular care was shown for orphans and wounded soldiers evacuated to Uzbekistan. Military hospitals are mainly located in Tashkent and Samarkand (20 each), 42 in the Fergana region (10). Academicians N. Anichkov, V. Osipov, V. Voyachik, V. A. Shamov, professors S. A. Novotelnikov, A. Lebedinsky, V. Dainikov, V. Broderzon, S. Yu. Minkin, M. Entin, F. M. Folkler, etc. During this period, there was an urgent need for nurses. In July 1941, courses for nurses were organized, where they were trained on the job for 2-6 months. For the period 1941–1945 8054 nurses and 22658 paramedics were trained. In December 1941, the Odessa Research Institute of Ophthalmology was evacuated to Tashkent. The Institute was headed by the famous surgeon Vladimir P. Filatov (1875–1956), who was later awarded with the "Certificate of Honor" of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR. In pursuance of the decision of the State Defense Committee of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the Uzbek SSR decided to place evacuation hospitals in the Republic. The most qualified and specialized hospitals were located in Tashkent and Samarkand, they had highly qualified medical personnel - professors, associate professors, specialists working at medical universities and research institutes. Specialized hospitals were created in Tashkent - by the end of the war, 45.3% of all beds in the evacuated hospitals of the republic were located here. Mortality in evacuated hospitals was very low (1.18%), and 91.3% were returned to military units and workplaces. As of December 1, 1941,

evacuation hospitals in Tashkent had 25.8% of all beds in the Republic, and by the beginning of the first quarter of 1943, almost half of all beds (49.6%) were concentrated in them (19:147–148).

All this is known and remembered by the peoples of Russia and Uzbekistan. Today there are borders between our countries. But there are events that have forever remained in the historical memory of the peoples of Russia and Uzbekistan. First of all, this is the Battle of Stalingrad. February 2, 2023 marks the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad. On July 15, 2022, the President of the Russian Federation signed a Decree on the establishment of the Organizing Committee for the preparation and holding of events in connection with the anniversary. This emphasized the status of the Volgograd region as a region of national importance. Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, has been appointed Chairman of the Organizing Committee. The workers of the Khorezm region sent more than 6 tons of meat and 27 heads of cattle, sheep, about 2 tons of poultry meat, 11 thousand eggs, over 5 tons of rice, 400 kg of meat, 1140 sheepskins, 1368 kg of wool, etc. to the Stalingrad front. Turakurgan district of this region was sent grain for 1,600,000 rubles. Stalingrad soldiers received gifts from other regions of Uzbekistan. In the Stalingrad direction, the 90th and 94th separate rifle brigades, formed in Ferghana and Kattakurgan, fought as part of the 21st Army of the Stalingrad Front. Uzbek warriors also fought in other formations. Only from the Namangan region over 10 thousand people participated in the Battle of Stalingrad. A newspaper in the Uzbek language was published on the Stalingrad front. Kh. Huzhmatov personally destroyed 117 enemy soldiers and officers by the beginning of the counteroffensive near Stalingrad. Other Uzbek snipers also distinguished themselves: M. Madamanov, Tashpulatov, K. Saitov, I. Tashmatov, Z. Ganieva. Heroism and courage were shown by the Uzbek soldiers of the 77th Guards Rifle Division - R. Akhadov, K. Khudaibergenov, A. Amanov, M. Khalilov and others. More than 2,730 people were awarded the medal For the Defense of Stalingrad. Among them I.A. Trupov, K. Tapirov, K. Sherdanov, Kh. Khuzhaev, T. Khuzhanafasov, D. Karimov and others. M. Dzhabarov was awarded the Order of Alexander Nevsky, and K. Elmuradov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner (20:647). The Battle of Stalingrad ended victoriously on February 2, 1943. The losses of the Nazi troops were over 800 thousand people, 32 divisions and 3 brigades were completely destroyed, and 16 divisions suffered heavy losses. During the liquidation of the encircled grouping from January 10 to February 2, 1943, over 91 thousand people were taken prisoner, including 2500 officers and 24 generals (2:115). The Uzbek people made their worthy contribution to the great Stalingrad Victory (4).

The common victory of the peoples of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War creates the fundamental foundations for strengthening friendship and cooperation between countries. The proof is the relations between Russia and Uzbekistan.

Diplomatic relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Uzbekistan were established on March 20, 1990, and on May 30 an agreement on the foundations of interstate relations, friendship and cooperation was concluded. The Strategic Partnership Treaty of June 16, 2004 and the Treaty of Allied Relations of November 14, 2005 set out priority areas for the development of the Russian-Uzbek partnership in the military-political, trade-economic and humanitarian spheres.

Top-level political contacts are regularly carried out. Since the mid-2000s, the presidents of the Russian Federation have been visiting Uzbekistan with state (January 2009), official (June 2012) and working (June 2004, June 2011) visits. President of the Republic of Uzbekistan I. A. Karimov visited Russia with official (November 2005, February 2008, April 2010, April 2013) and working (April 2004, June 2005, May 2006) visits. The leaders of the two countries also meet within the framework of multilateral international events.⁴

A new period in relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Uzbekistan began with the coming to power in Uzbekistan of Shavkat Miromonovich Mirziyoyev, a prominent Uzbek statesman and political figure. From December 12, 2003 to December 14, 2016, Sh. M. Mirziyoyev was the Prime Minister of Uzbekistan. From September 8 to December 14, 2016, he served as Acting President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Since December 14, 2016, Sh. M. Mirziyoyev is the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan⁵.

On October 24, 2021, in the presidential elections in Uzbekistan, President Sh. Mirziyoyev received a mandate to further implement his economic and political course, the provisions of which were set out in his election program. In the next five years, the republic, whose economy is the fastest growing in Central Asia, is waiting for the next economic reforms. Their effect will largely depend on the objective conditions associated primarily with the pandemic. The President's social program, if implemented, can help mitigate the negative consequences of market reforms.

Mirziyoyev's foreign policy reflected the new geopolitical situation in Central Asia, the situation in Afghanistan and Turkey. The development of relations between Uzbekistan and Russia testifies to the desire to maintain a balance in relations with leading foreign policy players. It can be stated that today the President of Uzbekistan has a strong position both within the country and abroad (6:97–114).

The trade turnover between Russia and Uzbekistan is growing: in the first nine months of 2021, it amounted to \$5 billion, and by the end of the year – \$7 billion. On November 19, 2021, President of Russia V. Putin met with President of Uzbekistan Sh. Mirziyoyev, who noted a breakthrough in bilateral relations, emphasizing that there were no such indicators in the trade turnover between the two countries before. The head of the Republic of Uzbekistan also noted the results of the intensive work of the Intergovernmental Commission headed by the prime ministers of both states. Sh. Mirziyoyev summed up the results of three large forums that were held on the eve of the state visit: following the results of the interregional forum, projects worth \$14 billion are already being developed, more than 35 agreements have been signed following the results of the educational forum. Over the past three years, 11 new Russian

⁴ Uzbekistan Took Part in the 5th Ministerial Meeting "Central Asia – Russia". Available from: <https://mfa.uz/ru/press/news/2022/uzbekistan-prinyal-uchastie-v-5-y-ministerskoy-vstreche-centralnaya-aziya-rossiya---31341>; Bilateral Relations between Uzbekistan and Russia have been Brought to the Level of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Available from: <https://mfa.uz/ru/press/news/2022/dvustoronnie-otnosheniya-uzbekistana-i-rossii-vyvedeny-na-uroven-vseobemlyuschego-strategicheskogo-partnerstva---32323>

⁵ Mirziyoyev, Shavkat Miromonovich. The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Available from: <https://tass.ru/encyclopedia/person/mirziyev-shavkat-miromonovich>

universities have started operating in Uzbekistan. Now there are 15 of them, taking into account the recently opened branch of Pirogov University. Cultural-humanitarian, military-technical, transport cooperation is actively developing.

According to Sh. Mirziyoyev:

Today there is a completely different level of relations between us. In-depth integration is going on in all directions: previously there were projects when they were negotiated between regions, and today there are projects that give added value. For example, large projects are successfully developing in metallurgy⁶.

The Head of Uzbekistan during this meeting also noted that this is a good opportunity to discuss interregional, bilateral, security issues, the issue of Afghanistan, to make serious decisions for the future.

A significant role in the development of the economy of Uzbekistan is played by agriculture, which is supported by investments: there is support from both the state and external partners. Agricultural products from Uzbekistan to Russia are diverse. In 2020, the Russian Federation was the largest importer of Uzbek vegetables and fruits: approximately 355 thousand tons of products were shipped. Russia is ready to increase cooperation in this area in the future (17).

Important are the issues of labor emigration from Uzbekistan to Russia. It is developing and it is necessary to solve some problems, including the need to liberalize small and medium-sized businesses in order to create jobs, tax and labor benefits for firms and entrepreneurs that ensure the opening of new vacancies in the labor market (16: 267–270).

The value basis of the cultural cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan is the legacy of the Central Asian Renaissance. This legacy was studied by Russian and Uzbek scientists as part of large-scale joint scientific and educational projects. It had a significant impact on the development of education, science and cultural life in both countries, and became a unique semantic axis of interaction between their intellectuals and peoples. Therefore, cooperation between the two countries is historically and value-based and is built on value-semantic components. Deepening cooperation in the humanitarian sphere can effectively improve the communication space for partnership between both countries (11).

Let us pay attention to the study of modern Russian-Uzbek cooperation, undertaken in a collective monograph, published in two editions – in 2020 and 2021. It reveals the state and prospects for the development of economic and socio-cultural ties between the two countries, the state of the joint implementation of national projects and national programs. From the Russian side:

1. increasing the competitiveness of the Russian financial market as part of the implementation of the state program;
2. the main problems of organizing the educational process in the conditions of the modern information environment in the framework of the implementation of the national project Education;

⁶ Vladimir Putin Held Talks with the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev in the Kremlin. Available from: <http://special.kremlin.ru/catalog/countries/UZ/events/67142>

3. national projects as drivers of regional development.

From the side of the Republic of Uzbekistan:

1. the development of higher education institutions is a guarantee of the progress of society and an increase in the competitiveness of the national economy;
2. the concept of development of the agricultural sector in the Republic of Uzbekistan;
3. Prospects for the socio-economic development of the agricultural sector (10).

The Republic of Uzbekistan is a full member of international organizations. Let us focus our attention on the two largest of them – the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The country joined the CIS on December 21, 1991. On this day, in the city of Alma-Ata, a Declaration was signed, which stated that “with the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceases to exist”. The Almaty Declaration was signed by the heads of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. I. Karimov put his signature for the Republic of Uzbekistan.

A contemporary of the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, created in 1991 after the collapse of the USSR, was E.M. Primakov, an outstanding political and statesman, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In his book “Meetings at the Crossroads” (2015), he analyzes “Problems of the CIS»” in a separate section, where he notes:

The formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was dictated rather by the desire to dull the sharpness of the negative internal reaction – the external one was basically the opposite – to the collapse of the great state ... Significant amounts are saved by maintaining unified systems of transport, energy, communications, production and cooperative relations between a number of enterprises, rejection of the continuous arrangement of “internal” borders in the Commonwealth (13:342).

Earlier, in his other book “Thoughts aloud” (2011), E.M. Primakov, in the section “Commonwealth with a difficult fate”, determined the direction of development of the CIS:

There was an objective interest in integration within the CIS... I would like to remind you that in September 1993 in Moscow, at a meeting of the prime ministers of the CIS countries, a document was adopted on the establishment of an Economic Union on the formation of a common economic space, the free movement of goods, services, labor, on the coordination monetary, tax, customs, foreign economic systems. The prime ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan put their signatures (12:77–78).

E.M. Primakov also refers to other documents that created the conditions for the integration process within the CIS. On April 15, 1994, an agreement on a free trade zone was signed (13:342).

The trend towards increased multifaceted integration in the CIS has intensified over the years. The main document regulating relations in the CIS system is the charter adopted on January 22, 1993 by a number of Commonwealth member republics.

Within the framework of military cooperation, Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed on May 15, 1992 in Tashkent the Collective Security Treaty. It was later joined by Belarus, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The parties to the treaty declared their readiness to exercise the right to collective defence. This agreement was a consequence of the concerns of the CIS countries about the growth of Islamic extremism in Central Asia. The reconstruction of a unified air defense system was agreed in February 1995 (Azerbaijan and Moldova did not join). Russia in this treaty acts as the coordinator of the air defense system, and political decisions remain with the leadership of the republics. In 1995, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on the joint defense of the borders of the CIS (7:199–200). In 2002, a decision was made to transform the Collective Security Treaty into a full-fledged international structure - the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which received observer status in the UN General Assembly. Initially, it included only six states – Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Finding itself in a situation of possible destabilization in the country and aggravation of relations with the United States, Uzbekistan also joined the CSTO (13:78–79).

Trends noted by E.M. Primakov, continue to develop. On October 7, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin, at an informal CIS summit in St. Petersburg, called for a more energetic transition to national currencies in mutual settlements and discussed measures to resolve conflicts between states in the post-Soviet space. The summit was attended by President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, Prime Minister of Armenia Nikolai Pashinyan, President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko, President of Kazakhstan Kasym Zhomart Tokayev, President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon, President of Turkmenistan Serdar Berdimuhamedov and President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev. Putin called the CIS countries his closest friends and allies, with whom Russia has “relationships of true strategic partnership.”

On October 13, 2022, Astana hosted the annual full-format summit – a meeting of the Council of the CIS Heads of State, dedicated to the issues of integration cooperation, where a package of documents was approved.

Both in St. Petersburg and in Astana, issues of developing trade and investment partnerships within the CIS, intensifying joint work to increase the stability of economies, in particular, through building up bilateral and multilateral cooperation ties, and ensuring technological sovereignty, were discussed.

According to the President of Russia V. Putin:

Economic cooperation between our states is consistently expanding. Last year, Russia's trade with the CIS countries increased by more than 30 percent, to \$96 billion, and grew by another seven percent in the first half of this year⁷.

Russian President V. Putin called for a more energetic transition to national currencies in mutual settlements between the Commonwealth countries:

⁷ Development of Investment Partnership and Transition to National Currencies in Mutual Settlements. What the Leaders of the CIS Countries Discussed at an Informal Summit in St. Petersburg. Available from: <https://rg.ru/2022/10/09/ot-strelny-do-astany.html>

As a matter of fact, we have been doing this for many years already, and this is in no way tied to any political situation whatsoever. In general, this will help strengthen the financial sovereignty of our states, develop domestic capital markets, and deepen regional economic integration⁸.

The most important areas are the development of cooperation in the field of combating terrorism and extremism, crime, drug trafficking and corruption. On April 26, 1996, in Shanghai (PRC), the heads of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed an agreement on building confidence in the military field in the border area. On this basis, a political association called the Shanghai Five was formed, its main task is to ensure stability along the borders of the former Soviet republics and China. On July 5, 2000, the organization was transformed into the Shanghai Forum. On June 14, 2001, at the summit in Shanghai, Uzbekistan joined the association. On June 15, 2001, the heads of six states adopted a declaration on the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. On June 7, 2022, the organization's statutory document, the SCO Charter, was signed (entered into force on September 19, 2003). On June 9, 2017, at the summit in Astana, the membership of India and Pakistan in the organization was officially approved. Since that time, the SCO has united the space from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean and from the Arctic to the Indian Ocean, and now occupies 61% of the Eurasian continent. What is the mystery of the SCO? The answer can be found in the SCO Charter, which laid the foundations for a new type of international association, where each state has a full voice, and all decisions are made by consensus. “The SCO states have enormous human and economic potential, but perhaps the more important measure of the authority of the Organization is the Shanghai spirit” – the spirit of mutual understanding and true partnership, the spirit of civilizational cooperation, the dialogue of cultures (21:7, 11).

All of the above was confirmed in September 2022, when the Republic of Uzbekistan hosted the heads of the SCO member states in Samarkand. This summit, which was the first face-to-face meeting in three years, brought together 15 world leaders in Samarkand. Special attention was riveted to the Samarkand meeting: in the context of sanctions pressure, the withdrawal of some foreign companies from the Russian market and the reduction in the supply of technological imports from unfriendly countries, a significant expansion of Russia's economic ties with the SCO countries is a necessary and logical step.

Business from the SCO countries plays a significant role in the Russian economy. According to the Center for Strategic Research, the products of at least 7 thousand companies from member countries, partners and observers of the organization are represented in Russia, while directly or indirectly (through dealers, distributors, etc.) these companies create jobs for at least 1 million Russians. The largest number of jobs (about 75%) is created by Turkish business. In the mass consciousness, until recently, business from some SCO countries was associated with simple consumer products (for example, clothing, textiles and food). Indeed, today in Russia the bulk of the businesses from the SCO countries are small enterprises that manufacture and supply such products, primarily from China. At the same time, if you look at the largest companies from the SCO countries in the Russian market, the picture will turn out to

⁸ Ibid.

be completely different. According to our estimates, among the eighty such largest companies that form about 80,000 jobs in Russia, two-thirds produce and supply technologically complex products that are difficult to produce in Russia due to a lack of technology, raw materials, and lack of professional competencies. First of all, we are talking about microelectronics, household appliances, automotive products, and the pharmaceutical industry and building materials.

