Prospects for the Integration of China and the CSTO

Abstract

Modern challenges, packages of European and American sanctions, and a special military operation in Ukraine have contributed to Russia’s reorientation to the East, not only in trade, economic and energy terms. The issue of military-political cooperation, in particular, between the countries of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the People’s Republic of China has acquired particular relevance. The coherence of their actions both in the direction of “CSTO + 1” and “CSTO + Shanghai Cooperation Organization” contributed to the development of interaction, a new round in the development of the CSTO, although some of its participants declare the possibility of leaving the Treaty (Armenia). But there are also countries that are ready to take a more active part in its work (Syria, North Korea). At the same time, none of the CSTO countries sent their military contingents to support the Russian army in the Northern Military District.

The Central Asian region occupies a special place in the system of relations between the CSTO and China: for example, the peacekeeping operation of the CSTO countries in Kazakhstan in January 2022 attracted the close attention of the Chinese authorities, which once again demonstrated their interest in regional stability. In the context of American pressure on China, its authorities have repeatedly spoken positively about jointly countering such challenges as terrorism, separatism and extremism (“three evils”).

The purpose of this work is to assess the prospects for cooperation in the field of countering the “three evils”. To achieve this goal, the authors use the comparative analysis method and SWOT assessment. The authors come to the concluson that since the CSTO countries and China face similar challenges, there is a possibility of situational involvement of China in the military operations of the CSTO. Therefore, a broader consideration of the “linkage” between the CSTO and the SCO is required.