In Samarkand, in addition to the importance of economic ties between the SCO countries, other topical issues were also discussed. On the first day of the meeting in Uzbekistan, Russian President Vladimir Putin held bilateral meetings with the leaders of Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan. And special attention was focused on the talks between the Russian President and Chinese President Xi Jinping. In the Kremlin, this contact was called long-awaited. This is the second personal meeting of the heads of state during the coronavirus pandemic and the first since the start of Russia's special operation in Ukraine. The leaders are focused on joint energy projects, development of economic cooperation and, of course, the international situation around Ukraine, Taiwan, US provocations. V. Putin noted:

The world is changing rapidly, but only one thing remains unchanged: the friendship between China and Russia, our good relations of strategic comprehensive partnership, and we continue to strengthen these relations," V.V. Putin at the beginning of the meeting⁹.

The Russian President emphasized that the foreign policy dialogue between Russia and China plays a key role in ensuring global and regional stability. Both countries stand for the formation of a just, democratic and multipolar world order. "Attempts to create a unipolar world have recently acquired an absolutely ugly shape and are absolutely unacceptable for the vast majority of states on the planet", – the Russian leader is sure¹⁰. In turn, Xi Jinping said that China is ready, together with Russia, to set an example of a responsible world power and play a leading role in order to "bring such a rapidly changing world to the trajectory of sustainable and positive development"¹¹. Speaking about the international situation, Putin stressed that Russia highly appreciates China's balanced position in connection with the Ukrainian crisis. "We understand your questions and your concerns in this regard", – Putin noted and promised his Chinese counterpart to clarify the position on this issue¹². The Russian President also said that Russia condemns the provocations of the US and its satellites in the Taiwan Strait. "For our part, we will firmly adhere to the One China principle in practice, – he promised¹³. Economic cooperation between Russia and China is developing. Thus, according to forecasts for the end of 2022, the countries will significantly increase the volume of trade, V. Putin is sure. He recalled that the leadership of the two countries set the task of bringing the trade turnover to \$200 billion, and believes that this goal will be achieved soon. "Multifaceted ties between our countries are actively developing, last year the

⁹ Putin has Strengthened a Strategic Alliance with China. Available from: <https://ura.news/articles/1036285396>

¹⁰ Putin: attempts to create a unipolar world have acquired "ugly outlines". Available from: <https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2022/09/15/18571081.shtml>

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

trade turnover increased by 35 percent and exceeded \$140 billion"¹⁴, – V. Putin stated. According to him, "over the first seven months of this year, the volume of mutual trade increased by another 25 percent". Deputy Prime Minister A. Novak told journalists about energy projects with China. The Deputy Prime Minister expects to reach final agreements with China on the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline in the near future. Putin spoke about new projects in gas supplies, the Pakistan Stream at a meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif. Diversification of economic relations in various areas was discussed at a meeting with the Presidents of Kyrgyzstan S. Japarov, Turkmenistan S. Berdimuhamedov and Uzbekistan Sh. Mirziyoyev¹⁵.

Russian President V. Putin said at the SCO summit in Uzbekistan that irreversible changes are taking place in world politics and the role of new centers of power is growing. The expansion of the SCO, the fight against unilateral sanctions, security and the transition to national currencies were the main topics of the Samarkand meeting. Following the summit, Vladimir Putin held a press conference and spoke about the prospects for the SCO and the course of the special operation in Ukraine.

As a result of the summit in Samarkand, the SCO leaders adopted a joint declaration in which they advocated:

- a more just multipolar world order;
- inadmissibility of unilateral application of economic sanctions, except for those adopted by the UN Security Council;
- gradual increase in the share of national currencies in mutual settlements;
- expansion of the SCO;
- further non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world and continuation of nuclear disarmament;
- inadmissibility of interference in the affairs of states under the pretext of countering terrorism. The SCO countries condemn terrorism and intend to actively eliminate the conditions conducive to it;
- the need to further strengthen international cooperation in combating the spread of the coronavirus;
- settlement in Afghanistan to strengthen the security of the SCO countries;
- cooperation in the field of literature, music, cinema¹⁶.

Conclusion

Uzbekistan's relations with different states are rising to a new, higher level. But Uzbekistan maintains the closest cooperation with Russia, although history has established borders between our states.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Geopolitics. The Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Samarkand was a New Atep towards a Multipolar World. Eastern SCO. Aysel Gereikhanova, Igor Dunaevsky, Sergey Tikhonov, Samarkand-Moscow. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 2022. September 16 (No. 208 (8856)).

¹⁶ Geopolitics. Vladimir Putin Spoke at the SCO Summit and Answered Journalists' Questions. The SCOWay. Aysel Gereikhanova. Samarkand. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 2022. September 19.No. 209 (8857))

Russia is the legal successor of the USSR not only on its own territory. It also bears obligations within the framework of the international treaties concluded by the USSR. And this makes a significant contribution to the development of interstate relations in the post-Soviet space.

In this activity, Russia proceeds from taking into account the free and harmonious development of cultures, languages, religions of all peoples living on the territory of states that emerged after the collapse of the USSR, which was then their common homeland.

Taking into account the historical ties between Russia and Uzbekistan, both states have come to the understanding that friendship of peoples as a post-Soviet phenomenon can and is becoming a socio-political value for these countries and the foundation for the development of bilateral relations. This is the historical significance of the contribution of the two countries within the framework of the CIS to building a new world order.

Full-fledged cooperation and integration of Russia and Uzbekistan in all areas, the growing trade turnover between them creates added value in increasing dynamics, from which the welfare of the citizens of the two countries grows.

The results of joint cultural and humanitarian cooperation revealed its unique potential. It lies in the historical and value rootedness of relations between the peoples of the two countries, in the presence in the friendship of peoples, as in a unique Soviet phenomenon, of its deep values and meanings. This creates significant opportunities for the free, diverse and harmonious development of cultures, languages and religions not only in the Central Asian region, and contributes to strengthening the new world order and international security.

References

1. Akilov K. A. Soviet intelligentsia of Uzbekistan: In 2 books. Tashkent: Fan, 1978–1979. In 2 Book 2. 1979: 384 p. (In Russian)
2. The Great Patriotic War without the stamp of secrecy. The book of losses: [the latest reference edition] / ed. team: G. F. Krivosheev (leader) and others. Moscow: Veche, 2010: 381 p. (In Russian)
3. The Great Patriotic War 1941–1945: Encyclopedia / Ch. ed. M. M. Kozlov. Moscow: Soviet Encyclopedia, 1985: 832 p. (In Russian)
4. The contribution of the people of Uzbekistan to the victory over fascism: a book-album. Authors and compilers: S. Saidolimov, M. Rakhimov, K. Sagdullaev, R. Nazarov, H. Bobozhonov. Tashkent: UZBEKISTAN, 2020: 320 p. (In Uzbek, Russian and English.)
5. Zhumazhanov M.E. Commonwealth of Independent States // XX century. Brief historical encyclopedia: Phenomena of the century. Countries. People: In 2 vol. / Ros. Acad. Sciences. Institute of World History. Moscow: Nauka, 2002. V. 1. Phenomena of the century. Russia, USSR, CIS. Western countries. Eastern Europe. 2001: 478 p. (In Russian)
6. Inoyatov Kh. Sh. Uzbekistan // Soviet Historical Encyclopedia / ch. ed. E. M. Zhukov. Moscow: Soviet Encyclopedia, 1961–1976. T. 14; 1973: columns 689–690. (In Russian)
7. Ionova E.P. The results of the presidential elections in Uzbekistan: the economic and political course of Sh. Mirziyoyev // Russia and the new states of Eurasia. 2021;IV (LIII):97–114. (In Russian)
8. History of the USSR: From ancient times to the present day: In 2 series, in 12 vols. / Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Institute of History; Head. ed. council.: B. N. Ponomarev (prev.) [and others]. Moscow: Nauka, 1966. Second series. Vol. 10: USSR during the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945 / Authors: P. S. Boldyrev, M. G. Bragin, V. N. Evstigneev [and others]. 1973: 781 p. (In Russian)
9. History of the Uzbek SSR: In 4 vols. / AN UzSSR. History and Archeology Institute. Tashkent: Fan, 1967–1968. T. 4: The period of completion of the socialism construction and the transition to communism (1938–1965). 1968: 583 p. (In Russian).

10. New horizons of cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan based on the implementation of national projects and national programs: monograph / under scientific. ed.: Yu. V. Gnezdova, Yu. A. Romanova, M. Kh. Saidov. 2nd ed. Moscow: Dashkov i K0, 2021: 256 p. (In Russian).
11. Posadsky A. V. Cultural cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan in the context of the heritage of the Central Asian Renaissance // Journal of the Heritage Institute. 2021; 3 (26). (In Russian).
12. Primakov E. M. Thoughts aloud. Moscow: Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2011: 207 p. (In Russian)
13. Primakov E. M. Meetings at crossroads. Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2015: 607 p. (Our twentieth century). (In Russian).
14. Rakhimov M.A. Modern multilateral relations in Central Asia. Tashkent: FAN, 2020: 224 p. (In Russian).
15. Rakhimov M.A. Modern history and international relations of Uzbekistan. Tashkent: FAN, 2020: 192 p. (In Russian).
16. Siparo K. A. Prospects and problems of cooperation between Uzbekistan and Russia in the field of labor emigration // Economics of sustainable development. 2021; 2 (46): 267–270. (In Russian).
17. Siparo K. A. Development of the agrarian sector of Uzbekistan and prospects for trade cooperation with Russia // Economics of agricultural and processing enterprises. 2021; 11. (In Russian).
18. Stalingrad Battle: July 1942 – February 1943: Encyclopedia / Administration of the Volgograd Region, Center for the Study of the Stalingrad Battle, Research Institute (of Military History) of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. 7th ed., add. Volgograd: Izdatel', 2017: 838 p. (In Russian).
19. Khainazarov B. B. Medical assistance of the Uzbek SSR to the evacuated peoples during the war // Military-historical aspects of the life of the South of Russia in the XVII–XXI centuries: issues of study and museumification / III Int. scientific and practical. conf. (2021; Volgograd). Volgograd: Sphere, 2021: 145–151. (In Russian).
20. SCO in the modern world 2016–2018: Shanghai Cooperation Organization in TASS messages / ed.: R. K. Alimov, S. V. Mikhailov. Moscow: Ves' mir, 2018: 290 p. (In Russian).

About the author

Nazirjon N. ABDUGANIEV. Deputy Chairman of the Council – Chairman of the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Public Organization “Assembly of Peoples of Russia”. <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0667-544X>. Address: 12, p. 4, Maly Gnezdnikovsky lane, 125009, Moscow, Russian Federation, nazir1970@yandex.ru

Contribution of the author

The author declares no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Submitted: July 31, 2022. Approved after peer reviewing: October 26, 2022. Accepted for publication: November 1, 2022. Published: December 21, 2022.

The author has read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

POWER, POLITICS, STATE

Political Institutions, Processes and Technologies

The accession and loss of territories is a normal process of state development that needs a scientifically substantiated political and legal basis recognized by the world community. Among other things, there is a need for mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of issues related to the realization of the right of peoples to reunification between the donor country and the acceptor country.

Chernyshov M.M.

The Evolution of the State as a Process of Increment and Loss of Territory in the Context of the Implementation of the People's Right to Reunification

Speaking about China's future foreign policy, Xi Jinping presented an openness strategy, more open than before, to «adhere to new level reforms» and «emphasize national security and social stability.» Such formulations were not heard in the report at the 19th Congress of the CPC.

Based on the text of the report, China-US relations in the next ten years will be assessed as «a relatively optimistic scenario of confrontation and rivalry.» At the same time, the main controversial foreign policy problems for China are in the solution of the Taiwan issue. The report indicates the necessary actions to overcome the crisis, related to the strengthening of national security and social stability.

Letiaev V.A., Wang Yu.

Foreign Policy and "Diplomacy of a World Power with Chinese Characteristics": Based on the Report of the CPC Central Committee to the XX Congress

The Evolution of the State as a Process of Increment and Loss of Territory in the Context of the Implementation of the People's Right to Reunification

Mikhail M. Chernyshov✉

National Communications Development Research Institution, Moscow, Russia,
mcherny@bk.ru, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0811-1867>

Abstract. The article considers a particular case of the evolution of state formations in the process of the increment and loss of territories, caused by the implementation of the people's right to reunification. It analyzes successful and unsuccessful attempts to implement the people's right to reunification while the states are returning their historical territories and realizing the policy of irredentism. The author analyzes the historiography of the issue in Russia, Eurasia and Africa, examines various cases of accession of territories in the XVII-XXI centuries, including the reunification the Crimea, Sevastopol, Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions with Russia. The author substantiates the need to amend the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, providing for the right of Russia to return historical territories in the case of discrimination of the Russian-speaking population, manifestations of neo-Nazism and Russophobia.

Keywords: irredentism, historical territories, the right of peoples to self-determination, the right of peoples to reunification

For citation: Chernyshov M.M. The Evolution of the State as a Process of Increment and Loss of Territory in the Context of the Implementation of the People's Right to Reunification. *Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue*. 2022; 4(6): 160-185, [https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4\(6\)-160-185](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4(6)-160-185).

Introduction

The problems of transformation of state entities caused by changes in borders, national and religious composition of the population were in focus of practical science long before the formation of its scientific foundation. Thinkers¹ at all times have been asking questions: Why do some countries maintain their autonomy, defending their independence

1 Machiavelli N. The Sovereign (Chapter III. About mixed states). Moscow: Planeta, 1990. Available from: <http://lib.ru/politolog/makiawelli/gosudar.txt>

through diplomatic and military means, while others unite with their neighbors on a peaceful basis? How to preserve the integrity of the state from internal separatism? What are the conditions under which people can exercise their rights to self-determination and reunification as an ethnos, nation or a religious group? This article examines examples of losses and returns of historical territories, including the reunification of peoples, identifies common signs of this process, stimulating its centrifugal or centripetal forces. We use the concept of irredentism² for the analysis.

Materials and Methods

The information materials of the research were scientific articles and monographs, periodical publications, archival documents. Information about the forms and mechanisms of reunification of various countries in the world with their historical territories is compared. The course of increment and loss of the territory of the Russian state since its inception is analysed. The territories that became a part of Russia at different stages of its development are listed; examples of voluntary entry of peoples into the Russian state are highlighted. The research used general scientific methods, including historiographical analysis, system analysis, abstraction, synthesis, comparative historical method and others.

Results

Since the emergence of the first State formations and throughout the subsequent history of mankind, there has been observed the absorption of some states by others, the process of increment and loss of territory and population, the collapse of huge empires (Macedonian, Roman, Byzantine, Mongolian, Spanish, Russian, British, Ottoman and others), the emergence of new alliances and countries. After the Second World War, the collapse of the colonial system allowed many peoples to exercise their right to self-determination and led to the emergence of new independent States – Third World countries.

At the end of the XX century, the emergence of integration associations with the transfer of a particular part of sovereignty to the supranational level, the removal of visa, customs and other inter-country barriers became a new trend. At the same time, the process of gaining independence and reunification continues and in recent decades it has

2 Irredentism (from Ital. irredento “unredeemed; not liberated”) is the policy of the state, party or political movement to unite the people, nation, ethnos within the framework of a single state. It is expressed in ethnic mobilization, in which the question of the reunification of the territory where the irredent live and the titular state in which their ethnic group is the majority is raised. Soloviev A. I. Political science: Political theory, political technologies / Textbook for university students. Moscow: Aspect Press, 2001:559.

led to an aggravation of international tensions. Thus, the conflict between Kosovo Albanians (from Kosovo) seeking independence and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia led to a NATO military operation in 1999 and the declaration of independence of the Republic of Kosovo in 2008. The setting of a “Kosovo precedent”³ by NATO countries as a unilateral (without the consent of the central government of the country) declaration of independence by the provisional institutions of self-government on the territory actually established a new standard for the revision of state borders and secession (withdrawal from a single state of any part of it (33:27)).

Several unrecognized states appeared in the Caucasus at the end of the XX century. Among them, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, the Republic of South Ossetia and the Republic of Abkhazia.⁴ In 2020, during a military operation, Azerbaijan managed to establish control over a part of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh (including the city of Shusha), and despite the ceasefire agreement, clashes between the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan and the Defence Army of the Republic of Artsakh continue to this day. In August 2008, Georgia tried to regain control over the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but the help of Russian peacekeepers allowed the republics to maintain independence. In the same year, the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was recognized by Russia, and then by a number of other countries of the world⁵.

As new territories get incorporated into the states, the latter often have to make a particular choice: establish a multinational, multi-confessional society or assimilate peoples and cultures into a single nation with a dominant religion. The choice connected with this problem is the following: will the people strive for internal self-determination (autonomization) or independence (becoming part of another state)⁶.

In 2014, under the conditions of a military coup in Ukraine, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol declared independence, and then became part of Russia as subjects of the federation. In the same year, the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics declared their independence. For almost 8 years, violating the Minsk Agreements, the Ukrainian authorities had been trying to regain control over the territory of the LPR and the DPR. In 2022, under the threat of invasion by Ukrainian troops, the DPR and LPR asked Russia for help in protecting their sovereignty, which led to a special military operation and the global crisis that followed.

3 Moshkin S.V. “Kosovo precedent” in the discourse of statements of the Russian leadership. *Paradigms and Processes*. 2018; 8: 159–168. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329761966_The_Kosovo_Precedent_in_Statements_of_Russian_Leaders

4 The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (the Republic of Artsakh) declared independence in 1991. The Republic of South Ossetia declared independence in 1992. The Republic of Abkhazia declared independence in 1994.

5 Five UN member states (Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru and Syria). Tuvalu withdrew its recognition of both republics in 2014, Vanuatu – in 2019. Source: The Foreign Minister of Vanuatu confirmed the “territorial integrity” of Georgia Available from: <https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2019/03/15/glava-mid-vanuatu-podtverdil-territorialnuyu-celostnost-gruzii>

6 “The question of the right to self-determination arises only in cases where titular peoples discriminate against other indigenous peoples who are in a minority living compactly on the territory of a state. If the peoples that make up a state are comfortable being in communion with each other, and nothing threatens their languages, cultures, customs and traditions, then, as a rule, small nations are content with the right to so-called internal self-determination” (15:40-44).

In this regard, we see that the problems of realizing the rights of the people to self-determination⁷ are becoming the main factor in the destabilization of the modern world order. Understanding the causes of this phenomenon, developing methods of scientific forecasting of the peoples' self-determination processes can help to avoid conflicts, including in the acute (military) phase.

The study of the historiography of the evolution of the Russian state from the standpoint of the increment and loss of territories allows us to understand which territories Russia can consider historically its own ones.

The tribes of the East Slavs inhabited the Eastern European plain in the VI–VII centuries. Despite the existence of the ancient cities of Derbent and Kerch on the territory of Russia, which have more than two thousand years of history, the beginning of Russian statehood is considered to be September 21, 862 – the date when the Rurik dynasty were called to the Russian reign, indicated by the chronicler Nestor⁸.

In 882, the regent of the Novgorod Principality Oleg seized Kiev, uniting the northern and southern lands of the Eastern Slavs, establishing Kievan Rus as an Old Russian state⁹. In 914, Prince Igor conquered Drevlians, in 943, he took a campaign against Byzantium, and in 944, he concluded a military-and-trade agreement with Byzantium. Prince of Novgorod and Grand Prince of Kiev Svyatoslav (reigned in 961–972), having crushed the Khazar Khaganate and Volga Bulgaria, took campaigns to the Volga region, the North Caucasus, the Kuban, the Northern Black Sea region, the Danube, the Balkan Peninsula and Constantinople. Prince Vladimir Svyatoslavich conquered Cherven and Przemyśl, conquered Vyatichi and Radimichi, participated in campaigns against the Volga Bulgars, Khazars, Bulgarians, Pechenegs. In 1036, Prince Yaroslav Vladimirovich the Wise defeated the tribes of the Pechenegs, taking control of the Black Sea steppe, he also returned the cities of Chervensk captured by Poland and founded the fortresses of Yaroslavl and Yuryev (Dorpat) in the Baltic Region. By the XI century, the ancient Russian state had become one of the largest European countries, and it was as large as the Holy Roman and Byzantine Empires in terms of territory¹⁰.

7 The right of peoples to self-determination means the right of each people to independently decide on the form of their state existence, freely establish their political status and carry out their economic and cultural development. The right of peoples to self-determination is one of the basic principles of international law, recorded in the UN Charter, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (resolution No. 1514 of the XV UN General Assembly of December 14, 1960), subsequent international covenants and declarations of the UN. The Declaration on the Principles of International Law (Resolution No. 2625 of the XXV UN General Assembly of October 24, 1970) states: “By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the UN Charter, all peoples have the right to freely determine their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural development without outside interference, and each state is obliged to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter”. Available from: <https://www.un.org/ru/about-us/un-charter/full-text>

8 The 1000th anniversary of the Russian state was celebrated as a national anniversary back in 1862.

9 This important circumstance indicates that the origins of Kievan Rus have the roots of Novgorod statehood, founded by the Varangian Rurik dynasty, who later ruled on the territory of the Moscow Kingdom – the forerunner of the modern Russian state.

10 During the period of Yaroslav the Wise, several important dynastic marriages were concluded with the royal houses of Sweden, Poland, Austria, Byzantium, Norway, Hungary, France (22: 8–20).

In 1054–1073, Kievan Rus was ruled by a triumvirate of Yaroslav the Wise's sons: Izyaslav (Kiev and Novgorod), Svyatoslav (Chernigov, Murom and Ryazan lands), Vsevolod (Pereyaslavl and Rostov the Great)¹¹. In 1097, at the Congress of Princes held at the initiative of Vladimir Monomakh in Lyubech, the principle of the establishment of regional dynasties was consolidated. In 1113–1132 (the Kiev reign of Vladimir Monomakh¹² and his son Mstislav), the State managed to preserve its unity and defend its borders.

The collapse of Kievan Rus and the period of political fragmentation began in 1132¹³, which lasted until the Mongol conquest (1237–1241). During this period, only Novgorod continues its territorial expansion on the development of the north-eastern territories (in the basins of the Vychegda, Pechora and Kama rivers). In 1169, the troops of Andrei Bogolyubsky, Prince of Vladimir and Suzdal, captured Kiev¹⁴, and the center of the Russian lands began to shift towards Vladimir¹⁵. In 1299, the metropolitan's residence was moved from Kiev to Vladimir, and from 1325, it was moved to Moscow.

In the XIV century, Kiev finally lost its political significance and became a provincial city of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Horde domination over the territories of the Russian principalities began in 1242¹⁶. In 1245–1263, the Russian lands receive a certain autonomy as a part of the Golden Horde, which controlled territories from the Danube and Vistula in the West, the Black Sea region, the Crimea, Kuban and the North Caucasus, the northern and eastern part of the Caspian lowlands, the Aral Sea, the northern part of Central Asia (the territories of modern Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) to Lake Balkhash and the Ob River basin. Subsequently, after the collapse of the Golden Horde, the Moscow tsars were perceived by the elites of the incorporated eastern territories as heirs¹⁷ of the title of

11 In accordance with the will of Yaroslav the Wise, Russia was divided between his five sons: Kiev and Novgorod went to Izyaslav, Svyatoslav got Chernigov, Tmutarakan, Murom and Ryazan lands, Vsevolod – Pereyaslavl and Rostov the Great, Vyacheslav – Smolensk, Igor – Volyn. There was a rota system in succession to the throne among Princes (8:16–20).

12 During this period, dynastic marriages were concluded with the royal houses of England and Hungary (22:36–69).

13 Violating the rota system, Mstislav handed over the Kievan Principality to his brother Yaropolk, thus violating the rights of the younger Monomashichs – Prince Yuri Dolgoruky of Rostov and Prince Andrei of Volhynia, which resulted in the internecine war. By the middle of the XII century, Kievan Rus was actually divided into 13–18 principalities. On the eve of the Mongol conquest, the Russian state was divided into 25 state entities. Source: Presnyakov A. E. Princely Law in Ancient Russia. Lectures on Russian history. Kievan Rus. Moscow: Nauka, 1993:634.

14 In 1203, Kiev was plundered for the second time by the Smolensk Prince Rurik Rostislavich. In 1240, Kiev was burned by the Mongols (42:605).

15 Vsevolod Yurievich the Big Nest, the Grand Prince of Kiev (1173) and Vladimir (1176–1212), achieved recognition of his seniority among the descendants of Monomakh. In 1236–1238, Kiev was ruled by Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, who was a younger brother of the Prince of Vladimir, in 1240 – by the Galician governor Dmitry, and in 1243, after the Mongols recognized Yaroslav Vsevolodovich of Vladimir as the eldest Prince in Russian lands, Kiev was ruled by Vladimir governors (42: 671–683). Since 1254, the title “King of Russia” was worn by the Galician-Volyn princes, and the title “Grand Princes of all Russia” began to be worn by the Grand Prince of Vladimir from the beginning of the XIV century (53:55).

16 In 1223–1241, the conquest of the Russian principalities took place, in 1242–1245, the vassal-fief dependence was established, the issuance of a “label for reigning” to the princes was introduced, the census of the taxable population was held, the payment of the “Horde exit” (tribute) started (42: 681).

17 The intitulation of Ivan the Terrible mentions the Golden Horde uluses (Tsar of Kazan, Tsar of Astrakhan, Grand Duke of All Siberian lands). (53:57)

the governors of the Ulus of Jochi¹⁸, included in the aristocratic system of the Mongol Empire (26:20). As the Golden Horde weakened in the XIV century, part of the Russian lands came under the rule of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (8; 16).

The battle of the united Russian troops on the Kulikovo field in 1380 is considered a turning point in the process of liberation of Russian lands and development of the Russian identity, the moment of creation of the united Russian nation¹⁹.

In 1389–1434, the Horde Khan retains the rights of the supreme arbiter in the disputes of Princes, receives the “Horde exit”, labels for the reign are issued on the spot by the Khan's authorized ambassadors. In 1434–1480, only the payment of the «exit» is preserved. The period between the battle of Alexin (1472) and the Standoff on the Ugra (1480) is considered the “completion of the Horde rule.” During this period, Ivan III the Great completed the consolidation of the lands of the northern and eastern Russian principalities around the Grand Principality of Moscow into a single Russian state²⁰. The western and southern Russian principalities became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

In 1547, Grand Duke Ivan IV the Terrible assumed the title of Tsar (from 1547 to 1721, the Russian state was called the Russian or Moscow Tsardom). Ivan IV annexed the khanates of the former Golden Horde to the tsardom (Astrakhan, Kazan, Siberian ones²¹). Under Fyodor I the Blessed, the Russian-Swedish War of 1590–1595 was completed, returning Ivangorod, Yam, Koporye and Korela lost in the Livonian War (Narva remained to belong to Sweden).

During the Time of Troubles (1598–1613), an internal political crisis began in the Russian Tsardom²². As a result, Russia lost the Smolensk and Seversk lands and also the access to the Baltic Sea²³. In 1623–1688, the Siberian lands became part of Russia along the Amur, Angara, Yenisei, Lena, Kolyma rivers, Lake Baikal, to the Sea of Okhotsk (Lamsky). In 1649–1689, the Russian-Qing border conflict took place, which ended with the conclusion of the Nerchinsk Treaty on the borders of Russia and China. In the XVIII–XIX centuries, the

18 Golden Horde or Ulug Ulus (Great Country), also the Ulus of Jochi (the eldest son of Genghis Khan) is a multinational state headed by the Jochid dynasty on the lands of central Eurasia in the period from 1224 to 1459, and in 1224–1269, as a part of the Mongol Empire (3:7).

19 “Muscovites, Suzdalians, Nizhny Novgorodians, inhabitants of Vladimir came to the Kulikovo field and back from there came the Russians” (11:27).

20 The lands of the Novgorod and Pskov republics, the Tver, Smolensk, Kozel, Starodubsky, Novgorod-Seversky, Ryazan principalities, part of the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania along the line Bryansk - Gomel - Chernigov - Priluki - Kursk - Yelets entered the unified Russian state under Ivan III and Vasily the Dark (29: 622–641).

21 The conquest of the Siberian Khanate began under Ivan the Terrible, it was Yermak's Siberian Campaign (1581–1585), and ended in 1598 under Fyodor the Blessed with the conquest of the Piebald Horde and victory in the Battle of Irmen (19:128).

22 After Boris Godunov's death in 1605, False Dmitry I (1605–1606) reigned. In 1606, Vasily IV Ivanovich Shuisky was crowned to reign, then False Dmitry II (1607–1610) and False Dmitry III (1611–1612) claimed the kingdom, after the overthrow of Vasily Shuisky, the Council of Seven (heptarchy) recognized the Polish prince Vladislav as the Russian Tsar. In 1612, the Polish interventionists were expelled by the militia, in 1613, Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov was elected to the kingdom, but it happened to be impossible to stabilize the situation in the country until 1618 (6:241).

23 Returning the cities of Novgorod, Porkhov, Staraya Russa, Ladoga and Gdov occupied by Sweden (6: 263).

Primorye lands, Chukotka and Kamchatka, Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands²⁴ joined Russia²⁵, and the colonization of Alaska also took place.

Throughout the XVIII-XIX centuries, the Russian state was constantly expanding, the Baltic States, the Northern Black Sea region, the Caucasus, Finland, Central Asia became part of it; during the partitions of Rzeczpospolita (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth), control over all Russian lands (except Galicia) as well as the lands of the Privislinsky Region was restored²⁶. As a result of the Russian-Japanese war, Russia lost the southern part of Sakhalin Island, returning these territories and the Kuril Islands in the course of World War II.

As a result of the collapse of the Russian Empire and defeat in the First World War²⁷ Russia lost 4% of the total territory (or 26% of the European territory) (18:48). In 1939–1951, the USSR regained part of the lost territory and incorporated new ones.

In November 1939²⁸, the USSR incorporated the territories of western Ukraine²⁹ and Belarus³⁰. In the summer of 1940, the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were included into the USSR³¹. In June 1940, under political pressure from the USSR, Germany and Italy Romania returned the territories of Bessarabia annexed in 1918 to the USSR³², as well as it returned the territories of Northern Bukovina and the Hertz region³³. Following the results of the Soviet-Finnish War (1939–1940), South Karelia (with the cities of Vyborg

²⁴ According to the Treaty of Shimoda (1855), the Northern Kuriles were ceded to Russia, the Southern Kuriles – to Japan, Sakhalin remained a joint possession. According to the St. Petersburg Treaty (1875), Sakhalin passed to Russia, the Kuril Islands – to Japan (27:139).

²⁵ According to the Aigun Treaty with China (1858) and the Convention of Peking (1860) URL: <http://www.oldchita.org/documents/6-xixc-documents/315-1858aihun.html> / (5:67).

²⁶ The cities of Warsaw, Lodz, Kalisz, Czestochowa, Lublin, Suwalki and the surrounding area, southwest of Lithuania (Alytus, Mariampole), part of the territory of the Grodno region of modern Belarus and part of the Sokal district of the Lvov region in modern Ukraine (40:97–114).

²⁷ On March 3, 1918, in the city of Brest-Litovsk, representatives of Soviet Russia and the Central Powers (the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, the Third Bulgarian Kingdom) signed the Brest Separate Peace Treaty, which ensured the withdrawal of the RSFSR from the First World War. Under the terms of the treaty, the RSFSR undertook not to claim the Baltic States and part of modern Belarus, withdraw troops from Finland and Ukraine, recognize the Ukrainian People's Republic as an independent state, withdraw troops from the territory of the Ottoman Empire, and also transfer the Ardagan, Batum and Kars districts to it. The treaty was annulled by the decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of November 13, 1918 (24: 64–68).

²⁸ In accordance with Articles I-III of the Secret Additional Protocol of the Non-Aggression Treaty between Germany and the USSR of August 23, 1939. Available from: www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1939pact.html

²⁹ In 1939, the territory of Western Ukraine was divided into Lvov, Drohobych, Ternopol, Stanislavsky, Volyn and Rovno regions (44:6). In 1951, an equal part of the territory of the Lvov region of the Ukrainian SSR was exchanged for the territory of the Republic of Poland. Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations. M., 1980. T.X:105–109.

³⁰ In 1940, Western Belarus consisted of five regions: Baranovichy, Belostok, Brest, Vileysk, Pinsk, which, according to the modern administrative division of Belarus, corresponds to Brest and Grodno regions, also covers the western districts of Minsk and Vitebsk regions and a small section of the Zhitkovichi district of the Gomel region (10:8–9).

³¹ On July 21–22, the newly elected parliaments of the Baltic states proclaimed the creation of the Estonian SSR, the Latvian SSR and the Lithuanian SSR, adopted Declarations on joining the USSR, and on August 3–6, 1940, in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, they were admitted to the USSR (31:11).

³² Currently, the territories of Bessarabia are part of the Republic of Moldova and the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, Odessa and Chernovtsi regions of Ukraine.

³³ Northern Bukovina and the Hertz region are currently part of the Chernovtsi region of Ukraine (without the Dnester region).

and Sortavala), part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, the territory of Salla-Kuusamo with the city of Kuoloyarvi were also ceded to the USSR.

Following the results of World War II, the Konigsberg region of Germany (part of East Prussia) became part of the USSR³⁴ as well as the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands previously occupied by Japan. In 1944, under the armistice agreement, Finland passed the Pechenga region to the USSR.

After the collapse of the USSR, independent states established within the borders of the former Soviet republics retained their territory. In 1997–1999, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan voluntarily transferred part of their territory to the PRC. All other territorial changes took place within the borders of the former USSR.

In 2014, as a result of the implementation of the right to reunification of peoples, the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, which broke away from Ukraine, became part of the Russian Federation, and in 2022, the territories of Novorossiia (former Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions) also entered RF.

For the purposes of the study, we will consider some facts of voluntary entry of territories into the Russian state.

1. Reunification of Ukraine with Russia³⁵ in 1654.

As a result of the uprising under the leadership of Bogdan Khmelnytsky, the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host,³⁶ following the results of the Zborovsky Peace Treaty (1649), an autonomy was formed as part of the Rzeczpospolita (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) – Hetmanate³⁷. The ruler of the autonomy was an elected hetman, the All-Cossack Rada was recognized as the Supreme body of the autonomy.

In 1651, after the defeat of Cossacks in Berestech, the Belotserkovsky Peace Treaty was concluded, significantly limiting the rights of their autonomy. After the defeat of the Poles in the Battle of Batog (1652) and the Battle of Zhvanets (1653), the Belotserkovsky Treaty was annulled and the Zborovsky Treaty was restored³⁸. As a result of the Cossacks's

³⁴ According to the Potsdam Agreement of 1945. Article VI of the Potsdam Agreement “On the city of Koenigsberg and the surrounding area” states that the part of the western border of the USSR adjacent to the Baltic Sea runs from the point on the eastern shore of the Danzig Bay, indicated on the attached map to the east – a little more to the north of Braunsberg – Goldap to the point where the borders of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and the former East Prussia meet.

³⁵ This refers to the transfer of the registered Zaporozhian Host and part of the territories controlled by it, Hetmanate, to the Russian allegiance of the Russian Tsardom.

³⁶ The uprising began in 1648, it was conducted under the slogans of liberation from national and religious oppression, covered the lands of the Zaporozhian Sich, Polish Rus, Lithuanian Rus, voivodeships of the Crown of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Then the uprising turned into the Russian-Polish War of 1654–1667. Reunification of Ukraine with Russia. Comp. P. P. Gudzenko, M. K. Kozyrenko, etc. Documents and materials in three volumes. Volume 1. Ukraine on the eve of the Liberation War (1620–1647). M.: Publishing House of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 1953:586.

³⁷ Hetmanate (Zaporozhian Host) – an autonomous territory in 1649–1654, covering part of the territory of modern Ukraine, Russia (Starodubye), Belarus (Loev) and Moldavia (northern part Transnistria). These territories of Kievan and Vladimir-Suzdal Rus were captured by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the XIV century.

³⁸ Reunification of Ukraine with Russia. Comp. by P. P. Gudzenko, M. K. Kozyrenko, etc. Documents and materials in three volumes. Volume 2. The Liberation war of the Ukrainian people and the struggle for reunification with Russia (1648–1651). M.: Publishing House of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 1953:558.

uprising and the punitive campaign of the Poles, the population of the autonomy was almost halved, famine and epidemics began. In 1653, the hetman sent envoys to Moscow with a request to accept "his entire Malorossiya (Little Russia) and the entire Zaporozhian Host into its eternal firm possession, allegiance and patronage."³⁹ In 1654, the All-Cossack Rada was held in Pereyaslav, which decided to unite the Hetmanate with the Russian Tsardom. By the decision of the Assembly of the Land of the Russian Tsardom, the King of Poland and the Grand Duke of Lithuania were accused of violating the oath of religious toleration; the Orthodox people of the Hetmanate (the people are treated as a religious community) were released from the Polish oath and passed into Russian citizenship. The Hetmanate was guaranteed broad powers of autonomy⁴⁰.

According to the Treaty of Andrusovo in 1667, the Hetmanate was divided into the Left-Bank Hetmanate as part of the Russian Tsardom – Little Russia⁴¹ (included the city of Kiev and its environs) and the Right-Bank Hetmanate as part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth⁴². In 1668, both parts were united within the framework of the Right-Bank Hetmanate⁴³. Following the results of the Second Russian-Turkish War (1672–1681) and the Treaty of Bakhchisarai⁴⁴, Russia included the left-bank lands of the Dnepr and Kiev with its surroundings. Zaporozhye gained its independence (41:9).

In 1708, the hetman of the Left Bank, I.S. Mazepa, broke the oath to Russia and took the side of the Swedish Kingdom. In 1709, Russian troops stormed the Zaporozhian Sich and destroyed it. In 1722–1727, the institutions of Hetman power were abolished, and their powers were transferred to the Little Russian Collegium (39:106). By 1764, the institutions of the Hetmanate were abolished and the Zaporozhian Host was disbanded, in 1775, the Zaporozhian Sich was abolished⁴⁵. Thus, the regions of

39 Reunification of Ukraine with Russia. Comp. by P. P. Gudzenko, M. K. Kozyrenko, etc. Documents and materials in three volumes. Volume 3. The end of the struggle of the Ukrainian people for reunification with Russia. Pereyaslavskaya Rada. (1651–1654 years.). M.: Publishing House of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 1953: 646.

40 Articles of March, 1654 ("The Treaty of Pereyaslav", "Articles of Bogdan Khmelnytsky", "Articles of the Zaporozhian Host", "Pereyaslav articles") are a legal act that formalized the autonomous position of the Hetmanate as part of the Russian state after the Pereyaslav Rada. Reunification of Ukraine with Russia. Comp. by P. P. Gudzenko, M. K. Kozyrenko, etc. Documents and materials in three volumes. Volume 3. The end of the struggle of the Ukrainian people for reunification with Russia. Pereyaslavskaya Rada. (1651–1654 years.). M.: Publishing House of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 1953:646.

41 In 1764, after the liquidation of the Hetmanate, the Little Russian (Malorossiya) governorate was established on the territory of the part of the Left-Bank Ukraine, in 1775, the Little Russian and Kiev provinces were united, and in 1781, it was divided into three parts – the Chernigov, Novgorod-Seversk and Kiev vicegerency, in 1796, the Little Russian province was reunited, and in 1802, it was divided into Poltava and Chernigov governorate. In 1835, the Kharkiv governorate was incorporated into the Little Russian Governorate-General (abolished in 1856). (9:14–48)

42 Zaporozhye came under joint Russian-Polish administration. In 1657 and 1687, a period of civil war (the Ruin) was observed on the territory of the Hetmanate. (23:7).

43 Right-bank Ukraine became part of the Russian Empire as a result of the second partition of Poland in 1793. (23:46).

44 The treaty was signed on January 3, 1681 between the Russian Tsardom and the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate (23: 69).

45 The Highest Manifesto of the Empress of All-Russia Catherine II dated August 3, 1775 "On the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich and its inclusion in the Novorossiysk governorate". Available from: https://russportal.ru/index.php?id=russia.manifest1775_08_03_01

Little Russia⁴⁶, the Northern regions and the regions and Slobozhanshchina can be considered as voluntarily joining the Russian state in 1654 and Russia can consider these territories its historical ones.

2. The entry of the Crimean Khanate into Russia in 1783, the reunification of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol in 2014.

According to the results of the Russian-Turkish war of 1768–1774 and the conclusion of the Kyuchuk-Kaynardzhi Peace Treaty (1774), the independence of the Crimean Khanate from the Ottoman Empire was recognized⁴⁷. Sahib II Gerai (1771–1775) came to power in the khanate, after his overthrow, the pro-Russian Shahin Gerai became the Khan (1777). In 1782, supporters of the Ottoman Empire, with the help of the clergy and aristocracy, rebelled against the power of Shahin Gerai⁴⁸. Assisted by the Russian troops, Shahin Gerai managed to suppress the uprising and block armed intervention by the Ottoman fleet. During the civil war, most supporters of the Ottoman Empire were exterminated or fled, but the Khan did not stop the repression against the civilian population. Under Russian influence, Shahin Gerai abdicated from the Khan's throne in 1783, and Catherine II, by her manifesto, included the lands of the Crimean Khanate, the Taman Peninsula and the Kuban into the Russian Empire⁴⁹. Crimean Tatar elders and clergy were sworn into allegiance to a Russian Empress, having received the rights of self-government. The entry of the Crimean Khanate into Russia was not opposed by the European powers (with the exception of the Ottoman Empire). In 1784–1796, Crimea was part of the Tauride region, then Novorossiysk governorate (1796–1802), Tauride governorate (1802–1921)⁵⁰, Crimean ASSR (1921–1946, 1991)⁵¹, the Crimean region⁵² (1946–1991), Autonomous Republic of Crimea (1992–2014), Republic of Crimea (2014–present).

In 1954, without holding a referendum or any other form of population survey, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Crimean region was transferred from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. At the same time, although Sevastopol

46 The Left Bank includes Little Russia (Kiev, Zhytomyr, Cherkasy and Poltava regions), Severshchina (Chernigov region) and Slobozhanshchina (Kharkov and Sumy regions). The right bank is Volyn (Volyn and Rovno regions) and Podillya (Vinnytsia and Khmelnytsky regions). Novorossiya (Donetsk, Lugansk, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, Kirovograd, Nikolaev, Kherson and Odessa regions) were the territories of the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate, incorporated into Russia in the XVII–XVIII centuries (9:85).

47 The Crimean Khanate was formed in the middle of the XV century after the collapse of the Golden Horde. In 1475, the coastal cities and the mountainous part of Crimean peninsula were conquered by the Ottoman Empire, the rest of the territory became the possession of the Crimean Khanate vassal to the Turks (17:290).

48 Bahadyr II Gerai was proclaimed the new Crimean Khan by the rebels (39:74).

49 In 1784, Catherine II, having signed the decree «On the establishment of the Tauride region», took a new official title – "Tsarina of the Tauride Chersonis", which was present in the title of Russian emperors up to Nicholas II (53:59).

50 During the Crimean War of 1854–1856, it was partially occupied by the troops of Great Britain, France and the Ottoman Empire (16:116).

51 In the period 1941–1944 the territory of Crimea was occupied by the troops of Nazi Germany and its allies (37:56).

52 In 1948, the city of Sevastopol was singled out as a separate entity being a city of national significance. Source: Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 403 of October 25, 1948 "On measures to accelerate the restoration of Sevastopol"

was considered a city of republican subordination within the Ukrainian SSR since 1954, no legal acts have been adopted in this regard (45:53).

In accordance with the all-Crimean referendum⁵³, held in January 1991 (81.37% of voters took part), "93.26% voted for the re-establishment of the Crimean ASSR as a subject of the USSR and a participant in the Union Treaty". The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR recognized the Crimean autonomy, but ignored its claims to get the status of a subject of the USSR.

Under the conditions of political instability and aggravation of civil confrontation in Ukraine, the removal of President Viktor Yanukovych as a result of the 2014 coup d'état, pro-Russian public activists carried out a change of the authorities of Sevastopol and Crimea⁵⁴, and a referendum on joining Russia was held (96.57% voted "for joining the Russian Federation"). On March 18, 2014, the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol returned to the Russian state on the rights of its subjects.

Thus, on the basis of the realization of the right of peoples to reunification, the historical territory of the Crimean Peninsula returned to Russia.

The entry of the Kartli-Kakhetian Kingdom into Russia in 1783.

In the XVI century, there were several kingdoms and principalities on the territory of Georgia, which were in the sphere of influence of the Ottoman Empire and Persia. During the Persian campaign in 1722, Peter I was unable to provide the promised assistance to King Vakhtang VI of Kartli in the fight against Persia. In 1782, the Kartli-Kakhetian tsar Irakly II appealed to Catherine II with a request to accept Georgia under the patronage of the Russian Empire, in 1783, the Treaty of Georgievsk on the Russian protectorate over the kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti was signed (the people are treated as an ethnic and religious community). However, in 1787, Irakly II signed a separate peace with the Turks, as a result of which Russian troops withdrew from Georgia. In 1795, the kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti was ravaged by the troops of the Persian Shah Mohammad Khan Qajar. After the death of Irakly II and the outbreak of the civil war, Tsar George XII (1798–1800) asked Emperor Paul I to accept the Kartli-Kakhetian Kingdom into Russian allegiance (14:39). In 1799, the Treaty of Georgievsk was renewed, Russian troops entered Kartli-Kakheti. In 1801, Paul I signed a decree on the entry of Kartli-Kakheti into the Russian Empire⁵⁵.

According to the Treaty of Georgievsk, only a small eastern part of modern Georgia (Kartli-Kakheti) became part of Russia. In the period 1803-1878, as a result of the Russian-Turkish wars and diplomatic efforts, Imereti, Batumi, Artvin, Akhaltsikhe, Poti, Abkhazia became part of Russia. In this regard, for example, South Ossetia and Abkhazia were not part of Georgia (14:40), but were territories of the Russian state, for some period

53 The first Soviet plebiscite is the all-Crimean referendum in 1991. Historical Note. Available from: <https://ria.ru/20110120/323139824.html>

54 The Russian military blocked the possibility for the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies to use the force.

55 Berdzenishvili N. A., Dondua V. D., Dumbadze M. K., Melikishvili G. A., Meskhia S. A., Ratiani P. K. History of Georgia from ancient times to the 60s of the 19th century. Educational settlement. Tbilisi, 1962, Chapter XXIII: 387.

administratively⁵⁶ united with Georgia on the rights of autonomies. All this creates legal prerequisites for the independence of the Republic of Abkhazia (1994) and the Republic of South Ossetia (1991), and also preserves for them the possibility of reunification with Russia.

4. The territories of Dagestan and Northern Azerbaijan became part of Russia in 1803.

At the beginning of the XIX century, the territories of modern Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan became part of the Russian Empire. The territories of the feudal lords of Dagestan and the khans of Northern Azerbaijan turned out to be inside the Russian possessions (4:47). By political and diplomatic means on December 26, 1802⁵⁷, an agreement was concluded in Georgievsk, which provided for the establishment of a "firm, unshakable and eternal, peaceful and friendly union" of Caucasian owners under the patronage of Russia⁵⁸. The Union provided rights for broad internal autonomy, obliged feudal lords and mountain societies to stop internecine strife, peacefully resolve disputes, and create the necessary conditions for the development of trade relations in the Caucasus [46:18]. With the signing of the Gulistan Peace Treaty (1813), the entry of these territories into Russia received international recognition.

After the murder of the Avar khans allied with Russia by the second imam of Dagestan and Chechnya Gamzat-Bek in 1834 (32:73), his successor Imam Shamil united the territories of Dagestan, Chechnya and Circassia into the theocratic state of the North Caucasian Imamate, which maintained independence until 1859, and then became part of the Dagestan region (1860–1917)⁵⁹.

This example is characterized by the fact that the voluntary reunification of the Dagestani peoples with Russia took place despite religious and ethnic differences.

5. The entry of the Uriankhaisky Krai (Region) into the Russian Empire in 1914 and the Tuva People's Republic into the RSFSR in 1944.

Historians date Tuvan statehood (the state of Dinlin-Go) to the IV-III centuries BC. In the VII-X centuries, on the territory of modern Tuva there was a state of the Kyrgyz Khaganate. At the beginning of the XIII century, the tribes of the Yenisei Kyrgyzes became part of the Mongol Empire, in the XIV century, they became part of the states of the Northern Yuan and the Khotogoyt Khanate, in the XVII-XVIII centuries, – part of the Dzungarian Khanate, from 1758 to 1912, -- part of the Manchurian Qing Empire.

Under the influence of the Mongolian National Revolution (1911) and the Xinhai Revolution in China (1912–1913), the Tuvan feudal lords appealed to the Russian Empire

56 Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom (1762 – 1801), Georgian Governorate (1801–1840), Georgian-Imereti Governorate (1840-1846), Tiflis and Kutaisi Governorates (1846–1917), Transcaucasian Democratic Federal Republic (1918), Georgian Democratic Republic (1918–1921), Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia (1921–1936) as part of Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (1922–1936), Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (1936–1991), Republic of Georgia (1991 – present).

57 January 8, 1803 according to the new style.

58 Butkov P.G. Materials for the new history of the Caucasus from 1722 to 1803. Ch. 2. St. Petersburg, 1869:562.

59 Subsequently, the independent Republic of the Union of Peoples of the North Caucasus (1917–1919), the Dagestan ASSR (1921–1991) as part of the RSFSR, the Republic of Dagestan (1991 – present) as part of the Russian FederationIO

to take the territories of Tuva under their patronage. In 1914, Tuva became part of the Yenisei Governorate as the Uriankhaisky Krai (Region) (25:13). In 1918, the Treaty on Self-Determination of Tuva was adopted. In 1921, the independent People's Republic of Tannu-Tuva was formed (since 1926 – the Tuva People's Republic – TPR). In 1944, the Small Khural of the TPR adopted a declaration on the entering the USSR. However, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR admitted the TPR as an autonomous region of the RSFSR. In 1961, the region was transformed into the Tuva ASSR (Tuva SSR till 1991, the Republic of Tyva since 1992).

The example of Tuva's entry into Russia shows the entry of a territory with a dominant ethnic group other than Russian (Tuvans are the Turkic people), a different language (Tuvan) and professing Buddhism and Shamanism.

The multinational and multi-confessional nature of the Russian state remains attractive in the modern period.

It should be noted that many countries of the world in recent centuries have incorporated their historical territories, realizing the right of peoples to reunification. Among them: Reconquista in Spain (722–1492), Risorgimento in Italy (1815–1871), People's Republic of China (Manchukuo – 1945, People's Republic of Inner Mongolia and East Turkestan Revolutionary Republic – 1949, Tibet – 1951, Hong Kong – 1997, Macau – 1999), India (Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir – 1947, Hyderabad and Berar – 1948, Goa, Daman and Diu – 1961), Germany (German Empire – 1870, Saarland – 1934, Sudetenland and Anschluss of Austria – 1938, Unification of Germany – 1989). There are positive examples of the unification of peoples similar in ethnic composition and religion (UAE, 1968–1971), and peoples different in language, ethnic groups and confessions (Swiss Union, 1291). There are also negative examples of the unification of peoples of different faiths and ethnic groups into a single state (Sudan – 1956, Yemen – 1990).

Having systematized the signs of various cases of the implementation of the right of peoples to reunification, comparing the presence (absence) of various external and internal factors, the use of mechanisms for legalizing the annexation of territories and international recognition (Table 1), one can note the evolution of the China's approaches: from short-term cases involving direct military intervention and annexation (Tibet), China has moved to the use of long-term predominantly diplomatic methods, granting territories extensive rights of economic autonomy. China (as well as the UAE and Yemen) did not hold referendums on the joining of territories to the country, making the decision of the issue at the elite level. The cases of the UAE and the Republic of Yemen are in many ways opposite: the two Arab countries had different prerequisites for unification, incomparable economic potential, different approaches to public administration, as a result, the UAE embodies a successful project, and Yemen is a failure. The reunification of peoples in Sudan occurred as a result of gaining independence, but it was artificial in nature, which later led to the collapse of the country.

Indian cases of joining territories show practically no dynamics in the choice of approaches. In all four cases, the Indian armed forces were actively used; territories with people (Punjab, Kashmir) or a religious community (Hyderabad) seeking self-determination

and independence were joined. In no case was a plebiscite held on the incorporation of the territory. A number of territories were further divided between several countries (Punjab, Kashmir) or between administrative units within the country (Hyderabad). The inclusion of a number of territories (Goa, Daman, Diu) into India did not receive international recognition for decades.

European cases are presented by Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Germany and Russia. Reunification in Spain took place by military (Reconquista) and politico-diplomatic (through dynastic marriages) means. At the same time, the ethnic, linguistic and confessional community of the territories was quite relative, since separatist sentiments are still strong in Spain today, during the Reconquista the population was forcibly Christianized.

The unification of German lands, despite the aggressive nature of Germany's foreign policy in the XIX-XX centuries, took place without active use of military force. Germany actively used forms of public hearing of the population (Saarland, Austria) and diplomatic methods. At the same time, the reunification of Germany in 1989 shows the haste of the decision that violates democratic decision-making procedures. Residents of the GDR did not get the opportunity to preserve their sovereignty.

The example of the inclusion of the territory of the Papal Region into Italy is very indicative. On the one hand, it shows that the opinion of the population and the desire of the people for reunification were taken into account, and on the other hand, it represents a political conflict (the so-called "Roman question"), which was not settled for 59 years (before the formation of the Vatican state in 1929).

Switzerland is an example of unification of peoples differing in religion, languages, and culture into a single confederate state. At the same time, the country is an example of non-violent (with due consideration given the opinion of the population) indication of a sovereign territory (Jura) and the possibility of transition (reunification) of small communities from one canton to another.

Throughout its history, Russia has actively incorporated territories, on a voluntary basis as well. Russia, as a multinational and multi-confessional country, is attractive even for peoples with a different religion, ethnic and cultural affiliation (Dagestan, Tuva). Most often, the incorporated territories were a zone of socio-political instability (Hetmanate – Little Russia, Crimea, Georgia, Novorossiia, Tuva) and, having become part of Russia, the territories experienced positive changes in their political and economic spheres. In all cases, Russia took into account the opinion of the population (or elites) of the incorporated territories.

In the conditions of instability, military aggression and increased discrimination of the Russian and Russian-speaking population, the regions of Novorossiia decided to reunite with Russia⁶⁰. Little Russia, Crimea and Novorossiia remained Russian historical

⁶⁰ The results of the vote on reunification with Russia in September 2022 ("for"): LNR – 98.42%, DNR – 99.23%, Kherson region – 87.05%, Zaporozhye region – 93.1%. Available from: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/27/09/2022/63335bff9a79475dbe1c7a69?from=from_main_8

Table 1. Comparative analysis for Russia and other countries of some cases of accessions of historical territories

Donor country	Events									
	Papal Region, 1870	Tibet, 1951	Hyderabad, 1948	Goa, Daman, Diu, 1961.	Hetmanate, 1654	Georgia, 1783	Crimea, 1783	Dagestan, 1803	Crimea, Sevastopol, 2014	Novorossiya, 2022
Italy	Papal Region, 1870	China	India	India	Poland	Persia	Turkey	Persia	Ukraine	Ukraine
The influence of violence of power factors										
socio-political instability in the studied territories or in the donor country (riots, mass protests, civil war)	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+
the entry of the troops of the acceptor country to protect (control) the territory	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+
carrying out active military operations to protect against the aggression of the donor country or the third countries	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	+
Influence of geopolitical and global economic factors										
geopolitical conditions (results of wars, confrontation of the world's "poles of power")	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
the need to protect against the threat from external enemies	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	+
availability of economic benefits from the connection	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Prerequisites for the accession of territories to the acceptor country										
reunification of the territory with the historical core	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+
the influence of the irredentism policy, creating a condition for reunification with the acceptor country	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	+
ethno-cultural similarity with the acceptor country	+	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	+	+

linguistic similarity with the acceptor country	+	-	+	-	+	-	-	-	+	+
confessional similarity with the acceptor country	+	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+
ethnic, confessional or other discrimination of the population of the annexed territory by the donor country	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	+
Taking into account the opinion of the population in the donor country and the acceptor country										
holding a plebiscite among the population of the territory	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+
holding a plebiscite in the acceptor country	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
holding a plebiscite in the donor country	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Conditions for the entry of the territory into the acceptor country										
the incorporation of the territory in the acceptor country on the terms of centralization of power	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
the incorporation of the territory under the conditions of decentralization of management (the status of autonomy)	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+
the existence of a transition period for the adaptation of legal and economic systems	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
preservation of the legal and economic autonomy of the territory during the transition period	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
preserving the integrity of the territory as a separate administrative unit	+	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	+	+
division of the territory into parts, becoming part of another administrative unit	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-

Events											
Papal Region, 1870	Tibet, 1951	Hyderabad, 1948	Goa, Daman, Diu, 1961.	Portugal	Poland	Georgia, 1783	Crimea, 1783	Dagestan, 1803	Crimea, Sevastopol, 2014	Novorossiya, 2022	
Donor country	Papal Region, Italy	Hyderabad, India	Portugal, India								
Acceptor country	China	India	India	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Ukraine	Russia	Ukraine
International recognition of the fact of the territory becoming part of the acceptor country											
recognition of accession by the donor country	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
recognition after entering the territory	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
(conclusion of international agreements by the donor country and the acceptor country)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
the absence of recognition	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Recognition of accession by the majority of UN member states	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Complete lack of international recognition of accession	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
The influence of third countries on the separation or the entry of the territory into the acceptor country											
Direct military intervention, military-technical assistance	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Diplomatic pressure	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Economic assistance	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
The meaning of the term «people» in the realization of the right of the people to reunification											
The people act as a nation	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
The people act as an ethnic group	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
The people act as a religious community	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

The table is compiled by the author

territories artificially rejected during the USSR period⁶¹ in violation of the conducted plebiscite⁶².

It should also be noted that over time, the factors of religious, linguistic and ethno-cultural community in Russian incorporation cases fade into the background, the people reunite as a nation, a multinational and multi-confessional superethnos.

Despite the rejection of the reunification of Crimea, Sevastopol and the regions of Novorossiia with Russia by the countries of the collective West, the factors, mechanisms and other features of the return of these territories to the Russian Federation do not have fundamental differences from the cases used in the past by China, India, Germany, Spain, Italy, and other countries of the world, and thus, these reunification processes represent the usual civilization trend.

Conclusion

The incorporation and loss of territories is a normal process of state development that needs to work out a scientifically sound and internationally recognized political and legal basis. In particular, mechanisms are needed for the peaceful settlement of issues to exercise the right of peoples to reunification between the donor country and the acceptor country.

Taking into account the influence of third countries on the process of secession or incorporation of territories, it is necessary to develop and approve at the international level a set of measures for permissible intervention in a dispute between a donor country and an acceptor country that would prevent the escalation of the conflict and its transfer to the stage of armed confrontation.

In the process of reunification of territories in the past (up to the middle of the XX century), the people more often acted as a holder of religion, and not as an ethnos or nation. Currently, the content of the term “the people” is closer to notion of “the nation”.

The plebiscite is an important element in the exercise of the right of peoples to reunification. It is necessary to develop universally recognized legal mechanisms for conducting this kind of a plebiscite and international legitimization of its results.

The reunification of peoples in the process of exercising the right to self-determination is a mutual process, which involves efforts of both the joining territory and the acceptor country.

61 “I can’t help but recall how the Soviet Union was formed when Russia was establishing modern Ukraine. It was Russia that created modern Ukraine by transferring significant territories there, the historical territories of Russia itself, together with the population, which no one asked about where and how people want to live, how they want to arrange the future of their children, in which state. And when the Soviet Union collapsed, the same thing happened – the elites decided everything among themselves, no one asked millions of ordinary citizens about anything.” Speech by the Russian President Vladimir Putin at the rally-concert “People’s Choice. Together forever” in support of the admission of the DPR, LPR, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions into Russia. September 30, 2022. Available from: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/69470>

62 According to the referendum held on March 17, 1991, 77.8% of the country’s residents voted for the preservation of the USSR, including 71.4% of the residents of the Ukrainian SSR. Source: On the results of the USSR referendum held on March 17, 1991 (From the message of the Central Commission of the USSR Referendum). Izvestia. 1991. March 27.

The actual annexation of the territory and its full or partial international recognition may be separated by a significant period of time (several decades).

The author's opinion is that it is necessary to amend p.14 of section II. "The Modern World and the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation" of the Concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, providing for the right of the Russian state to ensure security or return of historical territories in case of discrimination of the Russian-speaking population, manifestations of neo-Nazism and Russophobia. The legal consolidation of the possibility of holding a "Russian Reconquista" can become a weighty argument for the republics of the former USSR implementing a policy of neo-Nazism and Russophobia, and it will also mark the "red lines" in Russian foreign policy across the former Soviet Union in protecting representatives of the Russian nation who found themselves on the historical territories of Russia which became part of the Union republics without taking into account the opinion of the population.

References

- Antonova, K.A., Bongard-Levin, G.M., Kotovsky, G.G. History of India. Moscow: Mysl, 1979. 612 p. (In Russian).
- Baranov, S.A. Separatism in India. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2003. 238 p. (In Russian).
- Bichurin N. Ya. (Iakinf) The story of the first four khans from the house of Genghisov. The History of the Mongols. Moscow: AST: Transkniga, 2005. 234 p. (In Russian).
- Bronevsky, S.M. Historical notes on the relations of Russia with Persia, Georgia, in general with the mountain peoples in the Caucasus, living from the time of Tsar John Vasilyevich to this day. St.-Petersburg, 1996. 150 p. (In Russian).
- Bolgurtsev, B. N. The Russian Fleet in the Far East (1860–1861): The Beijing Treaty and the Tsushima Incident. Vladivostok: Dalnauka, 1996. 133 p. (In Russian).
- Buturlin, D. P. The history of the Time of Troubles in Russia at the beginning of the XVII century. Moscow: Kuchkovo pole; Berkut, 2012. 576 p. (In Russian).
- Volokitina, T.V., Murashko, G.L., Noskova, A.F., Pokivailova, T. A. Moscow and Eastern Europe. The formation of Soviet-type political regimes (1949–1953). Essays on history. Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN), 2002. 686 p. (In Russian).
- Gorsky, A.A. Russian lands in the XIII–XIV centuries: ways of political development. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2016. 192 p. (In Russian).
- Grinin, L.E. The State and the historical process. The era of the formation of the state: The general context of social evolution in the formation of the state. Moscow: KomKniga, 2007. 272 p. (In Russian).
- Gorbunov, T.S. The reunification of the Belarusian people in a united Soviet socialist state. Moscow: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1948. 231 p. (In Russian).
- Gumilev, L.N. Ancient Russia and the magnificent steppe. Moscow: Iris Press, 2007. 764 p. (In Russian).
- Gumilev, L.N. From Medieval Russia to Modern Russia. Moscow: AST, 2003. 397 p. (In Russian).
- Dzhakhiev, G.A. Russia and Dagestan at the beginning of the XIX century. Makhachkala, 1985. 96 p. (In Russian).
- Dzidzoev, V.D. Territorial claims of Georgia to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the context of the St. George's Treatise of 1783. North Caucasian Legal Bulletin, 2014; 4: 38–44. (In Russian).
- Dikaev, S.U. The right of the people to self-determination and reunification as a victimological problem // Criminology: yesterday, today, tomorrow. Law. 2014:40–44. (In Russian).
- Zaionchkovsky, A.M. The Eastern War: 1853–1856: In 2 vols. Saint-Petersburg: Polygon, 2002. Vol.2, part 1. 573 p., Vol. 2, part 2. 716 p. (In Russian).
- Zaitsev, I. V. Crimean Khanate: vassalage or independence? The Ottoman World and Osmanistics. Collection of articles. Moscow, 2010. pp. 288–298. (In Russian).

- Siebert, D. Map from the appendix to the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty: reasons for non-publication and errors in the interpretation of the text of the document in German-language historiography. Journal. Belarusian State University. History. 2018;2:47–56. (In Russian).
- Zuev, A. S. The nature of the annexation of Siberia in the modern Russian historiography // Eurasia: Cultural heritage of ancient civilizations. Vol.1. Cultural space of Eurasia. Novosibirsk, 1999:124–136. (In Russian).
- Kashin, V.P. Section of Punjab, 1947. India: Society, power, reforms. Moscow, 2003:164–187. (In Russian).
- Kolesnitsky, N.F. "The Holy Roman Empire": claims and reality. Moscow: Nauka, 1977. 210 p. (In Russian).
- Kostomarov, N.I. Russian History in the biographies of its main figures. St. Petersburg: Lenizdat, 2007. Vol. 1: X–XVII centuries. 541 p.
- Kostomarov, N.I. Ruina: Mazepa. Mazepintsy. Historical monographs and research. Moscow: Charlie, 1995. 800 p. (In Russian).
- Ksenofontov, I.N. The world they wanted and hated: Dokum. report [on the conclusion of the Brest Peace Treaty]. Moscow: Politizdat, 1991. 414 p. (In Russian).
- Kuzmin Yu. V. Urianhai in the system of Russian-Mongolian-Chinese relations. Irkutsk: Publishing house of the ISU, 2000. 66 p. (In Russian).
- Kuchkin, V.A. Formation of the state territory of North-Eastern Russia in the X–XIV centuries. Moscow: Nauka, 1984. 353 p. (In Russian).
- Latyshev V. M. After the Simodsky tract (1855–1858). Bulletin of the Sakhalin Museum. 2015;22:137–148. (In Russian).
- Levchenko M.V. USSR and Germany relations in 1952–1955. The search for the ways to solve the "German question" by the Soviet Union. Bulletin of Udmurt University. 2019; Vol. 29. Issue 1:77–86. (In Russian).
- Mavrodin, V.V. Ancient and Medieval Russia. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2009. 719 p. (In Russian).
- Marusenko, M.A. Languages and national identity: modern challenges to national unity and territorial integrity. Moscow: Political Encyclopedia, 2015. 575 p. (In Russian).
- Meltyukhov, M.I. The escalation of the Soviet military presence in the Baltic States. Stalin's Missed chance: The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Europe: 1939–1941 (documents, facts, judgments). Moscow: Veche, 2000. 605 p.
- Neverovsky, A. A. Extermination of the Avar Khans in 1834. – St. Petersburg, 1848. 37 p.
- Nurullin, R.M. The concept of secession in political science. Scientific Notes of Kazan State University. 2010; Vol. 152, book 1:212–221. (In Russian).
- Petrov, I.A. Bulletin of Europe: Separatism in Swiss. Vestnik Europy. 2005; Vol. XIII–XIV:99–103.
- Polynov, M.F. M. S. Gorbachev and the unification of Germany. The Modern History of Russia. 2011;1:202–215. (In Russian).
- Pochekaev, R. Yu. The Right of the Golden Horde. Kazan: Publishing House "Feng" of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan, 2009. 260 p. (In Russian).
- Raskina, E.Y. Crimea in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. Moscow: Yauza-catalog, 2017. 397 p. (In Russian).
- Romanov, D. A. "Siberian capture" or voluntary entry: The Siberian connection to Russia in Russian historiography. Tula Scientific Bulletin. Series of History and Linguistics. 2020;2:20–28. (In Russian).
- Russia – Ukraine: The history of relations. Editors: Miller, A. I., Reprintsev, V.F., Florya, B.N. Moscow: Languages of Russian culture, 1997. 248 p. (In Russian).
- Rolf, M. The Polish lands under the rule of St. Petersburg: from the Vienna Congress to the First World War. Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoje Obosrenije, 2020. 576 p. (In Russian).
- Selivonenko, A.N. The influence of Russia on the relationship between the Zaporozhye Sich and the Hetmanate. Izvestiya Saratov University. A new series. History and International relations series. 2019; Vol. 19, issue 1:8–13. (In Russian).
- Solovyov, S.M. Essays: In 18 books. Book 1: The History of Russia since ancient times. Vol.1–2. Book 2: The history of Russia since ancient times. Vol. 3–4. Moscow: Golos, 1993. 768 p. (In Russian).
- Takhnaeva, P.I. Hadji Murad. Khajimurad from Khunzakh / Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Moscow. 2019. 688 p. (In Russian).
- Trainin, I.P. National and social liberation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1939. 80 p. (In Russian).
- Fedorov A.V. The legal status of Crimea. The legal status of Sevastopol. Moscow: Publishing House of Moscow University, 1999. 56 p. (In Russian).
- Feodaeva, F.Z. Russian-Dagestan relations in the second half of the XVIII – early XIX centuries. Moscow, 2008. 240 p. (In Russian).

47. Filitov, A. M. Soviet politics and unification of Germany (1989–1990)). Otechestvennaja Istorija. 2004;6:45–60. (In Russian).
48. Filitov A. M. The Soviet Union and the German Question in the period of late Stalinism (on the genesis of the “Stalin note” on March 10, 1952). Stalin and the Cold War. Moscow, 1998: 315–349. (In Russian).
49. Shearer, W. The rise and the fall of the Third Reich. In 2 vol. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1991. (In Russian).
50. Yugoslavia in the XX century: essays on political history / K. V. Nikiforov, A. I. Filimonova, A. L. Shemyakin, etc. Moscow: Indrik, 2011. 888 p. (In Russian).
51. Yurlov, F.N., Yurlova, E.S. History of India. XX century. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2010. 920 p. (In Russian).
52. Yakovlev, A.Y. The Sikh question: the history of religious conflict in Punjab. Journal of scientific publications of postgraduates and doctoral students. 2008;9(27):102–106. (In Russian).
53. Yakovlev, R.A. About the titles in the ancient Russia // NovaInfo. 2017; 69: 57–59. (In Russian).
54. Boucek, Ch. Ottaway, M. Yemen on the Brink. Carnegie Endowment, 2010. 110 p.
55. Collins, R. The Arab Conquest of Spain: 710 – 797. Wiley, 1995. 256 p.
56. Goldstein, M. C. A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State. University of California Press, 1991, 936 p.
57. Kris, Ch. One Country, Two Systems’ could remain unchanged after 2047, says Hong Kong’s Carrie Lam / Hong Kong Free Press. 16.01.2020. URL: <https://hongkongfp.com/2020/01/16/one-country-two-systems-remain-unchanged-2047-says-hong-kongs-carrie-lam/>
58. Yousaf, N. Pakistan and India: The Case for Unification. Paper presented at the New York Conference on Asian Studies (NYCAS) at Cornell University held on October 09–10, 2009. URL: https://archive.org/details/infomashriqi_yahoo_1kc
59. Pounds, N.J.G. Political Geography. New York, McGraw Hill, 1963.
60. Singh, K. The Partition of Punjab. Patiala, 1972.
61. Steininger, R. Eine Vertane Chance. Die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952 und die Wiedervereinigung. Berlin/Bonn, Dietz, 1985. 412 p.
62. Stephen, P. C. The idea of Pakistan. Brookings Institution Press, 2004. 367 p.
63. Symonds, R. The Making of Pakistan. London: Islamic Book Service, 1987. 226 p.
64. The World Factbook 2009. Government Printing Office, 2009. pp. 559–561. URL: <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/>
65. Waheeduddin, F. S. The Real Ranjit Singh. Lion Art Press, 1965. 217 p.

About the author

Mikhail M. CHERNYSHOV. CandSc (Econ). Advisor to The National Communications Development Research Institution. <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0811-1867>. Address: 22, building 1, Korobeynikov Lane, Moscow, 119034, Russian Federation, mcherny@bk.ru

Contribution of the author

The author declares no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Submitted: October 11, 2022. Approved after peer reviewing: October 22, 2022.

Accepted for publication: October 30, 2022. Published: December 21, 2022.

The author has read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

POWER, POLITICS, STATE

Political institutions, processes and technologies

Original article

Political sciences

[https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4\(6\)-186-209](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4(6)-186-209)

Foreign Policy and «Diplomacy of the World Power with Chinese Characteristics»: Based on the Report of the CPC Central Committee to the XX Congress

Valerii A. Letiaev^{1a}✉, Wang Yu^{2b}✉

^{1,2} Kazan Federal University, Kazan, Russia

^a <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7540-3099>, valerii@letiaev.ru

^b <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1986-8849>, wangyuiki@mail.ru

Abstract: The article analyzes the text of the report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, which Xi Jinping delivered at the XX Party Congress, in the context of the current state and prospects of the foreign policy strategy of the People's Republic of China, as well as the challenges to the country's foreign policy in recent years. Based on the results of the analysis of the report, changes in China's strategic positions are discussed. It is concluded that the main strategy of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China as a whole will remain unchanged: the country in foreign affairs relies on the domestic political situation, the ideology of the Communist Party of China and the role of the national leader, openness, modernization of the system and the potential to ensure national security and social stability. The main challenge for the People's Republic of China remains the Taiwan issue, which is supposed to be resolved peacefully in the “one country-two systems” format, but the use of force is not ruled out. Relations with the United States of America are defined as a restrained global confrontation without open counteraction. The Russian-Chinese strategic partnership is understood as the choice of the People's Republic of China, which meets its national interests, which will contribute to the formation of a multipolar model of the modern world. The actualization of the country's foreign policy strategy at the XX Congress of the CPC is shown in its dynamics and comparison with previous strategies.

Key words: XX Congress of the Communist Party of China, Russia, People's Republic of China, USA, Taiwan issue, foreign policy

For citation: Letiaev V.A., Wang Yu. Foreign Policy and “Diplomacy of the World Power with Chinese Characteristics”: Based on the Report of the CPC Central Committee to the XX Congress. Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue. 2022; 4(6): 186-209, [https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4\(6\)-186-209](https://doi.org/10.53658/RW2022-2-4(6)-186-209)

Introduction

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China opened in Beijing on October 16, 2022. Even before the start of the Congress, it was expected that Xi Jinping would be re-elected as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for his third five-year term, which happened. It is obvious that in March 2023 he will retain the post of President of the PRC.

On the eve of this event, the United States adopted a new National Security Strategy¹, in which Russia and China are named the main opponents and competitors of the United States of America. It is noteworthy that China is named the only rival that has the economic and military-technological capabilities that can change the international order. The Report was expected to present China's vision of its strategic relationship with the US and Russia.

Xi Jinping's report at the Party Congress is a message about the situation in the country and the prospects for its development. Its key messages are: up-to-date presentation of "Chinese-style modernization", high-quality development, openness to the world, a credible national security system, and green transformation.

The report was at the center of attention of China and the whole world, as it formulated the foundations of the domestic and foreign policy of the PRC for the coming years. This determines the relevance of the study of this document.

Russian researchers (K.K. Merkulov) on the eve of the Congress also noted that:

Many experts associate the new goals in the integral social progress of the PRC with the epoch-making historical decisions of the 20th anniversary congress of the CPC, which is to be held in 2022. It seems that the Chinese communists will give a detailed analysis of the existing problems and contradictions on the path of development of the Celestial Empire, will give a refined interpretation of the whole complex of imbalances in the sociodynamics of the PRC, including "the main contradiction of Chinese society", which at the 19th Congress of the CPC called "the problem of uneven and incomplete development ..." (46:25)

The purpose of the study is to analyze Xi Jinping's speech at the 20th Congress of the CPC to identify changes in the foreign policy of the PRC and the relationship of these changes with its general policy. In the context of this goal, attention was focused on the analysis of changes in the following aspects: the policy of China's openness to the outside world, China-US relations and the Taiwan issue, the development of Russian-Chinese relations.

The issues of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China before the Congress of the CPC attracted the attention of a number of authors, in particular, Russian analysts K.K. Merkulov, V.L. Nezhdanov, K.M. Bychkov, Chinese author L. Guanqun, and others, their estimates will be used in this paper (1, 2, 3, 4, 5).

The works of Chinese authors were also involved: Wang Fang, Gao Fei, Sun Zhe, Wu Maochang, Fu Ying, Hu Angan (6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11).

¹ The National Security Strategy. October, 2022. Available from: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>

Materials and Methods

The main source of the study was Xi Jinping's report "Holding High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, Unitedly Strive for the Comprehensive Construction of a Modernized Socialist State" at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 16, 2022.

To analyze, compare and identify and understand the historical dynamics in the policy of the PRC, the texts of Xi Jinping's speech on the Taiwan issue on the 40th anniversary of the publication of Letters to Taiwanese Compatriots, selected works of Jiang Zemin, speeches by V.V. Putin were used. Also the following documents were used: the official statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China on "Sino-Russian Relations", made in June 2022, other documents of the PRC government, the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on International Relations Entering a New Era and Global Sustainable Development from February 5, 2022, US National Security Strategy, Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement.

We used Bloomberg statistics on the dynamics of exports in the world in 2022 to assess changes in world trade.

Also attracted responses to the Report of the CPC Central Committee, published in the Chinese press: expert assessment of "New Signals of Openness to the Outside World in the Report of the 20th CPC Central Committee" in China Daily by Wei Jianguo, Former Vice Minister of Trade and Vice Chairman of the Chinese Center for International Economic Exchanges, reports on meetings between Xi Jinping and V.V. Putin in Samarkand in the China Times, assessments by Chinese and American experts published on the XINHUA, YICAI, PEOPLE.CN resources, materials from the Lianhe Zaobao electronic information resource, news reports on events within the framework of the Russian-Chinese cooperation in the Russian press: RIA Novosti, ITAT-TASS agency, Rossiyskaya Gazeta.

Research literature in Russian and Chinese has been attracted, but there is not enough of it, since not enough time has passed for solid publications to appear.

The authors used the main general scientific methods of analysis and synthesis (the separate parts of the report were analyzed, which set the tasks of the party in the field of foreign policy and diplomacy, then they were considered in conjunction to formulate the Chinese specifics of the foreign policy strategy). The historical-genetic method was used, which made it possible to identify the emergence and development of individual foreign policy ideas of the CPC, to trace their development in dynamics. The comparative-historical approach made it possible to reveal differences in the approaches of the United States and China to certain foreign policy problems faced by the PRC. The method of systematization was used to formulate ideas about the foreign policy and diplomatic positions of the CPC and the PRC for the period after the 20th Congress of the CPC.

Results

The report consists of fifteen parts, including: a summary of Xi Jinping's achievements in power over the past five years, the main political directions for the next ten years, the Sinicization of Marxism-Leninism, the new mission of the Communist Party of China, a new development model at the economic level, the concept of China's openness, the development of the state through science and education, ensuring the rule of law in public administration, cultural self-confidence, the development of the country and the well-being of the people, green development, national security, national defense and military modernization, reunification of the motherland, the community of the common destiny of mankind, and the full implementation of strict intra-party governance².

The main theme of the Congress was outlined by Xi Jinping as follows:

holding high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, fully implement the ideas of socialism with Chinese characteristics for the new era, cultivate the great founding spirit of the CPC, strengthen self-confidence and strive for self-improvement, uphold the fundamental principles and innovate, work with enthusiasm, boldly and resolutely move forward, unitedly fight for the construction of a modernized socialist state and comprehensively promote the process of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation³.

Describing China's future foreign policy, Xi Jinping presented an openness strategy more proactive than before to "adhere to new level reforms" and "emphasize national security and social stability." Such formulations were not heard in the report at the 19th Congress of the CPC.

Sino-US relations in the next ten years are assessed as "a relatively optimistic scenario of confrontation and rivalry." At the same time, the main foreign policy problems for China are connected with the solution of the Taiwan issue. The report names the necessary measures to overcome the crisis situation, strengthen national security and social stability.

The Report noted the stability of Russian-Chinese relations and the trend towards their further strengthening.

The Report showed very strongly the influence of Xi Jinping's ideas, which he developed over the past 10 years. As noted by V.L. Nezhdanov, these ideas "represent an integral hierarchical system of concepts and terms related to the sphere of domestic and foreign policy", and "although the content of the ideas was made public only at the 19th Congress of the CPC (2017), the concepts associated with changing political approaches, began to appear immediately after the 18th Party Congress (2012)". It is noteworthy that the ideas of Xi Jinping, which he developed over the course of 10 years, were already reflected in the Charter of the CPC and the Constitution of the PRC. According to V.L. Nezhdanov's forecast, the concepts

² Ibid.

³ Xi Jinping Carrying High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, to Fight Together for the Comprehensive Construction of a Modernized Socialist State. Report at the XX National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 16, 2022. Available from: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/rus/zxxx/202210/t20221026_10792071.html

introduced into the political discourse in China by Xi Jinping "leave the potential for evolution in the event of a change in conditions, which will most likely ensure their high significance in the political life of the country after the 20th CPC Congress in the fall of 2022"(5).

China's policy of openness to the outside world

The main objectives of the openness policy in the Report are presented as follows:

opening up to the outside world, expanding institutional openness such as international rules, regulations, governance and standards, accelerating the construction of China as a powerful trading country, promoting the development of the Belt and Road Initiative and maintaining a stable international economic structure, strengthening economic and trade relations.

The course of China's openness to the outside world will develop in the following main directions:

Attracting global resources, improving the efficiency of interaction between domestic and foreign markets and resources, improving the quality and level of trade and investment cooperation. The basis for this is "super-scale domestic market, smooth internal circulation of the economy." The Chinese President pointed out that China should take full advantage of the huge domestic market and, through the prosperity of the domestic economy, give impetus to China's economic development and promote the recovery of the world economy. It should be noted that China perceives openness to the outside world as a foreign policy guideline, believing that there is a relationship between domestic development and international relations, which should complement each other:

Adhere to the direction of the socialist market economy, adhere to a high level of openness to the outside world, and accelerate the construction of a new development model with the internal cycle as the main element, and internal development and international relations should complement each other⁴.

According to Chinese researcher Hu Angang, the future process of reforms and expansion of openness, China will take more active peaceful steps in foreign policy, contributing to strengthening international cooperation and mutual benefit with all countries, paying special attention to the formation of standards and financing of infrastructure construction. Serious attention will be paid to the internal development of the country: from trade and infrastructure to industry, economy and science and technology, humanities and other fields, which will be the main impetus for China's openness (11:51).

3. Promoting the optimization and upgrading of trade in goods, updating the development mechanism for trade in services, developing digital trade, "thereby speeding up the process of China's transformation into a trading power."

4. Protecting the rights and interests of foreign investors, creating a first-class international business environment, "enforcing market principles and the rule of law."

⁴ Ibid.

5. Development of the initiative of the joint project “One Belt – One Road”. To this end, the task was set to “strengthen the leading position of the eastern coastal regions in the field of expanding openness, increase the level of openness of the central, western and northeastern regions of China.” In the west of the country, the task was set to “accelerate the construction of a new land-sea intermodal transport corridor”.

6. Expand the globally oriented network of high-level free trade zones.

7. Gradually promote the internationalization of the Chinese yuan.

8. Take full part in the global sectoral division of labor, protect the diversified and stable structure of the international economy and trade and economic relations.

In an expert assessment by Wei Jianguo, former vice minister of trade and vice chairman of the China Center for International Economic Exchanges, “Chairman Xi Jinping’s report to the 20th CPC Congress provides a clear roadmap for China for the future of an open world”⁵.

In his opinion, the outlined strategy gave three important signals that China sent to the whole world.

The first is a course on expanding openness, greater than in the previous ten years.

The second signal: the new concept of openness implies two changes – “the steady expansion of institutional openness in the form of rules, regulations and standards”, which has never been mentioned before. Wei Jianguo believes that:

in the past, rules were mostly mentioned, but now institutional openness is on the agenda, which also includes regulation and standards, indicating China’s desire to accelerate foreign policy openness⁶.

Therefore, for the first time, “maintaining a diversified and stable international economic model” is proposed. The key concepts in this paragraph are diversification and stability. This means that China does not want to promote unilateral protectionism, not trade hegemony, but multilateralism that can be adapted to the current global economic model. At the same time, the international economic model that needs to be supported must be not only diversified, but also stable. The report aims to promote the further development of the Belt and Road Initiative, which means that China should not only promote the construction of a “community of human destiny”, but more importantly, achieve high-quality development for the whole world⁷.

The third signal is the formation by the leadership of the country of public opinion about the obvious achievements of China on the way to external openness. The message noted the obvious achievements of China: “a more active strategy of openness has been introduced and, in particular, infrastructure projects have been jointly built as part of

⁵ 中国日报网. 魏建国: 二十大报告中对外开放的新信号 [Wei Jianguo: New signals of openness to the outside world in the report of the CPC Central Committee of the 20th convocation. China Daily]. Available from: <https://column.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202210/17/WS634cb6bca310817f312f23c9.html>.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

the “One Belt – One Road” initiative, which has become a platform for international cooperation». The Chinese President explained that:

China has become a major trading partner of more than 140 countries and regions. In terms of gross trade in goods, China ranks first in the world, the country attracts foreign investment, forming an even greater scale of cooperation, and creating an even wider field and deeper model of openness to the outside world⁸.

According to the National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC, in the ten years from 2012 to 2021, China’s foreign trade grew from 24.4 trillion yuan to 39.1 trillion yuan, and the international market share increased from 10.4% to 13.5%, China maintained world leader in merchandise trading⁹.

In addition, the structure of China’s foreign trade continued to improve, the share of countries along the “One Belt – One Road” in China’s total foreign trade has steadily increased, as well as cross-border e-commerce¹⁰.

Although the coronavirus epidemic hindered the economic recovery, Hu Angang estimated that China was able to take advantage of the large domestic market, the focus on which has become the basis of China’s economic strategy for the future. This gives impetus to the recovery and growth of the global economy. In a market economy, Chinese private enterprises prefer to be able to “go out into the world” and integrate with the rest of the world (11:50). Economic globalization is still the trend of the modern world with the distribution of production and technological processes and cooperation between countries, mutual benefit. China remains committed to building an open world economy and building a “community with a common destiny for mankind.” Declaring the course of deepening reforms, expanding openness and strengthening cooperation in science and technology, Xi Jinping noted that “we must stand on the right side of history” and “create new advantages for ourselves through openness in international cooperation and competition.”

Interaction with general trends in the global economy will also occur through the “acceleration of the green transformation of the development model” as a key link of “high-quality development”. This will be facilitated by China’s activity in achieving carbon neutrality¹¹.

⁸ Xi Jinping. Carrying High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, to Fight Together for the Comprehensive Construction Of A Modernized Socialist State. Report at the XX National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 16, 2022. Available from: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/rus/zxxx/202210/t20221026_10792071.html

⁹ 国家统计局. 党的十八大以来经济社会发展成就系列报告之十六 [GSU of the People’s Republic of China. A series of reports on the achievements of economic and social development after the 18th National Congress of the Party No. 16. 2022]. Available from: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/sjjd/202210/t20221009_1888989.html.

¹⁰ 新华网. 看习近平这几大重要讲话, 弄懂“大循环”“双循环” [Wang Jihui. Watching Xi Jinping’s important speeches these few times, understand the “big cycle” and the “double cycle”. Xinhua News Network.] Available from: http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/xxjxs/2020-09/05/c_1126455277.

¹¹ Xi Jinping. Carrying High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, to Fight Together for the Comprehensive Construction of a Modernized Socialist State. Report at the XX National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 16, 2022. Available from: Available from: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/rus/zxxx/202210/t20221026_10792071.html

China's openness to the world will also develop through "the spread of Chinese civilization and the expansion of its influence." China intends to "demonstrate the spiritual emblem of Chinese civilization and the quintessence of Chinese culture." To do this, a policy will be built on international platforms to "build Chinese discourse and narrative, you need to skillfully tell about China and convey the voice of China, show the world the image of China worthy of trust, approval and respect." This will contribute to building up the potential of Chinese civilization in the field of international communication, increasing its effectiveness, and will allow it to gain authority in the international arena, "commensurate with the combined power and international status of China." To do this, exchanges between representatives of different civilizations will be intensified¹².

Modernization of the system of ensuring national security and social stability

Let us note that in the Report these two areas of ensuring China's development are linked: national security and social stability. Although these are issues of domestic policy, they are the foundation of the country's defense against both external and internal threats. In accordance with the text of the Report, China's goal is to build a "calm China" through the creation of high standards, to provide a new development architectonics with the help of a new "security architectonics".

Therefore, ensuring the security of the people is perceived in China as the main goal, which is realized through:

- political security (the foundation of the foundations);
- economic security (foundation);
- military, scientific, technical, cultural and social security (guarantees);
- international security (pillar)

Xi Jinping explained this connection as follows:

National security is the basis of the revival of the nation, and social stability is the prerequisite for the might of the country. It is necessary to implement the concept of national security with unshakable firmness, unswervingly follow the principle of protecting national security in all spheres of party and government activities in order to reliably ensure the country's security and stability in society¹³.

Therefore, China intends to build up the capacity to ensure its security inside and outside its borders, protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens and legal entities abroad, "protect China's national rights and interests in the oceans, resolutely guard the sovereignty, security and development interests of our states".

China has put forward the "one country, two systems" narrative, which is understood as "the great undertaking of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the best institution to

¹² Ibid.
¹³ Ibid.

ensure long-term prosperity and stability in Hong Kong and Macao after they return to the fold of the motherland," so it must be firmly adhered to in the future.

To promote peace and development on the planet, to stimulate the formation of a common destiny for mankind

China sees the future of the peoples of all countries of the world in building a "common destiny for mankind". The new ideas are aimed at developing a policy whose origins fundamentally go back to traditional Chinese culture enriched by Marxism and to the ideas of the late 1970s, to the theses of President Hu Jintao put forward in his Report to the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of China on November 17, 2012. These ideas demonstrate the unity of Chinese history and culture. Xi Jinping also paid attention to this, which was noted by V.L. Nezhdanov, who concluded that "Chinese international relations and diplomacy are an integral part of the entire system of "Xi Jinping's ideas", becoming a mechanism for achieving the "Chinese dream". It is developed and complemented by the following concepts and initiatives: "Community of the Common Destiny of Humanity", "One Belt – One Road", "Two Centenary Goals", "New Type International Relations", "Building a Beautiful China", "Chinese Strength", "Chinese Spirit", "The Chinese Way"(5:53).

From the Report, we can conclude that China maintains continuity in its foreign policy and adherence to the five principles of peaceful coexistence. At the same time, it will promote the formation of a new type of international relations, deepen and develop global partnerships based on equality, openness and cooperation, and expand areas of intersection of interests with other countries of the world.

Such a campaign will promote peace and development on the planet. China reaffirms that it respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity and equality of all countries, regardless of whether it is a big or small country, strong or weak, rich or poor. Therefore China

respects the right of the peoples of all countries to independently choose their own path of development and social system, categorically opposes any form of hegemonism and power politics, against the Cold War mentality, interference in the internal affairs of other countries and the use of double standards... follow the concept of closeness, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness, as well as the course of developing friendly and partnership relations with them, deepen friendship and mutual trust with them, promote the integration of interests¹⁴.

Thus, China will adhere to the approaches of the UN in both social, political and economic development, as they are formulated in the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The country is ready to contribute to narrowing the gap between North and South.

China will resolutely oppose protectionism, oppose attempts to create barriers, oppose "disengagement" and "breaking the chains", and oppose the imposition of unilateral sanctions and

¹⁴ Ibid.

pressure. China is willing to increase resource investment for global development and cooperation, strive tirelessly to narrow the gap between the South and the North, unfailingly provide support and assistance to numerous developing countries to accelerate their development¹⁵.

Therefore, China will strive to contribute to the reform and development of the global governance system, oppose the creation of blocs and groupings of certain countries, but will help expand the influence of the BRICS, SCO, and strengthen international security cooperation.

Sino-American relations and the Taiwan question

In 2010, shortly before Xi Jinping first assumed the presidency of the PRC, China's national strength was already growing rapidly, and China's economy surpassed that of Japan to become the world's second largest economy. The first economy in the world, the United States of America, became wary of China, and as a result, relations between the two countries began to change dramatically. US President B. Obama, at the late stage of his administration, began to adjust his policy towards China, proposed a strategy of "returning the United States to Asia" and began to interfere in the affairs of the countries of Southeast Asia, as described in detail by T.A. Bychkova (2). Since Xi Jinping came to power, he has consistently continued the diplomatic strategies of previous Chinese leaders and proposed a foreign policy strategy characteristic of a major power.

The Obama administration began to shift its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific region, creating a network of alliances, strengthening the military presence of the American army in different countries. The United States initiated the Trans-Pacific Agreement on Strategic Economic Partnership. All this could not but affect relations with China.

During Xi Jinping's first term as President of the PRC, the development of Sino-US relations was still relatively stable, although China had minor disagreements with the United States and countries in the Asia-Pacific region on issues such as human rights and geopolitics. Economic and trade cooperation has been recognized as a stabilizing factor in Sino-US relations. The two countries cooperated on issues such as the fight against corruption and human rights, mainly supporting the Chinese model of non-conflict and non-confrontation.

With the election of D. Trump as President in the United States, this stable model of bilateral relations began to be violated. In July 2018, the United States of America announced an additional 25% duty on Chinese exports to the United States, totaling \$34 billion. On the same day, China announced an additional 25% tariff on high-value US imports. With these measures, the Sino-American trade war began. In May 2019, Trump announced an additional 25% tariff on another \$200 billion of Chinese exports to the United States. China has raised tariffs from 5% to 25% on some US\$660 billion worth of goods imported from the United States. In August 2019, the Trump administration expressed dissatisfaction with the purchases of US agricultural products by the Chinese government and announced a 10% duty on all remaining Chinese goods exported to the United States in the amount of 300 billion.

¹⁵ Ibid.

At present, although D. Trump was not re-elected to the post of President of the United States, D. Biden, who took this post, did not abandon the policy of tariff sanctions against China, demonstrating his commitment to the "international order based on rules", continued the strategy of US dominance in the technological sphere, for example, in the field of creating new products, imposing restrictions on the export of technologies. All this has led to even more tension between the two countries, along with ongoing mutual accusations of the artificial origin and spread of the coronavirus. The confrontation between China and Western countries is unabated.

As Sun Zhe noted, this is largely due to the fact that the United States is constantly intensifying Sino-American strategic competition. At the same time, China seeks to avoid the continuation of the "strategic confrontation", for which it is necessary to get rid of the side effect of the so-called "Thucydides trap" (in political science, a situation in which the fears of a stronger power about the rapid growth of a new rival country in itself escalate the confrontation between them and can become the root cause of a serious conflict) (8). China's current strategic position, according to Wang Fang, is that the United States is a strategic competitor, not a strategic enemy. Turning the relationship between the two countries into a hostile one is a risk that China tries to avoid in its foreign policy (6).

The position of the current administration in the United States towards China is officially defined by the Chinese Foreign Ministry as "competition that should not lead to a dead end", and China's policy towards the United States should be aimed at preventing an increase in confrontation. Relations between the two countries are defined by the term "quasi-cold war", and this situation is likely to continue for a long time. There are several reasons for such a situation:

both sides are in complex economic interdependence, and the market system has prevented a sharp deterioration in relations between the two sides;

D. Biden does not want to move from competitive relations with China to military confrontation;

the allies of the two countries do not want to participate in the competition¹⁶.

As Xi Jinping noted:

over the past few years, driven by the populism of the United States and the national rise of China, relations between the two countries have shifted from cooperation to full-blown competition and confrontation. However, in the future, the possibility of a full-scale conflict between China and the United States is rather low. The main thing is to find a way to coexist in the face of discord and competition¹⁷.

¹⁶ 习近平称不承诺对台湾放弃使用武力。[2019-09-24]。（原始内容存档于2020-11-02）。外交部台湾问题习近平在《告台湾同胞书》发表40周年纪念会上的讲话 [Xi Jinping said that he would not promise to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. [2019-09-24]. (Original content archived 2020-11-02). Xi Jinping's speech on Taiwan affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 40th anniversary of the publication of the Letters to Taiwanese Compatriots]. Available from: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/twwt/xjpzsjstzyjh/202206/t20220606_10698873.html.

¹⁷ Xi Jinping. Carrying High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, to Fight Together for the Comprehensive Construction of a Modernized Socialist State. Report at the XX National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 16, 2022. Available from: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/rus/zxxx/202210/t20221026_10792071.html

Xi Jinping specified China's position on the Taiwan issue as follows:

We insist on the prospect of peaceful reunification, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the possibility of taking all necessary measures¹⁸.

Let us pay attention to two theses: peaceful unification and the absence of a renunciation of the use of military force. The first proposal for a policy of peaceful reunification with Taiwan was put forward by the Chinese Communist Party in 1950, and in 1978, the CCP proposed a policy of peaceful reunification and the "one country – two systems" project, which became the basic principles of the People's Republic of China in resolving the Taiwan issue. Xi Jinping's report indicated that peaceful reunification is a promising prospect, but the possibility of using force remains. The first announcement of the possibility of using force was made on January 30, 1995 by Jiang Zemin, then General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, who delivered a speech "Keep Fighting to Help Complete the Great Cause of China's Reunification." In this speech, eight proposals were put forward to develop cross-Straits relations and accelerate the process of peaceful unification of China, it was also emphasized that:

Adhering to the principle of one China is the basis and prerequisite for achieving peaceful reunification... We do not promise to renounce the use of force, and this is not directed against Taiwanese compatriots, but against foreign forces interfering with Chinese reunification and supporting Taiwanese independence¹⁹.

Xi Jinping, speaking on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the publication of Letters to Taiwanese Compatriots on January 2, 2019, noted that the 1992 consensus is that "the two sides of the Taiwan Strait constitute one China and work together to strive for national unity." to achieve the goal of "peaceful reunification within the framework of the one-country-two-systems proposal" and to deepen exchanges with Taiwan to achieve the spiritual accord of compatriots. However, the PRC government does not promise to renounce the use of force against Taiwan and reserves the right to take all necessary measures to unify China²⁰.

In a report to the 19th CCP Congress, Xi Jinping reaffirmed the policy of giving up force to ease tensions in the Taiwan Strait. According to Chinese expert Wu Maochang, since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, the United States has been cautious and sensitive about the Taiwan issue. After George W. Bush came to power, the US began to strengthen Taiwan's military to increase Taiwan's ability to "resist unification by force" (9). Former Commander-in-Chief of the US Army in Japan, MacArthur, said: «Taiwan is the main hub of the US Pacific front and an unsinkable aircraft carrier» (3).

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ 江泽民文选第一卷, 北京: 人民出版社, 2021年, 第4期, 第418-423页. [Selected works of Jiang Zemin, Volume 1, Beijing: people's publishing house. 2021; 1:418-423].

²⁰ 习近平称不承诺对台湾放弃使用武力. [2019-09-24]. (原始内容存档于2020-11-02). 外交部台湾问题习近平在《告台湾同胞书》发表40周年纪念会上的讲话 [Xi Jinping said he would not promise to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. [2019-09-24]. Original content archived 2020-11-02). Xi Jinping's speech on Taiwan Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 40th Anniversary of the Publication of the Letters to Taiwanese Compatriots. Available from: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ziliao_674904/zl_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/twwt/xjpzsjstzyjh/202206/t20220606_10698873.html

The Report proclaimed peaceful reunification as China's main course. It is China's longstanding position that two systems can coexist in the same country. And, in this case, the emphasis was on the interests of one Chinese nation:

The course of peaceful reunification, "one country – two systems" is the best way to unite the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, as well as the best option for compatriots on both sides and the Chinese nation as a whole. We firmly adhere to the principle of one China and the 1992 Accords, and on this basis, we promote in-depth consultations with representatives of various parties, various circles of society in Taiwan on the development of relations between the two coasts and the peaceful reunification of the motherland, so as to jointly promote peaceful development²¹.

Thus, the Chinese policy reflected in the Report is directed against the intervention of external forces and a small number of separatists who advocate the so-called Taiwan independence, and is not directed against Taiwanese compatriots in general.

The United States of America is trying to realize its national interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and for this they use the Taiwan issue to contain China. The China-US game on the Taiwan issue has a significant impact on the development of China-US relations.

Development of Russian-Chinese relations

As two world powers, China and Russia continue to play a key role in the stability and development of the international community.

The Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on global sustainable development and on international relations entering a new era, dated February 5, 2022, fixes the joint position of the two countries:

Today, the world is undergoing massive changes, humanity is entering a new era of rapid development and large-scale transformations. Such processes and phenomena as multipolarity, economic globalization, informatization of society, cultural diversity, transformation of the system of global governance and world order are developing, the interconnectedness and interdependence of states is increasing, a trend is being formed to redistribute the balance of world forces, the demand of the world community for leadership in the interests of peaceful and progressive development is growing...

The Russian side highly appreciates the Chinese side's concept of building a "community with a common destiny for mankind" to strengthen the solidarity of the world community and join forces in responding to common challenges. The Chinese side highly

²¹ Xi Jinping. Carrying High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, to Fight Together for the Comprehensive Construction of a Modernized Socialist State. Report at the XX National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 16, 2022. Available from: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/rus/zxxx/202210/t20221026_10792071.html

appreciates the efforts of the Russian side to form a fair multipolar system of international relations²².

The high level of Russian-Chinese relations is in the interests of both sides, is a guarantee of maintaining the international strategic balance, peace and stability throughout the world, writes Chinese researcher Fu Ying (10).

According to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, during a telephone conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on October 27, 2022, China will support Russia in strengthening its status as a major power in the international arena. President V.V. Putin after the end of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China, sent a greeting to General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Xi Jinping, which, according to Wang Yi, testifies to “the high level of mutual trust and firm support of Russia to China... China will also firmly support the Russian side in bringing the Russian people under the leadership of President Putin rallied and overcame difficulties, achieved strategic development goals”²³. As each other’s largest, most important and reliable strategic partners, in the face of a complex and constantly changing international situation, China and Russia are working to form a new type of relationship between large countries and a new type of international order that meets the common interests of China and Russia, Russia–China cooperation should become a model of a new type of relations between large countries.

Shortly before the 20th CPC Congress, during the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Samarkand (Uzbekistan) on September 15-16, 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin held bilateral talks, where they analyzed the development trends of Russian-Chinese relations. President Vladimir Putin thanked China for its balanced position on the Ukrainian issue, reaffirming that Russia adheres to the “one China” principle, and condemned the provocations of the United States of America and other Western countries on the Taiwan issue. President Xi Jinping noted:

In the face of the colossal world changes of our time, unprecedented in the history of the world, our Russian colleagues and I are ready to set an example of a responsible world power and play a leading role in putting such a rapidly changing world on a trajectory of sustainable and positive development... China is ready to provide effective support to Russia on issues affecting fundamental interests of the two countries, deepen practical cooperation in trade, agriculture, communications²⁴.

22 Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on International Relations Entering a New Era and Global sustainable development. February 5, 2022. Available from: http://ru.china-embassy.gov.cn/rus/zewlxdt/202202/t20220205_10639068.htm

23 Chinese Foreign Ministry: The Country Intends to Support Russia in Overcoming Difficulties. Available from: <https://ria.ru/20221027/kitay-1827264903.html>

24 Xi Jinping: China is Ready to Support Russia on Issues Affecting the Fundamental Interests of the Two Countries. Available from: <https://rg.ru/2022/09/15/glava-knr-kitaj-gotov-podderzhivat-rossiiu-v-voprosah-zatragivaiushchie-korennye-interesy-dvuh-stran.html>

Table 1. Export dynamics January September 2022

	September export growth	Trade growth since the beginning of the year
Russia	21,1 %	32,5 %
Singapore	81,8	20,1
Netherlands	18,3	19,9
Canada	-22,2	15,6
India	13,4	14,6
USA	-11,6	6,9
Germany	-5,6	0,9
France	-7,6	-0,1
Japan	5,9	-1,4
Great Britain	-11,8	-3,8
Hong Kong	-7,6	-11,8

Source: Bloomberg, General Customs Administration, October 24, 2022²⁵

The deepening of strong personal relations between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin is becoming one of the most important factors in the development of relations between China and Russia against the backdrop of China’s economic recovery over the past four decades. The Chinese media, after the end of the summit in Samarkand, analyzing its results, give reference expert opinions of Western political scientists based on its results²⁶. Thus, A. Korolev, a political scientist from the University of New South Wales, Australia, noted: “The meeting (between V. Putin and Xi Jinping) showed that China is not only ready to continue its cooperation with Russia, but is even ready to demonstrate support and accelerate the formation of more strong ties with Russia. E. Small from the Research Institute of the German Marshall Fund believes that the meeting between the President of China and the President of Russia is of great symbolic importance, he stressed that “Xi Jinping thereby demonstrates the union not with Western countries, but strengthens the SCO as an organization that opposes the G7 and NATO”. After Western countries imposed the toughest sanctions against Russia in modern history over a special military operation in Ukraine, Putin said that Russia «no longer sees the West as a place of economic growth, science and technology, now Russia is turning to Asia.»

Since Europe’s purchases of Russian oil and natural gas continue to decline, the policy of Russian President V. Putin is expressed in an effort to increase energy exports

25 中国海关总署：2021年中俄贸易额1468.87亿美元 同比增长35.8% [The Main Customs Administration of the People's Republic of China: the Volume of Trade Between China and Russia in 2021 will Amount to \$146.887 billion an increase of 35.8% year-on-year. China Government Network]. Available from: <http://www.heihe.gov.cn/info/1185/125163.htm>

26 中华时报. 第38次“习普峰会”在乌兹别克斯坦古城撒马尔罕举行38 summit President of China Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin Took Place in the Ancient City of Samarkand, Uzbekistan. China Times. Available from: <https://chinatimes.com.hk/20220916/54646>

to China and Asian countries. This kind of economic and trade support largely offset the economic pressure caused by Western sanctions against Russia and weakened the effect of Western economic sanctions. According to Bloomberg, citing the General Administration of Customs, total trade with Russia this year grew by 32.5% in dollar terms, the most significant increase among major partners (Table 1)²⁷.

Discussion

As far back as 2017, the materials of the 19th Congress of the CPC recorded that China is “increasingly moving closer to the center of the world stage” and it is determined to participate more actively in the life of the international community. Justifying its position in the world, China has increased its investment in global development, and this has manifested itself in the ambitious “One Belt – One Road” initiative, the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund. The Chinese government is pursuing a friendly policy to fill the gaps in the United States of America’s social infrastructure development policy in developing countries; climate change and regional trade, and seeks to create an international order conducive to the simultaneous development of China and the world. The foreign economic policy of the “One Belt – One Road” initiative and the political discourse of the “common destiny of mankind” were included in the founding documents of the CCP at its 19th Congress.

Internal changes in China determine the adjustment of the diplomatic course, foreign policy and style of international relations, which is closely related to the growth of China’s economic and military power. The report of the CPC Central Committee to the 20th Congress noted that the coronavirus epidemic has seriously affected the global economy and international order, led to colossal world changes that have occurred for the first time in a century. Western countries, represented by the United States of America, initially failed to cope with the epidemic and the socio-economic problems it caused, which made China more confident in its management system. Wang Jiayi, dean of the Institute of International Strategy at Peking University, noted that over the past ten years, the international status of the United States has declined, while China’s authority, on the contrary, has grown. At the same time, the decline in the importance of the United States is not as rapid as that of the hegemonic countries of the past. As for China, after the 18th Congress of its Communist Party, a system of high centralization of political power was established, which stabilized the political system within the country, influenced international politics, since it actually complements the domestic one. Changes in the domestic political situation require Beijing not to show weakness in resolving contradictions and conflicts with Western countries and even strive for superiority in

²⁷ China's Exports to Major Markets have Declined, Russian Trade is Strong. Bloomberg. Available from: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-24/china-s-exports-to-major-markets-slump-russian-trade-strong?leadSource=uverify%20wall>

diplomacy. Thus, as it was before, Chinese diplomacy relies on the internal political and socio-economic situation in their country²⁸.

The firm diplomatic position of China, the pronounced character of its leader will continue to determine the country’s foreign policy strategy. In addition to external factors such as the rise of China’s national power and changes in the international situation, the progress in Chinese diplomacy during the ten years of Xi Jinping’s official rule is associated with the personal characteristics of the President of the People’s Republic of China as the leader of a world power. The Chinese media, analyzing the results of the Congress, note that over the 10 years of Xi Jinping’s tenure in power, China’s foreign policy has gone from Taoism and obscurity to taking the initiative. They refer to the opinions of experts reputable for China: Sun Yun and Drew Thomson. Thus, Sun Yun, director of the China project at the Stimson Center in Washington, states that the rise of China is a necessary but not sufficient condition for China to take a firmer position in foreign policy, but it is precisely the position of China’s official leadership that is a necessary and sufficient condition for the formation foreign policy course. Drew Thompson, visiting senior fellow at the School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, noted that the “new era” of China’s foreign policy strategy reflects the position of China’s official leadership, which is “based on public safety and the complex international situation.” He believes that China’s official foreign policy is based on an ideology that determines China’s relations with the world. The ideology draws on the unique culture of China and the history of the country, which combines the political structure of Marxism-Leninism with “Chinese characteristics”²⁹.

Thus, after the 20th Congress, the Chinese Communist Party will not fundamentally change the country’s foreign policy, since Chinese officials over the past decade have successfully formed the leading role of the party at all levels of social and economic development. The ideological gap between China and the West will not narrow, and the structural contradictions will not disappear.

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a June 2022 Sino-Russian Relations statement, noted that “Russian–Chinese relations are experiencing the best period in history.” According to the data provided in the document, in 2021, bilateral trade between China and Russia amounted to \$1146.887 billion, an increase of 35.8% year-on-year. China has been Russia’s largest trading partner for 12 consecutive years. The statement noted that “China and Russia hold the same or similar positions on a number of major international and regional issues and maintain close contacts and cooperation.” Regardless of the outcome of the armed conflict in Ukraine, China will not change its willingness to develop relations with Russia. This is determined by the geopolitical situation, since Russia, the second largest nuclear power, cannot be excluded from the architecture of international relations. China sees Russia as an important partner that can change the international system dominated by Washington.

²⁸ 二十大特稿：习近平主政10年中国外交从韬光养晦走向主动出击[CPC Central Committee of the 20th convocation of special projects: over 10 years of XI Jinping to power China's foreign policy has gone from Taoism and obscurity for initiative]. Available from: <https://www.kzaobao.com/shiju/20221011/125772.html>

²⁹ Ibid.

Conclusion

The report of the Chairman of the People's Republic of China at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China is an important policy document that defines the main directions of China's domestic political, diplomatic and ideological strategies for the next 5 years. As for foreign policy, from the Report of the CPC Central Committee and other sources of various kinds, from the domestic political and international political context, we can conclude that China will continue to pursue an independent and open policy in the international arena, based on its national interests. The main directions, forms and methods of China's diplomacy are based on the internal political situation, on the desire to harmonize society and improve the life of the Chinese people, so the "internal vector" of foreign policy will become the most important.

The diplomatic challenges identified in the report to the 20th Congress of the CPC are mainly focused on resolving the Taiwan issue, and the foreign policy situation that China will face is likely to become more difficult. The "independence" of Taiwan, used by Western countries as a deterrent against China, remains a problem to be solved. While maintaining the desire for a peaceful settlement of this problem, the President of the People's Republic of China believes that there remains an opportunity for its forceful solution.

Serious competition between leading foreign policy players, combined with differences in political systems, ideologies and values, will make China's relations with the Western world increasingly tense. While the US claims it does not seek conflict or a new Cold War with China, the US government has publicly identified China, judging by its national security strategy, as "the biggest long-term challenge to the international order" and calls the US-China strategic rivalry a "democratic confrontation and autocracy"³⁰. A low-key competitive relationship between the PRC and the US will remain a trend in bilateral relations, with military conflict or any other direct confrontation unlikely due to the strong interdependence of the two economies.

One of the main ideas of the Report is that the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership is China's choice in its quest to protect its own security and fundamental national interests. Therefore, the development of long-term Russian-Chinese relations will contribute to the formation of a multipolar international model. The momentum for developing cooperation between Russia and China will increase significantly against the background of external pressure from the United States, as a response to its policy of containment.

References

1. Barsky K.M., Vinogradov A.V., Salitsky A.I. On the Dialectical Unity of China's Domestic and Foreign Policy (To the 100th anniversary of the formation of the Communist Party of China), Bulletin of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 2021; 91(8):703–712. (In Russian).
2. Bychkova T.A. The Chinese policy of the Barack Obama administration in 2009–2012, Bulletin of the Tomsk State University. 2014;388:106–113. (In Russian).

³⁰ The National Security Strategy. October, 2022. Available from: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>

3. Guanqun L. The role of the Taiwan problem in China's maritime policy, International relations. – 2013; 4:469–509. DOI: 10.7256/2305-560X.2013.4.9754 (In Chinese).
4. Merkulov K.K. China on the Eve of the 20th CPC Congress. East Asia: Facts and Analytics. 2022;1:17–27. DOI: 10.24412/2686-7702-2022-1-17-27. (In Russian).
5. Nezhdanov V.L. On the issue of the specifics of foreign policy concepts of "Xi Jinping's ideas on socialism with Chinese characteristics of the new era". East Asia: Facts and Analytics. 2022;3:47–57. (In Russian).
6. Wang Fan. The Future of Sino-American Relations: Towards a "New Cold War" or the Resumption of Strategic Cooperation. International Studies. Beijing, 2021;1:55–68. (In Chinese).
7. Gao Fei, Yu Yu. Russia's foreign strategy and Sino-Russian relations in the context of great changes, The modern world, Beijing, 2021; 4:11–17. (In Chinese).
8. Sun Zhe. The Evolution of China's Strategy towards the United States: Models and Challenges. Asia-Pacific Security and Ocean Research. Nanjing University Press. 2021;1. (In Chinese).
9. Wu Maochang. Jiang Zemin's historical contribution to the development of Taiwanese relations. Collection of personal research results of the Literary Research Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 2012:650. (In Chinese).
10. Fu Ying. Be aware of the changes, be yourself and meet the new global era, in the "World Knowledge". Beijing: World Knowledge Press. 2019;19:21. (In Chinese).
11. Hu Angang. Great changes in China and the world: major trends and future trends. Philosophy and Social Sciences Publication: Global Governance and Chinese Initiatives. Journal of Xinjiang Normal University Press. 2021; 42(5):38–53. (In Chinese).

About the authors

Valerii A. LETIAEV DocSc(Law), CandSc(Hist). Professor of the Department of International Relations, World Politics and Diplomacy of the Institute of International Relations, Kazan Federal University. <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7540-3099>. Address: 1/55 Pushkin str., Kazan, 420111, Russian Federation, valerii@letiaev.ru

WANG YU. Postgraduate student of the Department of International Relations, World Politics and Diplomacy of the Institute of International Relations, Kazan Federal University. <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6902-5941>. Address: 1/55 Pushkin str., Kazan, 420111, Russian Federation. wangyuiki@mail.ru

Contribution of the authors

The authors contributed equally to this article.

The authors declare no conflicts of interests.

Article info

Submitted: October 14, 2022. Approved after peer reviewing: October 25, 2022. Accepted for publication: November 5, 2022. Published: December 21, 2022.

The authors have read and approved the final manuscript.

Peer review info

«Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue» thanks the anonymous reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

The National Communications Development Research Institution

invites you to join our scientific projects

The results of joint scientific research are published in journals, collective monographs, and are represented in scientific reports.

The developed recommendations and proposals are directed to government agencies and international organizations.

Communication modes and communication procedures in international practice: the international scientific laboratory is available to the scientists and experts from Russia and foreign countries. Thematic areas of research are:

- theory and methodology of countries and regions communication regimes research;
- modulation and fragmentation of the global communication order;
- models and types of country communication regimes;
- sociocultural factors of formation and reproduction of communication regimes;
- political factors of formation and reproduction of communication regimes;
- controllability of communication regimes;
- friendliness of communication regimes;
- problems of information security in some types of communication regimes;
- the influence of new actors and new practices on the rules and structures of communication regimes.

The first rating of the friendliness of communication regimes – the international expert group is available to the scientists, analysts, specialists in the field of international relations, political regionalism, international communication, information policy, social engineering, public relations, mass media. The National Communications Development Research Institution has developed a methodology for analyzing and evaluating the friendliness of country communication regimes. The first rating of the friendliness of the countries' communication regimes was published in December 2021. We invite scientists and analysts from different countries to join the experts.

International Humanitarian Communications is a scientific project available to the scientists and experts from Russia and foreign countries. The project is being implemented for developing and testing the models and technologies of international humanitarian communications for developing good-neighborly relations. Thematic areas of research are:

- systems of international humanitarian cooperation in integration organizations (CIS, SCO, EAEU, EU and others);
- institutionalization of international humanitarian communications;
- cross-border models of humanitarian communications;
- strategies and priorities of the language and cultural policy of the neighbor countries;
- the policy of social memory in the neighbor countries;
- digital formats of international humanitarian communications.

The Neighborhood Belt is a scientific project available to the scientists and experts from Russia and foreign countries. The Neighborhood Belt is a group of countries with which the Russian Federation borders, and countries with which Russia does not directly border, but historically has or is establishing cultural, economic, political ties.

The project is aimed at finding new directions, promising participants, models and technologies for the development of good-neighborly relations, prevention of possible conflicts and improvement of mutual understanding between countries and peoples. Project participants are free to choose research topics, provided that international teams are formed and they correspond to the concept of good neighborliness. The concept of good neighborliness reflects the meaningful and valuable side of the neighborhood – peace, mutual assistance, respect for each other's values and traditions, expansion of spheres and instruments of cooperation.

Digital solutions for intercultural, interethnic, and interfaith dialogue. Monitoring of digital projects is available to the authors of the projects dedicated to intercultural, interethnic, interfaith dialogue from Russia and foreign countries. The purpose of monitoring is to identify and support the best projects in the field of intercultural, interethnic, interfaith dialogue in the digital environment. The National Communications Development Research Institution promotes the popularization and implementation of the best digital solutions for the development of intercultural, interethnic and interfaith dialogue.

International Non-profit organizations and Civil Communications is an international laboratory, available to the experts from Russia and foreign countries. The purpose of the scientific project is to develop proposals for optimizing the use of the resources of Non-profit organizations for the development of good-neighborly relations and friendly civil dialogue. Thematic spheres of research are:

- organizational and legal, cultural, political, economic factors of the activities of international Non-profit organizations;
- models and work methods of international Non-profit organizations.

Scientific diplomacy is a scientific and publishing project available to the scientists from Russia and foreign countries. The project is aimed at the development of scientific communications in the neighborly countries and the development of models of international scientific cooperation. Thematic spheres of research are:

- state policy and strategies of countries in the field of international scientific cooperation;
- improving the directions and tools of cross-country scientific communications;
- diplomatic mission of scientists;
- new cooperation forms for Early-career scientists.

The National Communications Development Research Institution contributes to the development of international mobility programs for Early-career scientists. Graduate students and Early-career scientists from different countries are included in research scientific Institute's projects groups and common projects of The National Communications Development Research Institution and scientific and educational Russia and foreign institutions.

In the next issues of the journal «Russia & World: Sc. Dialogue» we will continue to take you through the projects of The National Communications Development Research Institution. You are able to discuss your participation with the project managers by sending an application to: komleva@nicrus.ru.

Russia & World: Scientific Dialogue

Peer-reviewed academic journal

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Vitaly V. NAUMKIN – DSc (Hist.), Full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, professor, Scientific Supervisor of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia).

DEPUTY CHIEF EDITORS

Valentina V. KOMLEVA – DSc (Soc.), professor, Deputy Director for Scientific Work of the National Research Institute for the Communications Development (Russia)

Alina V. GASUMYANOVA – CandSc (Law), Deputy Director for Media Activities of the National Research Institute for the Communications Development, Deputy Director of the Center for Strategic Studies in the Sphere of Energy and Digital Economy MIEP MGIMO (University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia.

EXECUTIVE EDITOR

Valerii A. LETIAEV – DSc (Law), professor, professor of the Department of International Relations, World Politics and Diplomacy, Kazan Federal University (Russia).

Editors-translators – DSc. (Filol) Leah E. Bushkanets

Proofreader – CandSc (Filol) I.A. Emelin

Languages for publishing articles in the journal: Russian, English.

LAYOUT AND PREPRESS

Publishing House «Project Media Group» (Department of media-projects)
5, 2d building, 1st floor, 2d office, Gagarinskiy pereulok, Moscow Tel. +7 495 146 83 02

Signed in the press on December, 21, 2022.

Printed in the LLC «Podol'skaya fabrika ofsetnoj pečhati» 80/42, Revolyucionnyj prospect, Podolsk, Moscow oblast
Circulation 2000 copies

ISSN 2782-3067



9 772782 306007 >

> УДК: 327 ББК 66.4


perspéctum


ЧЕЛОВЕК и МИР
ДИАЛОГ

ЕРСПЕКТИВА
ПОКОЛЕНИЕ ПОИСКА

Subscribe to Perspéctum magazines

explore the life and traditions
of Russia and 27 countries around





The cover design is based on the work of Kazimir Malevich (1879, Kyiv - 1935, Leningrad). The Russian and Soviet artist of Polish origin is best known as the founder of suprematism and the author of the painting «Black Square». Kazimir Malevich is not only a painter and art theorist, but also a teacher and set designer. His place in world culture, persistence and relevance of his inheritance are evidenced by the fact that in 2008 Malevich's Suprematism Composition was sold at Sotheby's for \$60 million.

